Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
COME NOW Defendants FranklinSquires Companies, LLC (“FSC”) and Hill Erickson,
LLC(“HE”), by counsel, and pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) files this their Rebuttal in Support of
1. Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 10, FSC and HE incorporate herein by reference their original
2. Coughlin seeks to avoid dismissal of his claims against FSC and HE by asserting that
the veil piercing doctrine somehow precludes the dismissal of the claims against HE. See para. 8 and
pp. 2-3 of Coughlin’s response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss of FSC and HE and related
memorandum, respectively. Coughlins veil piercing theory fails as a matter of law and/or otherwise
fails to state a claim under the applicable law. See para. 14 of the defendants’ Response to Motion
for Leave to File Amended Complaint, incorporated herein by reference pursuant to F.R.C.P. 10.
3. As set forth in the Motion to Dismiss of FSC and HE, Coughlin’s asserted
entitlement to a commission in relation to the Brantley Property specifically violates the real estate
brokerage provisions of the Mississippi Code as Coughlin has neither alleged nor is he, in fact, a
licensed real estate broker. See the Motion to Dismiss of FSC and HE at para. 3, incorporated herein
by reference pursuant to F.R.C.P. 10. It is undisputed that the Brantley Property is located in
Case 3:06-cv-00288-HTW-LRA Document 25 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 2 of 3
Mississippi. As a result, the real estate brokerage provisions of the Mississippi Code apply to the
4. Despite the clear applicability of the Mississippi real estate brokerage provisions to
the Brantley Property transaction, Coughlin asserts that Utah law applies to his contract claim for
a commission in relation to the Brantley Property and cites Anderson v. Johnson, 160 P. 2d 725
(Utah 1945) for the proposition that he is entitled to the claimed commission. See para. 13 and pp.
3-4 of Coughlin’s response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss of FSC and HE and related
Plaintiff in Anderson did not come within the provisions of the Utah real estate licensing provisions
because the plaintiff merely sought compensation from a broker for assisting him in obtaining a real
commission in relation to the Brantley Property transaction arising from HE’s purchase of such
property and would run afoul of either the Utah or Mississippi real estate licensing provisions. See,
Anderson, 160 P. 2d at 728; and para. 3 of the Motion to Dismiss of FSC and HE.
dismiss Coughlin’s claims against them with prejudice, that judgment be entered in favor of FSC and
HE as a matter of law and that the Court award FSE and HE any and all other relief the Court deems
appropriate.
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Case 3:06-cv-00288-HTW-LRA Document 25 Filed 09/06/2006 Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 6, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of the Court using the ECF System which sent notification of such filing to the following:
s/Eddie J. Abdeen
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