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A Spirit of TrustChapter Eight

From Irony to Trust: Modernity and Beyond

Section I: Stages in the Development of Spirit

Philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, and Kant helped give theoretical shape to ne attitudes to ard the nature and signi!icance o! su"#ectivit$ that can, in retrospect, "e seen to "e characteristicall$ modern% But Hegel as the !irst ma#or philosopher to take the advent o! modernit$ as an e&plicit theoretical topic%' (ndeed, as the chapter on Spirit makes clear, in an important sense that is the topic o! the Phenomenology% )he principal aim o! the "ook is to articulate, ork out, and appl$ a a$ o! understanding the transition !rom pre*modern to modern social practices, institutions, selves, and their immanent !orms o! understanding% +,eist- is Hegel-s collective term !or ever$thing that has a history rather than a natureor, put other ise, ever$thing hose nature is essentiall$ historical% ,eist as a hole has a histor$, and it is Hegel-s vie that in an important sense, that histor$ "oils do n to one grand event% )hat eventthe only thing that has ever reall$ happened to ,eistis its structural trans!ormation !rom a traditional to a modern !orm%.

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/s Pippin has argued at length, !or instance in Idealism as Modernism 0re!%1 )his is an oversimpli!ication% (n man$ places Hegel attri"utes more gross structure to histor$% 2or instance, in the Philosophy of Right 344565*5789 he identi!ies four stages in orld histor$, putting the :riental "e!ore the ,reek, and interposing the ;oman "et een the ,reek and the modern 3<ordic or ,erman9% ( think there is a point to his practice in the Phenomenology, o! ignoring the !irst and treating the ;oman as part o! the e&tended transition to modernit$%

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Hegel o!!ers us a voca"ular$ in hich to understand that titanic trans!ormation, and the ne kind o! sel!hood it "rings ith it% 2or coming to understand the transition to modernit$ is the achievement o! a distinctive kind o! sel!*consciousnessA historical sel!* consciousness% ,eistig "eings are to "e understood in terms o! their "ecoming, their present in terms o! their past, their states and statuses in terms o! the processes that produced them% B$ reading the Phenomenology e are to "ecome self-consciously modern, conscious o! ourselves as the products o! an unprecedented revolution in human institutions and consciousness%

)he ultimate point o! this theoretical, historical, recollective enterprise is practical, prospective, and progressive% 2or rational reconstruction o! the process o! sel!*!ormation is !or Hegel the engine o! sel!*development% /chieving an e&plicit historical understanding o! the genesis o! one-s current stage is ho one moves to the ne&t% )he histor$ o! ,eist is its o n act% ,eist is onl$ hat it does, and its act is to make itsel! the o"#ect o! its o n consciousness% (n histor$ its act is to gain consciousness o! itsel! as ,eist, to apprehend itsel! in its interpretation o! itsel! to itsel!% )his apprehension is its "eing and its principle, and the completion o! apprehension at one stage is at the same time the re#ection o! that stage and its transition to a higher% )o use a"stract phraseolog$, the ,eist apprehending this apprehension ane , or in other ords returning to itsel! again out o! its re#ection o! this lo er stage o! apprehension, is the ,eist o! the stage higher than that on hich it stood in its earlier apprehension% 0P; 45=51

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Hegel-s claim is that making e&plicit hat is implicit in the vast sea*change ,eist has undergone in "ecoming modern sho s that the same normative !orces that "rought !orth that change make appropriate and necessar$ another one, no less s eeping and signi!icant than the !irst% Properl$ understood, modernit$ "ecomes visi"le as a a$* station rather than a destination, as constituting onl$ the middle, interim phase o! a three stage process% Hegel is the prophet o! a second large*scale structural trans!ormation o! ,eist, o! its passage "e$ond modernit$ into a radicall$ ne !orm, a ne "eginning, the "irth o! a ne orld% )he principal positive practical lesson o! Hegel-s anal$sis o! the

nature o! modernit$, the !ruit o! his understanding o! the :ne ,reat Event in human histor$, is that e can "uild on the modern di!!erentl$ structured kinds o! institutions, practices, and sel!*conscious selvesones that are normativel$ superior "ecause the$ em"od$ a greater sel!*consciousness, a deeper understanding o! the kind o! "eing e are%

Hegel understands modernit$ in terms o! the rise o! sel!*conscious su"#ectivit$ o! the kind his philosophical predecessors had theorized a"out% His social theor$ o! sel!* consciousnesso! the intersu"#ective structure o! su"#ectivit$means that he understands the achievement o! that ne sort o! su"#ectivit$ as part o! a more ide* ranging process than the earlier modern philosophers had considered, one that necessaril$ encompasses also !undamental trans!ormations o! social practices and institutions% But his thought nonetheless sel!*consciousl$ develops the modern philosophical tradition stretching !rom Descartes to Kant% /t the core o! the distinctivel$ modern attitude to ard su"#ectivit$ to hich the$ gave e&plicit philosophical e&pression, Hegel sees a genuine insight% He takes it that modernit$ is the theoretical and practical ela"oration o!

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a better understanding o! some !undamental aspects o! the rational 3"ecause conceptuall$ articulated9 norm*governed activit$ in virtue o! hich e are the kind o! creatures e are% So the !irst "ig Buestion a"out the Spirit chapter o! the Phenomenology is ho should understand that crucial, orienting insight o! modernit$A Cuestion :neA Dhat e&actl$ is it that traditional !orms o! li!e got rong a"out us that modern !orms o! li!e get rightE Dhat have e gainedE Dhat is it that e have learned and incorporated into our practices and institutions that makes us modern selvesE Dhat is the Frise o! su"#ectivit$GE e

Hegel accepts Kant-s trope in FDhat (s EnlightenmentGA the transition to modernit$ is the passage o! humanit$ !rom the Fsel!*imposed tutelageG o! its childhood into the grappling ith responsi"ilit$ that is its adolescence% But he is concerned to envisage the maturit$ that lies "e$ond that adolescence% He generates these three stages conceptuall$ "$ construing them as di!!erent com"inations o! t o "asic elements% Dhile Hegel does think that the transition !rom traditional to modern culture as e&pressivel$ progressive that it essentiall$ involves the "ecoming e&plicit o! central !eatures o! ourselves and our practices and institutions that had previousl$ remained implicithe does not think that that progress as either complete or unallo$ed% Something crucial and important as also lost% His term !or hat traditional communities had that modern ones do not is +Sittlichkeit- 3!rom +Sitte-A mores, ethos9% 3Hiller translates +Sittlichkeit- as Fethical li!eG, "ut !or our purposes in this chapter it is "est le!t untranslated, to underline that it is a term o! art in su"stantial need o! interpretation%9 )he a"sence or opposite o! Sittlichkeit is alienation 3+Ent!remdung-9% Hegel is a romantic rationalist, ho aims to s$nthesize

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Enlightenment cheer*leading !or modernit$ and ;omantic critiBues o! it% /lienation is the master*concept articulating hat Hegel thinks is right a"out those critiBues% (t is "ecause the rise o! modern su"#ectivit$ can "e seen to have "een accompanied "$ alienation that the possi"ilit$ o! a !uture third stage in the progressive development o! Spiritan advance "e$ond the modern"ecomes visi"le% )hat notional third stage ould preserve the modern appreciation o! the signi!icance o! su"#ectivit$, hile re* achieving Sittlichkeit%

So the picture is like thisA Stage :neA Sittlichkeit, no modern su"#ectivit$I Stage ) oA /lienation, modern su"#ectivit$I Stage )hreeA Sittlichkeit 3in a ne !orm, compati"le ith su"#ectivit$9, modern su"#ectivit$ 3in a ne , sittlich !orm9% :r, alternativel$, like thisA No Subjectivity Subjectivity Sittlich eit Stage :ne Stage )hree !lienation J Stage ) o /s he is riting the Phenomenology, Hegel sees ,eist as "eginning to consolidate itsel! at Stage ) o% )he "ook is intended to make possi"le !or its readers the post*modern !orm o! sel!*consciousness Hegel calls +/"solute Kno ing-, and there"$ "egin to usher in Stage )hree% 3)he ne !orm o! e&plicit philosophical sel!*consciousness is onl$ the "eginning o! the process, since ne practices and institutions ill also "e reBuired to overcome the structural alienation o! modern li!e%9

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)hese schematic presentations a"out the developmental stages o! ,eist indicate that the !urther large Buestions a"out Spirit that must "e addressed areA Cuestion ) oA Dhat is pre*modern SittlichkeitE Cuestion )hreeA Dhat is modern alienationE Cuestion 2ourA Dh$ did the advent o! modern su"#ectivit$ "ring ith it alienationthat is, h$ did these t o structures arise togetherE )he +J- in the ta"le suggests another BuestionA Cuestion 2iveA Dhat is rong ith the idea o! pre-modern alienationE /nd !inall$A Cuestion Si&A Ho are e to understand Stage )hreeE Dh$ does the insight into su"#ectivit$ not entail alienationE Ho can hat as progressive a"out the transition to modernit$ "e preserved, hile re*achieving SittlichkeitE

Section II: Sittlich eit and !lienation

Dhat is SittlichkeitE ( have suggested that +alienated- #ust means +not sittlich-% (n contemporar$ usage, the term +alienation- is usuall$ applied to ps$chological attitudes o! individuals% )hough this usage derives !rom Hegel-s, it is e&tremel$ misleading to read it "ack into his vie % /ttitudes are indeed part o! hat is at issue !or him, "ut Sittlichkeit and 3so9 alienation are in the !irst instance metaph$sical structures o! normativit$ structures o! the hole, ,eist, that comprises communities and their practices and institutions, as ell as individuals and their attitudes% Sittlichkeit is a kind o! normativit$%

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/ttitudes are not all o! it, and the attitudes that matter are normative attitudes, rather than ps$chological ones%

)o "egin ith, e can think o! the normativit$ in Buestion in ver$ general terms o! proprieties or appropriatenesses, o! the +!ittingness- o! things, o! hat is or is done "eing right or proper, "eing as it ought to "e% )his is a notion o! normative status that is so !ar undi!!erentiated into ought*to*"e-s and ought*to*do-s, hich e sa in the previous chapter to "e distinguished and related in intricate and important a$s in Hegel-s theor$ o! action% Sittlichkeit is then a matter o! the bindingness 3+,Kltigkeit-, +Ler"indlichkeit-9 o! norms% )hat is, it concerns the nature o! their force or practical signi!icance% )he Hegelian image is that one is at home ith sittlich norms, one identifies with them% )he$ are the medium in hich one lives and moves and has one-s "eing% Mltimatel$, this is a matter o! them "eing a medium o! sel!*expressionunderstood as constitutive sel!* e&pression% )hat is the practice o! making e&plicit hat can then "e seen to have "een implicit that is the process o! su"#ectivit$5A sel!*formation "$ sel!*expression% )he overall aim o! this chapter is to !ill in the culminating details o! Hegel-s stor$ a"out that e&pressive process and the development o! our sel!*consciousness o! it% )he present task is to "egin to ork out the di!!erence "et een sittlich structures o! normativit$ and alienated onesA those in hich individuals are "ound "$ norms the$ are not in this sense at home ith, do not identi!$ ith, here, in the image to "e interpreted, hat "inds them does so as something e&ternal, alien, or other%

;ecall the discussion o! the relation "et een su"#ective processes and o"#ective relations under the heading o! +o"#ective idealism- in Chapter 2ive%

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Sittlichkeit is a matter o! the kind o! authority that norms have over normative attitudes% )he attitudes in Buestion are practical attitudesA taking or treating something as appropriate, !itting, or correct, as o"ligator$ or permittedthat is, as having some normative statusin individual, institutional, or communal practice% )he$ are practical attitudes to ard normative statusesA hat is rather than hat is ta en to be correct or appropriate, hat has authorit$ 3 hat one is responsi"le to9, as opposed to hat is merel$ treated as authoritative 3 hat one takes onesel! to "e responsi"le to9% (n this sense, Sittlichkeit is the authorit$ o! normative statuses over normative attitudes%

:ne important element o! the authorit$*structure that is Sittlichkeit is that sittlich norms are and are taken to "e actuall$ e!!icacious% )heir normative "indingness or authorit$ over attitudes is actuall$ and practicall$ ackno ledged% Dhat is appropriate according to a practice 3a normative status or norm9 makes a real di!!erence in hat is actuall$ done 3the attitudes and per!ormances o! practitioners9% Participants in a sittlich practice ac nowledge and act on their ackno ledgements o! proprieties, responsi"ilities, commitments, and authorit$%

But Sittlichkeit is not #ust a matter o! actuall$ doing hat one ought to doin !act con!orming to the norms% (t is a matter o! identifying with those norms% (n Chapter Si&, in the discussion o! Self-!onsciousness, the issue arose o! hat identi!$ing ith one, rather than another, aspect o! one-s sel!*conception consists in% )he ans er given there on Hegel-s "ehal! as that identi!ication ith something is illingness to ris and sacrifice !or it% So in the allegor$ o! the advent o! Spirit, the Haster identi!ies ith his

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independence, the authorit$ he claims, rather than ith his animal desires, "$ "eing illing to risk 3and i! need "e, sacri!ice9 his "iological li!e rather than relinBuish his claim or ackno ledge the authorit$ o! anotherthat is, "$ "eing illing to die !or normative recognition, !or ackno ledgement o! his attitudes as authoritative% )hat practical identi!ication, through risk and sacri!ice, ith one element o! hat he is !or himsel! at once e&presses and constitutes the Haster as in himsel! a geistig, normative "eing, and not #ust a desiring, natural one%

De sa in Chapters 2ive and Seven that this same e&pressive*constitutive process o! identi!ication "$ risk and sacri!icein this case o! some cognitive and practical commitments !or the sake o! other, incompati"le onesis the process o! determination at once o! conceptual contents and o! the individual selves that deplo$ them in #udgment and action% (t is the process in terms o! hich e must ultimatel$ understand the determinateness, in Hegel-s distinctive sense, "oth o! conceptual contents and o! individual kno ing and acting 3that is, concept*using9 su"#ects% Later in this chapter e ill "e much concerned, as e ere in the previous chapter, ith the !ine structure o! the perspectival relations "et een making 3constituting something ne 9 and !inding 3e&pressing something alread$ there9, "et een our authorit$ over senses 3phenomena9 and our responsi"ilit$ to re!erents 3noumena9, hich are induced "$ these developmental processes o! identit$*!ormation through identi!ication% ( have "een using +o"#ective idealism- as a tag !or the claim that there is a reciprocal sense*dependence relation "et een the concepts that articulate our grasp o! the o"#ective orld 3o"#ect, propert$, !act, la , incompati"ilit$o"#ective9 on the one hand, and the concepts that articulate our grasp

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o! the practices o! kno ing and acting su"#ects 3singular term, predicate, asserting, in!erring, incompati"ilit$su"#ective9 on the other% )hat o"#ective idealist claim is under ritten "$ an account o! hat it is a"out our discursive practice 3the application and manipulation o! concepts, c!% senses, phenomena9 that makes that activit$ intelligi"le as representing a orld o! o"#ective 3attitude*independent9 o"#ects, properties, !acts, and la s 3c!% re!erents, noumena9% )he ke$ to that account is that a su"#ect treats the orld as articulated "$ o"#ective incompati"ilities 3in terms o! hich e can understand the concepts o"#ect, propert$, !act, and la 9 "$ ackno ledging in practice an o"ligation to relinBuish, revise, or other ise repair its commitments hen the$ are, "$ its o n lights, mutuall$ incompati"le% )hat is, it is precisel$ the process o! identi!$ing ith some commitments "$ sacri!icing others that is ackno ledging the authorit$ o! hat one in that normative semantic sense there"$ counts as thinking or talking about% /t "ase, taking t o commitments to "e incompati"le in the normative sense that commitment to one precludes entitlement to the other, hence as reBuiring one to identify ith 3endorse, ackno ledge9 at most one o! them is hat taking it that those commitments 3 hether do&astic or practical9 ans er !or their correctness to o"#ects that cannot 3o"#ectivel$9 have incompati"le properties consists in%

Sittlichkeit reBuires that practitioners identi!$ ith the norms that govern their practices% Hegelian identi!ication ith, e have said, is risk and sacri!ice !or% Sittlich identi!ication is accordingl$ illingness to risk and sacri!ice !or the norms, !or hat is reall$ !itting, appropriate, or correct, ith hat one is in !act o"liged or committed to do% Dhat is it that is risked and sacri!iced !or the normsE (t is the particular, contingent, su"#ective

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attitudes o! practitioners% Sittlichkeit reBuires a particular kind o! ackno ledgment o! the authorit$ o! the norms over the normative attitudes o! practitionersA the illingness to sacri!ice 3and take it that others ought to sacri!ice9 attitudes and inclinations that are out o! step ith the norms% )hat is identi!$ing ith the norms%

(t is identi!$ing ith the norms, rather than one-s o n particular su"#ective attitudes hat one eternall$ risks and occasionall$ sacri!ices for the norms% )he participants in sittlich practices accordingl$ identi!$ ith something larger and more encompassing than #ust their o n individual attitudes% )he$ identi!$ ith the norms implicit in the practices the$ share%

)he process o! identi!$ing ith some attitudes at the e&pense o! other attitudes is not restricted to sittlich ,eist% (t necessaril$ characterizes all concept use% 2or the ad#udication o! the claims o! competing, "ecause incompati"le, commitments is the process "$ hich determinate conceptual contents are "oth applied and instituted% But at the metalevel, that process can sho up practicall$ in t o di!!erent !orms% (t can "e a matter o! the ackno ledgment o! the authorit$ o! norms hat reall$ !ollo s !rom and is incompati"le ith hat, hat one is actuall$ o"liged or committed to doover attitudes% :r it can "e a matter merely o! the collision o! attitudes, here the norms the attitudes are attitudes towards are demoted to something like adver"ial modi!ications o! the attitudes% )he !ormer is a sittlich, the latter an alienated structure% :nl$ attitudes, not genuine norms, are visi"le in alienated ,eist%

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:! course this ver$ general characterization provides onl$ a gesture indicating here the di!!erence "et een these a$s o! practicall$ construing normativit$ lies% (t lies in the relations "et een the force and the content o! conceptual norms% )o see hat this di!!erence amounts to reBuires looking more closel$ at hat Hegel sa$s a"out premodern Sittlichkeit and modern alienation%

Section III: Stage "ne: Immediate Sittlich eit

Hegel-s term !or the normative structure o! pre*modern Spirit is Fimmediate 0unmittle"are1 SittlichkeitG% (n keeping ith hat e-ve seen is a general procedure in the Phenomenology, his treatment o! the topic is allegorical% )his time"$ contrast !or instance, to his discussion o! the death*struggle !or master$ in Self-!onsciousnesshe e&plicitl$ reads the allegor$ !or us himsel!% )he allegor$ is the version o! ancient ,reek societ$ portra$ed in Sophocles- Antigone% /t the end o! his discussion, Hegel sums up the overall point o! the allegor$ this a$A )his ruin o! the ethical 0sittlichen1 Su"stance and its passage into another !orm is thus determined "$ the !act that the ethical consciousness is directed on to the la in a a$ that is essentiall$ immediate% )his determination o! immediac$ means that <ature as such enters into the ethical act, the realit$ o! hich simpl$ reveals the contradiction and the germ o! destruction inherent in the "eauti!ul harmon$ and tranBuil eBuili"rium o! the ethical Spirit itsel!% 0P, =>71

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)he +ruin- is the "reakup o! a pre*modern structure o! normativit$ 3+la -9% (t is the mani!estation o! the insta"ilit$ o! practices that identi!$ the normative ith the natural% )he practical vie in Buestion is one that looks !or norms in the a$ things simpl$ are, independentl$ o! an$ human activit$% )he !ittingnesses o! thingsho things ought to "e and hat one ought to doare thought o! as o"#ective, natural !acts% )his is the constitutive misunderstanding o! the normative characteristic o! immediate Sittlichkeit% )he norms ith hich practitioners identi!$ are thought o! as "rutel$ given !acts a"out ho things are% FDhat o"servation kne as a given o"#ect in hich the sel! had no part, is here a given custom 0Sitte1%G 0P, =7'1 )he mediation that is denied "$ this practical conception o! norms as immediate is mediation "$ the attitudes o! those ho are "ound "$ them%

)alking a"out this sensi"ilit$ else here in the "ook, Hegel sa$s o! the la s that the$ appear to immediate Sittlichkeit asA unalienated spirits transparent to themselves, stainless celestial !igures that preserve in all their di!!erences the unde!iled innocence and harmon$ o! their essential nature% )he relationship o! sel!*consciousness to them is eBuall$ simple and clear% )he$ are, and nothing moreI this is hat constitutes the a areness o! its relationship to them% )hus, SophoclesO /ntigone ackno ledges them as the un ritten and in!alli"le la o! the gods% )he$ are not o! $esterda$ or toda$, "ut everlasting, )hough here the$ came !rom, none o! us can tell%

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)he$ are% (! ( inBuire a!ter their origin and con!ine them to the point hence the$ arose, then ( have transcended themI !or no it is ( ho am the universal, and the$ are the conditioned and limited% (! the$ are supposed to "e validated "$ m$ insight, then ( have alread$ denied their unshakea"le, intrinsic "eing, and regard them as something hich, !or me, is perhaps true, "ut also is perhaps not true% Ethical disposition consists #ust in sticking stead!astl$ to hat is right, and a"staining !rom all attempts to move or shake it, or derive it% 0P, =5>1= Sittlich consciousness- relation to the norms is one o! passive ackno ledgment o! their "indingnessA o"edience, and shame and guilt !or diso"edience 3attri"uted and ackno ledged, respectivel$9% )his su"#ection o! su"#ective attitudes to o"#ective norms is sacri!ice o! hat is particular to hat is universal, hence identi!ication ith that universal% )his is FPimmediatePethical consciousness hich kno s its dut$ and does it, and is "ound up ith it as its o n nature%G0P, 6?>1

Dhat is rong ith the distinctivel$ pre*modern metaph$sics o! normativit$, hich treats norms as a kind o! !act, hose authority 3rational authorit$, in the sense o! settling hat has the !orce o! a reason9 is immediate" in deriving !rom their simple existence, independentl$ o! human practices, attitudes, ackno ledgment, or interpretationE Dhat is Fthe contradiction and the germ o! destruction inherent in the "eauti!ul harmon$ and
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)he /ntigone passage is !rom lines =6=*6>, hich Eliza"eth D$co!! 0re!%1 renders asA the godsO un ritten and un!ailing la s% <ot no , nor $esterda$Os, the$ al a$s live, and no one kno s their origin in time%%% Hegel mentions this passage again in the Philosophy of Right 04'==H1 in the third paragraph o! his introduction to SittlichkeitA F/ntigone proclaims that no*one kno s here the la s come !romA the$ are eternal% )hat is, their determination has "eing in and !or itsel! and issues !rom the nature o! the thing 0Sache1%G

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tranBuil eBuili"rium o! the ethical Spirit itsel!GE )he ans er is clearest i! e think a"out hat Hegel takes to "e the correct metaph$sics o! normativit$% :n the side o! the force o! norms, normative "indingness or validit$ is intelligi"le onl$ in the conte&t o! a recognitive communit$, in hich the attitudes o! recognizing and "eing recognized, claiming authorit$ and undertaking responsi"ilit$ onesel! and attri"uting those statuses to others, pla$ an essential role% :n the side o! content, norms are intelligi"le as determinatel$ content!ul onl$ in virtue o! their "eing caught up in practices o! ad#udicating the competing claims o! materiall$ incompatible commitments and entitlements% B$ den$ing these "asic !eatures o! its o n implicit norms, immediate Sittlichkeit condemns itsel! to practical sel!*contradiction%

)o "egin ith, the F"eauti!ul harmon$ and tranBuil eBuili"rium o! the ethical SpiritG is a recognitive achievement% (t is a re!lection o! a communit$the polisinstituted, maintained, and structured "$ mutual, reciprocal recognition%6 3:! course, there are also as$mmetric recognitive relations in pla$, literall$ "et een masters and slaves, "ut the$ are orthogonal to the ones that matter !or the allegorical point Hegel is a!ter in this discussion%9 )hat recognitive structure involves t o normative poles o! potentiall$ competing authorit$A the universal, or recognitive communit$, and the particulars hose recognitive attitudes institute it% (ndividuals, that is, particulars as !alling under the universal, as mem"ers o! the recognitive communit$, "oth e&ercise authorit$ and ackno ledge the authorit$ o! others, "oth undertake and attri"ute responsi"ilities%
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Does Hegel think that all pre*modern societies are characterized "$ reciprocal recognitionE <ot at all as his remarks else here a"out traditional (ndian and Chinese societies sho % )hus at the end o! the Philosophy of Right he puts F:riental orld*historical realmG, hich Foriginates in the natural hole o! patriarchal societ$G as a stage more primitive than the epoch epitomized "$ the ,reeks% But he does seem to think that the sort o! incompati"le norms hose practical o"trusiveness triggers the transition to modernit$ arise onl$ in this sort o! recognitive conte&t%

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Practicall$ o"#ecti!$ing normative proprieties as natural properties presupposes a pre* esta"lished Fharmon$ and eBuili"riumG among them, since an$ con!licts there ere among them ould "e irresolva"le "$ individuals% But !ormal reciprocit$ o! recognition does not guarantee and cannot establish such a s$stem o! norms% 2or the determinate content!ulness o! conceptual 3reason*articulating9 norms depends on incorporating matter*o!*!actual contingenc$ in the !orm o! normative necessit$A ackno ledging the authorit$ o! particulars over universals, as ell as the converse% 2riction, individuals !inding themselves su"#ect to the competing demands o! materiall$ incompati"le norms, is "oth the price o! determinateness o! normative content, and an inevita"le conseBuence o! Fthe distinction that action 3and consciousness9 involve%G

De-ve seen that the distinctions that action and consciousness involve re!lect the di!!erence o! social perspective "et een the particular and universal poles o! authorit$ to hich individuals in recognitive communities o e allegiance% (n the polis Hegel descri"es, the reciprocall$ recognizing particulars ho institute the communit$ are not individual humans, "ut families% )he polis and the !amil$ are accordingl$ the t o normative centers !rom hich potentiall$ con!licting demands can issue, addressed to the sel!*conscious individual agents ho must actualize the norms "$ appl$ing them in particular, contingent circumstances% )he !amil$ is in one sense a natural, hence immediate, "iological unit, held together "$ "onds o! se&ual desire and reproduction%7 But as a normative locus, it, too, is a recognitive communit$ 3al"eit one ith as$mmetric relations, at least "et een parents and children, and traditionall$, also "et een the hus"and and i!e9%
7

F/ natural ethical communit$this is the 2amil$G 0P, =681%

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Ho ever, although the 2amil$ is immediatel$ determined as an ethical "eing, it is ithin itsel! an ethical entit$ onl$ so !ar as it is not the natural relationship o! its mem"ersPthis natural relationship is #ust as much a spiritual one, and it is onl$ as a spiritual entit$ that it is ethicalP0)1he ethical principle must "e placed in the relation o! the individual mem"er o! the 2amil$ to the hole 2amil$ as the Su"stanceP0P, =6.1 Sophocles- Antigone is the per!ect allegor$ !or Hegel to use to e&hi"it Fthe little ri!t ithin the lute@ )hat "$e and "$e shall make the music mute@ /nd, ever* idening, slo l$ silence all,G in pre*modern 3immediate9 Sittlichkeit, "ecause its con!lict turns on the collision o! the recognitive demands o! !amil$ and polis% )he dispute is over the recognitive status o! an individual ho "elongs to "oth communities, ho has rights and o es duties to "oth normative institutions%

(n the allegor$, the concrete, practical "earer o! recognitive signi!icancethe practical attitude constitutive o! communit$ mem"ershipis the act o! burial% (t is a paradigm o! ho the acts and attitudes o! individuals do matter !or normative statuses, hich must go "e$ond hat is merel$ !ound in nature% 2or this sort o! recognitive per!ormance gives a normative signi!icance to a natural occurrence% )he normative status is conferred, not #ust found% )he signi!icance o! "urial is to turn something that other ise merel$ happens into something done% DeathP is a state hich has "een reached immediatel$, in the course o! <ature, not the result o! an action consciousl$ done% )he dut$ o! the mem"er o! a 2amil$ is on that account to add this aspect, in order that the

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individualOs ultimate "eing, too, shall not "elong solel$ to <ature and remain something irrational, "ut shall "e something done, and the right o! consciousness "e asserted in it% 0P, =6.1 Burial constitutivel$ recognizes someone as not merel$ a dead animal, "ut as a mem"er o! the communit$a mem"er ith a particular statusA a dead mem"er o! the communit$, an honored ancestor% FEven the departed spirit is present in his "lood*relationship, in the sel! o! the !amil$%G 0P, =N71 )he !amil$ Finterrupts the ork o! <atureG, it keeps a a$ !rom the dead this dishonouring o! him "$ unconscious appetites and a"stract entities, and puts its o n action in their place%%%)he 2amil$ there"$ makes him a mem"er o! a communit$ hich prevails over and holds under control the !orces o! particular material elements and the lo er !orms o! li!e, hich sought to unloose themselves against him and to destro$ him% 0P, =6.1 Burial Fmakes him a mem"er o! a communit$GI it is recognition%

(t is this recognitive deed that is at issue "et een Creon and /ntigone% )he la s o! the polis demand that her "rother not "e ackno ledged as an$thing more than a dead animal, and the la s o! the !amil$ demand that ackno ledgment, that recognition% )he normative institutions actualizing the t o recognitive moments o! the communit$ 3universal and particular9 clash over the propriet$ o! adopting a recognitive attitude, o! per!orming a recognitive deed% Because it is individuals ho must act, these con!licting demands !all on individuals representing the t o institutional recognitive moments% Because the norms in Buestion are immediatel$ sittlich, the t o !igures identi!$

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themselves ith 3sacri!ice !or9 one set o! those normsone issuing in a demand not to recognize "$ "urial, the other in a demand !or such normative constitution% )he immediac$ o! the sittlich norms means that this con!lict cannot "e avoided, ad#udicated, or resolved% Because, on the one hand, the ethical order essentiall$ consists in this immediate !irmness o! decision, and !or that reason there is !or consciousness essentiall$ onl$ one la , hile, on the other hand, the ethical po ers are real and e!!ective in the sel! o! consciousness, these po ers acBuire the signi!icance o! e&cluding and opposing one anotherP% )he ethical consciousness, "ecause it is decisivel$ !or one o! the t o po ers, is essentiall$ characterI it does not accept that "oth have the same essential nature% 2or this reason, the opposition "et een them appears as an un!ortunate collision o! dut$ merel$ ith a realit$ hich possesses no rights o! its o nP% Since it sees right onl$ on one side and rong on the other, that consciousness hich "elongs to the divine la sees in the other side onl$ the violence o! human caprice, hile that hich holds to human la sees in the other onl$ the sel!* ill and diso"edience o! the individual ho insists on "eing his o n authorit$% 0P, =771 <either o! the sittlich charactersavatars decisivel$ identi!$ing ith and acting !or one institutional aspect o! the normative communit$>is su"#ect to con!licting demands% But the audience sees the structural con!lict o! incompati"le la s% /nd e see that the contradiction or collision "et een the !amil$ and the polis stands !or a collision "et een

>

F0!1haracter#that ethical consciousnessP hich, on account o! its immediac$, is a speci!icall$ determined Spirit, "elongs onl$ to one o! the ethical essentialitiesPG 0P, 6?>1%

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the authorit$ o! the recognizing parties 3particulars9 and the recognitive communit$ 3universal9, respectivel$% )hese are not merel$ contingent normative institutions, "ut necessar$ and essential structural dimensions o! the recognitive conte&t in hich an$ norms can "e discerned%

/ntigone and Creon identi!$ ith and speak !or di!!erent aspects o! the recognitive communit$% <either distinguishes "et een the attitudes the$ evince and e&press and the norms the$ identi!$ ith% <either takes her@himsel! to "e settling hat is right% Each is onl$ practicall$ ac nowledging hat is o"#ectivel$ right, independentl$ o! those attitudes% )he other-s stu""orn re!usal to ackno ledge hat is o"#ectivel$ right cannot "e seen "$ them as a normative attitude at all% )he other-s attitude sho s up rather as the e&pression o! merel$ su"#ective, contingent particularit$% )he intransigence o! the dispute is thus a conseBuence o! the immediacy o! the sittlich practical attitudesA treating norms as o"#ective matters o! !act, hose normative !orce o es nothing to the attitudes o! those ho are "$ their nature "ound "$ those norms%

)he immediac$ that is the !atal structural !la in pre*modern Sittlichkeit is a running together o! the normative and the natural% :n the one hand, this means that normative proprieties are treated as natural propertiesA as simpl$ there, part o! the !urniture o! the orld, independentl$ o! the human practices the$ govern% :n the other hand, it means that merel$ natural properties are treated as having intrinsic normative signi!icance% )he paradigm to hich Hegel appeals to make this point is the a$ natural di!!erences o! "iological gender are taken o"#ectivel$ to determine !undamental normative roles%

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Speci!icall$, hich recognitive aspect o! the communit$ one decisivel$ is identi!ied ith, and hence hat sittlich character one is 3not +has-9 is taken to "e settled "$ nature% Domen are the agents o! the private !amil$, men o! the pu"lic political communit$% 0)1he t o se&es overcome their 0merel$1 natural "eing and appear in their ethical signi!icance, as diverse "eings ho share "et een them the t o distinctions "elonging to the ethical su"stance% )hese t o universal "eings o! the ethical orld have, there!ore, their speci!ic individualit$ in naturall$ distinct sel!*consciousnesses, "ecause the ethical Spirit is the immediate unit$ o! the su"stance ith sel!*consciousnessan immediac$ hich appears, there!ore, "oth !rom the side o! realit$ and o! di!!erence, as the e&istence o! a natural di!!erence%P(t is no the speci!ic antithesis o! the t o se&es hose natural e&istence acBuires at the same time the signi!icance o! their ethical determination% 0=6?1 )he pro"lem is not that natural distinctions are given or taken to have normative signi!icances, "ut that the$ are understood as alread$ having those signi!icances independentl$ o! the practices or attitudes o! those !or hom the$ are normativel$ signi!icant% F<ature, not the accident o! circumstances or choice, assigns one se& to one la , the other to the other la G% 0P, =761 )hese de!ining normative roles are accordingl$ not practicall$ conceived as roles individuals can pla$, "ut simpl$ as !acts a"out them% )his is !etishizing the naturalA seeing normative phenomena as merel$ natural ones%

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)here is accordingl$ a structural con!lict "uilt into Fthe "eauti!ul harmon$ and tranBuil eBuili"riumG o! immediatel$ Sittlich Spirit% Commitment to di!!erent +la s- is understood as given as part o! the nature o! individuals, assigned "$ "iological gender% Human la in its universal e&istence is the communit$, in its activit$ in general is the manhood o! the communit$, in its real and e!!ective activit$ is the government% (t is, moves, and maintains itsel! "$ consuming and a"sor"ing into itsel!Pthe separation into independent !amilies presided over "$ omankind%%% But the 2amil$ is, at the same time, in general its element, the individual consciousness the "asis o! its general activit$% Since the communit$ onl$ gets an e&istence through its inter!erence ith the happiness o! the 2amil$, and "$ dissolving 0individual1 sel!* consciousness into the universal, it creates !or itsel! in hat it suppresses and hat is at the same time essential to it an internal enem$ omankind in general% Domankindthe everlasting iron$ 0in the li!e1 o! the communit$P0P, =>61 Hegel thinks that traditional societ$ is distinguished "$ a one*sided o"#ectivism a"out normsA taking it that natural distinctions immediatel$ and intrinsicall$ have normative signi!icances% )he decisive move to modernit$ ill "e ackno ledging the signi!icance o! normative attitudes and practices in instituting norms and normative statuses% 3)he need to pass on "e$ond the modern arises "ecause the initial !orm this insight takes is a one* sided su"#ectivism a"out norms%9 )he paradigm e&ample he chooses to e&empli!$ this claim a"out traditional misunderstandings o! the signi!icance o! natural properties !or normative proprieties is gender essentialism% (n emphasizing that the core o! modernit$

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consists in a re#ection and overcoming o! the most "asic presuppositions o! this constellation o! practical attitudes, Hegel deserves a place in the !eminist pantheon%

)he most "asic structural con!lict that Hegel-s allegorical reading o! Antigone uncovers, ho ever, is not that "et een its protagonists, or hat the$ representnot "et een t o la s, "et een polis and !amil$, nor "et een men and omen% )hat is a real con!lict% But the more !undamental clash is at a higher levelA "et een the immediacy o! the construal o! norms and the constitutive character o! the recognition that is at issue "et een the t o sides% (t is "et een the implicit understanding o! normativit$ as immediateas holl$ natural and o"#ective, independent o! human practices and attitudeson the one hand, and an eBuall$ implicit grasp o! the signi!icance o! actual recognitive attitudes, per!ormances, and practices !or the institution o! normative statuses, on the other% (n the allegor$, hat Creon and /ntigone are !ighting a"out is o!!iciall$ understood "$ "oth to "e a matter o! o"#ective !act, o! ho it is right and proper to treat the dead Pol$neices, something that it is up to the various parties simpl$ to ac nowledge% But the stakes are so highidenti!ication ith the recognitive la o! the !amil$ up to the point o! sacri!icing "iological li!e, !or /ntigone"ecause "oth sides implicitl$ ackno ledge that recognition*"$*"urial confers the normative status in Buestion% (! Pol$neices remains un"uried, he ill be nothing "ut a dead animal, hereas "ur$ing him, even in secret, Fma es him a mem"er o! the communit$,G as Hegel sa$s in the passage Buoted a"ove% )he rong hich can "e in!licted on an individual in the ethical realm is simpl$ this, that something merel$ happens to himPthe consciousness o!

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0those ho share1 the "lood o! the individual repair this rong in such a a$ that hat has simpl$ happened "ecomes rather a ork deli"eratel$ doneP0P, =7.1 (n recognition through "urial, the !amil$ su"stitutes its action !or the merel$ natural occurrence, gives it a normative signi!icance, ta es responsi"ilit$ !or it, exercises its recognitive authorit$% (t there"$ gives contingenc$ the !orm o! necessit$that is, a normative !orm% )hat constitutive recognitive recognitive act is not intelligi"le as the immediate ackno ledgment o! ho things alread$ o"#ectivel$ are%

)he polis and the !amil$ are recognitive communities% Sittlich su"stance 3Spirit9 is s$nthesized "$ reciprocal recognition% Haking e&plicit the commitments that are implicit in sittlich practices reBuires giving up the practical understanding o! Sittlichkeit as immediate% :ne cannot properl$ understand normative statuses such as commitment, responsi"ilit$, authorit$, and correctness apart !rom their relation to normative attitudesA recognizing others "$ ta ing or treating them as committed, responsi"le, authoritative, as acting correctl$ or incorrectl$% )hat practical realization is the motor o! modernit$% 0S1el!*consciousnessPlearns through its o n act the contradiction o! those po ers into hich the su"stance divided itsel! and their mutual do n!all, as ell as the contradiction "et een its kno ledge o! the ethical character o! its action, and hat is in its o n proper nature ethical, and thus !inds its o n do n!all% (n point o! !act, ho ever, the ethical su"stance has developed through this process into actual sel!* consciousnessI in other ords, this particular sel! has "ecome the actualit$

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o! hat it is in essenceI "ut precisel$ in this development the ethical order has "een destro$ed% 0P, ==61 Hegel is here talking a"out an e&pressivel$ progressive trans!ormation o! SpiritA one that reveals something that as all along implicitl$ true% )he claim is not that this trans!ormation as inevita"le% (t is +necessar$- onl$ in the sense that it is necessar$ if hat e are implicitl$ is to "ecome e&plicit to us% /nd the trans!ormation need not "e total% Some individuals and institutions ma$ retain traditional practical conceptions o! sel!, agenc$, and communit$, even hile others take modern !orm% /ll o! that is compati"le ith a decisive cognitive and practical "reakthrough having "een made%

Section I#: The $ise of Subjectivity

(n taking the advent o! modernit$ as an e&plicit topic, Hegel inaugurated a discussion that ould shape the hole o! nineteenth centur$ thought, de!ining the !ounding issue o! hat as to "ecome the ne discipline o! sociolog$, providing !ocal ideas that ould "e developed in the ork o! such !igures as Har&, Durkheim, )onnies, and De"er% )he slogan !or his construal o! that transition that Hegel o!!ers in the passage #ust Buoted is Fthe development o! ethical su"stance into actual sel!*consciousness%G Hegel understands modernit$ to "egin ith in terms o! the rise o! a ne kind o! individual, su"#ective sel!* consciousness% B$ contrast to the modern su"#ect, 0in the1 ethical realmPsel!*consciousness has not $et received its due as a particular individualit$% )here it has the value, on the one hand, merel$ o!

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the universal ill, and on the other, o! consanguinit$% )his particular individual counts onl$ as a shado $ unrealit$% 0P, =7=1 (n a sense, individual agents are dissolved into the social institutions to hich the$ are understood to "e assigned "$ nature, and ith hich the$ decisivel$ identi!$% )he individual person is a mere re!lection o! his status, and can understand himsel! as an agent onl$ in terms o! the dut$ o! actualizing those implicit, o"#ective norms%N )he modern conception o! an individual person as one ho pla$s man$ roles and must make choices to ad#udicate the man$ con!licts among them is not $et on the horizon% )he ethical Su"stancePpreserved 0its simple unitar$1 consciousness in an immediate unit$ ith its essence% Essence has, there!ore, the simple determinateness o! mere "eing !or consciousness, hich is directed immediately upon it, and is the essence in the !orm o! custom 0Sitte1% Consciousness neither thinks o! itsel! as this particular exclusive self, nor has su"stance the signi!icance o! an e&istence e&cluded !rom it, ith hich it ould have to "ecome united onl$ "$ alienating itsel! !rom itsel! and at the same time producing the su"stance itsel!% 0P, =N=1 +Essence- 0Desen1 here means the norms implicit in the customar$ practices o! the traditional communit$ 3+su"stance-9%

:ne point o! contrast ith the sel!*understanding o! modern individual su"#ects is that immediatel$ sittlich ones do not take themselves to "e producing those institutions and their norms 3+su"stance- and +essence-9 "$ their o n activities%
N

2% H% Bradle$ summed up this vie in the title o! his "ook My Station and Its $uties%

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Spiritual su"stance is Fthe in*itsel! o! ever$ sel!*consciousness%G So it is hat is found as al a$s alread$ there, as Fthe unmoved solid ground and starting point !or the action o! all%G But a crucial part o! the !ounding insight o! modernit$ is that it is also made "$ the individual sel!*consciousnesses that are the !orm o! Spirit as it is for itsel!A )his su"stance is eBuall$ the universal wor produced "$ the action o! all and each as their unit$ and identit$, !or it is the being-for-self, sel!, action% 0P, =5?1 (ndividuals in traditional societ$ understand themselves as made "$ the norms the$ identi!$ ith "$ practicall$ ackno ledging the authorit$ o! those norms over particular attitudes and inclinations% But the$ treat the norms as !ound, rather than made% )he$ do not see themselves as having an$ corresponding authorit$ over the norms, hich are treated #ust as part o! the o"#ectivel$ given !urniture o! the orld% )he$ do not appreciate the contri"ution their o n activit$ makes to instituting those norms% )hat appreciationseeing Fthe trail o! the human serpent over allG, in Dilliam Qames-s phraseis distinctivel$ modern%

/genc$ is hat individuates, carving up the social su"stance% /nd it is in the practical conception o! individual agenc$ that e are to !ind the ke$ to this historic sea*change in the relations "et een acting su"#ects, the norms that li!t them a"ove the merel$ natural, and the practices and institutions in hich those norms are implicit% (n the traditional orld as so !ar considered

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/s $et, no deed has "een committedI "ut the deed is the actual sel!% (t distur"s the peace!ul organization and movement o! the ethical orldP% (t "ecomes the negative movement, or the eternal necessit$, o! a dread!ul !ate hich engul!s in the a"$ss o! its single nature divine and human la alike, as ell as the t o sel!*consciousnesses in hich these po ers have their e&istenceand !or us passes over into the a"solute "eing*!or*sel! o! the purel$ individual sel!*consciousness% :! course, pre*modern individuals per!ormed intentional actions and pursued private ends% Dhat is the di!!erence in their relations to their doings that Hegel is re!erring to in these apocal$ptic termsE

(t is a shi!t in the practical conception o! the Fdistinction that action involvesGthe distinction "et een hat is in the "road sense done "$ the agent and hat is more narro l$ intended% )his is the distinction "et een )at 3deed9 and Handlung, and "et een /"sicht and Lorsatz% De have seen that Hegel understands the pre*modern sel! as an e&pansive sel!, in that agents are characters, immediatel$ identi!$ing ith the recognitive communities to hich nature has assigned them, sacri!icing their particular attitudes and inclinations !or the norms implicit in their practices and institutions% FEthical consciousnessPis the simple, pure direction o! activit$ to ards the essentialit$ o! ethical li!e, i%e% dut$%G 0P, =761 But the traditional sel! is construed as an e&pansive sel! along another dimension as ell% )he pre*modern practical conception o! agenc$ is heroic, in that agents identi!$ ith hat the$ have done in the "roader sense, not the narro er ith the )at, rather than #ust the Handlung% )he$ ackno ledge responsi"ilit$

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!or hat the$ have done under all the descriptions that turn out to "e true o! it, not #ust the ones the$ intended or envisaged%

)hus :edipus is a parricideI he has committed that crime, even though he did not kno that the man he killed in anger as his !ather% He takes responsi"ilit$ !or that deed, and others attri"ute to him responsi"ilit$ !or it% )hat he did not intend the deed under this description, and did not kno that that is hat he as doing, in no a$ mitigates his guilt% He is responsi"le !or the deed under all its speci!ications, the conseBuential as ell as the intentional% ,uilt is not an indi!!erent, am"iguous a!!air, as i! the deed as actuall$ seen in the light o! da$ could, or perhaps could not, "e the action o! the sel!, as i! ith the doing o! it there could "e linked something e&ternal and accidental that did not "elong to it, !rom hich aspect, there!ore, the action ould "e innocent% 0P, =7N1 )hat hat the agent does hat he is responsi"le !oroutruns hat he intends or can kno is hat makes this heroic conception o! agenc$ also tragic% )raged$ is #ust the a$ the distinction that action involves appears in the conte&t o! the heroic acceptance o! responsi"ilit$ !or the hole deed% Ethical sel!*consciousness no learns !rom its deed the developed nature o! hat it actually did%%%)he resolve 0EntschluR1, ho ever, is in itself the negative aspect hich con!ronts the resolve ith an OotherO, something alien to the resolve hich kno s hat it does% /ctualit$ there!ore holds concealed ithin it the other aspect hich is alien to this kno ledge, and

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does not reveal the hole truth a"out itsel! to consciousnessA the son does not recognize his !ather in the man ho has ronged him and hom he sla$s, nor his mother in the Bueen hom he makes his i!e% (n this a$, a po er hich shuns the light o! da$ ensnares the ethical consciousness, a po er hich "reaks !orth onl$ a!ter the deed is done, and seizes the doer in the act% 2or the accomplished deed is the removal o! the antithesis "et een the kno ing sel! and the actualit$ con!ronting it%%%% 0P, =7?1 3Since the resolve Fkno s hat it doesG, it can "e identi!ied ith the Lorsatz%9 )he tragic aspect o! the heroic conception #ust is that one cannot kno have the po er to avoid crime and guilt, can kno hat one is doing, does not

hat one has made onesel!

responsi"le !or onl$ a!ter the !act% (n acting, one is e&posing onesel! to the !orces o! !ate 0Schicksal1, over hich the su"#ect has no authorit$% FB$ the deed, there!ore, it "ecomes guilt%G 0P, =7N1

(mmediate Sittlichkeit has sho n up under t o aspects% (t involves individuals identi!$ing ith the norms implicit in the practices and institutions o! a recognitive communit$, in the sense o! "eing illing to risk and sacri!ice their particular, contingent attitudes and inclinations to the dictates o! those norms% )his is hat Hegel calls +character-% (mmediate Sittlichkeit also involves the heroic conception o! agenc$% (ndividuals take responsi"ilit$ !or their deeds under ever$ descriptionA the un!oreseen conseBuential ones as ell as the ackno ledged intentional ones% Dhat is the connection "et een these t o aspects o! traditional ,eistE )he !irst concerns norms in the !orm o! ought*to*"esI the second norms in the !orm o! ought*to*dos% /nd it is o! the essence o!

