The Main Cause of the Ottoman-Safavid Persia War 1623-1639

James Hunter Gore HIS 386 April 19th, 2013

What was the main cause of the Ottoman-Safavid Persia War from 1623 to 1639? The Ottoman-Safavid Persia War of 1623 to 1639 was primarily caused by the rule of one man, the new Ottoman sultan, Murad IV. Murat IV restored the weakened Ottoman Empire, Boosted military power, waged two successful campaigns against the Safavids, restored lands that were lost that were lost in previous years to the Safavids, and eliminated the Safavid Shia influence from Ottoman territory. Throughout history, the Ottoman and the Safavid empires had fought in numerous separate series of short wars that lasted well over a century. Each of these short wars lasted approximately between five and ten years a piece. For the most part, each war possessed within itself different causes than the war before it. In particular, the war from 1623 to 1639 is significant precisely because it was the final war that was fought between these two empires and it was the last war that the Safavids would ever fight in. The war was a stretch of a long sixteen years and resulted in the end of the Safavid Empire power throughout the Middle East. Murat IV was completely responsible for the war that ended with the extermination of the Safavid Persia influence throughout all of Anatolia and Iran. Murad IV or Murat IV, son of Sultan Ahmed I, was born in 1609 and had come of age to rule in 1623. Murad IV eventually replaced his mentally disturbed uncle, Mustafa I, as sultan of the Ottoman Empire. However, it is extremely important to understand the background of the status of the Ottoman state before Murat IV came to power. Sultan Mustafa I had essentially ran the Ottoman Empire into the ground in the early part of the 1600s. Mustafas reign as sultan had grown highly unpopular with the people because he had become a victim of insanity. Most of the governors refused to obey orders of an

insane sultan and claimed it was illegal. The Ottoman state in itself was caught up in a decline and a financial disaster due to divisions among the empire. Finally, the decision was reached that Murad IV should take power and replace the mentally ill Mustafa. The decisive moment came when the corps promised not to demand an Accession Tax if Mustafa was deposed for Murad. On September 10, 1623, Mustafa was deposed and Murad IV was installed by general agreement, thus bringing to the throne a sultan who was to lead an empire out of imminent disaster1 to firm rule and military success.1 Murad IV wasted little time when he came to the throne in 1623. He knew his empire was in distress and it was up to him to bring power, glory, and restoration back to the Ottoman Empire that had been lost over the past decade. He became successful in accomplishing these goals by initiating a successful military campaign against the Safavid Dynasty, who were the long time archenemies of the Ottomans. Murads main goals of waging war with the Safavids were: the centralization of the Ottoman military, the reconquest of Baghdad, and removal of Safavid religious converters from Ottoman lands. Murad quickly turned his empire around by restoring the state, unifying the Ottoman military to fight under his flag, and providing the necessary leadership to save the empire. During the first part of his reign, until he reached puberty in 1632, he was under the domination of the political leaders who had brought him to power. After he took personal charge, he was ruthless in enforcing discipline and eliminating the elements of weakness in the state.1 The Ottoman state had entered a new era of rejuvenation of power. Murad IV was aware that the Ottomans most direct rival was the Safavids. He knew from past centuries

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the Ottomans were disgusted with the dominantly Shia Safavids in Iran, because most of the Ottomans at this time were Sunni Muslims. Secondly, rebels throughout the Middle East had taken notice of how weak the Ottomans were when Murat took the throne. The Ottoman military was essentially non-existent because of the numerous divisions among military leaders at the time Murad came to power. Murat knew he had to establish complete rule in his own empire to have control over the powerful Janissaries, restore order, and begin boosting Ottoman military presence in the Middle East. He would do exactly that and dominated the pesky Safavids once and for all. The first reason that Murad IV is the main cause of the war between the Ottomans and Safavids in 1623 was the rejuvenation of the Ottoman military. When Murat had come to power, the Ottomans had fallen to their weakest state in history thanks to Mustafa I, and the divisions among the rebels throughout the empire. The very order of how each city or state operated was basically under the personalized authority of the governor in each area because none of the Ottomans were going to obey an insane sultan. The Janissaries also were a product of corruption in the early 1600s. The Janissaries had played their role in weakening the power of the sultan because they input their own influence into the past sultans decision, as well as assassinating certain potential sultans just so they could get who they wanted to be seated on the throne. Murat IV knew he had to act swiftly to restore order and begin building up his military to ensure centralization of the empire. During the first part of his reign he was under the dominant influence of political leadership because he had not reached adulthood yet. After he took personal charge, he was ruthless in enforcing discipline and eliminating the elements of weakness in the state.1

