An Interim Report by the Citizens Commission On Benghazi
April 22, 2014
www.aim.org/benghazi
Media Contact: Vanessa Oblinger contact@jdcpubmail.com 2
Table of Contents
Key Takeaways 3 Summary of Findings 3 Freedom of Information Act Requests 7 Appendix (Primary Source Reporting) 22 Biographies of CCB Members 24 S Key Takeaways:
Since its initial September 2013 conference, the Citizens Commission on Benghazi has launched a months-long investigation into the causes and elements involved in the Benghazi, Libya attacks of September 11, 2012. This research, which involves interviews with several knowledgeable sources, has led the CCB to conclude that Muammar Qaddafi expressed his willingness to abdicate shortly after the beginning of the 2011 Libyan revolt, but the U.S. ignored his calls for a truce, which led to extensive loss of life (including four Americans), chaos, and detrimental outcomes for U.S. national security objectives across the region. The U.S. facilitated the delivery of weapons and military support to al Qaeda- linked rebels in Libya. On the day of the attacks in Benghazi, whether or not there was an official order to stand down, the result was the same. There were military assets, for example, at the U.S. base in Sigonella, in Sicily, Italy that could have been brought to bear, and perhaps could have saved the lives of the two men killed at the CIA Annex, the scene of the second attack that night. The failure to attempt to rescue these Americans amounts to a dereliction of duty. Previous investigations have been ineffective as the cover-up of Benghazi continues at all levels of government, prompting the need for a Select Committee with the power of subpoena to investigate this tragedy and compel testimony under oath outside the five-minute rule imposed on Congressional members by the current investigative structure.
Summary of Findings:
The war in Libya was unnecessary, served no articulable U.S. national security objective, and led to preventable chaos region-wide. In the period since the 2011 revolution in Libya, the country has remained fragmented, poorly governed, and overrun with violent militias, the majority of which are jihadist Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliates. Yet, at the time of his overthrow, Muammar Qaddafi was an ally of the United States in the Global War on Terror.
On 17 March 2011 the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1973 for a No Fly Zone, ostensibly to protect Libyan civilians caught up in the hostilities between Libyan government forces and the rebel forces, which were dominated by the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda. The following day in London, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced U.S. government support for the Brotherhood-led Libyan Transitional National Council in its revolt against Qaddafi.
4 The Citizens Commission on Benghazi (CCB) has discovered, however, that the ensuing civil war may well have been avoided, had the U.S. chosen to permit it. Within days of that declaration of U.S. government support for the Libyan rebels, Qaddafi sought to enter into negotiations with the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) under a flag of truce for the purpose of discussing his possible abdication and exile. On 21 March 2011, Rear Admiral (ret.) Chuck Kubic began email and telephone contact between Tripoli and AFRICOM Stuttgart regarding the possibility of talks under a white flag of truce. Over the following days, Qaddafi expressed interest in a truce, and possible abdication and exile out of Libya. He even pulled his forces back from several Libyan cities as a sign of good faith.
RADM Kubic telephoned LTC Brian Linvill, the U.S. AFRICOM point of contact for all military matters regarding the Libyan situation, to advise him of Qaddafis desire to enter into military-to-military discussions. General Carter Ham was advised immediately on 21 March 2011 of these communications and conveyed them up his chain of command to the Pentagon. After two days of back-and-forth with the Libyans, however, General Ham had received no positive affirmation of consent from Washington, D.C. to pursue Qaddafis offer. The war continued and ultimately cost tens of thousands of lives. The U.S. failure to even consider Qaddafis request for talks, and its determination to enter and pursue this war in support of al-Qaeda-linked rebels, presents the appearance of a policy intent upon empowering Islamic forces with no measurable benefit to U.S. national security.
Changing sides in the War on Terror: Even more disturbingly, the U.S. was fully aware of and facilitating the delivery of weapons to the al-Qaeda-dominated rebel militias throughout the 2011 rebellion. The jihadist agenda of AQIM, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and other Islamic terror groups represented among the rebel forces was well known to U.S. officials responsible for Libya policy. The rebels made no secret of their al-Qaeda affiliation, openly flying and speaking in front of the black flag of Islamic jihad, according to author John Rosenthal and multiple media reports. And yet, the White House and senior Congressional members deliberately and knowingly pursued a policy that provided material support to terrorist organizations in order to topple a ruler who had been working closely with the West actively to suppress al-Qaeda. The result in Libya, across much of North Africa, and beyond has been utter chaos, disruption of Libyas oil industry, the spread of dangerous weapons (including surface-to-air missiles), and the empowerment of jihadist organizations like al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Weapons Flow: An American citizen source trusted by the CCB who has long experience in the Middle East described the flow of weapons from Qatar to the Libyan rebels and the diversion of some of those arms. After Qaddafis regime had been ousted, S a delegation from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) traveled to Libya to collect payment for the weapons the UAE had financed and Qatar had delivered to the Transitional National Council (TNC) during the war. The UAE delegation was seeking $1 billion it claimed was owed. During their visit to Tripoli, the UAE officials discovered that half of the $1 billion worth of weapons it had financed for the rebels had, in fact, been diverted by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the Muslim Brotherhood head of the Libyan TNC, and sold to Qaddafi. Furthermore, according to information learned during the UAE visit to Tripoli, when Jalil learned that Major General Abdel Fatah Younis, Qaddafis former Minister of the Interior before his late February 2011 defection to the rebel forces, had found out about the weapons diversion, he ordered Abu Salim Abu Khattala, leader of the Abu Obeida Bin al-Jarrah brigade to kill him. Abu Khattala, later identified as the Ansar al- Shariah commander who led the 11 September 2012 attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, accepted the orders and directed the killing of Gen. Younis in July 2011.
The key significance of this episode is the demonstration of a military chain-of-command relationship between the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood leadership of the TNC and the al- Qaeda-affiliated militia (Ansar al-Shariah) that has been named responsible for the attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi. Abu Khattala is under a Department of Justice sealed indictment. His brigade merged into Ansar al-Shariah in 2012, and he was positively identified to the FBI in a cell-phone photo from the scene of the attack, yet remains free and available for interviews to the media.
The White House Cover-Up: Despite the several ongoing Congressional investigations, as well as the State Departments Accountability Review Board (ARB) report, the American people are no closer to knowing exactly what happened in Benghazi and why than they were on 12 September 2012. The Congressional committees have pursued their work in closed-door sessions as well as open testimony, but in a disjointed and uncoordinated fashion that has been stymied by administration stonewalling and the five- minute rule that severely curtails members ability to pursue a full and fair investigation. CCB members have signed two letters to Speaker John Boehner demanding the creation of a Select Committee to address these problems.
The CCB conducted an extensive research effort into the elements and sequence of the administrations two-week campaign to falsely claim that a protest had preceded the attack on our Benghazi mission, and their efforts to blame a YouTube video for the attack. The White House campaign appears to have been well-coordinated with U.S. Muslim Brotherhood organizations as well as Islamic state members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), who all joined in condemnation of the video, and, even more troubling, issued calls for restrictions on Americans free speech rights.
6 The FOIA Investigation: We have also begun our own investigation into the events surrounding September 11, 2012 through the use of the Freedom of Information Act request process. To date, Accuracy in Media and the CCB Members have filed 85 FOIA requests to the Department of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation. These requests can be seen at http://www.aim.org/benghazi/freedom-of-information-act-requests/. Major questions asked include requests to produce: [The] September 15th or 16th FBI 302 Interview Reports, and corresponding handwritten notes, of interviews conducted in Germany of United States personnel who had been in the Benghazi mission and the Benghazi CIA annex during the September 11th and 12th attacks on those facilities. Any and all videos depicting the United States Consulate in Benghazi, Libya (including the Special Mission Compound and the Annex) between September 10, 2012 and September 12, 2012. This request includes, but is not limited to (1) all videos and photographs obtained, transmitted, or recorded via any unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and (2) video of closed-circuit television monitor at the Benghazi Mission facility's Tactical Operations Center on September 11th and 12th, 2013. All records generated between September 11, 2012 and the present, by survivors of the September 11th and 12th attacks on the Benghazi mission and the Benghazi CIA Annex, or by any person regarding the survivors' accounts of the attack. Non-Disclosure Agreements signed by survivors of the Benghazi attacks, including employees or contractors of the CIA or DOD. 7 The CCB Freedom of Information Act Investigation The disjointed investigations by multiple House committees into the events of September 11, 2012 have yielded few new details regarding what occurred during the attack on the U.S. Mission and CIA Annex in Benghazi, Libya. What details have been uncovered are colored by partisanship due to the contentious nature of the two-party process. To uncover the truth about what happened that night, we have submitted 85 Freedom of Information Act requests to a variety of government agencies and departments.
Accuracy in Media, in conjunction with the CCB, has issued Freedom of Information requests to the Department of Defense, State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Central Intelligence Agency.
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!"#$"%&. This F0IA iequest is foi uisclosuie of iecoius iegaiuing the attack on 0S facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12. Specifically, we seek piouuction of:
/+(0&10. Recoius iegaiuing the ieauiness status of, anu oiueis given to, aiiboine special opeiations unit, "Commanueis In-extiemis Foice" ("CIF"), assigneu to the Euiopean Commanu, anu in Cioatia, incluuing: (a) 0iueis foi the CIF to ueploy to NAS Sigonella; anu (b) All communications fiom the CIF notifying commanu that it was ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, that aiiciaft was aiiboine, bounu foi NAS Sigonella, anu, if applicable, oiueis to aboit oi tuin back.
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!"#$"%&%. These F0IA iequests aie foi uisclosuie of iecoius iegaiuing the attack on 0S facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12. Specifically, we seek piouuction of:
1. 415(6"770. Recoius iuentifying, anu conceining, all 0S aiiciaft at NAT0 Base Sigonella, Naval Aii Station Sigonella in Sicily, Italy ("NAS Sigonella"), whethei tianspoit, caigo, iefueling, fightei, attack, oi suiveillance. Recoius shoulu incluue those that uisclose the ieauiness status of: ! Any F-16 anu F-18 fighteis (aka FA-18 - FighteiAttack); ! C-S, C-9, C-17, C-4u anu C-1Su tianspoit; ! C-2 caigo; C-26 passengeicaigo; ! KC-1u anu KC-1SS iefueling; anu ! P-S suiveillance.
2. Recoius uisclosing the ieauiness status of the 1Su-man Naiine Foice Reconnaissance Team at NAS Sigonella, incluuing: (a) All communications with, anu oiueis to, NAS Sigonella peisonnel to get ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, to ueploy, to Benghazi; anu (b) All communications fiom NAS Sigonella peisonnel notifying 8 commanu that assets weie ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, that aiiciaft was aiiboine, bounu foi Benghazi, anu, if applicable, oiueis to aboit oi tuin back.
S. !(&0. Recoius ievealing the status of two Naiine Coips "Fleet Antiteiioiism Secuiity Teams ("FAST"), at the Spanish naval base Naval Station Rota ("NAvSTA Rota"), incluuing: (a) All communications with, anu oiueis to, NAvSTA Rota peisonnel to get ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, to ueploy; anu (b) All communications fiom NAvSTA Rota peisonnel notifying commanu that assets weie ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, that aiiciaft was aiiboine, bounu foi Benghazi, anu, if applicable, oiueis to aboit oi tuin back.
4. 8171&0+- 0%%"&% 9+":9(%1&1(6"; 16 <=&(>"+ ?@AA. In auuition to iecoius iegaiuing the attack on 0S facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, we also seek iecoius iuentifying BoB assets pie-positioneu off the coast of Tiipoli on 0ctobei 18, 2u11, when Secietaiy Clinton visiteu Libya.
!"#$"%&% &( &)" *1+ B(+="
!"#$"%&%. These F0IA iequests aie foi uisclosuie of iecoius iegaiuing the attack on 0S facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12. Specifically, we seek piouuction of:
1. 415(6"770. Recoius iuentifying, anu conceining, all 0S aiiciaft at NAT0 Base Sigonella, Naval Aii Station Sigonella in Sicily, Italy ("NAS Sigonella"), whethei tianspoit, caigo, iefueling, fightei, attack, oi suiveillance. Recoius shoulu incluue those that uisclose the ieauiness status of: ! Any F-16 anu F-18 fighteis (aka FA-18 - FighteiAttack); ! C-S, C-9, C-17, C-4u anu C-1Su tianspoit; ! C-2 caigo; C-26 passengeicaigo; ! KC-1u anu KC-1SS iefueling; anu ! P-S suiveillance.
2. Recoius uisclosing the ieauiness status of the 1Su-man Naiine Foice Reconnaissance Team at NAS Sigonella, incluuing: (a) All communications with, anu oiueis to, NAS Sigonella peisonnel to get ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, to ueploy; anu (b) All communications fiom NAS Sigonella peisonnel notifying commanu that assets weie ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, that aiiciaft was aiiboine, bounu foi Benghazi, anu, if applicable, oiueis to aboit oi tuin back.
S. CB""& ;+- (3"+ D1>-0C +0;1( &+06%,1%%1(6. Any iecoiu of tiansmission fiom any aiiciaft uuiing the ciisis that stateu, "Feet uiy ovei Libya," oi woius to that effect, infoiming that aiiciaft was tiansitioning fiom above the Neuiteiianean Sea to above the Libyan lanumass.
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9 B<E* !"#$"%&. The iequesteis seek uisclosuie of iecoius iuentifying all 0S aiiciaft at Aviano Aii Base in noitheastein Italy on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12, incluuing all 0.S. Aii Foice S1st Fightei Wing assets, whethei tianspoit, caigo, iefueling, fightei, attack, oi suiveillance.
!"#$"%&% &( &)" 80+16"%
!"#$"%&%. These F0IA iequests aie foi uisclosuie of iecoius iegaiuing the attack on 0S facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12. Specifically, we seek piouuction of:
1. 415(6"770. Recoius uisclosing the ieauiness status of the 1Su-man Naiine Foice Reconnaissance Team at NAS Sigonella, incluuing: (a) All communications with, anu oiueis to, NAS Sigonella peisonnel to get ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, to ueploy, to Benghazi; anu (b) All communications fiom NAS Sigonella peisonnel notifying commanu that assets weie ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, that aiiciaft was aiiboine, bounu foi Benghazi, anu, if applicable, oiueis to aboit oi tuin back.
2. Any iecoius of the Bepaitment of Befense seeking help by use of Italian aiiciaft at NAS Sigonella.
S. !(&0. Recoius ievealing the status of two Naiine Coips "Fleet Antiteiioiism Secuiity Teams ("FAST"), at the Spanish naval base Naval Station Rota ("NAvSTA Rota"), incluuing: (a) All communications with, anu oiueis to, NAvSTA Rota peisonnel to get ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, to ueploy; anu (b) All communications fiom NAvSTA Rota peisonnel notifying commanu that assets weie ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, that aiiciaft was aiiboine, anu, if applicable, oiueis to aboit oi tuin back.