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this !orm o! li!e that the connection "et een them is practicall$ construed as "eing immediate% )hat is, hat one ought to do is understood as settled directl$ "$ ho things ought to be% (t is one-s sittlich o"ligation to do hat must be% )hat duty is independent o! one-s kno ledge o! ho to "ring a"out that state o! a!!airs% )hat one does not kno ho to "ring it a"out that one does not kill one-s !ather does not let one o!! the hook% Parricide ought not to "e% (t is accordingl$ one-s o"ligation not to do an$thing correctl$ descri"a"le as !ather*killing% )he eruption o! modernit$ "egins hen a gap emerges "et een these hen ho things ought to "e is not simpl$, directl$, and immediatel$ translata"le into hat one ought to do% )he edge that opens that gap is conditioning the connection on the attitudes o! the su"#ecton hat the agent kno s and intends%

)he essence o! the modern is contained in hat Hegel in the Philosophy of Right calls Fthe rights o! intention and kno ledge%G )his is the right to have one-s responsi"ilit$ apportioned to one-s authorit$to "e held responsi"le onl$ !or hat one does intentionally and nowingly, onl$ !or that part o! the )at that is the Handlung% )his right is the right o! the individual consciousness% (t al a$s implicitl$ collided ith the sittlich structure o! normsA (ts a"solute right is, there!ore, that hen it acts in accordance ith ethical la , it shall !ind in this actualization nothing else "ut the !ul!illment o! this la itsel!, and the deed shall mani!est onl$ ethical action%%% )he a"solute right o! the ethical consciousness is that the deed, the shape in hich it actuali%es itsel!, shall "e nothing else than hat it nows% 0P, =7>1

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E&plicitl$ ackno ledging that right o! individual consciousness is making the transition !rom the traditional heroic, and there!ore tragic, practical conception o! agenc$ to the modern, su"#ective one% :n the modern conception, the tragic structure o! guilt and !ate is seen as un&ust% ;esponsi"ilit$ and authorit$ must "e reciprocal and coordinate% )he t o sides o! the traditional conception o! agenc$ appear !rom this point o! vie to "e out o! "alance% )he heroic aspect is that one takes responsi"ilit$ !or the hole deed, the )at% )he tragic side is that one actuall$ has authorit$ onl$ over hat one intends and can !oresee, the Handlung% )he responsi"ilit$ and the authorit$ are not commensurate% :nl$ individual sel!*consciousnesses can apply the norms in concrete situations, and so actualize them% )he modern conception o! agenc$ accordingl$ treats su"#ectivit$ as sovereign, in that one-s normative status, hat one is committed to or responsi"le !or, is determined "$ one-s normative attitudes, hat one ac nowledges as a commitment or responsi"ilit$% )he e&pansive heroic conception o! agenc$ is contracted% ;esponsi"ilit$ e&tends onl$ as !ar as the speci!ications under hich the doing as intentionalthe ones in virtue o! hich it as a doing at alland not to all the conseBuential speci!ications% )his is the rise o! su"#ectivit$%

Hodernit$ !or Hegel consists in individual sel!*consciousness claiming a distinctive kind o! authorit$ !or its o n attitudes and activities% )his claim o! authorit$ has sho n up in t o !ormsA the rights o! intention and kno ledge in agenc$, and the idea that the norms e are "ound "$ are not #ust there, antecedentl$ to and independentl$ o! our doings% )he latter thought also involves the authorit$ o! su"#ective attitudes over norms hich accordingl$ can no longer "e thought o! as holl$ given, natural, and o"#ective% )he

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di!!erence is that in this case, the norms in Buestion are ought*to*"es rather than ought*to* dos% De ill see that the modern conception o! the normative according to hich our attitudes and activities pla$ a role in instituting norms also has t o aspects% 2or Hegel, all norms are conceptual norms, "ecause norms count as determinatel$ content!ul onl$ in virtue o! standing to one another in relations o! material incompati"ilit$ and 3hence9 material conseBuence% So e can distinguish normative force !rom the contents o! the norms, hich are articulated "$ those conceptual relations% )he !orce is the practical signi!icance o! the applica"ilit$ o! the normA its "indingness or authorit$, the responsi"ilities it puts in place, ho it changes the assessments, attri"utions, and ackno ledgments that are appropriate% /n account o! normative !orce is accordingl$ an account o! hat one is doing in appl$ing a concept, hat sort o! commitment one is undertaking or endorsement one is making, "$ making a #udgment or adopting an intention%

:n the side o! normative !orce, Hegel sees the revolution o! modernit$ as culminating in hat (-ve called the FKant*;ousseau criterion o! demarcation o! the normative%G )his is the thought that hat distinguishes constraint "$ norms !rom non*normative constraint 3!or instance "$ causes in nature or coercion "$ po er9 is that one is onl$ genuinel$ responsi"le to hat one ac nowledges as authoritative% :ne-s normative status as committed or o"liged depends upon one-s normative attitude o! having undertaken or ackno ledged that commitment or o"ligation 3perhaps not e&plicitl$, "ut at least implicitl$9% )he Enlightenment theories o! political o"ligation in terms o! implicit social contracts that inspired ;ousseau are onl$ one e&pression o! this conditioning o!

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normative statuses on normative attitudes% Kant-s distinguishing o! the realm o! nature !rom the realm o! !reedomconstraint "$ nature !rom constraint "$ normsin terms o! the contrast "et een "eing "ound "$ rules or la s and "eing "ound "$ conceptions o! rules or la s alread$ su"stantiall$ generalizes the conception%

Huch more radicall$, Hegel also thinks that the modern rise o! su"#ectivit$ culminates in the realization that not onl$ the force, "ut also the contents o! conceptual norms are dependent upon the attitudes and activities o! the individuals ho appl$ them in #udgment and action% )his is the idea, discussed in Chapter ) o, that our discursive activit$ does not consist either in simpl$ appl$ing conceptual norms that are someho given to us, nor in distinct and separa"le activities o! !irst instituting or esta"lishing those norms, and then appl$ing them% ;ather our discursive practices o! #udging and acting intentionall$ must "e seen as "oth the application and the institution o! determinatel$ content!ul conceptual norms% )he air o! parado& a"out that kind o! Hegelian*Cuinean re#ection o! the t o*phase Kantian*Carnapian picture is to "e dispelled "$ looking at the historical and social articulation o! the process o! determining conceptual contents% :ne o! the principal concerns o! this chapter is to la$ out the relations "et een the doctrine o! the attitude*dependence o! normative !orce and the doctrine o! the attitude*dependence o! conceptual contents%

)he modern sel! is a contracted sel!, relative to the e&pansive traditional sel!% :ne dimension o! contraction is !rom taking responsi"ilit$ !or the hole e&tended )atthe per!ormance the agent authorized, under all its speci!ications, including distant

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conseBuential onesto taking responsi"ilit$ onl$ !or the Handlung, the per!ormance onl$ as it is kno n and intended "$ the agent% )he other important dimension o! contraction o! the modern sel! is that instead o! identi!$ing immediatel$ ith the norms, as the sittlich sel! did, the modern sel! identi!ies immediatel$ rather ith its o n su"#ective attitudes% )his is alienation% (n this section, e have "een addressing Cuestion :ne posed a"oveA FDhat is the rise o! su"#ectivit$ that de!ines the modern structure o! normativit$EG /nd in the previous section, e addressed Cuestion ) oA FDhat is pre* modern SittlichkeitEG De must no turn to Cuestion )hreeA FDhat is alienationEG and Cuestion 2ourA FDh$ does the rise o! su"#ectivit$ "ring ith it alienationEG

Even "e!ore ans ering those Buestions, e alread$ have alread$ assem"led the ra materials needed to !ormulate a !urther important Buestion a"out the transition Hegel envisages !rom modernit$ to Stage )hreeA individuall$ sel!*conscious Sittlichkeit% )hat third stage o! the development o! norm*governed social su"stance is to "e the result o! retaining the insight into the authorit$ o! su"#ectivit$ and the attitudes and activities o! individual su"#ects, hile overcoming alienation% :vercoming alienation is re-achieving Sittlichkeit% But Sittlichkeit reBuires identi!$ing ith the norms understood as transcending individual attitudes% Immediate Sittlichkeit also reBuires the direct translata"ilit$ o! those ought*to*"es into ought*to*dos% /s a result, the expansive practical notion o! the sel! that consists in decisivel$ identi!$ing ith the norms implicit in the practices and institutions o! the recognitive communit$ entails adopting a heroic conception o! agenc$% )hat is another dimension along hich the immediatel$ sittlich sel! is more e&tended and inclusive than the modern one% De can then ask hether the

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connection "et een these t o dimensions along hich the traditional sel! e&tends "e$ond the individual as practicall$ conceived in the modern conte&t is also supposed to "e re*achieved at Stage )hree% )hat is, hen e ask Cuestion Si&, FHo can hat as progressive a"out the transition to modernit$ "e preserved, hile re*achieving SittlichkeitEG, e are asking in partA Cuestion SevenA Can a version o! the e&pansive, heroic conception o! agenc$ "e reconciled ith ackno ledging the rights o! intention and kno ledgeE

)he ans er to that Buestion o!!ered later in this chapter isA Ses% (! that is righti! some version o! the heroic conception o! agenc$, here individuals ackno ledge and are attri"uted responsi"ilit$ !or their hole deed, under all its speci!ications, is indeed part o! the mature, post*modern, mediated Sittlichkeit that Hegel envisagesthen it is a startling and distinctive !eature o! his vie o! the achievement o! modernit$% 2or almost ever$one else ho has thought a"out the issue takes it that the modern idea o! restricting responsi"ilit$ to hat is intended and reasona"l$ !oreseea"le "$ the agent producing a per!ormance as a decisive advance in our practical and theoretical understanding o! normativit$% )hat !eature o! modernit$ is taken to "e a !undamental insight into hat it is !air and #ust to hold people responsi"le !or, an essential element o! hat as progressive a"out the transition !rom traditional to modern a$s o! li!e% (t is not thought o!, even "$ most critics o! modernit$, as part o! hat ought to "e re#ected% /nd it is, in an$ case, hard to see ho there is room !or an$ version o! the rights o! intention and kno ledge alongside some version o! the heroic conception o! agenc$% Dh$ isn-t the one simpl$ the denial o! the otherE Hegel does think that the advent o! modernit$ represents

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!undamental and irrevoca"le progress in our practical understanding o! ourselves and our discursive practices% )hat eventthe one "ig thing that has happened in human histor$ does em"od$ !or him an essential insight into the dependence o! norms on the attitudes and activities o! individual su"#ects% But hen the content o! that insight is care!ull$ disentangled !rom the alienated, distinctivel$ modern, !orm in hich it initiall$ appears, it ill "e seen to "e compati"le ith an unalienated, sittlich !orm in hich the role o! attitudes in instituting or constituting norms is ackno ledged, "ut in hich selves are e&panded "e$ond the con!ines o! the modern conception along "oth dimensionsA identi!ication ith the communal norms and a heroic 3"ut not tragic?9 conception o! agenc$% )o "egin to tease apart these strands so as to see ho such a conception is possi"le, e must turn to the notion o! alienated su"#ectivit$%

Section #: !lienation

Dhat (-ve "een calling Fthe rise o! su"#ectivit$G is a ne appreciation o! the signi!icance o! normative attitudeso! undertaking and attri"uting commitments, ackno ledging authorit$ and responsi"ilit$% /lienation is not identi!$ing ith those normative statuses, not ackno ledging the authorit$ o! norms over one-s attitudes "$ "eing illing to sacri!ice attitudes !or norms% :n the practical conception distinctive o! alienation, hat one gives up one attitude !or is another attitude% But the attitudes are not understood as ans ering to something that is not a su"#ective attitude% Cuestion 2our asked a"ove asA Dh$ did the advent o! modern su"#ectivit$ "ring ith it alienationE )he ans er is that

/s Hegel sa$s o! the alienated, modern stageA FDestin$ is alien to this SpiritG 0P, =?.1%

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here the immediate Sittlichkeit Hegel takes to characterize traditional societ$ practicall$ construes the implicit normative structure o! its practices in a one*sidedl$ o"#ective a$, the alienation he takes to characterize modern societ$ practicall$ construes the implicit normative structure o! its practices in a one*sidedl$ su"#ective a$%

Dhat makes them one*sided, and so ultimatel$ inadeBuate, is in "oth cases the immediacy o! their practical conceptions% Hore speci!icall$, to use one o! Hegel-s !avorite a$s o! putting the point, "oth understand normativit$ in terms o! independence, rather than freedom% /s ( understand him, Hegel uses +independence- 0Mna"hTngigkeit1 in t o di!!erent a$s, depending on hether its conte&tual contrar$ is +dependence- or +!reedom-% (n the !irst usage, hat is independent e&ercises authority over hat is dependent upon it, hich is accordingl$ responsible to it% )he second usage concerns a particular, de!ective, a$ o! understanding those generic notions o! independence and dependence, authorit$ and responsi"ilit$% Dhat is de!ective a"out it is that it is atomistic and immediate, "$ constrast to the holistic, mediated conception o! !reedom%

:n the side o! our understanding o! conceptual content, the !onsciousness chapters o! the Phenomenology presented an argumentative tra#ector$ "eginning ith an atomistic construal in terms o! independence and ending in the mediated, holistic construal Hegel terms the Fin!inite ConceptG% )hat !inal version retains an internal Fmoment o! independenceG !or each determinate concept, ithin the holistic reciprocal sense* dependence o! one content on another that has "een revealed to "e a condition o! their determinateness% )his is the moment o! di!!erence ithin the larger unit$the unit$

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Hegel talks a"out "$ sa$ing that the reciprocall$ related, interdependent, items are +identical-, in the +speculative- sense% )he sense o! +independence- that is compati"le ith dependence is the !irst, not the second% :n the side o! our understanding o! normative !orce, the sense o! +independence- that contrasts ith !reedom is introduced under the heading o! +Haster$-% )he allegorical Haster-s conception o! authorit$, independence in the generic !irst sense, is that it is incompati"le ith an$ and ever$ sort o! dependence, rather than "eing the converse o! #ust some particular kind o! dependence% )he authorit$ o! the Haster is to "e recognized as immediate, independent o! all relations to others% (n particular, it is to "e independent o! the attitudes o! those ho recognize and are o"liged to recognize himthose ho ackno ledge and are o"liged to ackno ledge that authorit$% So the Haster construes recognition as necessaril$ as$mmetric% He cannot ackno ledge the authorit$ o! those ho recognize him, the dependence o! his authorit$ on their recognition o! it% )he correct understanding o! normative statuses as instituted "$ reciprocal recognitive attitudes is the conception o! !reedom that contrasts ith the Haster-s notion o! independence% Like the corresponding conception o! the Concept as in!inite, this notion o! !reedom essentiall$ involves moments o! independence in the !irst senseA the reciprocal authorit$ o! recognized and recognizer%

)he characteristicall$ modern insight is that norms are not, as traditional !orms o! li!e implicitl$ took them to "e, independent o! the su"#ective normative attitudes o! concept users% )he dependence o! norms on attitudes is a dimension o! responsi"ilit$ on the side o! the norms or statuses, and o! corresponding authorit$ on the part o! the attitudes% (t is "ecause that authorit$ o! attitudes over norms is construed on the model o! independence*

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as*Haster$ that the insight into the normative role o! su"#ectivit$ sho s up in its distinctivel$ modern, alienated, !orm% 2or hat is distinctive o! the atomistic conception o! authorit$ that is epitomized "$ the Haster is precisel$ that authorit$ 3independence9 is construed as ruling out an$ correlative responsi"ilit$ 3dependence9% (t !ollo s that i! norms are dependent on attitudes, there can "e no intelligi"le reciprocal dependence o! attitudes on norms% /lienation is the structural denial that su"#ective attitudes are responsi"le to norms hich, as authoritative count as independent o! those attitudes% )he claim is that traditional and modern practical understandings are alike in taking it that i! norms e&ert authorit$ over attitudes, then attitudes cannot e&ert authorit$ over norms, and vice versa% Either norms are independent o! attitudes and attitudes dependent on norms, or attitudes are independent o! norms and norms are dependent on attitudes%

)he most sophisticated theoretical !orm in hich this de!ective sort o! practical normative understanding is e&pressed is hat Hegel calls +Lerstand-% (t is "$ no a !amiliar point that he is recommending replacing that sort o! understanding "$ one that has Buite a di!!erent structure, hat he calls +Lernun!t-% )he holistic Lernun!t conception is one in hich dependence is al a$s reciprocal, and al a$s involves reciprocal independence% 2or J to "e dependent on S is !or S in that respect to "e independent o! J% But that relation is not onl$ compatible ith S "eing dependent on J in another respect, in hich J is accordingl$ independent o! S, it is necessary that there "e such correlative dependence% )he paradigm, as al a$s, is the structure o! reciprocal authorit$* and*responsi"ilit$ "$ hich sel!*conscious individual selves and their communities 3universals9 are together s$nthesized "$ mutual recognition 3"$ particular desiring

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organisms9% )hat sort o! reciprocal, mediating recognition is, o! course, #ust hat the Haster-s atomistic immediate as$mmetric conception o! authorit$ and responsi"ilit$ rules out% )hat is the conte&t that makes it seem that one must chooseA either norms have authorit$ over attitudes, or vice versa"ut not "oth%

So the claim is !irst that hen the h$per*ob&ectivity a"out norms characteristic o! immediate Sittlichkeit is shattered "$ a practical realization o! the essential role pla$ed "$ the normative attitudes o! individual su"#ects in instituting norms, the result is a complementar$ h$per*sub&ectivityA alienation% /nd second, that hat drives that pendulum !rom the one e&treme to the other is !ailure to appreciate the mediated structure o! reciprocal sense*dependence o! the concepts o! dependence and independence, that is, responsi"ilit$ and authorit$% (n short, it is retaining the immediacy o! the conception o! normativit$ that dictates that appreciating the dependence o! norms on attitudes precludes retaining a sittlich appreciation o! the dependence o! attitudes on norms, and so entails alienation%

Hegel introduces his discussion o! FSpirit alienated !rom itsel!G'8 in terms o! the concept o! culture 0Bildung1% Cultivation or acculturation is the process "$ hich e are trans!ormed !rom merel$ natural into spiritual creatures, coming to "e governed "$ norms and not #ust driven "$ desires% (t is hat makes sel!*conscious individuals out o! merel$ particular organisms, "$ "ringing them under universalsmaking them mem"ers o! a communit$, su"#ect to norms%
'8

FDer sich ent!remdete ,eistG, !rom the title o! Chapter L(B% /lienation, like Sittlichkeit, is not a ps$chological attitude o! individuals 3though it can "e re!lected there9, "ut a structure the hole o! Spirit e&hi"its%

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(t isPthrough culture that the individual acBuires standing 0,elten1 and actualit$% His true original nature and su"stance is the alienation o! himsel! as Spirit !rom his natural "eing% )his e&ternalization isPat once the means, or the transition, "oth o! the 0mere1 thought*!orm o! su"stance into actualit$, and, conversel$, o! the speci!ic individualit$ into essentialit$% )his individualit$ moulds itsel! "$ culture into hat it intrinsicall$ 0an sich1 isP its actualit$ consists solel$ in the setting*aside o! its natural sel!% Pit is the contradiction o! giving to hat is particular an actualit$ hich is immediatel$ a universal% 0P, =N?1 +Su"stance- is the communit$, and +essence- is the constellation o! norms implicit in its practices and institutions% )he acculturation o! individuals is accordingl$ not onl$ the process "$ hich the$ pass into +essentialit$-"ecome geistig "eings, su"#ect to norms% (t is also the process "$ hich those communal norms 3the Fthought*!orm o! su"stanceG9 are actualized in the attitudes o! individuals ho ackno ledge them as "inding% Dhat, in relation to the single individual, appears as his culture, is the essential moment o! the su"stance itsel!, viz% the immediate passage o! the 0mere1 thought*!orm o! its universalit$ into actualit$I or, culture is the simple soul o! the su"stance "$ means o! hich, hat is implicit in the su"stance, acBuires an ackno ledged, real e&istence% )he process in hich the individualit$ moulds itsel! "$ culture is, there!ore, at the same time the development o! it as the universal, o"#ective essence, i%e% the development o! the actual orld% 0P, =?81

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<ot onl$ does the culture make us, e make the culture% 2or the onl$ actual e&istence the norms have is in the attitudes and activities o! individuals ho ackno ledge them as norms% )hat is actualizing hat other ise is merel$ implicit% <orms are causall$ inert apart !rom the normative attitudes o! those ho ackno ledge them% Dhat appears here as the po er and authorit$ o! the individual e&ercised over the su"stance, hich is there"$ superseded, is the same thing as the actualization o! the su"stance% 2or the po er o! the individual consists in con!orming itsel! to that su"stance, i%e% in e&ternalizing its o n sel! and thus esta"lishing itsel! as su"stance that has an o"#ective e&istence% (ts culture and its o n actualit$ are, there!ore, the actualization o! the su"stance itsel!% 0P, =?81

/lienation is the ina"ilit$ to "ring together these t o aspects o! BildungA that sel!* conscious individuals ackno ledging the norms as "inding in our practice is hat makes those selves hat the$ are, and that sel!*conscious individuals ackno ledging the norms as "inding is hat makes the norms hat the$ are% )hese are the authorit$ o! the communit$ and its norms over individuals 3their dependence on it9, and the authorit$ o! individuals over the communit$ and its norms 3its dependence on them9, respectivel$% (n the traditional structure, attitudes have no normative eight at all% )he$ are not reall$ in the picture "ecause the$ are supposed #ust to re!lect the norms% (n the modern structure, "oth communal norms and individual attitudes are !ull$ in pla$% Each claims a certain authorit$% 2or the rise o! su"#ectivit$ is the realization that the communal norms hose ackno ledgment makes us cultural, and not #ust natural creatures depend in turn on our

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attitudes and activities to actualize them% De readers o! the Phenomenology are to come to see those claims as not onl$ compati"le "ut complementar$indeed, as each intelligi"le onl$ in the conte&t o! the other% (n alienated spiritual su"stance, ho ever, the claims to authorit$ o! sel!*conscious individual attitudes and communal norms compete, "oth in practice and in theor$% )he opposition and competition "et een normative attitudes and normative statuses is the core o! alienation% )he challenge o! modernit$ is to secure the "inding !orce and determinate content!ulness o! conceptual norms !rom the threat posed to themin the conte&t o! practical construals o! authorit$ according to the implicit structure o! Haster$ and theoretical construals o! authorit$ according to the e&plicit categories o! Lerstand"$ giving up the picture o! those norms as something e simpl$ !ind as part o! the attitude*independent orld and accepting the essential role our attitudes pla$ in instituting them% Ho can the responsibility o! su"#ective normative attitudes 3 hat is ackno ledged as correct9 to normative statuses 3 hat reall$ is correct9 "e reconciled ith the authority o! su"#ective normative attitudes over normative statusesE /n$ social, institutional, or conceptual conte&t that !orces a choice "et een these is an alienated one%

)he norms in Buestion are conceptually content!ul norms, in that their determinate contents settle hat is incompati"le ith con!orming to that norm and hat ould "e a conseBuence o! doing so% )hat means that the norms articulate reasonsreasons !or appl$ing concepts "$ #udging and acting intentionall$% /ctuall$ appl$ing a concept, endorsing a theoretical claim or practical plan, is adopting a normative attitude, undertaking a commitment% Doing that is ackno ledging or adopting a norm as "inding%

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/dopting such conceptuall$ articulated normative attitudes is doing something that can "e causall$ e!!icacious% :rdinar$ agents are ired up and trained to "e a"le to respond to ackno ledgings o! practical commitments to raise their arms "$ raising their arms, under a ide variet$ o! circumstances, !or instance% So the issue Hegel is addressing under the heading o! +alienation-a"out practical conceptions o! the relations "et een conceptual norms and normative attitudesincludes the relations "et een reasons and causes% (ndeed, it encompasses the Buestion o! ho to think a"out the relations "et een the normative and the natural orders more generall$% /s e-ll see, naturalistic reductionism, in the !orm o! commitment to an e&planator$ !rame ork that eliminates re!erence to norms entirel$, in !avor o! attitudes, is a principal e&pression o! the alienation o! the modern orld% Hegel-s account o! the nature o! the e&pressivel$ progressive development he can envisage "$ hich the modern alienated structure o! sel!*conscious su"#ectivit$ and social su"stance can give rise to a ne , "etter structure, hich overcomes alienation, so re*achieves Sittlichkeit, hile retaining the advance in sel!* conscious su"#ectivit$ characteristic o! modernit$ accordingl$ encompasses a non* reductive account o! ho e should understand the place o! norms in the natural orld%

)he aim o! the rest o! this chapter is tell that stor$%

Section #I: !ctual %onsciousness and &inguistic $ecognition

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Hegel-s discussion o! the normative structure o! the modern orld o! culture is long, intricate, and interesting% But our purposes do not reBuire rehearsal o! man$ o! its details% He distinguishes t o aspects o! that structureA actual consciousness and pure consciousness% /ctual consciousness comprises social institutions, the norms the$ em"od$, and individuals pla$ing roles and engaging in practices governed and articulated "$ those norms% B$ appl$ing those norms in their practice, individual su"#ects make them actual and e!!icaciousI the$ actualize the norms% )he norms and the individuals acting and assessing their actions according to those norms collectivel$ constitute the institutions, giving them, as ell as the norms, actual e&istence% )o act according to the norms is to appeal to these in one-s practical reasoning a"out hat to do% Similarl$, to assess according to them is to appeal to those normsthe ones implicit in customas standards in assessing one-s o n and others- per!ormances%

)he term Fpure consciousnessG is a a$ o! talking a"out the mediation that is the conceptualizing o! norms% Hegel sa$s that pure consciousness Fis "oth the thinking o! the actual orld, and its thought*!orm 0Denken und ,edachtsein1%G 0P, =N61 (t is the a$ normativit$ is understood, the theor$ that makes e&plicit the normativit$ implicit in the institutionalized practice o! actual consciousness% Pure consciousness is the a$ norms are conceived or conceptualized% Hegel-s term !or conceptual articulationarticulation "$ relations o! material incompati"ilit$ and in!erenceis +mediation-% Pure consciousness mediates the relation "et een actual individual selves and the norms it theorizes a"out% (n traditional societ$, as opposed to modern culture, the norms implicit in Sitte, in customs, are immediatenot the su"#ect o! conceptualization or

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thematization, not made explicit, and hence not su"#ect to critical scrutin$% (mmediate Sittlichkeit has a purel$ practical, implicit, non-conceptual conception o! norms, and so has no analogue o! pure consciousness% Pure consciousness is a distinctivel$ modern !orm o! sel!*consciousness, a mani!estation o! the rise o! su"#ectivit$% (t is a ne a$ the

norms implicit in the practices o! actual consciousness can "e something e&plicitl$ for consciousness% Dhere actual consciousness reBuires the adoption o! practical attitudes to ards the norms, appl$ing them in practice "$ #udging, acting intentionall$, and assessing the claims and per!ormances o! others, pure consciousness reBuires the adoption o! theoretical attitudes to ards the norms% Pure consciousness o!!ers e&plicit accounts o! the nature o! the "indingness and the source o! the content o! the norms% (t re!lects on the relations "et een them and the institutions that em"od$ them, on the one hand, and the su"#ective normative attitudes o! those hose practice the$ govern, on the other% Pure consciousness is a response to a !elt need !or the norms and their "inding !orce not onl$ to "e e&plicitl$ understood and e&plained, "ut to "e validated, legitimated, vindicated% )hat demand is itsel! a prime e&pression o! the ne l$ appreciated authorit$ o! sel!*conscious su"#ectivit$ and its attitudes% )he Buestion at issue "et een traditional and modern practical conceptions and constellations o! normativit$ is hether, hen the individual ackno ledges the norms in action and assessment, that needs to "e conceptuall$ mediated or not hether a theor$, a stor$ a"out it is needed% )o sa$ that it is is to accord a ne kind o! authorit$ to the attitudes o! the individuals ho produce, consume, and assess such stories% )hat is h$ the role in the orld o! culture o! hat Hegel calls Fpure consciousnessG is part o! the advent o! modernit$ as the rise o! su"#ectivit$%

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( emphasized in the previous section that alienation as Hegel conceives it is not primaril$ a ps$chological matter, nor a matter o! ho people feel% (t is an ontological matter o! the structure o! social su"stance, and hence o! sel!*consciousness% (t is in the end a recognitive structure, a !orm e&hi"ited "$ the recognitive processes that institute "oth communities and sel!*conscious individual communit$ mem"ers% )he !ailure o! norms and normative attitudes to mesh properl$ that is alienation sho s up in practical !orm in the structure o! actual consciousness and in theoretical !orm in the structure o! pure consciousness% ;ecognizing another is adopting a normative attitudeA taking the other to "e "ound "$ and su"#ect to normative assessment according to the norms o! the communit$, to "e a"le to undertake responsi"ilities and e&ercise authorit$% /lienation is a structural de!ect in the relations "et een the recognitive attitudes that s$nthesize the social su"stance and the communal norms that are its essencethe norms su"#ection to hich make sel!*conscious individuals out o! particular desiring natural organisms% (n Hegel-s terms, this de!ective metaph$sical structure is a de!ective logical structureA a !ailure in the a$ universals characterize particulars to $ield individuals%

)he alienation o! the modern !orm o! Spirit is mani!ested in the structure o! "oth actual and pure consciousness% :n Hegel-s account, "oth are divided into t o ultimatel$ competing su"*structures% (n each case, alienation sho s up in the relations "et een them%'' )he actualization o! the su"stance o! culture, its actual orld, takes t o di!!erent !orms, those o! Dealth and State Po er% (t is the actions o! sel!*conscious individuals in
''

)hus F"$ means o! the sel! as soul o! the process, su"stance is so moulded and developed in its moments that one opposite stirs the other into li!e, each "$ its alienation !rom the other gives it an e&istence and eBuall$ receives !rom it an e&istence o! its o n%G 0P, =?'1%

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intentionall$ producing per!ormances and assessing each other-s per!ormances that give hatever actualit$ there is to the norms and the institutions% )his is appl$ing norms in the #udgments and intentions that provide reasons !or per!ormances and in the assessment o! reasons !or per!ormances% )he t o sides o! hat Hegel calls Factual consciousnessG accordingl$ correspond to the t o aspects o! individualit$A particularit$ and universalit$% Dealth 0;eichtum1 is the thick institutional !orm in hich the particular aspect o! the certaint$ o! individual sel!*consciousness is e&pressed "$ "ecoming actual or pu"lic, acBuiring its truth in practical activit$% State po er 0Staatsmacht1 is the thick institutional !orm in hich the universal aspect o! the certaint$ o! individual sel!*consciousness is e&pressed or "ecomes actual or pu"lic, acBuiring its truth in practical activit$%

De have seen that the particular and universal aspects o! sel!*conscious individualit$ correspond to the t o structural elements necessar$ !or social su"stance to "e s$nthesized "$ recognitive relationsA the particular recognized and recognizing individuals, and the recognitive communit$ comprising those individuals% /ll the components o! actual consciousness in the !orm o! Dealththe norms, institutions, and sel!*conscious individuals ho appl$ those norms and pla$ roles in those institutionsare to "e understood as articulating the contri"ution to the institution and application o! norms that is pla$ed "$ the recognitive activities and attitudes o! particular sel!*conscious individuals% /nd all the components o! actual consciousness in the !orm o! State Po er the norms, institutions, and sel!*conscious individuals ho appl$ those norms and pla$ roles in those institutionsare to "e understood as articulating the contri"ution to the cultivation and acculturation o! sel!*conscious individuals that is pla$ed "$ norms

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3universals9 hose applica"ilit$ is ad#udicated "$ the recognitive communit$ in hose practices the$ are implicit% Hodern actual consciousness is alienated inso!ar as these t o constitutive aspects o! the recognitive process that produces "oth sel!*conscious individual selves and their communities stand in as$mmetric relations o! relative independencethat is, inso!ar as each side acts practicall$ as though its authorit$ over the other ere not "alanced "$ a corresponding reciprocal responsi"ilit$ to it% :vercoming alienation ill "e moving !rom recognitive processes e&hi"iting this structure o! immediate, as$mmetric independence to ones e&hi"iting instead the mediated, reciprocal structure o! freedom%

)he t o sides correspond to the t o sides o! the distinction that action implies% De sa in Chapter Seven that these correspond to t o social perspectivesA the perspective o! the agent ho intentionall$ produces a per!ormance, and the perspective o! the mem"ers o! a pu"lic audience, ho assess it% )he agent has a special authorit$ over the speci!ications under hich the per!ormance is intentional, hence a doing at allA the Handlung% But the audience has a corresponding authorit$ over conseBuential speci!ications o! the doing, hich can continue to un!old even a!ter the death o! the agentA the )at% So alienation also sho s up in a practical ina"ilit$ to reconcile the deed as intentional ith the deed as actual% (n Hegel-s picture o! the traditional conception o! agenc$, heroic e&pansion o! the sel! through identi!ication ith the hole deed stands in an unalienated eBuili"rium ith the tragic practical understanding o! the relation "et een Fkno ing and not kno ingG in terms o! !ate% But that is an eBuili"rium that cannot survive ackno ledgement o! the rights o! intention and kno ledgeA the recognitive seeds o! modernit$% (n the actual

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modern orld o! culture, hich results !rom that ackno ledgement, Dealth is the individual as having authorit$ over the application o! concepts, and State Po er is the individual as "eing responsible to the conceptual norms% )he division o! these, their con!lict, is the paradigmatic institutional !orm o! alienation%

:ne o! the most "asic interpretive ideas animating the pro#ect pursued in this "ook is that in the Phenomenology 3as ell as the Science of 'ogic9, Hegel is o!!ering us a sophisticated account o! conceptual normativit$% 2or him, as !or Kant, all norms are conceptual norms, in the sense that the$ are conceptuall$ articulated% 2or Hegel, that is "ecause something is intelligi"le as a norm onl$ i! it has a determinate content% 2or it must, implicitl$ or e&plicitl$, dra some line "et een hat is appropriate and inappropriate according to it, hat is o"ligator$ or not, hat is permitted or not% )o do that, it must stand in relations o! determinate negation to other possi"le norms% /nd e have seen that those relations o! material incompati"ilit$ induce material in!erential relations% (n this sense, not onl$ our su"#ective activities "ut the o"#ective orld in hich the$ take placethe cause o! sense and goal o! intellectis conceptuall$ structured% Dhat in the 'ogic he calls the +(dea-, a constellation comprising "oth thought and "eing is through and through conceptuall$ articulated% Both hat ( have called Hegel-s +o"#ective idealism- and his +conceptual idealism- are a$s o! understanding the co* ordinate relations "et een su"#ective and the o"#ective conceptual articulationA the a$s in hich su"#ective attitudes can set norms !or o"#ective !acts and the a$s in hich o"#ective !acts can set norms !or su"#ective attitudes, in "oth e&ercises o! intentional agenc$ and o! cognitive #udgment% )he$ are "oth idealist theses "ecause the$ insist that

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hat Hegel teaches us to see as the conceptual articulation o! the o"#ective orld into o"#ects and properties, !acts, and la s is unintelligi"le apart !rom the su"#ective attitudes, activities, and practices o! sel!*conscious agents and kno ers% )hat sort o! idealism is the thought o! as the culmination o! the progressive insight o! modernit$al"eit one that "$ moving !rom the metaconceptual categories o! Lerstand to those o! Lernun!t articulates that insight in an unalienated !orm, and so moves us "e$ond the merel$ modern% )he conceptual character o! normativit$ is e&pressed e&plicitl$ "$ and !or individual su"#ects through the use o! language% 3C!% Sellars claim that grasp o! a concept is practical master$ o! the norms governing the use o! a ord%9 So it is that Hegel-s account o! the relations "et een individuals, norms, and institutions in the modern orld centers on the distinctive role he accords to language in that conte&t%

:n his anal$sis, one o! the distinctive !eatures o! modernit$ is that language mediates the relations among individuals, their acts and attitudes, and their norms, institutions, and communities% Language "ecomes the medium o! recognition% )he modern institutional e&pression o! the norms is State Po er% (t can onl$ "e actualized, the norms it em"odies actuall$ applied, "$ the activities o! sel!*conscious individuals% FState po er is raised to the position o! having a sel! o! its o n%G 0P, 68>1 )hose individuals actualize State Po er "$ relinBuish the pursuit o! their private interests, sacri!icing their su"#ective attitudes !or the sake o!, and so identi!$ing ith, the norms that State Po er there"$ em"odies and actualizes% Here there need no longer "e a risk o! "iological death, !or the Buestion is ho alread$*constituted private individuals come to occup$ distinctive institutional roles "$ identi!ication ith pu"lic norms, rather than ho particular desiring

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animals come to "e sel!*conscious individuals "$ identi!ication ith themselves as recognized% F)he true sacri!ice o! "eing*!or*sel! is solel$ that in hich it surrenders itsel! as completel$ as in death, $et in this renunciation no less preserves itsel!%G 0P, 68>1 F)his alienation takes place solel$ in language, hich here appears in its characteristic signi!icance%G 0P, 68N1 )hat Fcharacteristic signi!icanceG is, as he puts the point else here, that Flanguage is the e&istence 0Dasein1 o! ,eist%G 0P, 76.1

)he Fcharacteristic signi!icanceG o! language is e&plicated "$ means o! a contrast% (n the orld o! the ethical order, in la and command, and in the actual orld, in counsel, language has the essence !or its content, and is the !orm o! that content% 0P, 68N1 )he +essence- is the norms% (n traditional societ$, and in the language o! counsel 3the characteristic means o! e&pression o! Dealth9, language is the !orm in hich the conceptual norms and the recognitive attitudes o! attri"uting and assessing per!ormances according to them can "e e&plicitl$ e&pressed hat the$ are, said o! them% 2or language is the !orm o! e&plicitness, o! e&pression% But the characteristic use o! language in modernit$ is not #ust to make e&plicit implicit norms and attitudes% (t is to institute those norms and adopt those attitudes% )he passage continuesA But here it has !or its content the !orm itsel!, the !orm hich language is, and it is authoritative as language% 0P, 68N1 )o sa$ that the content o! recognitive attitudes is also linguistic in the modern era is to sa$ that adopting the distinctivel$ modern recognitive attitudes is per!orming speech acts% )he pu"lic speech acts are hat institute the normative, recognitive relations in Buestions%

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)his +authoritative- is +,elten-, that is Kant-s term !or normative !orce, "indingness, or validit$ 0,Kltigkeit, Ler"indlichkeit1% F(t is authoritative as speech, as that hich per!orms hat has to "e per!ormed%G 0P, 68N1 Dhat has to "e per!ormed is the constitution o! a sel! "$ identi!ication, the institution o! norms and the ackno ledgment o! commitments, all o! hich is speci!ic recognition%

)his is !ollo ed "$ a long discussion no o! the per!ormative po er o! language, in constituting people, as "eing the medium o! recognitionA F!or it is the real e&istence , the Dasein, o! the pure sel! as sel!%G <ot onl$ is language the e&istence o! Spirit, it is the e&istence o! the sel! as sel!% )hat is "ecause the language and the linguistic utterances and the relations among them is the medium in hich recognition takes place% F(n speech, sel!*consciousness, Bua independent separate individualit$Gthe individuall$ sel!*conscious sel!, the one characteristic o! modernit$Fcomes as such into e&istence, so that it e&ists !or others%G )hat is the petitioning !or recognition% Dhat it is petitioning to "e speci!icall$ recognized as, the commitment it is authorizing others to attri"ute to it, is the individual-s identi!ication ith the authorit$ o! the norms% )he agent o! the state is ma ing o! his attitudes responsi"le to those norms% He is undertaking a commitment that serves as a standard ever$"od$ can hold him to, and measure his per!ormances against% )his is consitituting himsel! as that sort o! a sel!% )hat recognitive making onesel! responsi"le to the norms is a doing that consists in a certain kind o! sa$ing% (t is a going on record, a pu"lic commitment%

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)he content o! an$ non*linguistic act is still implicit% (n a linguistic act one actuall$ says hat it is that one is doing, hat the content is o! the commitment one are undertaking% /nd this is done in a a$ that transcends one-s o n authorit$ over that content% (t is open and availa"le !or others to attri"ute, discuss, and ad#udicate disputes a"out% )hat is hat language makes possi"le% Being authoritative as language is the coming into e&istence o! the individuall$ sel!*conscious sel! as such, "$ coming into e&istence in a$ that it e&ists !or others% )he passage continuesA :ther ise the (, this pure (, is non*e&istent, it is not there% (n ever$ other e&pression it is immersed in the realit$, and is in a shape !rom hich it can ithdra itsel!% (t is re!lected "ack into itsel! !rom its action and dissociates itsel! !rom such an imper!ect e&istence, in hich there is al a$s at once too much as too little, letting it remain li!eless "ehind% )he topic here is the alienation that is a a$ o! structuring the di!!erence "et een the Tat and the (andlung% Dhat one al a$s actuall$ does is al a$s too much or too little, and there is the possi"ilit$ o! distancing $oursel! !rom the content as not hat $ou intended% But hen $ou sa$ hat $ou-re committed to, hen $ou e&press $our intention, the e&plicit declaration doesn-t give $ou that distance% +(is important here "ecause it-s the paradigmatic ord "$ hich speakers undertake a commitment, e&plicitl$ marking the undertaking o! a commitment% F( claimG, F( intendG, F( didG, F( illG, that-s the !orm o! ackno ledging, sometimes constitutivel$, various sorts o! commitment%

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Continuing the passageA FLanguage, ho ever, contains it in its purit$% (t alone e&presses the (, the ( itsel!P)he ( is this particular (,G the sel! that-s sa$ing it, F"ut eBuall$ the universal (,G the norms that it-s appealing to and appl$ing in undertaking this determinatel$ content!ul commitment, hatever it is% F(t-s mani!esting is also at once the e&ternalization and "anishing o! this particular (%G (t is the e&ternalization, the actualization, the mani!estation o! it, and the "anishing o! it "ecause it-s heardI it no gets a signi!icance that runs "e$ond hat it intended% F)he ( that utters itsel! is heard or perceived, it is an in!ection in hich it is immediatel$ passed into unit$ ith those !or hom it is a real e&istence, and so is a universal sel!*consciousness%G +(- is important "ecause it is the concrete, e&plicit e&pression o! the role o! language as the medium o! recognition, and hence o! the social constitution o! sel!*conscious selves and their attitudes, and the social institution o! norms and communal institutions%

)he passage continuesA F)hat it-s perceived or heard means that its real e&istence dies a a$%G (t is a sa$ing, it-s #ust an event% )his its otherness has "een taken "ack into itsel!, and its real e&istence is #ust this, that as a sel!*conscious no , as a real e&istence, it-s not a real e&istence, and through this vanishing it is a real e&istence% )his vanishing is thus, itsel!, at once, its a"iding% <o that makes practicall$ no sense read "$ itsel!% But thought a"out in connection ith the end o! Sense !ertainty, it is a a$ o! telling us to think o! +(- in the a$ he taught us to think a"out +no -% ;ecall that e started o!! ith the anal$sis o! inde&icals, o!

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unrepeata"le utterances, ith the point o! their conceptual content "eing to "e unrepeata"le, so that di!!erent tokenings o! the same t$pe could have di!!erent contents% /s unrepeata"le events, the tokenings ere connected immediatel$, nonconceptuall$, to events that prompt or accompan$ them% /s unrepeata"le events or episodes the$ vanish% But the$ mark something in the sensuous orld in that a$% Demonstratives and inde&icals are our immediate point o! cognitive contact ith the orld% But, hat makes them cognitively signi!icant, hat gives them conceptual signi!icance, hat makes them a"le to engage ith in!erential practicesthe mediation that articulates their immediac$ is that e can pick them up anaphoricall$% )he$ can +a"ide- in these repetitions, in these recollections 3Erinnerungen9% Hegel is sa$ing that hat e-ve got to think a"out the signi!icance o! the +(- in the undertaking o! commitments is the a$ it can get held in place "$ people attri"uting the commitment to $ou, speci!icall$ recognizing $ou in the sense o! attri"uting a particularl$ content!ul commitment to $ou% Besides Hegel, no other philosopher "et een the scholastics and 2rege put +(- and +no - in a "o& and orried a"out their conceptual !unctioning together% /nd the !urther realization that there is something that is e&pressed in demonstratives and inde&icals that is essential to empirical kno ledge, on the one hand, and to the constitution o! selves on the other had to ait !or the middle $ears o! the t entieth centur$%'.

De see language, then, in its characteristic signi!icance as the e&pressive medium !or conceptual normativit$% B$ per!orming speech acts, engaging in discursive practices, individuals make e&plicit and pu"lic "oth petitions !or speci!ic recognition as risking and
'.

Lei"niz talks a"out us as creatures ho can sa$ moi, "ut he doesn-t orr$ a"out the contri"ution that the indexicality o! those sa$ings is making to the constitution o! selves%

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sacri!icing merel$ particular, su"#ective attitudes in !avor o! identi!ication ith the norms and corresponding grantings o! those recognitive petitions in the !orm o! attri"utions o! those sel!*constituting identi!icator$ commitments% )he structural alienation o! modern actual consciousness sho s up in the !act that the avatars o! Dealth, those ho actualize the particular aspect o! recognitive processes, re!use to recognize the avatars o! State Po er as identi!$ing ith the norms the$ to hich the$ pro!ess allegiance% ;ather than genuine identi!ication, the$ see onl$ the pursuit o! the private interests and motives o! the holders o! state o!!ice, under cover o! their roles as o!!icials%'5 )he petition !or recognition and so sel!*constitution is re#ected as a !alse description o! hat is reall$ going on% )he attempt at ma ing something so "$ an act o! identi!icationsomething that, as essentiall$ mediated "$ language, cannot "e achieved "$ the unreciprocated activit$ o! one individualis taken as contradicting ho things are found to "e% 2or sel!* interested motives o! various kinds can al a$s "e !ound !or the actions o! individuals, "e the$ state o!!icials or not% De ill return to this issue "elo , in Section J, in connection ith the discussion o! the meta*attitude Hegel associates ith Fpla$ing the part o! the moral valet%G

Because the modern medium o! recognition hat mediates the relations among individuals, their acts and attitudes, and the norms implicit in their practices and administered "$ their institutions and communitiesis language, the alienated character o! the modern recognitive structure is itsel! e&pressed linguisticall$% Dhen the alienation o! the particular !rom the universal, the practical construal o!
'5

Hegel has surel$ correctl$ diagnosed here a perennial strateg$ on the part o! the representatives o! ealthA to accuse the agents e&ercising state po er o! doing so not on "ehal! o! the pu"lic el!are, "ut o! their private "ureaucratic interests%

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individual actions in terms o! private attitudes rather than pu"lic norms or statuses, is e&pressed and enacted linguisticall$ ithin the sphere o! State Po er 3rather than in the relations "et een Dealth and State Po er9, Hegel sa$s the result is that Fthe heroism o! silent service "ecomes the heroism o! !latter$%G )hese are !orms o! +heroism- "ecause in each case the interests o! the particular individual are sacri!iced to something else% (n the case o! silent service, the aim is immediate practical identi!ication ith the norms 3dut$9% Dhat the e&plicitl$ alienated language o! !latter$ pro!esses is the sacri!ice o! the !latterer-s private interests and attitudes !or those o! the !lattered% /s ith Dealth-s accusation o! the agents o! State Po er, norms and duties 3universals9 drop out o! the picture in !avor o! the purel$ su"#ective attitudes o! particular individuals% /nd it is eas$ to see that the !latterer ma es true hat Dealth finds true o! the agents o! State Po er% 2or !latter$ o! a superior is the pursuit o! personal advantage in the guise o! sacri!ice o! it%

)here is a corresponding !orm o! !latter$ on the side o! DealthA Fthe language that gives ealth a sense o! its essential signi!icanceG, hich like ise dissem"les "ecause F hat it pronounces to "e an essence, it kno s to "e e&penda"le, to "e ithout intrinsic "eing%G 0P, 6.81 )he most e&plicit e&pression o! alienation, ho ever, Fpure cultureG, is a linguistic a$ o! "eing in the orld that mani!ests the as$mmetric recognitive relations "et een the t o !orms o! actual consciousness% (t is a Fnihilistic gameG o! Fdestructive #udgmentG, F itt$ talkG that undercuts the validit$ o! ever$ distinction and assessment, Fstripping o! their

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signi!icance all moments hich are supposed to count as the true "eing%G 0P, 6.'1 Dhat is learnt in this orld is that neither the actualit$ o! po er and ealth, nor their speci!ic <otions, OgoodO and O"adO, or the consciousness o! OgoodO and O"adO 3the no"le and the igno"le consciousness9, possess truth% 0P, 6.'1 )he hole normative dimension o! li!e is re#ected as illusor$% )here aren-t reall$ an$ norms, no distinction in ho things are in themselves "et een hat is appropriate or !itting and hat not, "et een hat one is o"liged to do and hat is not permitted% So the institutions that administer and appl$ those norms are !ounded on lies, are deceptive !rame orks !or the pursuit o! private ends and interests% )his conclusion is the conseBuence o! the modern discover$ that the norms are not simpl$ o"#ectivel$ there, independentl$ o! our attitudes and activities, in the conte&t o! a conception o! normative authorit$ as independence that o"liges one to treat that !act as demonstrating that the$ have no real authorit$ over our attitudes at all% (! the norms are dependent on hat individuals do, i! the acts and attitudes su"#ect to assessment according to those norms "ear some responsi"ilit$ !or those norms, then hat individuals do cannot, on the alienated practical conception o! authorit$ as independence, "e genuinel$ responsi"le to those norms% <orms are an illusion% )here are onl$ attitudes% )he h$per* o"#ective traditional picture o! normativit$ gives rise to a h$per*su"#ective modern, alienated conception, according to hich the ver$ idea o! a norm is a mere pro#ection o! our attitudes, o! practical distinctions made "$ individuals%

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But i! there reall$ are no norms, then the attitudes themselves can have no real content% (! the distinctions "et een good and "ad, right and rong, correct and incorrect, have no genuine content, then neither do attitudes o! ackno ledging or assessing acts as good or "ad, right or rong, correct or incorrect% /nd i! that is right, then hat o! the attitudes o! those ho practice the itt$, nihilistic talkE :n the one hand, it represents the triumph o! individual su"#ective attitude over norms, the assertion o! the authorit$ o! attitudes, in particular, its o n attitudes, over normative distinctions% F)his #udging and talking is, there!ore, hat is true and invinci"le, hile it overpo ers ever$thing%G 0P, 6.'1 :n the other hand, that nihilism is sel!*undercutting% Fthe vanit$ o! all things is its o n vanit$, it is itsel! vain%G 0P, 6.71 )he itt$ talk hich Fkno s ho to pass #udgement on and chatter a"out ever$thingGdenies the correctness o! talk o! ho things are in themselves, seeing onl$ ho the$ are !or consciousness% So it has no a$ to make intelligi"le even the notion o! ho things are !or consciousness, including !or itsel!% 2or the content o! such an attitude depends on its normative e&clusion o! other such attitudes% )he consciousness that is a are o! its disruption and openl$ declares it, derides e&istence and the universal con!usion, and derides its o n sel! as ellP)his vanit$ o! all realit$ and ever$ de!inite <otion 0is1 vanit$ hich kno s itsel! to "e suchP 0P, 6.61 )he practical understanding this disrupted consciousness has o! its o n attitudes is ironic% (t still makes distinctions and emplo$s concepts, "ut it does not take its

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commitments seriousl$, does not take itsel! to "e undertaking responsi"ilities "$ its talk% F)he content o! hat Spirit sa$s a"out itsel! is thus the perversion o! ever$ <otion and realit$, the universal deception o! itsel! and others%G 0P, 6..1 F(n that vanit$, all content is turned into something negative hich can no longer "e grasped as having a positive signi!icance%G 0P, 6.71 So the attitude o! this FlaceratedG consciousness to its o n attitudes must "e distanced and remote% (ts ironic stance consists in not identi!$ing even ith its o n attitudes, hich it kno s to "e in the end vain and contentless, never mind ith the norms to hich those attitudes on their !ace pro!ess allegiance% (ts language e&presses and enacts pure alienationA it kno s ever$thing to "e sel!*alienated, "eing*!or*sel! is separated !rom "eing*in*itsel!I hat is meant, and purpose, are separated !rom truthI and !rom "oth again, the "eing*!or*another, the ostensi"le meaning !rom the real meaning, !rom the true thing and intentionP% (t is the sel!*disruptive nature o! all relationships and the conscious disruption o! them% 0P, 6.71

Still, the adoption o! this nihilistic recognitive attitude remains a characteristicall$ modern assertion o! the authorit$ o! the individuala mani!estation o! the rise o! su"#ectivit$, even i! a perverse overreaction% (t is a Fsel!*centred sel!G 0P, 6.71, hich seeks recognition o! itsel! in its e&ercise o! the po er to ma e the norms vain "$ ta ing them to "e so% )his vanit$ at the same time needs the vanit$ o! all things in order to get !rom them the consciousness o! sel!I it there!ore creates this vanit$ itsel!

