Global Governance 19 (2013), 545565

Dual Identity and Issue Localization: East Asia in Global Governance

Il Hyun Cho
This article examines the sources and consequences of East Asias participation in global governance. Despite the rhetoric of global contribution, the article argues that global governance issues are reframed in East Asia to better suit domestic and regional priorities. Specifically, two underlying mechanisms are at work to complicate, and often render ineffective, East Asias foray into global governance: (1) the conflicting identities of the three countries at the regional and global levels; and (2) the localization of global governance issues. By examining the global role of China, Japan, and South Korea in climate change, peacekeeping, and nuclear nonproliferation, the article shows how the shared desire of enhancing global status in East Asia is tempered by the politics of dual identity and issue localization. KEYWORDS: East Asia, climate change, peacekeeping, nonproliferation.

THE IMPRESSIVE GROWTH OF CHINA HELPED PROPEL EAST ASIAS INCREASING visibility on the global stage. Some even suggest a Group of 2, closer coordination and cooperation between the United States and China, as a future model of global governance.1 The desire to join the global ranks, however, is not limited to China. Japan, the worlds third largest economy, is a key player in areas such as climate change and overseas development assistance. South Korea has also entered the fray by pledging its troops to Afghanistan, dispatching its navy to the treacherous waters off Somalia, and hosting the Group of 20 (G-20) and the Nuclear Security Summit. Will East Asias enthusiastic foray into the global arena translate into better global governance? What are the likely consequences of East Asias increasing global presence for regional relations in East Asia? To address these questions, in this article I examine the growing tension between East Asias pursuit of global roles and its preoccupation with domestic and regional considerations. In fact, different roles expected at the global level may hinder the effective management of regional priorities, or vice versa.2 For instance, Chinas focus on economic growth and regional stability interferes with its global role in climate change and nuclear negotiations with North Korea and Iran. To varying degrees, Japans and South Koreas considerations of domestic and regional priorities often shape the character and effectiveness of their involvement in global governance. By
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investigating the domestic debate on global roles in China, Japan, and South Korea, this article aims to explain the sources and consequences of East Asias participation in global governance.3 Specifically, I examine the regional and global dimensions of three global governance issue areas: climate change, peacekeeping, and nuclear nonproliferation.4 Assessing the global role of the three East Asian countries is important for several reasons. First, they matter in light of their potential impact on global governance (e.g., China as the biggest emitter), their capacity to meaningfully address various challenges (e.g., Chinas and Japans material resources), and their unique experiences (e.g., their nuclear expertise and participation in the Six-Party Talks aimed at defusing the North Korean nuclear crisis). Second, a comparative analysis of the East Asian countries may provide insight into domestic and regional factors shaping state behavior in global governance. Despite sharing similar interests in addressing global challenges, the three countries are quite different with respect to their material capability, political system, and ideational orientation. By systematically investigating a group of countries in the same region, my research aims to shed light on the regional dimension of global governance, which can also be applicable to other regions, and its effects on global governance and regional politics. The article is organized in the following manner. I first discuss existing accounts of East Asias growing role on the global stage. With the objective of identifying regional patterns in addressing global governance issues, I then examine the nature and form of East Asian participation in global governance. Specifically, two underlying factors are important: the conflicting identities of the three countries at the regional and global levels, and the localization of global governance issues. In this context, I discuss the three countries understandings of, and policies toward, climate change, peacekeeping, and nuclear nonproliferation. By doing so, I seek to demonstrate the degree to which the East Asian countries new global roles interact with their traditional task of managing various domestic and regional priorities. I conclude with a discussion on the effects of the three countries involvement in global governance on regional politics in East Asia.

Conceptualizing East Asias Participation in Global Governance East Asias foray into the global stage comes at an opportune time when the G-20 summit, of which all three East Asian countries are members, has emerged as a premier global forum. East Asias global drive is also part of broader efforts by emerging powers around the world to assume a greater role in global governance.5 As the world faces a variety of complex global problems that elude national solutions, the role of new global actors

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deserves systematic investigation. Yet careful attention is needed to discern the nature of their participation and underlying motivations. In examining the key factors behind global governance and how to improve global governance, however, existing research has tended to overlook how emerging or regional powers understand and approach issues of global governance.6 Instead, some scholars conceptualize the global participation of emerging powers as a challenge to the dominance of current global powers.7 Realists, for instance, would view East Asias increasing global role as a deliberate attempt to maximize national power or material gains in the global competition for resources and geopolitical influence. In this regard, scholars note that Chinas global role is driven by its mercantilist tendency to acquire material resources in various parts of the world. Rawi Abdelal and Adam Segal, for instance, suggest that the possibility of oil supply disruptions appears to fuel Chinas seemingly illogical drive to acquire stakes in oil production facilities abroad.8 While such material considerations are an undeniable part of global politics, they provide only a partial picture of the East Asian reality concerning global governance. First, East Asias participation in global governance is driven not just by material, hard power considerations, but also by soft power dimensions.9 East Asias global role is thus portrayed as an obligation to do its part and contribute to the global system so as not to be accused of free riding.10 As I examine below, however, East Asias approach is becoming more proactive than reactive. Moreover, the regionwide yearning for global participation has been consistent irrespective of the ups and downs of material power considerations in each country. Alternatively, a functionalist account would describe East Asias role in global governance as a problem-solving exercise extended to the global level.11 In this view, the East Asian states involvement in global governance would reflect their desire to learn about global problems that directly affect them as well. Through active participation in global venues, East Asian leaders may gain insight in resolving problems that travel across borders and incur significant costs such as financial crises, pandemics, and piracy. Chinas global participation may also secure a timely access to institutional fora where global politics are decided that might affect Chinas autonomy.12 The same can be said of Japans role in the Group of 8 (G8) meetings and South Koreas hosting of the G-20 summit amid the global financial crisis that began in 2008. While useful in many respects and particularly pertinent in crisis situations, this functionalist account is oblivious to the mismatch between the regional countries stated goals and their actual behavior. For instance, China regularly publishes white papers on climate change and even formed a leading national governmental group on climate change.13 At the same time, however, Chinese officials refuse to set total energy consumption tar-

