1 Police departments throughout the modern world tend to share an essentially military organizational structure and pattern of work.

Among the features that are self-evident and already inseparable from typical police work (Bittner, 1980) are a centralized organizational structure, a hierarchical chain of command, authoritative leadership, uniform outward appearance, top-down communication by means of orders and directives and down-up action reporting, and internal control over rank-and-file by commanders through strong internal discipline (Bittner, 1995; Bordua and Reiss, 1966; Roberg and Kuykendall, 1993; Walker, 1999). This military influence on police organization is hardly surprising. First, stemming from a common social necessity of organized physical defense and offense in large geographical and social spaces, these two institutions are the only ones authorized in modern Western democracies to use physical force (including weapons) against people in the name of the state. The military usually apply force against outside enemies, who must be neutralized by aggressive means. The police force use it against internal ones, civilians who sometimes are suspected of crimes or public disturbances and must accordingly be arrested and investigated, within judicial process restraints - such as the use of minimal reasonable force - which protect their constitutional rights (Dunlop, 1999). However, this dichotomy has not been always clear-cut: the army is sometimes called to assist the police in internal security and public disturbance functions, and the police sometimes assist the army in paramilitary functions (Hills, 1995). Second, the importance of the military as a model and a source of agents, ideas, and work patterns for bureaucratic institutions in general (see Weber, 1968), and particularly for modern criminal justice systems (see Foucault, 1977; Rothman, 1971), is commonly recognized. In the latter, the application of military principles and patterns to police work is as old as its own history.1

2 This social phenomenon whereby police forces (like other hierarchically modeled organizations) assume attributes that are characteristic of the armed forces may be defined generally as militarization of the police. In this study, militarization refers to a broad social phenomenon whereby a part of the population (in this case police forces) becomes socially, organizationally, institutionally, and/or ideologically dependent on, or controlled by the military itself or by military principles, usually without direct military participation or initiative (see Enloe, 1980: 132). In many cases, this phenomenon is not expressed solely by the external, superficial adoption of military organizational or administrative principles; it is based on the internalization of an ideology of militarism, the value and belief system providing the conceptual and ideological rationale supporting militarization. This ideological message emphasizes military values such as physical force, aggressiveness, order, discipline, and self-sacrifice as appropriate and desirable for the resolution of problems, for example, police problems. It glorifies military means such as military power, sophisticated equipment, and advanced technology for the achievement of goals (Ben Eliezer, 1998; Haggerty and Ericson, 1999; Kraska, 1994; 1996; Kraska and Kappeler, 1997).2

The Present Study

This social and organizational phenomenon is not constant and unique in its intensity and expressions across time and place. To be more specific, consider a theoretical continuum of low to high degrees of militarization. Then array various polices forces, say a cross-section or a specific department, during time along this continuum according to their levels of militarization. These will run from situations of increased militarization of the police (relatively greater influence of the military itself or military

3 patterns on police work) to opposite situations of demilitarization (relatively less influence). In the context of this study, militarization and demilitarization are proposed as organizer concepts in interpreting the historical, social, and organizational processes that have taken place in police forces over the past century. This study analyzes changes and trends in police forces along this militarization continuum, focusing specifically on two entirely different policing models. First, the highly decentralized and fragmented American police system is taken as reference here as representing militarization trends in other modern Western nations. Developments in the US, as the dominant political, economic, cultural, and even military power, typically influence policies and practices in other countries; this applies to the police field also (Haggerty and Ericson, 1999: 234). Moreover, the scope, the experience, the absolute and relative number of different police forces and programs, and the range and depth of pertinent research and scholarly work, clearly place the American police reality and changes at the forefront of the policing field. Generally, recent American policing ventures have been characterized in both rhetoric and in practice as moving away from a paramilitary, professional model of policing to a less-military and more sophisticated kind of professionalism. This new approach - community policing - realigns police tasks, redefines and broadens police roles, and seeks a wider mandate to allow more meaningful interaction with citizens (Friedmann, 1992: 159). Still, while perhaps predominant, this trend is certainly not the only one. A simultaneous secondary trend exists, towards an even more militarized model of policing than before, mainly for handling serious crimes and public order disturbances. In it, the usually clear limits between military and police forces are currently becoming constantly less distinct. The second model, serving as the main focus of this study, is the unitary and very militarized and centralized Israel National Police (INP). This model exemplifies an

4 attempt to shift from a highly quasi-military model, with a sharp combat-security inclination, to a general demilitarization in the national police, suggesting an apparent policing revolution in Israel. The chief purpose of this study is to describe these demilitarization trends in the INP, with the American trends taken as the reference. They are analyzed within the frame of social processes experienced by the societies in which these police forces operate.