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!"#$"%&%. These F0IA iequests aie foi uisclosuie of iecoius iegaiuing the attack on 0S facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12. Specifically, we seek piouuction of:
1. 415(6"770. Recoius iuentifying, anu conceining, all 0S aiiciaft at NAT0 Base Sigonella, Naval Aii Station Sigonella in Sicily, Italy ("NAS Sigonella"), whethei tianspoit, caigo, iefueling, fightei, attack, oi suiveillance. Recoius shoulu incluue those that uisclose the ieauiness status of: ! Any F-16 anu F-18 fighteis (aka FA-18 - FighteiAttack); ! C-S, C-9, C-17, C-4u anu C-1Su tianspoit; ! C-2 caigo; C-26 passengeicaigo; ! KC-1u anu KC-1SS iefueling; anu ! P-S suiveillance.
2. Recoius uisclosing the ieauiness status of the 1Su-man Naiine Foice Reconnaissance Team at NAS Sigonella, incluuing: (a) All communications with, anu oiueis to, NAS Sigonella peisonnel to get ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, to ueploy, to Benghazi; anu (b) All communications fiom NAS Sigonella peisonnel notifying 1u commanu that assets weie ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, that aiiciaft was aiiboine, bounu foi Benghazi, anu, if applicable, oiueis to aboit oi tuin back.
S. Any iecoius of the Bepaitment of Befense seeking help by use of Italian aiiciaft at NAS Sigonella.
4. !(&0. Recoius ievealing the status of two Naiine Coips Fleet Antiteiioiism Secuiity Teams ("FAST"), at the Spanish naval base Naval Station Rota ("NAvSTA Rota"), incluuing: (a) All communications with, anu oiueis to, NAvSTA Rota peisonnel to get ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, to ueploy; anu (b) All communications fiom NAvSTA Rota peisonnel notifying commanu that assets weie ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, that aiiciaft was aiiboine, anu, if applicable, oiueis to aboit oi tuin back.
S. /+(0&10. Recoius iegaiuing the ieauiness status of, anu oiueis given to, aiiboine special opeiations unit, "Commanueis In-extiemis Foice" ("CIF"), assigneu to the Euiopean Commanu, anu in Cioatia, incluuing: (a) 0iueis foi the CIF to ueploy to NAS Sigonella; anu (b) All communications fiom the CIF notifying commanu that it was ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, that aiiciaft was aiiboine, bounu foi NAS Sigonella, anu, if applicable, oiueis to aboit oi tuin back.
6. 809%. Naps uepicting all assets that coulu have been uispatcheu to the Benghazi mission oi the CIA annex facility on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12, iegaiuless of such maps weie cieateu befoie oi aftei Septembei 11, 2u12.
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This F0IA iequest is foi uisclosuie of iecoius iegaiuing the attack on 0S facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12. Specifically, we seek piouuction of:
Naps uepicting all assets that coulu have been uispatcheu to the Benghazi mission oi the CIA annex facility on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12, iegaiuless of such maps weie cieateu befoie oi aftei Septembei 11, 2u12.
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!"#$"%&%. These F0IA iequests aie foi uisclosuie of iecoius iegaiuing the attack on 0S facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12. Specifically, we seek piouuction of:
1. *B!E/<8 =(,,$61=0&1(6%. All iecoius of AFRIC0N }oint 0peiations Centei (}0C) Chief's communications subsequent to that 0fficei's ieceipt of messages emanating fiom the Compounu's T0C. This iequest is to be ieau to incluue all communications to all 0S peisonnel, whethei aimeu foices oi civilians, anu incluues communications to ueneial Caitei Bam, the 0nifieu Combatant Commanu, the Pentagon, CIA, Bepaitment of State, anu White Bouse incluuing the Situation Room.
2. *99"07% L(+ )"79. Recoius of iequests foi help foi peisonnel at the Special Nission Compounu anu the CIA Annex, to: (a) The Tuikish Consulate in Benghazi; 11 (b) The Italian Consulate in Benghazi; anu (c) The 0.K. Secuiity Team.
S. 809%. Naps uepicting all assets that coulu have been uispatcheu to the Benghazi mission oi the CIA annex facility on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12, iegaiuless of such maps weie cieateu befoie oi aftei Septembei 11, 2u12.
4. *$;1(. All iecoius of iauio communications emanating fiom the Compounu's Tactical 0peiations Centei (T0C), on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12, whethei maue by Regional Secuiity 0fficei (RS0) Alec Benueison oi any othei peison.
S. CB""& ;+- (3"+ D1>-0C +0;1( &+06%,1%%1(6. Any iecoiu of tiansmission fiom any aiiciaft uuiing the ciisis that stateu, "Feet uiy ovei Libya," oi woius to that effect, infoiming that aiiciaft was tiansitioning fiom above the Neuiteiianean Sea to above the Libyan lanumass.
6. 8171&0+- 0%%"&% 9+":9(%1&1(6"; 16 <=&(>"+ ?@AA. In auuition to iecoius iegaiuing the attack on 0S facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, we also seek iecoius iuentifying BoB assets pie-positioneu off the coast of Tiipoli on 0ctobei 18, 2u11, when Secietaiy Clinton visiteu Libya.
!"#$"%&%. These F0IA iequests aie foi uisclosuie of iecoius iegaiuing the attack on 0S facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12. Specifically, we seek piouuction of:
1. !(&0. Recoius ievealing the status of two Naiine Coips Fleet Antiteiioiism Secuiity Teams ("FAST"), at the Spanish naval base Naval Station Rota ("NAvSTA Rota"), incluuing: (a) All communications with, anu oiueis to, NAvSTA Rota peisonnel to get ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, to ueploy, to Benghazi; anu (b) All communications fiom NAvSTA Rota peisonnel notifying commanu that assets weie ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, that aiiciaft was aiiboine, bounu foi Benghazi, anu, if applicable, oiueis to aboit oi tuin back.
2. /+(0&10. Recoius iegaiuing the ieauiness status of, anu oiueis given to, aiiboine special opeiations unit, "Commanueis In-extiemis Foice" ("CIF"), assigneu to the Euiopean Commanu, anu in Cioatia, incluuing: (a) 0iueis foi the CIF to ueploy to NAS Sigonella; anu (b) All communications fiom the CIF notifying commanu that it was ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, that aiiciaft was aiiboine, bounu foi NAS Sigonella, anu, if applicable, oiueis to aboit oi tuin back.
S. H61&"; 4&0&"%. Recoius uisclosing the ieauiness status of, anu oiueis given to, Special 0peiations Foices ("Special 0ps" oi "S0F") in the 0niteu States, incluuing: (a) 0iueis foi Special 0ps to ueploy to Libya; anu (b) Communications fiom S0F notifying commanu that it was ieauy to ueploy, anu, if applicable, that aiiciaft was aiiboine, bounu foi Libya, anu, if applicable, oiueis to aboit oi tuin back.
12 4. CB""& ;+- (3"+ D1>-0C +0;1( &+06%,1%%1(6. Any iecoiu of tiansmission fiom any aiiciaft uuiing the ciisis that stateu, "Feet uiy ovei Libya," oi woius to that effect, infoiming that aiiciaft was tiansitioning fiom above the Neuiteiianean Sea to above the Libyan lanumass.
!"#$"%&%. F0IA iequest Nos. 1, 2 anu S aie foi uisclosuie of iecoius iegaiuing the attack on 0S facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12. Specifically, we seek piouuction of:
1. 809%. Naps uepicting all assets that coulu have been uispatcheu to the Benghazi mission oi the CIA annex facility on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12, iegaiuless of such maps weie cieateu befoie oi aftei Septembei 11, 2u12.
2. *99"07% L(+ )"79. Recoius of iequests foi help foi the Special Nission Compounu anu the CIA Annex, to: (a) The Tuikish Consulate in Benghazi; (b) The Italian Consulate in Benghazi; anu (c) The 0.K. Secuiity Team.
S. Recoius conceining P(16& ,171&0+- =(6&165"6=- 9706%: (a) Plan Iuentification (PIB) Numbei anu title of the opeiation plan oi plans piepaieu using Belibeiate Planning pioceuuies, founu in }oint Publication S-u, }oint 0peiation Plan, August 2u11, L(+ $%" by the suppoiteu combatant commanuei (1) to suppoit militaiy, uiplomatic anu inteiagency activities in LibyaQ thiough 2u12, anu (2) to suppoit the militaiy ciisis iesponse to the attacks on the Benghazi facilities on Septembei 11 anu 12, 2u12. (b) 0peiation plan oi plans foi use by the suppoiteu combatant commanuei to suppoit militaiy ciisis iesponse to the attacks on the Benghazi facilities on Septembei 11 anu 12, 2u12. (c) List of commanus, oiganizations anu agencies compiising the joint planning anu execution community (}PEC), founu in }oint Publication S-u, }oint 0peiation Plan, August 2u11, which uevelopeu, cooiuinateu, anu appioveu the opeiation plans iefeiieu to unuei (a) above. (u) Suppoiteu combatant commanuei's }oint Intelligence Piepaiation of the 0peiational Enviionment (}IP0E), uevelopeu to suppoit the plans iefeienceu unuei (a) above. (e) List of commanus, oiganizations, agencies anu offices compiising the suppoiteu combatant commanuei's joint inteiagency cooiuinating gioup (}IACu), establisheu to suppoit the plans iefeienceu unuei (a) above. (f) Copies of any combatant commanu commeicial contiacts establisheu to suppoit militaiy, uiplomatic anu inteiagency activities at Tiipoli anu at Benghazi piioi to the attacks on the Benghazi facilities on Septembei 11 anu 12, 2u12.
4. 8171&0+- 0%%"&% 9+":9(%1&1(6"; 16 <=&(>"+ ?@AA. In auuition to iecoius iegaiuing the attack on 0S facilities in Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, we also seek iecoius iuentifying BoB assets pie-positioneu off the coast of Tiipoli on 0ctobei 18, 2u11, when Secietaiy Clinton visiteu Libya. 1S
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1. 809%. Naps uepicting all assets within fifteen hunuieu miles of Benghazi, Libya, on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12, iegaiuless of such maps weie cieateu befoie oi aftei Septembei 11, 2u12.
2. 8171&0+- 0%%"&% 9+":9(%1&1(6"; 16 <=&(>"+ ?@AA. Recoius of all Befense Bepaitment assets that weie pie-positioneu off the coast of Tiipoli on 0ctobei 18, 2u11, when Secietaiy Clinton visiteu Libya.
S. R"++(+1%& &)+"0& 16 ?@A?. Foi the calenuai yeai 2u12, iecoius of the thieat to 0.S. peisonnel because of al-Qaiua oi Ansai al-Shaiiah oi othei belligeient builu-up in Benghazi, incluuing photogiaphs.
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FOIA Requests. These requests are for the following records of activities in Libya, in the care, custody or control of the State Department, regardless of the source of the records:
1. All records of whatsoever nature regarding (1) the Benghazi consulate and (2) its CIA Annex, for the time period of January 1st, 2011, through September 30th, 2012. This request is all-inclusive for all records, however recorded, including emails, reports, memoranda, correspondence, teletypes, telephone calls, text messages, and audio and video recordings, regarding all uses of the Benghazi consulate and CIA Annex. Responsive records include those that disclose:
(1) The comings and goings of all persons, whether civilian, military, American or foreign, including any non-US personnel questioned, interrogated, detained, or transported through, the CIA Annex and Benghazi consulate; (2) The descriptions and inventories of all weapons brought into the Annex; (3) The sources of all such weapons; (4) The descriptions and inventories of all weapons removed from the Annex, (5) The intended destinations and recipients of all such weaponry, including (i) All transfers of arms and equipment to Libyan resistance fighters, both before or after the United Nations recognized the National Transitional Council as the legal representative of Libya; (ii) Transportation of arms and equipment from Libya into Turkey; and (iii) US Government supply of weapons into Syria. (6) All communication and cryptographic equipment at the CIA Annex and Benghazi consulate; (7) The weaponry, communication, and cryptographic equipment, that may have been left in the Annex and Benghazi consulate when US personnel abandoned these facilities on September 11th and 12th, 2012; (8) Information about the weapons recovered from fallen attackers at the Ambassador's compound as well as the CIA Annex during and after the attacks; 14 (9) Information about the identities and affiliations of any of those fallen fighters as well as the disposition of their bodies, alive or dead; and (10) CIA situation reports, or "sitreps," sent, including on September 11th, 12th, and 13th.
2. Any anu all viueos uepicting the 0niteu States Consulate in Benghazi, Libya (incluuing the Special Nission Compounu anu the Annex) between Septembei 1u, 2u12 anu Septembei 12, 2u12. This iequest incluues, but is not limiteu to (1) all viueos anu photogiaphs obtaineu, tiansmitteu, oi iecoiueu via any unmanneu aeiial vehicles (0Avs), anu (2) viueo of closeu-ciicuit television monitoi at the Benghazi Nission facility's Tactical 0peiations Centei on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u1S.
S. All iecoius geneiateu between Septembei 11, 2u12 anu the piesent, by suivivois of the Septembei 11th anu 12th attacks on the Benghazi mission anu the Benghazi CIA Annex, oi by any peison iegaiuing the suivivois' accounts of the attack.
4. All iecoius of iauio communications emanating fiom the Compounu's Tactical 0peiations Centei (T0C), on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12, whethei maue by Regional Secuiity 0fficei (RS0) Alec Benueison oi any othei peison.
S. All iecoius of Secietaiy Panetta's actions anu communications foi the 24- houi peiiou beginning when fiist notifieu that the Benghazi Consulate was unuei attack. Responsive iecoius incluue: (1) All iecoius geneiateu by Secietaiy Panetta, incluuing all emails, memoianua, oi notes; (2) Telephone logs oi bills oi othei statements of all of his telephone calls placeu oi ieceiveu; anu (S) All iecoius geneiateu by anyone about the Secietaiy's actions anu communications
6. All iecoius of Secietaiy Clinton's actions anu communications foi the 24- houi peiiou beginning when fiist notifieu that the Benghazi Consulate was unuei attack. Responsive iecoius incluue: (1) All iecoius geneiateu by Secietaiy Clinton, incluuing all emails, memoianua, oi notes; (2) Telephone logs oi bills oi othei statements of all of hei telephone calls placeu oi ieceiveu; anu (S) All iecoius geneiateu by anyone about the Secietaiy's actions anu communications.
7. Any iecoius ieflecting the time, anu substance, of the Piesiuent's fiist notification that the Benghazi Consulate was unuei attack, anu his actions, anu communications, foi the next 24 houis.
8. All calenuais, uay books, jouinals, notes, memoianua, oi othei iecoius ieflecting Ambassauoi Stevens' scheuule on Septembei 11, 2u12, incluuing the Ambassauoi's uiaiy, anu all coiiesponuence to oi fiom the Ambassauoi iegaiuing his meetings that uay, incluuing with the Tuikish Consul ueneial.
