Perspectives of Intergenerational Ecological Justice: From Jos Ortega y Gasset to Andrew Dobson

Joshua Beneite Marti, UV (Spain) ECPR Summer School, Keele University

ABSTRACT

The interest shown by Ortega on the mutual configuration between landscape and our character as human beings, can have a significant potential in order to defend the idea of a life rooted in its natural environment. On the other hand, Ortega may be an early promoter of the importance that have the behavior of the current generation in future social configurations. Considering this, and the contemporary recommendations from Dobson about it, I want try to form a new scheme for intergenerational and ecological justice. Continuing the Dobson's critical wake, this justice could be understood as a most comprehensive, radical and transformative 'Justice', that the mere idea of a 'justice' (wich not claims to act on the causes, but to continue the same structures of exploitation and ecosystemic domination). No doubt that Andrew Dobson provides elements to construct a theory of justice "to the height of the circumstances" of the problem of our time. And this operates in the space between generations, establishing as irreducible conception of the good the sustainability of ecosystems.

Introduction It could be bizarre that a spanish candidate to unemployed philosopher goes to teachers house to talk about him; but, personally I think we have a nice debt since Andrew Dobson made a magnificent exhibition of the thought of Ortega y Gasset, the spanish philosopher. Dobson publish the first sistematic analisis of the political and phylosophical thougth of this fundamental spanish and european thinker (Dobson, 1989a). In fact, I am not the first spanish who works in Dobsons ideas. We can find one of the most relevant spanish eco-socialist, like Jorge Riechmann (Riechmann, 1998), who has worked with Dobson in the 90s. Also we can find political philosophers like ngel Valencia Saiz (Valencia, 2009), Joaqun Valdivieso (Valdivieso, 2004) or Carmen Melo Escrihuela at Keele University (Melo, 2008) working on questions about the Dobsonian ecological citizenship. Last but not least, we can found contemporary green activists like Florent Marcellesi (Marcellesi, 2012), who has based his political eco-socialist discourse in Dobsons Green political thought (Dobson, 1990). In my opinion, these facts show two things: first, the scope and importance of the thought of Dobson in the international political-philosophical space; and second, the affinity between the thought of Dobson and the ecological philosophy and politics from spain. But, what is the original relation between Dobson and Spain? On the early 80, Dobson was in Spain doing a research on Ortega y Gasset. Fruit of this research was the work aforementioned (Dobson, 1989a). The point is that this research is conducted by Dobson before focusing on what, in part thanks to him, is known as green political thought. And this has led me to think that the philosophy of Ortega may have influenced the thinking of Andrew Dobson. Not surprisingly, ngel Valencia says that the study of Ortega and Jean-Paul Sartre (Dobson, 1993) may have introduced elements of phenomenology and existentialism in philosophy of Dobson, but these are hard questions that we can not address here. Before we get into the potential influence of Ortega on Dobson, let me point out some ecological perspectives from Ortega, as I promised at the beginning. We have no time to comment, even in passing, all the ecological perspectives from Ortega y Gasset, but I will try to point out some fundamental lines (Beneite, 2013b). 2

Usually, spanish academics use two elements from the work of Ortega in order to relate him to issues of environmental philosophy. On one hand, their studies on the landscape (Paredes, 1998; Maceiras, 1996) and on the other, their relationship with antiDarwinian biologists (Laso, 1983; Benavides, 1988; Fernndez, 2003; Pelayo, 2009). First, for Ortega the landscape represents the natural roots of human identity in the whole of reality. The changes that occur in the landscape affect personal and social identity of human beings. Ortega also recognizes that these changes caused by intentional human actions have consequences in setting up human identity. Affirm that the landscape, or in a broader sense, the environment, is decisive to understand and explain the human condition and their politics, is something that Dobson, in my opinion, supports. We can see this in some of their works, particularly when Dobson presents the environment as an existential pre-condition for the human life, and of course, for any kind of policy (Dobson, 1996). On a philosophical level, Dobson has linked this idea with the principle of Sartre, but now, explaind this exceed the purpouses of this text (see Dobson, 2006). Secondly, the work of ultra-vitalist and anti-darwinist biologists as Jakob Von Uexkbll, caused great impact on Ortega. The key is that these trends will lead to position him against Darwinian evolutionary mechanicism (Heredia, 2011). Ortega always believed that nature was something overwhelming and exuberant that can not be controlled with mechanical laws. In any case, we may becoming trapped in a discussion about the vision that Ortega had regarding Descartes, but I want to skip this discussion in order to address issues much more fruitful. However, I want to mention some controversial passage that seems alienating Ortegas philosophy from nature. Ortega said that the man has no nature, but story, and continues or, equal: what nature is to the things, is the story to the man (Ortega, O.C. VI: 53-54.). While the first part of the quote seems to move away from a naturalistic philosophy, the latter may serve to try to return to it. Recall that one of the important Dobsons contributions to the field of ecologism epistemology was to highlight the historical elements that make ecologism (Dobson, 1990). In my opinion, both positions reflect estrangement from the romantic vision because Ortega says he is neo-romantic and Dobson tries to overcome the factual limitations of deep ecology.