Trends in American Policing

The militaristic character of police work was less prominent prior to World War I. During that period, police forces adopted external military work patterns without parallel internalization of the ideological messages of militarism. This was a period in which a significant part of police work concentrated on providing social/public services to the local community, in the frame of broad local political control over the police activities (Kelling and Moore, 1988; Weisenhorn, 1995: 423). However, the proximity among police officers, citizens, and local politicians often led to local corruption and excessive political intervention (Peak and Glensor, 1996; Walker, 1999). Influenced by the progressive movement and by the growing American emphasis on bureaucracy in business and industry, at the start of the 20th century the police as an institution underwent a gradual process of professionalization. It aimed at transforming the police into an effective and professional body free of political influences and local corruption, hence greater militarization. These processes were reflected in the adoption and implementation of essentially military organizational and administrative principles and in the dissemination of the institutional ideological messages of militarism among police officers. According to the newly defined professional police goals, law

5 enforcement became the exclusive and main specialization area of the police, to be formulated in terms of the intentionally quasi-military metaphor, war against crime (rather than a campaign or a struggle against it) by aggressive military means. The new image of the police was characterized by operational and technological sophistication, independence from external and political intervention, tight discipline according to a clear hierarchical scale of powers, obedience to orders and directives, internal control of police activities, and structural division into highly-specialized units (Bittner, 1995; Fogelson, 1977; Klockars, 1985; Mawby, 1990).3 This militarization trend started coming under fire in the 1960s. It was argued that the implementation of rigid military principles in police work, which did not result in a significant reduction of the rates of either crime or unresolved cases (see Moore and Kelling, 1985), was not compatible with the essentially unpredictable, civilian, and decentralized nature of police work (Auten, 1981; Bayley, 1994; Bittner, 1995; Franz and Jones, 1987; Fry and Berkes, 1983). There was widespread consensus that the police could not fight crime as the army fights, alone. Also, the military model led to a serious deterioration in the relationship between police departments and the communities in which they worked, bringing about a severe reduction in public willingness to report crimes as well as to help the police in solving criminal cases (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). This criticism of the military model led to a demand for the development of an alternative model of policing, more effective and civilian rather than military. The search was principally for renewed balance among police roles, recognition of the civilian-serving aspects of police work, and the need to reintegrate police functions into communities (Trojanowicz and Carter, 1988). The outcome was the development of the community policing philosophy. By now this has become the most popular police

6 approach, currently applied in many countries as the main alternative to the military model (see Greene, 1995; Miller and Hess, 1998; Pate, 1989; Peak and Glensor, 1996; Trojanowicz and Harden, 1985). Paradoxically, in parallel to this trend towards a more demilitarized and civilian community policing approach, various police scholars (particularly Peter B. Kraska and his associates) have interestingly documented an opposite, secondary trend. This is a renewed and simultaneous process of militarization of high-risk police work (in situations involving drug trading and gun possession), demanding highly skilled specialists in use of force. This renewed militarization is primarily recognizable in the sharp rise in the number of paramilitary police units, equipped with a variety of military equipment and technology, and built on the model of military special combat teams. There has been an expansion in their activities, being actually involved in classical and traditional police work. The irony is that these units are perceived by many police commands and officers as determining the changes toward community policing because they simply constitute more appropriate means for accomplishing community goals and values (Kraska, 1996; 1999; Kraska and Cubellis, 1997; Kraska and Kappeler, 1997).

The Militarization Trend in the Israeli Police

Unlike American police forces, Israel has only one, national, police force, the Israel National Police (INP). The organizational mode of the INP is highly militaristic, hierarchical, and centralized, with a distinct combat-security orientation (Brewer et al., 1996; Gamson and Yuchtman, 1977). This is expressed in its highly centralized command hierarchy, sharp division of authority and responsibility, clear definition of the organizational position of each police rank and/or level, strictly authoritative

7 leadership, written regulations, orders, and norms of behavior, rigid discipline, close internal control over police officer action, manifest distance between commander and rank-and-file level, and many military symbols and ceremonies. The organizational pyramid is headed by the Inspector-General of Police who, like the Chief-of-Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), is directly nominated by, and subordinate to a governmental authority (in the police case, the Ministry of Internal Security). Unlikely the situation in the US, the INP budget is provided by this ministry as part of the national budget; none of it is from municipal or other taxes. The Inspector-General has no political affiliations and is usually a veteran police officer. The chain of command is very strict, allowing for close scrutiny of all levels of the INP organization by the central command level. The INP is geographically organized into districts and sub-districts, the latter consisting of the local police stations and sub-stations providing police services to the public. The centralized organization of the INP is facilitated by the small size of the country and its population. In 1999 the INP had 25,700 serving police officers, the great majority (about 90%) Jewish, with women constituting about 20% of the overall police workforce (Haberfeld and Herzog, 2000). As in every police force, the INPs police functions include crime prevention, maintenance of law and order, apprehension of suspected offenders, and traffic law enforcement and control. However, in 1974, following a government decision, responsibility for internal security (i.e., providing proactive and reactive functions to fight terrorism within the borders of the country) was transferred from the IDF to the INP. Organizationally, this new assignment to the INP served to reinforce the quasimilitary model of police organization in order to allow efficient deployment of police forces and speedy response to terrorist attacks and serious disturbances of public order. This renewed process of police militarization was expressed in a number of ways. The

8 first was the creation of a national network of special paramilitary police units such as anti-terrorist units, special patrol units, and the incorporation and reinforcement of the already existing Border Police into the INP.4 The second was the quest for fresh recruitment reservoirs to find candidates suited to the reinforced combat-security role. This resulted in massive recruitment into the INP of young men demobilized from crack army units, in peak physical condition, experienced in small-team military operations, highly disciplined, and trained in the use of physical force (Gilboa, 1998: 23-24).