9. All iecoius of the puipose of Ambassauoi Stevens' meetings on Septembei 11, 2u12, incluuing analysis oi assessments of those meetings, whethei wiitten befoie oi aftei Septembei 11, 2u12.
1S 1u. All coiiesponuence to oi fiom Ambassauoi Stevens on Septembei 1uth anu 11th, 2u12.
11. All notes, memoianua, anu coiiesponuence geneiateu between }anuaiy of 2uu7 anu Septembei 11, 2u12, iegaiuing meetings between Chiistophei Stevens oi any othei Tiipoli Embassy official, anu one oi moie of the following inuiviuuals: ! *),"; *>$ S)0&&070, a commanuei of the Libyan Ansai al- Shaiiah militia gioup ! 8$%&0L0 *>;$7 O0717, Chaiiman of the Libyan National Tiansitional Council fiom S Naich 2u11-8 August 2u12 ! 80),($; O1>+17, Inteiim Piime Ninistei of Libya anu Chaii of the Executive Boaiu of the National Tiansitional Council fiom S\ Naich-2S 0ctobei 2u11 ! T1%%0, >16 F0,1;, a Libya Shielu Biigaue commanuei, suppoitei of the Libyan Nuslim Biotheihoou }ustice & Constiuction Paity, anu veteian jihau fightei of Iiaq & Afghanistan, who pioviueu secuiity foi 0S iepiesentatives in Benghazi anu was tentatively iuentifieu by the Libiaiy of Congiess as the heau of al-Qa'eua in Libya ! *>;"7)0U1, V"7)0;P (aka Abuallah al Saueq), veteian jihau fightei of Iiaq & Afghanistan, commanuei of the AQ fianchise militia, Libyan Islamic Fighting uioup (LIFu) (aka Libyan Islamic Novement foi Change), post-ievolution militaiy commanuei of Tiipoli, anu Libyan uelegation leauei to the Syiian Fiee Aimy in late 2u11 ! E%,0"7 07:40770>1 (biothei of Ali), commanuei of the Al-Qa'eua- linkeu al-Sahati Biigaue uuiing the ievolution, anu Benghazi Nilitaiy Council commanuei afteiwaius, close ally of Abuelhakim Belhauj anu Nustafa }alil ! *71 07:40770>1 (biothei of Ismael), calleu the 'spiiitual leauei' of the Libyan ievolution, Nuslim Biotheihoou links, leu effoit with Seif al-Qauuafi anu 0S Embassy Tiipoli to gain ielease of jihaui uetainees fiom Libyan jails ! 8()0,,0; 07:40770>1, fathei of Ali anu Ismael, among the founueis of the Libyan Nuslim Biotheihoou in the 196us ! *>$ 4$L106 >16 G$,$, veteian jihau fightei in Afghanistan fiom Beina, Libya, captuieu in 2uu1, uetaineu at uITN0, sent back to Libyan jail, ieleaseu in 2u1u, leu jihau vs Qauuafi in 2u11, anu leu Benghazi Nission attack in Sep 2u12.
12. Foi the peiiou of Febiuaiy 1Sth, 2u11, thiough Becembei S1st, 2u12, all B0B anu CIA oi othei intelligence community iecoius, shaieu with membeis of Congiess, iegaiuing collection, stoiage, tianspoitation of aims anu equipment in Libya.
1S. Foi the peiiou of Febiuaiy 1Sth, 2u11, thiough Becembei S1st, 2u12, all B0B anu CIA oi othei intelligence community iecoius of Congiessional appioval foi CIA tianspoit of aims to Syiian iebel foices.
14. All iecoius iegaiuing Beputy National Secuiity Auvisei foi Bomelanu Secuiity anu Countei-teiioiism }ohn Biennan's iecommenuations iegaiuing the oveithiow of Libyan leauei Nuammai uauuafi.
1S. Recoius of the names, anu titles, of inuiviuuals inuentifieu only as "Senioi 16 State Bepaitment 0fficial Numbei 0ne" anu "Senioi State Bepaitment 0fficial Numbei Two" uuiing the 0ctobei 9, 2u12, Backgiounu Biiefing on Libya, given by the 0ffice of the Spokespeison, the tiansciipt of which was publicly uiscloseu, titleu, "Backgiounu Confeience Call With Senioi State Bepaitment 0fficials."
*;;1&1(607 !"#$"%&% &( &)" 4&0&" M"90+&,"6&
1. Recoius geneiateu fiom August 2uu9, thiough 0ctobei of 2u11, iegaiuing Secietaiy of State Clinton's iecommenuations iegaiuing 0.S. suppoit to those seeking to oust foices loyal to Colonel Nuammai uauuafi anu his goveinment. 2. Recoius geneiateu fiom Naich of 2u11 thiough Septembei of 2u12, iegaiuing Secietaiy of State Clinton's iecommenuations to suppoit those seeking to oust foices loyal to the goveinment of Bashai al-Assau! S. Recoius of communications sent fiom, ieceiveu by, oi iouteu thiough, Secietaiy Clinton's office iegaiuing the neeu foi a 'peimanent constituent post" in Benghazi, as well as iecoius iegaiuing Secietaiy of State Clinton's uecision to continue opeiations in Benghazi, incluuing the extent to which the Benghazi Nission in any way facilitateu the existence anu opeiations of the CIA Annex. 4. Recoius inuentifying BoB assets pie-positioneu off the coast of Tiipoli when Secietaiy Clinton visiteu Libya in 0ctobei of 2u11. S. Recoius geneiateu fiom Secietaiy Clinton's Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12 iequests foi help foi peisonnel at the Special Nission Compounu anu the CIA Annex, to: (a) The Libyan goveinment; (b) The Tuikish Consulate in Benghazi; (c) The Italian Consulate in Benghazi; anu (u) The 0.K. Secuiity Team.
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1. All iecoius uesciibing oi uefining the puipose, scope, juiisuiction, anu powei of the FBI's investigation into the Benghazi attacks, incluuing the iuentity of goveinment official(s) iequesting oi oiueiing the piobe.
2. All iecoius of the Buieau's finuings in its investigation into the Benghazi attacks. Responsive iecoius incluue those that iegaiu (1) the iuentities of any non-0S peisonnel questioneu, inteiiogateu, uetaineu, oi tianspoiteu thiough, the Annex, (2) weapons biought into, anu iemoveu fiom, the Annex, as well as such weaponiy's uestinations incluuing whethei abanuoneu on Septembei 12, 2u12, (S) communication anu ciyptogiaphic equipment left in the Consulate anu Annex when 0S peisonnel abanuoneu the facilities on Septembei 12, 2u12, anu (4) any piobe into the meetings fiom }anuaiy 2uu7 thiough Septembei 2u12 between Tiipoli Embassy officials, incluuing Chiistophei Stevens, anu the inuiviuuals iuentifieu in the following Request S below.
S. All notes, memoianua, anu coiiesponuence geneiateu between }anuaiy of 2uu7 anu Septembei 11, 2u12, iegaiuing meetings between Chiistophei Stevens oi any othei Tiipoli Embassy official, anu one oi moie of the following inuiviuuals: ! *),"; *>$ S)0&&070, a commanuei of the Libyan Ansai al- Shaiiah militia gioup ! 8$%&0L0 *>;$7 O0717, Chaiiman of the Libyan National Tiansitional Council fiom S Naich 2u11-8 August 2u12 17 ! 80),($; O1>+17, Inteiim Piime Ninistei of Libya anu Chaii of \ the Executive Boaiu of the National Tiansitional Council fiom S Naich-2S 0ctobei 2u11 ! T1%%0, >16 F0,1;, a Libya Shielu Biigaue commanuei, suppoitei of the Libyan Nuslim Biotheihoou }ustice & Constiuction Paity, anu veteian jihau fightei of Iiaq & Afghanistan, who pioviueu secuiity foi 0S iepiesentatives in Benghazi anu was tentatively iuentifieu by the Libiaiy of Congiess as the heau of al-Qa'eua in Libya ! *>;"7)0U1, V"7)0;P (aka Abuallah al Saueq), veteian jihau fightei of Iiaq & Afghanistan, commanuei of the AQ fianchise militia, Libyan Islamic Fighting uioup (LIFu) (aka Libyan Islamic Novement foi Change), post-ievolution militaiy commanuei of Tiipoli, anu Libyan uelegation leauei to the Syiian Fiee Aimy in late 2u11 ! E%,0"7 07:40770>1 (biothei of Ali), commanuei of the Al-Qa'eua- linkeu al-Sahati Biigaue uuiing the ievolution, anu Benghazi Nilitaiy Council commanuei afteiwaius, close ally of Abuelhakim Belhauj anu Nustafa }alil S ! *71 07:40770>1 (biothei of Ismael), calleu the 'spiiitual leauei' of the Libyan ievolution, Nuslim Biotheihoou links, leu effoit with Seif al- Qauuafi anu 0S Embassy Tiipoli to gain ielease of jihaui uetainees fiom Libyan jails ! 8()0,,0; 07:40770>1, fathei of Ali anu Ismael, among the founueis of the Libyan Nuslim Biotheihoou in the 196us ! *>$ 4$L106 >16 G$,$, veteian jihau fightei in Afghanistan fiom Beina, Libya, captuieu in 2uu1, uetaineu at uITN0, sent back to Libyan jail, ieleaseu in 2u1u, leu jihau vs Qauuafi in 2u11, anu leu Benghazi Nission attack in Sep 2u12.
4. Any othei iecoius of whatsoevei natuie iegaiuing (1) the Benghazi consulate anu (2) its CIA Annex, foi the time peiiou of }anuaiy 1st, 2u11, thiough Septembei Suth, 2u12. This iequest is all-inclusive foi all iecoius, howevei iecoiueu, incluuing emails, iepoits, memoianua, coiiesponuence, teletypes, telephone calls, text messages, anu auuio anu viueo iecoiuings, iegaiuing all uses of the Benghazi consulate anu CIA Annex.
S. All iecoius geneiateu between Septembei 11, 2u12 anu the piesent, by suivivois of the Septembei 11th anu 12th attacks on the Benghazi mission anu the Benghazi CIA Annex, oi by any peison iegaiuing the suivivois' accounts of the attack.
6. All calenuais, uay books, jouinals, notes, memoianua, oi othei iecoius ieflecting Ambassauoi Stevens' scheuule on Septembei 11, 2u12, incluuing the Ambassauoi's uiaiy, anu all coiiesponuence to oi fiom the Ambassauoi iegaiuing his meetings that uay, incluuing with the Tuikish Consul ueneial.
7. All iecoius of the puipose of Ambassauoi Stevens' meetings on Septembei 11, 2u12, incluuing analysis oi assessments of those meetings, whethei wiitten befoie oi aftei Septembei 11, 2u12.
8. Septembei 1Sth oi 16th FBI Su2 Inteiview Repoits, anu coiiesponuing hanuwiitten notes, of inteiviews conuucteu in ueimany of 0niteu States peisonnel who hau been in the Benghazi mission anu the Benghazi CIA annex uuiing the Septembei 11th anu 12th attacks on those facilities. 4
18 9. Recoius of the viueo teleconfeience on the afteinoon of the Septembei 16th, 2u12, between the FBI anu othei IC officials in Washington, iegaiuing FBI inteiviews with 0.S. peisonnel who hau been on the compounus in Benghazi uuiing the attack. Foi youi iefeience, the following is an exceipt fiom the Becembei Su, 2u12, Senate Committee 0n Bomelanu Secuiity Anu uoveinmental Affaiis, "Flashing Reu: A Special Repoit 0n The Teiioiist Attack At Benghazi:"
0n Septembei 1Sth anu 16th, officials fiom the FBI conuucteu face-to-face inteiviews in ueimany of the 0.S. peisonnel who hau been on the compounu in Benghazi uuiing the attack. The 0.S. peisonnel who weie inteivieweu saw no inuications that theie hau been a piotest piioi to the attack. Infoimation fiom those inteiviews was shaieu on a secuie viueo teleconfeience on the afteinoon of the 16th with FBI anu othei IC officials in Washington; it is uncleai whethei the question of whethei a piotest took place was uiscusseu uuiing this viueo confeience.
1u. Complete Autopsy Repoits of each of the victims of the Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12, Benghazi attacks of the Ambassauoi's compounu, anu the CIA Annex.
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B<E* !"#$"%&%. These iequests aie foi the following iecoius of activities in Libya, in the caie, custouy oi contiol of the Cential Intelligence Agency, iegaiuless of the souice of the iecoius:
1. All iecoius of whatsoevei natuie iegaiuing (1) the Benghazi Special Nission Compounu oi "Ambassauoi's compounu" oi "Benghazi Nission" anu (2) the CIA Annex, foi the time peiiou of }anuaiy 1st, 2u11, thiough Septembei Suth, 2u12. This iequest is all-inclusive foi all iecoius, howevei iecoiueu, incluuing emails, iepoits, memoianua, coiiesponuence, teletypes, telephone calls, text messages, anu auuio anu viueo iecoiuings, iegaiuing all uses of the Benghazi Nission anu the CIA Annex. Responsive iecoius incluue those that uisclose:
(1) The comings anu goings of all peisons, whethei civilian, militaiy, Ameiican oi foieign, incluuing any non-0S peisonnel questioneu, inteiiogateu, uetaineu, oi tianspoiteu thiough, the CIA Annex anu Benghazi Nission; (2) The uesciiptions anu inventoiies of all weapons biought into the Annex, incluuing small aims, ammunition, anu man-poitable aii uefense systems, oi Nanpaus, anu missiles; (S) The souices of all such weapons; (4) The uesciiptions anu inventoiies of all weapons iemoveu fiom the Annex, (S) The intenueu uestinations anu iecipients of all such weaponiy, incluuing (i) All tiansfeis of aims anu equipment to Libyan iesistance fighteis, both befoie oi aftei the 0niteu Nations iecognizeu the National Tiansitional Council as the legal iepiesentative of Libya; (ii) Tianspoitation of aims out of Libya, bounu foi Syiia, thoiough Tuikey, Qatai, Sauui Aiabia, Qatai, oi }oiuan; (6) All communication anu ciyptogiaphic equipment at the CIA Annex anu Benghazi Nission; (7) The weaponiy, communication, ciyptogiaphic equipment, anu 19 electionic oi papei files, left in the Annex anu Benghazi Nission when 0S peisonnel abanuoneu these facilities on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12; (8) Infoimation about the weapons iecoveieu fiom fallen attackeis at the Ambassauoi's compounu as well as the CIA Annex uuiing anu aftei the attacks; (9) Infoimation about the iuentities anu affiliations of any of those fallen fighteis as well as the uisposition of theii bouies, alive oi ueau; anu (1u) CIA situation iepoits, oi "sitieps," sent, incluuing on Septembei 11th, 12th, anu 1Sth.