Ortega's statement can be explained by the perspectivism that pervades his philosophy, and this feature of Ortega's philosophy is highlighted in the monograph that Dobson devotes to it (Dobson, 1989a: 144-163). Indeed, I think Dobson has working hard trying to consider the environmental problematic from all possible angles, as shown in his brilliant Justice and the environment (Dobson, 1998). A purpose of the perspectivism, exactly with this item I will try to find the philosophical foundations of the intergenerational and ecological justice that we can rebuild through the work of Ortega and Dobson. Let me begin with a particular point. In Marxist terms, the historical dynamics is carried out by the class struggle. Ortega was not exactly Marxist, but he always considered the virtues of socialism. Consequently with her posture, Ortega raised another way of looking or conceive the dynamics of history. His proposal is contained in what became known as the historical generations. The generations method is a sample of perspectivism, because precisely the historical perspective through this method moves from the social struggle of classes to (not strictly) the young or present generations. As Jorge Costa puts: the theory of
generations, in that every generation has the task of contrasting cultural tradition that you received with the concrete world in which it is, can be considered (...) as a theoretical sublimation of very specific life experience, and continues: The reason has failed because it has tried to impose abstract structures that did not correspond with the real life. The revolution-or better, successive-revolutionary attempts have always failed in the same way because they are the political representation of the rationalist utopia. Attempts radical transformation of individuals flowed into terror against the resistance of the traditions incorporated in the subject and subsequently succumbed to this tradition into a counter trend (Costa, 2011: 116).

For that, and in advance of others contents of this communication, the project of the vital reason has political correspondence to Ortega: pure reason has to be replaced by
a vital reason, where [reason] it will locate and acquire mobility and strength transformation (Ortega, O.C. III: 614-615).

Moreover, according to Jorge Costa, this development represents the

naturalization of the concept of hierarchies because the hierarchy is inserted into a

concept (such as generation) which expresses the interaction between biology and history
(Costa, 2011: 108). This again extends a solid bridge between the denaturation, that some

have attributed to Ortega by the above quote, and its clear focus on the vital reason (razn vital, see [Dobson, 1989a: 163-181]). Costa explained this very clearly:
The [concept of] generation puts life, biology (...) in the foreground of the history () This description of the historical process allows Ortega to present life, ie changing the concrete reality of each historical moment, as a principle of human being. To which is oriented life is also a problem, but a minor problem compared to the fact that guidance serves life and not the other (Costa, 2011: 109, emphasis added).

Ortega himself signed that the issue of our time is to subjecting reason to the
vitality (Ortega, O.C. III: 593), in contrast to the theme of Ren Descartes which was

developing rationalism. In sum, the insistence on the vitality is a cyclical bet, a

counterpoint to the objectification of culture to achieve the rational synthesis vitalism. This stylistic device reformulates biological categories to grant a new meaning. In this way, allows see -or naturalize- that culture is a function of life, through a more emotional than rational () approach (Costa, 2011: 114).

Quickly I will return to the philosophical content of the method of generations, but I would like to remember the impact of this idea to the national and international level. Great Ortegas disciples have continued to work on this method in different ways, or at least on its core. For example we find Pedro Lan Entralgo applying this method to aesthetic theory, or also find Xavier Zubiri and Jos Luis Lpez Aranguren transcending the structure that was established by Ortega (see Ortega, O.C. VI: 398578; Dobson, 1989a: 174-176). In any case, from my point of view, the most important development of this theory was conducted by Julin Maras (Maras, 1949), another important disciple of Ortega. Maras arrived to take over the post about generation in the International Dictionary of Social Sciences. Not in vain the final formulation of the idea of the historical dynamics as a generational relief, is recognized as a mainly Spanish contribution. In the international arena, we can find the work of sociologist karl Manheim, or previous developments, but similar to Lan Entralgo, as applied in the field of aesthetic philosophy. All of this without talking about the germ assumptions about the