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and is the soul that supports it% Po er and ealth are the supreme ends o! its e&ertions, it kno s that through renunciation and sacri!ice it !orms itsel! into the universal, attains to the possession o! it, and in this possession is universall$ recognized and acceptedA state po er and ealth are the real and ackno ledged po ers% Ho ever, this recognition and acceptance is itsel! vainI and #ust "$ taking possession o! po er and ealth it kno s them to "e ithout a sel! o! their o n, kno s rather that it is the po er over them, hile the$ are vain things% 0P, 6.71 (ts merel$ ironic, mock renunciation and sacri!ice is no genuine recognition at all% (t is a petition to "e recognized as not recognizing% (t is accordingl$ visi"le as a strateg$ o! Haster$% )he same application o! categories o! independence 3the atomistic practical conception o! authorit$ as as$mmetric and nonreciprocal, as not onl$ not necessaril$, "ut not even possi"l$ "alanced "$ a co*ordinate responsi"ilit$9 that shapes its take on the relations "et een norms and attitudes shapes its sel!*consciousness as ell%

Section #II: The Model of &anguage

Language is the medium in hich the ultimatel$ recognitive relations among sel!* conscious individuals, their acts, their normative attitudes, the norms the$ are

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"ound "$, the practices in hich those norms are implicit, their communities, and their institutions are not onl$ e&pressed, "ut instituted and instantiated% )hat is h$ the de!ormations in that constellation that are its alienation take the !orm o! distinctive linguistic practicesmost e&plicitl$, ironic relations "et een individuals and the culture*constituting norms, hich are seen as pious !ictions% Hodernit$ is characterized "$ a one*sided !ocus on the normative signi!icance o! some o! these elements at the e&pense o! others% Paradigmaticall$ this is the privileging o! the authorit$ o! individuals and their acts and attitudes, construing them as independent o! and authoritative ith respect to the norms the$ !all under% )he ver$ !act that language has come to the !ore as the recognitive medium in hich conceptual normativit$ is articulated o!!ers some guidance as to ho the one*sidedness o! the modern appreciation o! the signi!icance o! su"#ectivit$ 3alienation9 can "e overcome, ithout having to give up the insight that marks the shi!t !rom traditional to modern culture as an e&pressivel$ progressive trans!ormation o! our sel!*consciousness% 2or it means that our model !or the articulation o! ,eist should "e the relations among individual language users, their speech acts, the attitudes those speech acts e&press, linguistic norms, linguistic practices, linguistic communities, and languages% )he move "e$ond modernit$ ill reBuire us to understand ho the "indingness o! o"#ective conceptual norms is compati"le "oth ith those norms "eing hat makes particular desiring organisms into geistig, sel!*conscious individuals and ith those norms "eing instituted "$ the practices such individuals engage inA practices o! appl$ing concepts in the #udgments and actions that e&press their commitments

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and other attitudes% (mplemented practicall$, in actual and not #ust pure consciousness, that understanding ill take the !orm o! a move !rom the relations "et een individuals and their conceptuall$ articulated norms e&hi"iting the structure o! irony to e&hi"iting the structure o! trust%

De have seen, "eginning alread$ in Chapter ) o, that there is a !undamental social division o! normative la"or corresponding to the distinction "et een the force and content o! speech acts% )he !orce 32regean +Kra!t-9 is the normative signi!icance o! a speech actA hat di!!erence it makes to the commitments and responsi"ilities that the speaker ackno ledges, undertakes, or licenses others to attri"ute% )he content is hat determines what one has committed onesel! to or made onesel! responsi"le !or "$ per!orming a speech act ith that content% )he ke$ point is that per!orming a speech act 3e&pressing a linguistic attitude, such as a "elie! or intention9 involves co*ordinate dimensions o! authority o! the speaker concerning the claiming, and responsibility ith respect to hat is claimed% Dhen e talk, making claims a"out ho things are, or e&pressing intentions as to ho the$ shall "e, there is al a$s something that is up to each one o! us, and something that is not% (t is up to each o! us hich move e make, hat concept e appl$, hat counter in the language game e pla$% /nd then it-s not up to us hat the signi!icance o! that is, given the content o! hat e have said% So it is up to me hether ( claim that this pen is made o! copper, hether ( pla$ the +copper- counter that is in pla$ in our practices% But i! ( do pla$ it, ( have "ound m$sel! "$ a set o! normsI ( have committed m$sel! to things independentl$ o!

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hether ( realize hat ( have committed m$sel! to% (n this sense, the normative status ( have taken on outruns m$ normative attitudes% Dhat ( am actuall$ committed to need not coincide ith hat ( ta e m$sel! to "e committed to% 3)he linguistic )at goes "e$ond the linguistic HandlungA the distinction that speech acts involve%9 (! ( sa$ that the pen is copper, then hether ( kno it or not ( have committed m$sel! to its melting at '85N%= degrees, "ecause hat (-m sa$ing cannot "e true unless that is true too% (t is up to me hether ( pla$ the counter, make that move, invest m$ authorit$ or normative !orce in that content, "ut then not up to me hat ( have committed m$sel! to "$ it, hat commitments ( have ruled out, hat ould entitle me to it% )he normative signi!icance o! the move ( have made, the "oundaries o! the responsi"ilit$ ( have undertaken is not up to meI it is a matter o! the linguistic norms that articulate the concepts ( have chosen to appl$%

)he conceptual norms determined "$ the content o! the concepts speakers appl$ in #udgment and intention are administered "$ the linguistic communit$, hich accordingl$ e&ercises an authorit$ correlative to that o! the speaker% Hetallurgical e&perts kno a great deal more than ( do a"out hat ( have claimed, hat ( have committed m$sel! to, "$ calling the pen +copper-% )hose to hom ( am speaking, those ho attri"ute and assess m$ speech act, have a certain kind o! privilegeA the authorit$ to keep a di!!erent set o! "ooks on its conseBuences than ( do% (t is important to Hegel that even e&pert audiences are not fully authoritative concerning the content% )he$ do not determine melting point o! copper% )hat is a

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matter o! ho things are in themselves, hich is not a matter o! ho things are !or the e&perts, or the rest o! the communit$, an$ more than it is a matter o! ho things are !or the speaker% )he norms are not something that can simpl$ "e read o!! o! the attitudes o! either% De have alread$ seen something o! ho Hegel ants to reconstruct the o"#ective, representational dimension o! discourse, the hat it is !or there to "e re!erents that are authoritative !or our in!erences, the noumena "ehind the phenomena, the realities "ehind the appearances, in terms o! the historical structure o! discursive practice% :ne o! the principal aims o! the second hal! o! this chapter is !urther to delineate the !ine structure o! the diachronic, historical account o! the relations "et een normative !orce and conceptual content% But the !act that there is a third pole o! authorit$, "esides that o! the speaker and o! the linguistic communit$, should not "e taken to minimize the authorit$ that the communit$ does e&ercise ith respect to conceptual content%

2urther, i! e ask ho the term +copper- came to e&press the content that it does, so that assertions emplo$ing it have the normative signi!icance that the$ do, the stor$ e tell is going to have to include the practices o! the linguistic communit$ in Buestion, the acts individual speakers have actuall$ per!ormed in concrete circumstances, and the assessments o! the correctness or incorrectness o! those per!ormances that their !ello communit$ mem"ers have actuall$ made% Someho , "$ using the e&pression +copper- the a$ e havein concert ith the uses e have made o! a hole lot o! other e&pressions e have managed to make +copper-*claims "eholden to ho it o"#ectivel$ is ith copper% De have

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incorporated !eatures o! the orld into the norms e collectivel$ administer, instituting a sense o! correctness according to hich the correctness o! our +copper- claims ans ers to the !acts a"out copper% /s the point as put in Chapter ) o, #udging and acting intentionall$ must "e understood "oth as the process o! applying conceptual norms and as the process o! instituting those norms% 3;ecall the slogan that in this respect, Hegel is to Kant as Cuine is to Carnap%9 (n terms e ill "e concerned ith !urther along, the !irst is the process o! giving contingenc$ the !orm o! necessit$, the second the process o! incorporating contingenc$ into necessit$% )he move !rom theoretical and practical application o! categories o! independence to categories o! freedom 3!rom Lerstand to Lernun!t9 promises to give us a conceptual apparatus !or "oth, on the one hand, identi!$ing ourselves as the products o! norms that incorporate !eatures o! the o"#ective orld like hat the melting point o! copper is and, on the other hand, seeing our activit$ as having instituted those norms, the norms that make that !act potentiall$ visi"le and e&pressi"le%

2ocusing on the linguistic character o! modern recognitive processesthe practices o! adopting speci!ic recognitive attitudes, that is, o! ackno ledging and attri"uting conceptuall$ content!ul commitments, responsi"ilities, and licensings provides a ne perspective on the notion o! !reedom, hich is characteristic o! Lernun!t% /ccording to the Kantian !rame ork Hegel takes over, agenc$ is thought o! as a matter o! hat agents are responsi"le !or% /gents 3and kno ers9 are creatures ho live and move and have their "eing in a normative space,

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creatures ho can commit themselves, ho can undertake and attri"ute responsi"ilit$ and e&ercise authorit$% Concepts determine hat one has committed onesel! to, hat one has made onesel! responsi"le !or in acting intentionall$ 3and #udging9% )his !rame ork leads Kant to distinguish "et een the realm o! nature and the realm o! !reedom in normative terms% )o "e free in his sense is to "e "ound "$ norms, to "e a"le to per!orm intentional actions and make #udgments, hich is to sa$ to "e a"le to undertake commitments% )hat is to "e a"le to make onesel! responsi"le in the a$s articulated "$ concepts, hich are rules !or determining hat one has committed onesel! to, !or instance, "$ calling the pen +copper-% :ne o! the radical !eatures o! this normative conception o! !reedom as constraint "$ norms is that it is a conception o! positive, rather than negative !reedom%'= <egative !reedom is !reedom from somethingA the a"sence o! some sort o! constraint% Positive !reedom is !reedom to do somethingA the presence o! some sort o! a"ilit$% (n Kant-s picture o! the !reedom characteristic

o! geistig, normative "eings, the capacit$ that the$ have to commit themselves, to undertake responsi"ilities, is o! a kind o! positive !reedom% )he$ are a"le to do something that merel$ natural creatures cannot% 2reedom !or Kant is the capacit$ to constrain onesel! "$ something more than the la s o! naturethe capacit$ to constrain onesel! normativel$, "$ undertaking commitments and responsi"ilities, ackno ledging authorit$, and so on%

'=

)he terminolog$ is due to (saiah Berlin, F) o Concepts o! Li"ert$G, in )our *ssays on 'iberty 0:&!ord Mniversit$ Press, '?7?1%

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:ne a$ in hich the model o! language helps us think a"out the possi"ilit$ o! overcoming alienation, then, is that it e&hi"its an unalienated com"ination o! authorit$ o! individual attitudes and their responsi"ilit$ to genuinel$ "inding norms% 2or linguistic practice e&hi"its a social division o! la"or% (t is up to each individual hich speech acts to per!ormA hich claims to make, hich intentions and plans to endorse% )he original source o! linguistic commitments is the acts and attitudes o! individual speakers% (n undertaking those commitments, those speakers e&ercise a distinctive kind o! authorit$% But in doing so, as an unavoida"le part o! doing so, the$ make themselves responsi"le to the norms that articulate the contents o! the concepts the$ have applied% Committing onesel! in asserting or e&pressing an intention is licensing the rest o! one-s communit$ to hold one responsi"le% )he speaker and agent-s authorit$ is not onl$ compatible ith a co*ordinate responsi"ilit$ 3that is, authorit$ on the part o! the norms, administered "$ the communit$9, it is unintelligi"le as determinatel$ content!ul apart !rom such responsi"ilit$% )he individual has authorit$ over the normative force, the undertaking o! a commitment, onl$ "$ making himsel! responsi"le to the orld and to others !or the content o! the commitment% )he positive !reedom to e&ercise authorit$ "$ undertaking determinatel$ content!ul commitments reBuires giving up some negative !reedom, "$ making onesel! responsi"le%

Mnlike Kant, Hegel has a social practice account o! the nature o! normativit$% 2reedom !or him is accordingl$ not a holl$ individual achievement, not something that can "e understood agent "$ agent% (t is possi"le onl$ in the

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conte&t o! communities, practices, and institutions that have the right structure% Because normativit$ is a social achievement, !reedom is an essentiall$ political phenomenon, in a a$ it is not !or Kant% )his di!!erence "et een the t o thinkers is connected to another oneA !reedom is a comparative normative phenomenon !or Hegel in a a$ that it is not !or Kant% <ot ever$one ho is constrained "$ norms is !ree, according to Hegel% :nl$ norm*instituting recognitive communities and institutions ith the right structure constitute free sel!*conscious individuals% )he paradigm o! that ideal !reedom*instituting structure is linguistic normativit$%

/ classic, perennial, in some sense de!ining pro"lem o! political philosoph$ has al a$s "een to e&plain ho and on hat grounds it could "e rational !or an individual to accept some communal constraint on her ill% Dhat could #usti!$ the loss o! negative !reedom the !reedom !rom constraintthat $ou get "$ entering into a communit$ and su"#ecting $oursel! to their norms, ackno ledging the authorit$ o! those normsE :ne can easil$ see ho that could "e #usti!ied !orm the point o! vie o! the communit$% Mnless people act right and con!orm to the norms there are lots o! things the communit$ cannot do% )he challenge has "een to sa$, ho one could #usti!$ that loss o! negative !reedom, as rational on the part o! the individual% ;esponses to this challenge !orm a !avorite literar$ genre in the Enlightenment% 3Ho""es and Locke are paradigmatic practitioners%9 Hegel sa in Kant-s notion o! positive !reedom, the possi"ilit$ o! a ne kind o! response to this challenge% (n this conte&t the model o! language takes on a special importance% His ans er is that some kinds o! normative constraint provide a positive !reedom, hich,

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in Hegel-s distinctive vie , and moving "e$ond Kant, is expressive !reedom% /nd the model !or the e&ercise o! that sort o! !reedom is talking%

Su"seBuent developments have put us in a some hat "etter position to sa$ hat is promising a"out the linguistic model o! positive !reedom% )hink to "egin ith a"out the astonishing empirical o"servation ith hich Chomsk$ inaugurated modern linguistics the o"servation that almost ever$ sentence uttered "$ an adult native speaker is a novel sentence% (t is ne , not #ust in the sense that that spea er has never produced or heard e&actl$ that string o! ords "e!ore, "ut in the much stronger sense that no one in the histor$ o! the orld has ever heard e&actl$ that string o! ords "e!ore% FHave a nice da$G ma$ get a lot o! pla$, "ut !or an$ tolera"l$ comple& sentence 3a sentence dra n at random !rom this te&t, !or instance9, the odds o! an$"od$ having uttered it "e!ore 3unless e-re in Buotation mode9 are reall$ in!initesimal% )his is an o"servation that has "een empiricall$ veri!ied over and over again "$ e&amining large corpora, transcri"ing actual conversations, and so on% /nd it is eas$ to sho on !undamental grounds% /lthough e do not have a grammar that ill generate all and onl$ sentences o! EnglishI e have lots o! grammars that generate onl$ sentences o! English% (! $ou look at ho man$ sentences o!, sa$, !e er than .6 ords there are, even in the voca"ular$ o! "asic English, 6,888 ords 3the average speaker ma$ use .8,8889, $ou can see that there hasn-t "een time !or a measura"le proportion o! them to "e uttered, even i! ever$one al a$s spoke English and did nothing "ut talk% So linguistic competence is the capacit$ to produce and understand an inde!inite num"er o! novel sentences% Chomsk$ anted to kno ho that is possi"le%

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Ho ever the trick is done, "eing a"le to do it is a kind o! positive linguistic e&pressive !reedom% )he !act is that hen $ou speak a language, $ou get the capacit$ to !ormulate an inde!inite num"er o! novel claims, and so to entertain an inde!inite num"er o! novel intentions, plans, and con#ectures% )hat is a kind o! positive !reedom to make and entertain novel claims, things that could "e true, or things one could commit onesel! to making true% :ne onl$ gets this e&plosion o! positive e&pressive !reedom, though, "$ constraining onesel! "$ linguistic normsthe norms one must ackno ledge in practice as "inding in order to "e speaking some particular language% Ho ever open*te&tured those norms ma$ "e, the$ involve genuine constraint% (! one does not su!!icientl$ respect the linguistic norms, then one ends up not sa$ing, or thinking, an$thing at all% :! course, one need not sa$ an$thing% :ne could #ust not ever sa$ an$thing, though at the cost, as Sellars sa$s, o! having nothing to sa$% But the onl$ a$ $ou one can "u$ this positive, e&pressive !reedom is "$ pa$ing a price in negative !reedom% :ne must constrain onesel! "$ linguistic and conceptual norms% Dhen one is speaking one-s o n language and not using !anc$ voca"ular$, that constraint "ecomes invisi"le% (t "ecomes much more visi"le hen speaking in a language in hich one is not !luent% )he point here is that the a$ in hich the language one does constrain onesel! "$ "ecomes the medium in hich one-s self not onl$ e&presses, "ut develops itsel! is a paradigm o! central importance !or Hegel%

(n the conte&t o! the essentiall$ political, "ecause social, account o! the nature o! normativit$, the paradigm o! linguistic norms provides the !orm o! an argument a"out ho it could "e rational to give up some kind o! negative !reedom, constraining onesel! "$ norms, making onesel! and one-s per!ormances responsi"le to them 3lia"le to

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assessment according to them9 "$ practicall$ ackno ledging them as authoritative% 2or consider a rational assessment o! the costs and "ene!its o! trading o!! some minor negative !reedom !or the "onanza o! positive e&pressive !reedom that comes ith constraining onesel! "$ linguistic norms% 3/n$ such assessment ould have to "e retrospective, o! course, since an$one ho has not $et made the deal is not in a position rationall$ to assess an$thing%9 Can there "e an$ dou"t that the trade*o!! is orth itE Even though the "easts o! !ield and !orest are not in a position to make this argument, it seems clear that it ould "e rational !or them to em"race this sort o! normative constraint i! the$ ere%

Part o! Hegel-s thought a"out ho

e can move "e$ond modernit$, and a lesson e

should learn !rom the one "ig thing that ever happened to Spirit, is that this is the paradigm o! !reedom !or normative, discursive "eings like us, and that political institutions and the normative constraint the$ e&ercise should "e #usti!ia"le in e&actl$ the same a$ that conceptual linguistic ones are% (n particular, ever$ loss o! negative !reedom should "e more than compensated !or "$ an increase in positive e&pressive !reedom% )his is the capacit$ to undertake ne kinds o! commitments, ne kinds o! responsi"ilit$, to ackno ledge and e&ercise ne kinds o! authorit$ all o! hich at once e&press and develop the sel!*conscious individuals ho are the su"#ects o! those ne norms% )his is a paradigm and measure o! #usti!ia"le political constraint% )his is ho it can "e rationall$ legitimatedperhaps onl$ retrospectivel$, since the positive e&pressive !reedom in Buestion ma$ not "e prospectivel$ intelligi"le, as it is not in the paradigmatic linguistic case% )he demand is that ever$ aspect o! the loss o! negative !reedom, o! the

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constraint "$ norms that individuals take on, is compensated !or man$ times over "$ an increase in positive e&pressive !reedom% )he !orm o! a rational #usti!ication !or a political institution and its immanent norms is to sho that it is language*like%

Language is o! course not a distinctivel$ modern institution% )here is no ,eist o! an$ kind apart !rom linguistic practices% But e can see that the stakes are high hen he sees language as coming to pla$ a distinctive role in the normative recognitive structure o! modernit$% ;ather than "eing #ust one optional !orm in hich the !orce o! norms can "e ackno ledged and their content e&pressed, language "ecomes the medium in hich the norms are instituted% )here are pro!ound conseBuences to seeing the rise o! su"#ectivit$ in the !orm o! the ackno ledgment o! the rights o! intention and kno ledge, the advent o! a ne kind o! sel!*conscious individualit$, as "ringing ith it this ne institutional centralit$ o! language% Hegel-s philosoph$ o! languagehis account o! the relations among speakers, their acts and attitudes, the linguistic communities the$ "elong to, and the linguistic norms that make up the language itsel!, and the idiom in hich that account is articulatedma$ "e the part o! his thought that is o! the most contemporar$ philosophical interest and value% )hat is partl$ "ecause he attri"utes deep political signi!icance to the replacement o! a semantic model o! atomistic representation "$ one o! holistic e&pression%

Section #III: 'ure %onsciousness

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/s actual consciousness is divided into State Po er and Dealth, pure consciousness is divided into 2aith and Enlightenment% /s those competing practical normative structures o! individuals, norms, and institutions line up ith the t o poles o! recognition, agenc$, logic, and !orm, so too do the competing theoretical normative structures%

Pure Consciousnes s 2aith

Actual Consciousnes s State Po er

$ecognition

!gency

&ogic: %ontent(Forc

Form

;ecognitive Communit$

)atA /gent*

e Mniversal @ <ecessar$ 3<orm9 Particular @ Contingent 3Per!ormance9

(n itsel!A :"#ectivit$ 2or consciousnessA Su"#ectivit$

Enlightenment

Dealth

;ecognizing@;ecognized (ndividual Sel!* Consciousnesses

;esponsi"ilit$ HandlungA /gent* /uthorit$

/lso like State Po er and Dealth, even though 2aith and Enlightenment each represent and e&press #ust one side o! these various distinctions* ithin*spiritual*identities, the$ too comprise not onl$ norms and the individuals su"#ect to them, "ut also practices and institutions in hich those norms are implicit% 2aith and Enlightenment are not #ust theories o! normativit$I the$ are institutionali%ed theories% )he characteristicall$ alienated structure o! modern normativit$ sho s up not onl$ in the relations "et een the competing !orms o! actual consciousness, "ut also in the relations "et een the competing alienated theories o! normativit$ em"odied "$ 2aith and Enlightenment% )hat is to sa$ that in "oth cases the relations o! authorit$ and responsi"ilit$ "et een the t o su"structures are practicall$ construed on the model o! independence, hence as

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competing and incompati"le, rather than on the model o! !reedom, as reciprocal and mutuall$ presupposing%

B$ telling us hat he thinks 2aith is right a"out, hat he thinks Enlightenment is right a"out, ho 2aith looks to Enlightenment and ho Enlightenment looks to 2aith, Hegel assem"les ra materials that are crucial !or the transition !rom modernit$ to /"solute Kno ing% (n general, Hegel-s reading o! 2aiththe distinctivel$ modern, alienated !orm o! religionis a successor pro#ect to Kant-s Religion +ithin the ,ounds of Reason Alone, a "ook that had had a tremendous in!luence on Hegel 3and his classmates Schelling and HUlderlin9 hen he as still a student at the Sti!t% Dhere Kant had looked !or the rational moral teachings that ere e&pressed in sensuous images in Christianit$, Hegel seeks also lessons a"out the metaph$sics o! sel!*conscious individualit$ and social su"stance% 3)he transition !rom the discussion o! 2aith and Enlightenment in the middle section, L(B, o! Spirit to the discussion o! Horalit$ in L(C parallels that !rom Perception to )orce and -nderstandingA the move !rom an understanding o! universalit$ that is restricted to sense universals to one in hich immediac$ merel$ marks and e&presses a structure o! universals hose content is articulated "$ the relations o! mediation among them%9

)hese passages a"out a core structure o! 2aith are a paradigm o! ho Hegel gives a metaph$sical reading o! religious imager$A Here, in the realm o! !aith, the !irst is the a"solute "eing, spirit that is in and !or itsel! inso!ar as it is the simple eternal su"stance% But, in the

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actualization o! its notion, in "eing spirit it passes over into "eing !or another, its sel!*identit$ "ecomes an actual sel!*sacri!icing a"solute "eing, it "ecomes a sel!, "ut a mortal, perisha"le sel!% ConseBuentl$, the third moment is the return o! this alienated sel! and o! the humiliated su"stance into their original simplicit$% :nl$ in this a$ is su"stance represented as spirit% 0P, 65.1 )hese distinct "eings, hen "rought "ack to themselves "$ thought out o! the !lu& o! the actual orld, are immuta"le, eternal spirits, hose "eing lies in thinking the unit$ the$ constitute% 0P, 6551 )his is his reading o! the actual signi!icance and deep meaning o! the doctrine o! the )rinit$% 3Similar accounts are !ound throughout his ork, nota"l$ in the Science of 'ogic%9 He thinks that the doctrine o! the )rinit$ is reall$ talking a"out the structure o! spirit, that is, o! social su"stance, and that the communit$ and the norms that are implicit in the communal doings is hat ,od the 2ather in the )rinit$ is the image o!% )he su"stance is social su"stance% )hat is the medium in hich the norms inhere% (n the model, that is the language% /nd those norms, Fpassing over into "eing !or another, "ecoming a sel!, a mortal, perisha"le, sel!Gin the image, the inter!usion o! humanit$ and divinit$ in ,od the Sonis the actual speakers, ho are "ound and constituted as sel!*conscious individuals "$ those norms, and the actual utterances o! those speakers% /nd the relations "et een themthe a$ in hich speakers and their utterances are hat the$ are onl$ "$ virtue o! the linguistic norms that govern them, and the norms are onl$ actualized "$ "eing applied to actual utterances "$ speakers and audiencesthat is the Hol$ Spirit in the )rinit$% So e have the universals or norms, their perisha"le

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incarnation raised a"ove mere particularit$, hich is also the actualization o! those norms, and the relation "et een them in individualit$% )he lesson Hegel dra s is that the "eing o! these spirits Flies in thinking the unit$ the$ constitute,G that is, in understanding his recognitive account o! normativit$ and individualit$% (t is a measure o! the a$ he orks that Hegel goes "ack and !orth cheer!ull$ "et een the logical voca"ular$, the theological voca"ular$, and the linguistic*cum*normative voca"ular$ !or talking a"out these things% )he religious language is a sensous allegor$ !or the most !undamental metaph$sical idea Hegel has%

)hinking o! the universal and particular elements o! individualit$ 3the divine and the human9 as standing in !amilial relations is construing mediation as immediac$% Mniversalit$ is thought o! as "eing a kind o! thingA in man$ a$s, like the things here, onl$ some here else, over there, in a "e$ond 3in a di!!erent ontological zip code !rom ours9% (n a corresponding and complementar$ approach, Enlightenment construes universalit$ and normativit$ as rationalit$% )his good thought sho s up onl$ in alienated !orm, ho ever, hen rationalit$ is then thought o! as a matter*o!*!actual dispositional propert$ that happens to "e shared "$ some particular organisms or kind o! organism hen our "eing geistig "eings is put in a "o& ith having opposa"le thum"s% )he lesson o! the transition !rom Perception to )orce and -nderstanding as that the universals, the conceptual norms that articulate !acts that sho up in the !orm o! la s, ere supposed to "e understood not as a supersensi"le orld o! theoretical entities standing "ehind and ontologicall$ distinguished !rom the o"#ects that sho up in sense, "ut rather as the implicit structure or articulation o! themthe modal articulation o! o"serva"le !act% (n

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the same a$, here, that is the lesson e-re supposed to learn a"out hat he insists is the common topic o! 2aith, under the heading o! the religious a"solute, and o! Enlightenment, under the heading o! reason% <ormativit$, universalit$, is not to see that as some kind o! a thing, either over there or in individual human "eings, "ut rather as implicit in the articulation o! individuals in a communit$, their recognitive interpla$, and the utterances and attitudes that actualize and e&press%

Enlightenment-s critiBue o! 2aith sho s some understanding o! this lesson% /s Hegel reconstructs that critiBue, it is a three*pronged attack% )here is an ontological claim, an epistemological claim, and a practical, moral, claim% )he !irst is that 2aith makes an ontological mistake% (t thinks that something e&ists, hen it does not% ,od is not in !act part o! the !urniture o! the orld% )hinking there is such a "eing is #ust a generalization to the orld as a hole o! pre* modern, magical thinking, hich sees ordinar$ sensi"le material o"#ects as enchanted, possessed o! magical properties% ,enericall$, this mistake is o! a piece ith thinking that there is a tiger in the ne&t room, hen in !act the room is empt$%

)he epistemological o"#ection o! Enlightement to 2aith is that even i! there ere such an o"#ect, e could not come to kno a"out it in the a$ 2aith claims to kno a"out ,od% )he actual epistemological grounds !or "elie! in this a"solute are pre#udice, error, gulli"ilit$, con!usion, stupidit$% 2aith claims an immediate relation to the /"solute, "ut in !act all the content o! its purported kno ledge depends on contingent, empirical

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claims% Claims o! miracles, accidental preservation o! evidence o! the kno ledge o! those occurrences through scripture, and correct interpretation o! the te&t cannot "ear the eight o! the "elie! that is predicated on it%

)hird, enlightenment accuses !aith o! "ad intention or motivation or errors o! action, o! immoral activit$% )he priests are accused o! tricker$, the pretense o! insight and kno ledge, using that as a means to amass po er% )he proo! o! that is the a$ despotism, through the doctrine o! divine right o! kings, is a state po er that emplo$s the gulli"ilit$ and "ad insight o! the masses and the tricker$ o! the priests to esta"lish itsel!% So, enlightenment sa$s, the ontological mistake and epistemological mistakes o! religion are put in service o! "ad political and moral activit$, and despotism and religious institutions are t o hands that ash each other% 3)his is the enlightenment attitude that is summed up pithil$ "$ Loltaire, ho sa$s that he ill onl$ "e happ$ hen the last king is strangled ith the guts o! the last priest%9

Hegel responds to these !amiliar, telling complaints, that Enlightenment is !undamentall$ misunderstanding 2aith "$ seeing it as in the !irst instance standing in a cognitive relation to some thingas consisting at "ase in a claim to nowledge o! the /"solute% )he criticisms as to evidence, the ungenerous attri"ution o! igno"le motives !or promulgating this "elie! 3 hich e-ll consider !urther in Section J9all o! these things depend on seeing !aith as making a matter*o!*!actual claim a"out ho things are, a"out hich e can then ask !or its epistemological credentials, and a"out the matter o! !actual truth or !alsit$ o! the claim% 2or Hegel, 2aith is, in the !irst instance, a matter o! realizing a

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certain sel!*conception% (t is not a kind o! cognition, "ut a kind o! recognition, and there!ore a kind o! self-constitution% ,enericall$, it is the identi!ication o! the individual sel! ith its universal rather than its particular aspect% )hat identi!ication ith the universal takes the !orm o! sacri!icing particular su"#ective attitudes and interests through service and orship%

)hat is, not, as in the original, melodramatic picture o! the transition !rom nature to spirit, here the !irst Hasters pulled themselves "$ their o n "ootstraps out o! the muck o! nature "$ "eing illing to risk their "iological li!e !or a normative status, !or a !orm o! authorit$, to "e recognized as having that normative status "$ "eing illing to die !or the cause, "ut "$ "eing illing to live !or it, "ut "$ su"merging particular desires to the communal norms% )hat is the sacri!ice o! service and orship% (n that a$, like the !irst sort o! Haster, "elieving consciousness succeeds in making itsel! something other than hat it alread$ as, constitutes itsel! as something more than that% )hat is hat !aith reall$ consists in% )he reason the criticisms o! 2aith "$ Enlightenment miss their mark, on this account, is that the sel!*conception to hich a communit$ is in this a$ practicall$ committed to realizing is not the having o! a "elie! that could turn out to "e radicall$ !alse% (t does not stand in that sort o! a relation to its orld% (t is a doinga making, not a taking% (t-s a recognition, kind o! sel!*constitution, not a kind o! cognition% Dhat it is a"out, the truth that the certaint$ o! the "eliever is ans era"le to, is not something distinct !rom the "eliever in the communit$I it is something that i! all goes ell, the "elievers ma e true o! themselves% (! not, the !ailure is practical, not cognitive%

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2aith, !or the "eliever, is not an alien thing hich is #ust !ound in him, no one kno ing ho and hence it came% :n the contrar$, the !aith o! the "eliever consists #ust in him !inding himsel! as this particular personal consciousness in the a"solute "eing, and his o"edience and service consist in producing, through his o n activit$, that "eing as his o n a"solute "eing% 0P, 6771 But here enlightenment is !oolish% 2aith regards it as not understanding the real !acts hen it talks a"out priestl$ deception and deluding the people% (t talks a"out this as i! "$ some hocus pocus o! con#uring priests, consciousness has "een pa ned o!! ith something a"solutel$ alien and other to it in place o! its o n essence% (t is impossi"le to deceive a people in this manner% Brass instead o! gold, counter!eit instead o! genuine mone$ ma$ ell "e passed o!!, at least in isolated cases% Han$ ma$ "e persuaded to "elieve that a "attle lost as a "attle on, and other lies a"out things o! sense and isolated happenings ma$ "e credi"le !or a time% But in the kno ledge o! that essential "eing in hich consciousness has immediate certaint$ o! itsel!, the idea o! this sort o! delusion is Buite out o! the Buestion%0 P, 6681 )he language o! "elie! is per!ormative, esta"lishing as ell as e&pressing social normative relationsnot #ust sa$ing ho things o"#ectivel$ are, independentl$ o! the attitudes o! the "elievers involved%

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Dhat is constituted "$ 2aith is a certain kind o! sel!*conscious individualit$% )he recognitive account o! sel!*consciousness tells us that this is possi"le onl$ i! a corresponding kind o! recognitive communit$ is instituted at the same time% )he religious communit$ is esta"lished "$ individuals- reciprocal recognition o! each other as serving and orshipping, hich is to sa$ as identi!$ing ith the norms through sacri!ice o! merel$ particular, su"#ective attitudes and interests o! the individuals the$ ould other ise "e% )his recognitive relation Hegel calls +trust- 0Lertrauen1% Dhomsoever ( trust, his certaint$ o! himsel! is !or me the certaint$ o! m$sel!I ( recognize in him m$ o n "eing*!or*sel!, kno that he ackno ledges it and that it is !or him purpose and essence% 0P, 6=?1 )he second part o! this passage puts three reBuirements !or an attitude to count as trust% )he trusting one must recognize her o n "eing*!or*sel!, her o n sel!*conception, in the trusted oneI the trusting one must correctl$ take it that that sel!*conception is ackno ledged "$ the trusted oneI and the trusted one must correctl$ take it that that sel!* conception is ackno ledged "$ the trusted one also as her o n% )he !irst part o! the passage sa$s that hen those conditions are met, the trusting individual counts as identi!$ing ith the trusted individual% So there is a kind o! emergent identi!ication* through*recognition here, according to hich identi!$ing ith the norms has the e!!ect or signi!icance o! identi!$ing ith other individuals ho also identi!$ their individual selves ith the norms% (denti!$ing ith 3"$ sacri!icing !or9 the norms, and recognizing other individuals as doing the same, is at once identi!$ing ith the communal side o! Spirit the recognitive communit$ in hose practices those norms are implicitand also identi!$ing ith the other individuals hom one recognizes as undertaking the same

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identi!ication% :ne is not identi!$ing ith the norms or the communit$ rather than ith the other individuals, "ut identi!$ing ith each "$ identi!$ing ith the other% Put another a$, "ecause o! the shared renunciation o! particularit$, the individuals one identi!ies ith "$ recognizing them as identi!$ing ith the communit$ and its norms are not "eing treated in practice as split into a particular and a universal aspect% Ever$one is identi!$ing ith the universal side o! individualit$% )he passage Buoted a"ove continuesA 2urther, since hat is o"#ect !or me is that in hich ( recognize m$sel!, ( am !or m$sel! at the same time in that o"#ect in the !orm o! another sel!* consciousness, i%e% one hich has "ecome in that o"#ect alienated !rom its particular individualit$, viz% !rom its natural and contingent e&istence, "ut hich partl$ remains therein sel!*consciousness, partl$, in that o"#ect, is an essential consciousnessP% 0P, 6=?1 )he communit$ s$nthesized "$ reciprocal recognition in the !orm o! trust sho s the a$ to the possi"ilit$ o! an unalienated communit$ o! sel!*conscious individuals% (t does not $et constitute such a communit$, "ecause the particularit$ o! the actual individual sel!* consciousnesses that actualize the norms "$ their acts and attitudes 3including their recognitive attitudes9 is still slighted% 2urther recognitive progress is reBuired to overcome alienation and move "e$ond the modern phase in the development o! Spirit% Mnalienated Spirit reBuires !urther recognitive structure "e$ond trust% But that the recognitive communit$ have the structure o! trust is one essential element o! Sittlichkeit a!ter the rise o! modern su"#ectivit$%

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Dhat trust "rings a"out is the Funit$ o! a"stract essence and sel!*consciousnessG, o! the norms "elieving individuals identi!$ ith and those "elievers% )hat unit$, Hegel claims, is the Fthe a"solute Being o! 2aith,G that is, the distinctive ob&ect o! religious "elie!% )he a"solute Being o! !aith is essentiall$ not the a"stract essence that ould e&ist "e$ond the consciousness o! the "elieverI on the contrar$, it is the Spirit o! the 0religious1 communit$, the unit$ o! the a"stract essence and sel!*consciousness% (t is the spirit o! the communit$, the unit$ o! the a"stract essence in sel!*consciousness% 0P, 6=?1 :n his vie , the real o"#ect o! religious veneration, Spirit, is not a ,od in the !orm o! a distinct thing that causall$ creates human "eings, "ut the religious communit$ that "elievers create "$ their recognitive identi!ication ith it and ith each other% )hat, a!ter all, is the lesson o! his reading o! the real lesson o! the Christian )rinit$A ,od the 2ather is the sensuousl$ clothed image o! the norm* governed communit$ s$nthesized "$ reciprocal recognitive attitudes 3having the structure o! trust9 among sel!*consciousness individuals% )he spiritual dimension o! human li!e, to ard hich religious "elievers properl$ direct their attention and respect, is hat must "e added to merel$ natural animals to make us persons, sel!* conscious individual selves, agents and kno ers, su"#ects o! normative assessment% )hat is the discursive normativit$ implicit in the practices o! a properl$ constituted recognitive communit$ o! language users%

)his vie is not as outrageousl$ heterodo& as it might other ise seem, hen it is vie ed in the conte&t o! the Pietist religious tradition in hich Hegel, like Kant,

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as raised% /lthough in this ork ( have generall$ avoided this sort o! discussion o! the intellectual historical conte&t provided "$ Hegel-s predecessors, it is orth sa$ing a !e ords a"out this movement here, "ecause it is important and

illuminating, largel$ un!amiliar to non*specialists, and provides a concrete e&ample o! the a$ Hegel incorporates, adapts, and trans!orms the traditions he inherits hat e ill come, later in this chapter, to recognize as the a$ he forgives them%

Pietism as a distinctivel$ ,erman intellectual movement that as important as providing the root !rom hich Kantian and post*Kantian pragmatism gre % (t thrived "ecause it !ound an environmental niche in hich it could challenge the a"uses o! an alread$ institutionalized Lutheranism among an increasingl$ educated and individualistic populace 3!or instance, the "urgher and artisan class !rom the ealth$ cities o! the old Hanseatic League9, hile at the same time not directl$ con!ronting its theoretical authorit$ 3 hich as in practice the "oundar$ line over hich the religious civil ars had "een !ought9% )he pietists did this "$ !ocusing not on theory, "ut on practice% )he$ called this the Second ;e!ormation 3and others have called it the triumph o! Erasmus over Luther9% (n theolog$ the$ spurned /ugustine in !avor o! his old opponent Pelagius, ho had long "een seen as attempting to rationalize Christianit$ "$ s$nthesizing its traditions ith those o! ;oman Stoicism% /ugustineOs emphasis on human dependence on gratuitous divine grace !or salvation contrasts ith PelagiusO emphasis on human responsi"ilit$ !or redemption and participation in the pro#ect o! salvation% (n place

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o! a vie o! man as depraved "$ original sin, redeema"le onl$ in the ne&t orld, Pelagius put !or ard an ideal o! per!ecti"ilit$, o! moral progress in this orld through sel!*control, education, and political involvement% )his latter involved an ethic o! V!reedom in and !reedom throughV communit$% He had a three*stage picture o! the moral progress and education o! mankind, ith each stage corresponding to a covenant ,od had entered into ith humanit$A a covenant o! nature ith /dam, a covenant o! la s ith Hoses, and a covenant o! grace ith Qesus% So the eschatolog$ the pietists inherited !rom Pelagius treats the Cit$ o! ,od not as something to "e achieved in another li!e, "ut as an in!inite task !or religious communities to achieve here on earth% Praxis pietatis is accordingl$ a communal striving to do good orks, one that puts special emphasis on secular education 3Bildung9 and personal improvement as the means here"$ the good could "e rationall$ discerned, and the ill to pursue it rationall$ cultivated% (n this a$ homo religiousus as to "e re!ormed, and civil li!e regenerated% )he pietists in particular, Crusius, the pre*eminent pietist intellectual o! his time, and the principal conduit through hich these ideas reached Kant and Hegelattacked Dol!!ian rationalism, the peak o! Enlightenment theory, !rom the point o! vie o! practice and the primac$ o! the practical% Hegel-s account o! 2aith is a metaph$sical radicalization o! this religious traditionone that s$nthesizes it in an a"solutel$ unprecedented a$ ith his o n semantic ideas a"out the transcendental conditions o! the possi"ilit$ o! determinatel$ content!ul conceptual norms%

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Even though its achievement o! a communit$ e&hi"iting the recognitive structure o! trust is a positive development, 2aith as Hegel descri"es it is still an alienated !orm o! sel!*consciousness% (t is alienated in that it does not suita"l$ and sel!* consciousl$ incorporate the particular element in its practical attitude to ard individualit$% (t is in !act the activit$ o! individuals that produces the communit$ and its implicit norms% 2urther, the relation o! each "elieving individual to that !or hich it sacri!ices and ith hich it identi!ies, the o"#ect o! its veneration, is mediated "$ its relations to other recognized and recognizing individuals, via those recognitive attitudes% But 2aith insists that it stands in an immediate relation to a"solute essence, and that the e&istence and nature o! that essence is holl$ independent o! the activities and attitudes o! "elievers% Dhereas in !act )hat 0the a"solute Being o! 2aith1 "e the spirit o! the communit$, this reBuires as a necessar$ moment the action o! the communit$% (t is this spirit onl$ "$ "eing produced "$ consciousness, or rather it does not e&ist as the spirit o! the communit$ ithout having "een produced "$ this consciousness% 0P, 6=?1 2aith does not understand itsel! this a$% Hegel has "een telling us hat the o"#ect o! 2aith is in itsel!, not hat it is for the kind o! sel!*consciousness in Buestion% He is descri"ing !or us the re!erent that the$ pick out 3address themselves to9 "$ means o! misleading senses 3conceptual contents9, the noumena "ehind the phenomena o! religious orship and service% (n this respect, Enlightenment is right in its criticisms o! 2aith% (t does seriousl$ misunderstand

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its o"#ect, hich is not 3as 2aith thinks9, an o"#ective, independent "eing, "ut a product o! its o n thought and practice% (t is #ust this that Enlightenment rightl$ declares !aith to "e, hen it sa$s that hat is !or !aith the a"solute Being, is a Being o! its o n consciousness, is its o n thought, something that is a creation o! consciousness itsel!% 0P, 6=?1 2aith seeks to ground its recognitive and practical activities in kno ledge o! !acts, that is, to give an o"#ectivist metaph$sical grounding !or the "indingness o! these norms% )hat attitude is carried over !rom traditional societ$A thinking o! the norms not as the products o! our activit$, "ut as something that is merel$ !ound in the a$ the orld is% Dhere !or the ,reeks the norms had "een part o! the natural orld, !or 2aith the$ are part o! the supernatural orld% But that is a speci!ic di!!erence ithin a general agreement that norms are grounded in ontolog$ and matters o! !act, in something a"out ho the orld #ust is antecedentl$ to its having human "eings in it% )hose norms and their "indingness are not understood as products o! our activit$, though the$ in !act are instituted "$ people acting according to the pure consciousness o! !aith% Believers institute these norms, "ut the$ don-t understand themselves as doing that%

Both 2aith and Enlightenment have a cognitive, theoretical dimension, and a recognitive, practical dimension% 2aith is rong in its cognitive attitudes, misunderstanding its o"#ect and its relation to that o"#ect% But it succeeds ith its recognitive practices, creating a communit$ o! trust% Enlightenment is right in its cognitive attitudes, correctl$ seeing that the normativit$ "oth are concerned ith is not something independent o! our attitudes