2. Any anu all viueos uepicting the 0niteu States Nission in Benghazi, Libya (incluuing the Special Nission Compounu anu the CIA Annex) between Septembei 1u, 2u12 anu Septembei 12, 2u12. This iequest incluues, but is not limiteu to (1) all viueos anu photogiaphs obtaineu, tiansmitteu, oi iecoiueu via any unmanneu aeiial vehicles (0Avs), anu (2) viueo of closeu-ciicuit television monitoi at the Benghazi Nission facility's Tactical 0peiations Centei on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u1S.
S. All iecoius geneiateu between Septembei 11, 2u12 anu the piesent, by suivivois of the Septembei 11th anu 12th attacks on the Benghazi mission anu the Benghazi CIA Annex, oi by any peison iegaiuing the suivivois' accounts of the attack.
4. All iecoius of iauio communications emanating fiom the Compounu's Tactical 0peiations Centei (T0C), on Septembei 11th anu 12th, 2u12, whethei maue by Regional Secuiity 0fficei (RS0) Alec Benueison oi any othei peison.
S. All iecoius of CIA Biiectoi Baviu Petiaeus' actions anu communications foi the 24-houi peiiou beginning when fiist notifieu that the Benghazi Nission was unuei attack. Responsive iecoius incluue: (1) All iecoius geneiateu by Biiectoi Petiaeus, incluuing all emails, memoianua, oi notes; (2) Telephone logs oi bills oi othei statements of all of his telephone calls placeu oi ieceiveu; anu (S) All iecoius geneiateu by anyone about the CIA Biiectoi's actions anu communications.
6. All iecoius of Beputy CIA Biiectoi Nichael Noiell actions anu communications foi the 24-houi peiiou beginning when fiist notifieu that the Benghazi Nission was unuei attack. Responsive iecoius incluue: (1) All iecoius geneiateu by Beputy CIA Biiectoi Noiell, incluuing all emails, memoianua, oi notes; (2) Telephone logs oi bills oi othei statements of all of his telephone calls placeu oi ieceiveu; anu (S) All iecoius geneiateu by anyone about the CIA Beputy Biiectoi's actions anu communications.
7. Any iecoius ieflecting the time, anu substance, of the Piesiuent's fiist notification that the Benghazi Nission was unuei attack, anu his actions, anu communications, foi the next 24 houis.
8. All calenuais, uay books, jouinals, notes, memoianua, oi othei iecoius 2u ieflecting Ambassauoi Stevens' scheuule on Septembei 11, 2u12, incluuing the Ambassauoi's uiaiy, anu all coiiesponuence to oi fiom the Ambassauoi iegaiuing his meetings that uay, incluuing with the Tuikish Consul ueneial.
9. All iecoius of the puipose of Ambassauoi Stevens' meetings on Septembei 11, 2u12, incluuing analysis oi assessments of those meetings, whethei wiitten befoie oi aftei Septembei 11, 2u12.
1u. All coiiesponuence to oi fiom Ambassauoi Stevens on Septembei 1uth anu 11th, 2u12.
11. All notes, memoianua, anu coiiesponuence geneiateu between }anuaiy of 2uu7 anu Septembei 11, 2u12, iegaiuing meetings between Chiistophei Stevens oi any othei Tiipoli Embassy official, anu one oi moie of the following inuiviuuals: ! *),"; *>$ S)0&&070, a commanuei of the Libyan Ansai al- Shaiiah militia gioup ! 8$%&0L0 *>;$7 O0717, Chaiiman of the Libyan National Tiansitional Council fiom S Naich 2u11-8 August 2u12 ! 80),($; O1>+17, Inteiim Piime Ninistei of Libya anu Chaii of the Executive Boaiu of the National Tiansitional Council fiom S\ Naich-2S 0ctobei 2u11 ! T1%%0, >16 F0,1;, a Libya Shielu Biigaue commanuei, suppoitei of the Libyan Nuslim Biotheihoou }ustice & Constiuction Paity, anu veteian jihau fightei of Iiaq & Afghanistan, who pioviueu secuiity foi 0S iepiesentatives in Benghazi anu was tentatively iuentifieu by the Libiaiy of Congiess as the heau of al-Qa'eua in Libya ! *>;"7)0U1, V"7)0;P (aka Abuallah al Saueq), veteian jihau fightei of Iiaq & Afghanistan, commanuei of the AQ fianchise militia, Libyan Islamic Fighting uioup (LIFu) (aka Libyan Islamic Novement foi Change), post-ievolution militaiy commanuei of Tiipoli, anu Libyan uelegation leauei to the Syiian Fiee Aimy in late 2u11 ! E%,0"7 07:40770>1 (biothei of Ali), commanuei of the Al-Qa'eua- linkeu al-Sahati Biigaue uuiing the ievolution, anu Benghazi Nilitaiy Council commanuei afteiwaius, close ally of Abuelhakim Belhauj anu Nustafa }alil ! *71 07:40770>1 (biothei of Ismael), calleu the 'spiiitual leauei' of the Libyan ievolution, Nuslim Biotheihoou links, leu effoit with Seif al-Qauuafi anu 0S Embassy Tiipoli to gain ielease of jihaui uetainees fiom Libyan jails ! 8()0,,0; 07:40770>1, fathei of Ali anu Ismael, among the founueis of the Libyan Nuslim Biotheihoou in the 196us ! *>$ 4$L106 >16 G$,$, veteian jihau fightei in Afghanistan fiom Beina, Libya, captuieu in 2uu1, uetaineu at uITN0, sent back to Libyan jail, ieleaseu in 2u1u, leu jihau vs Qauuafi in 2u11, anu leu Benghazi Nission attack in Sep 2u12.
12. Foi the peiiou of Febiuaiy 1Sth, 2u11, thiough Becembei S1st, 2u12, all B0B anu CIA oi othei intelligence community iecoius, shaieu with membeis of Congiess, iegaiuing collection, stoiage, tianspoitation of aims anu equipment in Libya.
1S. Foi the peiiou of Febiuaiy 1Sth, 2u11, thiough Becembei S1st, 2u12, all B0B anu CIA oi othei intelligence community iecoius of Congiessional 21 appioval foi CIA tianspoit of aims to Syiian iebel foices.
14. All iecoius iegaiuing Beputy National Secuiity Auvisei foi Bomelanu Secuiity anu Countei-teiioiism }ohn Biennan's iecommenuations iegaiuing the oveithiow of Libyan leauei Nuammai uauuafi.
1S. Recoius of the viueo teleconfeience on the afteinoon of the Septembei 16th, 2u12, between the FBI anu othei IC officials in Washington, iegaiuing FBI inteiviews with 0.S. peisonnel who hau been on the compounus in Benghazi uuiing the attack. Foi youi iefeience, the following is an exceipt fiom the Becembei Su, 2u12, Senate Committee 0n Bomelanu Secuiity Anu uoveinmental Affaiis, "Flashing Reu: A Special Repoit 0n The Teiioiist Attack At Benghazi:"
0n Septembei 1Sth anu 16th, officials fiom the FBI conuucteu face-to-face inteiviews in ueimany of the 0.S. peisonnel who hau been on the compounu in Benghazi uuiing the attack. The 0.S. peisonnel who weie inteivieweu saw no inuications that theie hau been a piotest piioi to the attack. Infoimation fiom those inteiviews was shaieu on a secuie viueo teleconfeience on the afteinoon of the 16th with FBI anu othei IC officials in Washington; it is uncleai whethei the question of whethei a piotest took place was uiscusseu uuiing this viueo confeience.
16. Non-Bisclosuie Agieements signeu by suivivois of the Benghazi attacks, incluuing employees oi contiactois of the CIA oi B0B.
4$>P"=&Y Nuammai Qauuafi Regime Biscussions with AFRIC0N about Talks unuei "White Flag of Tiuce"
4($+="Y Reai Aumiial Chailes R. Kubic, CEC, 0.S. Navy (iet)
Shoitly aftei NAT0 officially enteieu the Libyan ievolt on the siue of the iebels on 19 Naich 2u11, foimei Libyan iulei Nuammai Qauuafi expiesseu willingness to uiscuss uiiectly with AFRIC0N the possibility of abuication, exile, anu an enu to hostilities.
0n 2u Naich 2u11, ueneial Abdulqader Yusef Dibri, head of Muammar Qaddafi's personal security, conveyed Qaddafis willingness to consider direct talks with the U.S. government under a flag of truce. Upon receipt of this information, RABN (iet.) Chuck Kubic telephoneu LTC Biian Linvill at 49 7117 29S64S at his AFRIC0N office in Stuttgait, ueimany (cell phone # 49 1S1S 2S8128). LTC Linvill seiveu at that time as the AFRIC0N point of contact foi any anu all communications involving Qauuafi's Libyan militaiy baseu on his piioi seivice in Libya (2uu8-2u11) wheie he hau come to know peisonally all of Qauuafi's senioi militaiy staff.
RABN Kubic tolu LTC Linvill that he hau infoimation thiough an inteimeuiaiy that the Libyans weie ieauy to establish a uiiect line of communication with the 0.S. militaiy commanu. Linvill immeuiately passeu this infoimation up his chain of commanu to ueneial Caitei Bam, Commanuei of 0.S. AFRIC0N. AFRIC0N iesponueu quickly anu with inteiest in setting up a uiiect line of militaiy-to-militaiy communication with uen. Bibii.
0n 21 Naich 2u11, ueneial Ahmeu Namuu (a senioi aiue to Qauuafi) telephoneu LTC Linvill uiiectly in Stuttgait, ueimany anu ueclaieu the following:
! The Libyans wisheu to ueclaie a 72-houi tiuce foi the puipose of conuucting negotiations on the teims of a foimal ceasefiie. ! The talks coulu be helu in Tiipoli, Libya between Major General Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr, the Libyan Defense Minister, and General Carter Ham. ! If these conditions are acceptable, the Libyans will stop all combat operations immediately and withdraw all military forces to the outskirts of all cities, and assume a defensive posture. ! To ensure credibility with the international community, the Libyans recommend observers from the African Union be invited into Libya to ensure the truce is honored. 2S
That night, on NBC News, Gen. Ham issued a statement asserting that the U.S. military was not targeting Muammar Qaddafi. By 22 March 2011, Qaddafi verifiably had begun to pull his forces back from key rebel-held cities such as Benghazi and Misrata. Word was passed that he wanted a way out of the crisis and was willing to step down and permit a transition government to take power in his stead. Qaddafi reportedly sought only two conditions:
! Permit him to go after Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); and ! Remove sanctions against him, his family, and those loyal to him.
Despite the willingness of both AFRICOM Commander Gen. Carter Ham and Muammar Qaddafi to pursue the possibility of truce talks, permission was not given to Gen. Ham from his chain of command in the Pentagon and the window of opportunity closed.
24 Members of the Citizens Commission on Benghazi
Roger Aronoff, Editor of Accuracy in Media
Roger Aronoff, Editor of Accuracy in Media, is also AIMs Executive Secretary. Aronoff has worked as a journalist, TV producer, director, writer and distributor. He also hosts AIMs show on BlogTalkRadio, Take AIM. Roger joined AIM in May of 1997 and has written, produced and directed award-winning documentaries including Confronting Iraq: Conflict and Hope, The Clinton Legacy and TWA 800: The Search for the Truth. Aronoff has appeared as a guest commentator on National Public Radio, Air America, CNN, Fox News, CNBCs Kudlow & Company, Court TV, Russia Today, and CTV (Canadian TV), among others. A University of Texas graduate with a B.A. in History, Aronoff has worked as a freelance journalist in South Africa and a columnist for the Jewish Herald Voice, and as a producer of syndicated radio and TV musical/variety programs, including Woodstock: Ten Years Later, Billboards Artist of the Year, No Place But Texas, and Bravisimo.
In 2008 Aronoff produced, directed and co-wrote a documentary that aired on many PBS stations called Fighting Words: A Tale of How Liberals Created Neoconservatism, and in 2009 produced a weekly public affairs show on PBS called Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg.
Captain Larry Bailey (SEAL) USN Ret.
Captain Larry Bailey, a native of Marshall, TX, and a graduate of Stephen F. Austin State College, spent almost 27 years as a U.S. Navy SEAL. Obtaining his commission from Navy Officer Candidate School in 1962, he was first assigned to the destroyer USS LEARY before receiving orders to Underwater Demolition Team training in Little Creek, VA. After a year in UDT-22, he was assigned to SEAL Team TWO, where he spent almost five years and with whom he participated in the Dominican Republic invasion and deployed to Vietnam, where he led the first East Coast SEAL platoon into combat.
Included in Captain Baileys duty stations were the Philippines, Panama, Bolivia, and Scotland. He commanded Naval Special Warfare Center, where all SEALs are trained, for three years and retired in 1990 from the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, FL.
Since his retirement, Captain Bailey has been involved in issues of national policy and has chaired Gathering of Eagles since 2007. He is also co-chairman of Special Operations Speaks, an organization that speaks out on defense-related issues, particularly those involving special operations forces. He and his wife Judy live in Chocowinity, NC, and are the parents of two adult children.
2S Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Benway, U.S. Army Special Forces (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Ken Benway enlisted in the U.S. Army as a parachute infantryman in 1966. He underwent Army Special Forces training and deployed to Vietnam, serving from 1967-68, as a Special Forces medic with a Chinese Nung Company of the I Corps Mobile Strike Force, 5th Special Forces Group. In 1970, he was commissioned as Second Lieutenant of Infantry, serving in leadership assignments in both Germany and Italy with the 509th Parachute Infantry. Over the course of 27 years in uniform, he served with the 3d, 5th and 10 Special Forces Groups, with the Special Operations Command (Europe), as an exchange program officer with the Susa Alpine Infantry Battalion (Italian Army) in northwest Italy, and with the US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School.
On retiring in 1993, he served as senior special operations analyst, program manager and corporate director in a variety of contracted support arrangements with the U.S. Army Special Operations community.
Col. Dick Brauer Jr., USAF (Ret.)
Colonel Richard F. (Dick) Brauer Jr. USAF, (Ret) amassed 5,200 hours of worldwide flying, attaining the aeronautical rating of Master Navigator. His tours of flying duty and deployments include Southeast Asia/Vietnam (1967-68), Europe, Central and South America (1968- 1971) and Australia (1971-1973), where he represented the USAF and the United States as an Exchange Officer, flying as an instructor in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).
Following his Pentagon tour he was selected to be the 12th Commandant of the United States Air Force Special Operations School (Hurlburt Field, FL) and served the joint SOF, conventional and interagency communities in that education leadership position from 1986 until his retirement in 1991, having completed 26 years of active duty military service. In 2010 Colonel Brauer was inducted into the Air Commando Hall of Fame.
Lt. Col. Dennis B. Haney, USAF (Ret.)
