Journal of Muslim Affairs, Vol. 24, No.

1, April 2004

Muslims in China: The Social and Economic Situation of the Hui Chinese

OSMAN CHUAH
Abstract This paper surveys the Muslim Chinese, the Hui, as a minority ethnic group in their social interaction with the non-Muslim Chinese, the Han, in China. The ndings show that the Hui in China remain a marginalized group with little inuence on the political and economic affairs in China. It is also conrmed that since Islam is practised as a comprehensive way of life, which is different from the non-Muslim Chinese ways, the Han majority recognize the Hui only as a minority ethnic group. The paper examines three phases of relationships between the Muslim Hui and the non-Muslim Han. First, there is peaceful co-existence between the two groups while the Hui resist the great force of assimilation and acculturation of non-Muslim ways. In the second phase there is intensication of discrimination and persecution of the Hui by the non-Muslim Chinese who perceive them as a threat, and both parties entertain mutual stereotypes, suspicion and hostilities. In the third phase, the Muslim Chinese cannot take the pressure of the intensied prejudice, persecution and discrimination, and so they revolt against the Han. These three kinds of relationships continue to exist between the Muslim Hui and the non-Muslim Han in China depending on the delicate and complex situations of the two groups in various parts of contemporary China.

Introduction This study provides a brief account of the social and economic situation of the Chinese Muslims as a special minority group in China who share the language, customs and culture with the Chinese non-Muslims. They differ from the non-Muslim Chinese in that, other than the similarity in language, custom and culture, they are also part of the worldwide Muslim ummah. The religion of Islam as a complete way of life has a great impact over the lives of Chinese Muslims, which makes them different from the Chinese non-Muslims. Because of these differences, social conict, prejudice, discrimination and stereotyping occur and various degrees of acculturation and assimilation determine the nature of their relationship. Furthermore, the question remains as to what extent the Chinese Muslims are accepted by the rest of the Muslim ummah outside China as they also share their language, customs and culture with the Chinese non-Muslims in many respects. In this paper, the Chinese Muslims are studied as a minority ethnic group in China. Their number is small and they cannot exert any political inuence, and they also do not have control over any resources in any of the states and provinces in China. This is signicant in this study as Muslim Chinese remain a minority group in their various social settings and in their interactions with the majority Chinese non-Muslims.
ISSN 1360-2004 print/ISSN 1469-9591 online/04/010155-08 2004 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs DOI: 10.1080/1360200042000212133

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The Hui Min Uniquely different from the other Muslims, the Chinese Muslims are also known as Hui Min by the Chinese non-Muslims as well as by the Chinese Muslims themselves. This terminology is not derived from the Quran or from Arabic. It is spoken practically in daily language usage by the Hui Min and only understood by the Chinese. According to a Chinese scholar, who was paying a visit to Malaysia in 1995, the Chinese word Hui consists of two squares. The outer square means the universality of Islam, whereas the inner square refers to the Kabah. Thus Hui means Islam, the comprehensive way of life for the whole universe.1 Hui also means to return in Chinese, and hence, some Chinese Islamic scholars refer to the religion of the Hui as the religion that returns us to Allah. Thus, the term Hui refers to some of the tribal groups in Sinkiang, and other western parts of China. In Sinkiang, the Hui comprise of ve different Turkic speaking sub-groups, namely, Uighur, Kazath, Kirghiz, Uzbek and Tatar. There are also Persian speaking Tadjiks here.2 Although all Hui are Muslims, not all Chinese Muslims are Hui or derived from the above ve tribal groups as there are also Chinese Muslims from other parts of China who are known as Han Hui. The word Han refers to the dominant non-Muslim Chinese and many of them have embraced Islam in China. There are also born Han Hui in China as sometimes the Chinese non-Muslims or Han converted to Islam and married Muslims and their children are known as Han Hui. In China, the mosque is also known as Hui Min Si. Other than the term Hui, Islam is also known as the Ching Cheng Chiao (the true and pure religion). A halal restaurant owned by the Chinese Muslims is known as Cheng Cheng Chan Kuan (clean and pure food restaurant). To embrace Islam is also known as to enter the way of the Hui.