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and activities% But it !ails on the recognitive, practical side% Because it creates a communit$ ith the reciprocal recognitive structure o! trust, 2aith ackno ledges norms that can have some determinate contentI the$ are content!ul norms "ecause a communit$ like that can actuall$ institute, sustain, and develop determinatel$ content!ul conceptual norms% But Enlightenment creates no such communit$% :n the cognitive side, it sees that content!ul norms cannot simpl$ "e read o!! o! the a$ the orld simpl$ is, independentl$ o! the attitudes, activities, practices, and capacities o! the creatures ho are "ound "$ them% ;ationalit$ is a human capacit$% But Enlightenment is stuck ith a purel$ !ormal notion o! reason% (t can criticize the contents 2aith purports to !ind, "ut cannot on its o n produce replacements%

Enlightenment ackno ledges, as 2aith does not, that "oth the "inding !orce and the determinate content o! conceptual norms depends on the activit$ o! sel!*conscious individual kno ers and agents% (ts disenchanted, o"#ective natural orld does not come ith a normative structure% )he phenomena o! authorit$ and responsi"ilit$ are a human imposition, the product o! our attitudes and practices% Enlightenment mani!ests its alienation "$ developing its understanding o! the norms in a a$ that is as one*sidedl$ su"#ective as 2aith-s is one*sidedl$ o"#ective% )he ultimatel$ unsatis!actor$ result is Enlightenment utilitarianism'6, hich construes the normative signi!icance o! things as consisting in their use!ulness to us% )his vie radicalizes the insight that conceptual norms are not independent o! the activities o! sel!*conscious individuals ho appl$ those
'6

Enlightenment completes the alienation o! Spirit in this realm, too, in hich that Spirit takes re!uge and here it is conscious o! an unru!!led peace% (t upsets the housekeeping o! Spirit in the household o! 2aith "$ "ringing into that household the tools and utensils o! this orld, a orld hich that Spirit cannot den$ is its o n, "ecause its consciousness like ise "elongs to it% (n this negative activit$ pure insight at the same time realizes itsel!, and produces its o n o"#ect, the unkno a"le a"solute Being and the principle o! utilit$% 0P, =N71

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concepts in #udgment and intention 3F)he Mse!ul is the o"#ect in so !ar as sel!* consciousness penetrates it%G 0P, 6N'19, "$ turning it into the vie that norms are simpl$ re!lections o! the particular, contingent purposes o! individual sel!*consciousnesses% (n Hegel-s terms, the principle o! utilit$ identi!ies hat the norms are in themselves ith hat the$ are !or consciousness%

)he term +Mtilitarianism- is no usuall$ used to re!er to the sort o! moral theor$ given its classical shape "$ Qerem$ Bentham and Qohn Stuart Hill% )he term t$picall$ used to re!er to the e&tension o! that a$ o! thinking !rom the practical realm to the theoretical realm o! theories o! meaning and truth is +pragmatism-% Hegel sees a tra#ector$ o! thought that "egins ith the e&trusion o! su"#ective values !rom an o"#ective orld o! !acts, and ends ith an identi!ication o! all properties and !acts as purpose*relative, an understanding o! the truth o! claims as conduciveness to the success o! the practical enterprises o! individuals% +/lienation- is his term !or the common practical conception o! 3attitudes to ards9 authorit$ and responsi"ilit$ 3+independence- and +dependence-9 that underlies, motivates, and necessitates the oscillation "et een one*sided o"#ectivism and one*sided su"#ectivism% Dhen that alienated practical conception is made theoreticall$ e&plicit, he calls it +Lerstand-% Hegel-s overall philosophical aim is to give us the 3meta*9conceptual tools to get "e$ond the a$s o! understanding norms that reBuire us to choose "et een taking them to "e genuinel$ "inding on individual attitudes "ecause o"#ectivel$ there, antecedentl$ to and independentl$ o! an$ such attitudes, on the one hand, and taking them to "e mere re!lections o! those su"#ective attitudes, on the other% )hinking in terms o! the categories o! Lernun!t instead o! Lerstand is to ena"le us to overcome not onl$ the naWve,

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dogmatic ontological o"#ectivism a"out norms o! the tradition, "ut also this sort o! pragmatismBuite distinct !rom the sort o! pragmatism ( have argued Hegel endorsed ith its ironic distancing !rom the genuineness o! the "inding !orce o! the norms, hich has "een the modern culmination o! the rise o! su"#ectivism% 3/ radical and distinctive !eature o! Hegel-s thought is his vie that i! e get clear a"out ho ordinar$ conceptual norms ork!or instance, those governing concepts such as copper, e ill understand ever$thing e need in order to understand the moral normativit$ e&pressed "$ concepts such as cruel% ( ill sa$ more a"out this claim later in this chapter%9

Hegel thinks the practical stakes riding on this enterprise are high% Dhen pure consciousness in the !orm o! Enlightenment is the sel!*understanding o! actual consciousness in the institutional !orm o! State Po er 3the practical recognitive e&pression and actualization o! a theoretical cognitive vie 9, the result is the )error, hose paradigm is the !inal "loodthirst$ death*throes o! the 2rench ;evolution% Consciousness has !ound its <otion in Mtilit$P !rom this inner revolution there emerges the actual revolution o! the actual orld, the ne shape o! consciousness, a"solute !reedom% 0P, 6N.1 <orms that are products o! su"#ective attitudes are practicall$ understood as una"le to constrain those attitudes% / purel$ !ormal notion o! reason o!!ers no determinate content% )he state is understood on the model o! a particular individual sel!*consciousnessdistinguished onl$ in that the ill o! that consciousness, its commitments, are taken as "inding on ever$ individual% )hus

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individuals are o"liged to identi!$ ith and sacri!ice themselves !or that ill% But this sort o! purel$ !ormal recognition relationeach citizen recognizing himsel! in the ill or all, the common illcannot in !act institute a determinatel$ content!ul common ill% )hat ould reBuire that the particular su"#ective commitments o! the individuals have some sort o! authorit$ over the universal, the common ill% )he result, he thinks must "e a content*vacuum, hich can onl$ "e !illed "$ the su"#ective attitudes and inclinations o! some despotic individualin much the same a$ as in the realm o! a"stract legal personhood% /"solute )error is hat happens hen the authorit$ o! individual sel!* consciousness to institute norms is conceived and practiced as unconstrainedas a matter o! independence ithout correlative dependence%

Content!ul norms reBuire not incorporation o! particularit$ and contingenc$ in the !orm o! necessit$ 3normative !orce9 and universalit$ 3conceptual content9 through recognitive relations o! reciprocal authorit$ and responsi"ilit$ articulated not onl$ socially, "ut also historically, in the !orm o! constraint "$ tradition% Mnderstanding that there are no norms holl$ independent !rom the attitudes and practices o! individual sel!*consciousnesses is modernI understanding that authorit$ o! attitudes over statuses on the model o! unconstrained independence 3as$mmetric recognition9 rather than !reedom is alienated% /n$ such conception is "ound to oscillate "et een seeing the norms as not constraining attitudes "ecause the$ are contentless, and seeing them as not constraining attitudes "ecause their content is ar"itrar$, contingent, and particular, hence irrational,

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derived !rom the contingent attitudes, interests, and inclinations o! some particular su"#ect%'7 )he charge o! contentlessness as Hegel-s o"#ection at the end o! the Reason section to the Fhonest consciousnessG, hich pursues its contraction strateg$ !or construing agenc$ on the model o! Haster$ "$ taking responsi"ilit$ onl$ !or hat it tries to do, its will, narro l$ construed, rather than its actual doing% /nd e ill see the same o"#ection made to the conscientious consciousness, hich analogousl$ identi!ies dut$ ith hat it sincerel$ takes to "e dut$ 3norm ith attitude9 in the discussion o! HoralitTt near the end o! Spirit%

2aith and Enlightenment are each one*sided appreciations o! the true nature o! norms in relation to attitudes% 2aith is on the right track on the practical recognitive dimension o! sel!*consciousness, "ut has the rong theoretical cognitive take on the side o! consciousness% 2aith is right in hat it doesA to give the norms determinate content "$ "uilding a community% (t "uilds a community of trust, hich can develop and sustain determinatel$ content!ul norms% (t is right to see that its relation to the norms should "e one o! ac nowledgement and service% (t is rong to think that private conceptions and concerns must or can "e totall$ sacri!iced to make that possi"le% 2aith is rong to take over the traditional immediate conception o! its relation to the normsA to ontologize, and in a sense naturalize them% (t does not recognize itsel! in those norms% <either its communit$, nor its individual activities are seen as essential or as authoritative ith respect to those norms% Enlightenment is right that the norms depend !or "oth their !orce and their content on the attitudes and practices o! the ver$ individuals ho "ecome more

'7

Compare HcDo ell-s diagnosis o! the oscillation "et een F!rictionless spinning in the voidG and the H$th o! the ,iven, in Mind and +orld 0Harvard Mniversit$ Press, '??=1%

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than merel$ particular, natural "eings "$ "eing acculturated, that is, "$ "eing constrained "$ those norms% (t is rong to think that all e contri"ute is the form% /nd it is rong in the practical recognitive conseBuences o! its insight into our authorit$ over the norms% (t is right in its criticism o! 2aith-s metaph$sics, "ut rong to think that undercuts its !orm o! li!e% :n the recognitive side o! constituting communities and sel!*conscious individuals, the contrast "et een the )error and the communit$ o! trust could not "e more stark% So hat is needed is to com"ine the humanistic metaphysics o! Enlightenment 3 ith its cognitive emphasis on the contri"ution o! the activit$ o! individual sel!*consciousnesses9 ith the community of trust o! 2aith 3 ith its practical emphasis on the contri"ution o! the activit$ o! individual sel!*consciousnesses through ackno ledgement o!, service to, and identi!ication*through*sacri!ice ith the norms9%

Section I): Morality and %onscience

Enlightenment cannot understand the norms as "oth "inding and content!ul, and 2aith cannot understand the role e pla$ in instituting themA ma ing them "inding and content!ul% )he task is to reconcile the sittlich ackno ledgment o! the authorit$ o! the norms ith the modern ackno ledgment o! the authorit$ o! su"#ective attitudes% )he e&plicit aspiration to do that, hich is the "ridge !or ard !rom modernit$ to a ne epoch in the development o! Spirit, Hegel calls FHoralitTtG% Kant is its prophet% /lthough it does seek to reconcile the t o, it is in its !orm a development directl$ o! Enlightenment rather than 2aith, !or

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EnlightenmentPholds an irresisti"le authorit$ over !aith "ecause, in the "elieverOs o n consciousness, are !ound the ver$ moments hich Enlightenment has esta"lished as valid% 0P, 6>.1 Horalit$ ultimatel$ reveals itsel! as a !orm o! the contraction strateg$ !or understanding agenc$, hich e e&amined in connection ith the honest consciousness% (t is accordingl$ una"le satis!actoril$ to "ring together t o sides o! agenc$, to comprehend it as at once norm*governed and actual% (n shrinking hat the agent is genuinel$ responsi"le !or to a pure act o! ill, uncontaminated "$ particular sensuous inclinations, it precludes itsel! !rom understanding agents as having an$ genuine authorit$ over hat actuall$ happens in the o"#ective orld% )he !ailure to make intelligi"le the content o! the norms agents "ind themselves "$ in its purel$ !ormal terms that is implicit in the metaconception o! moralit$ "ecomes e&plicit in the metaconception o! the relation "et een norms and attitudes that Hegel calls +conscience- 0,e issen1%

)hought o! !rom the side o! recognition 3and so o! sel!*consciousness9, moralit$ and conscience are structures o! #usti!ication and appraisal% )he$ are accordingl$, practical attitudes to ard the constitution o! communal norms and their determination o! the appropriateness o! individual per!ormances% Such norms are actuall$ e!!icacious inso!ar as the$ are e&pressed in acts, attitudes, and practices o! #usti!ication and appraisal% )hose norms ma$ "e e&plicitl$ !ormulated as principles appealed to in #usti!ication and appraisal o! per!ormances, or ma$ remain implicit in the dispositions o! communit$ mem"ers to accept particular #usti!ications and appraisals% )he con!igurations o! Spirit

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e are considering come late in the process o! e&plicitation o! practices in principles, and so here deal ith the invocation o! principles as principles%

Horalit$ seeks to com"ine the universal applica"ilit$ o! moral principles 3conseBuences o! the applica"ilit$ o! a rule9 ith their origin and validation in the !ree commitment o! an independent individual agent to the principles as universall$ "inding 3grounds o! the applica"ilit$ o! a rule9% )reating a principle as universal in this sense is committing onesel! to accept the appropriateness o! appeal to that principle "$ anyone in #usti!ication, challenge, and appraisal o! #usti!ications o! per!ormances generall$% B$ insisting on universalit$ o! principles in this sense, moralit$ attempts to ensure the consilience o! #usti!ication and appraisalattitudes corresponding to t o di!!erent social*recognitive perspectivesreBuired "$ the overcoming o! alienation% 2or it seeks to ensure that the same principles ill "e recognized as valid in the conte&t o! deli"eration or #usti!ication on the one hand and the conte&t o! appraisal on the other% 2urther, it is in virtue o! the per!ormerOs relation to such principles treated as universal that he counts as an agent and his per!ormances as actions in the !irst place% )he$ are actions as "eing in the space o! giving and asking !or reasons or #usti!ications% )he$ get into that space "$ "eing per!ormed and evaluated as per!ormed according to principles taken as universal, and providing reasons !or them% Horalit$Os insistence upon universalit$ o! principles, com"ined ith the demand that actions "e per!ormed according to such principles thus appears to o!!er the !orm o! a re*achievement o! Sittlichkeit% 2or the dependence o! individuals upon the normative su"stance hich alone makes 3per!ormances ith the signi!icance o!9 action possi"le is em"odied in this structure o! acts, attitudes, and

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practices o! #usti!ication and appraisal, as is the validit$ o! those norms and appropriatenesses !or all individuals%

Dhile the reBuirement o! universalit$ represents moralit$Os attempt to reachieve Sittlichkeit, its recognition o! the role o! the individual in constituting the appropriatenesses so ackno ledged consists in its account o! ho universal principles "ecome validated% 2or moralit$Os claim 3KantOs claim9 is that hat ultimatel$ legitimates the constraint o! principles is their appropriation as "inding "ecause e&pressive o! oneOs sel! as rational9 "$ the individuals "ound% 2reedom and acting right coincide, and consist in acting according to principles one has chosen to "e "ound "$ as universal% )his is the Kant*;ousseau criterion o! demarcation o! the normative in terms o! autonom$% /ll genuinel$ normative !orce or validit$ 3"indingness9 is self-"inding% )he normative status o! being responsi"le is instituted "$ the attitude o! the su"#ect ho ackno ledges it as "inding% /s Kant sa$s, denizens o! the realm o! !reedom are not "ound "$ rules, "ut "$ conceptions or representations 0Lorstellungen1 o! rules% )he grip o! the rules on !ree creatures is mediated "$ their attitudes to ard those rules% 3Kant does, o! course, think that there are also higher*order, purel$ !ormal principles that are "inding on us simpl$ as rational creatures, i%e% in virtue o! "eing a"le to "ind ourselves "$ conceptual norms in #udgment and action% /ckno ledgment o! the "indingness o! those principles is implicit in all o! our discursive attitudes and practices% /s e ill see, Hegel develops this side o! Kant-s thought as ell% )he important point to realize here is that those norms are onl$ intelligi"le against the "ackground o! the ground*level institution o! conceptual

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commitments "$ attitudes o! ackno ledgment, hich is the core o! Kant-s idea o! normative autonom$%9

)he dignit$ o! the Enlightenment individual ill permit him to "e su"#ect to nothing "ut his o n ill% But in his insistence on universalizing that ill, the moral individual ackno ledges that actions must ans er to appraisals hich do not simpl$ repeat the particular intentions or attitudes that give rise to those actions% (n this a$, moralit$ seeks to overcome alienation in the speci!ic sense o! recognizing that norms are constituted "$ the actions o! communit$ mem"ers, hile not treating the "indingness o! those norms as undercut "$ that recognition 3as did the distracted, ironic consciousness9% (t is in its appreciation o! "oth o! these demands that moralit$ completes the e&plicitation o! the principles governing alienated practice, and at the same time points "e$ond those practices to the possi"ilit$ o! an unalienated !orm o! li!e hich ill com"ine Sittlichkeit and ackno ledgment o! the authorit$ o! the attitudes o! individual sel!*consciousnesses%

2or Hegel, KantOs attempt to com"ine the universal validit$ o! principles ith individual appropriation and endorsement o! those principles as the source o! their validit$ represents his attempt to heal the ri!t "et een the roles o! social sel! and individuated su"stance hich is the alienation o! Spirit !rom itsel! in the guise o! the opposition o! the t o social aspects o! action% Dithout e&plicitl$ recognizing the pro"lem o! alienation, Kant tries to solve it% /ccording to his schemeA a9 principles genuinel$ constrain individual actions hich are hat the$ are appraised as according to such principlesI "9 per!ormances are actions onl$ as so constrainedI and c9 there are no 3non*!ormal9 !acts

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a"out hat principles are valid apart !rom the !acts a"out hat princples people take to "e valid "$ endorsing or appropriating them, that is "$ committing themselves to their validit$% )hese are precisel$ the elements reBuired !or alienation to "e overcome%

But the strateg$ o! moralit$ is !la ed and !utile, !atall$ in!ected ith the Lerstand model o! individual independenceo! authorit$ not onl$ as not reBuiring, "ut as incompati"le ith a correlative responsi"ilit$that gives rise to the alienation it seeks to overcome% 2or in spite o! its intentions, moralit$ does not succeed in esta"lishing the consilience o! the #usti!ication o! action and its appraisal% )he universalit$ o! principle "$ means o! hich such consilience is to "e secured is undermined, so !ar as this !unction is concerned, "$ the account o! individual commitment as the source o! applica"ilit$ o! such principles% 2or although the #usti!$ing agent and appraising audience are each committed to treating their principles as universall$ valid, nothing in the speci!ication o! the structure o! moralit$ ensures that the principles appealed to "$ the agent in #usti!ication ill "e recognized and appropriated "$ the appraiser, and vice versa% )heir "asis in particular commitments "$ independent individuals instead institutionalizes the endorsement o! con!licting principles governing the t o social perspectives hich together make per!ormances into actions, and there"$ !ails to overcome the mutual independence o! those aspects o! #usti!ication and appraisal in hich the alienated structure o! action consists%

De ma$ sa$ that moralit$ reconciles #usti!ication and appraisal onl$ !or each agent, "ut not in itsel! or !or all in their interaction% Mniversalit$ o! principle means that each agent

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is committed to #usti!$ing his per!ormances onl$ "$ appeal to principles that are appropriatel$ appealed to "$ an$one in #usti!ication, and appropriatel$ applied to an$one, the agent himsel! included, in appraisal% 2rom the agentOs point o! vie , then, #usti!ication and appraisal appeal to #ust the same principles, and donOt stand in an$ holesale opposition or con!lict o! principle% But securing this lack o! opposition !or each agent*appraiser is not enough% (n actual social practice those individual points o! vie must also cohere, since #usti!$ing and appraising must in general "e the actions o! di!!erent individuals% )his social coordination is not achieva"le on Kantian principles, according to hich universalit$ is a matter purel$ o! !orm, hile normative content is a matter entirel$ o! individual commitment, ith respect to hich the content o! one individualOs commitments are independent o! the content o! anotherOs% Horalit$ thus sho s itsel! as a !orm o! still*alienated Spirit in the disparit$ "et een its intention and its achievement%

Conscientious consciousness also attempts to reconcile universal responsi"ilit$ to norms ith the constitution o! those norms "$ their ackno ledgement and appropriation "$ individuals, though its strateg$ e&ploits Buite a di!!erent structure !rom that o! moralit$% (n particular, "$ centering "oth #usti!ication and appraisal on appeals to conscience, the conscientious consciousness overcomes the perspectival disparit$ o! speci!ic recognition, hich revealed moralit$ as one more !orm o! the practical alienation o! action and sel!* consciousness !rom itsel!% Horalit$ had attempted to den$ the signi!icance o! di!!erences in the content o! hat is taken "$ di!!erent agents to "e dut$ "$ implicitl$ treating appraisal as evaluating action not according to the appraiserOs principles o!

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appropriateness 3as the reBuirement o! universalit$ on the part o! the principles endorsed "$ that appraiser demands9 "ut according to the meta*level principle that actions are morall$ in order i! the$ are per!ormed according to hat the agent ta es to "e his or her dut$% (n the conte&t o! moralit$, this implicit e&pression o! individual autonom$ collides ith the demands o! universalit$ o! dut$ or appropriateness% /t the stage o! conscience, it is raised to the level o! an e&plicit principle and e&plicitl$ em"raced as a strateg$%

)he !orm o! all #usti!ications o! actions is no e&plicitl$ understood to "eA the action as appropriate "ecause it as per!ormed in accord ith the conviction on the part o! the agent that it as an appropriate action% )hat attitude institutes the norm% Corresponding to this approach to #usti!ication is an approach to appraisal% )he appropriateness o! actions is to "e evaluated solel$ on the "asis o! hether the agent acted out o! a conviction o! the appropriateness o! the action% /cting according to dut$ is acting according to hat one ta es to "e dut$, "oth on the side o! #usti!ication and on the side o! appraisal% /ppropriateness as it applies to an individual is constituted "$ hat the individual takes to "e appropriate% <orms consist in their recognition and appropriation "$ individuals% /ttitudes determine "oth the !orce and the content o! norms% (n the conscientious consciousness and its understanding o! the relation "et een norms and attitudes e !ind the most e&plicit and e&treme e&pression o! the modern, alienated rise o! su"#ectivit$A the ackno ledgment o! the authorit$ o! attitudes over norms 3the dependence on or responsi"ilit$ to attitudes "$ norms9 in its most one*sided, h$per* su"#ective !orm% (t is this general structure hich is universal, shared "$ #usti!$ing agents and appraising agents alike% )hus even i! an appraiser disagrees ith a #usti!$ing agent

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a"out hat is in !act appropriate or reBuired "$ dut$ in a particular situation, the$ can still agree that the agent acted appropriatel$, so long as the appraiser attri"utes to the agent the conviction that appropriateness demanded the action hich as in !act per!ormed or intended%

)he seeds o! the parado& o! the conscientious consciousness are alread$ apparent in this !ormulation% /n appeal to conscience as the #usti!ication o! an action presupposes the e&istence o! duties or appropriatenesses that are constituted independentl$ o! the appeal to conscience% )he attempt to generate the duties or appropriatenesses themselves entirel$ on the "asis o! the legitimac$ o! such appeals is incoherent% Hartin LutherOs !amous V(ch kann nicht andere,V #usti!ication appealed to conscience, that is, to his personal conviction that his dut$ demanded his actions and not others% But he did not represent the conscientious consciousness as Hegel here discusses it% 2or his understanding o! the dut$ he as convinced reBuired his actions as not o! a dut$ constituted "$ his or othersO recognition o! it% Dut$ !or this agent o! 2aith consisted rather in acting according to ,odOs ill% )he primar$ !orm o! #usti!ication o! an$ action, and that in terms o! hich it should "e evaluated, he took to "e the claim that the action in !act e&pressed or !urthered the divine intent% /gainst the "ackground o! this independently constituted notion o! dut$, a secondar$ and parasitic !orm o! #usti!ication and appraisal then "ecame possi"leone that "rackets the Buestion o! hether oneOs action as actually in accord ith dut$, and inBuires as to hether it at least as per!ormed according to hat one as convinced as that dut$% /ppeals to conscience o! this sort provide a a$ o! dealing ith the occasional epistemic inaccessi"ilit$ o! dut$ in

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the primar$ sense% /ction ith ma$ not accord ith dut$ is e&cused as !alling short onl$ on the side o! kno ledge o! that dut$, not on the side o! the ill or intent to per!orm that dut$% /llo ing secondar$ appeals to conscience as an e&cuse !or !ailure to do one-s dut$, to !ul!ill one-s actual o"ligations, are a a$ o! ackno ledging the rights o! intention and kno ledge ithout making those rights !ull$ definitive o! dut$%

)he essential point is that appeals to conscience o! this sort presuppose an independentl$ constituted notion o! dut$ or appropriateness that can transcend the individual agentOs capacit$ to kno hat is appropriate in a particular case% :nl$ against the "ackground o!

the possi"ilit$ o! the !ailure o! the individual to grasp correctl$ hat is in !act appropriate, independentl$ o! hat he takes to "e appropriate, does this !orm o! appeal to conscience have a coherent content% So appeals to conscience are in principle parasitic on practices o! appealing to duties hich are not constituted "$ appeals to conscience 3that one tried to do oneOs dut$, or did hat seemed to one to "e oneOs dut$9% Conscience* talk presupposes an antecedent stratum o! appropriateness*talk, as seems*talk presupposes is*talk and tries*talk presupposes does*talk, and !or #ust the same reason% So the mistake o! the conscientious consciousness is structurall$ the same as that o! the honest consciousness and o! consciousness understanding itsel! as sense certaint$% (t is in each case a mistake to take an idiom that Buali!ies or ithholds a commitment, as to hether something is reall$ oneOs dut$, hether things are as the$Ore taken to "e, hether hat is accomplished as hat as intended, and erect it in to an autonomous stratum o! discourse in hich the onl$ commitments possi"le are the hedged or minimal ones hich are in !act de!ined onl$ in relation to their more ro"ust antecedents%

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)he conscientious consciousness, on the other hand, seeks to preserve the !orm o! appeals to conscience, "ut ithout the content the$ presuppose and acBuire !rom a prior conception o! dut$% )he onl$ notion o! appropriateness hich is in pla$ is that o! acting in a a$ that one ta es to "e appropriate% )he di!!icult$ is that i! hat one means "$ V/Os action is appropriate 3or according to dut$9V is V/ takes his action to "e appropriate 3or according to dut$9V, then "$ plugging the de!inition o! appropriateness into the later !ormula e arrive at the result that !or / to take an action to "e appropriate is !or him to take it to "e hat he ould take to "e appropriate% But / is incorrigi"le a"out ho he takes things to "e% )hat is, there is no di!!erence "et een ho / takes things to "e and ho he takes himsel! to take them to "e% (t !ollo s then that / is incorrigi"le a"out hat reall$ is appropriate !or him% 3(ndeed, the constitution o! dut$ "$ its conscientious recognition treats the constitutive takings as "oth cognitions and volitions, a !oreshado ing in alienated !orm o! an important insight a"out dut$9% Conscientious consciousness kno sA Pits o n sel!, in hich hat is actual is at the same time pure kno ing and pure dut$% (t is itsel! in its contingenc$ completel$ valid in its o n sight, and kno s its immediate individualit$ to "e pure kno ing and doing, to "e the true realit$ and harmon$% 0P, 75.1

/s e ill see, conscience is in certain sense right a"out normative !orce, and it is in a certain sense right a"out conceptual content% But to understand the sense in hich it is right, one must look at the a$ the distinction "et een normative !orce and normative

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content interacts ith and is mediated "$ that "et een norms and attitudes, and vice versa% /nd that reBuires looking at the interaction o! all three dimensions o! recognitive articulationA social, historical, and in!erential%

Section ): T*o Meta+!ttitudes, Four Species of Niedertr-chtig eit

/n important perspective on the concept o! alienation is provided "$ t o meta* attitudes that are in pla$ throughout the !inal t o thirds o! the Spirit chapter% Hegel-s terms !or these attitudes is +edelmKtig- and +niedertrTchtig-% Hiller translates these as +no"le- and +"ase- 3or +igno"le-9% ( ill argue that a "etter a$ to think a"out the contrast is as that "et een +generous- and +mean*spirited-, or +magnanimous- and +pusillanimous- 3literall$A +great*souled- and +small*souled-9% Because the rich content the$ are to conve$ goes "e$ond that e&pressed "$ an$ o! these la"els, ho ever, ( ill generall$ leave these terms in the ,erman% )he$ are meta*attitudes "ecause the$ are attitudes to ards the relations "et een norms 3or normative statuses such as commitments, responsi"ilities, and authorit$9 and attitudes o! ackno ledging or attri"uting such norms as "inding or applica"le% /s ( understand it, the edelmKtig meta*attitude takes it that there reall$ are norms that attitudes are directed to ards and ans er to% (t treats norms as genuinel$ e!!icacious, as reall$ making a di!!erence to hat individuals do% /ttitudes paradigmaticall$ the ackno ledgment o! a norm as "inding, taking onesel! or another to "e committed or responsi"le, practicall$ distinguishing "et een per!ormances that are appropriate and those that are notare the a$ the norms

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are actualized, the a$ the$ "ecome e!!icacious, ho the$ make things happen in the causal order% )he niedertrTchtig meta*attitude sees onl$ normative attitudes% )he norms are construed as at most adver"ial modi!ications o! the attitudesA a a$ o! talking a"out the contents o! those attitudes% <iedertrTchtigkeit is the purest e&pression o! the alienated character o! modern normativit$ 3hence culture, sel!* consciousness, and communit$9%

Dhen Hegel introduces these notions, he does so in terms o! seeing the unit$ or the disparit$ in !orms o! actual consciousness% So the no"le consciousness Psees in pu"lic authorit$Pits o n simple essence and the !actual evidence o! it, and in the service o! that authorit$ its attitude to ards it is one o! actual o"edience and respect% Similarl$, in the case o! ealth, it sees that this procures !or it a areness o! its other essential side, the consciousness o! "eing !or itsel!I it there!ore looks upon ealth like ise as essential in relation to itsel!, and ackno ledges the source o! its en#o$ment as a "ene!actor to hom it lies under an o"ligation% 0P, 6881 )he unit$ discerned here is "et een hat each !orm o! actual consciousness actuall$ does and the norms to hich it is "eholden% State Po er and Dealth are seen as genuinel$ actualizing their respective norms% :!!icials act in the service o! the pu"lic good, o"e$ing and respecting the communal norms, realizing the universal aspect o! the recognitive communit$% (n their activities, ealth$ individuals e&press the other normative pole o! the recognitive process, the essential contri"ution made "$ the actualizing activities o! individuals% )he ends

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the$ pursue are private rather than pu"lic 3particular rather than universal9, "ut the$ "oth reall$ have those ends, hich set norms !or their activit$, and their pursuit o! them provides the ra materials out o! hich the actual communit$ is constructed% (n actualizing their respective recognitive poles o! communal 3universal9 norms or goals and individual 3particular9 ones, State Po er and Dealth are seen as complementar$, cooperating components o! a structure in hich "oth a communit$ and its sel!*conscious individual mem"ers are constituted 3actualized, normativel$ instituted9 as such%

B$ contrast, )he consciousness hich adopts the other relation is, on the contrar$, igno"le% (t clings to the disparit$ "et een the t o essentialities, thus sees in the sovereign po er a !etter and a suppression o! its o n "eing*!or*sel!, and there!ore hates the ruler, o"e$s onl$ ith a secret malice, and is al a$s on the point o! revolt% (t sees, too, in ealth, "$ hich it attains to the en#o$ment o! its o n sel!*centred e&istence, onl$ the disparit$ ith its permanent essenceI since through ealth it "ecomes conscious o! itsel! merel$ as an isolated individual, conscious onl$ o! a transitor$ en#o$ment, loving $et hating ealth, and ith the passing o! the en#o$ment, o! something that is essentiall$ evanescent, it regards its relation to the rich as also having vanished% 0P, 68'1 State Po er and Dealth are seen as competing !orms o! oppression, rather than complementar$ aspects o! constitution o! the communit$ and o! sel!*conscious

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individuals% Pu"lic o!!icials are not seen as having an$ actual authorit$ over individual communit$ mem"ers, since the$ are not seen as acting out o! ackno ledgment o! communal norms% ;ather than seeing the positive contri"ution the$ make to the constitution o! the communit$, this attitude sees onl$ the constraint the o!!icials put on the activit$ o! individuals% Dealth$ individuals are not seen as genuinel$ ackno ledging an$ responsi"ilit$ to the communit$% ;ather than seeing their practical recognitive contri"ution to the constitution o! the communit$, this attitude sees ealth$ individuals onl$ as opposed to the communal norms, as perverting them !or their private ends% De sa in Section L((( that Enlightenment adopts a corresponding ungenerous, niedertrTchtig attitude to ard 2aith, imputing disreputa"le sel!*interested motives to priests and "elieversA re#ecting appeals to the universal essence the$ claim to serve% 3/nd there is a corresponding mean*spirited account "$ 2aith o! the adolescent, sel!*important pride seen as motivating the avatars o! Enlightenment de"unking%9

Hegel opens the Introduction ith a discussion o! the distinction that consciousness involves, "et een hat things are in themselves and hat the$ are !or consciousness% )he concept o! consciousness as a cognitive relation to !acts reBuires that ho things are in themselves pla$s the role o! a norm !or ho things are !or consciousness% Ho things reall$ are e&ercises a normative authorit$ over, sets a standard o! correctness !or, ho e take them to "e% )hat normative

semantic or intentional relation is the unit$ that comprises the t o distinguished

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elements% / complementar$ direction o! !it is e&hi"ited "$ intentional agenc$% )he Fdistinction that action impliesG, "et een intention and per!ormance 3underl$ing that "et een Handlung and )at9, is also an aspect o! a larger normative unit$% (n this case the intentionho things are !or the acting consciousnessserves as a norm or standard o! correctness !or assessment o! ho things are to "e in themselves, that is, !or hat actuall$ occurs% /t the end o! Chapter Seven e sa ho the historical character o! the c$cle o! cognition*and* action under rites a Hegelian version o! the 2regean distinction "et een sense and re!erence, in the !orm o! an account o! the relation "et een phenomena and noumena% )he t o meta*attitudes o! EdelmKtigkeit and <iedertrTchtigkeit are initiall$ "oth mani!estations o! alienation "ecause the$ seize one*sidedl$ on the unit$ o! kno ing*and*acting consciousness, in the one case, and the distinction that it involves, on the other% Since the de!ining !la o! modernit$ is its !ailure to get the unit$ and the distinction that kno ing*and*acting consciousness involve in !ocus together in one picture, the a$ !or ard to the re*achievement o! unalienated Sittlichkeit is a kind o! higher EdelmKtigkeit% :n the theoretical side, that is coming to appl$ metaconceptual categories o! Lernun!t, rather than those o! Lerstand% Hegel-s account o! hat that consists in is the core achievement o! his philosoph$% /s e dra closer the end o! his e&position in the Phenomenology, e get a ne vantage point on that structure o! unalienated understanding%

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)he clearest e&pression o! the ne piece o! the puzzle comes in a !amous passage a"out Fpla$ing the moral valet%G +Lalet- is +Kammerdiener-, and ( ill call this a"solutel$ crucial stretch o! te&t Fthe Kammerdiener passageG% (t e&presses a cardinal !orm o! <iedertrTchtigkeit, holding !ast to the disparit$ that action involvesA it holds to the other aspectPand e&plains 0the action1 as resulting !rom an intention di!!erent !rom the action itsel!, and !rom sel!ish motives% Qust as ever$ action is capa"le o! "eing looked at !rom the point o! vie o! con!ormit$ to dut$, so too can it "e considered !rom the point o! vie o! the particularit$ 0o! the doer1I !or, Bua action, it is the actualit$ o! the individual% )his #udging o! the action thus takes it out o! its outer e&istence and re!lects it into its inner aspect, or into the !orm o! its o n particularit$% (! the action is accompanied "$ !ame, then it kno s this inner aspect to "e a desire !or !ame% (! it is altogether in keeping ith the station o! the individual, ithout going "e$ond this station, and o! such a nature that the individualit$ does not possess its station as a character e&ternall$ attached to it, "ut through its o n sel! gives !illing to this universalit$, there"$ sho ing itsel! capa"le o! a higher station, then the inner aspect o! the action is #udged to "e am"ition, and so on% Since, in the action as such, the doer attains to a vision o! himsel! in o"#ectivit$, or to a !eeling o! sel! in his e&istence, and thus to en#o$ment, the inner aspect is #udged to "e an urge to secure his o n happiness, even though this ere to consist merel$ in an inner moral conceit, in the en#o$ment o! "eing

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conscious o! his o n superiorit$ and in the !oretaste o! a hope o! !uture happiness% <o action can escape such #udgement, !or dut$ !or dut$Os sake, this pure purpose, is an unrealit$I it "ecomes a realit$ in the deed o! an individualit$, and the action is there"$ charged ith the aspect o! particularit$% No man is a hero to his valet. not, ho*ever, because the man is not a hero, but because the valet/is a valet, hose dealings are ith the man, not as a hero, "ut as one ho eats, drinks, and ears clothes, in general, ith his individual ants and !ancies% )hus, !or the #udging consciousness, there is no action in hich it could not oppose to the universal aspect o! the action, the personal aspect o! the individualit$, and pla$ the part o! the moral valet to ards the agent% 0P, 7761

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)his is a rich and important passage%'> ( see its signi!icance as un!olding in a series o! concentric, idening ripples, and ( ant to !ollo them as the$ "roaden out !rom their center% )o "e a hero in the sense in pla$ here is to act out o! regard !or one-s dut$% )hat is to have one-s actions proceed !rom respect !or or ackno ledgement o! the authorit$ o! norms% )he hero is the one ho ackno ledges a norm as "inding "$ actualizing it, ho does hat he ought, "ecause he ought% )o pla$ the valet to such a hero is to impute onl$ sel!ish, particular motives, to trace ever$ action "ack to some perceived personal

'>

)he corresponding discussion in the Philosophy of Right isA Since the su"#ective satis!action o! the individual himsel! 3including the recognition hich he receives "$ a$ o! honour and !ame9 is also part and parcel o! the achievement o! ends o! a"solute orth, it !ollo s that the demand that such an end alone shall appear as illed and attained, like the vie that, in illing, o"#ective and su"#ective ends are mutuall$ e&clusive, is an empt$ dogmatism o! the a"stract Mnderstanding% /nd this dogmatism is more than empt$, it is pernicious i! it passes into the assertion that "ecause su"#ective satis!action is present, as it al a$s is hen an$ task is "rought to completion, it is hat the agent intended in essence to secure and that the o"#ective end as in his e$es onl$ a means to that% Dhat the su"#ect is, is the series o! his actions% (! these are a series o! orthless productions, then the su"#ectivit$ o! his illing is #ust as orthless% But i! the series o! his deeds is o! a su"stantive nature, then the same is true also o! the individualOs inner illP XA P<o this principle o! particularit$ is, to "e sure, one moment o! the antithesis, and in the !irst place at least it is #ust as much identical ith the universal as distinct !rom it% /"stract re!lection, ho ever, !i&es this moment in its distinction !rom and opposition to the universal and so produces a vie o! moralit$ as nothing "ut a "itter, unending, struggle against sel!*satis!action, as the commandA ODo ith a"horrence hat dut$ en#oins%O (t is #ust this t$pe o! ratiocination hich adduces that !amiliar ps$chological vie o! histor$ hich understands ho to "elittle and disparage all great deeds and great men "$ trans!orming into the main intention and operative motive o! actions the inclinations and passions hich like ise !ound their satis!action !rom the achievement o! something su"stantive, the !ame and honour, Yc%, conseBuential on such actions, in a ord their particular aspect, the aspect hich it has decreed in advance to "e something in itsel! pernicious% Such ratiocination assures us that, hile great actions and the e!!icienc$ hich has su"sisted through a series o! them have produced greatness in the orld and have had as their conseBuences !or the individual agent po er, honour, and !ame, still hat "elongs to the individual is not the greatness itsel! "ut hat has accrued to him !rom it, this purel$ particular and e&ternal resultI "ecause this result is a conseBuence, it is there!ore supposed to have "een the agentOs end and even his sole end% ;e!lection o! this sort stops short at the su"#ective side o! great men, since it itsel! stands on purel$ su"#ective ground, and conseBuentl$ it overlooks hat is su"stantive in this emptiness o! its o n making% )his is the vie o! those valet ps$chologists O!or hom there are no heroes, not "ecause there are no heroes, "ut "ecause these ps$chologists are onl$ valetsO% 0;P 4'.=1

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advantage, "e it onl$ a reputation !or virtue, or, here even that is not availa"le, the satis!action o! thinking ell o! onesel!%

Consider the o!!icial ho e&ercises state po er% He has committed himsel! to act purel$ according to universal interests or norms% )hat is, he commits himsel! to doing only hat ackno ledgement o! the norms reBuires% But ever$ actual per!ormance is a particular doing, and incorporates contingenc$% (t is al a$s more than #ust the ackno ledgment o! a norm, and ma$ ell also "e less than that% 3( can never &ust turn on the light or !eed the poor( am al a$s also doing other things, such as alerting the "urglar, or cutting the education "udget or raising ta&es%9 Contingent motives and interests ill al a$s also "e in pla$% )hus it ill al a$s "e possi"le !or the niedertrTchtig consciousness to point out the moment o! disparit$, the particularit$ and contingenc$ that in!ects each action% (t is never &ust an instance o! the universal% )he Kammerdiener can al a$s e&plain hat the hero o! service did in terms o! sel!*interested 3hence particular, contingent9 motives and interests, rather than as a response to an ackno ledged normative necessit$% )here is no action at all that is not amena"le to this sort o! reductive, igno"le description%

Broadening our horizons a little "it, ( think e can see an issue "eing raised concerning the relations "et een norms and attitudes Buite generall$% )he Kammerdiener does not appeal to norms in his e&planations o! "ehavior% )he attitudes o! individuals are enough% )he pu"lic o!!icial sa$s that he acted as he

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did "ecause it as his dut$% )he Kammerdiener o!!ers a competing e&planation that appeals onl$ to his desires% Dhat his dut$ actuall$ is, hat he ought to do, pla$s no role in this account% )hought o! at this level o! generalit$, the moral* ps$chological valet stands !or a kind o! nihilism a"out norms that is Buite idespread in contemporar$ culture% (t has, !or instance, more recentl$ "een championed ith particular clarit$ "$ ,il"ert Harman !or the special case o! moral norms%'N /ccording to this vie , invoking moral norms or values is e&planatoril$ otiose% 2or e can o!!er e&planations o! ever$thing that actuall$ happens in terms o! people-s views a"out hat is right and rong, hat the$ ta e to "e permissi"le or o"ligator$% (t is those attitudes that are causall$ e!!icacious% /nd those attitudesbelieving that it is rong to steal, !or instance ould have #ust the same causal conseBuences hether or not there ere !acts to hich the$ corresponded, hether or not it is in !act rong to steal% <or is the case an$ di!!erent i! e look upstream, to the antecedents o! moral attitudes, rather than do nstream at the conseBuences% H$ "elie! that it is rong to steal as "rought a"out "$ other "elie!s 3along ith other attitudes, such as desires9A some m$ o n, some held "$ m$ parents and teachers% )he truth o! the "elie! need not "e invoked to e&plain h$ ( have the "elie!, or h$ an$one else has it% (n this a$ moral "elie!s 3normative attitudes9 contrast ith the perceptual "elie!s e&pressed "$ nonin!erential reports, !or hich the !reBuent truth o! such "elie!s must "e appealed to "oth in e&plaining h$ e have those "elie!s and in e&plaining h$ having those "elie!s has the conseBuences it does% /cts o! appl$ing concepts in #udgment and intentional action, and acts o! assessing such applications !orm a
'N

,il"ert Harman The .ature of Morality 0:&!ord Mniversit$ Press, '?>>1%

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complete e&planator$ structure, one that is capa"le o! accounting !or hat people do ithout needing to "e supplemented "$ re!erence to the conceptual norms or standards that are supposedl$ "eing applied and ith respect to hich applications are supposedl$ "eing assessed% Since e do not need to appeal to norms, the "est e&planation o! our actions and attitudes appeals onl$ to attitudes% So e should conclude that there are no norms, onl$ attitudes% )his approach sees a massive error standing "ehind our ordinar$ a$s o! talking a"out norms%

/nother a$ to look at the issue is to ask hat sort o! theor$ o! practical reasoning the Kammerdiener-s meta*attitude depends on% (t is one that esche s hat are sometimes called Fe&ternal reasons%G / "roadl$ kantian !orm o! practical reasoning and e&planation appeals to in!erences such asA (t is rong to steal% )aking that ne spaper ould "e stealing% So ( shall not take that ne spaper% Here the norm, the rongness o! stealing, serves as a premise in a piece o! practical reasoning that can "e appealed to in deli"eration a"out hat to do, assessment o! hat has "een done, prediction o! hat ill "e done, and e&planation o! hat as done% )hat is the sort o! practical reasoning to hich the edelmKtig meta*attitude appeals hen it sees the o!!icial and the counselor acting out o! respect !or and o"edience to communal norms% / "roadl$ humean approach to practical reasoning, o! the sort endorsed "$ Davidson, insists that the kantian radicall$ misrepresents the reasons that actuall$ motivate intentional

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action% Even i! the !irst premise states a !act, even i! it is rong to steal, that !act ould not "$ itsel! engage ith m$ motivational machiner$% )o do that, ( must kno a"out or at least "elieve in the !act% )he real reason in the vicinit$ is that I believe that it is rong to steal% /part !rom that "elie!, the rongness o! stealing is nothing to me, and cannot a!!ect hat ( go on to do or tr$ to do% :nce e have added that "elie! as a premise, the original invocation o! a norm can drop out% )he humean principle is that onl$ "elie!s and desires 3that is, individual attitudes9 can serve as motivating reasons% <orms cannot% )he idea is that hat serve as reasons !or action must also "e causes, and onl$ attitudes such as "elie!s and desires can do that%

)he issue here concerns the practical conception o! the pragmatic notion o! normative force% Ho should norms 3 hat is or is not appropriate, correct, o"ligator$, or permissi"le9 or normative statuses 3responsi"ilit$, authorit$, commitment, or entitlement9, on the one hand, "e understood as related to normative attitudes 3ta ing per!ormances to "e appropriate, correct, o"ligator$, or permissi"le, ac nowledging or attributing responsi"ilit$, authorit$, commitment, or entitlement9, on the otherE )he traditional, premodern vie sa norms as independent and attitudes as dependent% )he o"#ective norms have authorit$ over the su"#ective attitudes o! individuals, hich are supposed merel$ to re!lect them, ackno ledge their authorit$, appl$ them in deli"eration and assessment, #udgment and action% )he modern vie sees attitudes as independent, and norms as dependent% )he su"#ective attitudes individuals adopt institute norms% )hat is

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h$ hen the commitments characteristic o! modernit$ are made e&plicit, the$ take the meta*level !orm o! utility% 2or usefulness comprises properties that simpl$ re!lect the relation o! an o"#ect to particular human purposes%

)he sel!ish particular motives that are all the Kammerdiener attri"utes are independentl$ authoritative attitudes that can "e re!lected onl$ in statuses such as use!ulness to private purposes, not in statuses such as dut$, or "eing unconditionally o"ligator$in the sense that the o"ligatoriness is authoritative !or attitudes, rather than conditioned on them, as in the h$pothetical, instrumental imperatives arising !rom prudent pursuit o! privatel$ endorsed ends% )he Kammerdiener "anishes talk o! values that are not immediate products o! individual valuings% )he rise o! su"#ectivit$ is the practical realization that values are not independent o! valuings% Cuintessential alienated later modern thinkers such as <ietzsche and the British utilitarians conclude that onl$ valuings are real% )aking it that the dependence o! values on valuings implies that valuings are independent o! values is a strateg$ o! independence hich understands ever$thing Humpt$ Dumpt$-s a$, as #ust a matter o! ho is to "e Haster% (! norms are not immediatel$ authoritative over attitudes, then attitudes must "e immediatel$ authoritative over norms% Practicall$ appl$ing categories o! immediac$ 3master$9 in this a$ 3 hat on the theoretical side is Lerstand9, epitomized in the Kammerdiener-s niedertrTchtig meta*attitude, is a pure !orm o! alienation "ecause it makes unintelligi"le the ver$ acculturating, conceptual norms su"#ection to hich makes even the Kammerdiener a discursive, geistig

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"eingA a kno er, agent, and sel!% Kammerdiener e&planations, hich admit onl$ normative attitudes, not onl$ cannot make sense o! normative force, "ut also in the end make the notion o! conceptual content unintelligi"le% )he relation "et een these is the topic o! the last part o! the Spirit section o! the Phenomenology%

Hoving !rom the practicall$ alienating standpoint o! Lerstand to the practicall$ sittlich standpoint o! Lernun!t reBuires "reaking out o! the seeming inevita"ilit$ o! this restricted pair o! alternativeseither norms are immediatel$, hence totall$, authoritative over attitudes, or vice versa"$ making intelligi"le the possi"ilit$ o! reciprocal dependence "et een norm and attitude% )o do that it is not enough, o! course, simpl$ to mouth the phrase Freciprocal dependence "et een norm and attitude%G )o make good on that phrase, Hegel o!!ers a richl$ articulated metaconceptual apparatus la$ing out the nature o! the comple& interdependence o! the authorit$ o! actual applications o! concepts over the contents o! those concepts and the responsi"ilit$ o! actual applications o! concepts to the contents o! those concepts% (t reBuires reconceiving the relations "et een normative !orce and conceptual content in terms o! a process o! e&perience 3a c$cle o! perception*and* action9 that is at once the institution and the application o! conceptual norms, "oth a making and a !inding o! conceptual contents% His account o! ho that is possi"le reBuires the interaction o! a social*recognitive dimension, a historical* recollective dimension, and an incompati"ilit$*in!erential dimension%

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)here is a third, still more general issue "eing raised "$ the Kammerdiener-s meta*attitude, "e$ond treating attitudes as independent o! norms 3 hich remain in the picture onl$ in an adver"ial capacit$, in an ultimatel$ unsuccess!ul attempt to individuate the contents o! the attitudes9% )hat concerns the relation "et een reasons and causes generall$, or, still more a"stractl$, the place o! norms in nature% 2or the Kammerdiener essentiall$ treats the hero o! dut$ as a merel$ natural "eing% )he onl$ a$ o! making the hero-s actions intelligi"le that the Kammerdiener admits are o! the sort that are availa"le in principle !or unacculturated creatures, those merel$ Fimmersed in the e&panse o! li!eG% )hough the ants attri"uted to the hero go "e$ond the "iologicall$ dictated desires o! mere animals 3!or instance, the Finner moral conceitG that consists in Fthe en#o$ment o! "eing conscious o! his o n superiorit$ and in the !oretaste o! a hope o! !uture happinessG9, the Kammerdiener-s vie o! the hero is as one ho Feats, drinks, and ears clothesGthat is, at "ase, a "eing driven "$ creaturel$ com!orts and discom!orts% So the most general issue Hegel is addressing in his discussion o! the Kammerdiener is that o! reductive naturalism a"out normativit$%

)his sort o! naturalism is the most !undamental possi"le challenge to the Kantian picture o! us as normative creatures, as distinguished !rom the merel$ natural precisel$ "$ our su"#ection to norms, "$ the !act that e can "ind ourselves "$ 3make ourselves responsi"le to9 norms, "$ appl$ing concepts, hose contents settle what e have made ourselves responsi"le !or and to% (s there reall$ an$ such thing as authorit$ or responsi"ilit$, as commitment or entitlementE :r is that

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sort o! normative talk holl$ optional and dispensa"le, indeed, a positivel$ misleading m$sti!icationA a !undamental error o! the sort o! hich Enlightenment accuses 2aithE 2or the Kammerdiener utilitarian, the ork o! Enlightenment is onl$ hal! done hen superstitious "elie! in a magical, invisi"le, supernatural o"#ective /uthorit$ has "een "anished, so long as human "ehavior is still descri"ed in an$ terms that invoke norms not immediatel$ deriva"le !rom the sensuous inclinations o! desiring "eings%

)he Buestion o! ho the mind should "e understood as !itting into the natural orld arose as a direct result o! the ne mathematized scienti!ic picture o! that natural orld% ;aised clearl$ and distinctl$ "$ Descartes, that Buestion !ormed one o! the characteristic a&es around hich philosoph$ turned in the earl$ modern period% )he rise o! science and the rise o! su"#ectivit$ are t o sides o! one coin% Kant-s normative turn transposed the issue into a ne ke$% (! mindedness is at "ase concept use 3the application o! concepts in #udgment and intentional action9, "ringing in its train a trans!ormation o! sensi"ilit$, and i! hat one is doing in appl$ing concepts, the practical signi!icance o! those acts, is adopting a distinctivel$ normative status 3at once e&ercising authorit$ and undertaking responsi"ilit$, committing onesel!9, then the issue o! the mind-s place in nature "ecomes the issue o! ho norms !it into nature% )his issue had "een addressed in a restricted !orm "$ practical philosophers orried a"out speci!icall$ moral norms% But the Kantian s$nthesis o! the principal concern o! theoretical metaph$sics o! mind ith this concern o! moral philosoph$ meant that the t o

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issues had !or the !irst time to "e addressed together, as aspects o! a single Buestion a"out normativit$% 3)his as the central lesson he learned !rom Hume% 2or Kant sa one deep pro"lem sho ing up in t o !orms, theoretical and practical, in the a$ in hich la !ul necessit$ outruns matter*o!*!actual regularit$ and the a$ hat ought to "e outruns hat merel$ is%9 Hegel understands Kant as o!!ering a t o* orld picture, in hich the ultimate source o! the norms that structure the phenomenal orld o! e&perience is to "e !ound in a noumenal one l$ing someho "e$ond or "ehind it% )hat picture, he re#ects, in !avor o! one that "rings the noumena "ack do n to earth% /s e have seen'?, his recollective semantics makes sense o! ho the a$ things are in themselves 3 hat e are reall$ talking and thinking about9 serves as a normative standard o! correctness !or ho things are for kno ers and agents 3 hat e sa$ and think a"out those things9 as aspects o! the process o! e&perienceA the social*practical activit$ o! adopting, assessing, and revising possi"l$ materiall$ incompati"le commitments%

)he Kammerdiener stands !or a niedertrTchtig, relentlessl$ naturalistic alternative to this edelmKtig, normative description o! concept use% (n place o! the picture o! +heroic- practical sensitivit$ to normstr$ing, in deli"eration and assessment, to determine hat reall$ is correct, hat one ought to do, hat one is obliged to do 3 hat +dut$- consists in9, ackno ledging genuine normative constraint on one-s attitudesthis meta*attitude appeals only to attitudes, hich are not construed as the ackno ledgment o! an$ normative constraint on or authorit$ over those

'?

