Quintov.

Commission on Elections
A case digest on Election Law decided by the Supreme Court February 22, 2010.

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commissionon Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides that, "Any person holding a public appointive office orposition including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy." Be it noted that petitioners of the above-entitled case are appointive officials who intend to be elected in the previously held 2010 elections and who felt aggrieved by the issuance of the questioned resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional RULING: The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision declaring the assailed resolution unconstitutional. Here, it strongly upholds the constitutionality of the resolution saying that it does not violate the equal protection clause. It is settled that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is reasonableness which requires that: 1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions; 2. It is germane to the purposes of the law; 3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4. It applies equally to all members of the same class.

In the case under consideration, there is a substantial distinction between public and elective officialswhich has been rendered moot and academic by the ruling made in the case of Farinas, etl. al. vs. Executive Secretary, et.al.

Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is constitutional.

Article VI, Section 25 Case Digest - Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. 192935 and 193036, December 7, 2010 Biragao v. Philippine Truth Commission G.R. 192935 and 193036 December 7, 2010 FACTS The petitioners raised in Court that E.O. No. 1, which created the Truth Commission, should be declared unconstitutional and to enjoin PTC from performing its functions. The petitioners alleged that E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. They also asserted the fact that the role of the president, as stated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office, which was inexistent before, the "Truth Commission". According to them, the said Executive Order violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions. The respondents, on the other hand, contested that E.O. No. 1 did not arrogate the powers of the Congress to create a public office because the President's executive power and power of control necessarily includes the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure laws are faithfully executed. More so, it does not violate the principle of separation of powers as alleged by the petitioners. They strongly argue that the said Executive Order, is valid and constitutional. ISSUE Does E.O. No. 1 transgress on the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office? HELD No. E.O. No 1 does not transgress on the power of the Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office. In the said E.O., there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations existing funds already appropriated. Thus, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. According to the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission," and thus, will be subject to auditing rules and regulations. However, the Court stressed that, "The end does not justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing its goals is simply irreconcilable with the constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot just run a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles. The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." Hence, the petitions were granted.

NBI-Microsoft Corporation v. Hwang

intellectual Property Law on Copyright Copyright Infringement
In May 1993, Microsoft and Beltron Computer Philippines, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement. Under Section 2(a) of the Agreement Microsoft authorized Beltron, for a fee, to: 1. 2. Reproduce and install no more than one copy of Windows on each Customer System hard disk; Distribute directly or indirectly and license copies of Windows (reproduced as per Section 2 of the Agreement and/or acquired from an Authorized Replicator or Authorized Distributor. Their agreement allowed either party to terminate if one fails to comply with their respective obligations. Microsoft terminated the Agreement in June 1995 by reason of Beltrons non -payment of royalties. Later, Microsoft learned that Beltron was illegally copying and selling copies of Windows. Microsoft then sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation. NBI agents made some purchase from Beltron where they acquired a computer unit pre-installed with Windows, 12 windows installer CDs packed as Microsoft products. The agents were not given the end-user license agreements, user manuals, and certificates of authenticity for the products purchased. They were given a receipt which has a header of T.M.T.C. (Phils) Inc. BELTRON COMPUTER. TMTC stands for Taiwan Machinery Display and Trade Center. A search warrant was subsequently issued where 2,831 CDs of Windows installers, among others, were seized. Based on the items seized from Beltron, Microsoft filed a case of copyright infringement against Beltron and TMTC as well as their officers (Hwang et al) before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Beltron, in its counter-affidavit, argued the following: 1. That Microsofts issue with Beltron was really just to have leverage i n forcing Beltron to pay the unpaid royalties; and that Microsoft should have filed a collection suit. 2. That the computer unit allegedly purchased by the NBI agents from them cannot be decisively traced as coming from Beltron because the receipt issued to the agents did not list the computer unit as one of the items bought. 3. That the 12 installers purchased by the agents which are actually listed in the receipt were not manufactured by Beltron but rather they were genuine copies purchased by TMTC from an authorized Microsoft seller in Singapore. 4. That the 2,831 installers seized from them were not a property of Beltron but rather they were left to them by someone for safekeeping. The DOJ secretary agreed with Beltron and dismissed the case. The Secretary ruled that the issue of the authority of Beltron to copy and sell Microsoft products should first be resolved in a civil suit. Microsoft appealed the decision of the DOJ secretary before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Beltron filed a motion to quash the search warrant before the RTC that issued the same. The RTC partially granted the quashal. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC. Hwang et al did not appeal the CA decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ Secretary is correct. HELD: No. Section 5 of Presidential Decree 49 enumerates the rights vested exclusively on the copyright owner. Contrary to the DOJs ruling, the gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the unauthorized manufacturing of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized performance of any of the

acts covered by Section 5. Hence, any person who performs any of the acts under Section 5 without obtaining the copyright owners prior consent renders himself civilly and criminally liable for copyright infringement. Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright. Being the copyright and trademark owner of Microsoft software, Microsoft acted well within its rights in filing the complaint before DOJ on the incriminating evidence obtained from Beltron. Hence, it was highly irregular for the DOJ to hold that Microsoft sought the issuance of the search warrants and the filing of the complaint merely to pressure Beltron to pay its overdue royalties to Microsoft. There is no basis for the DOJ to rule that Microsoft must await a prior resolution from the proper court of whether or not the Agreement is still binding between the parties. Beltron has not filed any suit to question Microsofts termination of the Agreement. Microsoft can neither be expected nor compelled to wait until Beltron decides to sue before Microsoft can seek remedies for violation of its intellectual property rights. Furthermore, the articles seized from Beltron are counterfeit per se because Microsoft does not (and could not have authorized anyone to) produce such CD installers The copying of the genuine Microsoft software to produce these fake CDs and their distribution are illegal even if the copier or distributor is a Microsoft licensee. As far as these installer CD-ROMs are concerned, the Agreement (and the alleged question on the validity of its termination) is immaterial to the determination of Beltrons liability forcopyright infringement and unfair competition. Beltrons defense that the box of CD installers found in their possession was only left to them for safekeeping is not tenable.