The Hui and the Han The religious customs and cultural differences that mark the two great civilizations of the world, namely, the Chinese and the Islamic, frequently create suspicion and distrust between the Han and the Hui communities. Although the Hui possess the dual inheritances of the great civilizations of China and Islam, the non-Muslim Han do not recognize the Hui as Chinese but only as a minority ethnic group. Because of these tensions, three kinds of dynamic relationships have been observed between the Hui and the Han in China.3 These are the relationships between the majority and minority, dominant and dominated, the strong and the weak.

Peaceful Co-existence The rst relationship is the ostensibly peaceful co-existence between the two groups of Hui and Han with each side condent of its superiority and both sides avoiding direct conict. As a minority, dominated, and weak group, the Hui are constantly diffused within the non-Islamic Han culture. There are two pressures for Hui: rst, the pressure pushing them to acculturate and assimilate into the non-Islamic culture; and second, the pressure to preserve the Islamic culture and identity. As long as the two pressures are within the tolerable level, the Hui and the Han can co-exist peacefully. Due to the pressure of assimilation in China, the ofcial education system does not cater to Islamic system and values. Although there are madrasahs or Islamic schools in China, these are few and far between. Islam and Arabic language are taught in the

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madrasahs, mosques and even in the university, but it is only basic and not taught at an advanced level. Most Chinese Muslims or Hui children have to go to the normal Chinese schools where Islamic education is not included in the curriculum. Mandarin is a common language of the Hui and the Han and remains the medium of instruction in government schools. The clothing of the Hui is similar to the Han. And even the mosques are externally similar to the temple in China. However, most institutions do not cater to the needs of the Muslim population. For example, military forces do not have provision for Islamic dietary requirements and do not provide halal food. Nevertheless, certain Chinese Muslim scholars present the similarity of Islam and Confucianism in China almost apologetically. This is to ease the external pressure against the Hui from the non-Muslim Han social forces. These external pressures and social interactions generate strong internal pressure for Islamic self-identity. Thus, the Hui greet one another in an Islamic way, call one another by their Islamic names, put on their special clothes to pray facing the Qibla in the West and go for pilgrimage to Makkah.4 This is the uneasy but peaceful co-existence between the Han and the Hui. The Hui have no choice but to adjust to the un-Islamic ways of the majority. Even to work for the government requires passing examinations based on non-Islamic syllabi in China. Intensication of Pressures The second relationship is the intensication of external pressures from the Han and this is counteracted by a parallel intensication of internal pressures from the Hui. This is likely to occur in areas where the Hui are a substantial minority. In these areas, persecution and discrimination against the minority Hui were more than acute. The Hui are seen as a threat to the majority, politically, economically and socially. Consequently, the Hui feel that they have no choice but to unify and maintain Islamic ways and identity to resist against this external pressure. Because of mutual prejudice, distrust and discrimination between Chinese Muslims and Chinese non-Muslims, there will be stereotyping, suspicion and hostility from both sides. The Hui as a minority group respond to the situation by avoidance of contact, acceptance of the situation or resistance against it. However, as far as avoidance of social contact, the Hui sometimes cannot do this as the Hui and the Han are interdependent in the social structure and the Hui have to depend on the established Chinese political order and governmental systems. For example, if the Hui want to register their children at school, they need to have contact with the Han. If they want to go to school, and sometimes the non-Muslim school is the only school, then the Hui have to register and attend the non-Muslim school unless the Muslim parents do not want to send their children to school at all. Even if they want to go to Makkah to perform hajj, the Hui have to obtain passports from the non-Muslim Han government. Revolt of the Minority Thus, most often the Hui have to accept the situation. However, when the stress of discrimination becomes intolerable, then it gives rise to rebellion.5 This has led to the numerous revolts against the Han government, and the most well known of them was led by Tu Wen-hsiu and Ping Nan-Kuo in 1856. This was only one of the many rebellions in China and millions of Hui have died in the various rebellions. However,