Beginning alread$ in Chapter )hree, and discussed ith the greater detail made possi"le "$ the discussion o! agenc$ in Reason" at the end o! Chapter Seven%

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attitudes% ;easons are traded !or causes% (t is this large*scale, !undamental disagreement "et een the reductive naturalist and the rational*normativist that Hegel is committed to resolving in his discussion o! hat the Kammerdiener gets right, hat he gets rong, and hat lessons e should learn !rom him% )his pro#ect, "roadl$ construed, is to provide a response to Kant-s )hird /ntinom$ the challenge to integrate reasons and causes% / signi!icant proportion o! Hegel-s claim to contemporar$ philosophical attention, ( think, should "e seen as deriving !rom his response to this issue o! normative naturalism% So the stakes are ver$ high%

Even "e!ore e go into the details o! Hegel-s response hat ( take to "e the !inal constructive moves in the Phenomenologyit should "e noted that there are some important points o! contact "et een the seemingl$ diametricall$ opposed humean attitude*naturalism and Hegelian semantic normativism% Consider the BuestionA are there an$ norms independent o! attitudesE Both positions accept the modern ans erA <o% )he Kammerdiener position is that that means that there are no norms that e&ercise any authorit$ over attitudes% (! there is an$ dependence o! norms on attitudes, there can "e no dependence o! attitudes on norms% De have seen that this is the Lerstand*level conception o! master$, appl$ing categories o! independence, according to hich the onl$ intelligi"le conception o! authorit$ is total authorit$, authorit$ unconditioned "$ a reciprocal responsi"ilit$% 3/n$ sort o! independence is incompati"le ith ever$ sort o! dependence9% But Hegel-s phenomenalismela"orating the notion o! ho things are in themselves "$

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helping himsel! onl$ to a notion o! ho things are !or us, re!erence in terms o! sensealso involves a commitment to making sense o! norms holl$ in terms o! attitudes% )he di!!erence is that he is committed to making sense in these terms o! genuine, and genuinel$ "inding conceptual norms% His account ill not involve reducing or e&plaining the norms a a$%

Hegel takes it that he shares ith Kant at least the aspiration to an account that manages to ackno ledge "oth the attitude*dependence o! norms and their genuine authorit$ over attitudes% )hat is h$ the Kantian structure o! HoralitTt opens the third section o! the Spirit chapter% Kant-s vie is transitional "et een the alienated modernit$ epitomized "$ the moral valet and a ne kind o! Sittlichkeit compati"le ith the rise o! su"#ectivit$% 2or Hegel, Kant opens the door to the third structural stage in the development o! sel!*conscious Spirit, even though he does not succeed in helping us through it% 2or Kant-s conception o! us as creatures ho are "ound not #ust "$ rules 3the la s that govern the realm o! nature9 "ut "$ conceptions 3or representations, Lorstellungen9 o! rules 3the norms that govern the realm o! !reedom9, together ith the tight conceptual connection he insists on "et een autonom$ and normativit$ e&press an attempt to reconcile the attitude*dependence o! norms ith their genuine "indingness% /ll genuinel$ normative "inding 3authorit$9 is self*"inding% (n the end, each o! us onl$ is committed to hat e have committed ourselves to% :ur real commitments are #ust those that e have 3at least implicitl$9 ac nowledged% (n this sense, it is our attitudes that "ring norms into !orce% De appl$ the concepts that onl$ then "ind

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us, "$ determining hat e have there"$ authorized and made ourselves responsi"le to and !or% )his is hat ( have called the FKant*;ousseau demarcation o! the normative in terms o! autonom$%G )his approach o!!ers a structural solution to the reconciliation o! the attitude*dependence o! norms and the norm*dependence o! attitudes that appeals to a distinction "et een the force o! conceptual norms and their content% (t is up to us, as kno ers and agents, hat norms e "ring into !orce% 2or it is up to us hat concepts e appl$% But it is not then up to us hat the content o! those norms isthe details o! what e have committed ourselves to "$ appl$ing the concepts e did, rather than some others%

De have seen.8 that Hegel does not think Kant has entitled himsel! to a notion o! conceptual content adeBuate to carr$ through an account ith this structure% Hegel e&presses his diagnosis in terms o! the +!ormalit$- o! Kant-s conception o! reason% )hat is a a$ o! talking a"out the perceived inadeBuac$ o! Kant-s notion o! conceptual content% (n particular, !rom Hegel-s point o! vie , Kant has not e&plained ho the contents o! the concepts e have availa"le to appl$ in #udgment and intentional action are determined "$ our actual applications o! them the cognitive and practical commitments e have actuall$ made% /t the core o! Hegel-s thought is the idea that in order to make the Kantian strateg$ orkto make intelligi"le the idea o! the kno er*and*agent as responsi"le !or "ringing a norm into force 3the authorit$ o! attitudes over norms9, hile still seeing the norm as genuinel$ constraining the kno er*and*agent 3the authorit$ o! norms over

.8

Beginning alread$ in Chapter ) o, and discussed ith the greater detail made possi"le "$ the discussions o! recognition and agenc$, in Chapters Si& and Seven%

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attitudes9, "$ insisting that the kno er*and*agent is not responsi"le !or 3authoritative over9 the content o! the conceptuall$*articulated commitmentone must ackno ledge "oth a social and a historical division o! la"or% /long the social dimension, ( deli"erate and decide a"out hat claims to make and hat practical pro#ects to undertake, "ut then others administer the conceptual norms "$ hich ( have there"$ "ound m$sel!, assessing the truth o! hat ( have said and the success o! hat ( have done "$ the standards ( have su"#ected m$sel! to% /long the historical dimension, the contents o! the concepts ( appl$ derive !rom previous actual applications o! those concepts in #udgment and action% )ogether these claims can "e summed up in the slogan that we 3"$ our attitudes and activities9 make the norms hich I then !ind availa"le to "ind m$sel! "$% Hegel-s principal theoretical innovation is the recognitive structure o! reciprocal authorit$ and responsi"ilit$ in terms o! hich he understands "oth o! these dimensions, in their interaction ith each other and ith the third recognitive dimension o! reciprocal authorit$ and responsi"ilit$A that relating the particular and universal aspects o! individuals% )he !inal !orm o! reciprocal recognition discussed in the Phenomenology, the structure o! trust that comprises con!ession and !orgiveness, is Hegel-s a$ o! orking out the Kantian strateg$ o! EdelmKtigkeit so as to provide a satis!actor$ response to the challenge posed "$ niedertrTchtig attitude* naturalism o! the Kammerdiener%

/ "asic criterion o! adeBuac$ o! adeBuac$ o! the practical conception o! normativit$ em"odied in the recognitive practices o! a h$pothetical !uture third

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age o! Spirit is that it "e sittlich% (t must retain the practical insight a"out the signi!icance o! the actual attitudes and activities o! individual practitioners that is at the core o! the modern rise o! su"#ectivit$, hile overcoming the alienation that as its un elcome concomitant% )he institutions and practices in hich norms are implicit are sittlich inso!ar as those norms are practicall$ ackno ledged as real, authoritative, and e!!icacious% ;ecognitive institutions and practices are alienated inso!ar as the practical attitude o! individuals to the conceptuall$ content!ul norms that acculturate them is one o! ironic distance% )hat alienated ironic detachment ma$ take the !orm o! regarding the norms merel$ as use!ul !ictions% :r it ma$ treat normative discourse as a positivel$ mistaken and misleading a$ o! talking a"out deli"eration and assessment that are not in !act the result o! appl$ing or ackno ledging the applica"ilit$ o! norms, "ut rather the e&pression o! particular, private attitudes, interests, and inclinations%

( have suggested that the !igure o! the Kammerdiener epitomizes !or Hegel the reductive naturalism that makes e&plicit one de!ining current o! modernit$% But there is another speci!ic !orm that the alienated displacement o! reasons in !avor o! causes 3the normative in !avor o! the natural9 can take% )hroughout this ork ( have emphasized Hegel-s concern to o!!er an account o! the nature o! conceptual contentnot #ust in the Science of 'ogic, here that concern is most mani!est.', "ut alread$ as an organizing and animating theme o! the Phenomenology% /t critical #unctures in the "ook, !rom the opening o! !onsciousness" in the

.'

)he thread most penetratingl$ !ollo ed out in Pirmin Stekeler*Deitho!er-s onder!ul reading o! the Science of 'ogic, (egels Analytische Philosophie 0re!%1%

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discussion o! Stoicism and Skepticism in the Self-!onsciousness chapter, through the treatment o! the Honest Consciousness at the end o! Reason, to the dissection o! the Conscientious Consciousness late in Spirit 3as ell as man$ other places9, Hegel-s diagnosis o! hat goes rong ith the shapes o! consciousness that most e&plicitl$ e&press the alienation that accompanied the modern rise o! su"#ectivit$ is that the$ cannot !und an intelligi"le notion o! determinate conceptual content% His overarching indictment turns on the claim that cognitive, practical, and recognitive practices hose theoretical e&pression e&hi"its the atomistic !orm o! Lerstand 3the model o! independence9 cannot achieve an adeBuate conception o! conceptual content, hich must a ait post*modern practices hose theoretical e&pression e&hi"its the holistic !orm o! Lernun!t 3the model o! !reedom9% /nd that reBuires the cognitive, practical, and recognitive epiphan$ that he calls the advent o! +/"solute Kno ing- 3 hich it is the goal o! the rest o! this chapter to descri"e9% )his concern ith content o! the conceptual norms that in!use and in!orm, and there"$ constitute the sel!*conscious individual selves hose practices incorporate them signals Hegel-s implicit concern ith another strand o! argument in the vicinit$ o! the Kammerdiener-s reductionism% Dhere e have considered so !ar some alienated a$s o! understanding the relations "et een t o dimensions o! normative forcespeci!icall$, ho the attitude*dependence o! norms ma$ "e seen to undercut the authorit$ the$ claim over attitudesthis !urther argument concerns the e!!ect that certain insights into the nature o! conceptual content has on ho one can understand the nature o! the normative !orce or "indingness o! conceptual norms%

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)he general thought is that the possi"ilit$ o! o!!ering a certain kind o! genealogical account o! the process "$ hich a conceptual content developed or as determined can seem to undercut the rational "indingness o! the norms that have that content% )his is a !orm o! argument that as deplo$ed to devastating e!!ect "$ the great unmaskers o! the later nineteenth centur$% Suppose that the correct ans er to the Buestion h$ e dra the distinction "et een right and rong as e do in some area o! discourse is a causal e&planation in terms o! economic class structure, or a Buasi*"iological account in terms o! the limited num"er o! a$s the ill to po er can mani!est itsel! in the eak, or a description o! ho earl$ traumas incurred hile acting out the 2amil$ ;omance relia"l$ recathect li"ido into standard repressed adult !orms% (! an$ such genealog$ can causall$ e&plain h$ our normative attitudes have the contents that the$ do h$ e make the #udgments e do instead o! some othersthen the issue o! the rational #usti!ia"ilit$ o! those attitudes lapses% De appear to have reasons !or our deli"erations and assessments, and it ma$ "e com!orting to ourselves to think that is h$ the$ have the contents the$ do% But talk a"out hat reasons there are !or adopting one attitude rather than another is unmasked "$ a convincing genealog$ o! the process as a mere appearance% )he genealog$ tells us hat is really going on, "$ presenting the underl$ing mechanism actuall$ responsi"le !or our taking this rather than that as appropriate, !itting, or correct% Seeing ourselves as creatures ho are genuinel$ sensitive to reasons, ho are tr$ing to !igure out hat is in !act appropriate, !itting, or correct hat e reall$ have reason to dothen

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comes to seem naWve and old*!ashionedA the result o! appl$ing an e&ploded e&planator$ !rame ork couched in a !anci!ul voca"ular$, hose adoption can itsel! "e e&plained a a$ genealogicall$ as the result o! a process Buite di!!erent !rom the reasoning to hich it pretends%

/ great deal o! the later Dittgenstein-s riting can "e read as pointing out genealogical antecedents o! our reason*giving and reason*assessing practices% /gain and again he is concerned to point out the a$s in hich the content o! a norm re!lects underl$ing matter*o!*!actual regularities% Ho it ould "e correct to go on in some practicecounting, measuring, appl$ing color*terms, even pointingdepends on ho practitioners in !act are disposed to go on% <ot onl$ our general capacit$ to institute implicit practical norms 3and hence to speak, to make an$thing at all e&plicit9, "ut the speci!ic contents o! those norms 3ho the$ sort novel candidates into those that do and those that do not accord ith the norm9 have to "e understood in terms o! contingent !acts a"out practitioners% )hose !acts do not provide reasons !or doing things one a$ rather than another, "ut can "e appealed to to e&plain h$ the "oundar$ "et een correct and incorrect is dra n here it is% 2or e can see that had the regularit$ "een di!!erent, the content o! the norm would have been di!!erent% )he norms implicit in our most "asic discursive practices accordingl$ sho up as deepl$ parochial, in that their speci!ic content depends on contingent !eatures o! our em"odiment and natural histor$, and o! antecedentl$ esta"lished practices and institutions% )hat is h$, i! the lion could speak, e ould not "e a"le to understand him%

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:ne response one might have to the revelation o! the contingent, parochial character o! the contents o! the norms in virtue o! hich e are discursive "eings at all is to see it as undercutting the intelligi"ilit$ o! their normative force% (n hat sense can e still understand ourselves as bound "$ the norms, once e realize that had various contingent matters o! !act a"out us "een di!!erent, the content o! hat the$ en#oin ould have "een di!!erentE /s a !amiliar e&ample and a reminder o! ho this !orm o! argument is applied more !ormall$ "$ Enlightenment to 2aithconsider the e!!ect on a $oung person "rought up in some particular religious !aith, sa$ Catholicism, o! the realization that she is Catholic "ecause o! the !amil$ she as "orn into, here and hen she as "orn, and so on% Had she had di!!erent parents, lived else here, or at another time, she ould have "een Pres"$terian, Qe ish, or Huslim% )he genealogical o"#ection arises hen one can sho that hether or not one ould #udge that a concept applies 3or that a possi"le application o! a concept ould "e correct9 depends on the o"taining o! a prior !act that is not in!erentiall$ related to the content o! the #udgment "eing made 3or assessed9% )he genealogical realization o! the contingenc$ o! the contents o! her religious commitments, through appreciation o! the actual causal mechanisms that "rought a"out those particular attitudes and endorsements, ma$ ell undermine their perceived authoritativeness, the "indingness o! those norms% /t the ver$ least, it raises the Buestion o! hat reasons one has !or those commitments, hich one can no see as having "een caused in a$s that do not "$ themselves constitute reasons% )hus, it is "ecause

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the truth o! the Christian !aith is not in!erentiall$ related to the religion o! an$one-s parents 3Qesus himsel! possi"l$ e&cepted9 that discovering that su!!icient conditions !or "elie! or non*"elie! can "e e&pressed entirel$ in terms o! the parentage o! the "eliever undercut the rational authorit$ to hich such "elie! ould other ise la$ claim% )he "elie! is supposed to "e sensitive to its semantic content 3and its in!erential involvements9, not to pragmatic !eatures having to do ith the "elieving rather than hat is "elieved% /nd it is natural to tr$ to address that issue "$ brac eting commitments ith similar suspect genealogiesit "eing no help ith the general pro"lem to appeal as reasons to other commitments one contingentl$ acBuired due to causes not sensitive to their truth% But i! the parochial character o! the contents o! "elie!s in the vicinit$ is su!!icientl$ u"iBuitous, the attempt at such "racketing ma$ leave one empt$*handed%

:! course not ever$ a$ in hich the content o! a concept or "elie! can "e dependent on contingent matters o! !act "ears on the intelligi"ilit$ o! the norm as "inding or the attitude as authoritative% (! the melting*point o! copper had "een di!!erent, hat it is correct to sa$ a"out the melting*point o! copper, and so the content o! the concept, ould have "een di!!erent% (! there ere not a cat in m$ stud$, the content o! m$ current "elie! a"out the Buestion o! hether there is a cat in m$ stud$ ould "e di!!erent% (! ( had not read the right "ook, or looked in the right direction, ( ould not kno the melting*point o! copper, or that there is a cat in m$ stud$% Had our e$es "een constructed so as to "e sensitive onl$ to portions o! the electromagnetic spectrum "e$ond the ultraviolet, e ould not "e a"le to

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deplo$ the o"servational concept red as e do% /ll o! these are contingent matters o! !act, and had the$ "een di!!erent, the contents o! our concepts or attitudes ould have "een di!!erent% But the$ concern hat contents ould "e true, or hat e ould have reason to "elieve% )he last case is the closest, "ut it, too, can "e thought o! as a contingent epistemological constraintA a constraint on hat "elie!s e can acBuire in the !orm o! a constraint on hat concepts e can deplo$% )he orr$ a"out genealog$ undercutting #usti!ication is o! a di!!erent sort%

)he strateg$ o! the genealogical argument is to !ind some !act f such that f is not evidentially related to pthere are no true or plausi"le au&iliar$ h$potheses hich, hen con#oined to f, $ield an argument !or p% (! one can then sho that S-s "elieving that p is sensitive to the o"taining o! fideall$, that f-s o"taining provides a sufficient explanation !or S-s "elieving that p 3thought o! as an event9 then one can argue that the "elie! is not rational, !or it does not sho the reBuisite sensitivit$ to the truth o! p, via evidence !or p% S cannot claim to have "een acting according to the norm, to have her "elie! governed "$ the norm, to "e ac nowledging the norm 3even though her "elie! ma$ ell "e correct, and so "e as the norm would dictate9she cannot claim to "e applying or assessing according to the norm, to "e sensitive to the normi! she can "e sho n to "e sensitive to f% )he genealogical 3aetiological9 realization saps the rational credi"ilit$ or credence o! the "elie! in Buestion% )he authority it ould other ise have as an application o! a conceptual norm is thro n into dou"t%

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)he clearest illustration o! ho a genealog$ o! content can undercut normative !orce is !ound in the principal model ( have suggested throughout !or Hegel-s account o! conceptual contentA the a$ concepts o! common la develop through the decisions o! #udges to appl$ them or ithhold application o! them in particular cases% ( originall$ invoked this e&ample 3in Chapter ) o9 as a model o! the a$ in hich a process o! applying conceptual norms in making #udgments and practical decisions can also serve to institute conceptual norms and determine their contents% )he ke$ point in the present conte&t is that there is nothing outside the previous #udges- decisions to determine the contents o! the concepts each #udge must appl$ in a ne case% )hose prior cases are the onl$ source o! reasons !or the current #udge to appl$ or not appl$ the concepts in Buestion to the ne set o! !acts% Here, too, a genealogical characterization o! the process is possi"le% 2or in each o! the prior cases appealed to in #usti!$ing a contemporar$ #udgment it ma$ "e possi"le to e&plain the earlier decision "$ appealing to hat caused the #udgment, rather than hat reasons there ere !or it% :ne ma$ "e a"le to account !or the precedential decision "$ looking at, in the slogan o! #urisprudential theor$, F hat the #udge had !or "reak!ast%G Less !anci!ull$, such a genealogical e&planation might invoke the nature o! the #udge-s training, the pre#udices o! his teachers, the opinions o! his culture circle, his career am"itions, the political emphases, issues, and pressures o! the da$, and so on% Pla$ing the moral valet to the #udge is o!!ering such a genealogical account o! a #udgmentA revealing it as not a response to reasons properl$ provided "$ precedent and principle, not a matter

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o! ackno ledging as "inding the content o! an antecedent norm, "ut as the product o! e&tra*#udicial, rationall$ e&traneous motives and considerations%

Such genealogical accounts reveal the contingenc$ o! the conceptual content a later #udge inherits !rom the tradition% 2or the$ make clear that had various #udges happened to have had di!!erent F"reak!astsG 3had the contingencies the Kammerdiener appeals to as causes "een di!!erent9, the current content o! the concept would have been di!!erent% Di!!erent decisions ould have "een made in the past, and ould accordingl$ have provided a di!!erent !ield o! possi"le precedents% (n !act, it is a commonplace o! #urisprudential genealog$ that another sort o! contingenc$ in!ects the process% 2or it is o!ten clear that the order in hich various di!!icult cases arose cruciall$ a!!ects the contents that emerge !rom the process% (n such situations, the present state o! the la ould "e ver$

di!!erent had the case that happened to arise !or ad#udication later had to "e decided "e!ore the one that in !act came up !irst% Similar contingencies a!!ecting the content o! concepts handed do n as precedents derive !rom the happenstance o! hat particular #urisdiction a particular set o! !acts arises in% )he issue ( am !ocusing on is ho the availa"ilit$ o! such a contingenc$*riddled genealogical e&planation !or h$ the concept currentl$ has the content that it does a!!ects the intelligi"ilit$ o! the norm em"odied in that concept as rationally binding, as providing genuine reasons !or the current decision to go one a$ or the other% )his is the issue o! the relation "et een genealog$ and #usti!ication% )here is a temptation, indulged and !ostered "$ the genealogical tradition that stretches !rom

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Har&, <ietzsche, and 2reud in the nineteenth centur$ through 2oucault at the end o! the t entieth, to take it that e&planations in terms o! causes trump e&planations in terms o! reasons, sho ing the latter to "e appeals to illusions 3or the result o! sinister delusions9% E&hi"iting the contingent !eatures o! things, not addressed "$ a conceptual content or commitment, that caused it to "e as it is, unmasks talk o! reasons is irrelevant m$sti!ication% <iedertrTchtig e&planations take precedence over edelmKtig ones%

Dh$ should that "eE )he ans er lies in a$s o! thinking a"out reason that are deepl$ rooted in the philosophical tradition% Both the ancients and the moderns de!ined reason in part "$ hat it e&cludes% )he ,reeks introduce the notion o! reason in terms o! the contrast "et een rational persuasion and sophistical a$s o! producing attitudesA the distinction "et een hat ought to convince and hat merel$ in !act does convince% :ne e&plains the advent o! the !irst sort o! attitude "$ rehearsing an argument% :ne e&plains the advent o! the second sort o! attitude "$ producing a genealog$% )he Enlightenment notion o! reason is similarl$ structured "$ the contrast "et een the rational authorit$ o! argument, and the merel$ ha"itual in!luence o! traditionA "et een hat e ought to "elieve and hat e merel$ as a matter o! !act have "elieved% Dhen Enlightenment o!!ers a genealog$ o! religious "elie! in terms o! interests o! priests and despots, or descri"es the contingent processes "$ hich scripture as transmitted, it understands itsel! as undercutting the rational authorit$ o! 2aith% Both the ancient and the modern conceptions o! reason motivate a pro#ect o! purifying reason, "$

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e&truding the alien, e&traneous in!luence o! hat is merel$ in !act e!!icacious in "ringing a"out "elie!s% :n their conceptions, hat merel$ as a matter o! !act is or has been "elievedthe #udgments 3applications o! concepts9 that have in fact "een endorsedshould "e granted no rational eight or !orce, that is, authorit$% Kant is onl$ making !ull$ e&plicit a a$ o! thinking that is alread$ !ull$ in pla$ in Descartes- Meditations hen he decisivel$ separates causal !rom &ustificatory grounding, criticizing Locke !or producing, in e!!ect, a mere genealog$ o! empirical "elie!s rather than an account o! ho the$ are rationall$ arranted% Hegel thinks that reason as so puri!ied is reduced to something empt$, contentless, purel$ !ormaland so inevita"l$ set on a road that leads to skepticism% Hegel-s notion o! reason is not opposed to the authorit$ o! traditionI it is an aspect o! it% Dhat merel$ is does have rational 3de!easi"le9 authorit$% 3F)he actual 0 irklich1 is the rationalI the rational is the actual%G9 Ho e have

in the past actually applied a concept!rom one point o! vie , contingently, "ecause not necessitated "$ the norm antecedentl$ in pla$helps determine ho it is correct to appl$ it% Conceptual norms incorporate contingenc$, and onl$ so can the$ "e determinatel$ content!ul% )his is ho the$ come to "e about hat there actuall$ is, to represent it, not in an external sense, "ut in a sense that involves incorporating into the representing the re!erence to hat is represented%

( think the later Dittgenstein orried a"out this issue% ( think he sa the temptation to see a demonstration o! the parochialit$ o! the content o! a normits dependence on or re!lection o! certain kinds o! contingent !eatures o! the

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practitioners and their practicesas undercutting the intelligi"ilit$ o! that norm as genuinel$ "inding, as "eing a real norm, as having normative !orce% Dittgenstein does not, as Hegel does, take it that to "e determinatel$ content!ul at all a norm must have a conceptual content 3though he does take the considerations a"out the dependence o! the content o! norms on contingent matters o! !act to appl$ also to the case o! the conceptual norms e&pressed "$ terms such as +rigid-9% )he e!!ect o! the contingenc$ o! their content on the rational "indingness o! our norms is accordingl$ not e&actl$ the a$ to put Dittgenstein-s pro"lem% But he does orr$ a"out the thought that sho ing !or instance that hat counts as the right a$ to go on depends on a reproduci"le consilience in ho practitioners actuall$ would go on makes m$sterious the sense in hich there is a right a$ to go on, a di!!erence "et een doing so correctl$ and incorrectl$% /nd ( take it that he is concerned "oth to re#ect that in!erence and to diagnose it as the conseBuence o! a traditional, "ut ultimatel$ magical notion o! normative !orce% )he e!!ect o! the demonstration o! the parochialit$ and contingenc$ o! the practices in hich our norms are implicit is not meant to "e normative nihilism% ;ather, space is to "e opened up !or ne #usti!ication% a$s o! construing the relations "et een genealog$ and

H$ concern here is not ith e&pounding Dittgenstein, so ( ill not tr$ to !ill in these all*too*sketch$ remarks% H$ concern is ith the a$ in hich ( see Hegel-s theor$ as directl$ 3i! less than e&plicitl$9 addressing a philosophical issue hose importance is perhaps underscored "$ thinking o! it in the a$ Dittgenstein

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"rought it 3more or less9 to light% )he issue arises !or Dittgenstein "ecause he sees "oth that there is nothing "ut the prior use o! an e&pression that can "e understood as determining the meaning that it has 3the content it e&presses9, and that an$ such use is shot through*and*through "$ contingencies o! all sorts that a!!ect that content, hile not providing reasons !or it to "e one a$ rather than another% :ne conseBuence o! that con#unction o! a pragmatist insight ith a genealogical insight is the concern ith ho an$ course o! actual applications o! a concept could su!!ice to give it a determinate contentA the concern that motivates Kripke-s reading o! Dittgenstein%.. 3/ central thread in m$ stor$ in this ork has "een that Hegel-s pro#ect is driven "$ his appreciation o! the need to develop a ne metaconceptual !rame ork that articulates a ne sense in hich conceptual content can "e understood as determinateA the categories o! Lernun!t, supplanting those o! Lerstand%9 )he other su"stantial conseBuence is the concern ( have "een sketchingA ho to understand normative !orce as compati"le ith the contingenc$ o! content% (t is not eas$ to sa$ hat Dittgenstein-s response is to this challenge presented "$ the content*dependence o! norms on the contingent histor$ o! their actual application% Hegel-s response is the !inal !orm o! reciprocal recognition, the structure o! con!ession and !orgiveness Hegel ela"orates in response to the Kammerdiener 3that one !ar*o!! divine event to ards hich this hole creation his and minehas "een moving9%

)he issue o! ho to recover a sense in hich conceptual norms can "e understood as genuinel$ "inding in the !ace o! the revelation o! the contingenc$ o! their
..

Saul Kripke +ittgenstein on )ollowing a Rule 0re!%1%

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content "$ a genealogical account o! their origin and development is particularl$ pressing !or Hegel "ecause, as e sa in Chapter ) o, his response to hat he takes to "e Kant-s uncritical attitude to ard determinate conceptual contents is to o!!er a conception o! experience as a single process that is at once the application and the institution o! conceptual norms% 3)hat is hat the common*la model is a model o!%9 )he slogan ( suggested there as that in this regard, Hegel is to Kant as Cuine is to Carnap% Each replaces a t o*phase stor$according to hich !irst meanings are speci!ied, and then the$ are applied to make #udgments 3language !irst, then theor$9"$ a one*phase stor$ in hich the t o !unctions are intermingled% Kammerdiener genealogies pose a threat to pragmatists o! this sort% )he possi"ilit$ o! a norm*!ree, niedertrTchtig account threatens the #usti!ia"ilit$ and even the intelligi"ilit$ o! norm*ackno ledging, edelmKtig ones% /nd !or Hegel, the issue concerns the rational !orce o! conceptual normsA their capacit$ to provide real reasons !or sa$ing or doing one thing rather than another% (n situating edelmKtig characterizations o! our discursive practice ith respect to niedertrTchtig ones, Hegel ill "e e&plaining ho e should understand hat the

normative force o! a reason consists in% )o repeat the earlier o"servationA the stakes are high%

)his challenge encompasses the one Hegel raised at the ver$ "eginning o! his Introduction in connection ith Kant-s pro"lematicA Ho can one understand us as getting a cognitive grip onunderstand our e&perience as genuinel$ revelator$ o!ho things ob&ectively are 3ho the$ are in themselves9 once one has seen

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ho our !aculties make unavoida"le contri"utions to ho things appear to us 3ho the$ are for us9E )his Buestion is en!orced "$ Kant-s commitment to apportion responsi"ilit$ !or various !eatures o! our e&perience "et een the su"#ect and the o"#ectto sa$ hat in our kno ledge the orld as it is apart !rom our interactions ith it is responsi"le !or, and hat e are responsi"le !or 3a pro#ect that is radicall$ trans!ormed i! one construes authorit$ and responsi"ilit$ according to the categories o! Lernun!t rather than those o! Lerstand9% 2or Hegel, the Buestion o! ho to see conceptual norms as rationally "inding, and as presenting an ob&ective 3attitude*independent.59 orld are t o sides o! one coin% He o!!ers one ans er to "oth% /nd e-ve alread$ considered most o! the pieces o! his ans er as it "ears on the issue o! o"#ectivit$% 2or it is a Buestion a"out ho to get together the Hegelian notions o! sense and re!erence, phenomena and noumena% (t is senses thataccording to each successive Dhiggish, rationalist, representational*realist retrospective stor$develop "$ 32regean9 determination, hich is the development*"$*e&pression o! the referents 3those re!erents "ecoming e&pressed more and more e&plicitl$ "$ senses9% /nd it is their referents that ob&ectively bind and set standards !or the normative assessment o! the o"#ective correctness o! the hole process% So the Buestion o! o"#ectivit$ is the Buestion o! ho the Hegelian "iperspectival semantics can "e understood as hanging together% La$ing out the !inal, trans!ormative !orm o! reciprocal recognition ill permit us to understand the rational !orce o! the norms that

.5

De sa in Chapter 2ive that !or Hegel, the kind o! dependence on attitudes that o"#ectivit$ reBuires the re#ection o! is reference*dependence% )he o"#ective orld is not sense*independent o! our concept* appl$ing activit$%

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develop through this process, and to understand the nature o! the e&pressivel$ progressive recollection that is reason-s march through the orld%

Section )I: Four Meta+Meta+Normative !ttitudes to the T*o Meta+ Normative !ttitudes

(n order to see hat the Hegelian account o! the relation "et een normative pragmatic force 3articulated "$ the distinction "et een norm and attitude9 and semantic content adds to the stor$ a"out the Hegelian version o! the 2regean semantic distinction "et een sense and reference rehearsed at the end o! the previous chapter, it is important to "e clear a"out the nature o! the distinction "et een the t o meta*attitudes to ards the relations "et een norms and attitudesA <iedertrTchtigkeit and EdelmKtigkeit% )here are !our di!!erent a$s o! thinking a"out that distinction!our di!!erent statuses it can "e taken to have% )he$ are progressivel$ more insight!ul and sophisticated, representing an e&pressive progressionthe cumulative emergence into e&plicitness o! implicit !eatures o! the relations "et een norms and attitudesthat corresponds to the stages "$ hich Hegel sees Spirit as a hole developing its sel!*consciousness%

)he !irst a$ o! understanding the relation "et een the edelmKtig normativist and the niedertrTchtig naturalist is as a cognitive disagreement a"out a matter o! o"#ective !act% )he$ disagree a"out the correct ans er to the BuestionA /re there norms, or notE (! one makes an e&haustive catalogue o! the !urniture o! the

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universe, ill one !ind norms on it, or onl$ normative attitudesE :n this a$ o! construing it, the issue is put in a "o& ith the Buestion o! hether there are leprechauns, and hether there is a "ird in the "ush% :ne or the other part$ to the dispute is rong% Dho is right and ho is rong is settled "$ an attitude* independent matter o! !actin the sense o! that hether there are norms or not is not re!erence*dependent on the meta*attitudes o! the normativist or the naturalist% 3)he normativist could "e correct i! it turned out that there are norms, "ut the$ are re!erence*dependent on normative attitudes%9 :n the side o! epistemolog$, rather than ontolog$, the normativist takes it that normative attitudes are themselves cognitive attitudes, and that at least hen things go right, the$ involve kno ledge o! norms% )he hero ma$ in !act kno hat his dut$ is and do it "ecause it is his

dut$% )he o"#ectivist meta*meta*attitude to the issue takes it additionall$ that "oth the normative and the naturalist attitudes are themselves cognitive attitudes, onl$ one o! hich can "e right a"out hat there reall$ is%

)his o"#ectivist a$ o! understanding the status o! the t o meta*attitudes to ards norms and normative attitudes is not the onl$ one availa"le, ho ever% (t is possi"le to adopt instead an almost diametricall$ opposed su"#ectivist meta*meta* attitude% /ccording to this a$ o! thinking, the normativist and the naturalist emplo$ di!!erent voca"ularies in descri"ing the orld% Msing one rather than the other is adopting a stance% )he t o stances are incompati"leI one cannot adopt them "oth% :ne either uses normative voca"ular$ or one does not% But "oth o! them are availa"le, and "oth o! them are legitimate%

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Qust as ever$ action is capa"le o! "eing looked at !rom the point o! vie o! con!ormit$ to dut$, so too can it "e considered !rom the point o! vie o! the particularit$ 0o! the doer1% 0P, 7761 /s !or the legitimac$ o! the reductive, niedertrTchtig attitude, Hegel ackno ledges that the Kammerdiener is not wrong% F<o action can escape such #udgement,G there is no action in hich it could not oppose to the universal aspect o! the action, the personal aspect o! the individualit$, and pla$ the part o! the moral valet to ards the agent% 0P, 7761% Ever$ intentional action is Fcharged ith the aspect o! particularit$,G in that the agent must have had some motive !or per!orming it, some attitude that as e!!icacious in "ringing it a"out% <orms are e!!icacious onl$ through attitudes to ards them, so one can al a$s short*circuit e&planations that appeal to the norms the attitudes are directed to ards 3 hat the agent ought to do, her dut$9, appealing onl$ to the attitudes themselves% (n the "roader reading, ( take it that Hegel is ackno ledging the possi"ilit$ o! purel$ naturalistic descriptions o! the orld, including human actions%

<o to admit onl$ that it is possible to o!!er a description o! things in some particular, restricted voca"ular$ is not much o! a concession% 2or it is onl$ to admit that one can sa$ some true things using that voca"ular$, hile "eing noncommittal on hat gets le!t out hat truths cannot "e e&pressed in the impoverished voca"ular$% )hus one can descri"e the orld using onl$ the

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predicates FP%has a mass o! greater than '8 grams,G and FPdoes not have a mass greater than '8 grams,G"ut there is a lot that one cannot sa$ in such an e&pressivel$ impoverished voca"ular$% )o "e su"stantive in this conte&t 3the conte&t, recall, o! a response to Kant-s )hird /ntinom$9, the concession must allo !urther that the voca"ular$ in Buestion permits an account that is explanatorily complete in its own terms% (n this case, that means that all naturalisticall$ speci!ia"le events and !eatures o! things can "e causall$ accounted !or "$ appealing onl$ to other naturalisticall$ speci!ia"le events and !eatures o! things% )his is the sense in hich, as Kant puts it, Fever$thing in the orld takes place solel$ in accordance ith la s o! nature%G

/ voca"ular$ can "e e&planatoril$ complete in this sense ithout "eing e&pressivel$ complete, ho ever% )he "ehavior o! a )uring machine is completel$ predicta"le and e&plica"le in a ver$ restricted voca"ular$ that su!!ices to speci!$ the !inite num"er o! token*t$pes it can read and rite, the t$pes o! the tokens that appear in ever$ sBuare o! the tape, the e&pression*triplets that appear in ever$ cell in its t o*dimensional state*ta"le, and the current position o! the read* rite head% )his remains true !or a realization o! 3a !inite*tape version o!9 the )uring machine, so long as it is orking properl$% But it ill have man$ properties that are not speci!ia"le in the restricted voca"ular$ used to speci!$ )uring machinesA a mass, a location, a shape, a ph$sical constitution, and so on% )here remain lots o! truths a"out the device that can onl$ "e e&pressed in other voca"ularies%

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Qust so, Fever$ action is capa"le o! "eing looked at !rom the point o! vie o! con!ormit$ to dut$,G that is, in the edelmKtig normative voca"ular$% Dhat sho s up in the causal*ps$chological voca"ular$ o! the Kammerdiener is nature, natural "eings, and natural processesA the orld o! desire% Dhat sho s up in the normative voca"ular$ o! the hero is Spirit, geistig "eings, and discursive practicesA the orld o! recognition% )he realm o! Spirit comprises e&perience and agenc$% (t is a structure articulated "$ relations o! authority and responsibility, o! commitment and entitlement, o! reasons and concepts ith the obligations and permissions that the$ involve and articulate% )his normative, discursive realm o! Spirit is Hegel-s topic% 3)he "ook is called FPhTnomenologie des /eistesG, a!ter all%9 (t, too, is real% /ccording to the stance stance 3meta*meta*attitude9, the reductive naturalist is rong to take it that the e&planator$ completeness o! the naturalistic*causal voca"ular$ in its o n terms indicates its e&pressive completenessso that an$ claims it cannot e&press cannot "e true% 2or it must leave out concept*use as such 3and hence the hole geistig dimension o! human activit$9, even though ever$ application o! concepts in #udgment and action can "e e&plained in naturalistic terms, i! it is descri"ed in naturalistic terms o! noises and motions% But the normative voca"ular$ is also sovereign and comprehensive ithin its domain, and can achieve a corresponding e&planator$ eBuili"rium% 2or it is a voca"ular$ !or descri"ing the use o! voca"ulariesincluding the voca"ular$ o! natural science% Ever$thing the scientist does, no less than the activities and practices o! other discursive "eings, can "e descri"ed in the

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language o! #udgment, intentional action, and recognition% )he Kammerdiener-s attitude, too, is a discursive attitude%

:ne o! the great Buestions o! modernit$transposed into a ne ke$ "$ Kant-s normative reconceptualizationconcerns the relation "et een Spirit and <ature% /s Hegel sa$s at the end o! the 'ectures on the (istory of PhilosophyA F<ature and the orld or histor$ o! spirit are the t o realitiesP)he ultimate aim and "usiness o! philosoph$ is to reconcile thought or the <otion ith realit$%G .= :ne strateg$ !or doing that is to see the naturalistic and normative voca"ularies as incommensura"le, "ut as each providing a legitimate, valid, in some sense comprehensive perspective on things% )he$ are understood as #ust e&pressing di!!erent !eatures o! things% )he choice o! hich to emplo$ in an$ particular case can then "e understood to "e pragmatic in the classical senseA a matter o! hat "est conduces to securing the ends and interests motivating the su"#ect making the choice o! voca"ular$ at the time% ;ather than disagreeing a"out an o"#ective matter o! !act, the naturalist and the normativist are seen as e&pressing di!!erent su"#ective pre!erences, adopting di!!erent attitudes, hich re!lect di!!erent interests% Dhichever voca"ular$ one adopts makes possi"le genuine kno ledge o! some aspect o! ho things reall$ are%

)here is something right a"out this pragmatic, perspectival a$ o! construing the relations "et een hat is e&pressed "$ normative and naturalistic voca"ularies% But the conception o! <iedertrTchtigkeit and EdelmKtigkeit as still "asicall$
.=

vol (((, p% 6=6 in the Haldane and Simpson translation o! 'N?7, reprinted "$ Humanities Press, '?N5%

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cognitive stances misses something essential to Hegel-s approach% Dhen he introduces it, Hegel sa$s that the niedertrTchtig attitude Fclings to the disparit$ "et een the t o essentialitiesG 0P, 68'1the distinction that action and 3actual9 consciousness involve% )he edelmKtig attitude seizes instead on the complementar$ moment o! unit$ or identit$% De have seen various a$s o! conceptualizing these !ormal aspects o! discursive activit$, corresponding to di!!erent a$s o! thinking o! hat is distinguished or united% Qudging and acting are species o! concept*application% So the$ involve a distinction "et een a universal and a particular to hich it is applied, and their unit$ in an individualA a particular as characterized "$ a universal% )he universal is the concept "eing applied, hat sets the standard o! correctness o! the #udgment or action% :n the "road construal, the niedertrTchtig attitude does not admit that there are standards o! correctness 3norms9 in pla$ at all% )he particulars are actual and real, the universals are illusor$% )here are no genuine individuals that reall$ unite universals and particulars% )he issue comes up e&plicitl$ !or intentional actionI the Kammerdiener does not admit that hat is done can "e ackno ledgments o! the "indingness o! a norm, can "e simpl$ an application o! it to a particular% )here are #ust particular per!ormances, "ut no Buestion o! them genuinel$ !alling under norms according to hich the$ can "e assessed% Qudgments and actions as such are visi"le onl$ !rom the edelmKtig point o! vie , hich discerns the unit$, and hence the content, o! consciousness and action%

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So !ar, this characterization is compati"le ith a purel$ cognitive reading o! the t o meta*attitudes% But immediatel$ a!ter the Kammerdiener passage, Hegel sa$s o! the moral valetA )he consciousness that #udges in this a$ is itsel! "ase 0niedertrTchtig1, "ecause it divides up the action, producing and holding !ast to the disparit$ o! the action ith itsel!% 0P, 7771% /dopting the niedertrTchtig meta*attitude not onl$ Fholds !astG to the Fdisparit$ o! the action ith itsel!,G "ut Fdivides up the actionG and FproducesG the disparit$% )his sounds much more practical than cognitivea matter o! ma ing something, rather than finding it% But in hat sense does the moral valet produce the disparit$E (t cannot "e that hat he produces is the Fdistinction that action impliesG 0P, =881% 2or that distinction"et een achievement and intention, "et een the conte&t o! assessment and the conte&t o! deli"eration, "et een particular per!ormance and universal conceptual norm that sets a standard !or correctness !or itis a u"iBuitous and essential part o! the metaph$sical structure o! action% )hat distinction is not a product o! modern alienation% /lienation is onl$ one structure that a practical conception o! that distinction can take% (ndeed, that alienated structural practical conception o! agenc$ is hat the Kammerdiener produces "$ adopting the reductive niedertrTchtig attitude, hich denies that kno ers and agents are genuinel$ sensitive to conceptual norms%

)he claim is that adopting the niedertrTchtig normative meta*attitude institutes a kind o! normativit$ that has a distinctive, de!ective structure% )o sa$ that is to sa$