Lt. Col. Dennis B. Haney, USAF (Ret) is a program manager, a U.S. Air Force jet fighter aircraft operations director, flight test director, and combat-experienced Electronic Warfare Officer with 22 years of experience as an Electronic Combat technical expert. He served three years on the 52nd Tactical Fighter Wing Staff in Spangdahlem AB, Germany, and has served in a number of positions at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. He assisted the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) Program Manager in managing 185 technical personnel in positions including Assistant Program Manager for the CEC Program. After retiring, he joined Special Operations Speaks (SOS) as the Operations Coordinator.
26 B/Gen. Charles Jones, USAF (Ret.)
Charles Jones, B/Gen., USAF (RET) served continuously in the Air Force and Air Force Reserves from 1954 to 1986. He is the founder, and was Chairman, now retired, of the National Veterans Coalition, an arm of the Constitution Party. He is a member of Stand up America and serves on the advisory Kitchen Cabinet. He is a lifetime member of both the Order of Daedalians, (a Fraternal Organization of Military Pilots) and the Military Officers Association of America, a veterans association dedicated to maintaining a strong national defense.
Clare Lopez, former CIA officer
Clare M. Lopez is Vice President for Research and Analysis at the Center for Security Policy and a Senior Fellow at The Clarion Project, the London Center for Policy Research, and the Canadian Meighen Institute. Also the Vice President of the Intelligence Summit, she formerly was a career operations officer with the Central Intelligence Agency, a professor at the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, Executive Director of the Iran Policy Committee from 2005-2006, and has served as a consultant, intelligence analyst, and researcher for a variety of defense firms. She was named a Lincoln Fellow at the Claremont Institute in 2011.
Admiral James Lyons (Ret.)
Retired Admiral James Ace Lyons is a former four star admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and the Father of the Navy Seal Red Cell Program. His other commands include U.S. Second Fleet, NATO Striking Fleet, as well as Seventh Fleet Logistic Force plus several ship commands. As the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations from 1983 to 1985, he was principal advisor on all Joint Chiefs of Staff matters. He also served as Senior U.S. Military Representative to the United Nations. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and has received post-graduate degrees from the U.S. Naval War College and the U.S. National Defense University.
General Thomas McInerney (Ret.)
Retired General Thomas McInerney served overseas in NATO, Pacific Air Forces and as commander of 11th Air Force in Alaska. Currently, he is a Fox News contributor, and is a member of the Iran Policy Committee. From 1994, McInerney was Director of the Defense Performance Review (DPR), reporting to the Secretary of Defense and Vice President Al Gore who conceived this initiative for the Federal Government. In that capacity, McInerney led the Pentagons reinventing government effort, focused on making government more efficient by using the latest and best business practices.
Col. Wayne Morris USMC (Ret.)
Retired USMC Colonel Wayne Morris is President at WAYMOR Inc. He has more than 34 years of service in the United States Marine Corps. Rising from Private to Staff 27 Sergeant and then, via a Combat Leadership Commission during Vietnam, from Second Lieutenant to Colonel, he retired in 1996. He was the Human Resources Director of Onslow County, North Carolina Local Government from 1997 to 2005 and was a Senior Operations Advisor to the Afghan National Army 2006 to 2007.
Chet Nagle
Chet Nagle is a Naval Academy graduate, a Georgetown Law School graduate, and a Cold War carrier pilot who flew in the Cuban Missile Crisis. He joined International Security Affairs (ISA) as a Pentagon civilian involved in international defense projects. Afterwards, he lived abroad for 12 years as a director of Aeromaritime, Inc and an agent for the CIA, working in Iran, Oman, and many other countries. Along the way, he founded a geo-political magazine, The Journal of Defense & Diplomacy. At the end of his work in the Middle East, he was awarded the Order of Oman for his role in Omans victory against communist Yemen. Nagles first book, Iran Covenant, is a fact-based novel about Irans nuclear weapons program and the use of EMP to end it. His second novel is The Woolsorters Plague. It describes an attack on Washington, DC, by terrorists with biological weapons made in Iran. He has appeared often on radio (including the Monica Crowley Fox News show, Rick Wiles TruNews, and the Hugh Hewitt Show) and television (including Stakelbeck on Terror on CBN, and Faster Please on PJTV)). He also appeared in Iranium, a documentary film about Irans nuclear weapons program. Nagle is a contributing editor for Family Security Matters, contributes to Daily Caller, and writes for various clients. His website is www.chetnagle.com.
John A. Shaw
John A. Shaw is the Senior Partner of the Cambridge Consulting Group, an international consulting firm specializing in trade, energy, and technology, especially the growing market of defense and dual-use technology. He has had a forty-year career focused on technology transfer, arms sales, and international development, with intensive experience in Europe and the Middle East. He has held senior management positions in the U.S. government and in major international management consulting firms.
At the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2005, Mr. Shaw served as Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for International Technology Security, a position created for him to assure that U.S. export controls are based on a solid technological understanding of the potential military and dual-use employment of all U.S. technology. Mr. Shaw was part of the office of the Undersecretary for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) and oversaw all international technology transfers and military sales involving U.S. technology in that area. Mr. Shaw at the same time served as Director, International Armament and Technology Trade (IATT), an arm of the DoD Inspector Generals office tasked with policing international technology exports.
In addition, his background as Inspector General together with his appointment as the technical IG trouble shooter for transportation and communications in Iraq surfaced the largest corruption case in Iraqi reconstruction: The fixing of the 3 billion dollar telecom 28 tender in 2003 involving tens of millions of dollars of bribes to American and British officials by an Iraqi billionaire with the aid of British intelligence. Efforts by the perpetrators of the fix to try to smear Shaw resulted in his complete exoneration by the FBI and Department of Justice.
Mr. Shaw also established that massive amounts of high explosives and chemical weapons were clandestinely moved to Syria by Russian troops just before the beginning of the Iraq war. Those Iraqi chemical weapons provided a massive foundation for the current Syrian arsenal of chemical weapons. Shaws efforts established definitively the presence of WMD in Iraq and the way in which they were dispersed despite a widespread international effort to cover up their presence.
Mr. Shaw served on the White House staff in the Ford, Reagan, and Bush I administrations, and was White House liaison at the Defense, State, and Commerce Departments. He oversaw the personnel transitions at Defense in 1975 and 2001, at State in 1981, and at Commerce in 1989.
Mr. Shaw received an A.B. with Highest Honors in History from Williams College in 1962, a B.A. (Cantab.), and an M.A. from Cambridge University in 1964 and 1967. He received a Ph.D. from Cambridge in 1972 and was Executive Secretary to Sir Herbert Butterfield in the formation of the Diplomatic Studies Group. He has taught international affairs at Cambridge, Williams, Georgetown, and the Institute Politique in Paris.
Kevin Shipp, former CIA officer
Kevin Shipp, a former CIA Officer and Antiterrorism expert, held several high level positions in the CIA. He was assigned as a protective agent for the Director of Central Intelligence, a counterintelligence investigator, a Counter Terrorism Center officer, a team leader protecting sensitive CIA assets from assassination, a manager of high-risk protective operations, a lead instructor for members of allied governments, an internal staff security investigator, and a polygraph examiner. He was tasked with protecting the CIA from foreign agent penetration and the chief of training for the CIA federal police force. Mr. Shipp functioned as program manager for the Department of State, Diplomatic Security, and Anti Terrorism Assistance global police training program. He is the recipient of two CIA Meritorious Unit Citations, three Exceptional Performance Awards and a Medallion for overseas covert operations. He is the author of From the Company of ShadowsCIA Operations and the War on Terrorism.
Wayne Simmons, former CIA officer
Wayne Simmons spent 27 years working with the CIA to combat terrorism, narco- terrorism and narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, counterfeiting, cyber-terrorists, and industrial and economic espionage. He sits on the Advisory Council for the Intelligence Summit, and is a contributor to the conservative publication Human Events. Simmons has been a Terrorism Analyst for the Fox News Channel since 2002.
29 General Paul Vallely (Ret.)
Retired General Paul Vallely served in the Vietnam War and retired in 1993 as Deputy Commanding General, Pacific Command. In 2004, together with retired Air Force Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney, he co-authored the book Endgame: The Blueprint for Victory in the War on Terror. He is the Chairman of Stand Up America and Nemo Arms Company. Vallely has lent his support to the organization Veteran Defenders of America.
Former Congressman and Retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Allen West
Former Congressman and Retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Allen West is a current contributor for Fox News and P.J. Media. Before taking office, he was an adviser to the Afghan National Army. On January 3, 2011, West took office as the first black Republican Congressman from Florida since Josiah T. Walls left office in 1876. West was also a member of the Tea Party Caucus and has been referred to as one of the champions of the Tea Party movement.
CCB Advisory Members:
Steven Emerson, Executive Director, Investigative Project on Terrorism
Steven Emerson is considered one of the leading authorities on Islamic extremist networks, financing and operations. He serves as the Executive Director of The Investigative Project on Terrorism, one of the world's largest storehouses of archival data and intelligence on Islamic and Middle Eastern terrorist groups. Emerson and his staff frequently provide briefings to U.S. government and law enforcement agencies, members of Congress and congressional committees, and print and electronic media, both national and international. Since 9-11, Emerson has testified before and briefed Congress dozens of times on terrorist financing and operational networks of Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and the rest of the worldwide Islamic militant spectrum. Emerson is the author or co-author of six books on terrorism and national security. He and his organization have been quoted or profiled in hundreds of newspaper and television stories since 9-11. Emerson is recognized as one of the first terrorism experts to have testified and warned about the threat of Islamic militant networks operating in the United States and their connections worldwide. In a pioneering congressional testimony delivered in 1998, he specifically warned about the threat of Osama Bin Laden's network. Nearly every one of the terrorist suspects and groups first identified in his 1994 film have been indicted, convicted, or deported since 9-11.
Pete Hoekstra, Senior Fellow, Investigative Project on Terrorism
The Honorable Pete Hoekstra is an IPT Shillman Senior Fellow, specializing in national Su security, international relations, global terrorism and cyber security.
Mr. Hoekstra served in the United States Congress for 18 years, representing Michigan's 2nd Congressional District from 1993 to 2011. After leaving the House, he became a senior advisor at Dickstein Shapiro LLP, consulting on intelligence and national security, education, and labor matters. He serves on the Board of Directors of Gentex, Inc. and West Michigan Community Bank, and the Advisory Boards of Newsmax and TransCertain.
Congressman Hoekstra was named chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in 2004 and held the post until January 2007. He served as the top Republican on the committee until January 2011. He was responsible for helping to lead Congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence during its modernization to confront the threats of the 21st century global war on terror, including restructuring the intelligence community with landmark legislation following the 9-11 Commission report. Prior to his appointment as committee chairman, Pete served as chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence.
Congressman Hoekstra is a graduate of Holland Christian Schools. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Hope College and a master's of Business Administration from the University of Michigan. He was born in Groningen, the Netherlands, and immigrated to Michigan with his family at the age of 3. The Muslim Brotherhood: How Did Its Influence Become So Powerful?
! The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic organization, founded by Hasan al-Banna in Cairo, Egypt in 1928, that is dedicated to restoration of the Caliphate and global enforcement of Islamic Law (shariah).
! Known as the Ikhwan in Arabic, the Brotherhoods motto is: Allah is our objective, the Prophet is our leader, the Quran is our law, jihad is our way, and dying in the way of Allah is our highest aspiration.
! With a presence in over 80 countries worldwide, the Ikhwan pursues its dual objectives (Caliphate and shariah) by pre-violent dawah (proselytizing, or the call to Islam), civilization jihad (or stealth jihad), as well as violent jihad.
! The Project is a 14-page document dated December 1, 1982 that was seized in a 2001 raid on a Swiss villa belonging to Yousef Nada, the Muslim Brotherhood director of the Al-Taqwa bank that had funded al-Qaeda.
! The Project outlines a campaign of progressive infiltration of the structures of Western society in order to achieve Islamic domination over the West.
! Among the tactics to be used are deception, infiltration and [i]nvolving ideologically committed Muslims in democratically-elected institutions on all levels in the West, including government.
! The 2008 U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation et.al. was the largest terrorism financing trial in U.S. history, and brought to light extensive documentation about Muslim Brotherhood activities and plans in the U.S.
! A 2004 raid by the FBI on the home of Ismail el-Barasse discovered the archives of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, including a document called An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America.
! The Memorandum makes clear the Brothers are engaged in America in a kind of grand jihad whose goal is eliminating and destroying Western civilization from within.
! An attachment to the Memorandum lists 29 groups under the heading A list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends among which are the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Muslim Students Association (MSA), and the Islamic Association of Palestine (IAPlater to become CAIR, the Council on American Islamic Relations).
! Those and other Muslim Brotherhood organizations today are among the most influential, mainstream Islamic groups in the country despite their known allegiance to a jihadist ideology. "
! Top officials of these Ikhwan groups advise, socialize with, and train the leadership of key agencies within the U.S. national security community.
! The Muslim Brotherhood has achieved information dominance inside the U.S. government about Islam, Islamic terrorism, and the nature and objectives of the Brotherhood itself.
! The 2011-2012 USG-wide purge of all curriculum training materials and instructors who taught the linkage between Islamic terrorism and its inspirational sources in the doctrine, law, and scriptures of Islam was undertaken under pressure from Brotherhood groups and neutralized U.S. national security efforts to counter Brotherhood influence operations.
! The disastrous consequences of this effort became evident in official U.S. backing for the 2011 Brotherhood- and al-Qaeda-dominated Islamic uprisings known as the Arab Spring.
! U.S. official support for the Muslim Brotherhood political leadership and al- Qaeda militias that ousted Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi led directly to the 11 September 2012 attacks on our mission in Benghazi and the chaos that grips Libya today.
Additional Suggested Resources
! An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America Online at http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judges/hlf2/09-25- 08/Elbarasse%20Search%203.pdf
! Lopez, Clare M., History of the Muslim Brotherhood Penetration of the U.S. Government. The Gatestone Institute, April 15, 2013. Online at http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3672/muslim-brotherhood-us-government
! Poole, Patrick, Blind to Terror: The U.S. Governments Disastrous Muslim Outreach Efforts and the Impact on U.S. Middle East Policy. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 2013). Online at http://www.gloria-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Blind-to-Terror-The- US-Goverments-Disastrous-Muslim-Outreach-Efforts-and-the-Impact-on-US- MidEast-Policy.pdf
! Poole, Patrick, The Muslim Brotherhood Project, Front Page Magazine, May 11, 2006. Online at http://archive.frontpagemag.com/Printable.aspx?ArtId=4476
# "#$%&'( &) %*+ ,&-+./01
! Innocence of Muslims was a 14-minute video trailer about the life of Muhammad posted to YouTube on 2 Jul 2012 by Sam Bacile.
! In the aftermath of the 11 September 2012 attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya, the U.S. administration ignored facts in evidence indicating that it was an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist attack not preceded by any demonstration or protest and publicly blamed the video instead.
! The coordinated nature of the international campaign by U.S. Muslim Brotherhood groups and member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) presents the impression that condemnation of the film was used to further an agenda supportive of the OIC/Muslim Brotherhood objective to criminalize criticism of Islam and curtail American Constitutional free speech rights.
