Phoenicians

Chapter 27

This raid on Beirut International Airport during the diminishing hours of

December 28th, 1968 set the stage for a government crisis that marked Lebanese
life for the next five years. In doing so it highlighted the delicate balance of internal
political forces in Lebanon and the connection between that balance and the extent
to which Lebanese identified with the Arab position in the Arab-Israel conflict.
Parliamentary elections before the raid had already revealed an increasing
polarization in the country, with two major coalitions, one pro-Arab and led by
“Rashid Karami” and the other pro-Western and led jointly by former President
“Camille Chamoun”, “Pierre Gemayel” and “Raymond Edde”. Both made major
gains and captured (“each”) 30 seats out of 99.
The governments authority was seriously challenged by the presence of the
armed Palestinian guerrillas in Southern Lebanon, and with the clashes between the
Lebanese army and the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) became
increasing frequent (May through October – 1969).
It is said, in some circles, that because of the turmoil, he eventually signed or
agreed to the “Cairo Agreement”. An agreement that is “purported” to be a secret
1969 agreement between the PLO and Lebanon’s government granting the PLO the
right of operate on Lebanese soil --- to include attacking Israel from Lebanon.
It is “disputed” whether any such agreement actually existed, and even if it did it
is not likely that it existed or formalized in a treaty-style documentation.
Believers in its existence say that it was signed by PLO chief “Yasser Arafat” and
the Lebanese army in Cairo on November 3rd, 1969 – a year before King Hussein
ousted the PLO from Jordon, in what became known as “Black September”.
Egyptian President “Gamal Abdel Nasser”, is said, to have assisted in brokering
the deal and was meant to be the guarantor of the agreement, this because of his
positive relations with both the Lebanese and the Palestinians. His death on
September 28th, 1970 of a heart attack (at the conclusion of a Cairo meeting of
leaders of Arab countries regarding Israel and the Black September action in Jordon)
created the ascension of Anwar Sadat, who had little or not interest in retaining
Nasser’s role.
 Whether or not the agreement existed, Palestinian involvement did increase in
Lebanon in the early 70s, especially after the failed coup in Jordan, and some
believe it “may” have contributed to the Lebanese civil war --- looking back as a
compiler of Lebanese history I say it did!
In fact as time progressed the Cairo agreement (if it existed, and even it didn’t)
escalated into a condition that Lebanon could no longer control, this due to its
fragmented structure, whereas the Lebanese army was unable to maintain any
check or order to how the PLO was effecting the country overall --- the PLO cross-
border attacks on Israel did nothing to secure the overall peace or retaliation
agenda it was hoped to accomplish.
In complete disagreement and opposing the “rightist” Maronite followers alliance
with its ‘Lebanonism’ stood the Lebanese National Movement (“LNM”), formed in
1969 by a large coalition of predominantly Muslim movements and leftist parties.
This coalition advocated “Arabism” and embraced the Palestine resistance
movement as a means to achieve comprehensive social reforms and to restructure
the economy and politics of Lebanon --- rather than out of ‘ideological conviction’ in
the “vague” [Pan-Arabism] or commitment to the Palestinian cause. By 1969, the
“LNM” had established itself as the ‘organized’ expression of the emerging mass
movement and sought to institute political reforms.
A student would have to be almost brain-dead not to see (especially with the
record preserved in writing) the obvious play that the PLO and its supporters in the
outcome of the political polarization that had settled in the country of Lebanon, a
country that no matter the effort by some assumed a fractured cultural identity
that, in most cases, still exists today, albeit improvement has been seen.
During the last months of Helou’s presidency, this polarization had assumed
dangerous proportions, where the “rightist” alliance accused the “Palestinian”
element for the troubles of the establishment, while the LNM accused the “Hilf”
alliance of using the resistance as a scapegoat in not wanting to deal with the
problems of underdevelopment in Lebanon.
Amidst the increasing political tensions, clashes between the Kataeb Social
Democratic Party (Gemayel’s Kataeb Party / LKP) against the PLO beginning in
March 1970 surfaced, although most of the skirmishes were put down and did not
escalate into major confrontations --- it appeared the countdown for overall military
escalation had started its countdown to the Lebanese Civil War. Keep on mind that
the LHP party had joined the “Hilf Alliance” that was formed with the National
Liberal Party and the National Bloc in 1968.
In 1970, Helou endorsed (along with Chehab) “Elias Sarkis” as his chosen
successor, Sarkis went on to loose the election in the National Assembly by one
vote to “Suleiman Frangieh”.
Unlike other former Presidents, who remained somewhat politically active after
retirement, he faded from the political scene – he did become involved in a
philanthropic venture, founding a number of restaurants to provide free meals to
the elderly.
Charles Helou died of a heart attack on January 7th, 2001 at the age of 87.
There is a monument “memorializing” him at a “Beirut-Damascus” line taxi
stand.