Militarization of the INP has led to the dissemination and adoption of militaristic views among police officers. Still today the combat dimension predominates over the civilian-service dimension in INP formal training and informal organizational subculture. On the one hand, the Police Academy trains police officers mainly for selfdefense, crowd dispersal, weapons firing, climbing obstacles, moving around urban environments, subduing suspects, and using weapons (Hakimi, 1996). On the other hand, Israeli police officers tend to define policing issues such as crime or public disturbances in terms of war, thereby justifying forceful measures. The prevailing police subculture boasts a strong esprit de corps (as in the army) which serves to perpetuate alienation and separation from the public. An us against them stand prevails regarding anyone who isnt a cop, particularly minorities (Palestinian and Israeli Arabs) or groups identified as typical criminal offenders (see Gimshi, 1999; Haberfeld and Herzog, 2000; Herzog, 1998; Kremnitzer Committee, 1994; Ministry of Police Comptroller, 1993). This perspective of the offender as an enemy, who only understands the language of force, tends to induce pre-violence behavior, namely exaggerated suspicion, rude and inconsiderate conduct, resort to unreasonable and

9 unnecessary measures, unwillingness to explain or to listen, and acceptance of violence for its own sake (Kremnitzer Committee, 1994: 13).

Sources of Militarization in the INP Several important sources have effected the militarization and militarist ideology of the INP. America has traditionally been perceived as a very important source for learning and even for imitation with regard to social and cultural issues, including policing (see Bensinger, 1998). However, the most important influences are local and specific to the INP, among them the British Mandatory Police, the IDF, and Israeli society in general. The birth of the INP in 1948 was attended by severe wartime conditions (the War of Independence). This resulted in police affairs being placed very low on the list of priorities of Israels first government, in contrast to the army, the labor shortage (ablebodied youth were sent to fight the war), and the very limited budget. In this difficult situation the new police administration chose to adopt the existing military police model of the British Mandatory Police, operating under the British Mandate for Palestine between 1922 and 1948, for its primary organizational, administrative, and operational structure. Apart from being the most convenient model to adopt at that time, the choice was also based on the knowledge that British rule had introduced advanced police-work patterns and a professional approach in several areas, including police administration, discipline, and organization (Hod, 1996: 137). The new INP adopted from the British police its legal basis, conventional policing techniques and tools (uniforms, rank structure, orders, training systems, discipline norms, organizational outlook, buildings, and even their military-style ceremonies), and in particular its centralized administration and structure. It should be noted that as a colonial police force, the main role of the

11 Mandatory police was to assist the British government to rule the colony, with its Jewish and Arab residents, by means of a paramilitary centralized force. Its main occupation was combat-security-oriented treatment of serious mass disturbances, riots, and terrorism (Gimshi, 1999; 23-26; Shadmi, 1998: 220). The second local source for the militarization of the INP was the IDF. Since Israels establishment, the external threat from its neighboring countries to its existence as an independent state has been the most dominant motif of Israeli life. Throughout the years, the IDF has been perceived as one of the foremost institutions in peoples lives and in the history of the state, and a pivotal symbol and carrier of Israeli collective goals and values (Azarya, 1983: 120; Kimmerling, 1993; Lissak, 1994). In contrast to the situation in many Western societies, in which the military is ascribed distancing and dividing characteristics (see Dunlop, 1999: 218), in Israeli society the army is ascribed approximating and connecting characteristics, conveying a feeling of belonging and dominance. This is due mainly to universal conscription and large-scale active reserve duty, which bring a large part of the population into close contact with the military. Because of its heavy demands on a significant part of the lives of its citizens, the aphorism that an Israeli citizen is a soldier on eleven months annual leave is not so far-fetched (Brewer et al., 1996: 130; Landau, 1998). The influence of the IDF on the militarization of the INP is seen at various levels. First, the military model has always served as a model for the police administration, especially during its early years when its senior posts were filled by high-ranking army officers with little or no police experience (Hod, 1996: 266). Second, because of the tendency to perceive the INP as a paramilitary force, and even as the junior stepbrother of the IDF, it is frequently called upon to perform combat and security functions, in respect of acts against both the state and Jews (closely analogous to what

