Topicality:extend are interpation

Prefer are interpation over the Affirmitives,they do not meet are interpation.So then that limits are education in the round.They ceed how Topicality is a Voter .So then therefore sine they do ceed all of this they cant allow us to run Cuban specific Ks such as Neolib,or a Foucaltian .Basis off this we are giving a list of what we can not run.But then as an well they do not extend how anything .Ceed

Our framework is the most effective means to transform politics Bleiker 2kPh.D. from the Australian National University, Professor of International Relations at the
University of Queensland (Roland, 2000 First Published, 2004 Edition, Cambridge University Press, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, p. 210-1)
While providing compelling evidence of subtle forms of domination, a discursive approach may run the risk of leaving us with an image of the world in which the capacity for human agency is all but erased, annihilated by impenetrable discursive forces. This risk is particularly acute in a world that is characterised by increasingly heterogeneous and perhaps even elusive cross-territorial dynamics. But recognising these transversal complexities does not necessarily lead into a pessimistic cul de sac. Discourses, even if they take on global dimensions, are not as overarching as some analysts suggest. They contain fissures and cracks, weak points which open up chances to turn discursive dynamics against themselves. The previous chapter has outlined this position in detail. A brief rehearsal even at the risk of appearing slightly repetitive is necessary to provide the prerequisite for an adequate discursive conceptualisation of human agency in global politics. For this purpose we must, as the prologue has already stressed, seek to see beyond the levels of analysis problematique that has come to frame international relations theory.

Rather than limiting the study of global politics to specific spheres of inquiry those related to the role of states and the restraints imposed on them by the structures of the international system an analysis of transversal struggles pays attention to various political terrains and the crossterritorial dynamics through which they are intertwined with each other. One of these terrains is the sphere of dailiness, which is all too often eclipsed by investigations that limit the domain of global politics to more visible sites of transversal struggle, such as wars, diplomatic negotiations, financial flows or trade-patterns. The domain of dailiness, though, is at least as crucial to the conduct of global politics, and an investigation into discursive dynamics illustrates why this the case.
Cracks and weaknesses in globalised discursive practices can be seen best by shifting foci from epistemological to ontological issues. This is to say that in

addition to analysing how discourses mold and control our thinking process, we must scrutinise how individuals, at the level of Being, may or may not be able to escape aspects of the prevalent discursive order. Being is always a product of discourse. But Being also is becoming. It contains future potential, it is always already that which it is not. Being also has multiple dimensions. Hyphenated identities permit a person to shift viewpoints constantly, to move back and forth between various ways of constituting oneself. Resulting methods of mental deplacement, of situating knowledge, open up possibilities for thinking beyond the narrow confines of the transversally established discursive order. This thinking space provides the opportunity to redraw the boundaries of identity which control the parameters of actions available to an individual. Exploring this thinking space already is action, Heidegger claims, for thinking acts insofar as it thinks. Such action, he continues, is the simplest and at the same time the highest, because it concerns the relation of Being to man.3 But how is one to understand processes through which critical thinking breaks through the fog of discourse and gives rise to specific and identifiable expressions of human agency? The concept of tactic offers the opportunity to take a decisive step towards exploring the practical dimensions of Dasein, the existential awareness of Being, without losing the abstract insight provided by Heidegger. The sphere of dailiness is where such practical theorising is most effective. Entering this ubiquitous sphere compels us to one more shift, away from contemplating the becoming of Being towards investigating specific ways in which individuals employ their mobile subjectivities to escape discursive forms of domination. The focus now rests on everyday forms of resistance, seemingly mundane daily practices by which people constantly shape and reshape their environment. One can find such forms of resistance in acts like writing, laughing, gossiping, singing, dwelling, shopping or cooking. It is in these spheres that societal values are gradually transformed, preparing the ground for more open manifestations of dissent.

Ontology Must Evaluate ontology first Dillon, University of Lancaster, 99

[Michael, Moral spaces, The scandal of the refugee] The question of ontology was not only reposed, however; the charge was also laid, to equally devastating effect, that the onto-theological yearnings that characterized Western thought were the source of its own understated but pervasive life-inimical violence. The
return of the ontological (which occurred in part, also, through the so-called "Language Turn" in philosophy) was, therefore, no mere turn of thought.