Demands for Release of the Blind Sheikh ! During most of 2012, pressure for the release of Omar Abdulrahman (The Blind Sheikh) featured prominently in discussions between the White House and the Morsi Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt as well as among Gamaat al- Islamiyya and Muslim Brotherhood figures, at least one of whom (Hani Nour Eldin) visited WDC to discuss the issue with National Security Council official Denis McDonough.
! 4 Sep 12: Film producer, an ex-pat Egyptian Coptic Christian, phoned al Youm al Sabaa (Seventh Day) daily newspaper in WDC area and emailed him a copy of the film trailer.
! 6 Sep 12: Gamel Girgis wrote a 3 paragraph article, calling the movie shocking.
! 8 Sep 12: Other newspapers began running the story; al Youm al Sabaa ran a follow-up.
! 8 Sep 12: Gamaat al-Islamiyya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad jointly issued a statement threatening to burn down Cairo Embassy unless the Blind Sheikh is released.
! 9 Sep 12: Arabic-language forum posted a statement inciting Egyptians [O, sons of Egypt!] to target the U.S. Embassy, indicating U.S. Embassy shouldn't remain in Egypt" until the Blind Sheikh was released. Appearance of the YouTube Video $ ! 9 Sep 12: al-Nas Egyptian TV host Khaled Abdullah aired a clip of Innocence of Muslims and invited viewer outrage.
! 9 Sep 12: The Grand Mufti of al-Azhar condemned the clip for insulting the prophet.
! 9 Sep 12: Facebook pages appeared, calling for 9/11 protests; callers asked U.S. Embassy in Cairo about the video, but they knew nothing about it at that time.
! 11 Sep 12: CNN Nic Robertson was outside Cairo Embassy interviewing protesters who wanted the Blind Sheikh released. Interviews included a one-on- one with Mohamed al-Zawahiri, brother of al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Violence broke out immediately afterwards.
! 11 Sep 12: CNN began to highlight the film narrative.
! 11 Sep 12 : Protests against the video broke out in over three dozen countries.
! 11 Sep 12: Military assault on the Benghazi mission began at 2140 local time that night. No demonstration or protest preceded the attack.
! 13-29 Sep: The YouTube clip eventually reached more than 17 million hits.
Aftermath of the Benghazi Attack: Cover-Up Begins ! 12 Sep 12: President Obama in the White House Rose Garden used phrase no act of terror but did not specifically call the Benghazi attack an act of terror.
! 13 Sep 12: Jay Carney: "The protests we're seeing around the region are in reaction to this movie
! 14 Sep 12: Jay Carney said protests were in reaction to a video.
! Few days after 11 Sep 12: At Tyrone Woods funeral, Secretary of State Clinton assured father Charles Woods that they were going to "arrest and prosecute" the man that made the YouTube video critical of Islam.
! 28 Sep 12: Film producer Mark Basseley Youssef arrested, sentenced to 1 year in jail for probation violations.
% ! 16 Sep 12: Libyan President Mohamed Magariaf told Bob Schieffer on Face the Nation: this leaves us with no doubt that this was preplanned, determined pre-meditated months ago, and they were planning this criminal act since their arrival.
! 16 Sep 12: Amb. Susan Rice appeared on five Sunday talk shows, including Face the Nation, directly after Libyan president and said:
o We do not have information at present that leads us to conclude that this was premeditated or preplanned.
o What happened in Cairo, in Benghazi, in many other parts of the region was a result a direct result of a heinous and offensive video.
! 18 Sep 12: Jay Carney said it was the video that caused the unrest in Cairo, and the video and the unrest in Cairo that helped--that precipitated some of the unrest in Benghazi
! 19 Sep 12: Jay Carney said we do not yet have indication that it was pre- planned.
! 19 Sep 12: Matt Olson, NCTC to Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Chairman Joe Lieberman, on whether the attack was a terrorist attack: They were killed in the course of a terrorist attack on our embassy.
! 20 Sep 12: Jay Carney admitted it was terrorism in Benghazi.
! 20 Sep 12: Obama at Univision townhall meeting said: "What we do know is that the natural protests that arose because of the outrage over the video were used as an excuse by extremists to see if they can also directly harm U.S. interests."
! 21 Sep 12: Secretary of State Clinton admitted the attacks were an act of terror and after that, except for UN speeches, the video narrative was abandoned.
U.S. Muslim Brotherhood Chimes In ! 17 Sep 12: The American Muslim website published Tariq Ramadan comments http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/an-appeal-to-the- conscience-of-muslims
o After the Danish cartoons, the Dutch video Fitna and several low- grade irritants, a short, crudely executedand scrupulously insulting film has inflamed deep-seated resentment. Several hundreds of furious & demonstrators gathered in front of the American Embassy in Cairo and the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. In the confusion and violence, a US Ambassador and three diplomats were killed.
o The violent reactions to the insults uttered against the Prophet [PBUH] have driven many Muslims to behaviours far removed from the principles of Islam.
o But behind the celebration of freedom of speech hides the arrogance of ideologists and well-fed racists who feed off the multiform humiliation of Muslims and to demonstrate the clear superiority of their civilisation or the validity of their resistance to the cancer of retrograde Islam. In criticising this ideological stance there can be no compromise either.
! 20 Sep 12: The American Muslim website published a collection of statements by U.S. Muslim Brotherhood groups http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/muslims-and-muslim- organizations-condemn-attacks-on-u.s.-embassies
o ISNA statement condemned depicting Prophet Muhammad.in a very profane manner.
o ISNA condemned the creation of such a hateful video, and we also call for an end to support for such mechanisms of hatred and bigotry.
o nothing justifies violent acts
o MPAC condemned attacks on U.S. missions in both Cairo and Benghazi.
o The attacks come after a low-budget movie on YouTube called Muhammad incited anger by depicting Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) in a demeaning and degrading manner.
o CAIR issued a video aimed at demonstrators in Nigeria It is clear that the motive behind the film is to enrage Muslims and to display a hatred of Islam appealing for calm.
o ICNA appealed for calm and added: We also appeal to the larger American public to be wary of such attempts by individuals and groups, who in most cases have foreign ties, engaging in such hateful projects that not only endanger American and others lives overseas, but also incite hate attacks against minorities in America as well. '
! 17 Sep 12: Ahmed Rehab, Executive Director of CAIR-Chicago spoke on a local radio show about violence, anti-American protests resulted from anti-Muslim film. http://www.ahmedrehab.com/2012/09/wbez-worldview-ahmed-rehab-talks- about-muslim-film-protest-violence/#more-3189
! 19 Oct 12: University of Wisconsin-Madison scheduled an MSA event on Islamophobia.
UN Speeches ! 25 September 2012: President Obamas UN speech cited the YouTube film multiple times.
o U.S. president bowed to Islamic Law on slander: The future must not belong to those who slander the prophet of Islam o Voices of tolerance that rally vs.blasphemy
! 25 September 2012: Pakistani PM Ali Zardari spoke. o "The international community must not become silent observers and should criminalize such acts that destroy the peace of the world and endanger world security by misusing freedom of expression."
! 26 September 2012 : Egyptian President Morsis UN speech explicitly rejected free speech, implied speech causes violence, emphasized UN responsibility to address speech that causes violence.
o UNGA as well as UNSC has the principle responsibility in addressing this phenomenon that is starting to have implications that clearly affect international peace & security
o Egypt respects freedom of expression but one that is not used to incite hatred against anyone. One that is not directed toward one specific religion
o The obscenities that I have referred to that were recently released as part of an organized campaign against Islamic sanctities are unacceptable. (YouTube video)
o We reject this. We cannot accept it, Morsi said, his voice thin with anger. We will not allow anyone to do this by word or deed.
( o We have a responsibility in this international gathering to study how we can protect the world from instability and hatred.
! 28 September 2012: Turkish FoMin Ahmet Davutoglu
o Unfortunately, Islamophobia has also become a new form of racism like anti-Semitism. It can no longer be tolerated under the guise of freedom of expression. Freedom does not mean anarchy."
! 29 September 2012: OIC SecGen Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu spoke to OIC FoMins at UN Headquarters. o Annual Coordination meeting of OIC FoMins held on sidelines of UNGA session in NYC adopted declaration condemning the sacrilegious act of releasing the defamatory video.
o OIC blamed the Benghazi attack on the film: serious consequences of abusing the principle of freedom of expression
o Called for adopting measures to criminalize incitement to imminent violence based on religion or belief.
o 29 Sep 12: During AP Interview. OIC SecGen spoke even more directly and issued thinly-veiled threats.
o "If the Western world fails to understand the sensitivity of the Muslim world, then we are in troubleSuch provocations pose a threat to international peace and security and the sanctity of life."
o "You have to see that there is a provocation. You should understand the psychology of people who revere their prophet and don't want people to insult him."
) Material Support to Terrorism: The Case of Libya
Libya in 2011 marks the place and the time that the United States (U.S.) and the Obama administration formally switched sides in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). A mere 10 years after al-Qaeda (supported by Hizballah and Iran) attacked the American homeland in the worst act of terrorism ever suffered by this country, U.S. leadership decided to facilitate the provision of weapons to jihadist militias known to be affiliated with al- Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood in order to bring down a brutal dictator who also just happened to be a U.S. ally in the GWOT at the time. And the U.S. media were silent. The major broadcast, print, and Internet outlets said not a word about this astonishing turnabout in American foreign policy. To this day, they have not seemed even to recognize that the pivot to support al-Qaeda took place. But it needs to be said. The American people deserve to understand that their most senior leaders, both elected and appointed, have violated their oaths to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. *+ United States law is quite explicit about providing material support to terrorists: its prohibited. Period. 18 U.S. Code 2339A and 18 U.S. Code 2339B address Providing Material Support to Terrorists or Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Together, these two sections outlaw the actions of any U.S. person who attempts or conspires to provide, or actually does provide, material support to a foreign terrorist organization knowing that it has been designated a foreign terrorist organization or engages, or has engaged, in terrorism or terrorist activity. Conspiracy means agreeing or planning to provide such support, whether or not such support ever is actually delivered. Penalties for conspiracy to provide material support to terrorism are stiff: imprisonment for up to 15 years and/or a fine of not more than $250,000. Penalties for actually providing or attempting to provide material support to terrorism are even harsher: imprisonment from 15 years to life, with a life sentence applicable if the death of any person results from such crime. Aiding, abetting, counseling, or procuring in support of a violation of Section 2339B is punishable by the same penalties as for the offense itself. The Arms Export Control Act is another law that makes it illegal for the U.S. government to export munitions to any country determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. While this provision applies specifically to those countriesCuba, North Korea, Iran, and Syriathat are designated as state sponsors of terrorism, the case of Libya stands out nevertheless. Removed from the State Departments list of state sponsors of terrorism in 2006, Libya by early 2011 was swarming with al-Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood militias and affiliates fighting to overthrow Muamar Qaddafis regime. The identities of those jihadis and their al-Qaeda affiliations were well known to the U.S. Intelligence Community, Department of State, and Tripoli Embassy long before the 17 February 2011 revolt broke out against Muamar Qaddafi. As with other al-Qaeda branches, the Libyan al-Qaeda affiliates such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) trace their origins back to the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya, which was founded in 1949 when Egyptian Brotherhood members fled a crackdown in Cairo and took refuge in Benghazi, according to a May 2012 study by the Brookings Doha Center. Colonel Muamar Qaddafi took over Libya in a 1969 coup dtat and showed little tolerance for Brotherhood activities. Brutal waves of repression kept the Brotherhood in check through the 1980s and 1990s when many Libyan fighters went to Afghanistan to join the mujahedeen in their battle against the Soviet Army. Some of those who fought there, like Abu Anas al-Libi and Abdelhakim Belhadj, would figure prominently in the revolt that ultimately ousted Qaddafi in 2011. The LIFG was founded in 1990 by Libyan fighters returning from the Afghan jihad who were now intent on waging jihad at home. Qaddafi came down hard on the group, though, and crushed the LIFGs 1995-1998 insurgency. Some LIFG members had moved to ** Sudan when Usama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri found refuge with Omar al- Bashirs Muslim Brotherhood regime in the early 1990s and others (including Belhadj) eventually fled back to Afghanistan, where both bin-Laden and al-Zawahiri also had relocated by the mid-1990s. Abu Anas al-Libi is alleged to have taken part in the pre- attack casing and surveillance of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya a few years prior to the 1998 al-Qaeda attack there. By 1995, things were becoming hot for the jihadis in Sudan and while bin Laden and al- Zawahiri returned to Afghanistan about this time, others such as Anas al-Libi were offered safehaven by the British. In return for political asylum in the UK, MI 6 recruited Anas al-Libis support for a failed 1996 plot to assassinate Qaddafi. In all, Anas al-Libi lived in Manchester from 1995-2000despite his known history of association with bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and other AQ leaders, as well as willingness to participate in assassination plots against national leaders, as I wrote in an October 2013 piece at The Clarion Project. The U.S.s British partners also provided asylum to Abu Abdullah As- Sadeq, the LIFGs top commander and allowed the LIFG to publish an Arabic language newspaper called al-Wasat in London. By 2000, though, as the FBI and other Western security services began to close in, Anas al-Libi and others were on the move again, leaving behind a 180-page al-Qaeda terror training manual that became known as the Manchester Document. In the run-up to the 11 September 2001 attacks, Anas al-Libi, Abdelhakim Belhadj, Abu Sufian bin Qumu, and other known LIFG members reconnected with bin Laden in Afghanistan. As John Rosenthal points out in a 10 October 2013 posting, The Inevitable Rise of Al-Qaeda in Libya, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the history of close cooperation between the LIFG and al-Qaeda was so extensive that the Libyan group figured among the very first organizations to be designated as al- Qaeda affiliates by the UN Security Council. In fact, according to Rosenthal who cites former LIFG member, Norman Benotman, Belhadj was actually present with bin Laden at Tora Bora in December 2001. The LIFG was formally accepted as an al-Qaeda franchise by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the AQ deputy at the time, in 2007. In the years following 9/11, various LIFG members were detained: Abu Sufian bin Qumu was captured in 2002 and sent to Guantanamo Bay (GITMO) and in 2004, both Abu Anas al-Libi and Abdelhakim Belhadj were captured. By the mid-2000s, GITMO detainees were being released to their home countries. Abu Sufian bin Qumu, for example, was released from GITMO and returned to Libya in 2007. Beginning about 2005, Qaddafi was under pressure from both the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli and his own son, Seif, to begin what came to be known as the reconciliation process, in which LIFG and other jihadist prisoners were released from Libyan jails. In this process, LIFG Muslim Brotherhood cleric Ali Mohammad Al-Sallabi was a key mediator. Abdelhakim Belhadj was released in 2008 (just as Christopher Stevens was appointed Deputy Chief of *" Mission to Tripoli) and Abu Sufian bin Qumu in 2010, after which he returned to Derna to begin plotting the revolt against Qaddafi. Even as this reconciliation process was underway and Christopher Stevens was preparing for his new posting, Libyan jihadis were flowing out of eastern Libya in droves to join the al-Qaeda jihad against U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. According to a June 2010 study compiled by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Al-Qaidas Foreign Fighters in Iraq, coalition forces in Iraq captured a stash of documents in October 2007 which documented the origins of the foreign fighters whod traveled to Iraq to join al-Qaeda between August 2006 and August 2007. Termed the Sinjar Records after the nearest town where these personnel records were found, the data showed that by far the largest contingent of foreign fighters per capita came from Libya. Across the spectrum, the most common cities of origin for foreign fighters in Iraq were Darnah, Libya and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Darnah is located in the eastern Cyrenaica region of Libya, long known as an incubator of jihadist ideology and the place which would become the cradle of the 2011 Islamic uprising against Muammar Qaddafi. Nor was the new Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Christopher Stevens unaware of what was going on. A June 2008 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli that went out over Stevens signature was obtained by the London Telegraph from Wikileaks. The report was given the name Die Hard in Derna, after the Bruce Willis movie, and described the determination of the young jihadis of this eastern Libyan town to bring down the Qaddafi regime. Because they believed the U.S. government supported the Qaddafi regime and would not allow it to fall after it had abandoned its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs and begun to provide counter-terrorism support, and as documented in the West Point study of the Sinjar Records, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) instead sent its fighters to confront the U.S. in Iraq, believing that was a way to strike a blow against both Qaddafi and his U.S. backers. A local Derna resident told the visiting Embassy