STRICT LIABILITY AND ABSOLUTE LIABILITY

In certain situations, a person is held liable for the damages caused by his actions even when the actions are done without any ill intention or negligence on account of equity and justice. For example if a person keeps a lion for a pet and despite of all the precautions the lion escapes the cage and kills someone In this case, the owner of the lion will be liable even though he had no ill intention to cause death and had taken all the precautions to keep the lion in the cage. This seems just because the damage happened only because he brought a dangerous thing on his property. e was also aware of the consequences if the lion escapes the cage and so he should be made liable if it escapes and causes damage. This principle of holding a person liable for his actions without any kind of wrong doing !"o Fault# on his part is called the principle of absolute liability or no fault liability. This principle was first upheld in the case of Ryland vs Fletcher by the Privy C !ncil in "#$#. owever, later on some exceptions to this were also established due to which %strict liability% is considered a more appropriate name for this principle. In this case, the defendant hired contractors to build a reservoir over his land for providing water to his mill. $hile digging, the contractors failed to observe some old disused shafts under the site of the reservoir that lead to plaintiff%s mine on the adjoining land. $hen water was filled in the reservoir, the water flooded the mine through the shafts. The plaintiff sued the defendant. The defendant pleaded that there was no intention and since he did not know about the shafts, he was not negligent even though the contractors were. &ven so, he was held liable. & Blac'b!rn observed that when a person, for his own purposes, brings to his property anything that is likely to cause a mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril and if it escapes and causes damage, he must be held liable. e can take the defence that the thing escaped due to an act of the plaintiff or due to vis major !act of 'od# but since nothing of that sort happened here, then it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient. To this rule promulgated by ( )lackburn, another requirement was added by the *ourt of &xchequer *hamber, that the use must be a non+natural use of land as was the case in ,yland vs Fletcher itself. For example, growing of regular trees is a natural use but growing poisonous trees is not. -eeping dogs as pet is a

natural use but keeping wild beasts is not. Thus, the conditions when this rule will apply are + .. The thin( 'e)t *!st be dan(er !s + The thing kept on the land must be as such as is likely to cause mischief if it escapes. For example, storing gas or explosives or wild beasts are all likely to cause damage if they escape.

/. The thin( *!st esca)e + If the thing is within the boundary of the defendant%s land, he is not liable. The thing must escape out of his land for him to be liable. In Cr ,h!rst vs A*ersha* B!rial B ard "#-#, branches of a poisonous tree were hanging outside the land of the defendant. 0laintiff%s cattle ate them and died. 1efendant was held liable because protrusion of branches out side his property were considered as escaping from his property. owever, in P ntin( vs N a'es "../, when the plaintiff%s horse intruded over his boundary and ate poisonous leaves of the defendant%s tree, he was not held liable because there was no escape.

2. The thin( *!st be a n n nat!ral !se 0 land + The use must not be an ordinary use of the land. There must be a special purpose because of which it brings additional danger to other. In N ble vs 1arris n ".2$, a branch of a tree growing on defendant%s land broke and fell on plaintiff%s vehicle. It was held that growing regular trees is not a non natural use of land and the branch fell because of an inherent problem and not because of any negligence of the defendant and so he was not liable. As *enti ned be0 re the 0 ll ,in( are e3ce)ti ns r de0enses a(ainst this r!le + .. Plainti004s ,n de0a!lt + If the thing escapes due to plaintiff%s fault the defendant cannot be held liable. In Eastern and S !th A0rican Tele(ra)h C 5 Ltd5 v Ca)et ,n Tra*,ay C ".625 The plaintiff%s submarine cable transmissions were disturbed by escape of electric current from defendant%s tramway. It was held that since the current was not causing any problem to regular users and it was causing problem to the cables only because they were too sensitive and so the defendant cannot be held liable. 3ne cannot increase his neighbour4s liabilities by putting his land to special uses. /. Act 0 7 d + In circumstances where no human has control over, no one can be held liable. In Nich ls vs 8arsland "#-$9 the defendant created artificial lakes to store rainwater. In that particular year, there were

exceptionally heavy rains, which caused the embankments to break causing floods, which broke defendant%s bridges. It was held that since there was no negligence on the part of the defendant and the flood happened only because of rains so heavy that nobody could imagine, the defendant was not liable.

2. C nsent 0 the )lainti00 + If the plaintiff has consented for the accumulation of the dangerous thing, he cannot hold the defendant liable. This is also the case when an activity is done for mutual benefit. For example, 5 lives on the ground floor and the defendant lives on the floor above 5%s. "ow, a water tank is built by the defendant to supply water for both of them. The defendant will not be held liable for leakage of water fro m the tank.

6. Act 0 third )arty + $hen a third party, who is not an employee or a servant or a contractor of the defendant is responsible for causing the dangerous thing to escape, the defendant will not be held liable for the damage. In B 3 vs &!bb "#-., the overflow from the defendant%s reservoir was caused by the blocking of a drain by some strangers. The defendant was held not liable. owever, if such act can be foreseen, this defence cannot be pleaded because the defendant must take precautions to prevent such an act. In 85P5 Electricity B ard vs Shail :!*ar AIR 2662, a person was killed by a live electric wire lying on the road. 7* applied the rule of strict liability and held that the defence of act of stranger is not applicable because snapping of wire can be anticipated and the &lectricity )oard should have cut off the current as soon as the wire snapped.