generations in August Comte, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Wilhelm Dilthey and many other classic thinkers. Regarding spanish originality of the theory has been discussed about its authorship, and many have said that Manheim is the real father. Research has shown that Ortega and Manheim probably not read to each other. At this point, not wanting to fully embrace the theories of Gustavo Bueno1, I must defend the spanish participation. The fact is that this theory is used in sociology, to the point that the main followers of this theory in Spain and in general in the world are sociologists (Costa, 2011; Moreno, 2011), and we should not forget the illustrious Zygmunth Bauman talking about the virtues of the method of Ortega at a conference in Barcelona (Bauman, 2007). This fact, leads me to believe that it is necessary to distinguish between the sociological and philosophical application of the method. Undoubtedly, Ortega has been the author who linked the method with philosophy. However, their development affects not only philosophy but also with the aesthetics, ethics, and even politics, as pointed out by Costa The theory of generations is not only a historical or philosophical method. It
involves a whole network of elections and political conditions, social and biographical (Costa, 2011: 105).

After these brief reminders, I will go into the philosophy of the method of Ortega, and politics and ethics that from it we can extract. For Ortega: The generation,
dynamic compromise between mass and the individual, is the most important concept of history, and, as it were, the hinge upon which it executes its movements, and the generation that this call to action is

A generation that attends most radical crisis in modern history (Ortega, O.C. III: 563).

As pointed out Josep Luis Moreno Pestaa (Moreno, 2011), one can distinguish three uses at Ortegas generations: a theory of scientific, historic and political understood as a discourse on the organization and the ethics needed to define and connect the experience with other groups of individuals. El tema de nuestro tiempo (Ortega O.C. III) is the first work in which Ortega develops its approach over the generations. These three dimensions are not equally present in all texts and vary with time.
1

Who says that modern philosophy is radically spanish, see (Bueno, 1972).

Therefore, in Vieja y nueva poltica (Ortega O.C. II), an opening of the Spanish League of Education Policy in 1914, there was the political and ethical generations, with emphasis on the latter, as the social education program proposed by the League is particularly sensitive to this. On El tema de nuestro tiempo, however, appears as a clear scientific position that is mixed with politics, but the ethical dimension never disappears, indeed, is implied in the title. Finally, En torno a Galileo (Ortega O.C IV) represents the most complete version of the scientific generation, where the political and ethical dimensions spend more unnoticed (Costa, 2011: 106). After seeing this brief chronology of the method of Ortega, I want to note a vanishing point which fits a priori critique. We can say that Ortega is very focused on the present generation, and his allusions to future generations are few, compared to the importance, for example, that Marx attributed to them in building a better future. In this sense we hear echoes of a kind of presentism, which some theorists of intergenerational justice have doomed. We will maintain this idea in stand-by, remembering that Marx (or the marxists) spoke of utopia, while Ortega is based on a framework as concrete as the very life (see apart Dobson, 1994). At this time, allow me interrupt this exposition of Ortega, to remember some basic points of the work of Andrew Dobson, who curiously also seems to focus the subject of ethics and politics in the present generation. It has a very specific reason, we will see why. After that, I will try to present some reflections on the direct link between the philosophy of Dobson and Ortega.

The thought of Andrew Dobson. From the ontological twist to political turn Since the 90s, Dobson has gradually revolutionizing the world of political ecology. In one of its first articles (Dobson, 1989b), made clear that it was necessary a radicalization and a policy implementation of the values of deep ecology. Thus, Green political thought relocates the ecologism as a complete ideology in its own right, and also establishes an epistemological distinction that is critical to contemporary environmental philosophy: there are two poles of intensity in environmental policy, one is revolutionary (and radical) and another is purely reformer (Dobson, 1990).

In Spain, probably the only chapter of political and philosophical literature devoted exclusively to Dobson is performed by ngel Valencia Saiz (Valencia, 2009). Although I hope add to this my job. However, all the authors I have mentioned at the beginning recognized the decisive influence of Dobson, and from my point of view it is remarkable the harmony existing between Dobson and Jorge Riechmann (who in addition to eco-philosopher is one of the greatest contemporary spanish poets)2. Another Spanish, but in the international arena, as the sociologist Manuel Castells, also referred to a similar trend to that of Dobson to explain the dynamics of current environmentalism (Castells, 1998: 137, 151, 221, 227). As you know, Robyn Eckersley, John Brian, Marcel Wissenburg, etc., have worked alongside Dobson and about some of their ideas (to this we might add the comments and references made by Pepper, 1993: 31; Benton, 1994: 43; J. Barry, 1999: 94; Conelly, 2009: 55). Or even we can locate one of his contumacious critics, like Ingolfur Blhdorn (Blhdorn, 2000: 11, 21-23; 2007). However, in the opinion of Anthony Giddens, the distinction between two poles of radical environmental policy assumed now (no doubt thanks to Dobson) is similar to that made by Arne Naess. A pole is considered merely reformist, the other is seen as revolutionary, therefore Giddens states that The distinction is similar to that Arne Naess
made between shallow and deep ecology (Giddens, 1996: 211).

