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Emotion
Robert C. Roberts

Introduction
The disciplinary diversity of the recent literature on emotions is indicative of the many dimensions of human life that emotions touch. Neuroscientists and other physiologists study them because emotions have rather specific neurological, neurochemical, and other bodily correlates. Anthropologists and historians study them because their character and the popular understanding of them can vary significantly from culture to culture and age to age. Evolutionary psychologists study emotions because at least the most basic ones have defensive and reproductive functions in supporting species survival. Experimental and social psychologists study them, often, with respect to their behavioral outputs, where behavior covers a wider class of movements than what philosophers call actions, for example emotions spontaneous facial expressions. Clinical psychologists study emotions because they impinge on social functioning and psychological well-being. Legal theorists study them because of their connection to the legal responsibility of defendants and their roles in the judgments of judges and juries. Specialists in religion study emotions because many or all religious experiences have emotional characteristics. Emotions interest philosophers in virtually all of the above connections, and in the ways these interrelate. Each of these disciplinary domains will tend to favor its own kinds of theories about what an emotion is neuroscientists neurological models, anthropologists social regulation models, evolutionary psychologists biological survival models, etc. but even theorists sharing the same discipline often offer many competing models. After surveying a few scientific models, Ronald de Sousa comments, It should be clear from this partial sampling that emotions theory has not unequivocally emerged from the methodological chaos that entitles it to be called philosophy (2010: 103). One common dimension of human life that can be fruitfully studied in connection with the emotions is ethics, and the present essay will focus on emotions relevance to that dimension. I will begin by reviewing four main questions to which major philosophers have offered answers regarding the relevance of emotions to ethics: Are human emotions the fundamental source of ethical values? Are emotions cognitive states? Can emotions be ethically appropriate motives to action? Which emotion types are relevant to ethics? Surveying the answers to these questions will put before us some of the main historical positions about emotions and ethics. Then in the second half of the essay, assuming affirmative answers to the second and third questions above, I will survey five aspects of the broadly ethical life in which emotions play a significant role.

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Edited by Hugh LaFollette, print pages 15901600. 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/ 9781444367072.wbiee290

Some Historical Positions

Are human emotions the fundamental source of ethical values? One of the distinguishing features of the eighteenth-century sentimentalist approach to emotions and ethics (see sentimentalism; sentiments, moral; shaftesbury, third earl of; smith, adam; hume, david) is that it seeks to find the source of ethical and other values in human emotions (see ayer, a. j.). In this feature sentimentalism is analogous to such other modern projects as the grounding of ethics in pleasure or happiness (see utilitarianism), pure practical reason (seekant, immanuel), or a social contract (see hobbes, thomas). It seems highly plausible that emotions are in some sense evaluations of the things or situations toward which they are directed. If I get angry at a colleague for something she says about me to the Dean, it seems clear that I take what she said to be inappropriate, wrong, opprobrious, inopportune, or something else negative; if I feel grateful to her for what she said, I assess it as appropriate, helpful, or good. It seems equally clear, however, that not just any emotion is fit to deliver the correct evaluation. If I am in a personal struggle with my colleague for promotion to Department Chair, or romantically infatuated with her, my emotions about her actions may be biased and unreliable. Emotions are not only evaluations; they are also subject to evaluation. So Hume (1978 [173940]: 472) tells us that evaluatively reliable emotions must be experienced from a disinterested standpoint, and Smith (1969 [1759]: 13942) requires that the evaluative emotion be one with which the impartial spectator can sympathize. But private interest is not the only distorter of our evaluative sentiments, so it is not enough for the evaluator to be disinterested; he or she must also be mature, wise, and good. But then we can ask, Which maturity, wisdom, and goodness? The one recommended by Nietzsche? Or that of Mohammed? Or Gandhi? Or Jesus? Or Socrates? Or Ben Franklin? The trouble with the emotions of all these sages, regarded as a foundation for ethical distinctions, is that they presuppose definite moral opinions the very kind of thing that was supposed to be derived from them. The foundational sentimentalist project requires the discovery of a class of emotions that are universally or at least paradigmatically human, are not infected with moral prejudices, and yet somehow have within them the potential to ground or yield moral judgments. The search is still under way for emotions answering this description (DArms and Jacobson 2003; Roberts 2010). The sentimentalists foundational project may be hopeless, but emotions are connected to morality in less problematic ways. Plato (see plato) and Aristotle (see aristotle) give emotion dispositions a central place in moral education and in the shape of mature ethical character. Several of the virtues that Aristotle analyzes in his Nicomachean Ethics turn out to be dispositions to experience emotions of one type or another at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way (NE 2.6, 1106b212). Courage is a disposition to feel fear and confidence rightly (1107a334), gentleness to feel anger rightly (4.5, 1125b2534), temperance to feel pleasures of touch rightly (3.10,

