Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
MOTION TO DISMISS
COME NOW Defendants FranklinSquires Companies, LLC (“FSC”) and Hill Erickson,
LLC(“HE”), by counsel, and pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) files this their Motion to Dismiss and in
1. Plaintiff Nicholas Coughlin (“Coughlin”) alleges that he was an agent of FSC and
that, in connection therewith, Coughlin approached Mr. Jeff Brantley (“Brantley”) about purchasing
his Clinton, MS home (“Brantley Property”). Coughlin’s Complaint at paras. 14 and 15. Coughlin
further alleges that he “negotiated a deal with Jeff Brantley for the sale of his home” and that FSC
subsequently purchased the Brantley Property through HE, an entity Coughlin alleges is under the
control of FSC. Coughlin’s Complaint at paras. 16 and 18. Coughlin also alleges that FSC has
breached a contractual obligation to pay him a twenty-five percent commission arising out of FSC’s
purchase of the Brantley Property through HE. Coughlin’s Complaint at paras.21-24. Even if the
allegations of Coughlin’s Complaint were true, which is denied by FSC and HE, Coughlin fails to
state a claim against FSC and HE upon which relief can be granted.
2. For the purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the allegations
of Coughlin’s Complaint must be taken as true. Fernandes-Montes v. Allied Pilots Assoc., 987 F.
2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). However, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where the pleadings
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on their face reveal that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle the plaintiff to the
requested relief. Garrett v. Commonwealth Mort. Corp. of America, 938 F. 2d 591, 594 (5th Cir.
1991).
3. The facts pled by Coughlin reveal that his breach of contract claim for the payment
of a commission arising out of HE’s purchase of the Brantley Property fail to state a claim against
FSE and HE upon which relief can be granted. Miss. Code Ann. § 73-35-33(1) provides in pertinent
part,
No person ... shall bring or maintain an action in any court of this state for the recovery of
a commission ... for any act done or services rendered, the doing or rendering of which is prohibited
under the provisions of this chapter for persons other than licensed real estate brokers, unless such
person was duly licensed hereunder as a real estate broker at the time of the doing of such act or the
rendering of such service.
Coughlin has alleged that he “negotiated a deal with Jeff Brantley for the sale of his home”,
that, based on such negotiations, FSC subsequently purchased the Brantley Property through HE and
that FSE has breached a contractual duty to pay Coughlin a commission arising out of such purchase.
Coughlin’s allegations clearly fall within the definition of real estate brokerage activities under
Mississippi law.
[t]he term “real estate broker”... shall include all persons, ... who for a fee, commission or
other valuable consideration, or who with the intention or expectation of receiving or collecting the
same, list, sell, purchase ... any real estate ... ; or who negotiate or attempt to negotiate any such
activity; ... ; or who direct or assist in the procuring of a purchaser or prospect calculated or intended
to result in a real estate transaction.
Miss. Code Ann. § 73-35-3 (1972, as amended). Moreover, in addition to criminal and/or civil
penalties, Miss Code Ann. § 73-35-31 provides that no person can recover a commission for real
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estate brokerage activities, as described in Miss. Code Ann. § 73-35-3 (1) (quoted above), unless
Coughlin has neither alleged nor is he, in fact, a licensed real estate broker under the laws
of the State of Mississippi. As a result, since Coughlin is asserting a breach of contract claim for the
payment of a commission arising out of the performance of real estate brokerage activities, as
defined by Mississippi law, Coughlin is precluded from maintaining this action against FSC and HE.
4. Not only does Coughlin’s asserted claim for the payment of a commission violate
Mississippi law, Coughlin merely alleges that FSC, not HE, has breached a contract with Coughlin
to pay him the claimed commission. Therefore, even if FSC has breached a contract with Coughlin,
which is denied, there is no basis alleged in Coughlin’s Complaint upon which HE could be found
liable for a breach of contract to which it is not a party. Simply put, Coughlin has failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted against HE under a breach of contract theory even if
5. For the reasons set forth herein, as well as those set forth in the Motion to Dismiss
of Defendant C. Rick Koerber, incorporated herein by reference pursuant to F.R.C.P. 10, all of
Coughlin’s claims against the defendants should be dismissed with prejudice. Further, at the time
Coughlin initiated this suit, Coughlin wrongfully filed a Lis Pendens Notice against and/or in relation
to the Brantley Property owned by HE. (See HE’s Counterclaim at paras. 16 and 19, as well as the
related exhibits, incorporated herein by reference pursuant to F.R.C.P. 10). Through a separate
motion, HE will seek the cancellation of Coughlin’s Lis Pendens Notice for the reasons set forth
dismiss Coughlin’s claims against them with prejudice, that judgment be entered in favor of FSC and
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HE as a matter of law and that the Court award FSE and HE any and all other relief the Court deems
appropriate.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 5, 2007, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of
the Court using the ECF System which sent notification of such filing to the following:
s/Eddie J. Abdeen
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