The Presidency of Suleiman Kabalan Beik Frangieh (Frangie, Franjieh, or

Franjiyeh) – his election to the Presidency of Lebanon in not only being the closest
(1-vote) is thought have been the “controversial” presidential election in Lebanese
history. The National Assembly elected him to the President of the Republic on
August 17th, 1970. He owed his “upset” victory over Elias Sarkis to a last minute
change of mind by “Kamal Jumblatt”, whose supporters in the National Assembly
switched their votes to Frangieh.
Posing as a “consensus candidate”, whereas he drew support from both the right
and the left and from “all” religious factions; there was little that provided a
common tie between his supporters ideologically except his promise to “maintain”
the semi-feudal system which concentrated power in the hands of local clan
leaders, known as “Zaiyms”. They very system that they felt was being
“undermined” by reforms enacted by the administrations of Presidents of “Fuad
Chehab” and “Charles Helou”, reforms the “Sarkis” had pledged to continue.
Frangieh’s victory also showed something of his willingness to “resort” to
violence; after the 3rd ballot resulted in a 49/49 split, gunmen led by his son “Tony”
forced their way into the parliamentary complex and forced the Parliamentary
Speaker (who usually, by custom, had abstained) to use his casting vote in favor of
Frangieh.
It appears “violence” was not a new tactic in his repartee. Born into an
influential Maronite family of northern Lebanon he was not initially slated to
represent the Frangieh family in politics, this was to be his brother’s task – “Hamid
Frangieh”, but he suffered a stroke in 1957, and he was picked as his successor.
Unlike his educated brother, he was classified and an “uneducated tough guy”, who
resorted to violence when it served his family’s “interests”. He was associated with
bloodshed in northern Lebanon that targeted supporters of rival families – to avoid
arrest he fled to Syria where he established contracts with the Assad family - a
relationship he would exercise during his presidency.
Unfortunately shortly after his election, in believing the Deuxieme Bureau was
staffed with “Shihab” loyalists, he purged it and stripped it of its powers. But the
Deuxieme Bureau had been the “only” governmental entity capable of monitoring
and controlling the Palestinians, and by his action unintentionally gave the PLO,
commanded by Yasser Arafat, more freedom of action in Lebanon.
He strongly opposed the presence of armed Palestinians in Lebanon and
authorized Lebanon’s army to train and give weapons to members of right-wing
militias. He aligned himself with the government of Syria for the duration of the
Lebanese war and later broke off his alliance with the Maronite-oriented parties and
groups in 1978, when his son – “Tony Frangieh”, was killed by gunmen loyal to the
Lebanese Forces.
Although his presidency is mostly noted as the one that “preceded” the
Lebanese Civil War, it also can lay claim to over developments including more
economic growth, some reforms in government, the rationalizing the
pharmaceutical industry, and providing for the state takeover of petroleum
refineries. Overall, a period of economical change, interrupted by periods of violent
political, social and economic crises.
With regard to institutions, the Ministries of Petroleum and Industry and of
Housing and Cooperatives were established, along with the 1st credit banks for
medium and long-term loans. Secondary education and the Lebanese University
continued to grow and be modernized, while a Social Security Health branch was
established. He also spearheaded the modernization of the thermal electric power
stations.
The reference to his regime being the “prelude” to the Civil War is not without
merit, as in the past history repeated its dramatic scenario in Lebanon. During his
term the vulnerability of the Lebanese political system was extremely susceptible