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that <iedertrTchtigkeit is in the !irst instance a kind o! recognition, rather than o! cognition% /!ter all, recognition in general is taking someone to "e a su"#ect o! normative statuses and attitudes 3hence a kno er and agent9, and speci!ic recognition is attri"uting particular normative statuses and attitudes% )he magnanimous historian, ho takes the hero to "e genuinel$ sensitive to and ackno ledging norms "e$ond his o n desires, recogni%es the hero in a ver$ di!!erent sense than does the one ho pla$s the moral valet to him% Qust so, Enlightenment-s taking 2aith to consist in a simple cognitive mistake is taking up a recognitive stance to 2aith% (t not onl$ makes a cognitive mistake hen it takes 2aith-s de!ining commitments to "e cognitive rather then recognitive 3"elie! in the e&istence o! a peculiar kind o! thing rather than instituting a communit$ o! trust9, it also commits a recognitive in#usticeA 2aithP receives at 0Enlightenment-s1 hands nothing "ut rongI !or Enlightenment distorts all the moments o! !aith, changing them into something di!!erent !rom hat the$ are in it% 06751 )o !aith, 0Enlightenment1 seems to "e a perversion and a lie "ecause it points out the otherness o! its momentsI in doing so, it seems directl$ to make something else out o! them than the$ are in their separatenessP% 067=1 (ts ungenerous, niedertrTchtig !ailure to recognize 2aith-s recognitive achievement changes that achievement, ma ing it less than it ould "e i! properl$ ackno ledged% B$ adopting that attitude, pla$ing the moral valet to 2aith, re!using proper recognition, Enlightenment re#ects communit$ ith 2aith, makes

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impossi"le the reciprocal recognition that ould institute a communit$ e&hi"iting the structure o! trust, and pushes the corresponding sort o! sel!*consciousness out o! reach%

)he moral valet does not #ust notice or point out the disparit$ that action and consciousness involve, he identifies ith it% 2or his recognitive act is also a recognitive sacri!ice% Dhat the Kammerdiener gives up is the possi"ilit$ o! a certain kind o! sel!*consciousnessA consciousness o! himsel! as genuinel$ "ound "$ norms% )he principled grounds he has !or re!using to recognize the hero as a norm*governed creature appl$ to himsel! as ell% His position is that the idea o! someone practicall$ ackno ledging a norm as "inding is unintelligi"le% )his characterization ma$ seem rong, at least !or the narro , literal construal o! the Kammerdiener stor$% /!ter all, he does attri"ute practical reasoning, and hence concept*use to the hero#ust nothing that is not immediatel$ sel!*serving, the satis!action o! some actual, contingent, motivating desire% So he does in some sense recognize the hero as a discursive "eing% But the claim ill "e that this is an unsta"le kind o! recognition% (! all an$one can do is !ul!ill !elt desires, then concept*use is not in the end intelligi"le as such% )he argument is the one rehearsed !or the conscientious consciousness% / notion o! dut$ sho ing some sort o! independence !rom attitudes is needed to give content to the idea o! assessing per!ormances accordingl$ as the$ ere or ere not per!ormed out o! a conviction that the$ ere hat dut$ demanded% <ormative attitudes are not in the end intelligi"le as content!ul apart !rom the norms that identi!$ and individuate

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their contents% Dhat the Kammerdiener is doing "$ adopting the niedertrTchtig recognitive stance is ma ing his o n and others- per!ormances and practices into something that is unintelligi"le as discursive%

)he third construal o! the niedertrTchtig and edelmKtig meta*attitudes to ard norms and normative attitudes is then that the$ are recognitive attitudes that have the e!!ect o! practical commitments% /dopting the edelmKtig stance o! spirit is committing onesel! to ma ing hat e are doing "eing "inding ourselves "$ conceptual norms, so ackno ledging the authorit$ o! such norms, "$ practicall$ ta ing it that that is hat e are doing"$ recognitivel$ treating ourselves and our !ello s as doing that% :n this vie normativit$ 3 hich, "ecause the norms in Buestion are !or Hegel all conceptually content!ul, is the same phenomenon as rationalit$9 is not !eature o! our practices independent o! our meta*attitude to ard it% F)o him ho looks at the orld rationall$, the orld looks rationall$ "ack,G Hegel sa$s%.6 <ormativit$ and rationalit$ are products o! our edelmKtig meta* attitudes, o! our practicall$ taking or treating hat e are doing 3recognizing each other9 as ackno ledging rational commitments% Spirit e&ists inso!ar as e ma e it e&ist "$ ta ing it to e&istA "$ understanding hat e are doing in normative, rational terms% De make the orld rational "$ adopting the recognitivel$ structured constellation o! commitments and responsi"ilities ( have!ollo ing Hegel-s usage in connection ith the communit$ 2aith is committed to instituting denominated trust% /s e ill see, this means that Spirit is "rought into
.6

Hegel enunciates this +Spiegeleier- slogan in the (ntroduction to his 'ectures on the Philosophy of (istory, pu"lished in English as Reason in (istory, ;o"ert S% Hartmann 3trans%9 0Bo""s*Herill, '?651, p% '5%

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e&istence and sustained "$ our commitment rationall$ to reconstruct the tradition o! e&perience in Dhiggish terms!inding tra#ectories through it that are monotonicall$ e&pressivel$ progressive, that e&hi"it hat e have "een doing as the un!olding into e&plicitness o! norms that ere all along implicit%

)his third understanding o! the meta*attitudes o! <iedertrTchtigkeit and EdelmKtigkeit, as practical, recognitive, hence communit$* and sel!*constitutive, like the second, still presents them as options availa"le !or the su"#ect !reel$ to choose "et een% (t is up to us hether to make ourselves into merel$ natural or genuinel$ normative "eings% :n this account, Hegel might "e urging us to not to make the Kammerdiener-s choice, "ut he is not claiming e are compelled to do so% )here is, ho ever, a !ourth a$ o! understanding the status o! these t o stances% (ts leading thought is that e have al a$s alread$ implicitl$ committed ourselves to adopting the edelmKtig stance, to identi!$ing ith the unit$ that action and consciousness involve, to understanding ourselves as genuinel$ "inding ourselves "$ conceptual norms that e appl$ in acting intentionall$ and making #udgments% 2or e do #udge and act, and e cannot avoid in practice taking or treating those #udgments and actions as "eing determinatel$ content!ul as materiall$ incompati"le ith certain other #udgments and actions, and as materiall$ entailing still others% De count some #udgments as reasons !or or against others, and some intentions and plans as ruling out or reBuiring others as means% Even the Kammerdiener and his resolutel$ reductive naturalist generalization o!!er content!ul accounts o! our doings 3per!ormances and

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attitudes9, accounts that aim to satis!$ the distinctive standards o! intelligi"ilit$, adeBuac$, and correctness to hich the$ hold themselves% If the determinate content!ulness o! the thoughts and intentions even o! the niedertrTchtig is in !act intelligi"le only !rom an edelmKtig perspective, then an$one ho in practice treats hat he is doing as #udging and acting is implicitl$ committed there"$ to EdelmKtigkeit% )he semantic theor$ that ( have "een e&tracting !rom the Phenomenology has as its conclusion the antecedent o! that conditional%

(! that is all right, then the apparent parit$ o! the t o meta*normative stances is an illusion% <o genuine choice "et een them is possi"le% B$ talking 3engaging in discursive practices9 at all, e have alread$ implicitl$ endorsed and adopted one o! them, hether e e&plicitl$ realize that or 3like the Kammerdiener9 not% :n this reading, hat Hegel is asking us to do is onl$ explicitly to ackno ledge theoretical and practical commitments e have alread$ implicitly undertaken #ust "$ taking part in discursive practices hich is to sa$, "$ "eing acculturated 0ge"ildet1% :ur e&plicitl$ adopting the edelmKtig practical*recognitive attitude is accordingl$ #ust achieving a certain kind o! sel!*consciousnessA realizing something that is alread$ true o! ourselves% So the issue is, in the end, a "roadl$ cognitive oneA a matter o! !inding out ho things in some sense alread$ are% But the achievement o! this de!initive kind o! sel!*consciousness is also, as must "e so according to Hegel-s social account o! hat sel!*consciousness consists in, the adoption o! a distinctive kind o! recognitive relation to others and to onesel!%

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)he realization that EdelmKtigkeit simpl$ consists in doing e&plicitl$ hat one has implicitl$ committed onesel! to do "$ adopting discursive attitudes and engaging in discursive practices also e&hi"its that recognitive attitude as a moral necessit$, in a sense that develops a Kantian idea% 3)his is part o! the reason Hegel-s e&positor$ development o! his novel positive account o! the shape o! an e&plicitl$ edelmKtig reciprocal recognitive relation closes the section titled +HoralitTt-9% Kant seeks to ground moral imperatives in the presuppositions o! rationalit$ and discursivit$, hence o! normativit$ and the sort o! positive !reedom that consists in "eing a"le to "ind onesel! "$ conceptual norms% His thought is that hatever can "e sho n to "e a necessar$ condition o! "eing a kno er and agent at all is there"$ sho n to have a grip on us that is unconditional in the sense o! not "eing relative to an$ particular endorsement or commitment o! ours, hether theoretical or practical% Hegel tells a di!!erent stor$ than Kant does a"out the relations "et een treating others as one minimall$ must in order to "e treating them as rational, discursive, norm*governed, !ree "eings 3that is, recognizing them9, on the one hand, and one-s sel!*consciousness as onesel! rational, discursive, norm*governed, and !ree% But he takes over the idea that speci!icall$ moral norms are to "e derived !rom the presuppositions o! discursivit$ in general% Sel!*recognition, recognizing onesel!, treating onesel! as a discursive "eing, a"le to undertake determinatel$ content!ul commitments, e&ercise determinatel$ content!ul authorit$ and so on, reBuires recognizing othersA attri"uting that kind o! responsi"ilit$ and authorit$ to them% /n$ practical or theoretical presupposition o! that is a structural presupposition o! one-s o n sel!*consciousness% )hat is the

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source o! moral reBuirements on ho

e treat others% )ransposed into the ke$ o!

Hegel-s e&pressive idiom, edi!ication concerning hat is necessar$ sho s up as the making e&plicit 3!Kr sich9 o! hat it is alread$ implicitl$ 3an sich9 committed to% Doing that al a$s has "oth a cognitive aspect o! !inding out ho things alread$ reall$ ere 3in themselves9, and o! recognitive sel!*trans!ormation and constitution o! onesel! as a ne kind o! sel!*consciousness%

)here are t o places in this argument !or the cognitive, practical*recognitive, and moral necessit$ o! adopting the edelmKtig meta*normative attitudethat doing that e&plicitl$ is #ust ackno ledging hat one has al a$s alread$ done implicitl$ at hich the convinced anti*normative reductionist could o"#ect% 2irst, o! course, is to the claim, grounded in Hegel-s comple& semantics, that onl$ an edelmKtig recognitive structure can make or !ind determinate conceptual contents% (n the ne&t section o! this chapter e-ll look more closel$ at the stor$ that "acks up that claim "$ connecting hermeneutic magnanimit$ ith the Hegelian process o! e&tracting representational content !rom in!erential content "$ recollection% )he other locus !or a possi"le o"#ection is the claim that the naturalist is implicitl$ committed, #ust "$ speaking and acting intentionall$, to the determinate content!ulness o! his attitudes in some sense that "rings into pla$ a semantics at all% 3)he sort o! naturalist ho ackno ledges that semantic normativit$ must "e under ritten, "ut seeks to do that in holl$ naturalistic terms !alls under the !irst heading rather than this one%9 )his is not true o! the Kammerdiener on the narro est, most literal construal, since he attri"utes content!ul attitudes, #ust

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e&clusivel$ sel!*interested ones, ones that more or less immediatel$ e&press particular desires o! the sort hose paradigm is "odil$ ants% But on the "roader reading, a determined naturalist might insist that e&actl$ hat he ants to den$ is that e must give intentional speci!ications o! our per!ormances and attitudes 3that is, ones that identi!$ or individuate them in terms o! their conceptual contents9 at all% (! he is illing to descri"e even his o n doings entirel$ in the restricted language o! noises, marks, and the motions o! "odies, h$ does not talk o! Fimplicit commitmentsG #ust "eg the Buestion against his vie E )here is, o! course, nothing to keep this sort o! naturalist !rom ma ing hat he sa$s true o! himsel!% He is also a desiring organism, and he can make himsel! into nothing more than that% 2or he can #ust stop talkingthough onl$, as Sellars remarksat the cost o! having nothing to sa$% But i! he does keep talking, then hatever else he is doing, he is responding to reasons as reasons, dra ing in!erences and o!!ering accounts% 2or his per!orming speech acts that have the signi!icance, regardless o! his vie o! the matter, o! claiming conceptuall$ articulated authorit$ and undertaking conceptuall$ articulated responsi"ilit$% /nd that is enough !or him also to "e incurring the implicit commitments that Hegel sees as made e&plicit "$ con!ession, !orgiveness, and trust%

(n much o! this chapter, ( have deli"eratel$ "een using +norm- in a loose and apparentl$ am"iguous a$% (-ve "een doing so to mirror, more or less, Hegel-s use o! +necessit$-% )hat use is intended to com"ine 3successor versions o!9 the t o notions that Kant distinguished under the headings o! Fsu"#ective necessit$G

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and Fo"#ective necessit$%G 2rom Hegel-s point o! vie , these are +einseitigconstruals o! aspects o! a single notion, hich stand to one another in comple& relations% )he conceptual apparatus needed to talk in a less am"iguous a$ has alread$ "een put on the ta"le% )he !irst, su"#ective aspect o! normativit$ re!ers to social normative statuses o! su"#ectsA commitments and entitlements, responsi"ilit$ and authorit$% )hese are the o"#ects o! recognitive attitudes that individual su"#ects adopt to ard other individual su"#ects% )he second, o"#ective aspect re!ers to the conceptual structure o! the o"#ective orldA the material incompati"ilit$ and 3so9 conseBuence relations that articulate that orld into determinate properties*and*o"#ects, !acts, and la s% )hese are the o"#ects o! cognitive attitudes that individual su"#ects adopt to ard the o"#ective orld% )he e&istence o! normative statuses is not re!erence*independent o! the e&istence o! su"#ective normative attitudes% )he e&istence o! o"#ective conceptual norms is re!erence*independent o! the e&istence o! su"#ective normative attitudes 3and hence o! normative statuses9% )he Hegelian thesis that normative statuses and o"#ective conceptual norms are reciprocall$ sense*dependent is hat in Chapter 2ive ( called Fo"#ective idealismG%

(t is important to keep this comple& structure o! various kinds o! dependence and independence in mind hen thinking a"out the relation "et een the third and !ourth construals o! <iedertrTchtigkeit and EdelmKtigkeit% /ccording to the !inal one, normative statuses are made "$ 3re!erence*dependent upon9 normative attitudes 3including the meta*normative attitudes o! <iedertrTchtigkeit and

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EdelmKtigkeit9, hile conceptual norms are !ound 3re!erence*independent o! normative attitudes, including the meta*normative ones9% Because o"#ective conceptual norms are 3reciprocall$9 sense*dependent on the normative statuses o! su"#ects 3o"#ective idealism9, the niedertrTchtig reductive naturalist is rong to think that he can den$ the intelligi"ilit$ 3his reason !or den$ing the e&istence9 o! normative statuses and still "e entitled to treat the o"#ective orld as a determinate o"#ect o! potential kno ledge% F<o cognition ithout recognitionZG is the slogan here% Because normative attitudes and normative statuses are both reciprocally sense*dependent and reciprocally reference-dependent, the attempt to entitle onesel! to talk a"out determinatel$ content!ul normative attitudes hile den$ing the intelligi"ilit$ and 3so9 e&istence o! normative statuses is "ound to !ail% De sa Hegel make arguments to the e!!ect that normative attitudes must "e thought o! as contentless i! normative statuses are taken out o! the picture, at various places in the te&t, such as the discussion o! skepticism, o! the honest consciousness, and o! the conscientious consciousness% Den$ing the intelligi"ilit$ o! normative statusesden$ing that genuine authorit$ and the "indingness o! commitments can "e made sense o!is alienation% /sserting the sense* and re!erence*dependence o! normative statuses on normative attitudesin this dual sense den$ing that normative statuses are independent o! normative attitudesis the core insight "ehind the modern rise o! su"#ectivit$% De are accordingl$ no in a position to see ho that insight can "e reconciled ith the overcoming o! alienation%

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<iedertrTchtigkeit is a pure e&pression o! alienation, hile EdelmKtigkeit sho s a a$ !or ard !rom the impasse o! modernit$% )he progression through the !our, ever more sophisticated, meta*meta*normative a$s o! understanding these meta* normative attitudes track the principal stages in the development o! Spirit% )he !irst, o"#ective@cognitive construal runs together normative statuses and conceptual norms "$ in e!!ect assimilating the !ormer to the latter% )he$ are either #ust there, independentl$ o! our 3meta*normative9 attitudes to ard them, or the$ are not% )his corresponds to the traditional, pre*modern attitude to ard norms% )he stance stance, hich sees a !ree choice "et een t o a$s o! talking, ith either meta*normative attitude availa"le !or adoption "$ su"#ects as a theoretical commitment corresponds to the modern, su"#ectivist attitude to ard norms, as that attitude is epitomized "$ Enlightenment% )his second rendering runs together normative statuses and conceptual norms "$ in e!!ect assimilating the latter to the !ormer "$ seeing conceptual norms as instituted "$ normative attitudes in the a$ normative statuses are 3the principle o! utilit$9% Mnderstanding the stances and the choice "et een them as a matter o! adopting a practical commitment, as producing the unit$ it discerns, hence ultimatel$ as a recognitive matter o! communit$* and sel!*constitution corresponds to the response Hegel makes to Enlightenment-s misunderstanding o! the nature o! the communit$ o! trust, on 2aith-s "ehal!% )hat is, these t o construals correspond to the t o alienated institutional !orms o! characteristicall$ modern understandings o! norms, statuses, and attitudes% Mnderstanding the edelmKtig attitude as a practical*recognitive commitment that has al a$s alread$ implicitl$ "een

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undertaken as a pragmatic condition o! semanticall$ content!ul cognition and agenc$ 3o! determinate su"#ective attitudes9 then corresponds to "reaking through the con!ines o! alienated modernit$ into the !orm o! sel!*consciousness Hegel calls F/"solute Kno ingG% /t the !irst stage, in hich necessit$ is construed as o"#ective necessit$, the norms are found% 2or normative statuses 3dut$, propriet$, hat one is committed to do, hat one is responsi"le !or doing9 re!lect and are determined "$ o"#ective 3attitude* and practice*independent9 norms% (n the middle, modern stage, in hich necessit$ is construed as su"#ective necessit$, normativit$ and reason must "e made "$ our attitudes and practices, rather than "eing !ound% /t the pro#ected post*modern third stage, !inding and making sho up as t o sides o! one coin, t o aspects o! one process, hose t o phases e&perience and its recollection, lived !or ard and comprehended "ack ard, the inhalation and e&halation that sustain the li!e o! Spiritare each "oth makings and !indings% (n e&perience, error is !ound and a ne phenomenon is made% (n recollection, a rational selection and reconstruction o! an e&pressivel$ progressive tra#ector$ o! e&perience is made, and an implicit noumenon is !ound% Senses are made, and re!erents !ound% )he unit$, the identit$ o! content, that consciousness and action involve must "e made, and the complementar$ disparit$ is !ound% /"solute Kno ing is comprehending the a$ in hich these aspects mutuall$ presuppose, support, complement, and complete one another%

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Section )II: %onfession, 0udgment, and Forgiveness

)he !inal movement o! Spirit is discussed in the concluding eleven paragraphs o! this long chapter% (t is here that Hegel sketches the a$ !or ard out o! modernit$ to a more adeBuatel$ sel!*conscious structure o! recognition, and so o! selves, norms, and communities% )his discussion is the culmination o! the su"stantive development o! the hole "ook% (t is true that the Spirit chapter is succeeded "$ t o moreA Religion, and Absolute 0nowing, "ut in a real sense the$ comment on a development that has alread$ "een completed "$ the end o! Spirit%.7 Absolute 0nowing is an account o! here e have arrived, a!ter our phenomenological recollection o! the development o! di!!erent shapes o! consciousness, sel!*consciousness, and reasonthat is, o! the cognitive, recognitive, and practical dimensions o! conceptual activit$and o! the stages o! Spirit as a hole% Dhen Absolute 0nowing "egins, e are supposed to have alread$ achieved the sort o! sel!*consciousness it concerns itsel! ith% /nd the point o! the Religion chapter is that the insights e have achieved philosophicall$, "$ the end o! the Spirit chapter, can "e seen to "e those that religion, too, seeks to e&pressal"eit not conceptuall$, "ut in the !orm o! sensuous immediac$% 3;ecall the s$m"olic*e&pressive role o! hat is immediatel$ o"serva"le in revealing an underl$ing uno"serva"le realit$, as introduced late in )orce and -nderstanding, discussed at the end o! Chapter 2our a"ove and !illed in "$ the treatment o! phenomena and noumena at the end o! Chapter Seven%9 Religion is to provide a di!!erent point o! vie on a lesson alread$ presented in more perspicuous !orm%
.7

(n this a$ the structure o! the Phenomenology deserves comparison ith the a$ in hich the su"stantive ork o! the Science of 'ogic is done long "e!ore the te&t ends, and is !ollo ed "$ a methodological section that is not a su"stantive part o! the s$stem "eing presentedthe picture o! the (dea that e have completed =8 pages or so "e!ore% (-ll discuss this point !urther in the ne&t chapter, hen considering the picture o! the (dea that is completed =8 pages or so "e!ore the end o! the 'ogic%

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(t is to the su"stantive ork completed in Spirit hat Kant-s Religion +ithin the ,ounds of Reason Alone is to the presentation o! his practical philosoph$ in the .nd CritiBue% )he lesson e are to have learned !rom the rehearsal o! the histor$ o! Spirit ill "e restated in Absolute 0nowing" and again, in some hat di!!erent terms, in the Preface% But its emergence !rom the ultimatel$ incompati"le structural commitments characteristic o! modernit$ is chronicled in these !e concluding paragraphs o! Spirit% (t is here that e are to achieve the state Hegel calls Fa"solute kno ing,G the end o! our spiritual #ourne$%

)he te&t that descri"es the transition to the third stage in the development o! Spirit is gnomic, dark, and allegorical% (t takes the !orm o! a para"le, a narrative recounting seBuential stages in the relationship "et een an Fevil consciousnessG 0P, 77'1 and a Fhard*hearted #udgeG 0P, 77?*>81A evil 0P, 77'*7.1, #udgment 0P, 77.*771, con!ession 07771, re!usal o! reciprocal con!ession 0P, 77>*7N1, the "reaking o! the hard heart and con!ession "$ the #udge 0P, 77?1, !orgiveness 0P, 77?*>'1, and the achievement o! a ne kind o! communit$ 3F)he reconciling Sea, in hich the t o O(Os let go their antithetical e&istence, is the e&istence o! the O(O hich has e&panded into a dualit$%G 0P, 7>'19% :ur task, as it has so o!ten "een, is to read the allegor$in this case, so as to understand the nature o! this !inal !orm o! mutual recognition as reciprocal con!ession and !orgiveness% Mnlike the earlier stories, this one outlines something that hasn-t happened $etA a !uture development o! Spirit, o! hich Hegel is the prophetA the making e&plicit o! something alread$ implicit, hose occurrence is to usher in the ne&t phase in our histor$%

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)he t o parties to this moralit$ tale, the #udged and the #udging consciousness, personi!$ the t o social perspectives on the application o! concepts in #udgment and agenc$ !amiliar to us !rom our consideration o! Hegel-s theor$ o! agenc$% )hese are the !irst* person conte&t o! deli"eration 3Lorsatz*Handlung9 and the third*person conte&t o! assessment 3/"sicht*)at9% )he one #udged makes himsel! responsi"le, "$ appl$ing a concept, and the #udge holds him responsi"le !or that application% Dhat e are

eventuall$ to comprehendthere"$ achieving Fa"solute kno ingGis the a$ in hich a process o! negotiation involving the normative attitudes o! the sel!*conscious individuals occup$ing the t o perspectives is intelligi"le as instituting a normative statusA a cognitive or practical commitment resulting !rom the application o! a conceptual norm hose determinate content is e&pressed, clari!ied, and developed in that ver$ process%

)he adoption o! normative attitudes to ards one another 3the attri"ution and ackno ledgment o! normative statuses9 is recognition% So the relations "et een the #udging and the #udged individuals are recognitive onesA the relations that articulate their sel!*consciousness and structure their communit$% /s our stor$ "egins, the recognitive attitudes in virtue o! hich the acting consciousness is denominated +evil- or + icked0"Use1, and the #udge Fhard*heartedG are niedertrTchtig ones% )he consciousness that #udges in this a$ is itsel! "ase 0niedertrTchtig1, "ecause it divides up the action, producing and holding !ast to the disparit$ o! the action ith itsel!% 0P, 7771 Dhat is rong ith <iedertrTchtigkeit is that such attitudes institute alienated recognitive structures% (n a social structure o! sel!*consciousness o! this kind, an

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individual-s #udgments and actions are not intelligi"le as such, to himsel! or to others% 2or hat he does cannot "e practicall$ understood as the application o! 3the "inding o! himsel! "$9 determinatel$ content!ul conceptual norms% De need to "e clear a"out the relations "et eenA '% .iedertr1chtig eit, as a practical attitude o! identi!ication ith, hence sacri!ice !or, the disparit$ that action and consciousness involve, hich produces that disparit$ in a distinctivel$ alienated !ormI .% Alienation, as a recognitive structure that is de!ective in making incomprehensi"le the normative dimension o! the activities o! individuals and the practices o! communities that e&hi"it that structure 3a !ailure o! sel!*consciousness9I and 5% Asymmetry o! recognition as its characteristic structural de!ect, and as resulting !rom practicall$ appl$ing categories o! immediac$ or independence 3the conception o! authorit$ and responsi"ilit$ epitomized "$ the Haster9%

)he !irst o"servation to make is that one a$ recognition can "e non*reciprocal or as$mmetric is i! the norms that are applied "$ the people ho are deli"erating a"out hat to do and #usti!$ing hat the$ are doing are not the same norms that are applied "$ the people attri"uting those doings and assessing those #usti!ications% /s e have seen, that is #ust the criticism that Hegel makes o! the meta*normative attitudes"oth the theoretical ones and the recognitive ones that result !rom rel$ing on those theoretical attitudes in practicethat he discusses under the heading o! +HoralitTt- in the !irst t o su"sections o! the third part o! the Spirit chapter% )he inevita"le di!!erence that action involves 3"ecause o! the di!!erence "et een the t o social recognitive perspectives on it9

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is produced 3"$ "eing practicall$ construed9 "$ these meta*attitudes in the !orm o! a disparit$ "et een the norms that are availa"le !or individuals to use in the conte&t o! deli"eration and ackno ledgment o! commitments, on the one hand, and the norms that are availa"le !or individuals to appl$ in the conte&t o! assessment and attri"ution o! commitments, on the other% )he successor meta*conception, conscience, Hegel portra$s as succeeding in getting the same norms to appl$ in "oth conte&ts% But that desira"le result is achieved onl$ at the cost o! losing the content o! the common norms% 2or hat is right is identi!ied "$ "oth parties, "oth the acting and the assessing consciousness, ith hatever the agent ta es to "e right% /nd that means 3as another philosopher ould later point out9 that on that conception there ultimatel$ is no Buestion o! right or rong% 2or there is nothing le!t that the agent can intelligi"l$ "e taking an application o! a concept to "e, hen he takes it to "e correct% (! norms are simpl$ identi!ied ith normative attitudes 3 hat is correct ith hat is taken to "e correct9, the latter "ecome unintelligi"le%

:ne o! Hegel-s most !undamental ideas is that the notion o! content is intelligi"le in principle onl$ in terms o! the sort o! friction "et een normative attitudes that sho s up in cognitive e&perience in the collision o! incompati"le commitments ac nowledged "$ one kno er, and hich e have come to see is rooted in the social*perspectival collision o! commitments ac nowledged and those attributed in practical e&perience o! the disparit$ o! Handlung and )at% /n$ attempt to remove the distinctions that consciousness and action involve "$ immediately identifying the t o sides ith one another necessaril$ discards ra materials essential !or making sense o! the notion o! determinate conceptual content% )he conscientious consciousness- characteristicall$ alienated attempt to replace

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norms "$ attitudes is merel$ the latest in a seBuence o! targets o! this generic criticism that Hegel has rehearsed, "eginning ith the conception o! immediate sense certaint$, in !onsciousness, including "oth the discussions o! master$ and o! stoicism and skepticism, in Self-!onsciousness, and the honest consciousness 3 hich identi!ied doings ith illings, construed as a kind o! minimal doing that is immediatel$ realiza"le "ecause identical ith the mere adoption o! an attitude9 in Reason% /ll are accused o! putting themselves in a position !rom hich the contents o! their attitudes are incomprehensi"le% )he niedertrTchtig #udge does not, like the conscientious consciousness, elide the distinction that action and consciousness involves% But, as e-ll see he does have the same sel!*de!eating meta*attitude that unless the agent-s motivating attitude 3purpose9 and the norm according to hich it is to "e assessed are immediately identical, then there is no common content in pla$ at all% /nd ithout that notion o! a content that can 3at the ver$ least, in !avored cases9 "e understood as common to hat is intended and hat is achieved, the notion o! a normative statuso! hat the agent is doing as committing himsel!, in action and #udgment, the o"#ect o! "oth sorts o! normative attitude, o! a commitment as hat can "e "oth ackno ledged 3onesel!9 and attri"uted 3"$ others9 together ith the notion o! the norm one is "inding onesel! "$ in adopting such a status, necessaril$ goes missing% (n order to overcome the pro"lems that are part and parcel o! the one*sided construals o! the unit$ o! action "$ the conscientious consciousness and o! its disparit$ "$ the #udge ho pla$s the moral valet to other agents, hat is needed is to move "e$ond the categories o! immediac$ the$ appl$ in their theoretical and practical understandings o! normativit$% )hen, and onl$ then can the distinction that action and consciousness involve sho up as t o forms in hich one content can appear%

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/gainst this "ackground, let us look at hat Hegel sa$s a"out ho the #udging consciousness applies di!!erent standards to the assessment o! action than does the agent himsel!% F)he consciousness o! an act declares its speci!ic action to "e a dut$%G 0P,

7761 )his is ho the agent #usti!ies his actionA "$ sa$ing 3here using Kantian terminolog$9 that it !alls under a norm, that it correct or reBuired% Doing this is e&hi"iting a normative attitude, portra$ing hat is done as an ackno ledgment o! a norm as "inding% (n a certain sense, this attitude is the end o! the matter !or the agent% He can onl$ do hat he ta es to "e his dut$% Dhen he has settled that, he has settled hat to do% His normative attitude, his ac nowledgment o! a commitment, is the !orm in hich his normative status, hat he is reall$ committed to, sho s up !or him% +Conscience0,e issen1 is Hegel-s term !or the metanormative conception according to hich that attitude ought also to settle things 3"e authoritative !or9 those ho assess the correctness o! hat the agent does% /s long as he did hat he too to "e his dut$, he acted conscientiousl$ 3i%e% out o! respect !or dut$9, and that is supposed to "e the onl$ "asis on hich he can "e assessed% Having seen the !atal structural !la in this strateg$the a$ the notion o! dut$ goes missing in it e 3the phenomenological + e-, Hegel-s readers9 are moving on to consider a successor strateg$ that does retain a di!!erence "et een the conte&t o! assessment and that o! appraisal% <o the #udging consciousness does not stop short at the !ormer aspect o! dut$, at the doers kno ledge o! it that this is his dut$, and the !act that the doer kno s it to "e his dut$, the condition and status o! his realit$% :n the contrar$, it holds to the other aspect, looks at hat the action is in itsel!,

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and e&plains it as resulting !rom an intention di!!erent !rom the action itsel!, and !rom sel!ish motives% Qust as ever$ action is capa"le o! "eing looked at !rom the point o! vie o! con!ormit$ to dut$, so too can it "e considered !rom the point o! vie o! the particularit$ 0o! the doer1P<o action can escape such #udgement, !or dut$ !or dut$Os sake, this pure purpose, is an unrealit$I it "ecomes a realit$ in the deed o! an individualit$, and the action is there"$ charged ith the aspect o! particularit$%%%%)hus, !or the #udging consciousness, there is no action in hich it could not oppose to the universal aspect o! the action, the personal aspect o! the individualit$, and pla$ the part o! the moral valet to ards the agent% 0P, 7761

(t is !rom the point o! vie o! such a #udging consciousness, assessing the con!ormit$ o! a per!ormance to dut$, that the per!ormanceany actual per!ormancesho s up as wrong, and the acting consciousness as bad% )he concept o! evil in pla$ here is o! actions that disregard hat the agent ought to do, hat it ould "e right to do, and respond onl$ to the agent-s personal ants and desires% (n this case, assessing the doing as evil is taking it not to have "een per!ormed out o! a pure respect !or dut$, that is, application o! a norm, ackno ledgement o! a commitment% De kno enough "$ no to see that the pro"lem is going to "e ith the Fpurit$G reBuired o! the purpose, that the action stem !rom Fdut$ !or dut$-s sakeG alone% /n insistence on those characteristics e&presses an understanding o! authorit$ on the one*sided model o! independence 3master$9A unless only the norm is authoritative, unless it is wholly authoritative, it cannot "e understood as

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authoritative at all% But hat, e&actl$, is the content o! the indictment delivered "$ the #udging consciousness and, at the ne&t stage in the para"le, con!essed "$ the acting consciousnessE

( think e should understand it as comprising t o related, "ut distinct claims% 2irst, and most o"viousl$, it is al a$s possi"le to o!!er a reductive, Kammerdiener-s account o! the aetiolog$ o! an action in terms o! attitudes rather than norms, inclinations rather than o"ligations, causes rather than reasons 3Fsel!ish motivesG, Fparticularit$G, Fthe personal aspectG9% De need not accept the agent-s claim to "e sensitive to norms, reasons, the standards o! correctness !or the application o! concepts% (n place o! a kantian e&planation in terms o! hat are o!ten called Fe&ternal reasonsG, e can al a$s give a humean e&planation in terms o! hat are correspondingl$ called Finternal reasonsGA appeal to the su"#ective desires o! the agent as motives instead o! to the agent-s o"ligations as reasons% 2rom this point o! vie the agent sho s up not onl$ as "ad, in the sense o! not reall$ responsive to norms, "ut also as h$pocritical 0P, 775*7=1, !or the agent claims to "e responsive to norms, "ut in !actaccording to the niedertrTchtig assessmentis reall$ responsive onl$ to its o n inclinations and attitudes% Counter!actuall$, i! the norms determining the content o! one-s real commitments were di!!erent, "ut one-s attitudes and inclinations ere the same, one would act in the same a$% So hat should one count as sensitive toE Since norms are onl$ actuall$ e!!icacious via attitudes, it is al a$s possi"le to see agents as sensitive onl$ to their o n attitudes% Construing that !act as meaning that those attitudes are not properl$ to "e understood as ackno ledgments o! commitments, as applications o! 3"indings o! onesel! "$9 conceptual norms, is <iedertrTchtigkeit%

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Second, Hegel characterizes the niedertrTchtig #udge as holding to the moment o! disparit$ that action necessaril$ involves, looking Fat hat the action is in itsel!,G hat is actuall$ achieved, rather than hat it is !or the agent, Fand e&plains it as resulting !rom an intention di!!erent !rom the action itsel!%G 3Hegel uses +/"sicht- here, "ut he has not $et made the technical distinction "et een +/"sicht- and +Lorsatz- that he ill later e&plain and en!orce in the Philosophy of Right, as discussed in Chapter Seven% (n those later terms, +Lorsatz- ould "e "etter here%9 2or hat is seized on is the disparit$ "et een the norm the agent claims to "e ans ering to 3the concept he is appl$ing9 and the actual per!ormance produced% (t is part o! the "asic metaph$sics o! agenc$ that one can never merely !ul!ill a purpose% Dhatever one does admits o! an inde!inite num"er o! speci!ications%.> )he niedertrTchtig assessor and attri"utor o! the doing re#ects the authoritativeness o! the agent-s privileging o! one o! these 3indeed, o!ten, as e-ve seen, one that is not even true o! hat as done, "ut stands to those that are true onl$ in a much eaker, retrospectivel$ discerned, "roadl$ anaphoric relation9 as hat he as tr$ing to do% )he #udge e&ercises his o n authorit$, attri"uting and holding the agent responsi"le !or the action under a di!!erent kind o! description, seeing it not as the ackno ledgment o! a norm "ut onl$ the evincing o! a desire or inclination% B$ acting this a$, the #udge in !act adopts an as$mmetric recognitive stance to ard the agent% 2or he insists on his o n authorit$ over action*speci!ications, hile not ackno ledging an$ corresponding authorit$ on the part o! the agent% /nd that as$mmetr$ is the direct result
.>

F/ction, in virtue o! the antithesis it essentiall$ contains, is related to a negative o! consciousness, to a realit$ possessing intrinsic "eing% Contrasted ith the simplicit$ o! pure consciousness, ith the a"solute other or implicit mani!oldness, this realit$ is a pluralit$ o! circumstances hich "reaks up and spreads out endlessl$ in all directions, "ack ards into their conditions, side a$s into their connections, !or ards in their conseBuences%G 0P, 7=.1

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o! understanding authorit$ and responsi"ilit$ on the model o! independenceA as precluding any kind o! reciprocal dependence 3taking authorit$ to "e incompati"le ith an$ correlative responsi"ilit$9%

)he Kammerdiener-s sort o! assessment is al a$s possi"le, and in the para"le o! con!ession and !orgiveness, the agent himsel! eventuall$ comes to assess his o n actions this a$% He con!esses to "eing evilcon!esses that his apparent respect !or the norms 3universals9 is a guise !or the pursuit o! personal 3particular9 ends% /dopting this reductive naturalistic characterization o! his o n doings is the ne plus ultra o! alienation% 2or the sel!*consciousness that makes this con!ession 3recognizing itsel! in niedertrTchtig terms9 "ecomes unintelligi"le to itsel! as a creature and creator o! norms, hence as a kno er and agent at all% )he reductive stance ackno ledges onl$ attitudes% (t is not #ust that the inde!inite multiplicit$ o! uniBue circumstances accompan$ing ever$ particular candidate !or application o! a conceptual norm make it impossi"le to "e sure hether it is correct to appl$ the universal to that particular, hat one-s use o! that term commits one to do, and so hat attitude one ould "e &ustified or entitled to adopt "$ the norms in pla$% (t is rather that the ver$ idea o! a norm that settles the Buestion one a$ or another !or novel cases 3the idea o! normative Frails laid out to in!init$G9 seems unintelligi"lea metaph$sical, rather than an epistemic pro"lem% Dhat there reall$ isinstead o! genuine conceptual norms, hich, hen applied "$ adopting an attitude to ard them, institute genuine normative statuses, paradigmaticall$ commitmentsis #ust cases here a term has "een applied in the past 3"$ onesel! and "$ others9, cases here such application has "een ithheld, and the inclinations and dispositions that various practitioners have as a

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matter o! !act acBuired in response to those prior uses, in the conte&t o! ho the$ are all ired*up and trained% Msing a term in some cases and not others is e&pressing a practical attitude% But on this reductive conception, it is not a normative attitude% )here are no norms in pla$ that could determine hat one as really committing onsel! to "$ doing so 3 hat normative status one had undertaken "$ adopting that attitude9%

/gain, the counter!actuals also point to the realit$ and e&planator$ su!!icienc$ o! attitudes rather than norms% (ad individual practitioners, as a result o! their o n particular, contingent motivations, applied terms di!!erentl$ in the past, their heirs would "e disposed to appl$ them di!!erentl$ no % 3)his counter!actual matter o! !act provides the grip that genealog$ gets on norms%9 Current attitudes 3uses9 are sensitive to past attitudes 3uses9% <o notion o! normative necessit$ 3 hat one has reason9 to do emerges !rom this picture o! massive contingenc$, in hich current applications are e&plica"le in terms o! F hat the #udge had !or "reak!ast%G (n this sense it is attitudes Fall the a$ do n%G )his reductive naturalism is the culmination o! modern alienation% (n it, hat as all along the dark side o! the implicit core o! modernit$its discover$ o! the constitutive signi!icance o! individual attitudescomes into the e&plicit light o! da$%

/s Hegel tells the stor$, the acting consciousness, hich Fdeclares its speci!ic action to "e dut$,G and "oth the #udging and con!essing consciousness, hich e&plain actions in terms o! non*normativel$ characterized motives 3attitudes9, see the issue a"out hich the$ disagree as a cognitive oneA a matter o! ho is right a"out an o"#ective !act% (s the agent in !act ackno ledging the "indingness o! a norm 3"eing sensitive to a normative

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necessit$9, or merel$ responding to other attitudes 3so the per!ormance "elongs in a "o& ith other phenomena e&plica"le "$ appeal to contingent matters o! !act9E (s naturalism a"out motives trueE (! it is, then it applies in the conte&t o! assessment #ust as much as in the conte&t o! deli"eration, and so to the #udge ho assesses and attri"utes actions as much as to the agent ho produces them% (! the agent cannot intelligi"l$ "e supposed to "e undertaking commitments, ackno ledging norms as "inding, "inding himsel! "$ norms, tr$ing to do hat is right, then neither can the #udge% :r again, i! the !act that one can adopt the Kammerdiener stance means that one must 3that that is the right a$ to think o! things9 in the case o! the consciousness "eing assessed, h$ does not the same thing appl$ to the consciousness doing the assessingE

But at this stage in the para"le, the #udging consciousness Fis h$pocris$, "ecause it passes o!! such #udging, not as another manner o! "eing icked, "ut as the correct consciousness o! the action%G 0P, 7771 )he #udge takes it that though the acting consciousness is evil, responding to the particular rather than the universal, the contingencies o! his su"#ective situation and dispositions rather than ackno ledging hat is normativel$ necessar$, he himsel! is responsive to the universal, to norms% Dhat the #udge sa$s is correct, the right a$ to descri"e hat is going on, the a$ one is obliged to think a"out it% )he #udge still takes it that he can Foppose to the universal aspect o! the action, the personal aspect o! the individualit$,G "ecause he still perceives that universal aspect% So the assessor and attri"utor o! actions applies Buite di!!erent standards to his o n activities than he does to those o! the ones he assesses% )his is an as$mmetric recognitive relation%

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)he !irst step to ard a s$mmetric, genuinel$ reciprocal interpersonal recognitive relation is taken "$ the individual ho is #udged, ho confesses its particularit$ and the contingenc$ o! its attitudes% 0P, 7771 Con!essing is ackno ledging and accepting the correctness o! the indictment o! the niedertrTchtig #udge% (t is a speech act, "ecause Flanguage as the e&istence o! SpiritPis sel!*consciousness e&isting !or others,G 0P, 76.1, Fit is the sel! hich as such is actual in language, hich declares itsel! to "e the truth, and #ust "$ so doing ackno ledges all other selves and is ackno ledged "$ them%G 0P, 76=1 )he content o! the con!ession is accordingl$ something likeA F( con!ess that m$ #udgments and actions have not "een #ust hat ( as o"liged or permitted 3committed or entitled9 to do "$ the norms implicit in the concepts applied thereinI the$ ere not simpl$ responses ackno ledging the normative necessit$ em"odied in those concepts% )he$ also e&press, re!lect, and are sensitive to m$ su"#ective attitudesthe do&astic and practical commitments, the particular contingent course o! e&perience ( have undergone, the "elie!s that ( have contingentl$ acBuired and re#ected or retained during this historical*e&periential process o! development, m$ contingent practical ends, pro#ects, and plans and their evolutionever$thing that makes me the distinctive individual ( am% )he$ are, in the end, my commitments, my attitudes, shot through and through ith particularit$ that is not a mere re!lection o! the universals ( took m$sel! to "e appl$ing%G )o sa$ that is to e&press the structural distinction and disparit$ that cognition and action involve% )hat is the distinction "et een hat things are !or consciousness and hat the$ are in themselves% Dhat is con!essed is that hat things are !or consciousness is not #ust hatever the$ are in themselves% Dhat things are !or me is in!luenced not onl$ "$ hat the$ are in themselves, "ut also "$ considerations particular to m$ actual, em"odied

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su"#ectivit$A the residual e!!ects o! the contingent tra#ector$ o! m$ training and e&perience, collateral attitudes, inclinations, concerns, and emphases o! attention 3class, individual level o! ressentiment, role in the 2amil$ ;omanceP9% (ndeed, m$ decision to appl$ or not to appl$ a given concept in some actual circumstances can "e e&plained "$ appeal to such contingencies concerning prior applications o! concepts, Buite apart !rom consideration o! the true content o! the conceptual norm "eing appliedA the norm ( in !act "ound m$sel! "$ in the sense that makes it relevant to assessments o! correctness and success% :n the cognitive side, this is the structural distinction "et een the Hegelian versions o! sense and re!erent, phenomena and noumena, conception and concept% :n the practical side, it is the structural distinction "et een purpose and achievement%

Haking such a con!ession is practicall$ identifying ith that structural disparit$ that kno ing and acting consciousness involves% 2or it is sacrificing the claim to entitlement !or or #usti!ication o! the #udgment or action "$ appeal to the content o! the conceptual norm "eing applied% (t is identi!ication ith one-s o n attitudes 3particularit$9, rather than ith the normative statuses 3individualit$9 that are adopted in virtue o! appl$ing concepts, "inding onesel! "$ norms 3universals9% )hat universal dimension is no longer ackno ledged as "eing in pla$onl$ attitudes% So the con!essor, too, adopts a niedertrTchtig attitude, no to ard his o n commitments% Like the #udge, he Fopposes to the universal aspect o! the action, the personal aspect o! the individualit$%G Doing that is a step to ard the achievement o! mutual, s$mmetric recognition, "ecause the con!ession consists in adopting the standards o! assessment deplo$ed "$ the #udging consciousness, ceasing to insist on his o n% /nd that means that the same standards are

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"rought to "ear "$ the agent as "$ the assessoreven though the$ are niedertrTchtig ones, "asel$ identi!$ing ith the disparit$ o! !orm that cognition and action involve, rather than no"l$ identi!$ing ith their identit$ o! content%

But there is a residual as$mmetr$% 2or i! the Kammerdiener-s reductive naturalism is correct, then it applies to the #udge too% Perceiving this identit$ and giving utterance to it, he con!esses this to the other, and eBuall$ e&pects that the other, having in !act put himsel! on the same level, ill also respond in ords in hich he ill give utterance to this identit$ ith him, and e&pects that this mutual recognition ill no e&ist in !act% 0P, 7771 Set the #udge need not 3though he ought9 ackno ledge this identit$% He can persist in appl$ing di!!erent standards to the concrete actions o! others than he does to his o n assessmentsA understanding hat the$ do genealogicall$, as the result o! peculiarities o! their particular cognitive*practical e&periential tra#ector$, hile understanding his o n #udgments #ust as correct applications o! universals, hose determinate contents necessitate those applications% )he details o! his o n "reak!ast, he insists, are irrelevant to his assessment% )he con!ession o! the one ho is icked, O( am soO, is not !ollo ed "$ a reciprocal similar con!ession% )his as not hat the #udging consciousness meantA Buite the contrar$% (t repels this communit$ o! nature, and is the hard heart that is !or itsel!, and hich re#ects an$ continuit$ ith the other% 0P, 77>1

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/t this stage, the #udge does not appear as impartiall$ appl$ing universals, simpl$ responding appropriatel$ to their normative demands% Dhat he is doing sho s up as adopting a stance, rather than #ust cognitivel$ apprehending ho things o"#ectivel$ are% 2or he decides to adopt a different stance to ards his o n sa$ings and doings than he does to those o! others% )his is an optional attitude on his part% 2urther, in Fre#ecting an$ continuit$ ith the otherG he is adopting a recognitive stanceA re#ecting an o!!er o! reciprocal recognition% )hat is a !urther kind o! doing, !or hich he is responsi"le% So as the allegorical narrative develops, Hegel is descri"ing a seBuence o! shi!ts in a$s o! understanding hat is going on that !ollo s the !our meta*meta*normative attitudes discussed in the previous section% (t !ollo s a tra#ector$ hose endpoints are the t o attitudes attri"uted "$ Qames Hogg in his cele"rated aphorismA F)o the icked, all things are ickedI "ut to the #ust, all things are #ust and right%G.N

/s a result, the situation is reversed% )he one ho made the con!ession sees himsel! repulsed, and sees the other to "e in the rong hen he re!uses to let his o n inner "eing come !orth into the outer e&istence o! speech, hen the other contrasts the "eaut$ o! his o n soul ith the penitentOs ickedness, $et con!ronts the con!ession o! the penitent ith his o n sti!!*necked unrepentant character, mutel$ keeping himsel! to himsel! and re!using to thro himsel! a a$ !or someone else% 077>1 )he hard*hearted #udge is doing hat he originall$ indicted the other !or% He is letting particularit$ a!!ect his application o! universalsA appl$ing di!!erent normative standards to doings #ust "ecause the$ happen to "e his doings% /nd in doing so, he is producing a
.N