11 the Mandatory British Police had previously done in respect of acts against the British).5 Third, most police officers enter the force after their three years of compulsory military service, often after active participation in combat or paramilitary or security operations. In both the regular and reserve army, they have undergone military socialization, which transformed them from citizens into warriors ready to fight enemies. In view of the military characteristics of the INP, its security orientation, and the military experience of its police officers, police work is often perceived by them as a natural extension of their military service, in which the internalized ideology of militarism is translated into police reality (Gimshi, 1999: 218).6 Beyond these influences, Israeli society itself can be seen as a fundamental source of militarization. Israeli society is highly democratic, but at the same time it is characterized by a high degree of centralization and militarization. Despite the extreme social, demographic, and economic changes that Israeli society has experience in its short history, its most potent source of stress has remained the constant security threat (Landau, 1998; Lissak, 1994). Israels establishment under conditions of armed conflict, and its subsequent involvement in five major wars, numerous retaliatory and deterrent operations, and countless acts of hostility and terrorism, both inside and outside its borders, has made it a society inclined to militarism, easily mobilized and recruited into military action as the need arises. Kimmerling (1984: 13) and Ben-Eliezer (1998: x) argue that in the course of Israels history, military principles and practices have gradually become institutionalized and a routine part of everyday life. The point has been reached where militaristic and aggressive solutions to national problems of the state have come to be perceived not only as valuable in themselves but as legitimate and desirable, hence the best option. According to Kimmerling (1993), militarism is one of

12 the main principles governing the way Israeli society determines its ground rules, its identity, and its borders. This situation of constant warfare touches on the lives not only of citizens serving in the security forces (including the INP); the intensification of Islamic terror against civilian targets contributes to a general sense of insecurity in society as a whole. The need to take precautionary steps and maintain a high level of alert serves as a constant reminder that the potential threat to life menaces everyone, everywhere. Unfortunately, this reality also leads to a security-linked us-against-them view of minority groups, among them Palestinian and Israeli Arab populations, defined stereotypically as part of a hostile national group, or as the enemy or security threats.

The Demilitarization Trend of the INP

Although the militarist character and the dominance of the combat aspect of the INP have persevered for over fifty years, the pattern and the intensity of these features have not remained constant; they have changed in response to changes in the situation of the country and society. In general, and similarly to the American police forces during the first half of the 20th century, this ongoing process has been directed toward the professionalization of police work, that is, the improvement of the police efficiency and effectiveness. This process of change, expressed mainly in organizational reforms, has transformed the INP from a small, somewhat amateur and ill-equipped force into a highly professional and technologically sophisticated large-scale organization (Hod, 1996; Shadmi, 1998). On the declarative level, most of the reforms were initiated to achieve more efficient treatment of new external security threats and internal public disturbances and riots.

13 They were also meant to respond to growing concern in the police administration about public (and even political) criticism of a general lack of police effectiveness in adapting to the changing conditions of Israeli society, particularly of problems linked to poor police performance (Brewer et al., 1996: 136; Hovav and Amir, 1979). These considerations resulted in organizational reforms in major police areas (such as patrols, investigation, recruitment, training, planning, deployment) and measures to increase professionalization and specialization in specific areas (such as juvenile delinquency, intelligence and detective work, and the development of technological resources). However, most of the reforms served to reinforce work principles and patterns that were essentially military, and deemed to provide solutions to these problems; accordingly they increased militarization of the police (Shadmi, 1998). In more recent years a new process of comprehensive change has been initiated involving redefinition of police roles and functions and the development of the most appropriate organizational model for their achievement. Compared with previous attempts at reform, this phase in the development of the INP seems to be revolutionary in character and orientation. To cite Gimshi, a high-ranking police officer and scholar, ... it is possible to state that for the first time in the INPs history, a strategic plan that expresses a deep change in the organizational culture of the police, a change in the perception of the police role, a change in the work patterns with the public, and a change in the administrative approach and organizational structure of the police, is being implemented. (1999: 29). For the first time in the historical development of the INP, the organizational, administrative, and functional changes being introduced are aimed at moving it away from its military character and orientation, into more significantly civilian ones; accordingly, it is a process of demilitarization. This process is expressed operationally in various specific changes, being part of a deliberate strategic planning by the police administration. In the following we identify and illustrate the main aspects of this

14 process: the adoption of a community policing perspective; the increased focus on the reduction of crime; the organizational and administrative decentralization of the police; and decisions related to the composition of police workforce.

From State Needs to Community Needs On the declarative level, the INP has always been defined as a service-oriented police force (Gimshi, 1999: 29). However, Israel as a society in the making, created basically as national homeland for Jews from around the world, under a permanent security threat, constitutes a classic example of national interests playing a decisive role in the policies and the organizational and administrative construction of its institutions, among them its national police (Hod, 1996; Shadmi, 1998). Since its establishment, the INP has seen itself as an active partner in the effort to achieve such national goals. This stems from the statist conception that the state and the community are essentially identical entities, so service to the young nation and its goals is perceived as service to the community. However, due to its limited resources, the INP has constantly been forced to compromise and massively invest human and material resources in military-security statist goals such as the maintenance of internal security and public order, at the expense of the goals and needs of the communities. For instance, local police officers, who supply the greater part of classic policing services to the public, often find themselves deployed elsewhere in the country to deal with urgent security needs. Such circumstances have inadvertently weakened the local stations, impairing the service given to the citizens (Shadmi, 1998).7 Influenced by rising crime rates after Yom Kippur War in 1973, a number of formal steps were taken during the 1970s and 1980s to reinforce public cooperation with the