On the flip side, the Safavids took notice of the downward spiral their rivals were headed in. Although the Safavids would strike the first blow in the war, they were not
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wishing war. The Safavids under Shah Abbbas I, would capture the city of Baghdad.

Although many scholars can argue that this was the major event that began this war but it is not. Since Murat had not completely restored order by 1624, the Safavids were simply taking advantage of their weak and unstable neighbors. This was more of a strategic move by the Safavids than an all out war, because at this time Baghdad did not adhere to Ottoman law. As the Safavids saw this Ottoman weakness as a opportunity to take back and regain control over Baghdad which was taken from them in in their war with Sultan Selim I in the middle 1500s. Murad now was faced with the reality his military was not centralized and very weak. If Murat were planning on going to go and fight the Safavids in a war, then he would need to restore the Ottoman military. He eventually was able to gain the military corps support and now he was in a good position to assert his own authority and to reform the Ottoman system. Once Murat built up his armies, he led two campaigns against the Safavids for the remainder of his rule. The campaigns into Caucasus and Azerbaijan were a success. The Ottomans captured the city of Erivan, and the city of Tabriz (the first Safavid capital), and Yerevan from the Safavids without much resistance in 1934. But when his armies returned to Istanbul, the Safavids returned to both of these areas. However, in December 1638, Murad decides the Ottomans were ready to retake Baghdad from the Safavids for good. The Safavids had set up strong defenses, but Murads forces eventually won. At the same time, Murad IV sent troops out over much

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of Mesopotamia to restore Sunni Islam forcibly and drive out the Shia population who had dominated during the previous half-century.1 Murad stayed in Mosul for the winter and planned on campaigning into Azerbaijan the next summer. However, he changed his mind when the Shah offered peace and stated they would abandon their forts along the Iraqi and eastern Anatolia borders. Murad signed the peace treaty known as the Treaty of Zuhab on May 17, 1639. The treaty significantly reduced Safavid power and influence in Iran. Iraq was confirmed for the Ottomans, while Erivan and the parts of the Caucasus then in Safavid hands were left to Iran, with the latter promising further to end its raids and missionary efforts in Ottoman territory, and also ended the public condemnation of Sunnis that had been made previously throughout Iran.3 Murad returned to Istanbul and decided not to further invade the Safavids. Now Iraq and the route to the Persian Gulf were restored to the Ottomans. Although he did not obtain the territory of Caucasus and Azerbaijan from the Safavids, his campaign was a success in that he ended Sunni persecution throughout all of Iran. Murad IV died at the age of 27, soon after coming home to Istanbul on February 8, 1640, of excessive drinking, most likely in celebration of his victory over the Safavids. The second major reason that Murad IV was the main cause of the war was that he saw the Safavid dynasty as a serious challenge to the Ottoman Empire. This challenge was a geographical or a territorial control challenge. For the turkomans and Kurds living in Ottoman Anatolia, the Safavid system of government, which resembled a nomadic tribal confederation, seemed more desirable than the centralized Ottoman rule that threatened the nomads way of life.1 Murad viewed the Safavids as a stumbling block

