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FinalDraft Title: Drafting Authors:

SummaryforPolicymakers SummaryforPolicymakers

IPCCWGIIIAR5

OttmarEdenhofer(Germany),RamnPichsMadruga (Cuba),YoubaSokona(Mali), ShardulAgrawala(France),IgorAlexeyevichBashmakov(Russia),GabrielBlanco (Argentina),JohnBroome(UK),ThomasBruckner(Germany),SteffenBrunner (Germany),MercedesBustamante(Brazil),LeonClarke(USA),FelixCreutzig (Germany),ShobhakarDhakal(Nepal/Thailand),NavrozK.Dubash(India),Patrick Eickemeier(Germany),EllieFarahani(Canada/Iran),ManfredFischedick(Germany), MarcFleurbaey(France),ReyerGerlagh(Netherlands),LuisGmezEcheverri (Colombia/Austria),ShreekantGupta(India),SujataGupta(India/Philippines),Jochen Harnisch(Germany),KejunJiang(China),SusanneKadner(Germany),SivanKartha (USA),StephanKlasen(Germany),CharlesKolstad(USA),VolkerKrey (Austria/Germany),HowardKunreuther(USA),OswaldoLucon(Brazil),OmarMasera (Mxico),JanMinx(Germany),YacobMulugetta(UK/Ethiopia),AnthonyPatt(USA), NijavalliH.Ravindranath(India),KeywanRiahi(Austria),JoyashreeRoy(India), RobertoSchaeffer(Brazil),SteffenSchlmer(Germany),KarenSeto(USA),Kristin Seyboth(USA),RalphSims(NewZealand),JimSkea(UK),PeteSmith(UK),Eswaran Somanathan(India),RobertStavins(USA),ChristophvonStechow(Germany),Thomas Sterner(Sweden),TaishiSugiyama(Japan),SangwonSuh(RepublicofKorea/USA), KevinChikaUrama(Nigeria/UK),DianargeVorsatz(Hungary),DavidVictor(USA), DadiZhou(China),JiZou(China),TimmZwickel(Germany)

Draft GiovanniBaiocchi(UK/Italy),HelenaChum (USA/Brazil),JanFuglestvedt(Norway), Contributing HelmutHaberl(Austria),EdgarHertwich(Norway/Austria),ElmarKriegler(Germany), Authors JoeriRogelj(Switzerland/Belgium),H.HolgerRogner(Austria/Germany),Michiel Schaeffer(Netherlands),SteveSmith(USA),DetlefvanVuuren(Netherlands),Ryan Wiser(USA)

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SPM: SummaryforPolicymakers Contents


SPM.1Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 3 SPM.2Approachestoclimatechangemitigation.............................................................................. 3 SPM.3Trendsinstocksandflowsofgreenhousegasesandtheirdrivers.........................................5 SPM.4Mitigationpathwaysandmeasuresinthecontextofsustainabledevelopment.................10 SPM.4.1Longtermmitigationpathways..................................................................................... 10 SPM.4.2Sectoralandcrosssectoralmitigationpathwaysandmeasures...................................20 SPM.4.2.1Crosssectoralmitigationpathwaysandmeasures................................................20 SPM.4.2.2Energysupply .......................................................................................................... 23 SPM.4.2.3Energyendusesectors ........................................................................................... 24 SPM.4.2.4Agriculture,ForestryandOtherLandUse(AFOLU)...............................................27 SPM.4.2.5HumanSettlements,InfrastructureandSpatialPlanning......................................28 SPM.5Mitigationpoliciesandinstitutions....................................................................................... 29 SPM.5.1Sectoralandnationalpolicies........................................................................................ 29 SPM.5.2Internationalcooperation.............................................................................................. 33

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SPM.1 Introduction
TheWorkingGroupIIIcontributiontotheIPCCsFifthAssessmentReport(AR5)assessesliterature onthescientific,technological,environmental,economicandsocialaspectsofmitigationofclimate change.ItbuildsupontheWorkingGroupIIIcontributiontotheIPCCsFourthAssessmentReport (AR4),theSpecialReportonRenewableEnergySourcesandClimateChangeMitigation(SRREN)and previousreportsandincorporatessubsequentnewfindingsandresearch.Thereportalsoassesses mitigationoptionsatdifferentlevelsofgovernanceandindifferenteconomicsectors,andthe societalimplicationsofdifferentmitigationpolicies,butdoesnotrecommendanyparticularoption formitigation. ThisSummaryforPolicymakers(SPM)followsthestructureoftheWorkingGroupIIIreport.The narrativeissupportedbyaseriesofhighlightedconclusionswhich,takentogether,provideaconcise summary.ThebasisfortheSPMcanbefoundinthechaptersectionsoftheunderlyingreportandin theTechnicalSummary(TS).Referencestothesearegiveninsquaredbrackets. Thedegreeofcertaintyinfindingsinthisassessment,asinthereportsofallthreeWorkingGroups, isbasedontheauthorteamsevaluationsofunderlyingscientificunderstandingandisexpressedas aqualitativelevelofconfidence(fromverylowtoveryhigh)and,whenpossible,probabilistically withaquantifiedlikelihood(fromexceptionallyunlikelytovirtuallycertain).Confidenceinthe validityofafindingisbasedonthetype,amount,quality,andconsistencyofevidence(e.g.,data, mechanisticunderstanding,theory,models,expertjudgment)andthedegreeofagreement.1 Probabilisticestimatesofquantifiedmeasuresofuncertaintyinafindingarebasedonstatistical analysisofobservationsormodelresults,orboth,andexpertjudgment.2Whereappropriate, findingsarealsoformulatedasstatementsoffactwithoutusinguncertaintyqualifiers.Within paragraphsofthissummary,theconfidence,evidence,andagreementtermsgivenforabolded findingapplytosubsequentstatementsintheparagraph,unlessadditionaltermsareprovided.

SPM.2 Approachestoclimatechangemitigation
Mitigationisahumaninterventiontoreducethesourcesorenhancethesinksofgreenhouse gases.Mitigation,togetherwithadaptationtoclimatechange,contributestotheobjective expressedinArticle2oftheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC): TheultimateobjectiveofthisConventionandanyrelatedlegalinstrumentsthatthe ConferenceofthePartiesmayadoptistoachieve,inaccordancewiththerelevant provisionsoftheConvention,stabilizationofgreenhousegasconcentrationsinthe atmosphereatalevelthatwouldpreventdangerousanthropogenicinterferencewiththe climatesystem.Suchalevelshouldbeachievedwithinatimeframesufficienttoallow
Thefollowingsummarytermsareusedtodescribetheavailableevidence:limited,medium,orrobust;and forthedegreeofagreement:low,medium,orhigh.Alevelofconfidenceisexpressedusingfivequalifiers: verylow,low,medium,high,andveryhigh,andtypesetinitalics,e.g.,mediumconfidence.Foragiven evidenceandagreementstatement,differentconfidencelevelscanbeassigned,butincreasinglevelsof evidenceanddegreesofagreementarecorrelatedwithincreasingconfidence.Formoredetails,pleaserefer totheguidancenoteforLeadAuthorsoftheIPCCFifthAssessmentReportonconsistenttreatmentof uncertainties. Thefollowingtermshavebeenusedtoindicatetheassessedlikelihoodofanoutcomeoraresult:virtually certain99100%probability,verylikely90100%,likely66100%,aboutaslikelyasnot3366%,unlikely0 33%,veryunlikely010%,exceptionallyunlikely01%.Additionalterms(morelikelythannot>50100%,and moreunlikelythanlikely0<50%)mayalsobeusedwhenappropriate.Assessedlikelihoodistypesetinitalics, e.g.,verylikely.
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ecosystemstoadaptnaturallytoclimatechange,toensurethatfoodproductionisnot threatenedandtoenableeconomicdevelopmenttoproceedinasustainablemanner. Climatepoliciescanbeinformedbythefindingsofscience,andsystematicmethodsfromother disciplines.[1.2,2.4,2.5,Box3.1] Sustainabledevelopmentandequityprovideabasisforassessingclimatepoliciesandhighlight theneedforaddressingtherisksofclimatechange.3Limitingtheeffectsofclimatechangeis necessarytoachievesustainabledevelopmentandequity,includingpovertyeradication.Atthe sametime,somemitigationeffortscouldundermineactionontherighttopromotesustainable development,andontheachievementofpovertyeradicationandequity.Consequently,a comprehensiveassessmentofclimatepoliciesinvolvesgoingbeyondafocusonmitigationand adaptationpoliciesalonetoexaminedevelopmentpathwaysmorebroadly,alongwiththeir determinants.[4.2,4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6,4.8] Effectivemitigationwillnotbeachievedifindividualagentsadvancetheirowninterests independently.Climatechangehasthecharacteristicsofacollectiveactionproblemattheglobal scale,becausemostgreenhousegases(GHGs)accumulateovertimeandmixglobally,andemissions byanyagent(e.g.,individual,community,company,country)affectotheragents.4International cooperationisthereforerequiredtoeffectivelymitigateGHGemissionsandaddressotherclimate changeissues[1.2.4,2.6.4,3.1,4.2,13.2,13.3].Furthermore,researchanddevelopmentinsupport ofmitigationcreatesknowledgespillovers.Internationalcooperationcanplayaconstructiverolein thedevelopment,diffusionandtransferofknowledgeandenvironmentallysoundtechnologies [1.4.4,3.11.6,11.8,13.9,14.4.3]. Issuesofequity,justice,andfairnessarisewithrespecttomitigationandadaptation.5Countries pastandfuturecontributionstotheaccumulationofGHGsintheatmospherearedifferent,and countriesalsofacevaryingchallengesandcircumstances,andhavedifferentcapacitiestoaddress mitigationandadaptation.Theevidencesuggeststhatoutcomesseenasequitablecanleadtomore effectivecooperation.[3.10,4.2.2,4.6.2] Manyareasofclimatepolicymakinginvolvevaluejudgementsandethicalconsiderations.These areasrangefromthequestionofhowmuchmitigationisneededtopreventdangerousinterference withtheclimatesystemtochoicesamongspecificpoliciesformitigationoradaptation[3.1,3.2]. Social,economicandethicalanalysesmaybeusedtoinformvaluejudgementsandmaytakeinto accountvaluesofvarioussorts,includinghumanwellbeing,culturalvaluesandnonhumanvalues. [3.4,3.10] Amongothermethods,economicevaluationiscommonlyusedtoinformclimatepolicydesign. Practicaltoolsforeconomicassessmentincludecostbenefitanalysis,costeffectivenessanalysis, multicriteriaanalysisandexpectedutilitytheory[2.5].Thelimitationsofthesetoolsarewell documented[3.5].Ethicaltheoriesbasedonsocialwelfarefunctionsimplythatdistributional weights,whichtakeaccountofthedifferentvalueofmoneytodifferentpeople,shouldbeapplied tomonetarymeasuresofbenefitsandharms[3.6.1,BoxTS.2].Whereasdistributionalweightinghas notfrequentlybeenappliedforcomparingtheeffectsofclimatepoliciesondifferentpeopleata singletime,itisstandardpractice,intheformofdiscounting,forcomparingtheeffectsatdifferent times[3.6.2].
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SeeWGIIAR5SPM.

Inthesocialsciencesthisisreferredtoasaglobalcommonsproblem.Asthisexpressionisusedinthesocial sciences,ithasnospecificimplicationsforlegalarrangementsorforparticularcriteriaregardingeffort sharing.


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SeeFAQ3.2forclarificationoftheseconcepts.Thephilosophicalliteratureonjusticeandotherliteraturecan illuminatetheseissues[3.2,3.3,4.6.2].

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Climatepolicyintersectswithothersocietalgoalscreatingthepossibilityofcobenefitsoradverse sideeffects.Theseintersections,ifwellmanaged,canstrengthenthebasisforundertaking climateaction.Mitigationandadaptationcanpositivelyornegativelyinfluencetheachievementof othersocietalgoals,suchasthoserelatedtohumanhealth,foodsecurity,biodiversity,local environmentalquality,energyaccess,livelihoods,andequitablesustainabledevelopment;andvice versa,policiestowardothersocietalgoalscaninfluencetheachievementofmitigationand adaptationobjectives[4.2,4.3,4.4,4.5,4.6,4.8].Theseinfluencescanbesubstantial,although sometimesdifficulttoquantify,especiallyinwelfareterms[3.6.3].Thismultiobjectiveperspectiveis importantinpartbecauseithelpstoidentifyareaswheresupportforpoliciesthatadvancemultiple goalswillberobust[1.2.1,4.2,4.8,6.6.1]. Climatepolicymaybeinformedbyaconsiderationofadiversearrayofrisksanduncertainties, someofwhicharedifficulttomeasure,notablyeventsthatareoflowprobabilitybutwhichwould haveasignificantimpactiftheyoccur.SinceAR4,thescientificliteraturehasexaminedrisksrelated toclimatechange,adaptation,andmitigationstrategies.Accuratelyestimatingthebenefitsof mitigationtakesintoaccountthefullrangeofpossibleimpactsofclimatechange,includingthose withhighconsequencesbutalowprobabilityofoccurrence.Thebenefitsofmitigationmay otherwisebeunderestimated(highconfidence)[2.5,2.6,Box3.9].Thechoiceofmitigationactionsis alsoinfluencedbyuncertaintiesinmanysocioeconomicvariables,includingtherateofeconomic growthandtheevolutionoftechnology(highconfidence)[2.6,6.3]. Thedesignofclimatepolicyisinfluencedbyhowindividualsandorganizationsperceiverisksand uncertaintiesandtakethemintoaccount.Peopleoftenutilizesimplifieddecisionrulessuchasa preferenceforthestatusquo.Individualsandorganizationsdifferintheirdegreeofriskaversionand therelativeimportanceplacedonneartermversuslongtermramificationsofspecificactions[2.4]. Withthehelpofformalmethods,policydesigncanbeimprovedbytakingintoaccountrisksand uncertaintiesinnatural,socioeconomic,andtechnologicalsystemsaswellasdecisionprocesses, perceptions,valuesandwealth[2.5].