15 INP (for example, encouragement of public volunteering for the Civil Guard), thereby to compensate for its statist orientation. However, although such developments did lead to more positive contact between the police and the public, they were mainly confined to public-relations efforts (Gimshi, 1999). Especially during the early 1990s, following the well-documented introduction of community policing in the US, the INP embarked on a series of experimental programs emphasizing service and problem-solving strategies (Weisburd et al., 1997). This was largely due to the perceived loss of contact with the population, loss of the police forces intelligence base in it, and loss of respect by the community for the police (Friedmann, 1992: 132). However, the radical change happened in 1994, when the Inspector-General decided to abandon the traditional military-cum-statist approach and adopt a community policing strategy which would focus on the interests and expectations of the community through partnership with local government and community representatives and organizations. The Unit for Community Policing was established with the general aim of training police officers and civilians, encouraging programs focused on a problem-solving approach, and developing an organizational police culture oriented to public service. According to this plan, by about 2003 the struggle against crime and the maintenance of public order will have become part of social processes defined on the local community level, with the police acting as an important partner.8

From Security Focus to Crime Focus Militarization of American policing is usually associated with proclamations of all-out war against crime; in Israel, militarization was mainly influenced by the necessity for effective police deployment to deal with permanent problems of internal security and public order. As already noted, these problems have constantly taken priority over other

16 areas, including social problems such as crime, traditionally seen as pertaining to the micro-social level and therefore less important (Gamson and Yuchtman, 1977: 202-203; Hod, 1996; INP, 1956). This extraordinarily heavy burden took its toll on effective and efficient policing in the area of traditional police functions: many resources were allocated to building up effective professional units whose mission was to prevent terrorism and minimize risks and hazards for public order. Note that the traditionally low priority assigned to crime problems was not only based on ideological considerations. Due to the security situation, much of the social stress linked to crime in the western world was not seen as a major problem in Israel, either on the national or on the police level, at least not until the 1970s (Rahav, 1998; Shadmi, 1998). Moreover, in the early years of the state, a great part of the population, both Jewish and Arab, was organized in local communities, especially in rural areas. Events related to crime were treated informally within these communities, if possible without an approach to the police (Weisburd et al., 1997: 114-115). This situation began to change during the 1970s, when mainly after the social crisis experienced in the wake of the Yom Kippur War (1973) sharp increases in crime rates resulted in a demand by the public and the media for more measures to be taken to reduce crime rates. The Shimron Committee, set up in 1978 to examine the crime problem in Israel, strongly recommended that the crime control role of the INP be reemphasized. However, during the same period the country experienced marked deterioration in the internal security situation, and in consequence the government decided to transfer overall responsibility for internal security to the INP. Despite the Committees recommendations, the security aspect of police activity prevailed, again at the expense of the struggle against crime (Shadmi, 1998: 228).

17 Recently the external security threat has diminished, but in consequence social conflicts among the different groups composing Israeli society have intensified. One major effect is increased crime rates (see Rahav, 1998), generating a sense of helplessness among law-enforcement officials, and still more among citizens, who perceive police treatment of crime problems as inefficient. In light of this situation, the police administration took another unprecedented decision. Although the INP maintained its dual function (security and crime), a more appropriate balance between the two functions was sought, with the classical roles of the police, especially the struggle against crime, taking priority. This decision is currently reflected in the significant increase in the number of police officers especially recruited for this goal on the sub-district and station level, the establishment of special units for the treatment of crime hot-spots, and increased attention to crime problems in training and supervision (Vilk, 1999). The decision to assign top priority to crime represents an almost revolutionary decision for the INP. For the first time in its history, crime events, which includes far more adversarial police contact with Jews than was true in the early days, are not perceived as secondary to national police goals but as a threat to the personal safety and quality of life of citizens and the community on the micro level.

From Centralization to Decentralization As already mentioned, one of the main characteristics of the INP is its high degree of organizational and administrative centralization, with the Inspector-General at the top of the pyramid, directly subordinate to the national government. The function of the minister responsible for the police is to determine general policy guidelines, especially with regard to important national issues. This policy is implemented in a vertical top-