It was prompted by and resonated with the historical changes and events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: bureaucratization and rationalization, global industrialization and technologization, and the advent of mass society, world war, and holocaust, which themselves challenged statesmen and women, as well as thinkers, to reconsider the character of the civilization they inhabited and the trajectory down which its own dynamics seemed to be propelling it World War I was pivotal in this regard. The subsequent advent of totalitarianism, together with the destruction of European Jewry, the advent of genocide as a regular tool of policy, and the invention, employment, and global deployment of weapons of mass destruction completed the turn. Philosophy and politics were intimately, if obscurely and confusedly, allied in these developments, in respect not only of science and technology, but also in terms of political movements, ideology, and the evolution of the
thought of politics itself. Whereas the political and economic character of the age seemed to demand a fundamental reappraisal of the fundaments to which it held, the

philosophical reappraisal of the fundaments called, in their turn, for a political reappraisal of the age. Modernity became the question, but the question was increasingly formulated in ways that were concerned less with its realization and more with whether or not it was capable of being outlived. Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As
Heidegger himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political*never tired of pointing out, the

relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is. without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it
seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its

foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock-innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.
While certain continental thinkers like Blumcnberg and Lowith, for example, were prompted to interrogate or challenge the modern's claim to being distinctively "modern" and others such as Adorno questioned its enlightened credentials, philosophers like Derrida and Levinas pursued the metaphysical implications (or rather the implications for metaphysics) of the thinking initiated by Kierkegaard, as well as by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The violence of metaphysics, together with another way of thinking about the question of the ethical, emerged as the defining theme of their work.5 Others, notably Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, Bau-drillard, and Bataille turned the thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger into a novel kind of social and political critique of both the regimes and the effects of power that have come to distinguish late modern times; they concentrated, in detail, upon how the violence identified by these other thinkers manifested itself not only in the mundane practices of

modern life, but also in those areas that claimed to be most tree of it, especially the freedom and security of the subject as well as its allied will to truth and knowledge. Questioning

the appeal to the secure self grounding common to both its epistemic structures and its political imagination, and in the course of reinterrogating both the political character of the modern and the modern character of the political, this problematization of modernity has begun to prompt an ontopolitkally driven reappraisal of modern political thought. This means that the ontological constitution of politics itself its legislating categories of time, space, understanding, and action, and of what it is to be prompted by the politics of the specific
(ontological) constitutional order of political modernity, has begun to come under sustained scrutiny. Taken up first (outside philosophy) in the study of literature, psychoanalysis, and sociology, the reception of this movement of thought was necessarily colored by the historical predispositions and disciplinary preoccupations into which it was first received, in North America especially and later in Britain. Without being diverted into an interdisciplinary excursus and without diminishing the continuing significance of the following issues or their relevance to the political, this accounts, at least in part, for the early preoccupations with textual it y (poststructuralism), subjectivity (individual and collective), and epochality (identification of a new epoch, the postmodern). The political implications of the return of the ontological have always been evident, but they were hardly the principal concerns of literature, psychoanalysis or even sociology. This meant that (with the exception of the critical members of the Frankfurt school and thinkers such as Carl Schmitt in Germany) they did not engage with the tradition of political thought until somewhat later. The work of Butler, Connolly, Dallmayr, Dumm, Flynn, Honig, Kateb, Shapiro, Strong, Villa, Warren, and White in the United States, and of Agambcn, Haar. Kristeva. Lacoue-Labarthe, Lefort, Laclau, Mouffe, Nancy, and Zizek in Europe is evidence of a plural body of thought that now does just that. Hannah Arcndi stands out here, not just for the individuality, extent, and quality of her political thought, but because she was there before all the rest. Her adherents, however, did not appreciate the extent to which her political thinking was enabled by Heidegger's early search for a fundamental ontology and his allied destruction of metaphysics, simply because until recently, the tradition of political thought has been largely ignorant or dismissive of these developments.' Much of that has now begun to change in a widespread and positive revival of interest, for example, in Arendt herself' It is, perhaps, ignorance of its own ontologica! indebtedness that (among other reasons) accounts for the continuing lack of interest in Arendt's thinking displayed by international relations, despite the ways in which it has been opened up to related currents of thought in recent years.1 Thinking

the political in the way we do because of the way we think, this turn in thought has profound implications for the thought of politics as well. The return
of the ontological, in other words, necessarily prompted a return of what Connolly has aptly called "the ontopolitical," something I want to turn to later.* One of the most important features of this development has been to concentrate the attention of political thought on the question of the political as such."1 Part of the argument 1 make here is that international understandings of the political, may instead