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this was not reported as an Islamic uprising but only as a political rebellion against the Chinese government. The overthrow of the non-Muslim state government in Yunan in 1856 lasted fteen years and was only one of the longer lasting uprisings against the non-Muslim government. Then the problems of the successful uprising in China in 1856 soon emerged along with the questions of whether they could impose the Huis way on the Han for long, the role of the non-Muslim Chinese, and what part of the non-Muslim administration could be preserved. The inadequate solutions to the above questions and failure to get advice and support from the rest of the Muslim ummah were the main factors that contributed to the collapse of the Hui state government when the Manchu government or Qing government launched a counter attack.6 The sacrices of the Hui in these uprisings were usually not known to the outer world including the Muslim ummah in other parts of the world. To the Muslims or the Hui in China, this Islamic uprising was obligatory as a great jihad as they followed the struggle to establish the way of Islam in their lives. However, to the non-Muslim Chinese government, this was only a barbarian revolt. The three types of relationships between Hui and Han could happen simultaneously in China. As an example, when there was a rebellion in Yunan in 1856, in other places such as Peking, co-existence was the norm between the Hui and the Han. Any rebellion is unlikely to be successful and would be a disaster for the Hui because of their small number of Hui, compared with the large number of Han. In Sinkiang and western parts of China, as the Hui are in substantially large numbers, the second relationship prevails.

The Reality in the Present Setting Although the Chinese Muslims or the Hui comprise a large number in China, they remain an isolated group and their connection with the rest of the Muslim ummah is weak. This is due to several factors. First, in a Communist country like China, religions are not encouraged, as religion is regarded as the opiate of the masses. Thus, there are serious prejudices and persecutions directed against Muslims. Second, the Hui have no control over the educational system. There are only few madrasahs or Islamic schools teaching simple qh and Arabic language at an elementary level. The Muslims who wish to gain high position in the government have to pass examinations based on the syllabi of Confucian teaching and on other non-Muslim Chinese literature. They end up by learning more teaching of Confucian and other non-Islamic sources. Sometimes the Hui after receiving their primary, secondary and university education become too appreciative of Confucian and Lao-tse thoughts. The late ex-ofcial of China, Ibrahim Ma, is one of them. His book of Chinese and Islamic thought seems too apologetic and subservient to the Confucian thought.7 In his works Ma frequently compared Prophet Muhammad with Confucius and shows equal respect to both, although Confucius was not even one of the Prophets mentioned in the Quran. Similarly, few Chinese Islamic Scholars have ever criticized any works of Confucius or Lao-tse. Many regarded these two Chinese great teachers as equivalent to Prophet Muhammad. However, the Chinese Muslim intellectuals always write books in Chinese and these are not understood by non-Chinese Muslim scholars. Few know their work. These books are also difcult to obtain. For example, the book by Wang Tai Yu in Chinese criticizing the weakness of Confucius was hardly available to the Muslim ummah. Thus, there are no intellectual exchanges between the Chinese Muslim scholars and other non-Chinese Islamic scholars.

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The Chinese Muslim activities including the revolts in Yunan did not seem to have any support from the ummah, although at one time, it was successfully compared with the Moro Liberation Front in the Philippines. Although the struggle of the Moro Liberation Front was a recent event, the Hui rebellions in China under the Qing dynasty remain little known past events. Nevertheless, the two are known as rebellions against the non-Muslim governments, though they could not be compared because of different times and situations. The death of millions of Hui struggling for Islamic identity in China was hardly known by the universal Muslim ummah, whereas the struggle of the Moro Liberation Front is widely known by most Muslims in the present world. Although millions of Hui died for Islam in Yunan to free themselves from the non-Muslim ways, the Muslim ummah was not aware of this. This is because most of the Hui in China can only read and write in Chinese. Only a few can speak and write in Arabic and English. Whereas among the non-Chinese Muslim ummah, Arabic is the common language, very few can speak and read Chinese. Thus, there has been a communication gap between the Chinese Muslims and the rest of the worlds Muslims. Most of the Hui do not understand English, which does not facilitate their international contact with the rest of the ummah. In China, the Muslim Chinese only operate as an isolated group with little contacts with the rest of the Muslim ummah. For example, on 21 May 1999, it was reported in the News Straits Times that four Eighurs were executed for separatist terrorism.8 Few Muslims will know that those executed were Muslims ghting for an independent state in Sinkiang, China. Many Hui also took part in the wider establishment and became prominent in the government. For example, Muhammad Cheng Ho, a legendary gure who visited Malacca Empire, was respected by the Malays in Malaysia. Ma Hsin-i was a Muslim and became the governor general of Fukien and Chekiang. Pai Chung-Hsi was the rst Minister of Defence in Taiwan. They were the only examples of success of high-ranking Muslim ofcials who climbed through the examination system to some of the highest posts in non-Muslim Chinese governments. Another well-known Chinese Muslim gure is Hsiang Fei, a very beautiful woman who became one of the concubines of Emperor Chien Lung. With the exception of Ma Ju-Lung (a Chinese Muslim) who fought against the Islamic uprising in Yunan successfully for the non-Muslim Chinese government, all the above-mentioned prominent Hui personalities gained a certain degree of reverence from the Hui community. All these people are mentioned with great respect by many Chinese Muslims.9 Even Ma Ju-Lung was not condemned by the Hui community.10 This was the reality of the Muslim Chinese as a minority group in the ocean of non-Islamic ways in China.