officer that Libyan fighters who had returned from earlier battlefields in Afghanistan (1980s) and elsewhere sometimes went on for additional religious training in Lebanon and Syria; when they eventually returned to Libya in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they began the process of preparing the ground for the eventual overthrow by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) of Muammar Qadhafis regime Career Foreign Service Officer Christopher Stevens was first posted to the American Embassy in Tripoli, Libya in June 2007 as the DCM and later as charge daffaires until 2009. For his second tour in Libya, Stevens was sent to rebel headquarters in Benghazi, Libya, to serve as special representative to the Libyan Transitional National Council. He arrived on a Greek cargo ship on April 5, 2011 and stayed until November. His mission was to forge stronger links with the Interim Transitional National Council, and gain a better understanding of the various factions fighting the Qaddafi regime. His *# reports back to Washington were said to have encouraged the U.S. to support and recognize the rebel council, which the Obama administration did formally in July 2011. As is now known, under urging from Sen. John McCain and other Congressional members, the White House endorsed Qatars plan to send weapons to the Libyan rebels shortly after Yousef al-Qaradawi, the senior jurist of the Muslim Brotherhood, issued a 21 February 2011 fatwa that called for the killing of Qaddafi. Seeking a zero footprint, no-paperwork-trail profile itself, the U.S. instead encouraged both Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to arm the Libyan jihadis, according to a key New York Times article published in December 2012. Knowing full well exactly who those rebel militias and their leadership were, and how closely they were connected with al-Qaeda (and perhaps even mindful of the legal restrictions on providing material support to terrorism), the U.S. sought to distance itself as the source of these weapons, which included small arms such as automatic rifles, machine guns, and ammunition. The NY Times piece noted that U.S. officials made sure to stipulate the weapons provided would come from elsewhere, but not from the U.S. But the fact that from the end of March 2011 onward, U.S. and other NATO forces completely controlled Libyan air space and the sea approaches to Libya means that the cargo planes and freighters transporting the arms into Libya from Qatar and elsewhere were being waved through with full U.S. knowledge and support. The U.S. mission in Libya, and especially in Benghazi, ramped up in this period to facilitate the delivery of the weapons to the Libyan al-Qaeda terrorists. What followed should hardly have come as a surprise to anyone. After NATO air support cleared the way to Tripoli, the Qaddafi regime fell in October 2011 and the Muslim Brotherhood political leadership and al-Qaeda fighters took over. Abdelhakim Belhadj was named Tripoli military commander. Chaos reigned, especially in the eastern regions, and now the weapons flow reversedout of Libya, and into the hands of jihadis in West Africa, the Sinai, and Syria. Some of that flow was wildly disorganized and some of it was directed, with the U.S. mission in Benghazi once again playing a key role as its teams on the ground facilitated the weapons delivery, now destined for the Syrian rebels, dominated by al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, who were fighting to overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime. In this endeavor, the U.S. was allied with its new Libyan partner, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and once again, with Qatar. The next chapter in the U.S. jihad wars was underway, with a new Presidential Finding, and material support to terrorism firmly established as official policy. Congress and the media and the military remained silent. The American people barely noticed.
*$ Benghazi and the Politicization of Intelligence
As we now know, within about 15 minutes after the start of the attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound (SMC) in Benghazi on 11 September 2012, top U.S. civilian and uniformed officials were informed that it was a terrorist attack. The information was clear, unambiguous, and remained consistent over the chaotic hours that followed. It did not change. If anything, the exceptionally accurate final mortar strike on the CIA Annex that took the lives of former Navy SEALs Glenn Doherty and Ty Woods, and gravely injured others, provided conclusive evidence of a carefully pre-planned attack. There is simply no room for equivocation on this: it was a well-organized, military-style assault by terrorists armed with assault rifles, RPGs, and eventually a mortar. Mike Morell, then-head of the CIAs Counterterrorism Center (CTC), had the task of helping to prepare talking points for then-U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, who was slated to appear on five Sunday morning talk shows a few days later. Morell was personally responsible for cutting some 50 percent of the text, including all references to Al Qaeda and the many earlier terror attacks against U.S. and other Western targets in Benghazi. When the Senate Intelligence Committee finally succeeded in prying loose the emails that had flowed back and forth to the CIA, State Department and the White House during the talking points editing process, it was clear that Morell not only had misrepresented his own role, but also had been less than forthcoming about the close oversight role played by the White House in ensuring that all references to al-Qaeda *% terrorism would be scrubbed. Morell also made sure to scrub from the talking points the honest assessment that We cannot rule out that individuals had previously surveilled the U.S. facilities, also contributing to the efficacy of the attacks. With the President in a close re-election race and touting the obviously inaccurate meme that al-Qaeda was on the run and close to defeat, it wouldnt have helped to admit that Islamic terrorists, after what was likely weeks of planning and rehearsal, had just overrun a U.S. diplomatic post in North Africa and killed four Americans. Better to obfuscate until the election was safely behind them. Besides, What difference does it make? that the most senior officials of the U.S. government deliberately subverted the intelligence process as long as it helped ensure the Presidents re-election? Nearly as troubling as Morells misleading congressional testimony was the overwhelming silence from senior Defense Department officials, who also knew full well that Susan Rices talk-show narrative was falseand yet remained silent. Republican chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Mike Rogers (MI) indicated on 27 February 2014 that Morell likely will be called back to clarify his testimony. There is no doubt that top officials at the Defense Department knew almost immediately that the Benghazi attack was a terrorist attackand given the stream of reporting about al-Qaedas increasingly aggressive behavior during the months leading up to the 11 September 2012 final attack, also should have had few doubts about who was responsible. According to closed door classified testimony on 26 June 2013 before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, AFRICOM commander Gen. Carter Ham (who happened to be in the Pentagon that night) immediately told Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Gen. Martin Dempsey about the attack, saying that it was unambiguously a terrorist attack. The two of themPanetta, and Dempseythen departed from the Pentagon together for a previously-scheduled meeting with President Obama at the White House. Even as these Defense officials were briefing the President on what was happening in Benghazi, telling him that the U.S. Ambassador to Tripoli, Christopher Stevens, was missing, the same information about the attack was reaching the Pentagon and key combatant commands, all of which were told the same thing: it was a terrorist attack. Later that night, Greg Hicks, the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Tripoli, spoke by phone with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other top State Department advisors, telling them that he feared Ambassador Stevens might be in the clutches of terrorists at a Benghazi hospital and that he was concerned about the possibility of a terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli as well. He soon learned from the Libyan prime minister that Stevens was dead, and relayed that information to the State Department at around 9 p.m. Washington time. But there was still nothing about a video. Nothing at all. Then came the 10 p.m. phone call from the President to Secretary of State Clintonthe person that almost no one (except Andrew McCarthy here) mentions. This was the 10 p.m. phone call that White House spokesman Jay Carney reluctantly mentioned on 20 *& February 2013 in response to questions from the press corps. According to CNS News, the President called Clinton to get an update on the situation. It was right afterward that Clinton released a statement linking the attacks to inflammatory material posted on the Internet, a reference to The Innocence of Muslims YouTube film trailer. As it turned out, that deliberately duplicitous initial reference to a video that had nothing to do with the attack on the Benghazi SMC presaged a full two weeks of false statements from President Obama, Secretary Clinton, White House spokesman Jay Carney, and others about the film clip. Neither Morell, nor any other top Obama administration official, has any excuse for not knowing the attack was a terrorist attack, or for thinking somehow that a demonstration or protests had preceded it. According to FOX News journalist Catherine Herridge, a report from the CIAs own senior officer on the ground in Tripoli, Libya confirmed in a 15 September 2012 email that the attack was not/not an escalation of protests, but rather a coordinated terror attack. That email was received by Morell, CIA Director David Petraeus, and other senior CIA officials a full day before Susan Rice was sent out to broadcast false information to the American people on the 16 September Sunday talk shows. But Morell still wasnt coming clean on everything. In November 2012, Morell was once again before the House Intelligence Committee, along with Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, and CTC Chief Matt Olsen. When asked who had been responsible for the talking points, Clapper said that he had no idea, while Morell remained silent. In another meeting that took place in late 2012, Morell again seemed to have trouble telling the truth. He and Rice met with Senators Kelly Ayotte (R-NH), John McCain (R-AZ), and Lindsey Graham (R-SC). Under questioning from the senators about the talking-points editing process, Morell tried to blame the FBI for cutting the reference to al-Qaeda terrorism; he said the FBI didnt want to compromise an ongoing criminal investigation. When Graham called the FBI and told them what Morell had said, they went ballistic, Graham said in an interview with Fox News. Confronted with this, Morell changed his statement and admitted that he, and the CIA, had been responsible after all. Confusion in the early hours, and even early days, following a chaotic situation such as that which confronted U.S. leadership on 11 September 2012 would be understandable. But it is the certain knowledge that our most senior civilian, intelligence, and military officers deliberately and repeatedly lied, including before Congress, about what they knew at the time to be a terrorist attack on our mission by al-Qaeda jihadis that so corrodes Americans trust in their leadership. This is particularly damaging because there is the appearance of a coordinated cover-up staged to ensure the re-election of a President whod staked his campaign on the repeated assertion that al-Qaeda had been decimated, or was on the path to defeat. In July 2013, Mike Morell joined the consulting firm of Beacon Global Strategies LLC, which had been founded not long beforehand by four others with close ties to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: Michael Allen, Jeremy Bash, Philippe Reines, and *' Andrew Shapiro (who was the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from 2009-2013, with responsibility for security relationships with U.S. Middle East partners). Clare M. Lopez is Vice President for Research and Analysis at the Center for Security Policy and a Senior Fellow at the London Center for Policy Research. She is also a member of the Citizens Commission on Benghazi. *(
Obama and His Media Loyalists Still Spinning Benghazi Roger Aronoff February 6, 2014
The media and Obama administration are at it again, trying to defend their earlier actions on Benghazi. For weeks following the September 11, 2012 attacks, President Obama and his colleagues blamed them on a spontaneous demonstration inspired by protests in Cairo, a position that has been repeatedly found to be patently untrue. But Obama would prefer that the American public ignore this and his other phony scandals. In fact, he told Bill OReilly in a recent pre-Super Bowl interview that scandals like the IRS controversy are the result of irresponsible reporting by Fox News. These kinds of things keep on surfacing in part because you and your TV station will promote them, he told OReilly. In an effort to convince us that Benghazi is not a scandal, Obama, arguing with OReilly, once again attempted to defend his completely indefensible narrative that in fact he said from day one that it was a terrorist attack (or in his words, an act of terror), and that the decision to claim the attack was the result of a spontaneous demonstration, sparked by an anti-Islam video, was made with the best information available. As Accuracy in Media has reported, General Carter Ham, head of AFRICOM, told *) then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta on the night of the attacks that there was a terrorist attack, not a spontaneous demonstration, in Benghazi. When asked about that, Obama maintained that Secretary Panetta told him that evening that it was just a plain attack. OReilly pressed the point. Understand, by definition, Bill, when somebody is attacking our compound, thats an act of terror, which is how I characterized it the day after it happened, responded President Obama. So, the question ends up being, who in fact was attacking us? It turns out, according to a recently released Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report, that the attackers were a mix of low-level terrorists: Individuals affiliated with terrorist groups, including [Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], Ansar al-Sharia, [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula], and the Mohammad Jamal Network, participated in the September 11, 2012 attacks, states the report. Ansar al Sharia was recently designated a foreign terrorist organization by the administration. But Obama still characterizes the attack differently. What happens is you have an attack like this taking place, and you have a mix of folks who just are troublemakers, you have folks who have an ideological agenda, you have some who are affiliated with terrorist organizations, you have some that are not, he said. Indeed, the SSCI report classifies the attack as not a highly coordinated plot, butopportunistic. However, to claim that that they couldnt classify it as a terrorist attack at the time is disingenuous. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) recently revealed that the FBI interviewed witnesses to the attacks on September 15, 16, and 17, and not one person ever mentioned anything other than a terrorist attack. No one mentioned a protest outside the consulate. Sen. Graham is backed up by the findings of the bipartisan Flashing Red report of December 2012. Yet the myth of a spontaneous protest in Benghazi lives on. And the debate could be seen on MSNBC, when in a post-State of the Union segment that included an interview with Representative Tim Huelskamp (R-KS), Rachel Maddow was left babbling, seemingly trying to turn the debate into a War on Women issue by suggesting that the congressman was being sexist in calling her a cheerleader. Maddow had just finished asking the congressman whether he had voted for bills that slashed funding for diplomatic posts in response to his outrage about Benghazi. But that is a phony issue, and Maddow must know that. State Department official Charlene Lamb had testified before the House that funding had nothing to do with the decisions surrounding Benghazis ongoing poor security. "+ Maddow: Did you just call me a cheerleader? Rep. Huelskamp: I dont know, maybe you have that history. Im saying Maddow: No, wait, wait. Hold on. Hold on. Rep. Huelskamp: When youre a cheerleader for the administration, youre not being a journalist. When youre not willing to look at the facts. If it was Bush, you would be jumping and screaming. Maddow: Youre amazing. Rep. Huelskamp made it clear that he was calling Maddow a cheerleader for the Obama administration. And, given her history, who could deny that? Then Mr. Thrill-up-his-leg Chris Matthews jumped in to claim that the SSCI report was a vindication of President Obamas and Susan Rices position on Benghazi. Clearly, Matthews either doesnt know whats in the report, or hes just doing his usual defend-Obama-at-all-costs routine. And also, by the way, the non- partisanor bipartisan, Senate Intelligence Committee has completely verified everything that Susan Rice said, every point, contended Matthews. [The attack] was caused by a copycat attack coming from Cairo over to Benghazi, which was itself stimulated by all the evidence they have by that crazy movie guy making a movie out in Los Angeles, he continued. And the fact that the use of the term extremist rather than terrorist came from the CIA, and the non-reference to the al Qaeda was a decision by the sainted General Petraeus at the CIA. Everything was done right. But wait. Didnt President Obama call it an act of terror from day one? If he knew it was a terrorist act, and not a spontaneous demonstration, why did Susan Rice, speaking on his behalf, say otherwise? Some intelligence suggests the attacks were likely put together in short order, following that days violent protests in Cairo against an inflammatory video, suggesting that these and other terrorist groups could conduct similar attacks with little advance warning, states the report. This has been used by some to say that the spontaneous demonstration narrative is true. However, the report does not call the attack a copycat attack, as Matthews does. In fact, the report says that intelligence analysts inaccurately referred to the presence of a protest at the [Benghazi] Mission facility and didnt rely enough on eyewitness statements in their data collection. "* As stated before, the eyewitnesses called it a terrorist attack in their interviews with the FBI. Former Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya Gregory Hicks characterized the YouTube video as a non-event in Libya in his testimony before the House. Clearly, some controversy remains over these points, and the difference in opinion appears to be between those sitting in their offices that night in the nations capital, who tried to spin the least harmful narrative two months before a presidential election, and those on the ground in Libya at the time. To suggest that Obama and Rice did everything right, and that they did not mislead the public, is also disingenuous on Matthews part.