I also believe that Dobson is influenced by Arne Naess, but is able to expand the potential of ecological virtue proposed by the deep ecology. Rather, what makes Dobson, is to transform the principles of deep ecology in a concrete policy agenda and try to extend the possibilities for his philosophy. After causing this small earthquake in the world of political philosophy, Dobson returns with a magnificent analysis of the relationship between justice, the environment and perceptions of sustainability (Dobson, 1998). Dobson throws a bucket of cold water on the hot tempers of specific policies aimed at sustainable development plans. All that glitters is not gold, and Dobson teaches us in this work that we must carry out a thorough analysis of all gains and losses in each case before establishing policies. And

See: http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/bib/bib_autor/riechmann/pcuartonivel4cb8.html?conten=poesia_textos

of course, starting from a concept of sustainability that considers the natural value of each element of the ecosystem.

Future generationism. An ethical vacuum Among the proposals that Dobson warns us, we find one of the latest formulations in the field of responsibility for future generations. The author who formulates this idea is Brian Norton (Norton, 1982, 1991), and he asserts that defending only the interests of future generations, we are defending (for the same price) the interests of the eco-systemic biodiversity. Norton argues that future generations are interested in biodiversity and that's why we just have to worry about meeting the needs we thought we could have. Dobson then raises two questions, first, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to imagine what will be the preferences and needs of future generations of humans, second, protecting biodiversity only for the interest of future generations of humans, leaves out playing a considerable part of the ecological community; and also, clearly facing death (Dobson, 1998: 240-262). In my opinion, this idea of Norton, seems similar to the idea of sacrifice everything for future generations (less what they need), how Marx says, but this seems part of another story. Something very interesting, however, for construct this criticism is that Dobson called this option future generationism (Dobson, 1998: 245), implying that Norton indeed projects a sacrifice for future generations. Contrarily, Dobson recommends shifting the focus and object of the policy, philosophy and ethics to present items that are subject to contemporary circumstances. But, does this mean that Dobson also suffers from the dreaded 'presentism' by contemporary theorists of intergenerational justice? To keep the suspense, we will reserve this discussion temporarily. With your permission, I will try to suggest (very roughly because they are the initial stages of my research) the relationship between the philosophy of Jos Ortega y Gasset and Andrew Dobson.

Philosophical convergences between Jose Ortega y Gasset and Andrew Dobson This trip will be a little dizzy, more than I would like, but I want to point out a general route between the convergences of both authors. In any case, you can use the Dobsons monograph (Dobson, 1989a) to enter the work of Ortega. In fact, all the contents that I will mention (and not the three links with environmental perspectives that I pointed out initially) are collected and analyzed by Dobson. Curiously, Dobson did not worry too much about the ecological perspectives from Ortega, but that does not mean that a small Ortega's seed root in his mind. Ortega believes that philosophy should be subject to three conditions. First a imperative of pantonoma or whole, which says that all philosophy must be comprehensive in its approach to reality of everything, which should cover the whole universe unlike the mechanical sciences fragmenting complex reality. Second one imperative of autonomy, which says that philosophy should not rely on preconceived previous budgets, for example religious, kantian, etc. And last but not least, one imperative of clarity and rigor: clarity is courtesy of the philosopher, and this should express their ideas and concepts clear and understandable, away from religious mysticism (Dobson, 1989a: 109-144). For my part, I think we find echoes of these ideas in the thought of Dobson. Consider the importance that Dobson has attributed to the holistic vision for science, politics and philosophy; his interest in finding a rationale beyond the weak cosmopolitanism, and finally, remember the Dobson's primary effort for translating politically the mystique of deep ecology (Dobson, 1989b; 1993b; 2005; 2006b) In relation to perspectivism, Ortega believes that all life is defined by its perspective, by the peculiar viewpoint adopted to face the reality that surrounds him. In Ortega, life and perspective imply each other. Each being implies a certain perspective, a certain point of view, 'ethos' or teleology for the reality. Therefore, to make the truth, it is necessary to gather as many perspectives as possible. (Dobson, 1989a: 144-163). In sum, the self can not exist without the things, you cant talk about things without the self or about the ego without things. This is the essence of Ortegas words: I am myself and
my circumstances (...) (Ortega, O.C. I: 256).