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that he had to remove so he could centralize his empire and achieve his goal of restoration the Ottoman Empire. The Safavids declared Shia Islam the official state religion over Persia and the shas agents embarked on a major religious campaign in Anatolia region and won several converts to support their cause. They targeted the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire among the Turkoman nomads for most to become their converts. This angered Murad greatly and he became determined to establish complete control over Anatolia and take back Baghdad from the Safavids. The city of Baghdad was the most important city in all of Iraq for the Ottomans because whoever controlled it, also controlled the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Controlling these important rivers granted international and regional trade route security for ships. Murat wanted complete control over these areas precisely because of these reasons. Another key element for Murad IV waging war on the Safavids was because they also controlled the city of Mosul. Mosul was vastly important for its rich agriculture economy and fertile lands between the Tigress and Euphrates rivers. Secondly, Mosul was a large-scale trade center on the route that connected the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. The city was strategic to the Ottomans both as a military outpost to control the Kurdish nomadic tribes to the north of the city, and to defend the empire from its archrival, Iran.4The Ottomans occupied Mosul until 1623, when the Persian Safavid armies captured it. Murat would eventually capture Mosul and turned the city into basically a military base for his Janissaries during his campaign against the Safavids throughout the early 1630s. This provided a strategic edge for Murad, as he was able to transport soldiers and supplies to his warfront at a much quicker rate than before.

3 Gabor,

Agoston, Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, p. 394 7

Murad IV fancied himself as a warrior sultan and he had high hopes of being able to prove himself as a successful militaristic sultan in the Ottoman Empire. In the seventeenth century the state of the Safavids was heading south. The Ottoman offensives led by Murad IV mounted in 1630s were aimed simply at restoring the former balance of power in the region, which had been upset by the defection of the Ottoman garrison at Baghdad to the Safavids in 1623 during a period of Ottoman dynastic crisis.5 Murat placed recapturing Baghdad a top priority, thus making him being the absolute cause for the war. This was a concentration of effort that was made feasible by the embroilment of Christian Europe in internal wars of its own between 1618 and 1648.4 Murats two-pronged campaign can be broken down into two separate massive strikes against the cities of Baghdad and Erivan in 1635. Murad issued large mobilizations against these cities, each involving in excess of 100,000 troops, made a symbolic show of Ottoman might, but neither of the armies remained long in the field.4 The historian Katib Chelebi who was present in the Ottoman army during Murats offensive against Erivan in 1635 openly admits that, although the sultan managed to stage an impressive troop inspection at Ilica in July, only a small portion of these forces remained at the sultans side a month later when Erivan was put to siege.4 Because of the relative quiet on other fronts during the 1630s, Murad was able to commit unprecedented manpower resources and treasury funds to his eastern wars.4 This assisted Murad at basically possessing the ability to throw everything he had at his biggest rival, the Safavids. He was able to raise a massive Ottoman army, unlike any past sultans before him, hence allowing him to make his mark in Middle Eastern history permanently. Murad IV set a

Rhodes Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, pp. 4-5 8

new record in Ottoman history in that he was the only sultan who had ever mounted back-to-back sultanic campaigns in 1635 and 1638. In a sense Murad was also a main cause of the war because he was a youthful sultan that pressured himself into going to war with the Safavids to help prove he was a great and a militarily successful sultan of Ottoman history. When young Murad came to power, the Ottoman military was not a centralized unit. Instead Murad was faced at uniting the provinces throughout the empire under his cause of pushing the Safavids out of their Anatolia, Iraq, and Iran further back into Persia. Each separate provincial military corps was in revolt because of the failure of the Ottoman government before Murad to pay them their salaries. In 1629 when Husrev Pasa was dismissed by Murad IV as grand vezir because of his failure at Baghdad, he managed to obtain the support of both the Janissary and Sipahi corps, leading to a whole series of military uprisings.6 The new grand vezir, Hafiz Ahmet Pasa, convinced Murad and the Imperial council that the way to solve the problem was to order the rebels, and in fact all the Janissary and Sipahi garrisons in the provinces, to come to Istanbul so that their grievances could be heard and solved. In no time, Istanbul was flooded with rowdy soldiers that did not fully respect the young Murad. In a desperate effort to appease the bandits, Murad dismissed seventeen leading officials, including the grand vezir and Seyhulislam Yahya Efendi, who were then torn apart by the soldiers immediately in front of the palace gates.5 These rebels quickly dominated the city of Istanbul and Murad was faced with the challenge of uniting this mess of a military. Murad became ruthless and begin enforcing his power with the help of the rebel leaders that swore to protect him and eliminate the bandits in