SPM.3 Trendsinstocksandflowsofgreenhousegasesandtheirdrivers
TotalanthropogenicGHGemissionshavecontinuedtoincreaseover1970to2010withlarger absolutedecadalincreasestowardtheendofthisperiod(highconfidence).Despiteagrowing numberofclimatechangemitigationpolicies,annualGHGemissionsgrewonaverageby1.0giga tonnecarbondioxideequivalent(GtCO2eq)(2.2%)peryearfrom2000to2010comparedto0.4 GtCO2eq(1.3%)peryearfrom1970to2000(FigureSPM.1).6,7TotalanthropogenicGHGemissions werethehighestinhumanhistoryfrom2000to2010andreached49(4.5)GtCO2eq/yrin2010.The globaleconomiccrisis2007/2008onlytemporarilyreducedemissions.[1.3,5.2,13.3,15.2.2,Box TS.5,Figure15.1] CO2emissionsfromfossilfuelcombustionandindustrialprocessescontributedabout78%ofthe totalGHGemissionincreasefrom1970to2010,withasimilarpercentagecontributionforthe period20002010(highconfidence).FossilfuelrelatedCO2emissionsreached32(2.7)GtCO2/yr,in 2010,andgrewfurtherbyabout3%between2010and2011andbyabout12%between2011and 2012.Ofthe49(4.5)GtCO2eq/yrintotalanthropogenicGHGemissionsin2010,CO2remainsthe majoranthropogenicGHGaccountingfor76%(383.8GtCO2eq/yr)oftotalanthropogenicGHG emissionsin2010.16%(7.81.6GtCO2eq/yr)comefrommethane(CH4),6.2%(3.11.9GtCO2eq/yr)
ThroughouttheSPM,emissionsofGHGsareweightedbyGlobalWarmingPotentialswitha100yeartime horizon(GWP100)fromtheIPCCSecondAssessmentReport.Allmetricshavelimitationsanduncertaintiesin assessingconsequencesofdifferentemissions.[3.9.6,BoxTS.5,AnnexII.2.9,WGIAR5SPM] InthisSPM,uncertaintyinhistoricGHGemissiondataisreportedusing90%uncertaintyintervalsunless otherwisestated.GHGemissionlevelsareroundedtotwosignificantdigitsthroughoutthisdocument.
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fromnitrousoxide(N2O),and2.0%(1.00.2GtCO2eq/yr)fromfluorinatedgases(FigureSPM.1). Annually,since1970,about25%ofanthropogenicGHGemissionshavebeenintheformofnonCO2 gases.8[1.2,5.2]

Figure SPM.1. Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2eq/yr) by groups of gases 19702010: CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes; CO2 from Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); fluorinated gases8 covered under the Kyoto Protocol (F-gases). At the right side of the figure GHG emissions in 2010 are shown again broken down into these components with the associated uncertainties (90% confidence interval) indicated by the error bars. Total anthropogenic GHG emissions uncertainties are derived from the individual gas estimates as described in Chapter 5 [5.2.3.6]. Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion are known within 8% uncertainty (90% confidence interval). CO2 emissions from FOLU have very large uncertainties attached in the order of 50%. Uncertainty for global emissions of CH4, N2O and the Fgases has been estimated as 20%, 60% and 20%, respectively. 2010 was the most recent year for which emission statistics on all gases as well as assessment of uncertainties were essentially complete at the time of data cut off for this report. Emissions are converted into CO2-equivalents based on GWP1006 from the IPCC Second Assessment Report. The emission data from FOLU represents land-based CO2 emissions from forest fires, peat fires and peat decay that approximate to net CO2 flux from the FOLU as described in chapter 11 of this report. Average annual growth rate over different periods is highlighted with the brackets. [Figure 1.3, Figure TS.1] [Subject to final quality check and copy edit.]

AbouthalfofcumulativeanthropogenicCO2emissionsbetween1750and2010haveoccurredin thelast40years(highconfidence).In1970,cumulativeCO2emissionsfromfossilfuelcombustion, cementproductionandflaringsince1750were42035GtCO2;in2010,thatcumulativetotalhad tripledto1300110GtCO2(FigureSPM.2).CumulativeCO2emissionsfromForestryandOtherLand Use(FOLU)9since1750increasedfrom490180GtCO2in1970to680300GtCO2in2010.[5.2]


Inthisreport,dataonnonCO2GHGs,includingfluorinatedgases,istakenfromtheEDGARdatabase(Annex II.9),whichcoverssubstancesincludedintheKyotoProtocolinitsfirstcommitmentperiod. ForestryandOtherLandUse(FOLU)alsoreferredtoasLULUCF(LandUse,LandUseChange,and Forestry)isthesubsetofAgriculture,ForestryandOtherLandUse(AFOLU)emissionsandremovalsofGHGs relatedtodirecthumaninducedlanduse,landusechangeandforestryactivitiesexcludingagricultural emissionsandremovals(seeWGIIIAR5Glossary).
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AnnualanthropogenicGHGemissionshaveincreasedby10GtCO2eqbetween2000and2010,with thisincreasedirectlycomingfromenergysupply(47%),industry(30%),transport(11%)and buildings(3%)sectors(mediumconfidence).Accountingforindirectemissionsraisesthe contributionsofthebuildingsandindustrysectors(highconfidence).Since2000,GHGemissions havebeengrowinginallsectors,exceptAFOLU.Ofthe49(4.5)GtCO2eqemissionsin2010,35%(17 GtCO2eq)ofGHGemissionswerereleasedintheenergysupplysector,24%(12GtCO2eq,net emissions)inAFOLU,21%(10GtCO2eq)inindustry,14%(7.0GtCO2eq)intransportand6.4%(3.2 GtCO2eq)inbuildings.Whenemissionsfromelectricityandheatproductionareattributedtothe sectorsthatusethefinalenergy(i.e.indirectemissions),thesharesoftheindustryandbuildings sectorsinglobalGHGemissionsareincreasedto31%and19%,respectively(FigureSPM.2).[7.3,8.2, 9.2,10.3,11.2]

Figure SPM.2. Total anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2eq/yr) by economic sectors. Inner circle shows direct GHG emission shares (in % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) of five economic sectors in 2010. Pull-out shows how indirect CO2 emission shares (in % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) from electricity and heat production are attributed to sectors of final energy use. Other Energy refers to all GHG emission sources in the energy sector as defined in Annex II other than electricity and heat production [A.II.9.1]. The emissions data from Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) includes land-based CO2 emissions from forest fires, peat fires and peat decay that approximate to net CO2 flux from the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) sub-sector as described in Chapter 11 of this report. Emissions are converted into CO2-equivalents based on 6 GWP100 from the IPCC Second Assessment Report. Sector definitions are provided in Annex II.9. [Figure 1.3a, Figure TS.3 a/b] [Subject to final quality check and copy edit.]

Globally,economicandpopulationgrowthcontinuetobethemostimportantdriversofincreases inCO2emissionsfromfossilfuelcombustion.Thecontributionofpopulationgrowthbetween 2000and2010remainedroughlyidenticaltothepreviousthreedecades,whilethecontributionof economicgrowthhasrisensharply(highconfidence).Between2000and2010,bothdrivers outpacedemissionreductionsfromimprovementsinenergyintensity(FigureSPM.3).Increaseduse ofcoalrelativetootherenergysourceshasreversedthelongstandingtrendofgradual decarbonizationoftheworldsenergysupply.[1.3,5.3,7.2,14.3,TS.2.2]

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Figure SPM.3. Decomposition of the decadal change in total global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion by four driving factors; population, income (GDP) per capita, energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy. The bar segments show the changes associated with each factor alone, holding the respective other factors constant. Total decadal changes are indicated by a triangle. Changes are measured in giga tonnes (Gt) of CO2 emissions per decade; income is converted into common units using purchasing power parities. [Figure 1.7] [Subject to final quality check and copy edit.]

WithoutadditionaleffortstoreduceGHGemissionsbeyondthoseinplacetoday,emissions growthisexpectedtopersistdrivenbygrowthinglobalpopulationandeconomicactivities. Baselinescenarios,thosewithoutadditionalmitigation,resultinglobalmeansurfacetemperature increasesin2100from3.7to4.8Ccomparedtopreindustriallevels10(medianvalues;therangeis 2.5Cto7.8Cwhenincludingclimateuncertainty,seeTableSPM.1)11(highconfidence).The emissionscenarioscollectedforthisassessmentrepresentfullradiativeforcingincludingGHGs, troposphericozone,aerosolsandalbedochange.Baselinescenarios(scenarioswithoutexplicit additionaleffortstoconstrainemissions)exceed450partspermillion(ppm)CO2eqby2030and reachCO2eqconcentrationlevelsbetween750andmorethan1300ppmCO2eqby2100.Thisis similartotherangeinatmosphericconcentrationlevelsbetweentheRCP6.0andRCP8.5pathways
Basedonthelongestglobalsurfacetemperaturedatasetavailable,theobservedchangebetweenthe averageoftheperiod18501900andoftheAR5referenceperiod(19862005)is0.61C(595%confidence interval:0.55to0.67C)[WGIAR5SPM.E],whichisusedhereasanapproximationofthechangeinglobal meansurfacetemperaturesincepreindustrialtimes,referredtoastheperiodbefore1750. Theclimateuncertaintyreflectsthe5thto95thpercentileofclimatemodelcalculationsdescribedinTable SPM.1.
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in2100.12Forcomparison,theCO2eqconcentrationin2011isestimatedtobe430ppm(uncertainty range340520ppm)13.[6.3,BoxTS.6;WGIAR5FigureSPM.5,WGI8.5,WGI12.3]
Forthepurposeofthisassessment,roughly300baselinescenariosand900mitigationscenarioswere collectedthroughanopencallfromintegratedmodellingteamsaroundtheworld.Thesescenariosare complementarytotheRepresentativeConcentrationPathways(RCPs,seeWGIIIAR5Glossary).TheRCPsare identifiedbytheirapproximatetotalradiativeforcinginyear2100relativeto1750:2.6Wattspersquare meter(Wm2)forRCP2.6,4.5Wm2forRCP4.5,6.0Wm2forRCP6.0,and8.5Wm2forRCP8.5.Thescenarios collectedforthisassessmentspanaslightlybroaderrangeofconcentrationsintheyear2100thanthefour RCPs.
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Thisisbasedontheassessmentoftotalanthropogenicradiativeforcingfor2011relativeto1750inWGI,i.e. 2.3Wm2,uncertaintyrange1.1to3.3Wm2.[WGIAR5FigureSPM.5,WGI8.5,WGI12.3]

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SPM.4 Mitigationpathwaysandmeasuresinthecontextofsustainable development


SPM.4.1 Longtermmitigationpathways
Therearemultiplescenarioswitharangeoftechnologicalandbehavioraloptions,withdifferent characteristicsandimplicationsforsustainabledevelopment,thatareconsistentwithdifferent levelsofmitigation.Forthisassessment,about900mitigationscenarioshavebeencollectedina databasebasedonpublishedintegratedmodels.14Thisrangespansatmosphericconcentration levelsin2100from430ppmCO2eqtoabove720ppmCO2eq,whichiscomparabletothe2100 forcinglevelsbetweenRCP2.6andRCP6.0.Scenariosoutsidethisrangewerealsoassessed includingsomescenarioswithconcentrationsin2100below430ppmCO2eq(foradiscussionof thesescenariosseebelow).Themitigationscenariosinvolveawiderangeoftechnological, socioeconomic,andinstitutionaltrajectories,butuncertaintiesandmodellimitationsexistand developmentsoutsidethisrangearepossible(FigureSPM.4,toppanel).[6.1,6.2,6.3,TS.3.1,Box TS.6]
ThelongtermscenariosassessedinWGIIIweregeneratedprimarilybylargescale,integratedmodelsthat projectmanykeycharacteristicsofmitigationpathwaystomidcenturyandbeyond.Thesemodelslinkmany importanthumansystems(e.g.,energy,agricultureandlanduse,economy)withphysicalprocessesassociated withclimatechange(e.g.,thecarboncycle).Themodelsapproximatecosteffectivesolutionsthatminimize theaggregateeconomiccostsofachievingmitigationoutcomes,unlesstheyarespecificallyconstrainedto behaveotherwise.Theyaresimplified,stylizedrepresentationsofhighlycomplex,realworldprocesses,and thescenariostheyproducearebasedonuncertainprojectionsaboutkeyeventsanddriversoveroften centurylongtimescales.Simplificationsanddifferencesinassumptionsarethereasonwhyoutputgenerated fromdifferentmodels,orversionsofthesamemodel,candiffer,andprojectionsfromallmodelscandiffer considerablyfromtherealitythatunfolds.[BoxTS.7,6.2]
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Figure SPM.4. Pathways of global GHG emissions (GtCO2eq/yr) in baseline and mitigation scenarios for different long-term concentration levels (upper panel) and associated upscaling requirements of low-carbon energy (% of primary energy) for 2030, 2050 and 2100 compared to 2010 levels in mitigation scenarios (lower panel). The upper and lower panels exclude scenarios with limited technology availability and the lower panel in addition excludes scenarios that assume exogenous carbon price trajectories. [Figure 6.7, Figure 7.16] [Subject to final quality check and copy edit.]