relations, once the citadel of metaphysical become a prime site for that very ontopolitical reappraisal of the political in which political thought rethinks itself by turning back to that which it is given to think, namely the political called for by the ontological turn." Inasmuch as we also think international relations in the way we do because of the way we think, and that international relations even when it most claims to be something else, something apoliticalis also a mode of political thought, the return of the ontopolitical has profound implications for international relations as well, not only for what is thought through international relations, but also for the very way in which international relations as a mode of thought is itself construed and may be further reconstrued.
What is ordinarily most difficult here, however, is finding how the wider philosophical issues raised by the ontopolitical turn can be shown to have direct critical purchase not only on the construal of that discipline as a domain of thought, but also on the international politics of decision and judgment, comprehension of which international relations claims as its definitive distinctive competence. What is required therefore is some "concretization." some location in readily appreciated international political circumstances or events, of these more philosophically derived issues, so that both the political implications of the philosophy and the character of political decision itself can be simultaneously illuminated My other principal argument, then, is that what I call the scandal of the refugee presents such a conjunction. It illuminates both the fundamental ontological determinations of international politics and the character of political action because the refugee is a function of the intentional political destruction of the ontological horizons of people's always already heterogeneous worlds, and effects an equally fundamental deconstruction of the ontological horizons that constitute the equally heterogeneous worlds into which, as refugees, these people are precipitated. It

is precisely on this concrete and corporeal site that both the ontological horizons and the allied political decision making of modern politics are thrown into stark relief and profoundly called into question. For it is precisely here that the very actions of modern politicsdecisions and judgments together with how those decisions and judgments are framed and determined by their own ontopolitkal assumptions both create and address the incidence of its own massive and self-generated political abjection. If that is one of the principal ends of international relations, one is forced to ask, what does it take as its beginning? If, in other words, the vernacular political architecture of modern international power commonly produces forcibly displaced people globally, one is inclined to ask about the foundations upon which that architecture is itself based.

The drive to eliminate disorder and maintain control is born out of the need for ontological security, in which the state can maintain the coherence of its perceived identity Epstein, Masters Candidate in the dept of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in 2k7
[Noa, , MIT International Review, explaining the war on terror from an ontological-security perspective, http://web.mit.edu/mitir/2007/spring/perspective.html] Conversely, international relations scholars in the Realist camp explain the U.S. response as an inevitable, rational, defensive and deterrent measure, perhaps even as revenge, in response to the attack on the U.S.s physical security. The
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which harbored terrorism and was hence guilty by association, was, according to them, attacked in order to install a new government that would eliminate the terrorists. Realists also

argue that the U.S.s real objective was to gain control over the oil and natural gas resources of central Asia. But these explanations do not suffice. They do not explain the rhetorical aspect of the U.S.s response (the strong emphasis on the U.S. being the worlds guardian of freedom in the face of evil) or the choice to frame the response as war, assuming that the U.S. could have been satisfied with strengthening law enforcement and destroying terrorist financial networks. Most importantly, if the physical damage alone (the death toll of over 3,000 and the material loss resulting from 9/11) was what prompted the response, then why wasnt war declared on obesity, smoking, and road accidents? By comparison, about 112,000 adult deaths
are associated with obesity each year in the United States; more than 400,000 Americans die every year from cigarette smoking; and in 2001, automobile crashes killed 15 times more Americans than terrorism did. There

seems to be a deeper, underlying explanation for the U.S.s response to 9/11. It will be argued here that a states behavior is fundamentally shaped by its identity and need for certainty. In order to achieve a sense of stability and purpose, states struggle to preserve what has been termed, by Jennifer Mitzen of Ohio State University, their ontological security (OS). The U.S.s response to 9/11 can be framed and understood in such terms, for the resort to the U.S. routine of declaring war on an evil antagonist, was significantly aimed at restoring the sense of ontological security that had been disrupted by the terrorists.