10

Perspectivism has also been, and still is, a key element in the thought of Dobson, as seen in the work that I mentioned earlier and many more. Apart from the distinctions of degrees in environmentalism, perspectivism is perceived at the time in which Dobson strongly recommended that we must take into account in our policies, and our own private lives (Dobson, 2003, 2012), the point of view of all elements of the ecosystem. This idea is articulated by Dobson suggesting that it should constitute a democratic lobby representing the interests of the extensive nature, not human (Dobson, 1996). Something that has been very fruitful for the field of politics of nature, and which means that to build the true politics of nature we must take into account the perspective of each of its elements. Now I will take a little more speed to try to approach us to the idea of the vital reason or razn vital, what it was first translated in english by Dobson as the reason
from the point of view of life (Dobson, 1989a: 163-181). For Ortega, life is the

fundamental problem of philosophy and reason the fundamental instrument. The philosophy is pure ontology of being, that in the case of man becomes a antropontologa. On the other hand, the fundamental characteristic of life is its timing. Freedom and perspective that characterize life are not static, deploy and retract in a certain time, so that all life has a historical character (see Dobson, 2009; 2013). Inside this history, both the self, the circumstance, and the prospects of the 'ego' vary and are redefined. As I said, the resource of life to face the circumstances is the reason, she helps him deal with it in a sensible and positive way, and to form their life project. Also, we must remember that the circumstance is for Ortega: the physical and natural space (landscape), the historical moment, social status, the cultural situation -or in summary, the perspective from which I know the world. The problem is that the reason put forward by humans to face reality, is not a reason which starts from zero for each individual, but it is conditioned by inherited beliefs (Dobson, 1989a: 72-86). According to Ortega, beliefs are intellectual content inherited from one generation to another and impose a number of tradition-based perspectives on reality, seemingly irrefutable (albeit Ortega put them in crisis). On another level, the ideas are intellectual content that are created by certain groups of people at a specific time to meet particular situations, but over time, if these are useful 11

may turn into beliefs. The individual in every age can choose to lead a life inauthentic, assuming thoughtlessly the beliefs inherited from the past (Rise of the), or choose his own vocation, a life project presenting new ideas. The same thing happens to generations, some generations are characterized by inertia, and others for their encouragement of renewal. Ortega speaks of ascending generations (that will leave the intellectual molds) and descending generations (that are conformist). But with a little more complex vision, Ortega said that in every generation there are two kinds of person, the 'mass' and the intellectual minority elite that introduces new values and perspectives on life and reality. It is not difficult to perceive Ortegas notes that can lead us to think about the need for a virtuous citizenry. A citizen who wants to do good, not so due to a policy of sticks and carrots, but because they want to be better. Its a citizenship that must revolt against inherited beliefs and try to develop their own strategies to address the problem of his own time (Dobson, 2003; 2012b). As will be thinking, this is the ecological citizenship. Even on the idea that is presented by Dobson we can find echoes of the need for an elite (not necessarily despotic or segregation) to educate the masses, otherwise, this education will be conducted by the mechanisms of the market-driven system capitalist. The elite should be responsible for directing the policy of the state and try to educate the masses. When this does not happen, explodes the revolt of the masses, and the 'mass-man' take control of the society, which is put on drift, causing a deep social and political crisis. But, what is the best way to deal with this crisis, philosophically or politically? Acording to Costa:
The rational theory of vitalism and generations have placed the philosophy and historyreformulated as proposed by Ortega-in a special place when trying to understand the world. The policy is secondary, a consequence of different attitudes to life, and science, as pure reason, is incomplete. Philosophy must regain its preeminent place in the intellectual field, but this should change (Costa, 2011: 116).