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gets, only occasionally announcing efficiency goals.14 Despite South Koreas call for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it was also reluctant to join the ninety-four-nation Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at North Koreas transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials.15 Moreover, not much collaboration exists among the three regional countries when they face similar challenges. For instance, at the Six-Party Talks, they often demonstrate competing views toward North Korea, making resolution of the nuclear crisis more difficult. They also lack regional coordination on peacekeeping. While more talk of regional cooperation is pronounced in climate change, their effects are marginal in East Asia. Although the three countries pledged to strengthen [their] cooperation to contribute to the successful outcome of [the 2010 Cancn Climate Conference], including the establishment of an effective post-2012 international cooperation framework on climate change,16 vigorous disagreement among the East Asian countries contributed to the failure of the Cancn conference.

Dual Identity and the Localization of Global Governance Issues What the above discussion suggests is that accounts based solely on power and interests do not sufficiently explain East Asias participation in global governance. Instead of a priori assuming material considerations as the primary source of state preferences, we need to empirically examine the ways in which regional countries interpret global governance issues and adopt a particular set of strategies to advance their goals, both material and nonmaterial. What drives East Asias activism in global governance is a regionwide desire to enhance global status.17 All three countries are pursuing a greater global role as a means to recast their national identities and enhance their global status and prestige. Specifically, Chinas notion of fu zeren de daguo (responsible global power), Japans chikyuu minsei taikoku (global civilian power),18 and South Koreas drive to enhance its gukgyuk (national prestige) are all part of the regionwide soft power enhancing campaign.19 At the same time, however, East Asian countries are geared toward domestic and regional priorities that undercut their role and effectiveness on the global stage. Specifically, two underlying mechanisms are at work: (1) the politics of dual identity; and (2) the localization of global governance issues. Despite their global activism, their conflicting identities tend to undercut their status-enhancing strategies and their potential contribution to global governance. In other words, although the new identity as an emerging global player calls for global leadership and better compliance with global rules, their respective alternative identities often lead them to free riding or even outright rejection of certain global norms and practices. For instance, while China is viewed as an unmistakable global power, it continues to

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maintain that it is still a developing country. This dual identity results in conflicting policy behavior; whereas the global power identity pushes China for a greater global contribution, its identity as the leader of the developing world compromises its effectiveness at global venues. Despite Japans substantial financial contribution to the UN, its identity as a pacifist nation, with its constitutional ban on the use of its military beyond self-defense, means that it can dispatch only limited, noncombat troops for peacekeeping missions. South Koreas desired identity as a global player is also hamstrung by its purported role as a mediator between the developed and developing worlds. Such a dual identity that East Asian countries perceive at different levels leads to role conflict, compromising their effectiveness in global governance.20 For instance, one central theme in Chinas narrative about climate change is that of fairness and justice, a concern shared to varying degrees by the other East Asian states.21 Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi thus claims that, while playing a positive and constructive role in countering global warming, China is also seeking equality for developing countries in international affairs and a fair and rational international order.22 This role conflict caused by the dual identity often results in skewed or distorted interpretations of global governance, prompting the localization of global governance: a regionwide pattern in East Asia where global governance issues are locally interpreted and transformed to better suit domestic or regional needs.23 With environmental issues, for instance, the three countries tend to highlight energy efficiency rather than climate change. Japans New National Energy Strategy offers a window into Japans current focus on energy efficiency.24 Recognizing the connection between climate change and energy efficiency, Chinese local governments also tend to claim credit for action on both issues even though they only take action related to energy saving.25 This distorted interpretation of global governance is accompanied by the selective reframing of local policies to overstate their global contribution. For instance, Chinese officials tout Chinas one-child policy as a factor helping slow the process of global warming, calling for population policy to be part of a comprehensive solution to climate change.26 Another Chinese tactic in promoting its global role is the claim that it promotes energy conservation even at the expense of economic growth. Highlighting that some local companies with high-energy use and emission were ordered to halt their operations, Premier Wen Jiabao declared, We are willing to achieve this goal at the cost of reducing GDP [gross domestic product] growth rate.27 Despite such lofty rhetoric, however, Chinese officials seek to make their participation largely voluntary.28 Stressing its identity as a developing nation (fazhan zhong guojia) and low per capita GDP, the Chinese argue that it is

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not realistic for China to assume the excess international responsibilities beyond its capability.29 Although proud of its leadership role in climate change and the site of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, Japanese policy elites are also critical of its assuming an unnecessary burden on the global stage, as evident in its refusal to extend the Kyoto Protocol.30 Reflecting its dual identity, the South Korean narrative of its global role also remains ambivalent. Although the term giyeo (contribution to the international community) has become a common refrain in its diplomacy, the Lee Myung-bak government also pursued a silyong (practical) and jawon (resource) diplomacy, provoking a criticism that such a dualistic approach undermines South Koreas global role.31 In the following subsections, I examine the impact of dual identity and the localization process as they shape East Asias global role in climate change, peacekeeping, and nonproliferation.
Climate Change