The affs scenarios and depictions of the world emanate from a desire to achieve ontological security-the more uncertainty the world is faced with the more policy choices become a matter of routine to assure stable identity. Epstein in 2k7 (Noa, Masters Candidate in the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, MIT International Review, explaining the war on terror from an ontologicalsecurity perspective, http://web.mit.edu/mitir/2007/spring/perspective.ht\ml)
Ontology is the branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature of being. Sociologist Anthony Giddens, the former director of the London School of Economics, used this term to develop his concept of ontological

security, arguing that all human beings seek a secure self (identity), which pertains to having a sense of certainty and stability with regard to the social order, and in this case, the international state system. Only in the past few years have international relations scholars applied the concept to state actors on the grounds that like human beings, states are considered rational and social actors, such that they, too, seek ontological security. They seek a stable identity and sense of certainty, and achieve it by turning their interaction with others into routines with desired ends. In order to grasp what OS means, picture a soldier at war. The soldiers physical
security, the security of his body, is constantly under threat by the possibility of being shot or stepping on a landmine. But there is more at stake, for the

soldier is not only concerned with his physical survival; he is also driven to preserve his sense of purpose. Being ontologically securethat is to say, having a stable sense of selfis a fundamental need of the soldier and any other social actor (including statesas corporate social actors). This is because it influences the soldiers ability to
act rationally. His ability to act rationally depends on an awareness of his objectives with respect to those of his enemy, an awareness of the challenges he must confront in his particular environment, and an awareness of his role in contributing to the goals of his society. Only in such an instance does the soldier know in fact who he is and what he is fighting for. Without such a sense of awareness and a clear sense of who he is, the soldier is powerless and his efforts utterly meaningless. To dig a little deeper, one can consider the soldiers identity as comprising two components. The first pertains to his intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute his individuality; his cultural essence, his so-called D.N.A.

of values and principles. The second aspect encompasses the soldiers social identity, which refers to his role vis--vis other actors. Because this aspect is constructed in relation to other actors (a teacher is a teacher by virtue of having students, just as a soldier is a soldier by virtue of having at least a potential enemy) it requires recognition by others in order to exist. Note that ontological identity) is

insecurity (an attack on generated by a deep sense of uncertainty. This can impede rational action (and since states are considered rational actorsdeep uncertainty impedes a states ability to interact), and because the social aspect of ones identity is endogenous to the interaction, deep uncertainty affects identity. To return to the previous example,
imagine what would happen if the soldiers military was confronted with a situation in which exogenous phenomena forced it to question the principles on which it had forever justified war. Suddenly, the rules of the game have changed. What then, would the soldiers objectives be? How could he operate effectively under such a deep sense of uncertainty? Consider then, what happened

to the U.S.s identity (conceptualized as a freedom-guarding benevolent hegemon, an economic and military superpower) when a nonstate actor (al-Qaida) came and attacked the U.S. from within its sovereign boundaries, using box cutters and nail clippers. Confronted with the condition of terrorism, what seems to have become an even more intractable force than its past foe of communism, the U.S. has had to find a way to restore its ontological security. In order to reestablish security in the ontological sense, a social actor tends to develop and rely on routines. Routines enable the actor to act, and, because part of an actors identity derives from the actors interaction with others, routines help to sustain stable interaction, and hence a stable identity. It follows that in a deep state of uncertainty or extreme anxiety, actors will resort to routines in order to retrieve their sense of self, re-establish a sense of certainty, and restore their OS.

Rules Bad And, ridged dogmatism of rules is what caused 21st century warfare and domination. Their argument is a link to the K. Johnston, Research Associate, Vancouver Island U, 99
[Ian, "There's Nothing Nietzsche Couldn't Teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist". http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/introser/nietzs.htm]
Take, for example, the offside rule in soccer. Without that the game could not proceed in its traditional way. Hence, soccer players see the offside rule as an essential part of their reality, and as long as soccer is the only game in town and we have no idea of its history (which might, for example, tell us about the invention of the off-side rule), then the offside rule is easy to interpret as a universal, a necessary requirement for social activity, and we will find and endorse scriptural texts which reinforce that belief, and our scientists will devote their time to linking the offside rule with the mysterious rumblings that come from the forest. And from this, one might be led to conclude that the offside rule is a Law of Nature, something which extends far beyond the realms of our particular game into all possible games and, beyond those, into the realm of the wilderness itself. Of course, there were powerful social and political forces (the coach and trainers and owners of the team) who made sure that people had lots of reasons for believing in the unchanging verity of present arrangements. So it's not surprising that we find plenty of learned books, training manuals, and locker room exhortations urging everyone to remember the offside rule and to castigate as "bad" those who routinely forget about that part of the game. We will also worship those who died in defence of the offside rule. And naturally any new game that did not recognize the offside rule would be a bad game, an immoral way to conduct oneself. So if some group tried to start a game with a different offside rule, that group would be attacked because they had violated a rule of nature and were thus immoral. But for contingent historical reasons, Nietzsche argues, that situation of one game in town did not last. The recreational unity of the area split up, and the growth of historical scholarship into the past demonstrated all too clearly that there was overwhelming evidence that all