Mitigationscenariosinwhichitislikelythatthetemperaturechangecausedbyanthropogenic GHGemissionscanbekepttolessthan2Crelativetopreindustriallevelsarecharacterizedby atmosphericconcentrationsin2100ofabout450ppmCO2eq(highconfidence).Mitigation scenariosreachingconcentrationlevelsofabout500ppmCO2eqby2100aremorelikelythannotto limittemperaturechangetolessthan2Crelativetopreindustriallevels,unlesstheytemporarily overshootconcentrationlevelsofroughly530ppmCO2eqbefore2100,inwhichcasetheyare aboutaslikelyasnottoachievethatgoal.15Scenariosthatreach530to650ppmCO2eq concentrationsby2100aremoreunlikelythanlikelytokeeptemperaturechangebelow2Crelative topreindustriallevels.Scenariosthatreachabout650ppmCO2eqby2100areunlikelytolimit temperaturechangetobelow2Crelativetopreindustriallevels.Mitigationscenariosinwhich
Mitigationscenarios,includingthosereaching2100concentrationsashighasorhigherthan550ppmCO2eq, cantemporarilyovershootatmosphericCO2eqconcentrationlevelsbeforedescendingtolowerlevelslater. Suchconcentrationovershootinvolveslessmitigationintheneartermwithmorerapidanddeeperemissions reductionsinthelongrun.Overshootincreasestheprobabilityofexceedinganygiventemperaturegoal.[6.3, TableSPM.1]
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temperatureincreaseismorelikelythannottobelessthan1.5Crelativetopreindustriallevelsby 2100arecharacterizedbyconcentrationsin2100ofbelow430ppmCO2eq.Temperaturepeaks duringthecenturyandthendeclinesinthesescenarios.Probabilitystatementsregardingother levelsoftemperaturechangecanbemadewithreferencetoTableSPM.1.[6.3,BoxTS.6]

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Table SPM.1: Key characteristics of the scenarios collected and assessed for WGIII AR5. For all parameters, the 10th to 90th percentile of the scenarios is 1,2 shown . [Table 6.3]
CO2eq Concentrations in 2100 (CO2eq) Subcategories Category label (concentration range) 9 < 430 450 (430480) 500 (480530) Total range 1,10 No overshoot of 530 ppm CO2eq Overshoot of 530 ppm CO2eq No overshoot of 580 ppm CO2eq Overshoot of 580 ppm CO2eq Total range RCP4.5 (650720) (7201000) >1000 1 Total range Total range Total range RCP6.0 RCP8.5 13101750 15701940 18402310 25703340 36204990 53507010 11to17 18to 54 52to95 54to21 7to 72 74to178 2.62.9 (1.84.5) 3.13.7 (2.15.8) Unlikely11 4.14.8 (2.87.8) Unlikely11 Unlikely Cumulative CO2 emission3 (GtCO2) Change in CO2eq emissions compared to 2010 in (%)4 2050 2100 2100 Temperature change (C)7 Temperature change (relative to 18501900)5,6 Likelihood of staying below temperature level over the 21st century8 1.5C 2.0 C 3.0 C 4.0 C

Relative position of the RCPs5

20112050

20112100

RCP2.6

5501300 8601180

Only a limited number of individual model studies have explored levels below 430 ppm CO2eq More unlikely 72to41 118to78 1.51.7 (1.02.8) 6301180 than likely 9601430 9901550 12402240 11702100 18702440 57to42 55to 25 47to19 16to7 38to24 107to73 114to90 81to59 183to86 134to50 1.71.9 (1.22.9) 1.82.0 (1.23.3) 2.02.2 (1.43.6) 2.12.3 (1.43.6) 2.32.6 (1.54.2) Unlikely

Likely More likely than not About as likely as not More unlikely than likely12 More likely than not More unlikely than likely Unlikely More unlikely than likely

11301530 10701460 14201750 12601640

Likely Likely

550 (530580) (580650)

The'totalrange'forthe430480ppmCO2eqscenarioscorrespondstotherangeofthe1090thpercentileofthesubcategoryofthesescenariosshownin table6.3.2Baselinescenarios(seeSPM.3)arecategorizedinthe>1000and7501000ppmCO2eqcategories.Thelattercategoryincludesalsomitigation scenarios.Thebaselinescenariosinthelattercategoryreachatemperaturechangeof2.55.8Cabovepreindustrialin2100.Togetherwiththebaseline scenariosinthe>1000ppmCO2eqcategory,thisleadstoanoverall2100temperaturerangeof2.57.8C(median:3.74.8C)forbaselinescenariosacross bothconcentrationcategories.3ForcomparisonofthecumulativeCO2emissionsestimatesassessedherewiththosepresentedinWGI,anamountof515 [445to585]GtC(1890[1630to2150]GtCO2),wasalreadyemittedby2011since1870[SectionWGI12.5].Notethatcumulativeemissionsarepresented herefordifferentperiodsoftime(20112050and20112100)whilecumulativeemissionsinWGIarepresentedastotalcompatibleemissionsfortheRCPs (20122100)orfortotalcompatibleemissionsforremainingbelowagiventemperaturetargetwithagivenlikelihood.[WGITableSPM.3,WGISPM.E.8] 4 Theglobal2010emissionsare31%abovethe1990emissions(consistentwiththehistoricGHGemissionestimatespresentedinthisreport).CO2eq emissionsincludethebasketofKyotogases(CO2,CH4,N2OaswellasFgases).5TheassessmentinWGIIIinvolvesalargenumberofscenariospublishedin thescientificliteratureandisthusnotlimitedtotheRCPs.Toevaluatethegreenhousegasconcentrationandclimateimplicationsofthesescenarios,the MAGICCmodelwasusedinaprobabilisticmode(seeAnnexII).ForacomparisonbetweenMAGICCmodelresultsandtheoutcomesofthemodelsusedin WGI,seeSectionWGI12.4.1.2andWGI12.4.8and6.3.2.6.ReasonsfordifferenceswithWGISPMTable.2includethedifferenceinreferenceyear(1986

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2005vs.18501900here),differenceinreportingyear(20812100vs2100here),setupofsimulation(CMIP5concentrationdrivenversusMAGICC emissiondrivenhere),andthewidersetofscenarios(RCPsversusthefullsetofscenariosintheWGIIIAR5scenariodatabasehere).6Temperaturechange isreportedfortheyear2100,whichisnotdirectlycomparabletotheequilibriumwarmingreportedinAR4(Table3.5,Chapter3WGIII).Forthe2100 temperatureestimates,thetransientclimateresponse(TCR)isthemostrelevantsystemproperty.Theassumed90thpercentileuncertaintyrangeofthe TCRforMAGICCis1.22.6C(median1.8C).Thiscomparestothe90thpercentilerangeofTCRbetween1.22.4CforCMIP5(WGI9.7)andanassessed likelyrangeof12.5CfrommultiplelinesofevidencereportedintheIPCCAR5WGIreport(Box12.2inchapter12.5).7Temperaturechangein2100is providedforamedianestimateoftheMAGICCcalculations,whichillustratesdifferencesbetweentheemissionspathwaysofthescenariosineach category.Therangeoftemperaturechangeintheparenthesesincludesinadditionalsothecarboncycleandclimatesystemuncertaintiesasrepresented bytheMAGICCmodel(see6.3.2.6forfurtherdetails).Thetemperaturedatacomparedtothe18501900referenceyearwascalculatedbytakingall projectedwarmingrelativeto19862005,andadding0.61Cfor19862005comparedto18501900,basedonHadCRUT4(seeWGITableSPM.2).8The assessmentinthistableisbasedontheprobabilitiescalculatedforthefullensembleofscenariosinWGIIIusingMAGICCandtheassessmentinWGIofthe uncertaintyofthetemperatureprojectionsnotcoveredbyclimatemodels.ThestatementsarethereforeconsistentwiththestatementsinWGI,whichare basedontheCMIP5runsoftheRCPsandtheassesseduncertainties.Hence,thelikelihoodstatementsreflectdifferentlinesofevidencefrombothWGs. ThisWGImethodwasalsoappliedforscenarioswithintermediateconcentrationlevelswherenoCMIP5runsareavailable.Thelikelihoodstatementsare indicativeonly(6.3),andfollowbroadlythetermsusedbytheWGISPMfortemperatureprojections:likely66100%,morelikelythannot>50100%,about aslikelyasnot3366%,andunlikely033%.Inadditionthetermmoreunlikelythanlikely0<50%isused.9TheCO2equivalentconcentrationincludesthe forcingofallGHGsincludinghalogenatedgasesandtroposphericozone,aerosolsandalbedochange(calculatedonthebasisofthetotalforcingfroma simplecarboncycle/climatemodelMAGICC).10Thevastmajorityofscenariosinthiscategoryovershootthecategoryboundaryof480ppmCO2eq concentrations.11ForscenariosinthiscategorynoCMIP5run(WGIAR5:Chapter12,Table12.3)aswellasnoMAGICCrealization(6.3)staysbelowthe respectivetemperaturelevel.Still,anunlikelyassignmentisgiventoreflectuncertaintiesthatmightnotbereflectedbythecurrentclimatemodels. 12 Scenariosinthe580650ppmCO2eqcategoryincludebothovershootscenariosandscenariosthatdonotexceedtheconcentrationlevelatthehighend ofthecategory(likeRCP4.5).Thelattertypeofscenarios,ingeneral,haveanassessedprobabilityofmoreunlikelythanlikelytoexceedthe2C temperaturelevel,whiletheformeraremostlyassessedtohaveanunlikelyprobabilityofexceedingthislevel.[Subjecttofinalqualitycheckandcopyedit.]