The Hui and the Non-Muslim Chinese Majority Conicts between non-Muslim Chinese and Muslim Chinese are normal. There are many reasons. Historically, China is one of the oldest kingdoms and nations. It has its proud historical heritage. Islam is a relatively new yet very fast spreading religion in China as it is in other parts of the world today. The meeting of Chinese and Islamic civilizations in China naturally creates uncomfortable co-existence due to the ethnocentric feeling of followers of both the Chinese and the Islamic civilizations.

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As early as 206 BC and until the nineteenth century, the Han dynasty in China was called the Zhong-kuo or the middle kingdom. People who lived outside the middle kingdom were regarded as barbarians. The non-Muslim Chinese regarded themselves as superior to the barbarians in culture, intelligence, morality and behaviour. The relationship between the Han Chinese and the barbarians would be like that of the feudal system of chieftain and vassals. The latter needed to admit the superiority of the former and accept acculturation unilaterally, and send tributes to the Chinese imperial court. In return, the vassals received presents, seals, and ofcial titles. This conrmed the lower status of the latter. This diplomatic symbolism indicates the barbarians subjugation to the former, which lasted 2000 years!11 Under this condition, it is natural that the non-Muslim Chinese have ethnocentric feelings of superiority compared with any other group, and refuse to accept any other way of life. In actual case, the Great Wall of China as one of the miracles of the world was built to prevent the uncivilized or barbarian tribes from invading China from the north, whereas in the southern and southwestern parts of China, the Hui are no less of an uncivilized tribe to the Han. Thus, in order to make the uncivilized tribes civilized, the Chinese imperial government imposed civil examinations on the non-Han tribes. Those who passed the civil examinations were given positions as ofcials of the Chinese government. As the examination syllabus consists usually of the Five Classics of Han literature and Four Books with only non-Islamic syllabi, the uncivilized tribes are forced to learn and get generally accultured and assimilated in the Han way.12

The Islamic Ways of the Hui As far as Islam is concerned, it is a complete way of life. Prophet Muhammad had succeeded in transforming a jahiliyyah or ignorant society in the Arabian peninsula to an enlightened way of living; from polytheistic to monotheistic faith; from disorderly society with rampant alcoholism, gambling, fortune-telling, womanizing to a clean society guided by the shariah for the well being of the individuals and the good of the community. One of the signicant changes in attitudes and practices brought about by Prophet Muhammad was the eradication of the practice of the live burial of female infants. This was widely practised during the time of the jahiliyyah when the Arabs treated women as a burden and a possible threat to their honour if the women failed to protect their chastity. In addition, the Arabs also followed the way of extreme tribalism due to which there were frequent wars and quarrels for small affairs that lasted for long periods. Islam, as an enlightened way from Allah, totally altered the corrupted society into a peaceful and cohesive new ummah. Islam also brought the values of love, care and brotherhood to all its followers.13 Thus, it is not surprising that the Chinese non-Muslims and Chinese Muslims with their ethnocentric attitudes were unable to accept each other. Chinese non-Muslims are also ignorant of Islam. There are barriers of communication between the Chinese Muslims and non-Muslim Chinese. While the Muslim Chinese are keen to communicate with the non-Muslim Chinese about Islam, the non-Muslim Chinese are indifferent towards Islam and regard their own culture as superior. Furthermore, as non-Muslim Chinese are not following a missionary religion, they are not keen to spread their ways to the Muslim Chinese.

