THE DUNES TESTS:

By the early 1970s the ionization device had developed a reputation as a detector that had an enormous false alarming problem. Also it had very little if any effect on the fire deaths in homes. So, a comprehensive fire test program, financed by the federal government, was initiated during 1974 to evaluate performances of fire detectors. It was called the Dunes Tests and involved two test series totaling 76 live fire tests. The manufacturers claimed the device would detect all four categories of fire (which were defined as: Incipient, Smoke, Visible Flame and High Heat), and would do so before smoke or flames appeared. The first significant test, which was Test No. 2, with an upholstered chair ignited with a charcoal lighter (as a smoldering type fire). Smoke appeared at 60 seconds. The duration of the smoldering (until flames appeared) was 1 hour and 43 minutes. The average time for the nine ionization devices installed was 1 hour and 34 minutes. The average for all smoldering fire tests during the Series 1 program (40 tests) exceeded one hour. Here is the box score fore the ionization device during Phase 1. Of the tests where xxx of the 40 tests involved smoldering type fires: Dunes Tests, Series 1 There were 18 smoldering fire tests with 9 ionization detectors installed per test. The results were: 1. Zero detectors operated within 5 minutes. 2. 1 operated within 10 minutes. 3. 28 (out of 162) operated within 30 minutes. 4. The average time for the device to operate (when it did operate) was 66 minutes.

Clearly, to any honest engineer, a detection time of one hour or more after the smoke appeared did not agree with the claims by the manufacturers that the device would sound before smoke appeared. This testing confirmed that the manufacturers were advertising false performance claims within the NFPA publication and that UL was approving a defective device. If the truth was told concerning the actual results of the tests the manufacturers, NFPA and UL might all have been indicted for fraud. However, the engineer in charge of the Dunes Tests, Mr. Richard Bukowski, worked for UL. Mr. Bukowski and the other engineers lied about the results of the testing and claimed that, In general, all smoke detectors responded well to all fires. THE SMOKE DETECTOR FRAUD REPORT: When I received a copy of the report prepared after the Dunes Tests I analyzed the computer generated data at the rear of the report and compared the data to the conclusions. I immediately realized the fire engineers that did the testing rigged the tests and also lied about

the results. I exposed the fraudulent testing in my 1976 report, The Smoke Detector Fraud. The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and the California Fire Chiefs (CalChiefs) then conducted their own tests of the device during 1978. The device performed so poorly that the engineer in charge, Chief John Gerard of the Los Angeles Fire Department, began to warn other fire chiefs relative the device. He predicted that the device would have a 50 to 80 per cent failure rate. However, Mr. Richard Bukowski had left UL and went to work for the federal government. He was able to pressure the fire chiefs to bury the Cal-Chiefs report. Thus the marketing of a fraudulent and often deadly so-called smoke detector continued. ONE HOUR IS NOT INSTANTANEOUS: Even a fifth grade child will be able to understand that when a manufacturer of a so-called smoke detector claims in full page ads, over a 15 year period, that the device will warn before smoke or flames will appear, and then under testing the time of operation exceeds one hour, something is wrong. Fire engineers know full well that if a fire smolders for an hour or more while those within the home are asleep, and then the smoldering fire breaks out into a fast growing flaming fire without a warning, that can be a very deadly scenario. The continued marketing of this device which, to date, has probably been the cause of 75,000 fire deaths has been an incredible betrayal of the public. THE HEAT DETECTOR LIES: The manufacturers of the ionization device realized when they first began to sell a fraudulent device with performance lies, that the heat detector was a road block to gaining full control of the market for fire detectors for the home. The heat detector had been the trigger for the fire sprinkler system for nearly a hundred years. And even though the lag time was deliberately made large to prevent premature operation and unnecessary water damage, still it was very close to a hundred percent guarantee of fire safety. Thus the heat detector was the number one enemy of those who wanted to make the phony smoke detector the code standard detector. By whatever means, the engineers who conducted the Dunes Tests were motivated to falsify the testing and the report so that the heat detector could be classed as defective and therefore removed from the fire detection code, NFPA No. 74. During the first 40 tests (Series No. 1) no real (fixed temperature) heat detectors were installed. Obviously, if none were installed, none would operate. But the Bukowski Team that wrote the report that stated, The results of the experiments indicate that these heat detectors including the one in the room of fire origin, failed to respond to a majority of the fires. This was an obvious and blatant lie because none were installed. Some Rate-of-Rise detectors had been tested; but these were not the type of detector in the code. They were not the type that would be installed in a home. And the reason why they failed to operate was because these devices (which were intended to detect fast growing flaming fires) were being tested against smoldering type fires (little or no heat). The required heat rise to operate these Rate-of-Rise detectors was a 15 degrees F. per minute (actually an extremely slow heat rise for a flaming fire). But smoldering type fires produce virtually no heat. It was like condemning a Cadillac automobile because it sank when used as a boat. But, why did the FPEs, who were advised of the corrupt nature of the Dunes Tests, continue to

promote the phony detector while concealing its flaws. I believe it was because they were weaned on the codes and depended on the codes so greatly. The FPEs did not want the fire chiefs and the public to realize that the codes were corrupt.