The Private Memoirs and !onfessions of a 2ustified Sinner% 0re!%1

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recognitive disparit$, allo ing his particular "eing*!or*sel! 3attachment to his o n attitudes9 to disrupt the achievement o! a communit$ 3universal9 "$ reciprocal recognition% (t is thus its o n sel! hich hinders that otherOs return !rom the deed into the spiritual e&istence o! speech and into the identit$ o! Spirit, and "$ this hardness o! heart produces the disparit$ hich still e&ists% 0P, 77>1

Dhat is normativel$ called !orin the sense that it ould "e the e&plicit ackno ledgment 3 hat things are !or the #udge9 o! hat is implicitl$ 3in itsel!9 going on is a reciprocal con!ession% )hat ould "e the #udge-s recognition o! himsel! in the one ho con!essed% 3FDe-re all "ozos on this "us%G9 2or F)he "reaking o! the hard heart, and the raising o! it to universalit$, is the same movement hich as e&pressed in the consciousness that made con!ession o! itsel!%G 0P, 77?1 )he #udge-s ackno ledgement that his #udgments, too, can "e e&plained as resulting !rom contingent !eatures o! his e&perience, that ever$"od$ is in the same "oat in this regard, ould "e a sacrifice o! his particularit$his attachment to his o n prior attitude o! privileging himsel! over others in the standards o! assessment he appliesthat is an identification ith and production o! a s$mmetric recognitive unity or identity, rather than a recognitive disparity% )hat sacri!ice need not "e thought o! as Fthro ing himsel! a a$ !or someone else,G "ut as identi!ication ith the universal, rather than the particular aspect o! his individualit$ 3the recognized instead o! the recognizing aspect9%

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;eciprocal con!ession is not $et the achievement o! a"solute Spirit 0P, 7>81, Fthe true, i%e% the sel!*conscious and e&istent, eBualization o! the t o sidesG 0P, 77?1, ho ever, so long as hat is achieved is #ust reciprocal <iedertrTchtigkeit% Having a hole communit$ o! kno ers and agents s$mmetricall$ and even*handedl$ pla$ing the moral valet to each otherreciprocall$ con!essing the #ustice o! assessments o! the sort originall$ made "$ the hard*hearted #udgedoes not $et a"olish alienation, "ut onl$ raises it to the level o! universalit$% 2or norms are still invisi"le% /nd since the$ are, so are normative statuses% Dhat one is doing is not intelligi"le as ackno ledging and attri"uting commitments, "inding onesel! and taking others to "e "ound "$ norms% So the reciprocal niedertrTchtig recognitive attitudes are not intelligi"le as normative attitudes either, "ut onl$ as natural states o! individuals 3inclinations, dispositions9, causall$ "rought a"out "$ and "ringing a"out other such states% 2rom this point o! vie , the per!ormances individuals produce cannot "e seen as intentional doings or claims to kno ledge, nor the individuals as agents or kno ers, hence not reall$ as sel!*conscious selves% Dhat the$ are !or themselves is accordingl$ not $et hat the$ are in themselves%

)he stage is set !or the transition to the ne&t and !inal stage in the development o! sel!* conscious Spirit, "$ the #udge traversing the !our meta*meta*attitudes laid out in the previous sectionA a9 2irst, the #udge ackno ledges that he is adopting a stance, rather than simpl$ ackno ledging a factI "9 Second, the #udge ackno ledges that the stance is a recognitive oneI

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c9 So, the #udge ackno ledges that hich stance he adopts produces a communit$ o! a certain kindI d9 <e&t, the #udge must ackno ledge that acting and #udging 3ackno ledging and attri"uting, deli"erating and assessing9 implicitl$ presuppose 3are intelligi"le onl$ in the conte&t o!9 edelm3tig recognitive stances% e9 2inall$, the #udge must e&plicitl$ adopt such a recognitive stance and institute an edelmKtig recognitive communit$% EdelmKtigkeitgenerosit$ or magnanimit$, the no"le recognitive stance that contrasts ith <iedertrTchtigkeit, mean*spiritedness or pusillanimit$, the "ase recognitive stance consists in treating onesel! and others in practice as adopting normative statuses, rather than #ust changing natural states% /chieving the kind o! sel!*consciousness that overcomes the alienation distinctive o! modernit$ and moves us decisivel$ into the post* modern phase in the development o! Spirit reBuiresA !irst realizing that in taking or treating ourselves and each other as selves, as a"le to make claims e&pressing "elie!s and pursue plans e&pressing intentions, e are implicitl$ adopting edelmKtig recognitive attitudes, and second, e&plicitl$ adopting such attitudes%

Doing that demands more than con!ession, even reciprocal con!ession% (n Hegel-s allegor$, hat it reBuires is forgiveness% He introduces this notion in the penultimate paragraph o! SpiritA )he !orgiveness hich it e&tends to the other is the renunciation o! itsel!, o! its unreal essential "eing hich it put on a level ith that other hich as a real action, and ackno ledges that hat thought characterized as

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"ad, viz% action, is goodI or rather it a"andons this distinction o! the speci!ic thought and its su"#ectivel$ determined #udgement, #ust as the other a"andons its su"#ective characterization o! action% )he ord o! reconciliation is the o"#ectivel$ e&istent Spirit, hich "eholds the pure kno ledge o! itsel! Bua universal essence, in its opposite, in the pure kno ledge o! itsel! Bua a"solutel$ sel!*contained and e&clusive individualit$a reciprocal recognition hich is a"solute Spirit% 0P, 7>81 2orgiveness 0Lerzeihung1 is a recognitive attitude that practicall$ ackno ledges the complementar$ contri"utions o! particularit$ and universalit$ to individualit$"oth the a$ the application o! the universal raises the particular to the level o! the individual, and the a$ application to particulars actualizes the universal in an individual% (t is a practical, communit$*instituting !orm o! sel!*consciousness that is structured "$ the meta*conceptual categories o! Lernun!t, rather than Lerstand% (t is sittlich, rather than alienated, in understanding the comple& interdependence o! norms 3universals, on the side o! content, necessit$, on the side o! !orce9 and attitudes and the process "$ hich together the$ institute and articulate normative statuses 3commitments9% (t is, in short, hat ushers in a post*modern !orm o! communit$ characterized "$ the !orm o! sel!* consciousness he calls Fa"solute kno ing%G )hat !orm o! understanding is hat the hole Phenomenology has "een aiming atA Fthat one !ar*o!! divine event, to ard hich the hole creation moves%G

So hat is !orgivenessE 2orgiving, like con!essing, is a speech act, something done in and ith language% (t is doing something "$ saying something% )hat is h$ Hegel talks

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a"out it in terms o! the F ord o! reconciliation 0LersUhnungG 0P, 7>81% (ndeed, all the recognitive relations discussed in the last part o! Spirit are linguistic per!ormances!rom the distinctive language "$ hich the lacerated consciousness gives utterance to its disrupted state to the arrant o! sincerit$ and conviction that is the core o! the conscientious consciousness-s claim to #usti!ication !or hat it does% FHere again, then, e see language as the e&istence o! Spirit% Language is sel!*consciousness e&isting !or others%G 0P, 76.1 )hat !orgiveness necessaril$ takes a linguistic !orm can tempt one to suppose that it is an easy speech act to per!ormA that it consists #ust in saying F( !orgive $ou,G uttering the ord o! reconciliation% But that cannot "e right, given hat is at stake here, the eight this concept must "ear in Hegel-s pro#ect% )he !orm o! reciprocal recognition that consists o! con!ession, !orgiveness "$ the #udge o! the con!essor !or hat is con!essed, and con!ession on the part o! the #udge, is the final !orm o! recognition Hegel envisages% :n the practical side it is to "e the overcoming modern alienation, re* achieving Sittlichkeit in a higher, sel!*conscious !orm% :n the cognitive side, it is the social and institutional !rame ork !or "ringing to "ear the meta*conceptual categories o! Lernun!t, so !or achieving the !inal, adeBuate !orm o! understanding o! the relation "et een the normative and the natural that Hegel calls Fa"solute kno ing%G 2or a !orm o! ords to accomplish that simpl$ "$ "eing pronounced, it ould have to "e a magic !ormula%

(! the speech act o! !orgiving is not to "e construed in this a$ as the casting o! a spell, hat one does "$ producing it must "e hardat least in the sense that one can tr$ to do it and !ail% B$ a$ o! comparison, consider the speech act o! demonstrating that some

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mathematical proposition is true, that is, e&hi"iting or producing a proof o! it% )hat is doing something 3proving a claim9 "$ sa$ing something, "ut the Buestion o! hether the ords produced succeed in per!orming the speech act in Buestion is the topic o! serious assessment% Proving something in this sense is hard, even though pronouncing the ords is not% De ant to kno hat standards o! assessment are appropriate to determine

hether the speech act someone per!orms in response to a con!ession succeeds in Buali!$ing it as e&pressing forgiveness !or hat is con!essed%

De can also "e con!ident that the ans er is not that hat is reBuired is that the ords o! reconciliation not #ust "e pronounced, "ut "e uttered sincerely, or ith the intent o! !orgiving% )hat ould "e appl$ing the meta*normative conception o! the conscientious consciousness to the present case% /s such, it ould su!!er !rom the same de!ect% (t makes sense onl$ in the conte&t o! some independent notion o! hat !orgiveness consists in hat one is intending to "e doing "$ one-s ords, hat e!!ect is sincerel$ aimed at% So, !or e&ample, i! one ants to impose a sincerit$ condition on hat counts as a speech act o! assertion, one must couch it in terms o! antecedent notions o! "elie! and intention to e&press one-s "elie!, rather than in terms o! intent to assert 3intent to do hat, e&actl$E9% Dhat e are looking !or is an ans er to the BuestionA hat is it that one is intending to do in intending to !orgive, and hat counts as succeeding in carr$ing out that intentionE

)he ke$ Buestion e must ask in order to e&tract the point o! the allegor$ then isA hat is it one must do in order to Buali!$ as forgiving an individual !or an actionthe application

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o! a conceptE /s a a$ o! thinking a"out hat could count as an ans er to this Buestion, think "$ analog$ o! the corresponding Buestion asked in Chapter Si& a"out another ke$ concept, that o! identi!ication% Dhat, e asked, must one do in order to count as identifying with some aspect o! hat one is for onesel!, rather than ith something one actuall$ is, in onesel! 3paradigmaticall$, ith something normative rather than natural, onesel! as authoritative and responsi"le, rather than as alive9E /nd the ans er asA one must "e illing to ris and i! need "e sacrifice the one !or the other% /ppealing to this model, a more speci!ic a$ o! putting the Buestion "e!ore us no isA Dhat is to forgiving as sacrificing for is to identifying withE

Hegel sa$s surprisingl$ little e&plicitl$ a"out it at this crucial point in the te&t% /!ter the long passage Buoted a"ove, in hich !orgiveness is introduced, there is onl$ a single concluding paragraph "$ a$ o! e&planation, and it is the !inal paragraph o! the Spirit chapter% ,iven the momentous signi!icance o! the lesson e are to learn !rom the para"le o! con!ession and #udgment, and the "reaking o! the hard heart in !orgiveness and reciprocal con!ession, the onl$ conclusion to dra !rom the e&treme "revit$ and concision o! Hegel-s discussion o! it is that he understands it as having to serve the !unction onl$ o! a template, as providing a !rame ork on hich to assem"le lessons e have alread$ learned !rom the developments e&pounded in the "od$ o! the "ook% /ll the elements o! the resolution o! the cognitive, recognitive, and practical pro"lems o! modernit$ that have "een e&pounded in the account o! the stages o! development o! Spirit in this chapter must have "een provided in previous chapters, reBuiring onl$ to "e

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properl$ deplo$ed according to the model presented in these !inal, concluding paragraphs%

Section )III: Trust: Forgiveness as $ecollection, Magnanimity as the Final Form of $ecognition

)he most important clues concerning the nature o! !orgiveness are contained in a !e gnomic, aphoristic sentencesA Spirit, in the a"solute certaint$ o! itsel!, is lord and master over ever$ deed and actualit$, and can cast them o!!, and make them as i! the$ had never happened%G 0P, 77>1 )he ounds o! the Spirit heal, and leave no scars "ehind% )he deed is not imperisha"leI it is taken "ack "$ Spirit into itsel!, and the aspect o! individualit$ present in it, hether as intention or as an e&istent negativit$ and limitation, straight a$ vanishes% 0P, 77?1 )he invocation o! master$ indicates that the !orgiving that accomplishes this healing is the e&ercise o! some sort o! constitutive authorit$A the capacit$ o! making something so "$ taking it to "e so% )he + ounds- are the contingent particular attitudes 3Fthe aspect o! individualit$G9 and the errors and !ailures the$ "ring a"out 3Fe&istent negativit$ and limitationG9, hich are con!essed% )he Buestion is hat one must do in order to Fcast them o!! and make them as i! the$ had never happened,G to heal the ounds, Fleaving no scars "ehind,G hat the !orgiving individual must do in order to count as having success!ull$ e&ercised that constitutive healing authorit$%

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( think the ans er is that forgiveness is a kind o! recollection 3Erinnerungc!% 0P, N8N19% Dhat one must do in order to !orgive the con!essor !or hat is con!essed is to o!!er a rational reconstruction o! a tradition to hich the concept*application 3theoreticall$ in #udgment or practicall$ in intention9 in Buestion "elongs, in hich it !igures as an e&pressivel$ progressive episode% )elling such a stor$ is a su"stantive undertaking, one that the magnanimous 3edelmKtig9 ould*"e !orgiving assessor ma$ ell not "e a"le to accomplish% (ndeed, hat the assessor confesses, in his turn, is his su"#ective ina"ilit$ success!ull$ to !orgive ever$thing he is committed to !orgiving%

B$ a$ o! a model, think once again o! the situation o! the #udge at common la , hich as suggested in Chapter ) o as help!ul !or understanding Hegel-s a$ o! thinking a"out the development o! concepts, and has "een appealed to at various points since% )he #udge is charged ith deciding hether a novel set o! !acts arrants the application o! a concept, according to the norm implicit in the tradition o! prior applications o! it and its in!erential relatives that he inherits !rom previous #udges% Dhat a #udge ho makes such a decision confesses is that his decision could "e e&plained "$ hat he had !or "reak!ast or, less !igurativel$, "$ attitudes o! his that are e&traneous to the !acts at hand and the la he is appl$ing, "$ !eatures o! his training, reading, or mood, "$ the cases he happens to have ad#udicated recentl$, the political climate, and so on% Hore generall$, he con!esses that the Kammerdiener ould not "e rong a"out him, in that his decision to appl$ or not to appl$ the universal 3concept9 to these particulars can "e e&plained "$ appeal #ust to !actors that are contingent in the sense that the$ are not ackno ledgments

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o! the necessity that is the normative !orce articulated "$ the actual content o! the concept% He con!esses that one need not see his decision as suita"l$ responsive to the content o! the norm he is supposed to suppl$, hich is hat ould &ustify the decision% 2or one can instead see it as caused "$ various e&traneous circumstances% )he decision is in!ected ith Fthe aspect o! individualit$%G 3+Particularit$- ould "e a "etter e&pression o! hat Hegel is a!ter here, "ut he is not as care!ul in his diction on this point in the Phenomenology as he later ill "e in the Science of 'ogic%9 2or collateral attitudes that #ust happen to "e ackno ledgments o! commitments "$ the same individual a!!ect his decision as to hether to appl$ the concept in each ne case% (n making such a con!ession the #udge need not admit 3and !or the con!ession to "e in order it need not "e true9 that he as not trying or intending to appl$ the norm 3universal, concept9 he inherited correctly in the ne case% ;ather, hat is con!essed is that the result o! doing that e&pressed hat the content o! the concept as for him, rather than hat it as in itself, an appearance to him rather than the realit$% Dhat drives a edge "et een the t o is precisel$ that his decisions are responsive to contingencies o! his particular su"#ective attitudes, circumstances, and prior e&perience% (t !ollo s that the con!ession is also an ackno ledgment o! the necessit$ and u"iBuit$ o! the distinction that consciousness and action involve, the Fnegativit$G that sho s up hen one !inds onesel! ith incompati"le commitments, an ackno ledgment that concept application necessaril$ has the shape o! the e&perience o! error and !ailure 3FlimitationG9%

2or a later #udge concretel$ to forgive the earlier #udge is to incorporate the decision that as the su"#ect o! con!ession into a retrospective rational reconstruction o! the tradition

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o! appl$ing the concept in Buestion, as having precedential signi!icance% Doing that is recharacterizing and re*presenting the content o! the concept 3 hat it reall$ is, hat it is in itsel!9 as graduall$ emerging into the da$light o! e&plicitness through a seBuence o! applications o! it to novel cases, each o! hich reveals some hitherto hidden !eature o! it, and e&hi"iting the !orgiven #udge-s decision as having pla$ed that role% 2rom the point o! vie o! such a reconstructive recollection, though the decision might have "een caused "$ contingent su"#ective attitudes and #usti!icatoril$ irrelevant circumstances, what as so caused as an application that as "oth correct and e&pressivel$ progressive% )hat is, it as #ust hat as needed !or us to !ind out more a"out the real content o! the concept% )he e&perience o! incompati"ilit$ is e&hi"ited in its capacit$ as the engine o! conceptual, cognitive, and practical progress, rather than in its capacit$ as the mark o! error and !ailure%

)o sa$ that the !orgiving recollection reconstructs the tradition so that the !orgiven concept application sho s up as a correct application o! the concept that is then seen as all along setting the normative standard !or such applications does not mean that there is not and can "e no residual disparit$, according to the !orgiving #udge, "et een hat things are !or the one !orgiven and hat the$ are in themselves% ;ather, the rational reconstruction !ocuses on the identit$ o! 3Hegelian9 re!erencethe underl$ing conceptual normthat is sho n to uni!$ and tie the tradition together, rather than the disparit$ "et een the elements o! the seBuence o! 3Hegelian9 senses "$ hich, according to the !orgiving Erinnerung, hat the concept is in itsel! is graduall$ unveiled% )his !orgiving recognitive 3individual*constituting9 attitude is not simpl$ the complement o! the

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Kammerdiener-s one*sided, niedertrTchtig !ocus on the disparit$ "et een the particular and the universal% 2or the identit$ o! noumenon that is recollectivel$ !ound to lie "ehind the seBuence o! disparate phenomena is not a simple, immediate unit$% /s as !oreshado ed alread$ in the Introduction and emerged in !uller detail "$ the end o! Reason, the ver$ idea o! o"#ective realit$, hat things are in themselves, cannot "e understood apart !rom consideration o! the relations "et een su"#ective appearances o! it, hat things are !or consciousness, selected and arranged so as to "e visi"le as phenomena graduall$ e&pressing more and more adeBuatel$ and e&plicitl$ the underl$ing, initiall$ merel$ implicit noumena% )hat Hegelian re!erence is intelligi"le onl$ in terms o! the t o*phase process o! e&perienceprospectivel$ in terms o! the seBuential development o! senses, driven "$ ackno ledged incompati"ilities o! commitments, and retrospectivel$ in terms o! the recollective rational reconstruction o! that development as e&pressivel$ progressivemani!ests a sense dependence relation that ensures that the kind o! identit$ that uni!ies the disparate senses is comple& and thoroughl$ mediated "$ the relations o! incompati"ilit$ among them that drive the prospective phase o! the process and "$ the relations o! monotonicall$ increasing e&plicitness that must "e !ound to structure the retrospective phase% )he unit$ o! the conception o! /nsichsein that emerges !rom a !orgiving recollection o! the e&perience o! partial errors and !ailures is one that incorporates and is articulated "$ the determinate di!!erences "et een 3 hat that recollection e&hi"its as9 a$s it can sho up !or consciousness%

)he com"ination o! incorrectness and correctness in ever$ #udgment, o! !ailure and success in ever$ action is the same one discussed in Chapter Seventhe one that as

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ultimatel$ e&plicated in terms o! Hegelian notions o! sense and re!erence% )he disparities o! sense, made o"trusive and urgent "$ the e&perience o! ackno ledging incompati"le commitments, are hat are con!essed% )he identit$ o! re!erence underl$ing those various developing senses is revealed "$ doing the recollective*reconstructive ork that is !orgiveness% Consider an e&ample% Dhen /ristotle sa$s that a hand detached !rom a human is not 3is no longer9 a human hand, and Hoore sa$s that he has t o hands, their conceptions o! hat a hand is are incorrect% /ristotle thinks that the hand is not controlled "$ the "rain via nerves, since he thinks that the !unction o! the "rain is to cool the "lood% Hoore thinks that his hand is made o! ;uther!ord atomsA tin$ solar s$stems in hich spherical electrons ith de!inite "oundaries or"it nuclei that are clumps o! spherical protons and neutrons% )he$ are "oth rong a"out these things, and so have !alse conceptions o! hands% Dhat hands are for them is not hat hands are in themselves% <othing is or could literall$ "e a hand in the senses the$ give to the term% 3(n /ristotle-s case, o! course, not +hand-, "ut +-%9 )heir su"#ective conceptions are not correct e&pressions o! the o"#ective concept, !or the$ do not e&press hat is reall$ incompati"le ith hat, and so hat reall$ !ollo s !rom hat% )here is a genuine and important sense in hich one cannot e&press truths "$ appl$ing such de!ective concept3ion9s% )his is the sense in hich hen /ristotle and Hoore sa$ that the$ have t o hands, hat the$ sa$ is !alse% )he$ do not have t o o! hat they mean "$ +hand-, nor does or could an$one else% Similarl$, on the practical side, one cannot reall$ intend to raise one-s hand, in the senses in hich they mean +hand-% )his is the 3einseitig9 sense in hich all claims are !alse and all actions are !ailures, the sense in hich hat things are for consciousness is never hat the$ are in themselves% (n this sense, every conception ill eventuall$ turn out to "e

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inadeBuate, as evidenced "$ its correct application 3according to the norm determined "$ the content o! the conception9 leading to incompati"le commitments% Having a conception that, "ecause o! contingent causes and particular su"#ective attitudes o! the concept*user, is in this sense !alse is hat the niedertrTchtig #udge accuses agents and kno ers o! 3recognizes them as9, and hat the$ con!ess%

But e have also seen that there is another genuine and important sense in hich all claims are true and all actions success!ul% 3Because this sense is compati"le ith the possi"ilit$ o! hat in Chapter Seven ( called +vulgar- error and !ailure, it ould "e less misleading to sa$ Fpotentially true and success!ul%G9 2or i! e !ocus on hat the$ are talking and thinking about, rather than hat the$ sa$ and think a"out thema"out the referents, rather than the meanings o! their termsthen /ristotle and Hoore are right that the$ have t o o! those, and the$ ere Buite capa"le 3at least !or most o! their lives9 o! raising them% )his is the sense o! concept" referent" or content that persists through changes in conception, sense, or form% /ristotle and Hoore not onl$ succeeded in making true claims and !orming success!ul intentions regarding their hands, in doing so the$ genuinel$ ere responsive to the underl$ing concept 3 hich e have a much "etter handle onconception e&pressingthan the$ do9% )he distinction "et een sense and re!erence eBuips us to see ho that is compati"le ith their nonetheless s$stematicall$ misappl$ing the concept"$, !or instance, accepting incorrect in!erences to and !rom it ith having a faulty conception, a conception that e can see retrospectivel$ as in!ected ith the su"#ective contingenc$ o! the e&periential tra#ector$ o! particular sel!* conscious individuals and o! their times%

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De sa in Chapters 2our and 2ive that one o! the central theses developed in the !onsciousness chapters o! the Phenomenology concerns the essentiall$ holistic character o! the determinate conceptual contents o! our cognitive attitudes% Cuine, one hundred and !i!t$ $ears laterand su"stantiall$ in!luenced "$ the holistic metaph$sics o! the British (dealists inspired "$ Hegel, hich sa all relations as internal, 3think o! Cuine-s remark in F) o Dogmas o! EmpiricismGA FHeaning is hat essence "ecomes hen it is detached !rom the thing and attached to the ord,G9similarl$ espoused a holistic theor$ o! meaning% Drestling ith some o! the same issues and di!!iculties that Hegel had, Cuine concludes that talk o! truth, or even o! content shared su!!icientl$ !or agreement and disagreement to "e intelligi"le, reBuires sta$ing at the level o! reference rather than meaning% :! course, here Cuine as orking ith roughl$ 2regean notions o! meaning 3sense9 and re!erence, Hegel, as e sa at the end o! Chapter Seven, is orking ith his o n distinctive notions corresponding to sense and re!erence% De sa there, too, ho the t o one*sided vie s o! action and cognitionone seeing all actions as !ailures and all cognitions as !alse, the other seeing them all as successes and truthsare partial e&pressions o!, legitimate "ut incomplete perspectives on, one process%

2orgiving is the recollective la"or o! !inding a concept that is "eing e&pressed 3no less, no more !ull$ and !aith!ull$9 "$ the conceptions endorsed "$ those hose #udgments and actions are "eing !orgiven% 2or it to "e !ull$ success!ul, a !orgiving recollection must not onl$ e&hi"it /ristotle and Hoore as succeeding in making claims and !orming intentions concerning their hands 3securing a re!erence, a noumenon sho ing up in the

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phenomena as the$ grasp them9, "ut also sho that in doing so the$ ere doing things that !urthered the cause o! our !inding out more a"out hat hands reall$ are, something that e&pressivel$ developed our conception o! hands, something that moved that conception in the direction o! the concept% 2or that is hat is reBuired !or them to count not onl$ as having su"#ected themselves to 3"ound themselves "$9 the norm, hich determines under hat circumstances hat the$ sa$ is true and hat the$ do is success!ul, "ut also as sho ing themselves to "e sensitive and responsive to that norm, to have "een ackno ledging its !orce 3necessit$9%

:ne might onderA hat sense does it make to talk a"out Fthe conceptG, or F hat reall$ !ollo s !rom 3or is incompati"le ith9 hatG, hen it is also claimed 3and has "een since Chapter :ne9 that no set o! determinate concepts 3conceptions9 can "e !inall$ adeBuate, permanent, or ultimatel$ coherent, in the sense that correct applications o! them in empirical@practical situations ill never lead to incompati"le commitmentsE )he ans er is that this is #ust hat the stor$ o! the recollective reappropriation o! past conceptions, arranging and organizing them into an e&pressivel$ progressive tradition o! applications o! a concept that is seen as having "een all along alread$ in pla$ as the norm users o! that concept ere "inding themselves "$ in making #udgments and endorsing purposes is meant to ans er% )his !orgiving, retrospective phase o! e&perience is the practical doing that makes sense o! the notion o! there "eing some a$ things are in themselves, o! noumena "eing revealed 3i! onl$ darkl$9 "$ the phenomena% (t is the making that is a !inding% (t is the activit$ that makes intelligi"le the relation o! representation, "$ e&hi"iting the evolution o! de!ective senses as the gradual revelation o! underl$ing

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re!erents, hence as representings o! something represented% 3)his is the as$mmetric sense*dependence relation that underlies conceptual idealismthe !inal component in a"solute idealismas e ill see in Chapter <ine%9 Having started ith an account o! +that-*intentionalit$ 3the conceptual contents grasped and applied in #udging and acting intentionall$9 in terms o! material incompati"ilit$ and in!erence 3determinate negation and mediation9, Hegel uses the notion o! recollection to e&tract !rom the a$ conceptions change in response to the ackno ledgment o! incompati"le commitments an account o! the representational dimension implicit in those conceptual contents, that is, o! +o!-* intentionalit$%

+ithin each necessaril$ triumphalist !orgiving recollective stor$, some late*coming sense or conception pla$s the role o! the re!erence or conceptA a a$ things can "e !or consciousness that is also the a$ the$ are in themselves% But no such stor$ is !inal% <one anoints as concepts conceptions hose correct 3according to the norms the$ are taken "$ their users, including the ones producing the retrospective rational reconstruction, to em"od$9 application ill not lead to incompati"le commitments, the e&perience o! error and !ailure sho ing the disparit$ "et een hat things are !or consciousness and hat the$ are in themselves that must "e con!essed and !orgiven ane % Each such stor$ ill itsel! eventuall$ turn out to have cro ned a de!ective conception ith the la"elA hat things are in themselves, the real concepts% )he sense in hich there is and can "e no !inall$ adeBuate set o! determinate concepts 3or conceptions9 is visi"le prospectivel$, in the space between recollections, in the need o! each !orgiving #udge himsel! to "e !orgiven in turn% (t is this di!!erence o! perspectiveretrospective and

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prospective, ithin recollections and "et een themthat makes it possi"le to sa$ both o! the concept application o! the one ho con!esses that he did not get things right, that hat things ere !or him is not hat the$ are in themselves, and that !rom a complementar$, eBuall$ valid point o! vie , there is no such thing as getting things 3sta"l$, permanentl$, !inall$9 right% )he process o! e&perience is ma ing #udgments and per!orming actions, finding onesel! ith incompati"le commitments, and recollectivel$ ma ing sense o! that "$ finding a ne , "etter candidate !or the concept that has all along "een implicitl$ governing one-s #udging and acting% /ll these phases and aspects are eBuall$ essential and ultimatel$ intelligi"le onl$ in terms o! one another%

)he unit$ that the imputation o! a re!erent 3a concept articulating the content o! a "elie! or intention9 "rings to a seBuence o! senses is a higher unit$, in Hegel-s sense, "ecause it incorporates and is "uilt out o! the determinate di!!erences and material incompati"ilities "et een the senses that it e&hi"its as di!!erent !orms in hich that content is e&pressed% ;ecollection is !rom one perspective the production and !rom another the revelation o! that unit$% 2orgiving presupposes something to !orgive, something con!essedA the disparit$ o! sense and re!erence, conception and concept% 2orgiving is, in Hegel-s image, the healing o! a ound% So there must be a ound !irst, hich is onl$ a!ter ards, through success!ul recollective rational reconstruction made as if it had never occurred% 2orgiving overcomes the disparit$ that is con!essed, achieving a ne unit$ that includes and presupposes the disparit$, as part o! its internal structurerevealing hat is con!essed as a retrospectivel$ necessar$ phase o! the process o! more adeBuatel$

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e&pressing the concept no seen to have "een all along setting the standard !or assessing the correctness and success o! cognitive and practical commitments%

Characterizing recollecting as forgiving emphasizes that it is not onl$ a cognitive and practical enterprisereconstruing #udgments and actions"ut also the adoption o! a recognitive stance to ard the ones hose #udgments and actions are so construed% /s a recognitive relation, the edelmKtig stance is an identification ith that higher unit$% B$ contrast, the niedertrTchtig stance is identi!ication ith the moment o! disparit$ that consciousness and agenc$ necessaril$ involveA the collision o! incompati"le commitments that eventuall$ sho s the inadeBuac$ o! each set o! cognitive and practical commitments and the conceptions that articulate them% Speaking o! the relation "et een the individual ho con!esses and the individual ho !orgives, Hegel sa$sA But #ust as the !ormer has to surrender its one*sided, unackno ledged e&istence o! its particular "eing*!or*sel!, so too must this other set aside its one*sided, unackno ledged #udgement% /nd #ust as the !ormer e&hi"its the po er o! Spirit over its actual e&istence, so does this other e&hi"it the po er o! Spirit over its determinate concept 0seinen "estimmten Begri!!.?1% 0P, 77?1 Dhat is FsurrenderedG or Fset asideG is sacrificed% Dhat the one ho con!esses gives up is his Fparticular "eing !or sel!,G his Factual e&istence%G )hat is to sa$ that he ceases to assert the authorit$ o! his actual attitudes, ackno ledging that he has "ound himsel! "$ an o"#ective conceptual norm that di!!ers !rom his su"#ective conception o! it% 2or that
.?

( have altered the translation here% Hiller hasA Fover its speci!ic <otion of itselfG 0emphasis added1, reading Fits conceptG 3or Fhis conceptG9, Fseinem 3"estimmten9 Begri!!,G as a concept of the !orgiving #udge in the sense o! having him as its o"#ect, rather than its su"#ectthat is, as an o"#ective, rather than a su"#ective genitive%

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authorit$ as not recognized or ackno ledged 0nicht annerkanntes1% Dhat the #udge relinBuishes is his insistence on the authorit$ o! his hard*hearted assessment, hich, as a one*sided assertion o! disparit$ as also not reciprocall$ ackno ledged% Sacri!icing the

authorit$ o! these one*sided, su"#ective attitudes hat things are !or oneis identifying with hat one has sacrificed forA hat things are in themselves, the content that uni!ies the disparate !orms in hich it as e&pressed 3sho ed up !or individual consciousnesses9% Both sides ackno ledge that hat recollectivel$ sho s up as hat as reall$ "eing talked or thought a"out 3the o"#ective concept9 has authorit$ over their attitudes and applications o! the concept 3su"#ective conceptions9% Mnlike the attitudes that each sacri!ices, this authorit$ is ackno ledged "$ "oth% ;ecognition as con!ession and !orgiveness is reciprocal%

)he one ho con!esses Fe&hi"its the po er o! Spirit over its actual e&istenceG "$ ackno ledging that in adopting particular attitudescontingent and e&plica"le "$ causes or non*normativel$ characteriza"le impulses and motives though the$ ma$ "ehe has nonetheless succeeded in "inding himsel! "$ 3making himsel! responsi"le to9 o"#ective conceptual norms, and so instituted normative statuses 3undertaken commitments, "oth cognitive and practical, "$ appl$ing those norms9 hose content outruns his su"#ective conceptions o! them% )he !orgiving #udge Fe&hi"its the po er o! Spirit over its determinate conceptG "$ recollectivel$ reconstruing the content o! that concept, so as to sho it as authoritative over su"#ective conceptions and attitudes% Hagnanimous !orgiving recollection is the e&ercise o! the po er o! Spirit over the determinate concept% Hegel summarizes, in the penultimate paragraph o! SpiritA

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)he !orgiveness hich it e&tends to the other is the renunciation o! itsel!, o! its unreal essential "eing hich it put on a level ith that other hich as a real action, and ackno ledges that hat thought characterized as "ad, viz% action, is goodI or rather it a"andons this distinction o! the speci!ic thought and its sub&ectively determined #udgement, #ust as the other a"andons its su"#ective characterization o! action% )he ord o! reconciliation is the ob&ectively e&istent Spirit, hich "eholds the pure kno ledge o! itsel! Bua universal essence, in its opposite, in the pure kno ledge o! itsel! Bua a"solutel$ sel!*contained and e&clusive individualit$a reciprocal recognition hich is absolute Spirit% 0P, 7>81 2orgiveness is a FrenunciationG o! the previous identi!ication o! the hard*hearted #udge ith the disparit$ "et een his Fsu"#ectivel$ determined #udgment 0!Krsichseiendes "estimmendes Mrteil1G and the Fdeterminate thought 0"estimmten ,edanken1that is, o! the distinction "et een hat things are !or the #udge and hat the$ are in themselves, the su"#ective conception or attitude and the o"#ective concept or thought% )hrough !orgivenessthe F ord o! reconciliationG, hich is not #ust saying that the other is !orgiven, "ut actuall$ going through the recollective la"or o! ma ing it sothe #udge "rings a"out the unit$ that he identi!ies ith% :n the cognitive and practical dimensions o! activit$ it is the unit$ o! actual particularit$ 3the causall$ e&plica"le and e!!icacious attitudes and "ehavior o! su"#ects9 and universal essence 3the conceptual norms hose application in attitude and act institute normative statuses9 visi"le hen hat is said and done "$ su"#ects is understood as appl$ing, "inding themselves "$, making themselves responsi"le to concepts or conceptual norms% :n the recognitive dimension, it is the

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unit$ o! particular, acting su"#ects and the normative communit$ the$ s$nthesize "$ reciprocal recognition% E&plaining !orgiveness as recollection displa$s the !ine structure underl$ing the general claim made in Chapter ) o that recognition serves "oth as the model o! and as the context ithin hich the application o! conceptual universals to actual particulars is to "e understood%

Dhat is con!essed is that applications o! concepts respond to contingent !eatures o! su"#ective conceptions and attitudes, not #ust to the normative necessit$ determined "$ the content o! the o"#ective concepts% <ecessit$ is in!ected ith contingenc$% )he result o! the recollective la"or o! the recognitivel$ generous !orgiver is to give contingenc$ the !orm o! necessit$% 2or the !orgiving rational reconstruction is success!ul #ust inso!ar as it e&hi"its the #udgments and actions that resulted !rom particular contingent circumstances, conceptions, motivations, and attitudes as correct applications o! the concepts that ere applied, according to the account o! the contents o! those conceptual norms that the !orgiving consciousness supplies% ,enerousl$ reconstruing the conceptual contents so as to make it the case that, !or instance, /ristotle generall$ succeeded in his intention to raise his hands and kne that lightning could cause !ires, and Hoore truth!ull$ o"served that he had t o hands and correctl$ in!erred that the$ contained electrons, is "uilding the contingencies o! the actual use o! terms into the norms understood as governing their correct use% Hegel-s account o! the t o phases o! e&periencethe passive !inding o! onesel! ith incompati"le cognitive or practical commitments, hich is the e&perience o! error and !ailure, o! the disparit$ that consciousness and action involve, and the active remaking o! conceptual contents so as to uni!$ a course o! e&perience "$ recasting it as

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e&pressivel$ progressivespeci!ies a mechanism "$ hich hat in Chapter ) o ere called the actual application o! terms and the institution o! conceptual norms governing such applications reciprocall$ interact 3mediate one another9 as aspects o! one process, there"$ !illing in the details in the "roadl$ Cuinean outline sketched there% (n doing that, the stor$ a"out ho generous recollective reconstruals o! the content o! a concept respond to and incorporate contingent details o! actual applications o! concepts responds to the orr$ sketched in Section J a"ove concerning the threat that the parochialit$ o! conceptual contents 3their responsiveness to the vagaries o! individual-s use o! terms e&pressing them9 can seem to o!!er to their normative !orceA the threat that genealog$ o!!ers to #usti!ication construed in terms o! the semantic categories o! Lerstand% 2or !rom the perspective provided "$ Hegel-s account o! semantic contents as derived not #ust !rom the ground*level use o! e&pressions, "ut also and eBuall$ !rom the recollective reconstruals o! that use, !ar !rom undercutting the rational, normative !orce o! conceptual norms, the incorporation o! contingencies o! use in the contents o! concepts is o! the essence o! their determinateness, hich is a necessar$ condition o! the intelligi"ilit$ o! that !orce 3the possi"ilit$ o! "eing bound "$ those norms9%

)hat same model o! cognitive and practical e&perience as a t o*stroke enginein hich confession o! error or !ailure is !ollo ed "$ forgiveness through recollective reconstrual the achievement o! an al a$s onl$ temporar$ conceptual eBuili"rium that ill prove itsel!, too, to "e unsta"le, to lead to error and !ailure, repeating the c$cledescri"es the process, the activit$ "$ su"#ects, that makes intelligi"le the a$ the determinate content!ulness o! concepts is to "e understood according to the categories o! Lernun!t,

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hich supersedes the Enlightenment-s Lerstand conception that Kant still deplo$s, and hich is continued later "$ 2rege% )he Lerstand version understands empirical and practical concepts as having to "e determinate in the sense o! having static, sta"le "oundaries, and as standing in !i&ed, unchangea"le in!erential and incompati"ilit$ relations to other similarl$ determinate concepts% De sa in Chapter ) o that Hegel thinks Kant is uncharacteristicall$ uncritical a"out the presuppositions 3conditions o! the intelligi"ilit$9 o! taking concepts to "e determinate in this sense% )his is recogniza"l$ a relative o! Dittgenstein-s later concerns a"out common a$s o! misconstruing hat e are doing in using linguistic e&pressions that make it seem m$sterious that prior uses o! terms could Fla$ out rails to in!init$G determining the correctness or incorrectness o! all possi"le !uture applications, !or instance in the a$ reBuired !or notions o! mathematical proo! to have the normative !orce e attri"ute to them% )he t o*stroke model o! e&perience provides the larger conte&t in hich Hegel thinks these traditional conceptions are intelligi"le% 2or it is the #o" o! each Dhiggish retrospective stor$ to find concepts ith concepts that are determinate in the Lerstand sense% But determinate content in that sense must also "e understood as the product o! the activity o! !orgiveness, "$ hich contingencies o! the actual application o! concepts are incorporated into the contents o! our conceptions, so given the !orm o! necessit$% Each e&perience o! error or !ailure, each ackno ledgment o! commitments incompati"le "$ our o n lights, teaches us something a"out ho things reall$ are, a"out hat reall$ !ollo s !rom and is incompati"le ith hat% Success!ul recollection incorporates those lessons into the contents o! our conceptionsA hat things are !or us, a ne candidate !or ho things are in themselves% Lerstand-s understanding o! the state o! determinateness is a constitutive

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ideal o! cognition and agenc$% Commitment to !inding conceptual contents that are determinate in this sense is an essential element o! concept use, so o! the intelligi"ilit$ o! consciousness in "oth its theoretical and practical dimensions% But, Lernun!t teaches us, it is onl$ one aspect o! the process of determining conceptual contents, hich is incorporating the contingent particularit$ o! actual episodes o! concept application into the contents o! the universals hose application has the normative !orce o! necessit$ the authorit$ "$ hich e "ind ourselves, make ourselves responsi"le to, "$ appl$ing them%

2orgiveness is the process "$ hich immediac$ is mediated, "$ hich the stu""orn recalcitrance o! realit$ is given conceptual shape, ackno ledged in hat things are !or consciousness% )he semantic holism conseBuent upon understanding conceptual content in the !irst place in terms o! relations o! material incompati"ilit$ 3determinate negation9, and hence material in!erence 3mediation9 among such contents means that getting one determinate concept right reBuires getting them all right% /nd the interdependence o! hat !ollo s !rom and is incompati"le ith hat, on the one hand, and hat e take to "e true, ho e take things to "e, in themselves, on the other, means that recti!$ing our

concepts and recti!$ing our "elie!s and #udgments are complementar$ aspects o! one enterprise, neither completa"le apart !rom the other% (n the conceptual setting provided "$ those overarching semantic commitments, the ine&hausti"ilit$ o! immediac$ entails the ultimate insta"ilit$ o! an$ set o! Lerstand*determinate empiricall$*and*practicall$ content!ul concepts% <o matter ho much e have studied the matter, there ill always "e a course o! possi"le e&perience that ould result in someone-s "eing in the same

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position ith respect to our concept o! hands that e are ith respect to /ristotle-s or Hoore-s% But the notion o! there "eing a a$ things determinatel$ are, in themselves that is independentl$ o! hat the$ are !or us, indeed, in hich ho things are !or us is on the contrar$ dependent on ho the$ are in themselves, in the sense that the latter is authoritative !or, sets normative standards !or, the !ormeris, Hegel thinks, an essential element o! the concept o! "oth theoretical and practical consciousness 3and, indeed, is an essential part o! hat "inds them together9% /part !rom the idea that our conceptuall$ articulated attitudes are about something in the normative sense o! having made ourselves responsi"le to it, that it settles hat e have made ourselves responsi"le for, the actual content o! the normative status e have undertaken, hat e have "ound ourselves "$, e cannot make the concepts o! consciousness and action intelligi"le% /n$ adeBuate an account o! the determinate content!ulness o! thought must make sense o! the realistic, representational dimension o! intentionalit$% )he t o*phase model o! finding 3old9 referents retrospectivel$, ithin each recollective stor$, and ma ing 3ne 9 senses prospectivel$ "$ coming up ith such stories in response to the !elt and ackno ledged inadeBuac$ o! the previous ones, is Hegel-s account o! ho these t o demands on the notion o! determinate conceptual content can "oth "e satis!ied% )he Lerstand conception o! determinate conceptual content!ulness is important, and it is right as !ar as it goes% But it is one*sided and incomplete, leaving out elements o! the larger conte&t that are essential to its intelligi"ilit$%

Dhat the Lerstand version o! the determinateness o! concepts leaves out is the crucial contri"ution made "$ the c$cle o! confession 3the ackno ledgment o! error and !ailure, o!