18 down military fashion, from the national headquarters downwards, via the district and sub-district level, to the level of the police stations located around the country. In recent years, attempts have been made to redesign the organizational and administrative structure of the INP with the aim of achieving a higher degree of decentralization and flatness. Organizationally, this change is reflected in the gradual reinforcement and transfer of financial and human resources on two levels: first, from the headquarters level to field police stations, in an attempt to flatten out the organizational structure and do away with the middle management (sub-district ) level; and second, from central downtown police stations to mini-stations (or community policing centers, usually one-man police centers but sometimes a mobile or temporary center) set up in a specific area, such as in commercial, entertainment, and tourist centers, and outlying neighborhoods, to deal with their specific problems. In this way, it was hoped to achieve greater economy of police resources, to eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy, and to improve communication between the police administration and the police stations (see Bayley, 1994; Kelling and Moore, 1988). Administratively, this change is expressed by the recent adoption (in 1998) of the Policing by Objectives approach which facilitates the determination of most local police goals (eight out of ten) at the police-station level in cooperation with local government representatives and community organizations. These local police objectives, usually defined once a year, should serve as an operational translation of the main problems affecting the quality of life of residents. The aim of this administrative change is to bring residents and police officers into a true partnership in determining the main goals and their implementation. This change significantly affects the roles and responsibilities of local authorities with regard to issues such as the struggle against crime and crime prevention. Unlike the American model, mayors (and other local

19 community bodies) have never had any formal or legal authority to influence local police action. As yet, the process of implementing a preventive strategy to achieve those objectives is not attained by a truly partnership approach, as is expected by the community policing paradigm. However, many multi-agency models of tackling crime and in-civilities, traditionally not considered a part of the policing work of the stations, are already being integrated in it.

From a Combat Ethos to a Civilian Ethos In its early years, due to severe workforce shortages, the INP actually failed to recruit police officers with the ideal characteristics prescribed by the military image of the police officer modeled on the soldier. This was mainly on account of the higher prestige ascribed to service in the IDF, the low salary offered by the INP, and the distasteful connotation of police work following bitter experiences at the hands of the Mandatory British Police. Except for the higher ranks, this led to recruitment mainly from the lowest socioeconomic groups and immigrants, many of whom saw police training as an aid to absorption into Israeli society (Brewer et al., 1996: 135). This situation gradually changed following implementation of several police reforms aimed at transforming the image of the INP into an organized and professional body offering appropriate remuneration and incentives. The multi-level recruitment system in the 1970s and other such schemes were developed to recruit college graduates and professionals, in many cases directly to high ranks and administrative positions. As a result, the working salary and the working conditions of the police have generally improved since then, exceeding the average in the Israeli public sector workforce. Still, at the same time the transfer of internal security functions to the INP served to reinforce

21 militarization. Consequently, as noted above, younger men compatible with the military perception of police work were recruited, with ex-army officers often recruited straight into high police positions (Shadmi, 1998: 226-227). More recently, the effort to recruit higher quality candidates has led to a move away from the police officer stereotype based on the military/combat model and an attempt to recruit a workforce with values and attitudes more compatible with the role of a modern police officer such as cultural tolerance, sensitivity, restraint, and a service orientation. For example, in addition to a battery of personal interviews and psychometric tests aimed to find these traits, all candidates must have matriculated high school after 12 years of schooling. The trend of change in the workforce domain has been mainly expressed on two levels: the recruitment of more women and a gradual process of civilianization of police positions. The latter means the replacement of police officers by civilians for posts not directly related to typical police work, or the hiring of services (e.g., catering, vehicle repair, computers, maintenance) on the private market (see Schwartz et al., 1975). Note however that although civilianization appears to be in line with demilitarization, its implementation in Israel stemmed mainly from budgetary and organizational considerations: savings on the management level leading to wider deployment of police officers on the station level. Women have always played a role in the INP. However, their recruitment to the INP was not based on gender considerations but on the lack of suitable male candidates (Hod, 1998). In the early years of the INP, women were recruited for female roles (such as clerical work and guarding female prisoners) and, during the 1960s, patrol and traffic functions. During the 1970s, following the recruitment of more skilled personnel, womens recruitment was intensified, some women even reaching command and senior

21 administration positions. Currently, almost every function is open to women (including combat roles in the Border Police and special patrol units) and there are women in the senior ranks of the INP. Nevertheless, women still lag behind men in number, rank, and job opportunities (Hod, 1998). Similar to the situation in US during the 1960s and 1970s, in Israel, following submission of a petition to the Supreme Court against the INP, the police administration found itself having to devote thought to the issue of womens recruitment. The report of an internal commission determined that the police should increase the number of women serving in the INP with the aim of women comprising one-quarter of its workforce within ten years.

Social Sources of Demilitarization Policing Trends

Militarization and the present demilitarization trends do not arise in a vacuum: police forces are a direct reflection of the priorities, divisions, and social and economic conditions of the societies in which they exist. Therefore, police innovations such as organizational and functional changes on the militarization continuum should be viewed from a broader perspective, that is, as an attempt by police forces to adapt to the changing needs and character of the societies in which they work and from which police officers come. The question that arises is how demilitarization helps police forces to adapt to the changing social conditions around them. According to Skogan (1995), community policing in US has been the result of parallel changes in the American society that support its development and dissemination (see also Peak and Glensor, 1996). The most important structural factor is politics: coalitions of groups, mainly minorities, which frequently have had hostile relations with the police, are a potent political force in many American cities. Hence, political leaders