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Scenariosreachingatmosphericconcentrationlevelsofabout450ppmCO2eqby2100(consistent withalikelychancetokeeptemperaturechangebelow2Crelativetopreindustriallevels) includesubstantialcutsinanthropogenicGHGemissionsbymidcenturythroughlargescale changesinenergysystemsandpotentiallylanduse(highconfidence).Scenariosreachingthese concentrationsby2100arecharacterizedbylowerglobalGHGemissionsin2050thanin2010,40% to70%lowerglobally16,andemissionslevelsnearzeroGtCO2eqorbelowin2100.Inscenarios reaching500ppmCO2eqby2100,2050emissionslevelsare25%to55%lowerthanin2010globally. Inscenariosreaching550ppmCO2eq,emissionsin2050arefrom5%above2010levelsto45% below2010levelsglobally(TableSPM.1).Atthegloballevel,scenariosreaching450ppmCO2eqare alsocharacterizedbymorerapidimprovementsofenergyefficiency,atriplingtonearlya quadruplingoftheshareofzeroandlowcarbonenergysupplyfromrenewables,nuclearenergy andfossilenergywithcarbondioxidecaptureandstorage(CCS),orbioenergywithCCS(BECCS)by theyear2050(FigureSPM.4,lowerpanel).Thesescenariosdescribeawiderangeofchangesinland use,reflectingdifferentassumptionsaboutthescaleofbioenergyproduction,afforestation,and reduceddeforestation.Alloftheseemissions,energy,andlandusechangesvaryacrossregions.17 Scenariosreachinghigherconcentrationsincludesimilarchanges,butonaslowertimescale.Onthe otherhand,scenariosreachinglowerconcentrationsrequirethesechangesonafastertimescale. [6.3,7.11] Mitigationscenariosreachingabout450ppmCO2eqin2100typicallyinvolvetemporaryovershoot ofatmosphericconcentrations,asdomanyscenariosreachingabout500ppmto550ppmCO2eq in2100.Dependingontheleveloftheovershoot,overshootscenariostypicallyrelyonthe availabilityandwidespreaddeploymentofBECCSandafforestationinthesecondhalfofthe century.TheavailabilityandscaleoftheseandotherCarbonDioxideRemoval(CDR)technologies andmethodsareuncertainandCDRtechnologiesandmethodsare,tovaryingdegrees,associated withchallengesandrisks(seeSectionSPM4.2)(highconfidence).18CDRisalsoprevalentinmany scenarioswithoutovershoottocompensateforresidualemissionsfromsectorswheremitigationis moreexpensive.ThereisonlylimitedevidenceonthepotentialforlargescaledeploymentofBECCS, largescaleafforestation,andotherCDRtechnologiesandmethods.[2.6,6.3,6.9.1,Figure6.7,7.11, 11.13] EstimatedglobalGHGemissionslevelsin2020basedontheCancnPledgesarenotconsistent withcosteffectivelongtermmitigationtrajectoriesthatareatleastaslikelyasnottolimit temperaturechangeto2Crelativetopreindustriallevels(2100concentrationsofabout450and about500ppmCO2eq),buttheydonotprecludetheoptiontomeetthatgoal(highconfidence). Meetingthisgoalwouldrequirefurthersubstantialreductionsbeyond2020.TheCancnPledgesare broadlyconsistentwithcosteffectivescenariosthatarelikelytokeeptemperaturechangebelow 3Crelativetopreindustriallevels.[6.4,13.13,FiguresTS.11,TS.13]
ThisrangediffersfromtherangeprovidedforasimilarconcentrationcategoryinAR4(50%to85%lower than2000forCO2only).Reasonsforthisdifferenceincludethatthisreporthasassessedasubstantiallylarger numberofscenariosthaninAR4andlooksatallGHGs.Inaddition,alargeproportionofthenewscenarios includenetnegativeemissionstechnologies(seebelow).Otherfactorsincludetheuseof2100concentration levelsinsteadofstabilizationlevelsandtheshiftinreferenceyearfrom2000to2010.Scenarioswithhigher emissionsin2050arecharacterizedbyagreaterrelianceonCarbonDioxideRemoval(CDR)technologies beyondmidcentury. Atthenationallevel,changeisconsideredmosteffectivewhenitreflectscountryandlocalvisionsand approachestoachievingsustainabledevelopmentaccordingtonationalcircumstancesandpriorities[6.4, 11.8.4,WGIIAR5SPM]. AccordingtoWGI,CDRmethodshavebiogeochemicalandtechnologicallimitationstotheirpotentialonthe globalscale.ThereisinsufficientknowledgetoquantifyhowmuchCO2emissionscouldbepartiallyoffsetby CDRonacenturytimescale.CDRmethodscarrysideeffectsandlongtermconsequencesonaglobalscale. [WGIAR5SPM.E.8]
18 17 16

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Delayingmitigationeffortsbeyondthoseinplacetodaythrough2030isestimatedtosubstantially increasethedifficultyofthetransitiontolowlongertermemissionslevelsandnarrowtherange ofoptionsconsistentwithmaintainingtemperaturechangebelow2Crelativetopreindustrial levels(highconfidence).Costeffectivemitigationscenariosthatmakeitatleastaslikelyasnotthat temperaturechangewillremainbelow2Crelativetopreindustriallevels(2100concentrations betweenabout450and500ppmCO2eq)aretypicallycharacterizedbyannualGHGemissionsin 2030ofroughlybetween30GtCO2eqand50GtCO2eq(FigureSPM.5,leftpanel).Scenarioswith annualGHGemissionsabove55GtCO2eqin2030arecharacterizedbysubstantiallyhigherratesof emissionsreductionsfrom2030to2050(FigureSPM.5,middlepanel);muchmorerapidscaleupof lowcarbonenergyoverthisperiod(FigureSPM.5,rightpanel);alargerrelianceonCDRtechnologies inthelongterm(FigureSPM.4,toppanel);andhighertransitionalandlongtermeconomicimpacts (TableSPM.2).Duetotheseincreasedmitigationchallenges,manymodelswithannual2030GHG emissionshigherthan55GtCO2eqcouldnotproducescenariosreachingatmosphericconcentration levelsthatmakeitaslikelyasnotthattemperaturechangewillremainbelow2Crelativetopre industriallevels.[6.4,7.11,FiguresTS.11,TS.13]

Figure SPM.5. The implications of different 2030 GHG emissions levels for the rate of CO2 emissions reductions and low-carbon energy upscaling from 2030 to 2050 in mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to 500 (430530) ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100. The scenarios are grouped according to different emissions levels by 2030 (coloured in different shades of green). The left panel shows the pathways of GHG emissions (GtCO2eq/yr) leading to these 2030 levels. The black bar shows the estimated uncertainty range of GHG emissions implied by the Cancn Pledges. The middle panel denotes the average annual CO2 emissions reduction rates for the period 20302050. It compares the median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent intermodel comparisons with explicit 2030 interim goals to the range of scenarios in the Scenario Database for WGIII AR5. Annual rates of historical emissions change (sustained over a period of 20 years) are shown in grey. The arrows in the right panel show the magnitude of zero and low-carbon energy supply up-scaling from 2030 to 2050 subject to different 2030 GHG emissions levels. Zero- and low-carbon energy supply includes renewables, nuclear energy, and fossil energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), or

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bioenergy with CCS (BECCS). Note: Only scenarios that apply the full, unconstrained mitigation technology portfolio of the underlying models (default technology assumption) are shown. Scenarios with large net negative global emissions (>20 GtCO2eq/yr), scenarios with exogenous carbon price assumptions, and scenarios with 2010 emissions significantly outside the historical range are excluded. [Figure 6.32, 7.16] [Subject to final quality check and copy edit.]

Estimatesoftheaggregateeconomiccostsofmitigationvarywidelyandarehighlysensitiveto modeldesignandassumptionsaswellasthespecificationofscenarios,includingthe characterizationoftechnologiesandthetimingofmitigation(highconfidence).Scenariosinwhich allcountriesoftheworldbeginmitigationimmediately,thereisasingleglobalcarbonprice,andall keytechnologiesareavailable,havebeenusedasacosteffectivebenchmarkforestimating macroeconomicmitigationcosts(TableSPM.2,greensegments).Undertheseassumptions, mitigationscenariosthatreachatmosphericconcentrationsofabout450ppmCO2eqby2100entail lossesinglobalconsumptionnotincludingbenefitsofreducedclimatechangeaswellasco benefitsandadversesideeffectsofmitigation19of1%to4%(median:1.7%)in2030,2%to6% (median:3.4%)in2050,and3%to11%(median:4.8%)in2100relativetoconsumptioninbaseline scenariosthatgrowsanywherefrom300%tomorethan900%overthecentury.Thesenumbers correspondtoanannualizedreductionofconsumptiongrowthby0.04to0.14(median:0.06) percentagepointsoverthecenturyrelativetoannualizedconsumptiongrowthinthebaselinethatis between1.6%and3%peryear.Estimatesatthehighendofthesecostrangesarefrommodelsthat arerelativelyinflexibletoachievethedeepemissionsreductionsrequiredinthelongruntomeet thesegoalsand/orincludeassumptionsaboutmarketimperfectionsthatwouldraisecosts.Under theabsenceorlimitedavailabilityoftechnologies,mitigationcostscanincreasesubstantially dependingonthetechnologyconsidered(TableSPM.2,orangesegment).Delayingadditional mitigationfurtherincreasesmitigationcostsinthemediumtolongterm(TableSPM.2,blue segment).Manymodelscouldnotachieveatmosphericconcentrationlevelsofabout450ppm CO2eqby2100ifadditionalmitigationisconsiderablydelayedorunderlimitedavailabilityofkey technologies,suchasbioenergy,CCS,andtheircombination(BECCS).[6.3]
Thetotaleconomiceffectsatdifferenttemperaturelevelswouldincludemitigationcosts,cobenefitsof mitigation,adversesideeffectsofmitigation,adaptationcostsandclimatedamages.Mitigationcostand climatedamageestimatesatanygiventemperaturelevelcannotbecomparedtoevaluatethecostsand benefitsofmitigation.Rather,theconsiderationofeconomiccostsandbenefitsofmitigationshouldinclude thereductionofclimatedamagesrelativetothecaseofunabatedclimatechange.
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Table SPM.2: Global mitigation costs in cost-effective scenarios and estimated cost increases due to assumed limited availability of specific technologies and delayed additional mitigation. Cost estimates shown in this table do not consider the benefits of reduced climate change as well as co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation. The green columns show consumption losses in the years 2030, 2050, and 2100 (green) and annualized consumption growth reductions (bright green) over the century in cost-effective scenarios relative to a baseline development without climate policy.1 The orange columns show the 2 percentage increase in discounted costs over the century, relative to cost-effective scenarios, in scenarios in which technology is constrained relative to 3 default technology assumptions. The blue columns show the increase in mitigation costs over the periods 20302050 and 20502100, relative to scenarios with immediate mitigation, due to delayed additional mitigation through 2020 or 2030.4 These scenarios with delayed additional mitigation are grouped by emission levels of less or more than 55 GtCO2eq in 2030, and two concentration ranges in 2100 (430530 ppm CO2eq and 530650 CO2eq). In all figures, the median of the scenario set is shown without parentheses, the range between the 16th and 84th percentile of the scenario set is shown in the parentheses, and the number of scenarios in the set is shown in square brackets.5 [Figures TS.12, TS.13, 6.21, 6.24, 6.25, Annex II.10] Consumptionlossesincosteffectiveimplementation scenarios Increaseintotaldiscountedmitigationcostsin scenarioswithlimitedavailabilityof technologies Increaseinmid andlongterm mitigationcostsduedelayed additionalmitigationupto2030 [%increaseinmitigationcostsrelative toimmediatemitigation] 55GtCO2eq 2030 2050 2050 2100
28(1450) [N:34] 2.7(1.54.2) 4.7(2.410.6) 0.06(0.030.13) 39(1878) [N:11] 13(223) [N:10] 8(515) [N:10] 18(466) [N:12] 3(516) [N:14] 4(411) 15(332) [N:10] 16(524) 15(559)

[%reductioninconsumption relativetobaseline] 2100 Concentration (ppmCO2eq) 450(430480) 500(480530) 550(530580) 580650 2030 2050 2100

[percentage pointreduction [%increaseintotaldiscountedmitigationcosts inannualized (20152100)relativetodefaulttechnology consumption assumptions] growthrate] 20102100 NoCCS Nuclear Limited Limited phase Solar/ Bio out Wind energy
0.06(0.040.14) 138(29297) [N:4] 7(418) [N:8] 6(229) [N:8] 64(4478) [N:8]

>55GtCO2eq 2030 2050 2050 2100


44(278) [N:29] 37(1682)

1.7(1.03.7) [N:14] 1.7(0.62.1) [N:32] 0.6(0.21.3) [N:46] 0.3(00.9) [N:16]

3.4(2.16.2)

4.8(2.911.4)

1.7(1.23.3)

3.8(1.27.3)

0.04(0.010.09) 0.03(0.010.05)

1.3(0.52.0)

2.3(1.24.4)

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Notes: 1 Cost-effective scenarios assume immediate mitigation in all countries and a single global carbon price, and impose no additional limitations on technology relative to 2 the models default technology assumptions. Percentage increase of net present value of consumption losses in percent of baseline consumption (for scenarios from general 3 equilibrium models) and abatement costs in percent of baseline GDP (for scenarios from partial equilibrium models) for the period 20152100, discounted at 5% per year. No CCS: CCS is not included in these scenarios. Nuclear phase out: No addition of nuclear power plants beyond those under construction, and operation of existing plants until the end of their lifetime. Limited Solar/Wind: a maximum of 20% global electricity generation from solar and wind power in any year of these scenarios. Limited Bioenergy: a maximum of 100 EJ/yr modern bioenergy supply globally (modern bioenergy used for heat, power, combinations, and industry was around 18 EJ/yr in 2008 [11.13.5]). 4 5 Percentage increase of total undiscounted mitigation costs for the periods 20302050 and 20502100. The range is determined by the central scenarios encompassing the 16th and 84th percentile of the scenario set. Only scenarios with a time horizon until 2100 are included. Some models that are included in the cost ranges for concentration levels above 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 could not produce associated scenarios for concentration levels below 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 with assumptions about limited availability of technologies or delayed additional mitigation. [Subject to final quality check and copy edit]

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Onlyalimitednumberofstudieshaveexploredscenariosthataremorelikelythannottobring temperaturechangebacktobelow1.5Cby2100relativetopreindustriallevels;thesescenarios bringatmosphericconcentrationstobelow430ppmCO2eqby2100(highconfidence).Assessing thisgoaliscurrentlydifficultbecausenomultimodelstudieshaveexploredthesescenarios.The limitednumberofpublishedstudiesconsistentwiththisgoalproducesscenariosthatare characterizedby(1)immediatemitigationaction;(2)therapidupscalingofthefullportfolioof mitigationtechnologies;and(3)developmentalongalowenergydemandtrajectory.20[6.3,7.11] Mitigationscenariosreachingabout450or500ppmCO2eqby2100showreducedcostsfor achievingairqualityandenergysecurityobjectives,withsignificantcobenefitsforhumanhealth, ecosystemimpacts,andsufficiencyofresourcesandresilienceoftheenergysystem;these scenariosdidnotquantifyothercobenefitsoradversesideeffects(mediumconfidence).These mitigationscenariosshowimprovementsintermsofthesufficiencyofresourcestomeetnational energydemandaswellastheresilienceofenergysupply,resultinginenergysystemsthatareless vulnerabletopricevolatilityandsupplydisruptions.Thebenefitsfromreducedimpactstohealth andecosystemsassociatedwithmajorcutsinairpollutantemissions(FigureSPM.6)areparticularly highwherecurrentlylegislatedandplannedairpollutioncontrolsareweak.Thereisawiderangeof cobenefitsandadversesideeffectsforadditionalobjectivesotherthanairqualityandenergy security.Overall,thepotentialforcobenefitsforenergyendusemeasuresoutweighthepotential foradversesideeffects,whereastheevidencesuggeststhismaynotbethecaseforallenergy supplyandAFOLUmeasures.[WGIII4.8,5.7,6.3.6,6.6,7.9,8.7,9.7,10.8,11.7,11.13.6,12.8,Figure TS.14,Table6.7,TablesTS.3TS.7;WGII11.9]

Figure SPM.6. Air pollutant emission levels for black carbon (BC) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) in 2050 relative to 2005 (0=2005 levels). Baseline scenarios without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today are compared to scenarios with stringent mitigation policies, which are consistent with reaching atmospheric CO2eq concentration levels between 430 and 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100. [Figure 6.33] [Subject to final quality check and copy edit.]