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the distinction that cognition and agenc$ involve, "et een hat things are in themselves and hat the$ are !or consciousness9, forgiveness 3recasting the previous actual applications o! concepts so as to e&hi"it them as a cumulative, e&pressivel$ progressive revelation o! the contents o! Lerstand*determinate concepts that sho up as having "een al a$s alread$ all along the ones kno ers and agents ere "inding themselves "$9, and confession o! the ultimate inadeBuac$ o! that !orgiveness 3the residual di!!erence "et een hat things are !or that !orgiving consciousness and hat the$ ill turn out to "e in themselves9% :n Hegel-s picture, then, a proper understanding o! the nature and origin o! the determinateness o! thoughto! the conditions o! "oth its intelligi"ilit$ and its actualit$reBuires ackno ledging the crucial role pla$ed "$ edelmKtig attitudes o! con!ession and !orgiveness% /deBuate semantic sel!*consciousness, articulated "$ the holistic, pragmatic meta*concepts o! Lernun!t rather than the one*sided meta*concepts o! Lerstand, is accordingl$ intimatel$ "ound up ith the !inal !orm o! reciprocal recognition descri"ed at the end o! Spirit% 3:! course, that there are intimate connection "et een !orms o! self-consciousness and !orms o! recognition is a central Hegelian theme, hich has "een ith us since it as introduced in Self-!onsciousness% So the onl$ surprise here lies in the details o! these culminating !orms o! each%9 (n particular, once one understands hat it is !or thought to "e determinatel$ content!ul, one sees that in taking or treating one-s #udgments and intentions as having such contents one is implicitl$ committed to adopting generous, !orgiving, edelmKtig attitudes to ards one-s o n and others- commitments% 2or onl$ such attitudes can make or !ind 3 e no see that these are not e&clusive alternatives, "ut di!!erent perspectives on one activit$, seen no !rom

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the point o! vie o! senses, no !rom the point o! vie o! re!erents9 determinate conceptual contents%

;ecall the !our meta*meta*attitudes to the t o normative meta*attitudes o! <iedertrTchtigkeit and EdelmKtigkeit discussed in Section J( a"ove% )he !irst a$ o! understanding them as o"#ectivist and cognitivistA there is a !act o! the matter a"out hether or not there reall$ are norms over and a"ove the causes o! "ehavior, the impulses and attitudes o! individuals, and one or the other parties is right a"out that matter o! !act and the other is rong% )he second approach sa them as optional, eBuall$ availa"le and potentiall$ valid, still "roadl$ cognitive, stances or voca"ularies one could choose to adopt or emplo$% )he third takes them to "e practical recognitive attitudes, hich institute di!!erent kinds o! communities and sel!*conscious individual selves, "ut hich are still "oth in principle availa"le, ith no attitude*independent !acts !orcing one choice over the other% De are no in a position to put meat on the "ones o! the !ourth alternative% (t ackno ledges that the attitudes are recognitive ones, hence practical in the sense o! ma ing something "e so, not #ust ta ing it to "e so% But it recaptures, at a higher level, versions o! the o"#ectivism and cognitivism o! the !irst attitude% )here is a kind o! !act involved, hich one ould "e ignoring i! one adopted the niedertrTchtig, reductive attitude% )hat !act is the conceptual !act that determinate conceptual content and the practical*recognitive attitudes that constitute EdelmKtigkeit in the !orm o! con!ession and !orgiveness are reciprocall$ sense*dependent concepts% Becoming e&plicitl$ a are o! this !act is achieving the kind o! sel!*consciousness characterized "$ sittlich Lernun!t rather than alienated Lerstand% ;ealizing it is realizing that in treating one-s o n

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thoughts and intentions as "eing determinatel$ content!ul, as "inding one in the sense that onl$ certain a$s the orld could "e ould count as making one-s "elie!s true and one-s intentions success!ul, is implicitl$ committing onesel! to understanding onesel! in terms o! a communit$ hose constitutive recognitive structure is that o! reciprocal con!ession and !orgiveness% Commitment to EdelmKtigkeit is implicit in "eing a discursive "eing% /lienation is having one-s e&plicitl$ ackno ledged commitments "e incompati"le ith this implicit structural commitment o! consciousness and agenc$%

( take it that this point is the punchline o! the Phenomenology, the !inal lesson he has organized the hole "ook to teach usA semantic sel!*consciousnessa areness o! the transcendental conditions o! the intelligi"ilit$ o! determinatel$ content!ul attitudes, o! thinking, "elieving, meaning, or intending an$thingconsists in e&plicitl$ ackno ledging an al a$s*alread$ implicit commitment to adopt generous recognitive attitudes o! reciprocal con!ession and recollective !orgiveness% 2or that recognitive structure is the "ackground !or cognition and action, the conte&t in hich alone the$ can "e made sense o!% )he t o*phase account o! e&perience in terms o! error and recollection e&plains hat it is e must do in order there"$ to make o"#ective conceptual norms availa"le to "ind ourselves "$ in #udgment and action, so as to make the a$ the orld is in itsel! availa"le as something !or our consciousness% ;esponding to the ackno ledgment o! error "$ undertaking the la"or o! !orgiveness o! those errors, "oth others- and our o n, is e&hi"iting the sense in hich conceptual norms have been e!!icacious ith respect to attitudes, hich sho up in such recollections as "oth sensitive to and expressive of them% )he ans er to the challenge o! the pusillanimous

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Kammerdiener"oth in the narro er !orm that esche s e&planation in terms o! norms and the normative statuses that result !rom "inding ourselves "$ them in !avor o! mere attitudes, and in the ider, more stringentl$ reductive !orm that !inds no e&planator$ ork !or norms to do in a natural orld o! causescomes in three parts% )he !irst part is the account o! recollective forgiveness as the practical*recognitive process that reveals 3and in terms o! hich alone e can make sense o! the ver$ idea o!9 "oth o"#ective conceptual norms and 3there"$9 hat things are in themselves, and sho s h$ and in hat sense these t o notions !orm an indissolu"le package% )he second part is the presentation o! a ne conception 3articulated "$ the holistic, developmental categories o! Lernun!t rather than the atomistic, static ones o! Lerstand9 o! hat the determinateness o! conceptual contents consists in, according to hich it is the e&ercise o! generous recollection that at each stage incorporates more o! ho things are in themselves into ho the$ are !or consciousness 3"ecause such rational reconstructions must "e e&pressivel$ progressive9, gives contingent !eatures o! attitudes actuall$ adopted the !orm o! necessit$ in that the contents o! the norms discerned are sensitive to the details o! the circumstances under hich terms e&pressing them are actuall$ used, and mediates 3making e&plicit as !eatures o! conceptual contents9 the immediacies hose stu""orn eruption in non*in!erential o"servation reports is hat ultimatel$ o"liges kno ers and agents to ackno ledge their error and !ailure 3the con!ession that calls !or !orgiveness9% )he third part is then the o"servation that "ecause it is onl$ inso!ar as e adopt generous recollective recognitive attitudes 3part one9 that our thought has determinate conceptual content 3part t o9, there!ore in treating ourselves in practice as undertaking determinatel$ content!ul cognitive and practical commitments 3having "elie!s and intentions that are

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true or !ul!illed in some potential novel circumstances, and not others9 e are implicitly committing ourselves to adopt that sort o! recognitive attitude, to take part in that sort o! recognitive communit$, to "e the sort o! individual sel! hose sel!*consciousness is articulated "$ that kind o! social recognitive relation%

)he "asic !orm o! this argument is "oth simple and !amiliar% /gainst the "ackground o! an understanding o! discursivit$ and intentionalit$ that sees it as consisting in the capacit$ to "ind onesel! "$ conceptual norms, hich Hegel adapts !rom Kant "$ transposing the operative notion o! normativit$ into a social ke$ via his account o! recognition, an$ theor$ that denies the e&istence or intelligi"ilit$ o! conceptual norms and normative statuses, o! discursive authorit$ and responsi"ilit$, hether in !avor o! the inclinations and attitudes o! individuals, or o! some other range o! natural causes, must stand condemned o! "eing una"le in the end to make sense o! cognitive and practical discursive activit$, including hat one is doing in putting !or ard such a theor$% /n$one ho adopts meta*attitudes o! this sort is enacting hat /pel ould call a Fpragmatic contradictionG hat Hegel thinks o! as a !ailure o! sel!*consciousness, in that hat he is in himsel!, hat he is actuall$ doing, is not e&pressed in hat he is for himsel!% Dhat he implicitl$ commits himsel! to "$ hat he does is not hat he e&plicitl$ ackno ledges% )he contents o! the status and o! the attitude are incompati"le ith one another% )heir structure ensures that arguments o! this !orm ill onl$ "e as good as the understanding o! conceptuall$ articulated activit$ on hich the$ are premised% 3/!ter all, according to a theor$ hich takes the capacit$ o! intentional states to represent states o! a!!airs outside themselves to presupposes the e&istence o! ,oda venera"le line o! thought, hich

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appears in various !orms in various places in the ork o! Descartes, Spinoza, Lei"niz, and Berkele$then so much as entertaining atheistic h$potheses entangles one in this sort o! di!!icult$%9 Hegel-s distinctive philosophical contri"ution seems to me to lie precisel$ in the details o! his semantic theor$A in his account o! the nature o! normativit$, o! conceptual content, and o! their relation to the activities o! individuals and the kind o! recognitive relations that structure their communities 3hence the su"title o! this ork9%

Determinatel$ content!ul concepts have "een in pla$ throughout the histor$ o! Spirit, "ecause not onl$ the ackno ledgment o! error and !ailure "ut also the recollective rational reconstrual o! conceptual contents that is !orgiveness has "een u"iBuitous% Both are essential phases o! our actual e&perience% /t ground level, e reall$ do per!orm the generous recollective la"or on our ordinar$ empirical and practical concepts 3including theoretical ones9 that is characteristic "oth o! the #udges at common la e have taken as

a model, and o! the !orgiving #udge hose hard heart has "een "roken in Hegel-s o n #urisprudential para"le% )his is an empirical, descriptive claim% /nd on the normative side, e-ve seen that Hegel thinks that as geistig "eings 3that is, as concept users9 e are all al a$s alread$ implicitl$ committed to adopting semanticall$ magnanimous attitudes to ards each others- uses o! concepts in !orming actual "elie!s and intentions% )he ne step reBuired to move decisivel$ "e$ond the alienation that is a structural characteristic o! modern individual sel!*consciousnesses and their recognitive communities alike is e&plicitl$ to ackno ledge and em"race "oth the !act and the commitment "$ theoreticall$ and practicall$ structuring our recognition, and hence our cognition and action, according to the meta*conceptual categories o! Lernun!t rather than those o! Lerstand% (t is

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relativel$ clear hat it is to understand things theoreticall$ in terms o! Lernun!tA e must em"race the account o! concepts, norms, and selves that Hegel has "een developing throughout the "ook% But hat o! the practical side o! instituting the ne kind o! recognition 3hence normative statuses and selves9E

De can "e sure on general grounds that the kind o! recognition that moves us "e$ond alienation must "e reciprocal and s$mmetric% ;ecollection, ho ever, is at "ase an as$mmetric relation, since it incorporates a temporal relation in hich the recollecting comes essentiall$ later than hat is recollected% Qust so, !orgiveness is essentiall$ a later phase in a seBuence% (n the para"le, that is the seBuenceA crime, con!ession, !orgiveness% (ndeed, lining up these temporal*developmental dimensions is one o! the motors o! the reading o! !orgiveness as e&pressivel$ progressive recollective reconstrual o! the content o! conceptual norms% SoA hence the s$mmetr$E

Even though the recollecting event o! !orgiving must, in the paradigmatic case, come later than the recollected event !orgiven, !orgiving as a recognitive relation "et een agents could still "e s$mmetric and reciprocal% Sou and ( might simultaneousl$ !orgive each other-s earlier con!essed transgressions% /s Dilliam Blake has itA F)hrough all eternit$, @ ( !orgive $ou, and $ou !orgive me%G But recognition need not "e synchronic in order to "e symmetric% /s e sa in outline alread$ in Chapter ) o, a conceptual tradition can e&hi"it a s$mmetric recognitive structure o! reciprocal authorit$ and responsi"ilit$ diachronically too% (n our model o! #udges determining conceptual contents "$ developing case la , the present #udge e&ercises authorit$ over past

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applications o! a legal concept, assessing their correctness "$ accepting 3or re#ecting9 them as precedential, hich is ackno ledging them as having genuine normative authorit$ over !uture applications% 2inding a a$ to construe the conceptual content in such a a$ that an earlier rulingeven one that can "e e&plained per!ectl$ ell "$ hat the #udge had !or "reak!astis displa$ed "oth as correct according to the "inding norm the earlier #udge inherited and as revelator$ o! some hitherto o"scure aspect o! the concept is, o! course, the paradigm o! a !orgiving recollection and magnanimous speci!ic recognition% But that authorit$ o! the present #udge to recognize is "alanced "$ his responsi"ilit$ to the past% 2or his entitlement to that authorit$ derives holl$ !rom his claim not to "e innovating 3clothing contingencies o! his o n attitudes in the guise o! necessit$9, "ut only appl$ing the conceptual norms he has inherited% )he Bualit$ o! his recollective rational reconstrual o! the tradition is the onl$ arrant !or the authorit$ he claims !or his o n assessments and applications o! the concept% /nd that responsi"ilit$ o! the present #udge to the pastto the actual content o! the concept in Buestionis administered "$ !uture #udges, ho ill assess in turn the precedential authorit$ o! the present #udge-s construal o! precedent, in terms o! its !idelit$ to the content the$ recollectivel$ discern as having "een all along implicitl$ setting the standards o! correctness o! applications and assessments o! applications o! the concept% So the recognitive authorit$ o! the present #udge ith respect to past #udges is conditioned on its recognition in turn "$ !uture ones% )his diachronic, historical structure o! reciprocal recognition, ( have "een claiming, is the central original 3even !rom our retrospective perspective9 element in Hegel-s semantic account o! conceptual content, o! the relations "et een phenomena and noumena, hat things are !or consciousness and hat the$ are

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in themselves, sense and re!erence, representing and represented, su"#ective attitude and o"#ective conceptual norm%

)he reciprocal recognitive structure o! con!ession and !orgiveness is o! this diachronic, historical t$pe% Dhen concept users have !ull$ achieved the sort o! semantic sel!* consciousness that Hegel gives us the metaconcepts !or 3the philosophical categories o! Lernun!t9, e ill each con!ess that our applications o! concepts and assessments o! such applications are no dou"t in!luenced "$ contingencies o! our collateral su"#ective attitudes and stra$ causal !actors o! hich e are not a are or not in intentional control% 3F<o dou"t,G Fnot a are,G and Fnot in controlG "ecause an$ speci!ic such in!luences o! hich e are a are and have control over, e are o"liged to take account o!, altering our particular applications o! concepts in "elie! and intention accordingl$%9 /nd e ill each ackno ledge our 3edelmKtig9 commitment to !ind a$s concretel$ and speci!icall$ to !orgive in the #udgments and actions o! others hat !irst sho s up as the con!essed disparit$ "et een hat things are !or those concept users and hat the$ are in themselves a$s to displa$ their applications o! concepts as precedential% )his is ackno ledging commitment to a ne ind o! speci!ic recognition o! others, hich is hat the ne kind

o! general recognition consists in% /nd e ill also con!ess that this recognitive commitment, too, e&hi"its the disparit$ that consciousness and action involveA the disparit$ "et een hat e are committed to do and hat e actuall$ do% )hat is, e con!ess that e have not succeeded in !ul!illing this recognitive commitment% De are not capa"le o! retrospectivel$ "ringing a"out the unit$ o! norm and actual per!ormance in each case e are committed to !orgive% :ur recollective reconstrual o! the contents o! the

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concepts involved inevita"l$ !ails to e&hi"it ever$ use as correct and e&pressivel$ progressive% De con!ess that though our generous, !orgiving recognitive spirit is illing, our !lesh is eak% De have not !ull$ healed the ounds o! the Spirit, have not made the aspect o! individualit$ present in ever$ actualit$ holl$ vanish, have not made the disparit$ o! all the deeds as i! it had never happened%

)hose con!essions"oth o! residual ground*level disparit$ o! norm and actual attitude, and o! the higher*level recognitive !ailures adeBuatel$ and completel$ concretel$ to !orgive the con!essed !ailures o! othersat this level o! sel!*consciousness and Spirit, themselves have the practical*recognitive signi!icance o! petitions !or recognition, petitions !or !orgiveness% )he !ocus o! the para"le o! the hard*hearted #udge and the "reaking o! his hard heart, ith hich Hegel closes Spirit, is the normative e&pectation "$ the one ho con!esses, o! !orgiveness !rom those ho #udge him% (ndeed, con!ession is not #ust a petition !or recognition as !orgiveness, it is the assertion o! a right to recognition through !orgiveness% (t creates a responsibility to treat the one ho con!esses generousl$, and not meanl$, not to pla$ the moral valet% )his is the responsi"ilit$ to reciprocate recognition% B$ using forgiveness as the a&is around hich revolves the para"le he uses to introduce the !inal !orm o! reciprocal recognition, Hegel is intentionall$ invoking the central concept o! Christianit$, and depending on its epitome in the petition o! the Lord-s Pra$erA F2orgive us our de"ts, as e !orgive our de"tors%G 3)hat is the King Qames version%58 Luther-s rendering o! this part o! the Mnservater is Fvergi" uns unsere Schuld, ie auch ir verge"en unseren Schuldigern%G Perhaps the sense o! o"ligation, o! hat is o ed, o! the !ailure to !ul!ill a commitment is clearer ith
58

Hathe 7A?*'5% / variant is at Luke ''A.*=%

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+Schuld-% +Schuld- is also guilt, and crime, in the sense o! hat is con!essedc!% Schuld und SKhne, crime and punishment% )he proper English translation has al a$s "een a point o! contention among religious con!essions, ith +trespasses- and Fthose ho trespass against usG, and +sins- and Fthose ho sin against usG "eing popular alternatives to +de"ts- and +de"tors-%9

Con!ession and !orgiveness are "oth at "ase per!ormances that e&press "ack ard*looking attitudes% Hegel-s telling o! his para"le o! recognition does not include an e&plicit term !or the !or ard*looking attitude that is the recognitive petition !or !orgiveness, ith its attendant institution o! a corresponding recognitive obligation to !orgive on the part o! those to hom it is addressed% ( propose to use the term +trust- !or that purpose% (n con!essing, one not onl$ e&presses retrospective ackno ledgement o! the residual disparit$ in one-s "elie!s and actions "et een hat things are in themselves and hat the$ are !or one, "et een norm and su"#ective attitude, one also e&presses prospective trust in others to !ind a$s o! !orgiving that disparit$, !orging@!inding a unit$ o! re!erent "ehind the disparit$ o! sense, healing the ound% Such trust is an ackno ledgement o! dependence on others !or recognition in the !orm o! !orgiveness% +Dependence- here is used in Hegel-s normative sense% Dhat is ackno ledged is the recognitive authority o! those on hom one depends !or !orgiveness% /nd what depends on the !orgiveness o! those to hom one has con!essed is #ust the authorit$ o! one-s o n concept applications 3a"out hich one con!essed9#ust as is the case ith the precedential authorit$ o! an earlier #udge-s ad#udications in the legal case that is our model% )rusting is "oth ackno ledging the authorit$ o! those trusted to !orgive and invoking their responsi"ilit$

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to do so% Prospective trust that one ill "e !orgiven !or hat one con!esses is the recognitive attitude complementar$ to !orgiveness% )ogether these reciprocal practical attitudes produce a communit$ ith a s$mmetric, edelmKtig recognitive structure% )he choice o! the term +trust- is motivated "$ Hegel-s use o! it 0Lertrauen@vertrauen1 to descri"e hat as progressive a"out 2aith, in spite o! the cognitive errors !or hich it stands condemned "$ EnlightenmentA the reciprocal recognitive structure o! the religious communit$% Dhomsoever ( trust, his certaint$ o! himsel! is !or me the certaint$ o! m$sel!I ( recognize in him m$ o n "eing*!or*sel!, kno that he ackno ledges it and that it is !or him purpose and essence% 0P, 6=?1 ( take it that this descri"es the recognitive ideal Hegel !oreshado ed alread$ hen he !irst introduced the notion o! reciprocal recognition in Self-!onsciousnessA Dith this, e alread$ have "e!ore us the <otion o! Spirit% Dhat still lies ahead !or consciousness is the e&perience o! hat Spirit isthis a"solute su"stance hich is the unit$ o! the di!!erent independent sel!* consciousnesses hich, in their opposition, en#o$ per!ect !reedom and independenceA O(O that is ODeO and ODeO that is O(O%G 0P/ '>>1%

)he kind o! individual sel!*consciousness and communit$ recognitivel$ s$nthesized "$ prospective trust and recollective !orgiveness are an +(- and a + e- that are identical in Hegel-s holistic, +speculative- senseA distinct, "ut mutuall$ presupposing elements hose relations articulate a larger unit$, and hich are unintelligi"le apart !rom the role the$ pla$ in that hole% )his ne sort o! recognitive structure is unalienated, sittlich, in virtue

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o! the division o! normative la"or it e&hi"its "et een the +(- and the + e-% )he mistake characteristic o! modernit$ as the practical conviction that #ustice could "e done to the essential contri"ution o! the actual activities and su"#ective attitudes o! individuals to the institution o! normative statusestheir authorit$ over hat the$ are responsi"le !or onl$ i! those individuals are conceived o! as holl$ independentA as !ull$ and solel$ authoritative, as constitutively authoritative% Dithin the con!ines en!orced "$ the atomistic metaconceptual categories o! Lerstand, the sense in hich hat ( "elieve and do is up to me could onl$ "e ackno ledged "$ identi!$ing practicall$ #ust ith hatever is entirely up to me% 2or independence 3authorit$9 is so understood as to "e incompati"le ith an$ and ever$ sort o! dependence 3corresponding responsi"ilit$9% De have !ollo ed Hegel-s rehearsal, in the "od$ o! the Phenomenology, o! ho the logic o! this de!ective practical and theoretical conception o! the normative statuses o! authorit$ and responsi"ilit$ reBuires a contraction strategy culminating in the sel!*conceptions and conceptions o! agenc$ epitomized "$ the honest consciousness and the conscientious consciousness%5' )he onl$ doings !or hich the !ormer takes responsi"ilit$ are pure acts o! illA hat it tries to do% 2or these are the onl$ ones over hich it has total authorit$ the onl$ things it cannot tr$ to do and !ail% /nd the latter asserts its right to "e #udged onl$ "$ hether it has acted according to its conception o! dut$, insisting that hat it is responsi"le !or is restricted to hat it ta es itsel! to "e responsi"le !or% )he alienation the$ e&press o! the actual !rom the normativetheir !ailure to make sense o! the reciprocal e!!ects o! the norms on hat actuall$ happens 3 hen e "ind ourselves "$ conceptual norms in #udging and acting9, and o! hat actuall$ happens on the norms 3 hen the contents e&pressed "$ our ords depends on ho
5'

e use those ords9makes

Discussed in this connection at the end o! Section J( o! Chapter Seven%

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the ideas o! kno ing ho things reall$ are, acting so as to change ho things reall$ are, and so much as "eing a"le to entertain determinatel$ content!ul thoughts eBuall$ and in principle unintelligi"le%

B$ contrast, !orgiveness and trust em"od$ an expansion strategy, "$ hich sel!* conscious individuals identi!$ ith actual goings*on 0)aten1 over hich the$ e&ert some real, "ut al a$s onl$ partial authorit$, identi!$ themselves as the seats o! responsi"ilities that outrun their o n capacit$ to !ul!ill% Con!ession o! the need !or !orgiveness and trust that it ill "e !orthcoming "oth ackno ledge the sense in hich others are in a distinctive a$ also responsible !or hat I have done% 2or the eventual signi!icance o! m$ per!ormance, the content o! the commitment ( have adopted, practicall$ as intention or cognitivel$ as "elie!, is no le!t in their care% (n one sense, ( as agent am responsi"le !or hat are in the ordinar$ sense my doings% 2or it is m$ adoption o! an attitude, m$ endorsement o! a purpose 3Lorsatz9 that opens the process that proceeds and develops there!rom to normative assessment in the !irst place% ( must pla$ the counter in the game !or a move to have "een made 0Handlung1% But then, in another sensevisi"le !rom the point o! vie o! Lernun!t as a complementary sensem$ !ello communit$ mem"ers, those hom ( recognize in the sense o! trusting them to !orgive m$ per!ormance, are responsi"le !or !inding a a$ to make it have "een a successful application o! the concept e&pressed "$ the counter ( pla$ed% )hat is, the$ are responsi"le !or the imputation o! an intention 3/"sicht9 that can "e seen retrospectivel$ as having "een carried out as the seBuence o! conseBuential speci!ications o! the doing un!olds% )hat intention sets the normative standard !or the success o! the action and, as the content e&pressed "$ the

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purpose that is the actuall$ e!!icacious attitude, is construed as guiding the process that is the e&ecution o! the plan% Concretel$ !orgiving the action is !inding a a$ to reconstrue the content o! the concept applied in the Lorsatz so that the resulting /"sicht turns out to "e success!ul%

So the e&plicit ackno ledgment o! this sharing o! responsi"ilit$ !or hat is done "et een the con!essing and trusting agent and the !orgiving communit$ e&presses an e&panded practical conception o! ho happenings Buali!$ as doings% )he unit$ o! actions 3 hat de!ines their identit$9 that "oth the agent ho trusts and the communit$ ho !orgives identi!$ ith and produce "$ adopting these reciprocal recognitive stances 3relinBuishing claims to merel$ particular su"#ective authorit$ not "alanced "$ a correlative responsi"ilit$9 is a comple&, internall$ articulated unit$ that comprises "oth aspects o! the disparit$ that action involves% 2or it com"ines as essential, mutuall$ presupposing aspects the action as something that Buali!ies as such onl$ "ecause it has "oth speci!ications under hich it is intentional and conseBuential speci!ications in terms o! actual e!!ects that unroll un!oreseea"l$ to the in!inite horizon% Both the prospective e&ercise o! authorit$ "$ the agent and the retrospective e&ercise o! authorit$ "$ the !orgiving communit$ are reBuired to "ring a"out this unit$A to make hat happens into something done%

;ecall the immediate version o! hat "$ no has developed into an intricatel$ mediated per!ormance o! concrete !orgiving, introduced "$ Hegel in the opening movement o! Spirit in the allegor$ in hich something that naturall$ happens, death, is made into

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something done, the a!!irmation and development o! a normative status o! !amil$ mem"ership, "$ "urial% Mp to this point, ( have emphasized the cognitive, retrospective character o! the e&ercise o! authorit$ through !orgivenessA the sense in hich generous recollection is a necessar$ condition o! the intelligi"ilit$ o! determinatel$ content!ul, o"#ective concepts articulating ho the things that are something !or us are in themselves 3that is, o! the idea that there is some determinate a$ things o"#ectivel$ are, hich e are tr$ing to !ind out9% )his dimension is a"solutel$ crucial !or understanding the deep conceptual connection "et een the intersu"#ective process o! recognition as !orgiving recollection 3an e&ercise o! authorit$ on the part o! those in hom conceptual trust is placed9, on the one hand, and o"#ectivit$ and actualit$, on the other% But invoking the practical recollective ork that is the recover$ o! an intention as a concept*application that uni!ies the purposive and conseBuential aspects o! action points to the a$ in hich !orgiveness on the practical side can "e not onl$ retrospective, in reconstruing hat is taken to "e the o"#ective content o! the concept to ard hich a practical attitude is adopted in endorsing a purpose, "ut also retroactive%

2or the conseBuential speci!ications o! a doing are not something simpl$ given, availa"le onl$ !or theoretical re*interpretation% Concrete practical !orgiveness involves doing things to change hat the conseBuences o! the act turn out to "e% 2or e&ample, one might trust one-s successors to ma e it the case that one-s inadvertent revelation, one-s sacri!ice, or the decision to go to ar, as orth hile, "ecause o! hat it eventuall$ led to"ecause o! hat we made o! it "$ doing things di!!erentl$ a!ter ards% Something ( have done should not "e treated as an error or a crime, as the hard*hearted niedertrTchtig

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#udge does, "ecause it is not $et settled what ( have done% Su"seBuent actions "$ others can a!!ect its conseBuences, and hence the content o! hat ( have done% )he hard*hearted #udgment rongl$ assumes that the action is a !inished thing, sitting there, !ull$*!ormed, as a possi"le o"#ect o! assessment independent o! hat is done later% )he Kammerdiener-s mini!$ing ascription o! the hero-s action to lo , sel!*interested motives rather than ackno ledgment o! a norm as "inding in the situation depends on a de!ective atomistic conception o! hat an intention is%

;ecall the model o! agenc$ put in place in Chapter Seven% Dhether an$ particular event that occurs conseBuentiall$ do nstream !rom the adoption o! a practical attitude 3Lorsatz9 makes an e&pressivel$ progressive contri"ution to the !ul!illment o! an intention depends on its role in the development o! a retrospectivel$ imputed plan% /nd the role o! a given event in the evolving plan depends on what else happens% /s ne conseBuences occur, the plan is altered, and ith it the status o! the earlier event as aiding in the success!ul e&ecution o! the plan% )hat status can "e altered "$ other doings, hich, in the conte&t o! the earlier one, open up some ne practical possi"ilities and close others o!!% )he signi!icance o! one event is never !ull$ and !inall$ settled% (t is al a$s open to in!luence "$ later events% )he magnanimous commitment to concrete practical !orgiveness is a commitment to act so as to ma e the act !orgiven have been correct as the ackno ledgment o! a norm that can no "e imputed as the content o! the governing intention% (n a communit$ ith the recognitive structure o! trust and !orgiveness, there is a real sense in hich ever$thing is done "$ ever$one% 2or ever$one takes responsi"ilit$ !or hat each one does, and each takes responsi"ilit$ !or hat

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ever$one does% 3)his is the Husketeer conception o! agenc$A F/ll !or one and one !or all%G9 )his is hat ( meant "$ talking a"out an Fe&pansion strateg$G !or edelmKtig sel!* consciousness, "$ contrast to the Fcontraction strateg$G o! alienated sel!*consciousness% )he conception o! the agent in the sense o! the doer ho is responsi"le !or hat is done is e&panded so that the sel!*conscious individual is #ust one element in a larger constellation including those he recognizes through trust and ho recognize him through !orgiveness% )he deed is not imperisha"leI it is taken "ack "$ Spirit into itsel!, and the aspect o! individualit$ present in it, hether as intention or as an e&istent negativit$ and limitation, straight a$ vanishes% )he sel! that carries out the action, the !orm o! its act, is onl$ a moment o! the hole%%% 0P, 77?1

(n the sphere o! agenc$, the modern rise o! su"#ectivit$ takes the !orm o! the assertion o! hat Hegel calls the Frights o! intention and kno ledge%G )hese are the rights o! the individual sel!*consciousness to "e held responsi"le !or hat it does onl$ under the speci!ications under hich it as intentional, together ith conseBuential speci!ications it could !oresee% )his modern notion o! agenc$ contrasted ith the heroic conception o! agenc$ characteristic o! traditional, pre*modern practical sel!*consciousness% :n that conception, the individual agent as responsi"le !or hat is done under all o! its speci!ications, hether intended or envisaged or not% 3F( do hat happens%G9 /s e-ve seen, Hegel-s em"lematic e&ample is :edipus, ho is held responsi"le 3and holds himsel! responsi"le9 !or committing the crimes o! killing his !ather and marr$ing his mother, in spite o! not having intended to do an$thing under those descriptions, and having no a$ o! kno ing that hat he intended under other descriptions ould have

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those conseBuences% )hose !acts do not e&cuse or e&culpate him% )he$ merel$ illustrate the tragic character o! heroically taking responsi"ilit$ !or hat one does in this e&tensive senseA that e do not and cannot kno hat e are doing, that an$ action opens us up to

the vagaries o! !ate% 3F)he stone "elongs to the devil hen it leaves the hand that thre it%G9

Hegel is clear that modernit$-s ackno ledgement o! the rights o! intention and kno ledge is e&pressivel$ progressive% But "$ itsel! it leaves us alienated !rom our doings, una"le satis!actoril$ to uni!$ the various aspects o! agenc$A the normative and the actual, the intentional and the conseBuential% Dorking ithin the categories o! independence, o! Lerstand, the modern vie can attri"ute genuine responsi"ilit$ onl$ here the authorit$ o! the agent is complete% )he result is the contraction strateg$, here our doings are contracted to mere illings% Dhat as lost is hat the heroic conception o! agenc$ had rightA the kind o! responsi"ilit$ that e&tends to our doings under all their speci!ications, including conseBuential ones that ere not e&plicitl$ envisaged or endorsed% )he normative status one enters into "$ acting hat the agent makes hersel! responsi"le !or, hat she has committed hersel! tooutruns the su"#ective attitude in virtue o! hich it is her doing% )he traditional vie is rong in not ackno ledging the sense in hich the agent-s responsi"ilit$ is limited "$ the rights o! intention and kno ledge% )he modern vie is rong in thinking that there is no responsi"ilit$ !or hat as not part o! the individual-s purpose or kno ledge% )he recognitive structure o! trust and !orgiveness, in virtue o! its division o! normative la"or, its sharing o! responsi"ilit$ "et een agent and communit$, incorporates versions o! "oth the individual rights o!

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intention and kno ledge characteristic o! modernit$ and the heroic conception o! agenc$ characteristic o! traditional societ$% )he agent and the communit$ together are responsi"le !or the action under all its speci!ications% )he rights o! intention and kno ledge mark the sense in hich the doing is the agent-s doing, e&pressing the !act that it is the attitudes o! individual agents that are the source o! actualizing an$ norm, adopting an$ normative status% But hat the agent has donethe content o! the status entered intois not understood as restricted "$ hat is e&plicit in those attitudes% )his third vie ould #ust "e the traditional heroic conception o! agenc$, e&cept that the !act

that hat the agent has done is understood not #ust as having made her responsi"le !or the doing, "ut as having made us all responsi"le !or it 3has imposed a responsi"ilit$ concretel$ and practicall$ to !orgive it9 means that the re*achievement o! the heroic conception no takes a higher !orm% )hat higher !orm does not essentiall$ involve the traged$ that is a con!rontation ith an alien destin$% )hough the agent cannot kno she does, others are committed to and responsi"le !or its not turning out to "e a crime% She trusts that the$ ill !orgive, ill e&ercise their po er to heal the ounds o! the Spirit in!licted "$ the stu""orn recalcitrance o! cause, contingenc$, actualit$, immediac$, and particularit$, "$ giving it the !orm o! the conceptual, necessit$, normativit$, mediation, and universalit$% Heroism is the genuine "indingness o! norms on actualit$A the agent-s "eing genuinel$ 3"ut not holl$ independentl$9 authoritative over and responsi"le !or hat actuall$ happens% )he sharing o! responsi"ilit$ "et een the con!essing and trusting kno er*and*agent and trusted !orgiving and con!essing assessors o! claims and deeds, hich articulates the historical*perspectival 3prospective@retrospective9 division o! normative la"or ithin the magnanimous recognitive communit$, is hat makes hat

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su"#ective attitudes intelligi"le as the application 3"inding o! onesel! "$9 o"#ective norms, so as the institution o! normative statuses 3cognitive and practical commitments9 hose contents outrun the su"#ective conceptions o! an$ o! the participants% )hrough his adoption o! attitudes, the application o! concepts, hence the ackno ledgment o! o"#ectivel$ determinatel$ content!ul conceptual norms as governing the assessment o! the resulting per!ormances, the agent "oth e&ercises real 3though incomplete9 authorit$ over hat happens and makes hersel! 3though not hersel! alone9 responsi"le !or hat actuall$ happens, under all its speci!ications, conseBuential as ell as intentional% )he sharing o! responsi"ilit$ that is the e&ecution o! the e&pansion strateg$ is hat makes possi"le heroism 3 hat no man is to his valet9 ithout traged$%

)his is the !inal stor$ a"out the relation o! norms to nature, concepts to causes, and statuses to attitudes% Con!ession, !orgiveness, and trust are hat e must do, recognitivel$, in order to find o"#ective, determinatel$ content!ul conceptual norms "eing applied cognitivel$ in #udgment and practicall$ in action% Hagnanimous recollection constructs a conception 3sense9 that purports to e&press the o"#ective concept 3re!erence9 articulating the content o! the commitment 3normative status9 "eing undertaken in the !orm o! "elie! and intention, so that the !ormer is true and the latter !ul!illed% )he activit$ that is in this sense success!ull$ !orgiven is e&hi"ited as the conceptualizing o! the actual and the actualizing o! the conceptualA in!using the normative into the natural so as to make hat actuall$ happens su"#ect to normative assessment, and in!using the contingent into the necessar$ so as to make concepts determinatel$ content!ul% )his sort o! retrospective reconstrual and retroactive reconte&ting is reason-s march through histor$,

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the making that is the !inding o! reason as active in histor$% F:n him ho looks at the orld rationall$, the orld looks rationall$ "ack,G Hegel sa$s5. 3his Spiegelei conception o! rationalit$9% Dhat one must "e doing in order to "e Flooking at the orld rationall$G is !orgivingA rationall$ reconstructing a tradition so as to e&hi"it it as e&pressivel$ progressive, as the "ecoming e&plicit o! initiall$ implicit concepts through the endorsement o! hat turn out to "e true claims and success!ul intentions% )his sho s our activities to "e rational and rationall$ governed in the sense that the$ consist in our "inding ourselves "$ and so making ourselves lia"le to assessments according conceptual norms that set o"#ective standards !or correctness 3truth and success9% :nl$ as a rationall$ "ased succession o! phenomena, themselves containing and revealing hat reason is, does this histor$ sho itsel! as rational, as a rational event%55

Sho ing histor$ as rational in this sense, "$ producing a !orgiving recollection, is hat Hegel does in his ;ealphilosophie% (n an important sense, these applications are hat the metaconcepts o! his logic are for% )he$ are the tools he uses to displa$ an e&pressivel$ progressive developmental tra#ector$ through the vast amount o! empirical material he considers in those orks% So !or instance, "oth the 'ectures on Aesthetics and the 'ectures on the Philosophy of Religion sho ho these !orms o! sel!*consciousness o! ,eist evolve ever more adeBuate e&pressions o! hat it is in itsel!% /lthough "oth art and religion are doomed to !all short o! the !ull$ adeBuate understanding o! ,eist that Hegel takes philosoph$ to "e a"le to achieve, "ecause o! the de!ining role that sensuous
5.

Reason in (istory 3(ntroduction to Hegel-s 'ectures on the Philosophy of +orld (istory9, translated "$ ;o"ert S% Hartman 0(ndianapolis, Bo""s*Herrill Pu"lishing, '?>N1 p% '5% 55 Berlin (ntroduction to 'ectures on the (istory of Philosophy, p% .5%

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concepts pla$ in each o! those enterprises, the$ are sho n nonetheless "oth to have a genuine grip on the truth as more adeBuatel$ e&pressed "$ philosoph$, and !urther, to have a monotonicall$ improving grip on it% ( am impressed, too, "$ the pragmatic and e&perimental spirit in hich Hegel seems to approach these undertakings% <ot onl$ do later versions o! the religion lectures incorporate !urther historical !acts, as Hegel-s stud$ o! the topic progressed, "ut di!!erent strategies are tried out !or using the conceptual apparatus o! the 'ogic to organize them into seBuences in hich hat turns out to have "een implicit all along is made graduall$ more e&plicit% (n some versions, the largest progression is mapped onto that !rom Being, through Essence, to Concept, as in the Science of 'ogic% But else here roughl$ the same material is understood in terms o! the progression !rom /nsichsein, through 2Krsichsein, to /n*und*2Krsichsein% )o "e sure, there is an important relation "et een these t o large structures% But there are also important conceptual di!!erences "et een them% /s ( read him, Hegel as sure that his metaconcepts ere the right tools ith hich to !orge a !orgiving recollection, to !ind a rational histor$, "ut as much less sure #ust ho to appl$ them in an$ particular case so as "est to achieve that end% )he !act that he tries out di!!erent recollective strategies is evidence o! #ust ho rong it is to see Hegel as tr$ing to o!!er a priori derivations o!

proprieties governing the application o! ground*level empirical concepts !rom the concepts o! his logic% )he #o" o! the latter is e&pressive, as semantic metalanguage% )he attempt to !ind "etter a$s to deplo$ those e&pressive resources, so as to achieve "etter recollections, e&hi"iting a more rational, more revelator$ histor$, incorporating more o! the earlier constellations o! concepts and trans!ormations o! those constellations as making a progressive e&pressive contri"ution is an implicit confession o! the onl$ partial

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success o! each particular e&ercise o! generous recollection% Such a con!ession is an invitation !or us ho come a!ter him concretel$ to !orgive him !or the partial !ailure o! his attempt to !orgive, "$ telling a still "etter stor$% He trusts us to continue the conceptuall$ magnanimous enterprise%

Huch more central to Hegel-s pro#ect, ho ever, is !ul!illing this o"ligation o! generous recollection to his speci!icall$ philosophical predecessors% )he 'ectures on the (istory of Philosophy culminates in hat he insists is not his s$stem "ut the s$stem o! philosoph$ that he e&pounds in the Science of 'ogic, and applies in the *ncyclopedia% Each prior !igure is presented !rom the point o! vie o! hat he understood, hat his thought can retrospectivel$ "e seen to have revealed a"out ho things actuall$ are, hich aspects o! the philosophical concepts that articulate his current, adeBuate sel!*consciousness are e&pressed, ho ever darkl$, in his conceptions, and ho the e&pressive inadeBuacies o! those vie s can "e seen to have served the progressive purpose o! "eing necessar$ preconditions o! the ne&t stage, providing the e&perience o! error and !ailure out o! hich a ne er, "etter conception arises% /s Hegel sa$s in the conclusion o! his three volumesA /t this point ( "ring this histor$ o! Philosoph$ to a close% (t has "een m$ desire that $ou should learn !rom it that the histor$ o! philosoph$ is not a "lind collection o! !anci!ul ideas, nor a !ortuitous progression% ( have rather sought to sho the necessar$ development o! the successive philosophies !rom one another, so that the one o! necessit$ presupposes another preceding it% )he general result o! the histor$ o! Philosoph$ is thisA in the !irst place, that throughout all time there has "een onl$ one

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Philosoph$, the contemporar$ di!!erences o! hich constitute the necessar$ aspects o! one principleI in the second place, that the succession o! philosophic s$stems is not due to chance, "ut represents the necessar$ succession o! stages in the development o! this scienceI in the third place, that the !inal philosoph$ o! a period is the result o! this development, and is truth in the highest !orm hich the sel!*consciousness o! spirit a!!ords o! itsel!% )he latest philosoph$ contains there!ore those hich ent "e!oreI it em"races in itsel! all the di!!erent stages thereo!I it is the product and the result o! those that preceded itP%(t is m$ desire that this histor$ o! Philosoph$ should contain !or $ou a summons to grasp the spirit o! the time, hich is present in us "$ nature, andeach in his o n place consciousl$ to "ring it !rom its natural condition, i%e% !rom its li!eless seclusion, into the light o! da$%5= )he aspiration is to o!!er a rational histor$A a reconstruction in hich each element makes an essential contri"ution to hat is !inall$ revealed as having "een all along implicitl$ the topic% )he progression is retrospectively necessar$% (t is not the case that a given stage could have evolved in no other a$ than as to produce hat appears as its successor% ;ather, that successor 3and ultimatel$, the !inalso !artriumphant, culminating conception9 could not have arisen e&cept as a development !rom the earlier ones% )he passage closes ith Hegel-s e&pression o! trustA his summons to the ne&t generation to do !or its time hat he has done !or hisA to take on the !orgiving recollective la"or o! e&plicitation that makes a rational histor$%

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(egel4s 'ectures on the (istory of Philosophy, E% S% Haldane and 2% H% Simson 3trans%9 0<e Qerse$A Humanities Press '?N51 volume 5, pp% 66.*65%

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)he Phenomenology itsel! is, o! course, an enterprise ith #ust this shape% (t, too, takes as its task making it the case that nothing is !or nothing, that all things happen !or the "estA Lei"nizian optimism understood as a practical commitment rather than a mere statement hat ould "e true an$ a$, ithout our la"or% Each shape o! consciousness considered in the !irst !ive chapters o! that "ook, each phase o! Spirit considered in the si&th, pla$s an essential e&pressive role in the e&positor$ tra#ector$ that takes us to the !inal vision o! concepts, norms, and selves, each reveals some necessar$ aspect o! ho e should

understand ourselves% )he hole narrative is an e&tended act o! concrete !orgiveness% (ts target is not all acts o! concept applicationall #udgments and intentional actions% Dhat he is !orgiving is rather something like all attempts to understand that ground*level discursive activit$% Dhat is "eing !orgiven is theoretical and practical a$s 3"oth individual and institutional9 o! understanding ourselves as creatures ho "ind ourselves "$ conceptual norms% )he metaconceptual vie that !inall$ emergesthe account o! ho commitment to the generous recognitive structure o! con!ession, trust, and recollective !orgiveness is implicit in ordinar$ cognitive and practical activit$, a necessar$ condition o! the determinate content!ulness and representational directedness o! "elie!s and intentionsis put !or ard not onl$ as the implicit content e&pressed genuinel$ "ut imper!ectl$ and incompletel$ "$ each o! the inadeBuate theoretical and practical metaconceptions that !inds a place in the "od$ o! the narrative, "ut also, given its speci!ic content, as the e&plicit articulation o! a structural recognitive commitment that is implicit in ordinar$, ground*level concept use% )he Phenomenology is accordingl$ a paradigm instance o! hat it is a theor$ o!A making a tradition have "een about

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something, and have "een a gradual "ut ultimatel$ success!ul !inding out a"out it% Dhat happens is turned into something done, "$ the retrospective, retroactive imputation o! hat amounts to a uni!$ing un!olding plan*structured intention that can "e seen to have "een implicit in the various events that are there"$ recollected and !orgiven%

Dhat the Phenomenology does !or our sel!*understanding as discursive creatures, e should do !or it as a te&t% )hat !orgiving ork invites, o"liges 3FsummonsG9, and trusts us to !orgive itA to !ind a content "ecoming e&plicit in it, to discern a governing intention guiding the un!olding o! a plan*structured narrative% /s as pointed out in Chapter Seven, on Hegel-s conception o! intention 3F/"sichtG9, the Buestion o! hether Hegel changed his mind hal! a$ through the riting o! the Phenomenology 3tacking on the long chapter on Spirit even though it as not part o! the original plan9, is one that should "e responded to "$ finding a uni!ied and uni!$ing intention% :! course, e ma$ not "e a"le to "ring o!! that concrete la"or o! !orgiveness% But i! not, inso!ar as there are "its o! the te&t that remain indigesti"le, impossi"le to assimilate into a suita"l$ e&pressivel$ progressive recollective rational reconstruction, that is something to "e confessed, trusting that those ho come a!ter ard ill "e a"le "etter to !ul!ill that responsi"ilit$%

)hat is hat ( have "een aiming !or in this orkA to do !or Hegel hat he did !or his predecessors% 3Some ould sa$A +to- them%9 ( have tried to present hat ( take to "e Hegel-s understanding o! the nature o! concepts, norms, and selves, and the relations among them, to sho ho each o! the strands in the !inal stor$ emerges !rom the considerations introduced and developed in the di!!erent parts o! the "ook, and ho those

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strands are oven together into an ever richer and more intricate tapestr$ until the !ull picture emerges% (n constructing and articulating that recollection, ( have not hesitated to use voca"ular$ that is not Hegel-s, hich reBuires !orging ne in!erential links ith voca"ular$ that is Hegel-s, #ust as he did not hesitate to use his ne philosophical voca"ular$ in e&pressing and placing the vie s o! /ristotle, Descartes, and Kant% :n Hegel-s o n semantic vie s, as here reconstructed, doing that is reconstruing the contents o! the concepts, in the sense o! o!!ering a ne conception, a ne a$ o!

e&pressing the concept that is taken to "e the one Hegel as e&pressing% But that sort o! prospective making o! a ne sense is hat retrospective !inding o! a re!erent consists in, on that account% Producing a ne candidate conception 3in this case, a content articulated "$ ne in!erential connections, to concepts that the te&t does not and could not e&plicitl$ connect the original to9 is one essential aspect o! the process o! articulating the meaning that the te&t reall$ hasin the onl$ sense in hich a te&t has a meaning or e&presses a conceptual content% )his comple&, t o*phase account o! the kind o! making that is the !inding o! meaning is o!!ered as a successor to the atomistic Lerstand conception o! meanings as cr$stalline, sel!*contained things 3CuineA Fthe m$th o! the museumG9, hich stand there independent o! their connection to each other, and as intelligi"le apart !rom their involvement in the processes and practices that are the evolving e&perience o! those ho use ords to e&press them 3as another later thinker ould have itA the impossi"le conception o! hat sort o! thing one ould have to add to a sign*post, thought o! as mere shaped ooden matter, as its signi!icance, under the condition that that signi!icance "e intelligi"le apart !rom the practices o! those to hom it is signi!icant9%

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;easons, in the !orm o! o"#ective conceptual norms, sho s up retrospectivel$ as ackno ledged in the attitudes o! practitioners, hence as setting standards articulating the contents o! the commitments the$ undertake and the authorit$ the$ claim, ithin each generous, !orgiving recollection e&hi"iting a progressive tradition o! imper!ect, "ut cumulative, ever more e&plicit, and ultimatel$ success!ul e&pression o! those concepts% Particularit$, contingenc$, and immediac$ enter during the prospective phase o! e&perience, making themselves !elt as practitioners !ind themselves !alling into error and !ailure "$ appl$ing their current conceptions, !ind themselves ith theoretical, practical, and indeed recognitive that are commitments incompati"le "$ their o n lights, hich normativel$ call !or the alteration o! those conceptions and the reconstrual o! that tradition% Dhat is, hen it appears, still irrational 3the moment o! di!!erence9, the eruption o! causes into the realm o! concepts 3the e&ercise "$ particulars o! authorit$ over universals9, sho s up in the "reaks, the ruptures, the caesuras "et een the Dhiggish Erinnerungen% )he !irst is the construction o! concepts, the second is the incorporation into them o! the initiall$ non*conceptual immediac$ and contingenc$ in virtue o! hich those concepts are determinatel$ content!ul% )he recognitive c$cle o! con!ession, trust, and !orgiveness, !ollo ed "$ con!ession o! the inadeBuac$ o! that !orgiveness, is hat ties these phases together, articulating the internal !ine structure o! the relations "et een the moment o! rational unit$ and the moment o! determinate disparit$% Mnder the heading o! Lernun!t, Hegel is putting !or ard a ne metaph$sics o! meaning and intentionalit$, a highl$ structured stor$ a"out the pragmatics o! semanticsA a"out the sorts o! doings that are the necessar$ "ackground !or saying or intending an$thing determinatel$ content!ul, and a"out the sense in hich concepts can "e thought o! as

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having determinate contents% )hat stor$ in!orms his o n practiceA the a$ he thinks a"out the concepts o! science, religion, art, and philosoph$, his understanding and presentation o! the vie s, accomplishments, and !ailures o! his predecessors, and the shape o! his o n ritings% )he generous hermeneutics he practices is an implicit e&pression o! trust in us, his interpreters, to ackno ledge and !ul!ill our o"ligation to per!orm the corresponding reconstructive recollective la"or o! producing hat sho up retrospectivel$ as more adeBuate e&pressions o! the ver$ concepts he developed and deplo$ed%

Hegel-s stor$ a"out ho determinate conceptual content arises out o! normative force hat it is to ta e o"#ective conceptual norms to "e ackno ledged as "inding in the attitudes o! discursive practitioners, and there"$ to ma e those attitudes properl$ intelligi"le as the adoption o! normative statuses, the undertaking o! commitments and responsi"ilities that outrun the conceptions o! those hose statuses the$ areis accordingl$ supposed to "e at once a cognitive theor$ and a practical !ighting !aith !or the !irst generation o! moderns !or hom intellectual histor$ came to seem a central and essential undertaking% (t is, remarka"l$, a semantics that is morally edi!$ing% 2or properl$ understanding the conditions o! having determinate thoughts and intentions, o! "inding ourselves "$ determinatel$ content!ul conceptual norms in #udgment and action, turns out to commit us to adopting recognitive stances o! a particular kind to one another% )he sort o! Hegelian semantic sel!*consciousness that consists in understanding our discursive activit$ according to the categories o! Lernun!t accordingl$ o"liges us to "e a certain kind o! sel!, and to institute certain kinds o! communities% (n particular, the sort

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o! theoretical understanding he teaches 3the e&plicit ackno ledgment o! hat he sho s to "e implicit in our discursive practice9 o"liges us in practice to !orgive and trust one anotherA to "e that kind o! sel! and institute that kind o! communit$% Practicing the recognitive hermeneutics o! magnanimit$ is not #ust one option among others% / proper understanding o! the kind o! creatures e are o"liges us to "e !orgiving and trustingA to see the orld through rational e$es, not onl$ "ecause the orld then looks rationall$ "ack, "ut "ecause that rational orld is the onl$ mirror in hich e can see ourselves% )he reconciling Sea, in hich the t o O(Os let go their antithetical e&istence, is the e&istence o! the O(O hich has e&panded into a dualit$, and therein remains identical ith itsel!, and, in its complete e&ternalization and opposite, possesses the certaint$ o! itsel!A it is ,od mani!ested in the midst o! those ho kno themselves in the !orm o! pure kno ledge% 0P, 7>'1

End o! Chapter Eight

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