22 have an interest in curbing police abuse, and in promoting a style of policing that serves their constituents. Next is shifts in societal organization, including a general trend toward decentralization of large-scale organizations into smaller, more flexible and responsive units, coupled with an increased reliance on market-like mechanisms to secure a customer orientation. Third is new levels of concern about police effectiveness, due to rising crime rates within hard fiscal and financial constraints, which prevent resolution of the problem by the hiring of more police officers in the traditional way. And fourth is the emergence of relatively well-educated and sophisticated police administrators, who, armed with university degrees, are both much more aware of the limitations of traditional policing and more receptive to the social shift toward liberalization and customer orientation among public organizations (Skogan, 1995: 9093). Unlikely the situation in the US, Israel matches the model of in-house initiated change toward demilitarization in its national force, not precipitated by formal external pressures, public outcries, blue-ribbon commissions, or a political agenda (Friedmann, 1992: 176). Nevertheless, and despite the great differences between the two societies, social and cultural factors similar to those in the US may be said to underpin the demilitarization trend of the Israel Police. According to Israeli sociologists (Almog, 1995; Levy, 1997; Peri, 1996), Israeli society itself has been undergoing a comprehensive process of demilitarization. This process has led to the gradual development of an Israeli civil society, that is, differentiation and separation between the state and a part of society, comprising a complex of autonomous institutions economic, religious, intellectual and political, which is acquiring a life of its own, largely autonomous from the state. This part engages in individual and collective activities no longer guided primarily by the rules of primordial collectivities and

23 directed by the state (Shils, 1991). This development is based mostly on values such as democratization, pluralism, decentralization of power and influence, and liberalism (Amir, 1997). These dimensions on the macro-level of Israeli society are described briefly in the following. The political level: The public at large, as well as many of the politicians representing them, no longer see aggressive military means as a legitimate way of solving political problems. Israel has finally succeeded in achieving two peace agreements with former enemies, Egypt and Jordan, an agreement expressing a historical compromise with the Palestinians in the territories occupied in the 1967 Six Day War, and negotiation tracks with a great part of the Arab world. With the easing of the existential security threat over Israel, local and internal issues have become more salient. They are expressed in both the actual worsening of internal conflicts between groups within the Israeli society, and in the recent discourses of the different political parties and their representation in the Knesset (parliament) during last general elections. Accordingly, local authorities and leaders are demanding the cooperation of local police on local issues. This situation has led to the political decentralization of power, resources, and services from the national to the local level (Gimshi, 1999). The social level: Israel was created as an autonomous homeland for Jews, who migrated to it from all over the world. In the early years, it may said that it was populated generally by two groups: Jews, who saw themselves as one people united against external threats; and Palestinians and other Arabs, who were perceived by the Jewish majority as part of the external threat. Over time, with the diminution of existential threat, the divisions among Jews (secular vs. orthodox; European vs. AsianAfrican; native-born vs. new immigrants; left-wing vs. right -wing) have become

24 apparent and have been reflected in increases in social conflicts and consequently in crime rates and instances of violent public disorder. The economic level: With higher standards of living and an accumulation of economic resources in the middle classes over the past two decades, materialistic and consumerist values have become very salient. As a result, civil economic values, such as individualism, competition, privatization, and criticism, have gradually replaced economic centralization and institutional collectivism. Consequently, a market economy composed of autonomous private associations, institutions, and business firms, which according to Shils (1991) constitute the appropriate pattern of the economic life of a civil society, began to flourish in Israel. This change, like the above-mentioned situation in the US, is also reflected in the public sector (including the police), in a service revolution, emphasizing consumer needs and the implementation of advanced management approaches (Shalev and Yehezkeally, 1997). The institutional level: The IDF has gradually become less dominant in Israeli society. In recent years, it has been reduced in size (relative to the size of the population) and it receives a smaller portion of the national budget. The extent of its autonomy has also been curtailed, and concomitantly civilian bodies have gained in strength as reflected in increased control and supervision by the State Comptroller, the judicial system, the media, soldiers parent groups, etc. Even the image of the army has become eroded: increasing dominance of materialistic values has brought about a change in the motivation of youth to serve in the army. The cultural level: The strengthening of the anti-militaristic wing in Israeli society is extremely evident on the cultural level. The army now finds itself constantly criticized by the media and the arts (books, movies, the theater). Issues such as the inappropriate behavior of soldiers, maltreatment of subordinates by commanders, and even cover-up

25 of operational accidents, previously taboo, have become the topics of public debate in the media. The questioned no-choice war in Lebanon (1982-1985) and the moral shake-up of the IDF during the Intifada due to its police functions created a crisis in the relationship between the army and civilian society.