8. Stat!t ry A!th rity + $hen an act is approved by the legislature or is done on the direction of the legislature, it is a valid defence for an action of tort even when the rules of ,yland vs Fletcher apply. owever, it is not application when there is negligence.

P siti n in India+ Abs l!te Liability

The principle of strict liability is applicable in India as well. For example, 9otor :ehicles 5ct recogni;es no fault liability. 7imilarly, the liability of a public carrier such as railways has also been increased from that of a bailee to an insurer. owever, there has been a deviation in the scope of this rule. 1epending on the situation, its scope has been increased as well as decreased by the courts. For example, in 8adras Rail,ay C 5 vs ;a*indar ".-/, the water collected in a pond for agricultural purposes escaped and caused damage to the railway track and bridges. ere, the application of this rule was restricted because the collection of water in such a way is a necessity in Indian conditions and so it is a natural use of the land. This mechanism to store rainwater is used throughout the country and since ages. Therefore, the defendant was not held liable.

The position remained constant and thought to be saturated in common law countries until .<=>s when pursuant to the biggest industrial disaster in world in )hopal Indian 7upreme court in an unrelated gas leak case !3leum gas leak case of 1elhi# laid down a liability principle without any exceptions. The Bh )al disaster The )hopal disaster also known as )hopal 'as Tragedy was a gas leak accident in India, considered one of the world%s worst industrial catastrophes. It occurred on the night of 1ecember /?2, .<=6 at the @nion *arbide India Aimited !@*IA# pesticide plant in )hopal, 9adhya 0radesh, India. 5 leak of methyl isocyanate gas and other chemicals from the plant resulted in the exposure of hundreds of thousands of people. &stimates vary on the death toll. The official immediate death toll was /,/8< and the government of 9adhya 0radesh has confirmed a total of 2,B=B deaths related to the gas release. 3thers estimate 2,>>> died within weeks and another =,>>> have since died from gas+ related diseases. 5 government affidavit in />>C stated the leak caused 88=,./8 injuries including 2=,6B= temporary partial and approximately 2,<>> severely and permanently disabling injuries. @*IA was the Indian subsidiary of @nion *arbide *orporation !@**#. Indian 'overnment controlled banks and the Indian public held 6<.. percent ownership share. In .<<6, the 7upreme *ourt of India allowed @** to sell its 8>.< percent

share. @nion *arbide sold @*IA, the )hopal plant operator, to &veready Industries India Aimited in .<<6. The )hopal plant was later sold to 9cAeod ,ussel !India# Atd. 1ow *hemical *ompany purchased @** in />>.. *ivil and criminal cases are pending in the @nited 7tates 1istrict *ourt, 9anhattan and the 1istrict *ourt of )hopal, India, involving @**, @*IA employees, and $arren 5nderson, @** *&3 at the time of the disaster. In (une />.>, seven ex+employees, including the former @*IA chairman, were convicted in )hopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of about D/,>>> each, the maximum punishment allowed by law. 5n eighth former employee was also convicted, but died before judgment was passed.

5 landmark case in this respect was the case of 8 C 8ehta vs Uni n 0 India AIR ".#-. In this case, oleum gas from a fertili;er plant of 7hriram Foods and Fertili;ers leaked and caused damage to several people and even killed one advocate. In this case, the rule of ,yland vs Fletcher was applied. owever, the company pleaded sabotage as a defence. 7* went one step further and promulgated the rule of 5bsolute Aiability. It observed that the rule of ,yland vs Fletcher was a century old and was not sufficient to decide cases as science has advanced a lot in these years. If )ritish laws haven%t progressed, Indian courts are not bound to follow their law and can evolve the laws as per the requirements of the society. It held that an enterprise that engages in dangerous substances has an absolute responsibility to ensure the safety of the common public. It is only the company that can know the consequences of its activities and so it must take all the steps to prevent any accident. If, even after all precautions, accident happens, the company still should be made absolutely liable for the damages. The reas n bein( that the c *)any has a s cial bli(ati n t c *)ensate the )e )le ,h s!00ered 0r * its activity5 7upreme *ourt also laid down that the measure of compensation should depend on the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise so that it can have a deterrent effect. $here an enterprise is engaged in a ha;ardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such ha;ardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of

toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis+E+vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in ,ylands v. Fletcher. The Indian (udiciary tried to make a strong effort following the )hopal 'as Tragedy, 1ecember, .<=6 !@nion *arbide *ompany vs. @nion of India# to enforce greater amount of protection to the 0ublic. The 1octrine of 5bsolute Aiability can be said to be a strong legal tool against rogue corporations that were negligent towards health risks for the public. This legal doctrine was much more powerful than the legal 1octrine of 7trict Aiability developed in the @case ,yland4s :s. Fletcher. This meant that the defaulter could be held liable for even third party errors when the public was at a realistic risk. This could ensure stricter compliance to standards that were meant to safeguard the public.