Inthesescenarios,thecumulativeCO2emissionsrangebetween655815GtCO2fortheperiod20112050 andbetween90350GtCO2fortheperiod20112100.GlobalCO2eqemissionsin2050arebetween7095% below2010emissions,andtheyarebetween110120%below2010emissionsin2100.


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Thereisawiderangeofpossibleadversesideeffectsaswellascobenefitsandspilloversfrom climatepolicythathavenotbeenwellquantified(highconfidence).Whetherornotsideeffects materialize,andtowhatextentsideeffectsmaterialize,willbecaseandsitespecific,astheywill dependonlocalcircumstancesandthescale,scope,andpaceofimplementation.Important examplesincludebiodiversityconservation,wateravailability,foodsecurity,incomedistribution, efficiencyofthetaxationsystem,laboursupplyandemployment,urbansprawl,andthe sustainabilityofthegrowthofdevelopingcountries.[BoxTS.11] Mitigationeffortsandassociatedcostsvarybetweencountriesinmitigationscenarios.The distributionofcostsacrosscountriescandifferfromthedistributionoftheactionsthemselves (highconfidence).Ingloballycosteffectivescenarios,themajorityofmitigationeffortstakesplacein countrieswiththehighestfutureemissionsinbaselinescenarios.Somestudiesexploringparticular effortsharingframeworks,undertheassumptionofaglobalcarbonmarket,haveestimated substantialglobalfinancialflowsassociatedwithmitigationforscenariosleadingto2100 atmosphericconcentrationsofabout450to550ppmCO2eq.[Box3.5,4.6,6.3.6,Table6.4,Figure 6.9,Figure6.27,Figure6.28,Figure6.29,13.4.2.4] Mitigationpolicycoulddevaluefossilfuelassetsandreducerevenuesforfossilfuelexporters,but differencesbetweenregionsandfuelsexist(highconfidence).Mostmitigationscenariosare associatedwithreducedrevenuesfromcoalandoiltradeformajorexporters(highconfidence).The effectofmitigationonnaturalgasexportrevenuesismoreuncertain,withsomestudiesshowing possiblebenefitsforexportrevenuesinthemediumtermuntilabout2050(mediumconfidence). TheavailabilityofCCSwouldreducetheadverseeffectofmitigationonthevalueoffossilfuelassets (mediumconfidence).[6.3.6,6.6,14.4.2]

SPM.4.2 Sectoralandcrosssectoralmitigationpathwaysandmeasures SPM.4.2.1 Crosssectoralmitigationpathwaysandmeasures


Inbaselinescenarios,GHGemissionsareprojectedtogrowinallsectors,exceptfornetCO2 emissionsintheAFOLUsector21(robustevidence,mediumagreement).Energysupplysector emissionsareexpectedtocontinuetobethemajorsourceofGHGemissions,ultimatelyaccounting forthesignificantincreasesinindirectemissionsfromelectricityuseinthebuildingsandindustry sectors.Inbaselinescenarios,whilenonCO2GHGagriculturalemissionsareprojectedtoincrease, netCO2emissionsfromtheAFOLUsectordeclineovertime,withsomemodelsprojectinganetsink towardstheendofthecentury(FigureSPM.7).22[6.3.1.4,6.8,FigureTS.15] InfrastructuredevelopmentsandlonglivedproductsthatlocksocietiesintoGHGintensive emissionspathwaysmaybedifficultorverycostlytochange,reinforcingtheimportanceofearly actionforambitiousmitigation(robustevidence,highagreement).Thislockinriskiscompounded bythelifetimeoftheinfrastructure,bythedifferenceinemissionsassociatedwithalternatives,and themagnitudeoftheinvestmentcost.Asaresult,lockinrelatedtoinfrastructureandspatial planningisthemostdifficulttoreduce.However,materials,productsandinfrastructurewithlong lifetimesandlowlifecycleemissionscanfacilitateatransitiontolowemissionpathwayswhilealso reducingemissionsthroughlowerlevelsofmaterialuse.[5.6.3,6.3.6.4,9.4,10.4,12.3,12.4] Therearestronginterdependenciesinmitigationscenariosbetweenthepaceofintroducing mitigationmeasuresinenergysupplyandenergyenduseanddevelopmentsintheAFOLUsector
21

NetAFOLUCO2emissionsincludeemissionsandremovalsofCO2fromtheAFOLUsector,includingland underforestryand,insomeassessments,CO2sinksinagriculturalsoils.

22

AmajorityoftheEarthSystemModelsassessedinWGIAR5projectacontinuedlandcarbonuptakeunder allRCPsthroughto2100,butsomemodelssimulatealandcarbonlossduetothecombinedeffectofclimate changeandlandusechange.[WGIAR5SPM.E.7,WGI6.4]

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(highconfidence).Thedistributionofthemitigationeffortacrosssectorsisstronglyinfluencedby theavailabilityandperformanceofBECCSandlargescaleafforestation(FigureSPM.7).Thisis particularlythecaseinscenariosreachingCO2eqconcentrationsofabout450ppmby2100.Well designedsystemicandcrosssectoralmitigationstrategiesaremorecosteffectiveincutting emissionsthanafocusonindividualtechnologiesandsectors.Attheenergysystemlevelthese includereductionsintheGHGemissionintensityoftheenergysupplysector,aswitchtolowcarbon energycarriers(includinglowcarbonelectricity)andreductionsinenergydemandintheenduse sectorswithoutcompromisingdevelopment(FigureSPM.8).[6.3.5,6.4,6.8,7.11,TableTS.2] Mitigationscenariosreachingaround450ppmCO2eqconcentrationsby2100showlargescale globalchangesintheenergysupplysector(robustevidence,highagreement).Intheseselected scenarios,globalCO2emissionsfromtheenergysupplysectorareprojectedtodeclineoverthenext decadesandarecharacterizedbyreductionsof90%ormorebelow2010levelsbetween2040and 2070.Emissionsinmanyofthesescenariosareprojectedtodeclinetobelowzerothereafter.[6.3.4, 6.8,7.1,7.11]

Figure SPM.7. Direct emissions of CO2 by sector and total non-CO2 GHGs (Kyoto gases) across sectors in baseline (left panel) and mitigation scenarios that reach around 450 (430480) ppm CO2eq with CCS (middle panel) and without CCS (right panel). The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the range which differs across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolution and time horizon of models. Note that many models cannot reach 450 ppm CO2eq concentration by 2100 in the absence of CCS, resulting in a low number of scenarios for the right panel [Figures 6.34 and 6.35]. [Subject to final quality check and copy edit.]

Efficiencyenhancementsandbehaviouralchanges,inordertoreduceenergydemandcompared tobaselinescenarioswithoutcompromisingdevelopment,areakeymitigationstrategyin scenariosreachingatmosphericCO2eqconcentrationsofabout450or500ppmby2100(robust evidence,highagreement).Neartermreductionsinenergydemandareanimportantelementof costeffectivemitigationstrategies,providemoreflexibilityforreducingcarbonintensityinthe energysupplysector,hedgeagainstrelatedsupplysiderisks,avoidlockintocarbonintensive infrastructures,andareassociatedwithimportantcobenefits.Bothintegratedandsectoralstudies providesimilarestimatesforenergydemandreductionsinthetransport,buildingsandindustry sectorsfor2030and2050(FigureSPM.8).[6.3.4,6.6,6.8,7.11,8.9,9.8,10.10]

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Figure SPM.8. Final energy demand reduction relative to baseline (upper row) and low-carbon energy carrier shares in final energy (lower row) in the transport, buildings, and industry sectors by 2030 and 2050 in scenarios from two different CO2eq concentration categories compared to sectoral studies assessed in Chapters 8-10. The demand reductions shown by these scenarios do not compromise development. Low-carbon energy carriers include electricity, hydrogen and liquid biofuels in transport, electricity in buildings and electricity, heat, hydrogen and bioenergy in industry. The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the ranges which differ across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolution and time horizon of models. [Figures 6.37 and 6.38] [Subject to final quality check and copy edit.]

Behaviour,lifestyleandculturehaveaconsiderableinfluenceonenergyuseandassociated emissions,withhighmitigationpotentialinsomesectors,inparticularwhencomplementing

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technologicalandstructuralchange23(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).Emissionscanbe substantiallyloweredthroughchangesinconsumptionpatterns(e.g.,mobilitydemandandmode, energyuseinhouseholds,choiceoflongerlastingproducts)anddietarychangeandreductionin foodwastes.Anumberofoptionsincludingmonetaryandnonmonetaryincentivesaswellas informationmeasuresmayfacilitatebehaviouralchanges.[6.8,7.9,8.3.5,8.9,9.2,9.3,9.10,Box 10.2,10.4,11.4,12.4,12.6,12.7,15.3,15.5,TableTS.2]