the various attempts to show that one particular game was privileged over any of the others, that there was one true game, are false, dogmatic, trivial, deceiving, and so on. For science has revealed that the notion of a necessary connection between the rules of any game and the wider purposes of the wilderness is simply an ungrounded assertion. There is no way in which we can make the connections between the historically derived fictions in the rule
book and the mysterious and ultimately unknowable directions of irrational nature. To play the game of science, we have to believe in causes and effects, but there is no way we can prove that this is a true belief and there is a danger for us if we simply ignore that fact. Therefore, we

cannot prove a link between the game and anything outside it. And history has shown us, just as Darwin's natural history has demonstrated, that all apparently eternal issues have a story, a line of development, a genealogy. Thus, concepts, like species, have no reality--they are temporary fictions imposed for the sake of defending a particular arrangement. Hence, God is dead. There is no eternal truth any more, no rule book in the sky, no ultimate referee or
international Olympic committee chairman. Nietzsche didn't kill God; history and the new science did. And Nietzsche is only the most passionate and irritating messenger, announcing over the PA system to anyone who will listen that someone like Kant or Descartes or Newton who thinks that what he or she is doing can be defended by an appeal to a system grounded in the truth of nature has simply been mistaken. So What's the Problem? This insight is obvious to Nietzsche, and he is troubled that no one seems to be worried about it or even to have noticed

it. So he's moved to call the matter to our attention as stridently as possible, because he thinks that this realization requires a fundamental shift in how we live our lives. For Nietzsche Europe is in crisis. It has a growing power to make life comfortable and an enormous energy. But people seem to want to channel that energy into arguing about what amounts to competing fictions and to force everyone to adhere to a particular fiction. Why is this insight so worrying? Well, one point is that dogmatists get aggressive. Soccer players and rugby players who forget what Nietzsche is pointing out can start killing each other over questions which admit of no answer, namely, questions about which group has the true game, which group has privileged access to the truth. Nietzsche

senses that dogmatism is going to lead to warfare, and he predicts that the twentieth century will see an unparalleled extension of warfare in the name of competing dogmatic truths. Part of his project is to wake up the people who are intelligent enough to respond to what he's talking
about so that they can recognize the stupidity of killing each other

AT: No Link We Had Other Impacts

1. This is a link of inclusion. Other impacts dont justify death impacts.They are Its like saying an environment impact gives free reign to trivialize the Holocaust.

2. Their choice to initiate death impacts denies our choice to avoid them. Were forced to debate death to make impact comparisons and because debates that include death are strongly pressured to go to the body count.
3. You make focus on structural violence impossible- the spectacle draws our eye, and necessitates escalating spectacles to grab the attention of an increasingly anesthetized debate community- meanwhile, we ignore structural violence and its effects, grabbing for the biggest nuclear war- means we never operationalize any plans to combat structural violence

*** 2NC OV

The question of the debate is whether representing death in the simulation of debate represents a valuable or harmful practice- they cant access the case without justifying their conclusion that death simulations are important

We control the offense. Our impacts stem directly from being forced to debate death. Their impacts are missing the internal link between talking about death and fearing death.