Chinas activism in climate change has multiple sources, one of which is a growing sense of its vulnerability to the harmful effects of global warming such as the melting of the Tibetan glaciers that run through the Yangtze and Yellow rivers in China.32 In 2002, it ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and a year later set up the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC).33 Nonetheless, climate change was hardly a priority in the long list of Chinas domestic agendas. In fact, the word for climate change (qihou bianhua) did not even appear in its five-year national plans until the eleventh plan (20062010).34 A major shift came in 2008 when the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) became the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) with a more prominent status and wider authorities.35 MEPs role, however, is limited and the implementation of its directives is also dependent on local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs). For financial support, the EPBs rely on local officials who tend to view meeting GDP growth expectations as their primary objective.36 The focus on economic growth is also evident in the fact that Chinas chief negotiator at the UN Climate Change Conference was not an MEP official, but a bureaucrat from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). For instance, the Chinese delegation at the 2011 conference was led by Xie Zhenhua, vice chairman of the NDRC.37 At the conference, China agreed to join a legally binding treaty limiting emission after 2020. Due to its dual identity, however, it did so only on the condition that China and other emerging economies must be treated differently from the so-called rich countries.38 This is not to say that China has neither the will nor the capacity to address climate change. Instead of viewing it solely as a burden on economic growth, China now entertains the idea that clean energy may serve as a new engine of economic growth.39 However, its overall approach to cli-

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mate change is localized to focus on energy efficiency, not the reduction of total emissions as envisioned by the United States and other countries.40 Chinese analysts themselves acknowledge that, as long as climate change is not internalized as a local issue, it would be difficult to expect any tangible outcomes other than energy efficiency.41 At the same time, China is eager to boast its leadership position in renewable energy. For instance, China emphasizes that its investment in renewable energy was ranked first in the Asia Pacific, highlighting its new status as the biggest solar photovoltaic equipment producer in the world.42 However, Chinas astonishing advances in energy efficiency have not been matched by its efforts to reduce carbon emissions. In fact, China has been on a spending spree for coal imports, signing a series of contracts with mining companies around the world, including a $60 billion deal with an Australian company. David Graham-Caso, spokesman for the Sierra Club, whose Beyond Coal campaign has helped to prevent the construction of 139 coal plants in the United States, warns that Chinas coal import binge is undermining everything weve accomplished.43 Japans activism in climate change is also driven by the desire to promote its image as a global player. At a UN plenary session on climate change, for instance, Japanese ambassador Tsuruoka Koji praised Japan as a responsible member of the international community and the host country of the negotiations that led to the Kyoto Protocol.44 Similar to the Chinese case, Japan localized the environmental issue to highlight its leading role in energy efficiency. Japans government documents on climate change often refer to the fact that its level of energy efficiency is three times the global average.45 Echoing Chinas narrative about economic growth, the Japanese also realized that eco-business, or green business, might well hold a key to Japans continued prosperity.46 Specifically, the Japanese government focuses on high-efficiency coal thermal power, CO2 recapture/CO2 sequestration, and fast reactors.47 In a similar vein, Kaieda Banri, Japans minister of economy, trade, and industry, calls energy cooperation with five countries around the Mekong River a growth center for the world and Asia with which Tokyo hopes to advance industrial cooperation.48 Despite Japans rhetoric about its active role in climate change, Japans lack of leadership and visibility was criticized during the 2009 Copenhagen conference, which failed to reach a consensus on climate change.49 In the following year in Cancn, Japan insisted that it would renew the Kyoto Protocol only after China and other major developing economies make legally binding reduction commitments.50 By rejecting the second round of the Kyoto Protocol under any circumstance, thereby hardening the positions of developing countries, Japan was again seen as a major villain that blocked progress.51

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Similar to the Chinese and Japanese cases, South Koreas national strategy also addresses both climate change and energy security in a holistic manner.52 Mirroring Japans approach, the South Korean government has been approaching the climate industry as [a] new growth engine and seeking to take the lead in climate change in the context of a Global Korea initiative.53 It is in this context that the South Korean government announced its plan to invest $35.4 billion in the renewable energy sector over the next five years.54 Under the new motto of Green Growth, the South Korean government has launched the Presidential Commission on Green Growth and the National Science and Technology Council to coordinate and oversee the development and research for green technologies among the academic, industry, and research sectors.55 The desire to become a global player in climate change has led to some initial successes. For instance, aspiring to become a green growth leader, the South Korean government pledged to increase the amount of official development assistance, while raising the proportion of Green ODA to 20% by 2013 and 30% by 2020, compared to 11% in 2007.56 At the same time, South Koreans tend to view the UN Climate Change Conference as problematic because it has become too politicized to tackle these issues, with developed countries pitted against developing ones.57 Similar to its neighboring countries, the South Korean government calls for a balance between environmental and economic aspects of climate change while respecting different economic and social conditions of each country.58 Central to South Koreas ambiguous position is its perceived identity as a nation straddling both the developed and developing worlds. As a result, the South Korean position on climate change remains ambivalent, often purporting to play a vague role as a nation bridging between developed and developing countries by forming a strong partnership between the two.59
Peacekeeping

Given that peacekeeping missions are sanctioned multilaterally at the UN, they have a veneer of legitimacy and help participants to bolster their identity as legitimate great powers. 60 Chinese leaders thus perceive Chinas participation in UN peacekeeping as a means for signaling its changing normative stance on use of force issues.61 Traditionally, Chinas view of peacekeeping operations was negative due to its long-standing policy of not interfering in other countries internal affairs. Chinas initial participation in UN peacekeeping came in January 2000 when it sent its first contingent of troops to East Timor.62 Chinese policymakers came to realize that active participation in UN peacekeeping is a visible and effective way to meet its obligations to the UN and further its multilateral agenda on the regional and global scenes. 63 Chinas activism in peacekeeping is also driven by its regional priority, the concerted effort to pro-