SPM.4.2.2 Energysupply
InthebaselinescenariosassessedinAR5,directCO2emissionsfromtheenergysupplysectorare projectedtoalmostdoubleoreventripleby2050comparedtothelevelof14.4GtCO2/yearin 2010,unlessenergyintensityimprovementscanbesignificantlyacceleratedbeyondthehistorical development(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).Inthelastdecade,themaincontributorsto emissiongrowthwereagrowingenergydemandandanincreaseoftheshareofcoalintheglobal fuelmix.TheavailabilityoffossilfuelsalonewillnotbesufficienttolimitCO2eqconcentrationto levelssuchas450ppm,550ppm,or650ppm.[6.3.4,7.2,7.3,Figures6.15,SPM.2,SPM.7] Decarbonizing(i.e.reducingthecarbonintensityof)electricitygenerationisakeycomponentof costeffectivemitigationstrategiesinachievinglowstabilizationlevels(430530ppmCO2eq);in mostintegratedmodellingscenarios,decarbonizationhappensmorerapidlyinelectricity generationthanintheindustry,buildings,andtransportsectors(mediumevidence,high agreement)(FigureSPM.7).Inthemajorityoflowstabilizationscenarios,theshareoflowcarbon electricitysupply(comprisingrenewableenergy(RE),nuclearandCCS)increasesfromthecurrent shareofapproximately30%tomorethan80%by2050,andfossilfuelpowergenerationwithout CCSisphasedoutalmostentirelyby2100.[6.8,7.11,Figures7.14,TS.18,SPM.7] SinceAR4,manyREtechnologieshavedemonstratedsubstantialperformanceimprovementsand costreductions,andagrowingnumberofREtechnologieshaveachievedalevelofmaturityto enabledeploymentatsignificantscale(robustevidence,highagreement).Regardingelectricity generationalone,REaccountedforjustoverhalfofthenewelectricitygeneratingcapacityadded globallyin2012,ledbygrowthinwind,hydroandsolarpower.However,manyREtechnologiesstill needdirectand/orindirectsupport,iftheirmarketsharesaretobesignificantlyincreased;RE technologypolicieshavebeensuccessfulindrivingrecentgrowthofRE.Challengesforintegrating REintoenergysystemsandtheassociatedcostsvarybyREtechnology,regionalcircumstances,and thecharacteristicsoftheexistingbackgroundenergysystem(mediumevidence,medium agreement).[7.5.3,7.6.1,7.8.2,7.12,Table7.1] NuclearenergyisamaturelowGHGemissionsourceofbaseloadpower,butitsshareofglobal electricitygenerationhasbeendeclining(since1993).Nuclearenergycouldmakeanincreasing contributiontolowcarbonenergysupply,butavarietyofbarriersandrisksexist(robustevidence, highagreement).Thoseinclude:operationalrisks,andtheassociatedconcerns,uraniummining risks,financialandregulatoryrisks,unresolvedwastemanagementissues,nuclearweapon proliferationconcerns,andadversepublicopinion(robustevidence,highagreement).Newfuel cyclesandreactortechnologiesaddressingsomeoftheseissuesarebeinginvestigatedandprogress inresearchanddevelopmenthasbeenmadeconcerningsafetyandwastedisposal.[7.5.4,7.8,7.9, 7.12,FigureTS.19] GHGemissionsfromenergysupplycanbereducedsignificantlybyreplacingcurrentworldaverage coalfiredpowerplantswithmodern,highlyefficientnaturalgascombinedcyclepowerplantsor combinedheatandpowerplants,providedthatnaturalgasisavailableandthefugitiveemissions associatedwithextractionandsupplyarelowormitigated(robustevidence,highagreement).In
Structuralchangesrefertosystemstransformationswherebysomecomponentsareeitherreplacedor potentiallysubstitutedbyothercomponents(seeWGIIIAR5Glossary).
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mitigationscenariosreachingabout450ppmCO2eqconcentrationsby2100,naturalgaspower generationwithoutCCSactsasabridgetechnology,withdeploymentincreasingbeforepeakingand fallingtobelowcurrentlevelsby2050anddecliningfurtherinthesecondhalfofthecentury(robust evidence,highagreement).[7.5.1,7.8,7.9,7.11,7.12] Carbondioxidecaptureandstorage(CCS)technologiescouldreducethelifecycleGHGemissionsof fossilfuelpowerplants(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).Whileallcomponentsofintegrated CCSsystemsexistandareinusetodaybythefossilfuelextractionandrefiningindustry,CCShasnot yetbeenappliedatscaletoalarge,operationalcommercialfossilfuelpowerplant.CCSpower plantscouldbeseeninthemarketifthisisincentivizedbyregulationand/oriftheybecome competitivewiththeirunabatedcounterparts,iftheadditionalinvestmentandoperationalcosts, causedinpartbyefficiencyreductions,arecompensatedbysufficientlyhighcarbonprices(ordirect financialsupport).ForthelargescalefuturedeploymentofCCS,welldefinedregulationsconcerning shortandlongtermresponsibilitiesforstorageareneededaswellaseconomicincentives.Barriers tolargescaledeploymentofCCStechnologiesincludeconcernsabouttheoperationalsafetyand longtermintegrityofCO2storageaswellastransportrisks.Thereis,however,agrowingbodyof literatureonhowtoensuretheintegrityofCO2wells,onthepotentialconsequencesofapressure buildupwithinageologicformationcausedbyCO2storage(suchasinducedseismicity),andonthe potentialhumanhealthandenvironmentalimpactsfromCO2thatmigratesoutoftheprimary injectionzone(limitedevidence,mediumagreement).[7.5.5.,7.8,7.9,7.11,7.12,11.13] CombiningbioenergywithCCS(BECCS)offerstheprospectofenergysupplywithlargescalenet negativeemissionswhichplaysanimportantroleinmanylowstabilizationscenarios,whileit entailschallengesandrisks(limitedevidence,mediumagreement).Thesechallengesandrisks includethoseassociatedwiththeupstreamlargescaleprovisionofthebiomassthatisusedinthe CCSfacilityaswellasthoseassociatedwiththeCCStechnologyitself.[7.5.5,7.9,11.13]

SPM.4.2.3 Energyendusesectors Transport


Thetransportsectoraccountedfor27%offinalenergyuseand6.7GtCO2directemissionsin2010, withbaselineCO2emissionsprojectedtoapproximatelydoubleby2050(mediumevidence, mediumagreement).ThisgrowthinCO2emissionsfromincreasingglobalpassengerandfreight activitycouldpartlyoffsetfuturemitigationmeasuresthatincludefuelcarbonandenergyintensity improvements,infrastructuredevelopment,behaviouralchangeandcomprehensivepolicy implementation(highconfidence).Overall,reductionsintotaltransportCO2emissionsof1540% comparedtobaselinegrowthcouldbeachievedin2050(mediumevidence,mediumagreement). [FigureTS.15,6.8,8.1,8.2,8.9,8.10] Technicalandbehaviouralmitigationmeasuresforalltransportmodes,plusnewinfrastructure andurbanredevelopmentinvestments,couldreducefinalenergydemandin2050byaround40% belowthebaseline,withthemitigationpotentialassessedtobehigherthanreportedintheAR4 (robustevidence,mediumagreement).Projectedenergyefficiencyandvehicleperformance improvementsrangefrom3050%in2030relativeto2010dependingontransportmodeand vehicletype(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).Integratedurbanplanning,transitoriented development,morecompacturbanformthatsupportscyclingandwalking,canallleadtomodal shiftsascan,inthelongerterm,urbanredevelopmentandinvestmentsinnewinfrastructuresuch ashighspeedrailsystemsthatreduceshorthaulairtraveldemand(mediumevidence,medium agreement).Suchmitigationmeasuresarechallenging,haveuncertainoutcomes,andcouldreduce transportGHGemissionsby2050%in2050comparedtobaseline(limitedevidence,low agreement).[8.2,8.3,8.4,8.5,8.6,8.7,8.8,8.9,12.4,12.5,FigureSPM.8toppanel] Strategiestoreducethecarbonintensitiesoffuelandtherateofreducingcarbonintensityare constrainedbychallengesassociatedwithenergystorageandtherelativelylowenergydensityof

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lowcarbontransportfuels(mediumconfidence).Integratedandsectoralstudiesbroadlyagreethat opportunitiesforswitchingtolowcarbonfuelsexistintheneartermandwillgrowovertime. Methanebasedfuelsarealreadyincreasingtheirshareforroadvehiclesandwaterbornecraft. Electricityproducedfromlowcarbonsourceshasneartermpotentialforelectricrailandshortto mediumtermpotentialaselectricbuses,lightdutyand2wheelroadvehiclesaredeployed. Hydrogenfuelsfromlowcarbonsourcesconstitutelongertermoptions.Commerciallyavailable liquidandgaseousbiofuelsalreadyprovidecobenefitstogetherwithmitigationoptionsthatcanbe increasedbytechnologyadvances.Reducingtransportemissionsofparticulatematter(including blackcarbon),troposphericozoneandaerosolprecursors(includingNOx)canhavehumanhealth andmitigationcobenefitsintheshortterm(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).[8.2,8.3,11.13, FigureTS.20,rightpanel] Thecosteffectivenessofdifferentcarbonreductionmeasuresinthetransportsectorvaries significantlywithvehicletypeandtransportmode(highconfidence).Thelevelizedcostsof conservedcarboncanbeverylowornegativeformanyshorttermbehaviouralmeasuresand efficiencyimprovementsforlightandheavydutyroadvehiclesandwaterbornecraft.In2030,for someelectricvehicles,aircraftandpossiblyhighspeedrail,levelizedcostscouldbemorethan USD100/tCO2avoided(limitedevidence,mediumagreement).[8.6,8.8,8.9,FiguresTS.21,TS.22] Regionaldifferencesinfluencethechoiceoftransportmitigationoptions(highconfidence). Institutional,legal,financialandculturalbarriersconstrainlowcarbontechnologyuptakeand behaviouralchange.Establishedinfrastructuremaylimittheoptionsformodalshiftandleadtoa greaterrelianceonadvancedvehicletechnologies;aslowingofgrowthinlightdutyvehicledemand isalreadyevidentinsomeOECDcountries.Foralleconomies,especiallythosewithhighratesof urbangrowth,investmentinpublictransportsystemsandlowcarboninfrastructurecanavoidlock intocarbonintensivemodes.Prioritizinginfrastructureforpedestriansandintegratingnon motorizedandtransitservicescancreateeconomicandsocialcobenefitsinallregions(medium evidence,mediumagreement).[8.4,8.8,8.9,14.3,Table8.3] Mitigationstrategies,whenassociatedwithnonclimatepoliciesatallgovernmentlevels,canhelp decoupletransportGHGemissionsfromeconomicgrowthinallregions(mediumconfidence). Thesestrategiescanhelpreducetraveldemand,incentivisefreightbusinessestoreducethecarbon intensityoftheirlogisticalsystemsandinducemodalshifts,aswellasprovidecobenefitsincluding improvedaccessandmobility,betterhealthandsafety,greaterenergysecurity,andcostandtime savings(mediumevidence,highagreement).[8.7,8.10]

Buildings
In2010,thebuildingsector24accountedforaround32%finalenergyuseand8.8GtCO2emissions, includingdirectandindirectemissions,withenergydemandprojectedtoapproximatelydouble andCO2emissionstoincreaseby50150%bymidcenturyinbaselinescenarios(mediumevidence, mediumagreement).Thisenergydemandgrowthresultsfromimprovementsinwealth,lifestyle change,accesstomodernenergyservicesandadequatehousing,andurbanisation.Thereare significantlockinrisksassociatedwiththelonglifespansofbuildingsandrelatedinfrastructure,and theseareespeciallyimportantinregionswithhighconstructionrates(robustevidence,high agreement).[9.4,FigureTS.15] Recentadvancesintechnologies,knowhowandpoliciesprovideopportunitiestostabilizeor reduceglobalbuildingssectorenergyusebymidcentury(robustevidence,highagreement).For newbuildings,theadoptionofverylowenergybuildingcodesisimportantandhasprogressed substantiallysinceAR4.Retrofitsformakeypartofthemitigationstrategyincountrieswith
Thebuildingsectorcoverstheresidential,commercial,publicandservicessectors;emissionsfrom constructionareaccountedforintheindustrysector.
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establishedbuildingstocks,andreductionsofheating/coolingenergyuseby5090%inindividual buildingshavebeenachieved.Recentlargeimprovementsinperformanceandcostsmakeverylow energyconstructionandretrofitseconomicallyattractive,sometimesevenatnetnegativecosts. [9.3] Lifestyle,cultureandbehavioursignificantlyinfluenceenergyconsumptioninbuildings(limited evidence,highagreement).Athreetofivefolddifferenceinenergyusehasbeenshownfor provisionofsimilarbuildingrelatedenergyservicelevelsinbuildings.Fordevelopedcountries, scenariosindicatethatlifestyleandbehaviouralchangescouldreduceenergydemandbyupto20% intheshorttermandbyupto50%ofpresentlevelsbymidcentury.Indevelopingcountries, integratingelementsoftraditionallifestylesintobuildingpracticesandarchitecturecouldfacilitate theprovisionofhighlevelsofenergyserviceswithmuchlowerenergyinputsthanbaseline.[9.3] Mostmitigationoptionsforbuildingshaveconsiderableanddiversecobenefitsinadditionto energycostsavings(robustevidence,highagreement).Theseincludeimprovementsinenergy security,health(suchasfromcleanerwoodburningcookstoves),environmentaloutcomes, workplaceproductivity,fuelpovertyreductionsandnetemploymentgains.Studieswhichhave monetizedcobenefitsoftenfindthattheseexceedenergycostsavingsandpossiblyclimatebenefits (mediumevidence,mediumagreement).[9.6,9.7,3.6.3] Strongbarriers,suchassplitincentives(e.g.,tenantsandbuilders),fragmentedmarketsand inadequateaccesstoinformationandfinancing,hinderthemarketbaseduptakeofcosteffective opportunities.Barrierscanbeovercomebypolicyinterventionsaddressingallstagesofthebuilding andappliancelifecycles(robustevidence,highagreement).[9.8,9.10,16,Box3.10] Thedevelopmentofportfoliosofenergyefficiencypoliciesandtheirimplementationhas advancedconsiderablysinceAR4.Buildingcodesandappliancestandards,ifwelldesignedand implemented,havebeenamongthemostenvironmentallyandcosteffectiveinstrumentsfor emissionreductions(robustevidence,highagreement).Insomedevelopedcountriestheyhave contributedtoastabilizationof,orreductionin,totalenergydemandforbuildings.Substantially strengtheningthesecodes,adoptingtheminfurtherjurisdictions,andextendingthemtomore buildingandappliancetypes,willbeakeyfactorinreachingambitiousclimategoals.[9.10,2.6.5.3]