(in some cases invited) to foreign interventions as it had been in 1820, 1840, 1860
and 1958, whereas internal religious-communal hostility, and widespread economic
disparity were the rule of the day. In turn, regional and international powers and
other factors created civil strife, which in turn were exploited by external groups to
achieve their particular objectives.
This time was not different than before, only the players names had changed,
there was no Muhamad Ali’s “Egypt”, or the Ottoman High Porte, now you had the
Assad’s of Syria, the IDF of Israel, and the PLO and other splinter groups. You also
will note that within the international players, the world order and the nature of
foreign policy and alliances had once again shifted, in some cases 180 degrees from
their present position --- in all this, the essence of the “confessional” spirit that
haunted the hearts and minds of the population of Lebanon – had changed very
little.
Instead of drawing lessons from Lebanon’s, sometime violent history, and
negotiating a political solution in the way of compromise, practical accommodation
and mutual adjustment – the combating Lebanese political leaders encourage their
followers (using passionate rhetoric) to resort to armed conflict in their approach to
the Lebanon upcoming crisis. One of those internal players (leaders) was Kamal
Jumblatt.
By 1975, Kamal Jumblatt was considered a part of Lebanon’s “political folklore,
he was a “feudal politician” and a strict follower of “Chehabism”, and he led the
Anti-Establishment Alliance and now the Druze leader of the Progressive Socialist
Party (“PSP”) which reflected his personal views.
In 1975 he was able to rally the support of a well-disciplined structured political
parties to his side, they being the “Lebanese Communist Party”, the “Syrian Social
National Party”, the “Ba’ath Party”, and his own party. Along with these
organization he did attract other less disciplined, with less structure such as the
“Arab Communist Action Organizations”, four or five different “Nasserite”
organizations, the “October 24 Movement” and the sectarian Shiite “Movement of
the Deprived” (or) “Amal”.
On August 18th, 1975, he announced the National Movement’s transitional
program for political reform (or) [Al-Barnany, al-Marhali lil-Islah al Siyassi] the main
points that touched on the following issues:
a. Abolition of the Confessional System and the Full Secularization of the State
 The main argument being is that Confessionalism is a bad system
perpetuating internal divisions, feeding a complex set of rivalries and tension
and encouraging bigotry – it is both corrupt and inefficient.
b. Electoral Reform
Democratic Reform of Popular Representation, to enact new electoral laws
with their primary focus on;
1. Establishing Lebanon as a single electoral district
2. Applying the ratio of a deputy per 10,000 eligible voters
3. Implementing the secret ballot and to form a judicial committee
4. Supervising elections and adjudicating complaints
c. Revision of the Constitution
This reform was intended to procure “checks and balances” in the political
system and ensure a power-balance between the three branches of the state;
1. Presidency
2. Premiership
3. Parliament
To increase the parliaments basic legislative functions (besides) the authority
of selecting the PM and by stipulating that Premier has the authority to
choose his cabinet ministers after consultation with the parliamentary blocs,
in other words, this reform was aimed at “restricting” and defining the
presidential authority – and the President’s role would be confined to the
approval of the appointment of the cabinet jointly with his premier.
d. Election of a “Representative Constituent Assembly”
This included the election by popular vote on a “non-sectarian” basis of 250
members representing the various political orientations in the country to
conduct a national dialogue in order to discuss and implement suggested
reforms.