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ject a more benign and harmonious image beyond its borders, to reassure neighbors about its peaceful intentions, and to softly balance US and Western influence while gradually but more firmly establishing Chinas acceptance as a great power.64 There is, however, a gulf between Chinas rhetoric about its contribution to UN peacekeeping and its actual performance. This is because Chinas role in peacekeeping is also shaped by its domestic and regional considerations. In fact, China has blocked peacekeeping missions when they conflicted with its domestic priorities. For instance, two of Chinas six vetoes in the Security Council concerned peacekeeping missions in Guatemala and Macedonia, which maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan.65 Facing various requests for sending more forces, Chinese policymakers also resort to its dual identity, stressing that it is a regional (not global) power, and that it is still a developing country.66 While its contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget grew from 0.9 percent in the 1990s to above 3.0 percent by 2008, the amount is dwarfed by the US contribution that was about 26 percent for 20082009.67 Overall, despite its rhetoric, China reinterpreted and localized the issue of climate change as it deliberately formulated its policy on [UN peacekeeping operations] in strategic terms to serve its strategic interests in the context of Chinas peaceful rise.68 Furthermore, due to its expanding global economic interests, especially in securing oil and other raw materials, China put a particular emphasis on its missions in Africa, most prominently in Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo. Not surprisingly, Sudan is the destination for the largest number of Chinese peacekeepers, about 800 military and police personnel.69 This, however, contrasts sharply with its reluctance to engage in its vicinity, evidenced in Chinas veto of a 2007 Security Council draft resolution on Myanmar, a long-time regional pariah state until recently but Chinas regional ally, on the grounds that no regional institutions called for such a mission and that Myanmar was not considered a threat to international peace and security.70 Chinese leaders also came to view that Chinas peacekeeping experience can contribute to various domestic priorities in China. Citing the 2008 Chinese Defense White Paper, for instance, an International Crisis Group report notes that peacekeeping deployments have provided practical experience for Chinese security forces and have helped improve their responsiveness, riot-control capabilities, coordination of military emergency command systems and ability to conduct military operations other than war at home.71 In 2011 China dispatched four military transport aircraft and a guided missile frigate ship to Libya, which was reportedly in response to the domestic criticism that the Chinese Peoples Liberation Armys initial handling of Chinese nationals trapped in Libya was not speedy and effective. But in the Chinese official statement, the dispatch was depicted as the

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biggest operation in Chinas history and as a clear indication that China is emerging as a responsible great power.72 In Japan, an earlier motivation for a greater role in peacekeeping was to free itself from the accusation of its checkbook diplomacy during the Gulf War of 1991 when it was under fire because it made only a financial contribution of $13 billion, but not its own military forces. To avoid a repeat of the diplomatic embarrassment caused in part by its identity as a pacifist nation, the Japanese government adopted in 1992 the International Peace Cooperation Law which enabled Japan to dispatch its Self Defense Forces (SDF) to other countries.73 Beginning with the UN mission in Cambodia in September 1992, the SDF has participated in several UN peacekeeping and other humanitarian assistance missions in Mozambique, Rwanda, TimorLeste, Afghanistan, and Iraq. As of February 2013, approximately 400 personnel of the SDF are deployed to six peacekeeping missions.74 Reflecting its dual identity of a global, yet pacifist nation, however, Japans participation in peacekeeping missions remains marginal, and the nature of its contribution has often been reinterpreted in consideration of various domestic or regional priorities. For instance, Japans 2010 Defense White Paper called for the improvement and enhancement of equipment for international peace cooperation activities not only because it would improve Japans performance in such activities, but also because it would be useful for responding to domestic contingencies.75 Japan also announced in May 2011 the SDFs first full-fledged overseas base in Djibouti.76 However, according to a Foreign Ministry official, the decision was made in part to appeal to African nations and thus to help win broad support for Japans bid to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.77 Japan also switched its role in the war in Afghanistan to financial assistance solely for medical purposes, mainly in response to opposition from the Social Democratic Party.78 South Koreas first participation in peacekeeping mission came in 1993 when it dispatched an engineering battalion to Somalia. Since then, South Korea has been an active participant in the UN peacekeeping missions. As of March 2013, 446 South Korean soldiers were participating in various missions, with recent deployments that include Afghanistan, Haiti, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Gulf of Aden for antipiracy operations.79 The motto of enhancing national status through global contribution is also prominent in the South Korean discussion of peacekeeping. Situated in a region surrounded by powerful states, South Korea has been particularly sensitive to its global and regional status. A country colonized by its neighbor for most of the first half of the twentieth century, South Korea also fell victim to great power politics in the second half. With its global role and prosperous economy, South Korea is seeking a new national identity in the changing regional and global contexts. In this vein, a central narrative with

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regard to South Koreas global contributions in general and peacekeeping in particular is the image of South Korea as an aiding country, no longer an aided country.80 This unique identity shift notwithstanding, South Koreas peacekeeping missions are also shaped by its domestic and regional considerations. Along the lines of Chinas emphasis on Africa and Japans focus on its contribution to stability in the Middle East, South Koreas troop dispatch abroad is based primarily on considerations of its growing economic interests in various parts of the world. A case in point is its decision in November 2010 to send 130 Special Forces to the UAE. South Koreas Ministry of National Defense announced that the primary objective of the troop dispatch was to help the UAE train its Special Forces and to conduct joint exercises. Interestingly, the announcement came after its successful billion-dollar bid for constructing nuclear power plants in the UAE. In a significant departure from its previous focus on peacekeeping missions and US-requested coalitional support, the dispatch of Special Forces is now cast as a novel way to fulfill South Koreas expanding national interests.81
Nuclear Nonproliferation

As the first nuclear power in Asia, China had traditionally been focused on maintaining its nuclear deterrence capability, with little enthusiasm in supporting the nonproliferation regime. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, however, Chinas stance on nuclear nonproliferation shifted, with a growing realization that nonproliferation principles were genuinely global norms.82 Overall, however, Chinas stance on nuclear proliferation has been largely declaratory, devoid of substantial behavioral changes or positive outcomes. This reflects its dual identity as an emerging global player and a regional power fixated on its domestic and regional priorities. Along with its longstanding policy of the no first use of nuclear weapons, China claims that to [safeguard] the international non-proliferation regime and maintaining world and regional peace and security, China has been committed to promoting diplomatic solutions of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and the Iranian nuclear issue.83 Yet whenever the international community discusses sanctions on Iran and North Korea, China is reluctant to go along with the sanction drive. Chinese foreign minister Yangs comment in February 2010 is emblematic of this tendency: To talk about sanctions at the moment will complicate the situation and might stand in the way of finding a diplomatic solution.84 Several motivations are behind Chinas position on nonproliferation. First, consideration of regional security appears to be a decisive factor in Chinas thinking. In fact, China was widely viewed as a source of a blueprint for a nuclear weapon in Pakistan in the 1970s.85 Chinas technological support for Pakistan and their military cooperation continued in the