From the point view of Dobson, philosophy is perhaps the most important, but he is well aware that today if it is true that philosophy has changed, it has becoming worse. Therefore, the policy is taken by Dobson as a tool to reform people's everyday 12

philosophy while reshaping at same time the field of international political relations. This represents further evidence that Dobson incorporates ideas from Ortega but is able to transcend them. We must recognize that today's problems even overflow the europeist dream of Ortega because they transcend all borders. I would go concluding this brief hermeneutics about these two radical and critics authors, being aware of the number of issues that remain unaddressed, but I hope to have aroused curiosity about the thought of Ortega y Gasset beyond the small and always sleepy Spain. Thus, I want try to conclude in three steps, first I will point a few last comments about Ortega, generations and Dobson. Second, I will present one proposal that may seem some metaphorical, but perhaps she should not be so metaphorical. Third, I'm going to try to finalize the text with the synthesis of a portion of my thesis which, once the work of hermeneutics and the fundamentation is completed, he will intended to provide the framework to discuss the philosopical basis of intergenerational ecological justice with the critical materials supplied for Andrew Dobson (and if I'm right, even from Ortega's legacy).

A few words about future generations and intergenerational justice today From my point of view, the current topic of responsibility for future generations has a germinal moment in this part of the work of Ortega (Historic method of generations). Translating this philosophy to the present moment, it is clear that if the issue of our time is the ecological crisis, from the thought of Ortega we can understand that are the generations who must assume the task of reconfiguring the legacy received to address the problems of the crisis. For my part, I think that Ortega intended to provide clues for specific ethical and political action, and this can only be made (logically) by the present generation who is living now. So I think Dobson is absolutely right when call to re-direct the policy attention to the elements and beings of the present moment. Probably justice intergenercional be an aporstic field, and is difficult, if not impossible, to find conclusive answers to the questions of prospective character (Dobson, 1998). All time I was talking about intergenerational justice, but without referring to anything in particular, let me tell you something now about the theory of 13

intergenerational justice and how presently is handled by academics. This was the subject of my research for the MA in ethics and democracy, and you can see a detailed analysis in the quoted text (Beneite, 2012a). However, I want remember some essential references. You can trace the philosophical foundation in the work of Hans Jonas (Jonas, 1984; see also Sikora and Barry, 1978; Partridge, 1981), it definitely picks up a trend that has been brewing, such as I mentioned, in Ortega and others (unfortunately, I do not know if Jonas came to read Ortegas work). On the other hand, you can find the political and rational basis (not metafisical, as Jonas) mainly in the work of John Rawls (Rawls, 1975). From Rawls, a debate erupts between contractarian and utilitarian tendencies, which unfortunately remains unfinished today and often seems a power struggle rather than a search for truth. In utilitarianism that reacting against Rawls, we find equally important authors who have participated in the debate, as Peter Singer (in a very small way), or many others much involved as Dieter Birnbacher (Birnbacher, 1994, 2006; see also Mulgan, 2006; Arrhenius, 2000.). Can also find communitarian approaches, as Avner De Shalit (De Shalit, 1995; see also Thompson, 2010), thoroughly criticized by Dobson. But I would like to draw attention to authors who have tried to speak of the rights of future generations (see Brown-Weiss, 1999). Some of these authors work hard for the inclusion of the protection of future generations in national constitutions. In this practical sense, are in the same Dobsons policy area when it comes to include direct representation in the game of democracy.

Joerg Chet Tremmel and Axel Gosseries on rights for future generations The best way to approach the contemporary topic of intergenerational justice is consult Das Journal fr Generationengerechtigkeit (has edition in English). It brings together virtually all professionals from different fields and approaches (from Emmanuel Agius to Wilfred Beckerman [Agius, 1998; 2006; Beckerman, 2001, 2006]), too many to mention here. While there are certainly two names that stand out in my opinion, and the two are relatively oriented to Rawls. They are Joerg Chet Tremmel 14

(Tremmel, 2006; 2008) from Germany and Axel Gosseries (Gosserires, 2004, 2009) from France (of course there are scholars working on these issues even in Asia). You can see their interesting works and monographs. All arguments are quite interesting and have brought some light to the actual development of responsibility for future generations. Again, I can not delve into their proposals, that on the other hand are a decanting logic of contemporary debates. As I said, both authors work on the basis of Rawls (while still know other proposals, like the ontology of Jonas or transgenerational communities). Therefore, suffer from the same problems that Rawls suffers, as brilliantly pointed out Dobson. Remember that one of the problems (and many others!) was the uncertainty of what capital notions included for Rawls, and Dobson, considering that the fact is inseparable from being and vice versa, said that critical natural capital should be the pre-conditional par excellence (Dobson, 1998: 127). But let's see how these two authors have tried to overcome the rawlsian lack of concreteness. According to Tremmel In the intergenerational context, the societal end is often
designed as the total value of various types of capital far more often than in the intragenerational context (Tremmel, 2008: 70). Gosseries, for instance, writes: It [the basket that is transferred by each generation to the next one, J.T.] contains a capital, broadly understood, which consists of a variety of elements, namely physical ones, but also technological, cultural, relational, political and other elements (Gosseries 2004, 40).