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It is unlikely that the Chinese Muslims will emerge as a strong ethnic group in China in the near future. Because of the national educational policy in which Islam has not been included as a basic part of the syllabus, the Hui or Chinese Muslims would not know much more about Islam than the non-Muslims. In fact they learned more non-Islamic ways than Islamic ways. Furthermore, anyone joining the army or police or governmental institute for training will not be provided the facilities to practice their faith, and even the food provided by the training institute may not be halal. To join the ranks of government ofcers, the citizens have to pass examinations that do not have Islamic content. Many schools also do not provide Islamic teaching. There is a strong tendency for the Muslim Chinese to acculturate and to assimilate into the non-Muslim ways. Since Chinese Muslims are a relatively small minority group compared with the large Chinese non-Muslim population, their rst fear is of assimilation into the non-Muslim Chinese or the Hans way. If any Chinese is to be successful politically, then he must accommodate himself to the mainstream of political and cultural forces in China. A prominent national gure must join the China Communist Party in order to climb the political ladder. Rashid Pau, the National Honorary President of China Muslim Association, the sixth Vice-Chairman of National Political Coordination Committee in China, was also a very prominent Communist member. He had to struggle his whole life to the tune of Communist Chinese policies such as accommodating the socialist system of government and also respecting the integrity of the Chinese government to achieve an honourable position and to be respected by the non-Muslim National gures. He passed away on August 27, 1989.14 Similarly, in Taiwan, Omar Pei, the rst Defence Minister of Taiwan, had to tow the line of the non-Muslim Nationalist government under President Chiang Khai-Shik or he would not have risen to the position of Defence Minister. In fact, the Chinese National policy to assimilate the Hui into the Han was successful except in Yunan and Sinkiang, the southern and western parts of China, as the number of Chinese Muslims had dwindled from 50 million to 40 million.15 Today the ofcial estimate is that there are only 10 million Muslims in China. The question now remains as to what happened to the tens of millions of Muslims of China in the last two decades. Is it a matter of assimilation or a question of estimation? NOTES
1. The Chinese scholar was invited by the Malaysian government to explain Islam to the non-Muslim Chinese. I met him personally in Baitul Mal Building, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia while doing my research about Chinese Muslims for my PhD in 1995. 2. Barbara Line Kroll Pillsbury, Cohesion and Cleavage in a Chinese Muslim Minority, unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1973, p. 67. 3. Raphael Israeli, Chinese Versus Muslims: A Study of Cultural Confrontation, unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, 1974, p. x. 4. Ibid., pp. xxii. 5. Ibid., p. xiii. 6. Ibid., p. xiv. 7. Ibrahim Ma, Islam and Chinese Thoughts, Kuala Lumpur: Perkim, 1960. 8. The New Straits Times, 21 May 1999, p. 16. 9. Ibid., pp. 9293. 10. Ibid. 11. Yuan-Lin Tsai, Confucian Orthodoxy vs Muslim Resistance, unpublished PhD thesis, Temple University, 1997, pp. 3340.

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12. Ibid. 13. Akram Diya Al-Umari, Madinan Society at the Time of the Prophet, Washington, DC: Institute of Islamic Thought, 1992. 14. The Chinese Muslim (Al-Muslim Al-Shini), No. 6, Peking: China Muslim Association, 1989, pp. 223. 15. Raphael Israeli writes in 1974 that there were 50 million Chinese Muslims in China. See Israeli, Chinese versus Muslims, op. cit. Twenty years later Yusuff Chang estimates that in 1990 there are 40 million Muslims in China. See Yusuff Chang, The Muslim Minority in China, The Muslim World League Journal, Vol. 17, 1990. Now the ofcial Chinese government gure is only 10 million.