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1990s, as China attached strategic importance to Pakistan.86 More broadly, Chinas position on nonproliferation reveals a larger dilemma for East Asian states: while China seeks to show its positive role as a responsible global player by cooperating on the nuclear front, it also is yearning for greater influence and leverage in East Asia. Not surprisingly, China has carefully weighed the associated costs and benefits of norm adherence against its strategic position and international image.87 Various domestic priorities are another key factor. In this regard, Thomas Christensen argues that the impact of domestic politicsconcerns about internal stability and the increasing role of domestic interest groups such as oil and other businesses and the militaryhas curtailed Chinas ability to tackle various global problems. Specifically, state-owned oil companies and other financial institutions in the case of Iran and the military in the case of North Korea may challenge any Chinese policies that go against their interests.88 More generally, while US officials acknowledge Chinas efforts to set up the bureaucratic structures and laws to control the export of sensitive technologies, they complain that Chinas track record in actually cracking down on those who violate the laws is far too limited.89 An example of Chinas lax approach to nonproliferation is the alleged sale of high-quality carbon fiber used for centrifuges to Iran.90 In comparison to Chinas ambivalence, Japan has been a relatively consistent supporter of the nonproliferation regime. With the legacy of being the only country ever to have experienced nuclear devastation, Japan firmly maintains the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing nuclear weapons and not permitting their introduction into Japan.91 Japans stance on nonproliferation solidified in the 1990s as it boosted its public diplomacy in support of global nonproliferation. For instance, every year since 1994, the Japanese government has proposed at the UN General Assembly a resolution calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, since 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has published a biannual white paper, in both Japanese and English outlining Japans policy position on arms control and nonproliferation.92 Japan has also made a series of efforts to promote regional cooperation on nonproliferation, including the hosting of the Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) in Tokyo since 2003 and the convening of eighteen Asia Export Control Seminars since 1993.93 Such admirable efforts aimed at enhancing its global status, however, have been undercut by Japans performance in the Six-Party Talks. Its official position has been calling for North Korea to take concrete actions to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in compliance with the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and relevant Security Council resolutions.94 However, Japanese delegations at the Six-Party Talks have often used the multilateral venue for nonproliferation as a site to

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address domestic concerns about the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korean agents in the 1970s, prompting negative reactions from North Korea and making resolution of the nuclear crisis all the more difficult. The fact that Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzo created an office in charge of the abduction issue (and later a cabinet minister in charge of it), but did not set up a similar office dealing with North Koreas nuclear situation, illustrates the limits of Japans contributions due to domestic considerations.95 Similarly, South Koreas performance in nuclear nonproliferation has been far from stellar. In the wake of the Nixon Doctrine set forth by President Richard M. Nixon, which led to the withdrawal of substantial US forces from South Korea and East Asia, the Park Chung Hee government secretly pursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s. Amid the US pressure, the nuclear pursuit eventually ended after President Park was assassinated in 1979. Since then, its track record in nuclear nonproliferation has improved. In 1991, the South Korean government went even further to declare that it would not manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons and that it would not acquire enrichment or reprocessing facilities.96 South Korea also issued and has maintained the declaration on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.97 At the global level where potential status gain is greater, South Koreas position has also shifted in the positive direction. While South Korea joined other East Asian countries in stressing the importance of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in effectively [enhancing] global nuclear security, it also used the venue as a means to showcase South Koreas growing global status and influence.98 As a result, the South Korean government made substantial efforts toward the hosting of the subsequent nuclear summit in 2012. However, South Koreas efforts for nonproliferation are also hampered by its role in the North Korean nuclear crisis. Similar to the Chinese and Japanese cases, domestic considerations figure prominently in South Koreas role in the Six-Party Talks. What is striking in South Koreas domestic debate on North Korea are the competing narratives between conservatives, including the ruling Saenuri (New Frontier) Party, that portray the North Korean question as a nuclear issue and progressives that seek to address both the nuclear and inter-Korean dimensions simultaneously in a mutually reinforcing manner.99 Coupled with Chinas strategic considerations regarding North Korea and Japans preoccupation with the abduction issue, South Koreas domestic politics surrounding North Korea dims the prospect of formulating an effective regional approach to the nuclear crisis.

Conclusion What emerges from this analysis is a mixed picture: despite the three East Asian states energetic foray into the global arena, their global contribution