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Istanbul. In a few months, the empire was rid of bandits and Murad had united his military. Bribery and corruption were largely eliminated and order and security restored, with literally thousands of malefactors paying for their crimes with their lives. It seemed possible at least that Murad had done the impossible and really restored the Ottoman system.7 By sheer force of his personality and by executing over 20,000 men, he managed to bring some stability and restore much of the empires vigor, at least for the moment, thus delaying the results of decline.6 Back on the flip side, many people believe that the main cause of this war was by the actions of the new Persian Shah, Abbas I. At this time, Shah Abbas I was engaging in the same kind of events that Murad IV was performing in the Ottoman Empire. He was similar to Murad in that he came to power at the age of sixteen and was highly influenced by a group similar to the Janissaries known as the Qizilbash. The Qizilbash encouraged Shah Abbas to go to war with the weak Ottomans and spread their Shia religion as the reason for war. For example, the Safavids were made up of mostly nomads and organizing the Safavid military proved extremely difficult. Still, Abbas I was able to reorganize his military. To finance the new military units Shah Abbas raised additional income by bringing more provinces under direct state control.8 In direct contrast, Cengiz Sisman wrote an article about how Stephen Dales book was too brief, he stated For example, the Ottoman Empire, in particular, has left an enduring and yet contested legacy on modern Muslim and non-Muslim nation-states such as Iran, Turkey, and the Balkans

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Stanford Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, pp. 197-200 Stephen Dale, The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, p. 94 10

and that the role of theses empires in global history receives very little attention.9 Being that the Ottomans were a direct threat to his empire, he believed it was best to secure bordering cities of the empire and remove any Ottomans that were a threat the Safavid economy. This is precisely why many think Abbas is to blame for the war, but one must look at the big picture here, in that the Ottoman Empire itself at this time was essentially non-existent because of the harsh decline in was caught up in. Recapping, Shah Abbas people believed started the war for economic and territorial reasons, but there was one last reason he went to war with the Ottomans and that was religious beliefs. Shah Abbas and his Safavid Dynasty were dominantly Shia Muslim, while the Ottomans to their west were mostly all Sunni Muslim. These two groups were counterparts of one another in the Islamic realm and considered the other group basically their enemy. During these centuries the Islamic world was also characterized by religious complexity: two major sectarian divisions of Sunnis and Shias, doctrinal differences within both Sunni and Shii communities, and distinctly different attitudes toward salvation and the relative importance of orthodox practice and individual piety.10 This explains why so many people believe that Shah Abbas Is actions rather than Murad IVs caused the war. This leads directly into the third major reason why Murad IV is the main cause of the war from 1623-1639, which is the conflicting of religious beliefs between the Ottomans and the Safavids. All Muslims practice either Sunni or Shia Islam. Murad wished to eliminate the Safavids that were converting his people to Shia Muslim in Iran and in Anatolia. Unlike past sultans that had failed in doing away with the Safavids,