Concerning the content of this capital, Tremmel raises this distinction:

It is crucial to distinguish natural from artificial capital. Natural capital includes all the natural resources man can use or enjoy. Artificial capital refers to man-made values. That includes marketable goods and services, e. g. all technical plants, production methods, consumer goods, consultation services, and financial assets. Further-more, all social arrangements like laws, institutions, courts, parliaments, admini-stration systems, as well as economic and social principles are also part of the artificial capital. Then there is the so-called social capital: the quantity and quality of social contacts (Tremmel, 2008: 70).

Tremmel then presents a table that sets out the forms of capital, the Natural Capital is the first, and I contains the next features descriptive: Biodiversity, renew-able
and non-renew-able resources, sinks, atmosphere, ozone layer. Regarding how to calculate

the value of what passed at the end of the Term, the process indicated by Tremmel is:

15

Value at the beginning of the period naturally -losses/consumption + newly created capital (Tremmel, 2008: 72).

It might be interesting explore some of the following distinctions between types of capital on Tremmels scheme, for example, the immediately below called real equity by Tremmel, contains somethings like consumer goods, investment goods, infrastructure, buildings, and the question is now if there any of these things that are not make with some parts of natural capital. Perhaps we can say the same for each of the next items on Tremmel's table, another example can be the case of human capital. That contains the health condition, then, can we think of human health without reference to environmental health? Even the knowledge capital was historically built using tons and tons of paper (although the inexhaustible pdf is increasingly replacing the book). In any case, as Tremmel said, not all authors agree in distinguishing knowledge as a kind of capital: This knowledge can be either be free of charge
(knowledge stored in libraries) or be accessible against a fee (intellectual property rights, patents stored in patent offices). Most authors, however it, do not identify knowledge as a

seperate principal form of capital, this author however, consider that the key lies in cultural capital, and thus introduce us to the basic question: the whether arises question
naturally cultivated equity belongs to the category natural capital or real capital (which is part of the artificial capital) (Tremmel, 2008: 72).

So, what comprises the cultivated natural capital? , Tremmel says cultivated
natural capital is natural capital modified by man (e. g., aqua farms, farm animals,

farmland, commercial forests in the form of monocultures, zoos, laying batteries with genetically modified chicken, etc.) Note also that in Tremmel is not called critical natural capital but only natural capital. Thus he says: Cultivated as well as non-cultivated
natural capital serves man in many ways, yet cultivated natural capital does not fulfill the other purposes of non-cultivated natural capital, for instance of being a habitat for wild animals, and

bemoans that In many cases, it will not be possible to answer the question of whether
something is artificial or natural with a clear yes or no, but only with more or less (Tremmel, 2008: 72-73). To this difficulty, according to Tremmel, we must add the fact

that:

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The question of whether natural capital is purely a heritage (or a legacy to a certain extent) also arises: AIDS viruses are definitely a part of nature. But arent they rather a legacy for coming generations than a heritage? Can elements of natural capital be considered negative? The more deadly viruses are eliminated, the better? This leads us to evaluation problems between the instrumental and intrinsic value of nature which shall not be discussed any further here (Tremmel, 2008: 73).

On the other hand, we can see Tremmel (Tremmel, 2008: 74, footpage 228) quoting in this sense four Bryan Nortons works, but nothing about Dobson, and this provide us an intuition about her orientation about the sustainability. Fortunately, Tremmel says:
In actual fact, real capital is fully evaluated, but of natural capital, only the elements considered appraisable are taken into account, and continues, However, natural capital comprises more than that. The following segments of nature should definitely be included in the natural capital: the atmosphere, the ozone layer, global substance cycles, the climate system, soil, individuals of animals and plants, genetic and species diversity, the groundwater, streams, lakes, forests, and other ecosystems, mineral resources, and fossil energy carriers (Tremmel, 2008: 75).