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is tempered by the politics of dual identity and issue localization. The East Asian cases suggest that other emerging powers global role may also be limited depending on their domestic considerations. For instance, Indias status as a nonsignatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty curtails its role in nonproliferation while, despite its pursuit of global status, Brazils limited role in peacekeeping stems largely from domestic conditions under which the primary focus of its military remains internal security.100 The nature of the three East Asian countries participation in global governance is shaped to an important degree by their conflicting identities at the global and regional levels, and their understandings of the link between global governance issues and domestic and regional priorities. In a sense, beyond their shared desire of enhancing their global status, the East Asian countries are interested primarily in localizing the issues of global governance to deal better with various domestic and regional priorities. As a result, despite their increasing visibility on the global stage, the East Asian countries contribution to global governance has been limited. This pattern of East Asias participation in global governance, in turn, has several global and regional consequences. Overall, there has been a lack of regional coordination on a wide variety of global governance problems that would otherwise help these countries contribute substantially to both global governance and cooperative regional relations. The lack of regional coordination not only has squandered the opportunity to enhance their collective influence on the global stage, but also has prevented effective management of global and regional problems. While China has long maintained that the role of regional institutions is critical in UN peacekeeping missions, it is not pressing for active participation of East Asian institutions in conflict resolution. This is not to suggest that regional cooperation is impossible in East Asia. China, for instance, called for East Asian cooperation on climate change at the fifth East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2010, proposing the establishment of an East Asia research and cooperation center for climate change.101 Regular environmental cooperation among the three countries is also taking place in the form of the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM).102 Despite these positive developments and the rhetoric of greater cooperation, East Asias role in global governance has remained largely uncoordinated and often has led to regional competition and mutual suspicion. More alarmingly, zero-sum competition and relative gains considerations have seemed to dominate the regional discussion on energy security, especially between Chinese and Japanese leaders.103 The result has been the emergence of an acute security dilemma in which China believes it is acting defensively by ensuring the global access to energy supplies that will be needed to safeguard Chinese development goals, while Japan tends to interpret these steps as aggressive and a threat to its own energy security.104

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In the midst of this increasing regional competition over energy, the Kan Naoto administration considered a substantial cut in Japans financial aid to China.105 At the same time, the Japanese government strengthened its cooperation with Pacific nations on climate change, pledging 50 billion yen to this effort. The Japanese effort to boost ties with the sixteen-member Pacific Island Forum is viewed in Japan as a means to counter Chinas growing influence.106 The South Korean government also has pushed for cooperation with Vietnam over several environmental issues, including the safety management of drinking water and environmental policy and technology cooperation for green growth. Echoing Japans involvement in the Southeast Asian infrastructure market, the South Korean government has framed the projects in Vietnam as opportunities for Koreas environmental businesses to enter the Vietnamese market.107 In this competitive action-reaction dynamic among the regional countries, the prospect of East Asias cooperation on various global challenges appears to be remote. To conclude, my findings suggest that we need to pay greater attention to the interconnection between global governance and regional politics. Particularly important are the ways in which regional countries understand and exert their roles in global governance. In this vein, it is important to channel the East Asian countries desire for a global role in ways that make tangible benefits to global governance while being mindful of their consideration of various domestic and regional priorities. For instance, given that energy efficiency and renewable energy are a key domestic focus for all three countries, their efforts in this field should be further encouraged both as a means to reduce carbon emission and as a way to improve their global status.108 Similarly, giving due credit to East Asias leadership in renewable energy and green technology and granting them more opportunities to host or lead global initiatives would further satisfy their yearning for greater global status, along the way contributing to global efforts to curb climate change. By the same token, failing to take into account the conflicting identities of China, Japan, and South Korea and their preoccupation with domestic and regional priorities not only would reduce the chance to better address various global challenges, but also would undermine regional cooperation in East Asia in the years ahead.

Notes
Il Hyun Cho is assistant professor in the Government and Law Department and the Asian Studies Program at Lafayette College. His research focuses on the nexus between international relations theory and contemporary East Asia, with a particular emphasis on nuclear proliferation, global governance, and regionalism. His publications have appeared or are forthcoming in Review of International Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Chinese Journal of International Politics, and Korean Journal of Defense Analyses. An earlier version of this article was

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presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 2011. The author is grateful to Stefan Schirm, Seo-Hyun Park, participants in the ISA panel, and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. He also thanks Melanie Furey for her research assistance. 1. The Group of 2 idea was put forth by Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. It later gained wider salience when President Barack Obama called for global cooperation between the two powers. See also William Overholt, Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Kenneth Lieberthal, The China-US Relationship Goes Global, Current History 108, no. 719 (September 2009): 243 249. For criticisms of the G2 idea, see Elizabeth C. Economy and Adam Segal, The G-2 Mirage: Why the United States and China Are Not Ready to Upgrade Ties, Foreign Affairs 88, no. 3 (MayJune 2009): 1423. 2. Michael Barnett, Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System, International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (September 1993): 271 296. 3. In comparing the nature of domestic debate in the three countries, one has to bear in mind an important political difference between authoritarian China and the two Asian democracies, which may influence the degree to which the global role is contested domestically. That said, in all three countries there exist multiple views of what constitutes an appropriate global role. 4. All three countries under study have shown particular activism in the three issue areas, but with different emphases and approaches, which is ideal for systematic comparison. 5. Stefan A. Schirm, Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance, European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2010): 197221. 6. Stefan Schirms study of emerging powers role in global governance is a rare exception. See Schirm, Leaders in Need of Followers. For prominent works on the sources and nature of global governance see, among others, Craig Murphy, Global Governance: Poorly Done, Poorly Understood, International Affairs 76, no. 4 (October 2000): 789803; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, eds., Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Narcis Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 7. One recent example of this in the economic realm is Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How Chinas Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-first Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010). 8. Rawi Abdelal and Adam Segal, Has Globalization Passed Its Peak? Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (JanuaryFebruary 2007): 111. 9. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Future of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011). 10. Jusuf Wanandi, East Asian Regionalism and Global Governance, in Jusuf Wanandi and Tadashi Yamamoto, eds., East Asia at a Crossroads (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2008), p. 29. 11. An example of this reasoning is Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohanes study of the changing role of NATO from a narrowly focused military alliance into a much broadened security institution. See Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane, Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions, in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (London: Oxford University Press, 1999).