Without the alts protest against militarization of the public sphere, continuously escalating spectacles of violence become desirable and necessary- all of their impact claims are produced to justify a constant state of domestic insecurity and the alt is the only way to solve any of them anyway. We are a pre-requisite to solve literally all of their offense, from fear of death good to political action good. Giroux 3/14
Henry A Giroux, Frequent author on pedagogy in the public sphere, Truthout, Youth in Revolt: The Plague of State-Sponsored Violence, March 14, 2012, http://truthout.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=7249:youth-in-revolt-the-plague-of-statesponsoredviolence As the social is devalued along with rationality, ethics and any vestige of democracy, spectacles of war, violence and brutality now merge into forms of collective pleasure that constitute an important and new symbiosis among visual pleasure, violence and suffering. The control society is now the ultimate form of entertainment as the pain of others, especially those considered disposable and powerless, has become the subject not of compassion, but of ridicule and amusement in America. High-octane violence and human suffering are now considered another form of entertainment designed to raise the collective pleasure quotient . Reveling in the suffering of others should no longer be reduced to a matter of individual pathology, but now registers a larger economy of pleasure across the broader culture and social landscape. My emphasis here is on the sadistic impulse and how it merges spectacles of violence and brutality with forms of collective pleasure. No society can make a claim to being a democracy as long as it defines itself through shared fears rather than shared responsibilities. Widespread violence now functions as part of an anti-immune system that turns the economy of genuine pleasure into a mode of sadism that creates the foundation for sapping democracy of any political substance and moral vitality. The prevalence of institutionalized violence in American society and other parts of the world suggests the need for a new conversation and politics that addresses what a just and fair world looks like. The predominance of violence in all aspects of social life suggests that young people and others marginalized by class, race and ethnicity have been abandoned as American society's claim on democracy gives way to the forces of militarism, market fundamentalism and state terrorism. The prevalence of violence throughout American society suggests the need for a politics that not only negates the established order, but imagines a new one, one informed by a radical vision in which the future does not imitate the present.(27) In this discourse, critique merges with a sense of realistic hope and individual struggles merge into larger social movements. The challenge that young people are posing to American society is being met with a statesponsored violence that is about more than police brutality; it is more importantly about the transformation of the United States from a social state to a warfare state, from a state that embraced the social contract to one that no longer has a language for community - a state in which the bonds of fear and commodification have replaced the bonds of civic responsibility and democratic vision. Until we address how the metaphysics of war and violence have taken hold on American society (and in other parts of the world) and the savage social costs it has enacted, the forms of social, political and economic violence that young people are protesting against as well as the violence waged in response to their protests will become impossible to recognize and act on .

2NC A2: No Structure to Alt Joke- not a sufficient bright line on what constitutents a structural alt- we can explain how our alt would work politically- sovles their offense No inherent right to institutionally-based DAs to the alt- critical to forcing teams to consider dimensions to politics beyond praxis AT: Alt Doesnt Solve
Voting neg solves 2 reasons: A. Deterrence. Racist language proves. Alfred C. Snider, Edwin Lawrence Assistant Professor of Forensics - University of Vermont, 4 (http://debate.uvm.edu/ReplyFrank.doc, date from Archive.org, article also cites 2002 articles) The challenges to the game of debate mentioned in my essay also directly address this. The critical move in debate, where debaters step outside of the traditional box to analyze the ethical issues of argumentative perspectives and to analyze the language employed in a debate belies this concern. Almost all American debaters know that making a racist or sexist comment in a debate is one of the easiest ways to lose a ballot, as the opposing team is likely to make that the only issue in the debate, and the judge will make an example of you. There is no time in debate history when falsification and fabrication of evidence has been better monitored or when the behavior of debaters as regards evidence has been better. This may be more due to the ability to check the evidence used by others, but it still is the case. This sort of ethical dimension of argument and presentation has been made an issue in the decision. Winning at all costs could cost you the win. B. Corrective justice. The ballot has to delineate what is acceptable. Alfred C. Snider, Edwin Lawrence Assistant Professor of Forensics - University of Vermont, 84 (The National Forensic Journal, II, Fall, Ethics in Academic Debate) Ethics concerns codes of behavior, specifically in the "ought to" or "should" sense of behavior. Duke notes that the ethics of game use is a very important issue.5 While an issue of importance should be dealt with by strict criteria in the game design process, this is not possible, since many ethical considerations cannot be anticipated during the design process and must be dealt with during the play of the game itself. In attempting to compose an ethical code for the game of debate, the options are either to state a small number of criteria which lack precision or to produce a long list of criteria which restrict the options of the participant. Almost all philo-sophical disputations which attempt to determine whether a given pattern of behaviors is "ethical" or not give special attention to the particulars of the situation and the ends which are at issue. While murder is seen as unethical behavior by most individuals, never-theless these same individuals might find it tolerable if it was committed in self-defense. Once we begin formulating ethical guidelines we are soon lost in a sea of "if. . . then" statements designed to take situational factors and the desirability of certain ends into account. What is true of general ethical guidelines is also true of ethical guidelines for debate. Recognizing that ethical considerations probably must be dealt with inside a given debate situation, it seems appropriate to opt for the course of generating a small number of generally applicable ethical standards.