Tremmel thus seems to be aware that () multifunctionality makes it difficult to

substitute it. It would be ideal if we had one or more replacement goods that could adequately fulfill all the environmental purposes of each of our present multifunctional envi-ronmental goods, and agreed with us in thinking that Realistically, however, we can at best have substitutes for ful-filling individual purposes: it is relatively easy to find construction material to replace wood, but almost impossible to replace the climate-stabilising function of the forest (Tremmel, 2008: 76). At last, Tremmel refers to Andrew Dobson to identify trends of "strong sustainability", according to Tremmel if we add this element could establish a theory of intergenerational justice that operate with the following maxim: The capital available to mankind shall increase/ stay
equal/may decrease over the course of time, but the natural capital must by all means be preserved. A condition is only acceptable if at least one type of capital is increased, but none is decreased (Tremmel, 2008: 76). After this,

inexplicably, Tremmel leads to the following reflection:

significant methodological difficulties arise if the term capital, which makes sense if used for real goods, is applied to nature. Even the terms of investment are fundamentally different: investments in real capital are always bound up with costs, whereas the idea of investing in natural capital seems unusual or even strange

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(And says happily!): Nature often recovers by itself if it is left alone. Therefore, the
investment is often -though not always- idleness (Tremmel, 2008: 81).

What does tell us Tremmel? Maybe we should not worry about the nature and let regenerate itself? I think if it is this, is very innocent. We can not let nature to the fate of any human project, certainly needs protection. This has been the problem identified by Dobson in the hypothesis of Norton, and still present in the current authors. So I think it is necessary to raise the need for intergenerational justice that also will incorporates radical ecological elements. For now, let me hint at acquiring a more biological ethos.

Biological ethos Recall that at the beginning we talked about the relative affinity between Ortega and some anti-darwinist biologists. In particular I mentioned to Jakov von Uexkll, who caused great impact on Ortega. Well, this biologist's work seems to have opened the possibilities for the development of one bio-semiotics, a more biological way of understanding semiotics. Considering this, and the idea of bio-mimicry proposed by Jorge Riechmann (which consists in adopting the rhythms and the biological processes for our social metabolism), I think it's time to make the move towards a complex and integrative bio-paradigm. However, this does not mean that we should add to all words or concepts the particle 'bio', because then happen how in Spain happened (when the bio yogurt of Danone became famous for their laxative properties and not by reason of being more ecological or naturally). From my point of view, humanity needs two new sensitive tools: first a better bio-hermeneutics necessary to understand and interpret signals from nonhuman natural world, and second, improved bio-rhetorical skills for a better discursive communication with the nonhuman natural world, while we walk towards a more naturalistic conception of the sense in which we conceive the discourses that spontaneously deploy living entities. To conclude, I will expose the provisional hypothesis where I would like to build the foundation for a more ecological justice.

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The quest for ecological justice. Provisional hypothesis After an inquiry, we can see that intergenerational justice theories have certain deficiencies when it comes to constitute the scope of their moral community, especially regarding the non-human natural world. However, it is possible to solve this anthropocentric bias gathering the materials presented on the work of Andrew Dobson, mainly located in the analyzes of the normative idea of 'sustainability' and its relation to the responsibility for future generations and democracy. With this, will we can develop an outline for a theory of intergenerational justice fuller opening considering the limits of their moral community towards a holistic understanding of our dependence on ecosystem. Thus, the content of responsibility for future generations, will be expanded to include the prospect of radical environmentalism, according to which there is no reason to discriminate between epochs, humans or species, in terms of justice. In short, the aim of this thesis is attempt to construct a theory of intergenerational justice, which, with the contribution of the materials submitted by Andrew Dobson, would constitute a moral community of justice that reaches all humans and all possible parts of the nonhuman world. Continuing the Dobson's critical wake, this justice could be understood as a most comprehensive, radical and transformative 'Justice', that the mere idea of a 'justice' (wich not claims to act on the causes, but to continue the same structures of exploitation and ecosystemic domination). No doubt that Andrew Dobson provides elements to construct a theory of justice "to the height of the circumstances" of the problem of our time. And this operates in the space between generations, establishing as irreducible conception of the good the sustainability of ecosystems. We find ourselves in a crisis that is ecological and existential. The proposals made from ecological modernization drive us toward a ethical vacuum regarding the nature, as in the case of future generationism from Norton, or to the total abandonment of our natural character in Slavoj Zizek (from whom, unfortunately, we have to omit the controversy). The topic of intergenerational justice, which has been proposed as solution to the ecological problem continuity, is a minefield of dead ends. Actually, the most important part in the ethical of "responsibility for future generations"

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are not "future generations", but the call to the present generation to take care of his responsibility. In this sense, I believe it is necessary to recover the essence of Ortega to continue driving our ineluctable condition of "ontological centaur" without becoming men without landscape. As last words, I would like to say something about the little environmentalism found in Ortega. Do not forget that when Ortega thought about the landscape (as we say in Spain) A chipmunk could still traverse the country without down from the trees. Try to do it today, but do not forget the visa. Thank you very much for your attention.

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Notes

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