FIRE TESTING THAT EQUATED TO MURDER: The fraudulent testing relative the heat detector during the Dunes Tests, Phase 1 (40 tests) created much criticism. This deception did not fool the relatively few fire officials who actually read the report. So, there was a demand for more honest testing of the heat detectors during the Phase 2 Tests. Therefore, during the Dunes Tests Phase 2, the engineers ran 6 flaming fire tests that clearly produced sufficient heat within 10 minutes of ignition. This was more than sufficient heat to operate fixed temperature heat detectors (the correct type). But, the engineers reported that during those six hot fire tests the heat detectors sounded during only one fire test. Seemingly, this five out of six failures of the heat detectors during Phase2 finally convinced the fire chiefs that the heat detector should play no role in protecting lives in homes. There was a double message to these supposed failures. Fire sprinkler systems also are operated by heat detection. So, the message was that both heat detector and fire sprinkler systems were inferior to the ionization device for protecting lives in homes. When I analyzed the Dunes Tests Series 2 data, I discovered the reason for the five failures of the heat detector to perform during the hot fire tests. During five of the six hot fire tests the engineers failed to install heat detectors in the fire rooms. Yes, the engineers removed the heat detectors from the fire rooms before five of the six hot fires were lighted. Then they convinced the fire chiefs that the heat detector was useless protection in a home. MY REPORT, THE SMOKE DETECTOR FRAUD: When I received a copy of the Dunes Tests, Phases 1 and 2 during 1976, before I read much of the report I realized it was all a fraud. Indeed, I was so shocked by the conclusions that I spent weeks assembling the data. The data for any one test was located within 11 separate sections at the rear of the report; hence organizing the data first was needed to figure out the facts for any test. Then I wrote my report entitled appropriately, The Smoke Detector Fraud. I realized that by revealing the corruption within a federally financed test, largely conducted by engineers from Underwriters Laboratories, I was putting myself in a position where I was certain to be attacked. But, the alternate was to be in league with those who would kill children for profits. I sent 3000 copies of my report to fire engineers and fire officials nationally. In return I received only one reply, a reply critical of me for disseminating the information. It is the fire engineers that I will give the lions share of the blame for the continuation of this horrible children killing fraud. It is the trained engineers who were best able to comprehend the technical aspects of the smoke detectors failings. The engineers had a DUTY OF CARE to protect the public from frauds of this nature. They not only failed to demand honesty, they facilitated the corruption. This is one of the reasons why I call it VOODOO ENGINEERING.

THE PRUDENTIAL BUILDING FIRE AND REPORT: On January 2, 1986, approximately 10 years after I sent 3000 copies of my report, The Smoke Detector Fraud, to engineers and fire officials, a fire occurred in the Prudential Building in Boston. A fast growing fire initiated on the 14th floor of this office building. The fire broke through the supposed fireproof elevator doors and rose upwards within this 52 story high rise. The smoke poured out of the fireproof elevator shafts on floors 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52. There was an ionization type smoke detector in each elevator lobby of these floors. The smoke was so thick it produced a visibility of less than ten feet, meaning it was potentially a deadly mix of smoke, toxic gases and heat. Although the smoke flowed for two hours as fire control operations were in progress, none of the smoke detectors on these floors operated. However, after the fire was put out the fire inspectors tested these so-called smoke detectors and all of them sounded. The fire proved what I warned of ten years previously. The devices were not capable of detecting real (visible- large particulate) smoke from a smoldering (low heat) fire or aged smoke (that has cooled and become large particulate smoke) from a flaming fire. In this case, the smoke from the hot fire cooled on the way up the shafts and became large particulate smoke before entering the detectors. This fire motivated a thorough investigation and report by the following organizations: Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), the Boston Fire Department and Yale University. The report was detailed and an excellent technical explanation of the reasons why the ionization device is not capable of detecting (promptly enough to save lives) a high percentage of the fires that occur within homes. Also, in a very dramatic way, this fire and the report confirmed that the way that the firefighters routinely test the smoke detectors is with a phony test device. It a spray can (looking like a bug spray) that delivers the right particulate to cause the device to sound. Unfortunately, a real fire often will not deliver the right particulate to cause the device to sound. Perhaps the FPEs could find some justification for having ignored the findings and warnings in my report ten years prior. I was but one engineer rebutting the claims of the powerful, including the NFPA and UL. But here was one of the most prestigious engineering schools in the country providing irrefutable facts relative a very dangerous device. There was no valid excuse to ignore this report by WPI et al. But the marketing of a deadly device to the consumer continued. A DUTY OF CARE: Engineers have an obligation to the public. Engineers have a duty to protect the public, not unlike a doctor having a duty to the patient. The conduct of the FPEs during the three plus decades when the ionization device was known to be defective, and the defects were being concealed as thousands of children died, was nothing short of criminal. R. M. Patton