1117b25). Other virtues, such as liberality and justice, are not analyzed with reference to some particular emotion type, but Aristotle says that one cannot be said to have the virtue of justice if one does not take pleasure in performing just actions, nor liberality if one does not take pleasure in liberal actions (NE 1.8, 1099a1620). We can perhaps extend this insight by noting that to be a just person also involves a disposition to be emotionally distressed at injustice, grateful to those who help out in just causes, to admire people whose commitment to justice is conspicuous, and so forth. For Aristotle, emotions are significant in the moral life because they make possible the full engagement of the person in her actions and judgments. It is not enough merely to act rightly, nor even to act and judge rightly; only with emotional engagement is the agent fully present in her actions andthoughts. Scholars do not all agree concerning just what kind of cognitive state Aristotle took emotions to involve. (For the debate, see Cooper 1996; Nussbaum 1996.) Some hold that he, like the Stoics, took them to require judgment or belief about the emotions cognitive content. In this view, if fear involves the cognition that some feature of the subjects current situation is a threat that attains a certain probability of eventuating and a certain degree of momentousness, then anyone who fears something believes or assents to the proposition that her situation contains such a threat. But the Stoic view does not seem to be true, since phobics sometimes know that what they fear is harmless and people sometimes feel guilty about actions they do not regard as really wrong. So it seems likely that the cognitive content of some emotions, including instances of anger, guilt, shame, and fear, needs only to be an impression or appearance (Greek phantasia), not a full-fledged judgment. It is noteworthy that in Aristotles definitions of the various emotion types in Rhetoric 2.111, the language of appearance dominates in characterizing the subjects take on her situation. In any case, whether Aristotle took emotions to require evaluative judgments or only evaluative impressions, he certainly thought that mature emotions involve some kind of correct cognition of the situationsto which they are directed (see reason and passion). Because of emotions power to orient a person evaluatively, that is, to engage him with respect to both his actions and his judgments, bad or inappropriate emotions are a real detriment. They are a major distorting factor in the character defect of moral weakness or weakness of will (akrasia) (NE 7.110; see weakness of will), and Aristotle says that people who are immature, by deficiency of either years or moral living, are not suited to hear lectures on ethics, because they follow their passions (NE 1.3, 1095a8). Still, it would be foolish to try to eradicate all emotions. Not only would the project fail; if it succeeded, it would ruin its subjects character as a human being. By contrast, the official doctrine of the Stoics (see stoicism) is that all emotions are false value judgments, and that none of them is a feature of moral maturity. On the official Stoic view, emotions (passions) are judgments to the effect that something or other that is beyond the subjects control is very good or very bad. For example, my anger at my colleague for reporting to the Dean that I went fishing and left a graduate student in charge of my classes amounts to a judgment that my colleagues

report is a very bad thing. However, according to official Stoicism, nothing that is beyond the subjects control is very good or bad (though such things can be preferable or dispreferable); the only thing that is really good is good character and the only really bad thing is bad character, and these are within our control. (One thing that seems to be good, yet beyond our control, for the Stoics, is the beautiful rational order of the universe that to which the sage has conformed his mind.) I refer above to the Stoics official view, because in practice they sometimes take a much more moderate view. In this connection it is interesting to compare Senecas treatise On Anger with his treatise On Favors (see Seneca 1995). In On Anger Seneca, in orthodox Stoic fashion, criticizes anger across the board and recommends strategies for eradicating it. But in On Favors, he criticizes people who are ungrateful and commends the feeling of gratitude, and of joy in both the giving and the receiving of favors. Surely, gratitude and joy are as fully emotions (passions) as anger is! Here Seneca looks a bit more like Aristotle, in trying to delineate when gratitude is appropriate and when it is not (except that Aristotle in fact does not commend gratitude in particular, and seems to think it a rather servile emotion type) (see NE 4.3, especially 1124b1023; see gratitude). We have seen that the sentimentalists want to derive moral values from emotions, but cannot derive them from the ordinary emotions that are shaped from an early age by our culture and our moral beliefs. Perhaps this explains, in part, why they tend to work with a rather stark dichotomy between reason and passion. Unlike the Stoics, who think that emotions are generically rational while mistaken (like beliefs formed by reasoning from a false premise), the sentimentalists tend to think of emotions as non-cognitive (see non-cognitivism), as making no kind of claim at all, as blank impulsive feelings and colorings of experience. This position is hard to maintain, since people can often give reasons for the emotions they have, and emotions tend, as Aristotle notes in the Rhetoric, to engender judgments; and it is easy to detect the sentimentalists saying things that covertly presuppose these facts. Immanuel Kant is the last philosopher whose views I will sketch before moving on to a more substantive analysis of emotions moral import. Kant is less critical of the emotions than official Stoicism, because he does not think that emotions have to be positively obnoxious, or contrary to normative reason. Though emotions of all types except one (respect for the moral law) lack intrinsic moral value, he says that if we always just acted from duty and never felt any benevolence for one another, agreat moral ornament would then be missing from the world (1996 [1797]: 576), and he seems to think that proper emotions can have various kinds of instrumental value in aid of our doing our duty (1996 [1785]: 4950; see also Sherman 1990). Kant appears to inherit the sentimentalists dichotomy between emotions and reason. He strongly associates emotions with sensation, sensory desire, inclination, heteronomy, self-interest, and passivity, as opposed to reason, agency, duty, limitation of self-love, and autonomy. Morality falls decisively on the latter side of the dichotomy, preventing most emotions from being properly moral motives.