Besides its radical demand for the “abolition” of confessionalism, the program
contained some reasonable suggestions concerning the establishment of checks
and balances in the system, the cleanup of electoral corruption, the purging of
nepotism from the public administration, reorganization of the civil service, the
independence of the judiciary and the introduction of social reforms.
 Nevertheless the “National Movement’s” reforms was too much to yield a
common ground for compromise with the “Establishment Alliance”, which included
the “Kataeb Party”, “Chamoun’s National Liberal Party”, the “Maronite League”,
“The Maronite Order of Monks”, the “Defenders of the Cedars”, and the “Franjieh’s
Marada Brigade”.
President Suleiman responded on February 14th, 1976 with his administrations
constitutional document that had 17 points, the most significant as follows:
1. Lebanon is an Arab Country – Sovereign and Independent
This commitment to “assert” the Arab identity of the country was intended to
address and resolve the lingering “identity-crisis” that was dividing the
political culture of the Lebanese people and the present crisis – the political
usefulness of such a statement, was put into doubt namely for the Christians
who were through history known for their pro-Western tendencies and
inclinations.
2. Written Confirmation of the Oral Practice of Allocating the Highest Political
Posts of the State to Particular Sects
Accordingly, the President of the Republic shall be a Maronite, the president
of the Chamber of Deputies a Shiite, and the Prime Minister a Sunni. This
official consecration of “confessionalism” was completely rejected by both
the National Movement “circle” and by the traditional “Muslim Leadership”.
It was judged by the National Movement as the anti-thesis of political
denominationalism, and by the Muslims as a costly concession.
3. Equal Distribution of the Parliamentary Seats between Muslims and Christians
and their “Proportional” Distribution among the sects o Each Group
This Constitutional Document stipulated the amendment of the electoral law
to secure a better representation of the electorate. The “National
Movement”, as we have seen, wanted nothing “less” than a radical electoral
reform that reflected its “alleged” popular representation
4. Election of the Prime Minister by a “Simple Majority” of the Chamber of
Deputies
The proposal that the Prime Minister shall be elected by the parliament rather
than appointed by the President intended to institutionalize the process of
selection of the Sunni premier and render his position more autonomous than
 before. The joint selection of the ministers insured (to some extent) the
sharing of executive authority in this delicate matter.
5. Institution of a Supreme Council to Render the President, Prime Minister and
the Cabinet Ministers responsible for their actions and try them in Case of
Legal abrogation or Constitutional Violation or their respective Duties and
Obligations.
6. Election of the President of the Republic by a 55% Majority in the Chamber of
Deputies and Legal Requirement of a Two-Thirds Parliamentary Majority in
Vital Cases
These two provisions were intended to create a “suitable atmosphere” for
forging a national consensus on decisive matters such as ratification of
treaties, declaration of war, changing the constitution and so on. They also
aimed at “preventing” the polarization of the deputies into “confessional”
blocs, thus facilitating the reaching of compromise solutions.
7. The Issuing of All Decrees and Draft Laws in Agreement between the
President and the Premier
This article instigated an executive “partnership” between the President and
his Premier – replacing the elastic and wide presidential authority of the 1926
Constitution ---as all official decrees were to carry both signatures and Muslim
resentment was to be alleviated. The only exceptions to this rule were the
decrees appointing the Prime Minister and accepting the resignation of the
cabinet (or) dismissing it
8. Abolition of the Sectarian Distribution of Office in the Civil Service
This proposal was intended to apply the principle of competence and merit in
the recruitment of civil servants, except in the “first category” positions,
which would be “confessionally” divided and distributed.
Other points tackled the issue of introducing social, economic and fiscal reforms.
Those evolved around decentralizing the administration, developing rural regions,
promoting social justice, enhancing public education, amending the naturalization
law and strengthening the army.
In all of this President Franjieh promised the “rule of law”, administrative reform,
and the end of corruption and protection of personal rights. His 1 st cabinet reflected
his intentions, as it was made of young “technocrats”, (some who later resigned)
and other succumbed to the political realities.
 In his “Constitutional Document” he primarily pushed an Arab, sovereign and
independent Lebanon, equal distribution of Parliamentary seats between the
Muslims and Christians, institution of a Supreme Council and the abolition of the
sectarian distribution of Office in the Civil Service --- Unfortunately his term
experienced the “resurgence” of political feudalism, spread corrupt practices and
the militarization of civil society --- the results, a Civil War.

There is no doubt that the State played a major role in the economic and the
advancement of conditions in Lebanon between 1943 and 1975, where it
experienced:
1. Rapid growth in national income, including a 4-fold growth between 1950 and
1970, and 50% growth between 1970 and 1975
2. Rapid growth in service activities: the increase in the share of services as a
portion of national income from 63% in 1950 to 70% in 1975
3. Externally-oriented growth motivated by the needs of foreign (regional)
markets, particularly in services, industry, trade, and the export of labor,
meanwhile the share of remittance in terms of national income rose from
5.4% in 1951 to 30% in 1975
4. A tendency toward a more equal distribution of the benefits of economic
growth
In general, the 1943-1975 time/frame can be characterized by a “reduction” in
the economic and social differences between the Lebanese, across the board. But
there was a downside also, the externally-oriented economic growth wasn’t always
positive, there was insufficient growth in agriculture and industry and there
remained poor income distribution in social, regional, and sectarian terms. These
negatives did not constitute the “main” character of economic development, in
reality their sharpness only increased with the gradual “disappearance” of the State
during the wars and occupations after 1975.