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12. Jeffrey W. Legro, What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power, Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3 (September 2007): 525. 13. China Active in Fight Against Global Warming, Peoples Daily, 17 December 2009. 14. Keith Bradsher, China Reportedly Plans Strict Goals to Save Energy, New York Times, 4 March 2011. 15. South Koreas Roh Moo-hyun government refused to join the PSI largely because of concerns that South Koreas participation might jeopardize inter-Korean relations. After the second North Korean nuclear test, the conservative Lee Myungbak government finally joined the PSI in May 2009. PSI gaip ppali gyeolon naerilgut [The Decision to Join the PSI Is Likely], Joongang Ilbo, 26 May 2009. 16. Trilateral Cooperation Vision 2020 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 30 May 2010), www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/summit1005/vision2020.html. 17. For recent applications of Chinas and Japans status considerations in their foreign policy approaches, see Shogo Suzuki, Seeking Legitimate Great Power Status in PostCold War International Society: Chinas and Japans Participation in UNPKO, International Relations 22, no. 1 (2008): 4563. Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy, International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 6395; Yong Deng, Chinas Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (London: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 18. For the identity of a responsible great power, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 19802000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 148. For the concept of a global civilian power, see Christopher W. Hughes, Japans Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 30; Akiko Fukushima, Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 178. 19. This is not to say that East Asian states are not concerned about material factors. For instance, Chinas participation in UN peacekeeping not only is to bolster its global status, but also to enhance the role of the Security Council in which it is a veto-wielding permanent member. Its peacekeeping activities are more prominent in resource-rich African states from which it imports oil and other resources. As for climate change, all three East Asian states stress the importance of energy efficiency in order to boost their ecofriendly image and promote economic growth. 20. Barnett, Institutions, Roles, and Disorder. 21. Paul G. Harris, Global Warming in Asia-Pacific: Environmental Change vs. International Justice, Asia-Pacific Review 9, no. 2 (2002): 145. 22. China Ready to Assume World Obligations, Peoples Daily, 13 December 2010. 23. Amitav Acharyas study shows how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states selectively localized several Western security norms in ways that suit state- and regional-level realities. See Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, International Organization 58 (Spring 2004): 239275. 24. Peter C. Evans, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series: Japan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, December 2006), p. 19. 25. Ye Qi, Li Ma, Huanbo Zhang, and Huimin Li, Translating a Global Issue into Local Priority: Chinas Local Government Response to Climate Change, Journal of Environment and Development 17, no. 4 (December 2008): 393. 26. Chinas Population Policy Helps Slow Global Warming, Says Official, Peoples Daily, 10 December 2009.

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27. China Sacrifices Economic Growth to Reduce Emissions, Peoples Daily, 29 November 2010. 28. Anthony Faiola, Juliet Eilperin, and John Pomfret, Copenhagen Climate Deal Shows New World Order May Be Led by US, China, Washington Post, 20 December 2009. 29. Chinas Rise Needs Magnanimity, Sober Reflection, Peoples Daily, 15 February 2011. 30. My analysis in this article is based primarily on the views of policy elites, not the general public. However, echoing the government position, the Japanese public perception of Japans global role also seems skeptical. In a poll, only 39 percent surveyed endorsed Japans global role while 55 percent did not view that Japan should be a global power. Poll: 95% Fear for Japans Future, Asahi Shimbun, 12 June 2010. 31. Insun Kang, Yije Silyong woigyo ganpanul bakwoyahanda [Its Time to Replace the Motto, Practical Diplomacy], Chosun Ilbo, 24 December 2009. 32. China Wont Compromise on Issues of Principle, Says Chief Negotiator, Peoples Daily, 5 December 2010. 33. Stephen Tsang and Ans Kolk, The Evolution of Chinese Policies and Governance Structures on Environment, Energy and Climate, Environmental Policy and Governance 20, no. 3 (2010): 190. 34. Ibid., p. 191. 35. Ibid., p. 187. 36. Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 195. 37. John M. Broder, At Climate Talks, a Familiar Standoff Emerges Between the US and China, New York Times, 7 December 2011. 38. Ibid. 39. A Long Game: China Sees Opportunities as Well as Dangers in Climate Change, The Economist, 3 December 2009. 40. Edward Wong and Keith Bradsher, China Joins US in Pledge of Hard Targets on Emissions, New York Times, 27 November 2009. 41. Qi et al., Translating a Global Issue into Local Priority, p. 398. 42. China Active in Fight Against Global Warming, Peoples Daily, 17 December 2009. 43. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Nations that Debate Coal Use Export It to Feed Chinas Need, New York Times, 21 November 2010. 44. Carin Holroyd, National Mobilization and Global Engagement: Understanding Japans Response to Global Climate Change Initiatives, Asian Perspective 33, no. 2 (2009): 74. 45. Japans Initiative on Climate Change, version 3, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 2009), www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/warm/cop/initiative 0905.pdf. 46. Holroyd, National Mobilization and Global Engagement, pp. 8081. 47. Japans Initiative on Climate Change. 48. Japan, SE Asia to Ally in Energy, Japan Times, 16 August 2011. 49. Eric Johnston, Japan Under Fire for Laying Low in Copenhagen, Japan Times, 12 December 2009. 50. Eric Johnston, Japan Says China Cuts Must Be Binding, Japan Times, 9 December 2009. 51. Daisuke Yamamoto, ANALYSIS: Japan Cast as Villain at UN Climate Talks, Japan Times, 14 December 2010.