Renewed militarization in American police forces Like the demilitarization trend, this recent secondary trend of militarization of police in general, and in respect of crime and drug problems in particular, seems not to be accidental in the US. Kraska (1999) finds its social reasons in the ending of the Cold War threat, with the consequent loss of the communist enemy, and a situation of severe economic recession, where the leading industrial nations (mainly the military-industrial complex) have no external enemies to mobilize against. In these circumstances it is reasonable to assume that the war against internal enemies, dangerous offenders, rioters, and drug dealers, obtains higher priority (Christie, 1994: 13-14; see also Nadelman, 1993: 475; Sherry, 1995: 431). The international dimensions of crime, particularly drug trading, is formally recognized in the US, and there is awareness of the routine burden on local police forces and of the efficiency and renewed popularity of the military. Accordingly, the US Congress has legislated some laws and regulations permitting the use of military resources, equipment, and expertise in support of American civilian police forces and other foreign military forces (such as in Latin America), mainly for the war on drugs (Dunlop, 1999: 219; Haggerty and Ericson, 1999; Zirnite, 1998). This macro-level situation has caused a dual development. On the one hand, there is increasing involvement of the military in domestic security and law enforcement, such as the war on drugs and illegal immigration, namely police-ization of the military (Dunlop, 1999; Dunn, 1996; 1999; Kraska, 1993). On the other, there is the rise and

26 enlargement of paramilitary units in police forces, namely the aforementioned renewed process of militarization in the police. These two trends have led to a gradual blurring of the traditional limits of the functions between external (the military) and internal (the police) security forces. The consequence is the subtle targeting of certain civilian populations as internal security threats, which can be located and handled by military methods of information gathering and processing, operations, and technology (on this last aspect see Haggerty and Ericson, 1999). In this new situation, both sides benefit: the military broadens its mandate from external to internal problems; the police force gets advanced technology, budgets, and training from the military, hence it is perceived by the public as more effective and legitimate, and ultimately more professional (Kraska, 1999: 213).

Conclusions
That both the American and Israeli police forces are currently undergoing a process of attempted demilitarization is quite evident. This trend, which is supported by their police administrations and many social scientists, seems to constitute a natural development, based on broad social processes in both societies, towards decentralization, liberalization, improved relationships with the public, and customer orientation. However, these factors do not assure the successful institutionalization of the change or its persistence in the long term. At the beginning of the 21st century it is still too early to assess its impact. As in the American situation (Greene and Mastrofski, 1991; Hunter and Barker, 1993; Rosenbaum, 1994; Walker, 1999), many programs of community policing in Israel may still be perceived as traditional anti-crime, anti-drug efforts. In some police stations and regions there is little more than rhetoric, while demilitarization efforts are still applied as a way of appearing to be progressive and innovative without actual abandonment of traditional militarized policing. A major

27 obstacle to real change common to both countries seems to be the police organizational culture. Police officers on every police level are habituated to act and to think according to militaristic principles and find it difficult to adopt civilian thought and work patterns. These factors may lead them to oppose and even to sabotage the process (Landstrom and Savage, 1992; Peak and Glensor, 1996; Shalev and Yehezkeally, 1997; Skolnick and Bayley, 1986). Willingness to change is therefore a fundamental requirement for demilitarization implementation: police agencies must modify their organizational culture. Some additional obstacles seem to be more particular to Israel. For example, there is a lack of local cooperative tendencies (unlikely national ones) in Israeli society that could facilitate active participation in community policing. Apart from religious Jewish communities, some Arab communities, cooperative and collectivist villages, and even ideological settlements in the territories, there is very little sense of community in Israel (Gimshi, 1999; Weisburd et al., 1997: 117-118).9 This obviously raises the question of how may the Israeli high police command establish community policing if one cannot clearly identify communities there. An answer is given by Bensinger (1998): community policing (like organizational and administrative decentralization, and civilianization of police positions) is just another artificial application of American solutions to American problems in Israel, akin to others applied in Israeli society in general, and in its criminal system in particular. Moreover, Israeli media coverage of eventual municipal police forces has already created a fear of political involvement and use of the police by local politicians (Yehezkeally and Shalev, 1996: 36). An additional particular obstacle to Israel is the fact that despite the aforementioned organizational changes, the INP continues to work as national police, subordinated to central government and acting according to broad

28 national, rather than local considerations. Police policy is still determined by the Ministry of Internal Security and operationalization is still the responsibility of the Inspector-General (Gilboa, 1998; Shadmi, 1998). As a result, the military character of the police is likely to prevail as long as severe problems of internal security and public n, continued monitoring will be required to assess order exist. In conclusi demilitarization trends in both countries on the operational level. If these developments towards demilitarization in the police rest on broad social changes, what may be said about the secondary trend of renewed militarization in the US? Compared with the earlier trend, this change seems to be more worrying. Kraska (1999: 213) raises some possible consequences: does it actually reflect a trend towards a new form of totalitarianism? Or is it perhaps an advance towards new forms of technological and intelligence surveillance, especially of targeted internal threats? What is more clear is that the blurring of limits between the military and the police force has always been disadvantageous for the public whom the latter is supposed to serve. As Dunlop (1999:227) concluded, A military organization adept at destroying targets and undermining enemy command and control structures is not necessarily the best organization to do such work in a democracy.