Roger Aronoff is the Editor of Accuracy in Media, and can be contacted at roger.aronoff@aim.org.
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New York Times Attempts to Blur Benghazi Scandal Roger Aronoff and Bethany Stotts December 31, 2013
The New York Times latest piece on Benghazi is a farce, and some media outlets are calling the paper on this agenda-driven reporting. The piece, by Times reporter David Kirkpatrick, argues that the attacks on the Special Mission Compound and CIA Annex last year were in reaction to a YouTube video, and that there was no involvement by al Qaeda. If the Times thought this article would be the final word, they were badly mistaken. The effect has been to bring Benghazi back front and center, where it is getting new, badly needed scrutiny. Accuracy in Media has, time and again, disproven these points. But, given, the misinformation put forward by the Gray Lady, the facts bear repeating: Months of investigation by The New York Times, centered on extensive interviews with Libyans in Benghazi who had direct knowledge of the attack there and its context, turned up no evidence that Al Qaeda or other international terrorist groups had any role in the assault, reported The New York Times (emphasis added). The attack was led, instead, by fighters who had benefited directly from NATOs extensive air power and logistics support during the uprising against Colonel Qaddafi. I think, honestly, if you asked anyone in the U.S. intelligence business, they would tell you the same thing, said Kirkpatrick on NBCs Meet the Press. Theres just no chance that this was an al-Qaeda attack, if, by al Qaeda you mean the organization founded by Osama bin Laden. "# AIM asked James Woolsey, former CIA director under President Clinton, about al Qaeda in a different context, for the documentary Confronting Iraq. Al-Qaeda is both an organization and, in a sense, an ideology, he told us. In either sense of the term used for al Qaeda, they were definitely involved in Benghazi. But even if The New York Times were correct in its two main assertions, that would not exonerate President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for the administrations repeated decisions not to increase security at the Special Mission Compound despite the deteriorating situation in Benghazi. Nor would it address what is perhaps the biggest part of the scandal, the failure to send available forces to attempt to save the people under attack. That was what motivated many high-ranking military and CIA officers to come together to form the Citizens Commission on Benghazi, and it has never been satisfactorily explained. Matthew Vadum, writing for Front Page Magazine, outlines this blurring of the lines on Benghazi for just what it is: a shameless attempt to find wiggle room for Hillary Clintons political career. Vadum argues that the New York Times is attempting to rewrite the narrative about what really happened in Benghazi and afterwards. He writes, It is trying to resurrect the Obama administrations original line of argument in order to create wiggle room for Hillary Clinton who has been scathingly criticized by Republican lawmakers and the occasional Democrat for bungling the Benghazi saga. The Times editorial page editor, Andrew Rosenthal, pushed back against charges that the Times was providing political cover for Mrs. Clinton and President Obama: For anyone wondering why its so important to Republicans that Al Qaeda orchestrated the attackor how the Obama administration described the attack in its immediate aftermaththe answer is simple. The Republicans hope to tarnish Democratic candidates by making it seem as though Mr. Obama doesnt take Al Qaeda seriously. They also want to throw mud at former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who they fear will run for president in 2016. Charles Krauthammer, on Fox News Special Report, responded to Rosenthals defense of Kirkpatricks piece, saying, Well, I think he gave the game away. By being defensive about this, hes making it quite obvious the reason that the Times invested all the effort and time in this, and put on the front page precisely a way to protect the Democrats, to deflect the issue, to protect Hillary, who is exposed on this issue as almost no issue in her tenure in the administration. It is obviously a political move. The Times piece virtually ignores the security situation in Benghazi at the time, instead focusing partly on a video and its supposed impact on the attacks. As mentioned above, Kirkpatrick believes that local militias who defeated Gaddafi "$ are responsible for the attack, not al Qaeda. Some analysts argue that the White House, meanwhile, sought to play down any potential characterization of the assault as a Qaeda attack, because that would undercut its claims to have crushed Al Qaeda, wrote Kirkpatrick very ironically in October of 2012 for the Gray Lady. Is he serving that White House purpose now? Even Democratic Congressman Adam Schiff (CA) said that the intelligence indicates that al-Qaeda was involved, but there were also plenty of people and militias that were unaffiliated with al-Qaeda that were involved. As for the Times report, it may add some insights, but I dont think its complete, he said. The article even contradicts comments from Hillary Clinton, as reported in The New York Times on September 26 th , 2012, while the Obama administration was still trying to get its story straight: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has long operated in the region, she [Sec. Clinton] said, and was now exploiting a haven in Mali to export extremism and terrorist violence to neighbors like Libya. Now with a larger safe haven and increased freedom to maneuver, terrorists are seeking to extend their reach and their networks in multiple directions, Mrs. Clinton told leaders assembled at the meeting, including President Franois Hollande of France and the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon. And they are working with other violent extremists to undermine the democratic transitions under way in North Africa, as we tragically saw in Benghazi (emphasis added). Fox News Adam Housley was able to elicit statements from his sources about The New York Times reporting, one of which was, To say that it wasnt tied to Al Qaeda is completely false. There is literal evidence in many forms and shapes, directly linking him [Ahmad Abu Khattalah]. Other intelligence links al Qaeda to the attacks, including the CIA and FBI internal emails at the time. In an email sent on September 14, 2012 from the CIA, a staffer wrote Thanks Fyi FBI says AQ (not AQIM) was involved and they are pushing that theory. The New York Times uses Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrebs (AQIMs) lack of stated involvement in a letter found in Mali by the Associated Press as further proof that al Qaeda was not involved in the attacks, when the email cited above demonstrates that intelligence sources were analyzing core al Qaeda involvement days after the attacks occurred. Fox News correspondent Catherine Herridge points out that her news organization revealed that A former Guantanamo detainee, Sufian bin Qumu, who is suspected of training some of the operatives who took part in the assault, "% was in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, according to a knowledgeable source. Fox News was told last fall that the intelligence community was trying to determine whether he played any role directing the attack and whether he was physically on or near the consulate grounds. Of Qumu, the Times says: But neither Mr. Qumu nor anyone else in Derna appears to have played a significant role in the attack on the American Mission, officials briefed on the investigation and the intelligence said. So, contradictions still endure in this case, but we are supposed to take the Times unnamed official source as the gospel truth. As for Ansar al Sharia, The New York Times actually quotes from a militia leader who likened it to the Boy Scouts, and also talks about all the charitable things that Ansar al Sharia does: Ansar al-Shariah focused on charitable missionary work, including an antidrug campaign with local corporate sponsors, picking up garbage during sanitation strikes and offering exorcisms for those troubled by evil spirits. Al Nusrah does charitable deeds in Syria; that doesnt absolve it from its position as an al Qaeda-linked terrorist group. Ansar al Sharia is connected to al Qaeda, and has been connected since before the attacks. As pointed out in a recent AIM column, an August 2012 government counterterrorism report stated that Ansar al-Sharia (Supporters of Sharia), a militia group led by Sufian Ben Qhumu, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee, could be the new face of al-Qaeda in Libya despite its leaders denial (emphasis added). In a different direction, Ansar al-Sharia may become the new brand name under which jihadist groups in the Arab world seek to organize, the report stated. These are not words describing a locally oriented group. But the Republican arguments appear to conflate purely local extremist organizations like Ansar al-Shariah with Al Qaedas international terrorist network, reported Kirkpatrick in his controversial Times piece. It wasnt Republicans who wrote the August 2012 Library of Congress report weve cited. As for the spontaneity of the attack, Kirkpatrick writes that The attack does not appear to have been meticulously planned, but neither was it spontaneous or without warning signs. The violence, though, also had spontaneous elements. "& Lets put aside, for a moment, that Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, has said that he thought the operational phase of the attack lasted at least a couple of weeks. Libyan National Congress President Mohamed Yousef El-Magariaf estimated that they had been planning it for months when he appeared on CBSs Face the Nation on September 16, 2012. The Times mentions Susan Rices talk show appearances, but not Magariafs Face the Nation appearancewhich took place immediately before Rices. The idea that the attacks were the result of the videowhich the Times arguesis pure baloney, according to Aaron Klein writing for WorldNetDaily. After all, A review of more than 4,000 postings was conducted by the leading social media monitoring firm Agincourt Solutions, reportedly finding the first reference to the film was not detected on social media until the day after the attack, reports Klein. Former Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya Gregory Hicks, testifying before Congress, characterized the video as a non-event in Libya at the time. It was a coordinated attack. It is completely false to say anything else. It is completely a lie, one witness tells Fox News. For this individual [Kirkpatrick] to insult the intelligence of the American people is offensive, asserted former Congressman Allen West in a recent editorial. To them, if some jihadist does not walk up, give them a business card, and say, Hi, Im from al-Qaeda and Im here to kill you, then the threat isnt real and can be pushed aside. West is a member of Accuracy in Medias Citizens Commission on Benghazi.
Roger Aronoff is the Editor of Accuracy in Media, and can be contacted at roger.aronoff@aim.org. Bethany Stotts is a freelance writer, and former staff writer for Accuracy in Academia. She blogs at http://bethanystotts.wordpress.com/. "' There is, however, a limit at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue. ~ Edmund Burke
The Honorable John Boehner Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives The Capitol, H-232 Washington, D.C., 20515
March 5, 2014
Dear Speaker Boehner,
Through the investigative journalism of Fox News reporter Catherine Herridge, a report of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and the investigation and litigation efforts of Judicial Watch, we now know that there is compelling evidence that former Acting Central Intelligence Director Michael Morell has made false and misleading statements to Congress. This issue demands your immediate personal attention.
We were pleased to see that our letter of January 6, 2014 may have persuaded you and your various committee chairs investigating the Benghazi attacks to make some limited efforts to promote information gathered through the uncoordinated work of the House.
But the establishment of the Internet website, The House Republican Investigation of Benghazi only highlights the inadequacies of House efforts to date. Most Americans, in addition to a large majority of your partys caucus, demand a full and complete investigation of this terror attack. Mr. Morells statements and conduct appear to have materially contributed to confusing and misleading the Congress and the American people. Susan Rices latest rounds of lies about Benghazi on the February 23, 2014 edition of Meet the Press illustrate the contempt that this Administration has for your committees investigation to date.
Americans want facts and justice not controlled leaks of heavily redacted interview transcripts. The latest polling shows, Sixty-six percent of voters want Congress to keep investigating the White Houses handling of Benghazi. That includes 50 percent of Democrats, 68 percent of Independents and 83 percent of Republicans.
Once again, we urge you to now create a House Select Investigative Committee on Benghazi fully resourced with staff and subpoena powers to conduct a thorough, coordinated investigation.
Mr. Morell must be compelled to appear before Congress and explain his statements and conduct. Even if he invokes his right not to testify under the Fifth Amendment, then the Congress must pursue, through a Select Committee, the many unanswered questions and apparent Obama administration cover-up of the terror attacks that cost the lives of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service Officer Sean Smith, and Security Officers Glen Doherty and Ty Woods.
In addition to these new concerns about potentially false and misleading testimony and information being provided to Congress, there are a host of other Benghazi-related questions that remain unanswered. Most troubling perhaps are the still unresolved questions about whether any Obama Administration officials prevented available military assets, especially in the African "( Command (AFRICOM), from being used to protect and secure American personnel and facilities under attack in Benghazi. Indeed, Judicial Watch recently obtained new documents, first uncovered by a retired military officer, that dramatically highlight significant U.S. Navy assets that could have been deployed to assist and protect U.S. lives on September 11, 2012.
Gravely disturbing evidence of possible criminality and abuse of both public office and the public trust is now before you. Mr. Speaker, you must act now.
Sincerely,
The Undersigned
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History of the Muslim Brotherhood Penetration of the U.S. Government Clare M. Lopez Gatestone Institute April 15, 2013 http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3672/muslim-brotherhood-us-government As bad as these developments were, things became immeasurably worse for American national security under the administration of Barack Obama. Whereas President Bush and most of his administration insiders remained largely unaware that they had been manipulated by the Muslim Brotherhood, Obama and his close advisors proactively chose to reach out to the Brotherhood, its affiliates, and supporters for advice, training, and even administration appointments.
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Another senior affiliate, Rashad Hussain, is the Obama administration's envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Hussain's background is replete with Muslim Brotherhood associations, including the American Muslim Council (founded by al-Qa'eda and Muslim Brotherhood operative, Abdurahman Alamoudi); the IIIT (which is on the Brotherhood's own list of "our friends and the organizations of our friends"); and the Muslim Students Association (MSA, the original Brotherhood front group in the U.S.).[82] In his official capacity, Hussain is responsible for providing advice on national security and Muslim outreach. He assisted in writing the President's June 2009 Cairo speech, in which Obama announced a new approach to the Muslim world and essentially declared war on his host, then-President Hosni Mubarak, by publicly signaling his recognition of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. Hussain also acts as point man for the Obama administration's cooperation with the Istanbul Process, the OIC effort to criminalize internationally any criticism of Islam. The current administration's weeks-long duplicity in the aftermath of the 11 September 2012 terror attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya, when it repeatedly and mendaciously claimed that an Internet video trailer sparked a protest there that got out of hand, appears to have been carefully scripted not just with the OIC but Muslim Brotherhood organizations in the U.S., as well.