Industry
In2010,theindustrysectoraccountedforaround28%offinalenergyuse,and13GtCO2emissions, includingdirectandindirectemissionsaswellasprocessemissions,withemissionsprojectedto increaseby50150%by2050inthebaselinescenariosassessedinAR5,unlessenergyefficiency improvementsareacceleratedsignificantly(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).Emissionsfrom industryaccountedforjustover30%ofglobalGHGemissionsin2010andarecurrentlygreaterthan emissionsfromeitherthebuildingsortransportendusesectors.[SPM.3,FigureSPM.7,10.3] Theenergyintensityoftheindustrysectorcouldbedirectlyreducedbyabout25%comparedto thecurrentlevelthroughthewidescaleupgrading,replacementanddeploymentofbestavailable technologies,particularlyincountrieswherethesearenotinuseandinnonenergyintensive industries(highagreement,robustevidence).Additionalenergyintensityreductionsofabout20% maypotentiallyberealizedthroughinnovation(limitedevidence,mediumagreement).Barriersto implementingenergyefficiencyrelatelargelytoinitialinvestmentcostsandlackofinformation. Informationprogrammesareaprevalentapproachforpromotingenergyefficiency,followedby economicinstruments,regulatoryapproachesandvoluntaryactions.[10.7,10.9,10.11] ImprovementsinGHGemissionefficiencyandintheefficiencyofmaterialuse,recyclingandre useofmaterialsandproducts,andoverallreductionsinproductdemand(e.g.,throughamore intensiveuseofproducts)andservicedemandcould,inadditiontoenergyefficiency,helpreduce GHGemissionsbelowthebaselinelevelintheindustrysector(mediumevidence,highagreement). Manyemissionreducingoptionsarecosteffective,profitableandassociatedwithmultipleco

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benefits(betterenvironmentalcompliance,healthbenefitsetc.).Inthelongterm,ashifttolow carbonelectricity,newindustrialprocesses,radicalproductinnovations(e.g.,alternativesto cement),orCCS(e.g.,tomitigateprocessemissions)couldcontributetosignificantGHGemission reductions.Lackofpolicyandexperiencesinmaterialandproductserviceefficiencyarethemajor barriers.[10.4,10.7,10.8,10.11] CO2emissionsdominateGHGemissionsfromindustry,buttherearealsosubstantialmitigation opportunitiesfornonCO2gases(robustevidence,highagreement).CH4,N2Oandfluorinatedgases fromindustryaccountedforemissionsof0.9GtCO2eqin2010.Keymitigationopportunitiesinclude, e.g.,thereductionofhydrofluorocarbonemissionsbyprocessoptimizationandrefrigerantrecovery, recyclingandsubstitution,althoughtherearebarriers.[Tables10.2,10.7] Systemicapproachesandcollaborativeactivitiesacrosscompaniesandsectorscanreduceenergy andmaterialconsumptionandthusGHGemissions(robustevidence,highagreement).The applicationofcrosscuttingtechnologies(e.g.,efficientmotors)andmeasures(e.g.,reducingairor steamleaks)inbothlargeenergyintensiveindustriesandsmallandmediumenterprisescan improveprocessperformanceandplantefficiencycosteffectively.Cooperationacrosscompanies (e.g.,inindustrialparks)andsectorscouldincludethesharingofinfrastructure,information,and wasteheatutilization.[10.4,10.5] Importantoptionsformitigationinwastemanagementarewastereduction,followedbyreuse, recyclingandenergyrecovery(robustevidence,highagreement).Wasteandwastewateraccounted for1.5GtCO2eqin2010.Astheshareofrecycledorreusedmaterialisstilllow(e.g.,globally,around 20%ofmunicipalsolidwasteisrecycled),wastetreatmenttechnologiesandrecoveringenergyto reducedemandforfossilfuelscanresultinsignificantdirectemissionreductionsfromwaste disposal.[10.4,10.14]

SPM.4.2.4 Agriculture,ForestryandOtherLandUse(AFOLU)
TheAFOLUsectoraccountsforaboutaquarter(~1012GtCO2eq/yr)ofnetanthropogenicGHG emissionsmainlyfromdeforestation,agriculturalemissionsfromsoilandnutrientmanagement andlivestock(mediumevidence,highagreement).Mostrecentestimatesindicateadeclinein AFOLUCO2fluxes,largelyduetodecreasingdeforestationratesandincreasedafforestation. However,theuncertaintyinhistoricalnetAFOLUemissionsislargerthanforothersectors,and additionaluncertaintiesinprojectedbaselinenetAFOLUemissionsexist.Nonetheless,inthefuture, netannualbaselineCO2emissionsfromAFOLUareprojectedtodecline,withnetemissions potentiallylessthanhalfthe2010levelby2050andthepossibilityoftheAFOLUsectorsbecominga netCO2sinkbeforetheendofcentury(mediumevidence,highagreement).[6.3.1.4,11.2,Figures 6.5,SPM.7] AFOLUplaysacentralroleforfoodsecurityandsustainabledevelopment.Themostcosteffective mitigationoptionsinforestryareafforestation,sustainableforestmanagementandreducing deforestation,withlargedifferencesintheirrelativeimportanceacrossregions.Inagriculture,the mostcosteffectivemitigationoptionsarecroplandmanagement,grazinglandmanagement,and restorationoforganicsoils(mediumevidence,highagreement).Theeconomicmitigationpotential ofsupplysidemeasuresisestimatedtobe7.2to11GtCO2eq/year25in2030formitigationefforts consistentwithcarbonprices26upto100USD/tCO2eq,aboutathirdofwhichcanbeachievedata <20USD/tCO2eq(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).Therearepotentialbarriersto implementationofavailablemitigationoptions[11.7,11.8].Demandsidemeasures,suchaschanges indietandreductionsoflossesinthefoodsupplychain,haveasignificant,butuncertain,potential
25 26

Fullrangeofallstudies:0.4911GtCO2eq/year

Inmanymodelsthatareusedtoassesstheeconomiccostsofmitigation,carbonpriceisoftenusedasa proxytorepresentthelevelofeffortinmitigationpolicies(seeWGIIIAR5Glossary).

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toreduceGHGemissionsfromfoodproduction(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).Estimates varyfromroughly0.768.6GtCO2eq/yrby2050(limitedevidence,mediumagreement).[11.4,11.6, Figure11.14] Policiesgoverningagriculturalpracticesandforestconservationandmanagementaremore effectivewheninvolvingbothmitigationandadaptation.SomemitigationoptionsintheAFOLU sector(suchassoilandforestcarbonstocks)maybevulnerabletoclimatechange(medium evidence,highagreement).Whenimplementedsustainably,activitiestoreduceemissionsfrom deforestationandforestdegradation(REDD+27isanexampledesignedtobesustainable)arecost effectivepolicyoptionsformitigatingclimatechange,withpotentialeconomic,socialandother environmentalandadaptationcobenefits(e.g.,conservationofbiodiversityandwaterresources, andreducingsoilerosion)(limitedevidence,mediumagreement).[11.3.2,11.10] Bioenergycanplayacriticalroleformitigation,butthereareissuestoconsider,suchasthe sustainabilityofpracticesandtheefficiencyofbioenergysystems(robustevidence,medium agreement)[11.4.4,Box11.5,11.13.6,11.13.7].Barrierstolargescaledeploymentofbioenergy includeconcernsaboutGHGemissionsfromland,foodsecurity,waterresources,biodiversity conservationandlivelihoods.Thescientificdebateabouttheoverallclimateimpactrelatedtoland usecompetitioneffectsofspecificbioenergypathwaysremainsunresolved(robustevidence,high agreement).[11.4.4,11.13]Bioenergytechnologiesarediverseandspanawiderangeofoptionsand technologypathways.Evidencesuggeststhatoptionswithlowlifecycleemissions(e.g.,sugarcane, Miscanthus,fastgrowingtreespecies,andsustainableuseofbiomassresidues),somealready available,canreduceGHGemissions;outcomesaresitespecificandrelyonefficientintegrated biomasstobioenergysystems,andsustainablelandusemanagementandgovernance.Insome regions,specificbioenergyoptions,suchasimprovedcookstoves,andsmallscalebiogasand biopowerproduction,couldreduceGHGemissionsandimprovelivelihoodsandhealthinthe contextofsustainabledevelopment(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).[11.13]

SPM.4.2.5 HumanSettlements,InfrastructureandSpatialPlanning
Urbanizationisaglobaltrendandisassociatedwithincreasesinincome,andhigherurban incomesarecorrelatedwithhigherconsumptionofenergyandGHGemissions(mediumevidence, highagreement).Asof2011,morethan52%oftheglobalpopulationlivesinurbanareas.In2006, urbanareasaccountedfor6776%ofenergyuseand7176%ofenergyrelatedCO2emissions.By 2050,theurbanpopulationisexpectedtoincreaseto5.67.1billion,or6469%ofworld population.CitiesinnonAnnexIcountriesgenerallyhavehigherlevelsofenergyusecomparedto thenationalaverage,whereascitiesinAnnexIcountriesgenerallyhavelowerenergyusepercapita thannationalaverages(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).[12.2,12.3] Thenexttwodecadespresentawindowofopportunityformitigationinurbanareas,asalarge portionoftheworldsurbanareaswillbedevelopedduringthisperiod(limitedevidence,high agreement).Accountingfortrendsindecliningpopulationdensities,andcontinuedeconomicand populationgrowth,urbanlandcoverisprojectedtoexpandby56310%between2000and2030. [12.2,12.3,12.4,12.8] Mitigationoptionsinurbanareasvarybyurbanizationtrajectoriesandareexpectedtobemost effectivewhenpolicyinstrumentsarebundled(robustevidence,highagreement).Infrastructure andurbanformarestronglyinterlinked,andlockinpatternsoflanduse,transportchoice,housing, andbehaviour.Effectivemitigationstrategiesinvolvepackagesofmutuallyreinforcingpolicies, includingcolocatinghighresidentialwithhighemploymentdensities,achievinghighdiversityand integrationoflanduses,increasingaccessibilityandinvestinginpublictransportandotherdemand managementmeasures.[8.4,12.3,12.4,12.5,12.6]
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Thelargestmitigationopportunitieswithrespecttohumansettlementsareinrapidlyurbanizing areaswhereurbanformandinfrastructurearenotlockedin,butwherethereareoftenlimited governance,technical,financial,andinstitutionalcapacities(robustevidence,highagreement).The bulkofurbangrowthisexpectedinsmalltomediumsizecitiesindevelopingcountries.The feasibilityofspatialplanninginstrumentsforclimatechangemitigationishighlydependentona citysfinancialandgovernancecapability.[12.6,12.7] Thousandsofcitiesareundertakingclimateactionplans,buttheiraggregateimpactonurban emissionsisuncertain(robustevidence,highagreement).Therehasbeenlittlesystematic assessmentontheirimplementation,theextenttowhichemissionreductiontargetsarebeing achieved,oremissionsreduced.Currentclimateactionplansfocuslargelyonenergyefficiency. Fewerclimateactionplansconsiderlanduseplanningstrategiesandcrosssectoralmeasuresto reducesprawlandpromotetransitorienteddevelopment28.[12.6,12.7,12.9] Successfulimplementationofurbanscaleclimatechangemitigationstrategiescanprovideco benefits(robustevidence,highagreement).Urbanareasthroughouttheworldcontinuetostruggle withchallenges,includingensuringaccesstoenergy,limitingairandwaterpollution,and maintainingemploymentopportunitiesandcompetitiveness.Actiononurbanscalemitigationoften dependsontheabilitytorelateclimatechangemitigationeffortstolocalcobenefits(robust evidence,highagreement).[12.5,12.6,12.7,12.8]

SPM.5 Mitigationpoliciesandinstitutions
SPM.5.1 Sectoralandnationalpolicies
Substantialreductionsinemissionswouldrequirelargechangesininvestmentpatterns.Mitigation scenariosinwhichpoliciesstabilizeatmosphericconcentrations(withoutovershoot)intherange from430to530ppmCO2eqby2100leadtosubstantialshiftsinannualinvestmentflowsduringthe period20102029comparedtobaselinescenarios(FigureSPM.9).Overthenexttwodecades(2010 to2029),annualinvestmentinconventionalfossilfueltechnologiesassociatedwiththeelectricity supplysectorisprojectedtodeclinebyaboutUSD30(2166)billion(median:20%comparedto 2010)whileannualinvestmentinlowcarbonelectricitysupply(i.e.,renewables,nuclearand electricitygenerationwithCCS)isprojectedtorisebyaboutUSD147(31360)billion(median: +100%comparedto2010)(limitedevidence,mediumagreement).Forcomparison,globaltotal annualinvestmentintheenergysystemispresentlyaboutUSD1200billion.Inaddition,annual incrementalenergyefficiencyinvestmentsintransport,buildingsandindustryisprojectedto increasebyaboutUSD336(1641)billion(limitedevidence,mediumagreement),frequently involvingmodernizationofexistingequipment.[13.11,16.2.2] Thereisnowidelyagreeddefinitionofwhatconstitutesclimatefinance,butestimatesofthe financialflowsassociatedwithclimatechangemitigationandadaptationareavailable.Published assessmentsofallcurrentannualfinancialflowswhoseexpectedeffectistoreducenetGHG emissionsand/ortoenhanceresiliencetoclimatechangeandclimatevariabilityshowUSD343to 385billionperyearglobally(mediumconfidence)[BoxTS.14].Mostofthisgoestomitigation.Outof this,totalpublicclimatefinancethatflowedtodevelopingcountriesisestimatedtobebetweenUSD 35to49billion/yrin2011and2012(mediumconfidence).Estimatesofinternationalprivateclimate financeflowingtodevelopingcountriesrangefromUSD10to72billion/yrincludingforeigndirect investmentasequityandloansintherangeofUSD10to37billion/yrovertheperiodof20082011 (mediumconfidence).[16.2.2]
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Figure SPM.9. Change in annual investment flows from the average baseline level over the next two decades (2010 to 2029) for mitigation scenarios that stabilize concentrations within the range of approximately 430530 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Investment changes are based on a limited number of model studies and model comparisons. Total electricity generation (leftmost column) is the sum of renewables, nuclear, power plants with CCS and fossil power plants without CCS. The vertical bars indicate the range between minimum and maximum estimate; the horizontal bar indicates the median. Proximity to this median value does not imply higher likelihood because of the different degree of aggregation of model results, the low number of studies available and different assumptions in the different studies considered. The numbers in the bottom row show the total number of studies in the literature used for the assessment. This underscores that investment needs are still an evolving area of research that relatively few studies have examined. [Figure 16.3] [Subject to final quality check and copy edit]