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52. Song Min-soon, Statement at the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change, Washington, DC, 27 September 2007 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea), www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule /htsboard/template/read/engboardread.jsp?typeID=12&boardid=304&seqno=303768 &c=TITLE&t=&pagenum=1&tableName=TYPE_ENGLISH&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu =&vu=&iu=&du=. 53. Kyoung-Sik Choi, Climate Change Measures and Kyoto Mechanism, Ministry of Environment, 19 October 2009, http://eng.me.go.kr/board.do?method =view&bbsCode=res_mat_policy&docSeq=191. 54. Mridul Chadha, South Korea to Invest $35 Billion in Renewable Energy by 2015 to Reduce Dependence on Fossil Fuels, Ecopolitology, 13 October 2010, http://ecopolitology.org/2010/10/13/south-korea-to-invest-35-billion-in-renewableenergy-by-2015-to-reduce-dependence-on-fossil-fuels/. 55. Road to Our Future: Green Growth, National Strategy and the Five-Year Plan (20092013) (Presidential Commission on Green Growth, Republic of Korea, 2009), www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/common/download.jsp?boardid=11049&table name=TYPE_ENGLISH&seqno=034023024004fdf01601504d&fileseq=069fef0340 0bfd6024feeff4. 56. Ibid. 57. Conference Report: G-20 and Global Governance Reform (Seoul: ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, October 2010), p. 14. 58. Song, Statement at the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change. 59. Song Min-soon, A Critical Turning Point of International Efforts Against Climate Change, Korea Herald, 21 September 2007. 60. Suzuki, Seeking Legitimate Great Power Status, p. 55. 61. Foot and Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order, p. 59. 62. Huang Shan, A Decade of Chinas Peacekeeping Missions, 18 January 2010, www.china.org.cn. 63. Chinas Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, Asia Report No. 166 (New York: International Crisis Group, 17 April 2009), pp. 1, 1113. 64. Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, Chinas Expanding Peacekeeping Role: Its Significance and the Policy Implications, SIPRI Policy Brief (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, February 2009). 65. Ibid., pp. 5859. 66. Chinas Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, pp. 78. 67. Ibid., pp. 78. 68. Yin He, Chinas Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations, Asia Paper (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, July 2007), pp. 4849. 69. Andrew Higgins, China Showcasing Its Softer Side: Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping Signals Desire to Project Image of Benign Power, Washington Post, 2 December 2009, p. 6. 70. Chinas Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, p. 25. 71. Ibid., pp. 1113. 72. Setting Sail for Libya, The Economist, 1 March 2011. 73. Defense White Paper (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2010), p. 323. 74. Japans Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2013), www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pdfs/contribution .pdf. 75. Defense White Paper, pp. 323324.

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76. SDF Readies Overseas Base in Djibouti: 1st Outpost Abroad to Help Fight Piracy, Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 May 2011. 77. Hajime Furukawa, Djibouti Base in National Interests, Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 May 2011. 78. Govt to Give Medically Targeted Financial Aid to Afghan Forces, Yomiuri Shimbun, 18 December 2009. 79. Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Monthly Summary of Contributions, 31 March 2013, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors /2013/mar13_1.pdf. 80. International Peacekeeping Operations (Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, January 2011), www.mnd.go.kr/mbshome/mbs/mnd_eng/subview .jsp?id=mnd_eng_020300000000. 81. Kwon Hyukchul and Sung Yeonchu, Wonjeon school daekaro UAE-e teukjeonsa pabyung [Deployment of Special Forces to the UAE in Return for Oil Export], Hangyorye, 3 November 2010. 82. John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-imperial World (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), p. 235. 83. Statement by H.E. Ambassador LI Baodong Head of the Chinese Delegation at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 4 May 2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjfywj/t689876.htm. 84. Glenn Kessler, China Could Block Sanctions Against Iran, Washington Post, 5 February 2010. 85. John Pomfret, US Says Chinese Businesses and Banks Are Bypassing UN Sanctions Against Iran, Washington Post, 18 October 2010. 86. Kai He and Huiyun Feng, If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and US Policy Toward China, Security Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): 390. 87. Foot and Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order, p. 134. 88. Thomas J. Christensen, The Advantages of an Assertive China, Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (MarchApril 2011): 6162. 89. Pomfret, US Says Chinese Businesses and Banks Are Bypassing UN Sanctions Against Iran. 90. Ibid. 91. Japans Role in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Autumn 2004). 92. Llewelyn P. Hughes, Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan, International Security 31, no. 4 (Spring 2007): 74. 93. Japans Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy, 4th ed., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy /pamph0812.html. 94. Statement by H. E. Tetsuro Fukuyama, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New York, 4 May 2010, www.mofa.go.jp/announce/svm/state100504.html. 95. Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa, Not Going Nuclear: Japans Response to North Koreas Nuclear Test, Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online, 19 July 2007, www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/CoverStory. The abduction scandal became a major political scandal in Japan after Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiros visit to Pyongyang in 2002. During the visit, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il for the first time acknowledged North Koreas involvement in the abductions in the late

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1970s, confirming the earlier suspicion and providing ammunition for hardline conservative politicians within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. 96. T. V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2000), pp. 122123. 97. Ibid., p. 123. 98. Chairmans Statement of the East Asia Summit, Hanoi, Vietnam, 30 October 2010, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/eas/pdfs/state101030.pdf. 99. Jongsuk Lee, Nambuk gwangye-eseo jinbowa bosuui sigak [The Perspectives of Conservatives and Moderates on Inter-Korean Relations], Hangyorye, 28 February 2010. 100. Arturo C. Sotomayor Velazquez, Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin Americas Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations, Security Studies 19, no. 1 (2010): 168. 101. Chinese Premier Calls for Deepening East Asian Cooperation, Peoples Daily, 30 October 2010. 102. Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia (Korea-China-Japan), Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea, http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method =moveContent&menuCode=pol_int_coo_northeast. 103. Elizabeth Wishnick, Competition and Cooperative Practices in Sino-Japanese Energy and Environmental Relations: Towards an Energy Security Risk Community? Pacific Review 22, no. 4 (September 2009): 403. 104. Ibid., p. 409. 105. Kan Eyes Drastic Cut to China Aid as Growth Soars, Japan Times, 3 March 2011. 106. The forum, established in 1971 to share views concerning regional economic growth, governance, and security, currently has seventeen members. Japan Looks to Build Up Ties with Pacific Island Nations, Japan Times, 17 October 2010. 107. Environmental Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea, http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menu Code=pol_int_coo_southeast. 108. Joanna I. Lewis, Climate Change and Security: Examining Chinas Challenge in a Warming World, International Affairs 85, no. 6 (2009): 1208.