Cengiz Sisman, Book Review of Dales: The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, pp. 177 10 Stephen Dale, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, pp. 11-12
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Murad was determined to free his empire from their religious influence from his borders. The Sunnis recognized the legitimacy of the first four Caliphs, the rightly guided political successors to the Prophet Muhammad, and regarded these men and their Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad as guardians of the political integrity of the Muslim world.10 In Sunni Muslim eyes Khalifas or caliphs were ordinary mortals and emphatically not individuals who possessed unique religious status or divinely inspired insight. Sunni worshipers usually adhered to one of four Islamic legal schools sometimes the source of sectarian tension, but these differences paled in comparison with the distinction between Sunnis and Shias.10 As for Shias, they believed in something entirely different about the foundation of Islam. Shias were located in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Egypt. Shias did not recognize the legitimacy of the first three Caliphs, the Abbasids, or other Sunni rulers, since they held that only descendants of Ali, the Prophet Muhammads first cousin and son-in-law and fourth rightly guided Caliph, could be authentic leaders of the Muslim umma.10 One can easily determine the outcome of the future of these two beliefs, which is the constant warfare throughout the existence of each empire. However, since the Ottoman Empire was heading in such a fast paced decline, Murad IV believed that with the elimination of the threat of the Shia Safavids that he could save his empire and bring it back to being Sunni Muslim once again. Murats primary task and main reason for waging war on the Safavids was the reconquest of the city of Baghdad to assist him in restoring order. He would send his armies against Baghdad in 1626 and in 1630, but it was not until 1638 that the city was finally returned to Ottoman rule. In 1639 Sultan Murad IV and the Iranian Shah Safi agreed to the

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Treaty of Zuhab, which awarded Baghdad to the Ottomans and settled the frontier until the Safavid dynasty collapsed in the 1720s.11 Murad IV was successful in the war, which produced a downward shift in the percentage of Shia Muslims in the Middle East. The Ottoman Sunnis on the borders of the empire were now free from the persecution of the Safavids who were responsible for converting many Ottomans during the war. The end result was that the Ottomans were now safe in that they would not lose any more of their own people to the Safavid Shia Muslim religious beliefs. This meant that Murad had succeeded in liberating Mesopotamia of the Shias from his empire and completely centralized the empire as Sunni Islam. The peace established a permanent equilibrium of power in the region, and the Safavids were no longer a threat to Murad IV and the Ottoman strides toward progress and unification. By the Treaty of Zuhab, the modern day Turkey-Iran and the Iraq-Iran boundary lines were drawn. Murad IV was the main cause of Ottoman-Safavid Persia war from 1623-1639 because of three major reasons. Murad believed war was necessary with the Safavids in order for his empire to end its discourse. The first reason Murad went to war with the Safavids was to completely unify the Ottoman military and state. Numerous rebellions and division constantly sprang up during Murads earliest years as the new Ottoman sultan. Murad used centralization as a means for war and became an extremely ruthless leader to establish a centralized Ottoman military that would provide the final blow to the Safavid threat. The second major reason Murad IV was the main cause of the war with the Safavids was the reconquest of the city of Baghdad. Baghdad was a vital city to trade routes and was taken from the Ottomans prior to Murads reign due to the ever-growing

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Gabor Agoston, Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, p. 171 13

weakness of the Ottoman state. Murad saw regaining the lost city of Baghdad as a key role in his war with the Safavids. Murad was extremely successful in his campaigns and was the second ever sultan to actually lead his armies into battle in Ottoman history. The third reason Murad IV was the main cause of the war was that he saw that his people were being converted to Shia Islam by the Safavids and considered this as another excuse for waging war. He viewed the war as somewhat of a liberation of Anatolia and Mesopotamia from the evil Safavids who were persecuting Ottomans near the borders of the Safavids. He wished to remove their influence upon his empire and rid the Shia Muslims of Ottoman territory. Murad was successful in doing just that with the signing of the Treaty of Zuhab on May 17, 1639, which significantly reduced Safavid power and influence in Iran and throughout the Middle East.

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Works Cited goston, Gbor, and Bruce Alan Masters. Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire. New York, NY: Facts On File, 2009. Print. Dale, Stephen Frederic. The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. Print. Murphey, Rhoads. Ottoman Warfare. London: UCL, 1999. Print. Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1976. Print. (Shaw) (Shaw) Sisman, Cengiz, ed. "Book Review of Stephen Dale's: The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, And Mughals." Journal of World History (2012): 177. Web. Copyright: University of Hawaii Press

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