Therehasbeenaconsiderableincreaseinnationalandsubnationalmitigationplansand strategiessinceAR4.In2012,67%ofglobalGHGemissionsweresubjecttonationallegislationor strategiesversus45%in2007.However,therehasnotyetbeenasubstantialdeviationinglobal emissionsfromthepasttrend[Figure1.3c].Theseplansandstrategiesareintheirearlystagesof developmentandimplementationinmanycountries,makingitdifficulttoassesstheiraggregate impactonfutureglobalemissions(mediumevidence,highagreement).[14.3.4,14.3.5,15.1,15.2] SinceAR4,therehasbeenanincreasedfocusonpoliciesdesignedtointegratemultipleobjectives, increasecobenefitsandreduceadversesideeffects(highconfidence).Governmentsoften explicitlyreferencecobenefitsinclimateandsectoralplansandstrategies.Thescientificliterature hassoughttoassessthesizeofcobenefits(seeSectionSPM.4.1)andthegreaterpoliticalfeasibility anddurabilityofpoliciesthathavelargecobenefitsandsmalladversesideeffects.[4.8,5.7,6.6, 13.2,15.2]DespitethegrowingattentioninpolicymakingandthescientificliteraturesinceAR4,the analyticalandempiricalunderpinningsforunderstandingmanyoftheinteractiveeffectsareunder developed[1.2,3.6.3,4.2,4.8,5.7,6.6].

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Sectorspecificpolicieshavebeenmorewidelyusedthaneconomywidepolicies(medium evidence,highagreement).Althoughmosteconomictheorysuggeststhateconomywidepoliciesfor thesingularobjectiveofmitigationwouldbemorecosteffectivethansectorspecificpolicies,since AR4agrowingnumberofstudieshasdemonstratedthatadministrativeandpoliticalbarriersmay makeeconomywidepolicieshardertodesignandimplementthansectorspecificpolicies.Thelatter maybebettersuitedtoaddressbarriersormarketfailuresspecifictocertainsectors,andmaybe bundledinpackagesofcomplementarypolicies.[6.3.6.5,8.10,9.10,10.10,15.2,15.5,15.8,15.9] Regulatoryapproachesandinformationmeasuresarewidelyused,andareoftenenvironmentally effective(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).Examplesofregulatoryapproachesincludeenergy efficiencystandards;examplesofinformationprogrammesincludelabellingprogrammesthatcan helpconsumersmakebetterinformeddecisions.Whilesuchapproacheshaveoftenbeenfoundto haveanetsocialbenefit,thescientificliteratureisdividedontheextenttowhichsuchpoliciescan beimplementedwithnegativeprivatecoststofirmsandindividuals.[Box3.10,15.5.5,15.5.6]There isgeneralagreementthatreboundeffectsexist,wherebyhigherefficiencycanleadtolowerenergy pricesandgreaterconsumption,butthereislowagreementintheliteratureonthemagnitude [3.9.5,5.7.2,14.4.2,15.5.4]. SinceAR4,capandtradesystemsforGHGshavebeenestablishedinanumberofcountriesand regions.Theirshortrunenvironmentaleffecthasbeenlimitedasaresultofloosecapsorcaps thathavenotprovedtobeconstraining(limitedevidence,mediumagreement).Thiswasrelatedto factorssuchasthefinancialandeconomiccrisisthatreducedenergydemand,newenergysources, interactionswithotherpolicies,andregulatoryuncertainty.Inprinciple,acapandtradesystemcan achievemitigationinacosteffectiveway;itsimplementationdependsonnationalcircumstances. Thoughearlierprogrammesreliedalmostexclusivelyongrandfathering(freeallocationofpermits), auctioningpermitsisincreasinglyapplied.Ifallowancesareauctioned,revenuescanbeusedto addressotherinvestmentswithahighsocialreturn,and/orreducethetaxanddebtburden.[14.4.2, 15.5.3] Insomecountries,taxbasedpoliciesspecificallyaimedatreducingGHGemissionsalongside technologyandotherpolicieshavehelpedtoweakenthelinkbetweenGHGemissionsandGDP (highconfidence).Inalargegroupofcountries,fueltaxes(althoughnotnecessarilydesignedforthe purposeofmitigation)haveeffectsthatareakintosectoralcarbontaxes[Table15.2].Thedemand reductionintransportfuelassociatedwitha1%priceincreaseis0.6%to0.8%inthelongrun, althoughtheshortrunresponseismuchsmaller[15.5.2].Insomecountriesrevenuesareusedto reduceothertaxesand/ortoprovidetransferstolowincomegroups.Thisillustratesthegeneral principlethatmitigationpoliciesthatraisegovernmentrevenuegenerallyhavelowersocialcosts thanapproacheswhichdonot.Whileithaspreviouslybeenassumedthatfueltaxesinthetransport sectorareregressive,therehavebeenanumberofotherstudiessinceAR4thathaveshownthemto beprogressive,particularlyindevelopingcountries(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).[3.6.3, 14.4.2,15.5.2] ThereductionofsubsidiesforGHGrelatedactivitiesinvarioussectorscanachieveemission reductions,dependingonthesocialandeconomiccontext(highconfidence).Whilesubsidiescan affectemissionsinmanysectors,mostoftherecentliteraturehasfocusedonsubsidiesinfossil fuels.SinceAR4asmallbutgrowingliteraturebasedoneconomywidemodelshasprojectedthat completeremovalofsubsidiestofossilfuelsinallcountriescouldresultinreductionsinglobal aggregateemissionsbymidcentury(mediumevidence,mediumagreement)[7.12,13.13,14.3.2, 15.5.2].Studiesvaryinmethodology,thetypeanddefinitionofsubsidiesandthetimeframefor phaseoutconsidered.Inparticular,thestudiesassesstheimpactsofcompleteremovalofallfossil fuelsubsidieswithoutseekingtoassesswhichsubsidiesarewastefulandinefficient,keepinginmind nationalcircumstances.Althoughpoliticaleconomybarriersaresubstantial,somecountrieshave reformedtheirtaxandbudgetsystemstoreducefuelsubsidies.Tohelpreducepossibleadverse effectsonlowerincomegroupswhooftenspendalargefractionoftheirincomeonenergyservices,

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SummaryforPolicymakers

IPCCWGIIIAR5

manygovernmentshaveutilizedlumpsumcashtransfersorothermechanismstargetedonthe poor.[15.5.2] Interactionsbetweenoramongmitigationpoliciesmaybesynergisticormayhavenoadditive effectonreducingemissions(mediumevidence,highagreement).Forinstance,acarbontaxcan haveanadditiveenvironmentaleffecttopoliciessuchassubsidiesforthesupplyofRE.Bycontrast, ifacapandtradesystemhasabindingcap(sufficientlystringenttoaffectemissionrelated decisions),thenotherpoliciessuchasREsubsidieshavenofurtherimpactonreducingemissions withinthetimeperiodthatthecapapplies(althoughtheymayaffectcostsandpossiblytheviability ofmorestringentfuturetargets)(mediumevidence,highagreement).Ineithercase,additional policiesmaybeneededtoaddressmarketfailuresrelatingtoinnovationandtechnologydiffusion. [15.7] Somemitigationpoliciesraisethepricesforsomeenergyservicesandcouldhampertheabilityof societiestoexpandaccesstomodernenergyservicestounderservedpopulations(lowconfidence). Thesepotentialadversesideeffectscanbeavoidedwiththeadoptionofcomplementarypolicies (mediumconfidence).Mostnotably,about1.3billionpeopleworldwidedonothaveaccessto electricityandabout3billionaredependentontraditionalsolidfuelsforcookingandheatingwith severeadverseeffectsonhealth,ecosystemsanddevelopment.Providingaccesstomodernenergy servicesisanimportantsustainabledevelopmentobjective.Thecostsofachievingnearlyuniversal accesstoelectricityandcleanfuelsforcookingandheatingareprojectedtobebetweenUSD72to 95billionperyearuntil2030withminimaleffectsonGHGemissions(limitedevidence,medium agreement).Atransitionawayfromtheuseoftraditionalbiomass29andthemoreefficient combustionofsolidfuelsreduceairpollutantemissions,suchassulfurdioxide(SO2),nitrogenoxides (NOx),carbonmonoxide(CO),andblackcarbon(BC),andthusyieldlargehealthbenefits(high confidence).[4.3,6.6,7.9,9.3,9.7,11.13.6,16.8] Technologypolicycomplementsothermitigationpolicies(highconfidence).Technologypolicy includestechnologypush(e.g.,publiclyfundedR&D)anddemandpull(e.g.,governmental procurementprogrammes).Suchpoliciesaddressmarketfailuresrelatedtoinnovationand technologydiffusion.[3.11,15.6]Technologysupportpolicieshavepromotedsubstantialinnovation anddiffusionofnewtechnologies,butthecosteffectivenessofsuchpoliciesisoftendifficultto assess[2.6.5,7.12,9.10].Nevertheless,programevaluationdatacanprovideempiricalevidenceon therelativeeffectivenessofdifferentpoliciesandcanassistwithpolicydesign[15.6.5]. Inmanycountries,theprivatesectorplayscentralrolesintheprocessesthatleadtoemissionsas wellastomitigation.Withinappropriateenablingenvironments,theprivatesector,alongwith thepublicsector,canplayanimportantroleinfinancingmitigation(mediumevidence,high agreement).Theshareoftotalmitigationfinancefromtheprivatesector,acknowledgingdata limitations,isestimatedtobeonaveragebetweentwothirdsandthreefourthsonthegloballevel (20102012)(limitedevidence,mediumagreement).Inmanycountries,publicfinanceinterventions bygovernmentsandnationalandinternationaldevelopmentbanksencourageclimateinvestments bytheprivatesector[16.2.1]andprovidefinancewhereprivatesectorinvestmentislimited.The qualityofacountrysenablingenvironmentincludestheeffectivenessofitsinstitutions,regulations andguidelinesregardingtheprivatesector,securityofpropertyrights,credibilityofpoliciesand otherfactorsthathaveasubstantialimpactonwhetherprivatefirmsinvestinnewtechnologiesand infrastructures[16.3].Dedicatedpolicyinstruments,forexample,creditinsurance,powerpurchase agreementsandfeedintariffs,concessionalfinanceorrebates,provideanincentiveforinvestment byloweringrisksforprivateactors[16.4].
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SeeWGIIIAR5Glossary.

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SPM.5.2 Internationalcooperation
TheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)isthemainmultilateral forumfocusedonaddressingclimatechange,withnearlyuniversalparticipation.Otherinstitutions organizedatdifferentlevelsofgovernancehaveresultedindiversifyinginternationalclimatechange cooperation.[13.3.1,13.4.1.4,13.5] Existingandproposedinternationalclimatechangecooperationarrangementsvaryintheirfocus anddegreeofcentralizationandcoordination.Theyspan:multilateralagreements,harmonized nationalpoliciesanddecentralizedbutcoordinatednationalpolicies,aswellasregionaland regionallycoordinatedpolicies.[FigureTS.37,13.4,13.13.2,14.4] TheKyotoProtocolofferslessonstowardsachievingtheultimateobjectiveoftheUNFCCC, particularlywithrespecttoparticipation,implementation,flexibilitymechanisms,and environmentaleffectiveness(mediumevidence,lowagreement).[5.2,13.7.2,13.13.1.1,13.13.1.2, 14.3.7.1,TableTS.9] UNFCCCactivitiessince2007haveledtoanincreasingnumberofinstitutionsandother arrangementsforinternationalclimatechangecooperation.[13.5.1.1,13.13.1.3,16.2.1.1] Policylinkagesamongregional,national,andsubnationalclimatepoliciesofferpotentialclimate changemitigationandadaptationbenefits(mediumevidence,mediumagreement).Linkagescanbe establishedbetweennationalpolicies,variousinstruments,andthroughregionalcooperation. [13.3.1,13.5.1.3,13.5.3,14.5] Variousregionalinitiativesbetweenthenationalandglobalscalesareeitherbeingdevelopedor implemented,buttheirimpactonglobalmitigationhasbeenlimitedtodate(mediumconfidence). Manyclimatepoliciescanbemoreeffectiveifimplementedacrossgeographicalregions.[TableTS.9, 13.13,14.4,14.5]

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