Nevertheless, Kant cannot sideline all feeling from the moral life, and he places one emotion (Gefhl) firmly at the center of morality (this one is not merely an ornament and has intrinsic moral value), and gives it an internal relationship to reason. He says, [b]ut though respect [see respect] is a feeling, it is not one received by means of influence; it is, instead, a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different from all feelings of the first kind, which can be reduced to inclination [passive attraction] or fear [passive repulsion] (1996 [1785]: 56 n.). Unlike the other feelings, respect is fully rational and agential, being respect for the rational law that the practically rational agent gives himself in his freedom. Let us turn now to a more systematic account, considering first which emotion types have moral significance, and then looking at some of the major ways emotions figure in the moral life. In each of the dimensions that I will expound, emotions can play either a salutary and positive moral role, or a deleterious, negative one.

Which Emotions Have Moral Properties?

Philosophers tend to think that some, but not all, emotion types have moral properties. We see two tendencies of restriction. The first is to emotions whose type-definitions require that they be directed (a) at human beings or (b) even at human beings in their aspect as responsible agents. We have noted Kants restriction of moral emotion to respect for the moral law (one interpretation of which makes it respect for humans as having dignity). John Rawls (1971: 724, 47290) identifies the special moral emotions as guilt, resentment, indignation, shame, contempt, and derision, and marks other emotions regret, fear, anxiety, joy, sorrow, anger, and annoyance as (nonmoral) natural feelings. Alan Gibbard (1990: Ch. 7) says the moral emotions are guilt and anger. Anger (resentment, indignation) and guilt may be thought to fall in the (b) part of the category (emotions that are directed only at persons as responsible agents), and shame, contempt, and derision in the (a) part (emotions that are directed only at persons). But if this is the principle, then regret, fear, annoyance, and many other emotions that do not necessarily but do sometimes take human beings or responsible human beings as their objects should count as moral emotions when they do so. It is remarkable that both Rawlss and Gibbards lists include only what we might call negative emotions, attitudes of detraction or rejection. This is the second tendency of restriction. Perhaps the dominance of negative emotions in the lists comes from seeing morality as restricting, limiting, setting boundaries, on proper conduct. Kant says that respect has both a detracting and an attracting aspect, but its strong connection to the moral law would also suggest that it is about restriction andboundaries. Hume and the ancients have a broader conception of morality, in which it has as much or more to do with what we love and seek as with boundaries andobligations. In this essay I will suppose that pretty much the whole range of emotion types are relevant to ethics and have both morally positive and morally negative instances.

Thus joy can be morally admirable if it is, say, about the healthy birth of ones neighbors baby, and morally despicable if occasioned by a traitors willingness to hand over an innocent but politically troublesome man so that he can be judicially murdered. I turn now to emotions five broadly moral functions, hoping that what I have just claimed will be borne out by the cases.

Five Moral Dimensions

Epistemic
Emotions, when well formed, can mediate to us a special kind of moral knowledge, which we might call appreciation. Consider the case of a former racist contemplating an especially egregious action in which he humiliated an innocent member of the race that he formerly despised. Imagine first that he contemplates the action with equanimity. He is fully convinced that the action was wrong and can easily explain to others what is wrong with it. He has no inclination to perform such action again. It would appear that he has justified true belief about the moral status of the action. But he contemplates it without emotion. Imagine now a contrasting case which is the same as above, except that the agent feels ashamed of himself for having done the action, and feels compassion for the victim. The subjects moral knowledge seems better in the second case. The added knowledge is not more extensive; he does not know any extra moral facts about himself and the victim. But what he does know, he knows more profoundly, more intensely; he grasps it more intimately and personally. We might say that he is acquainted with the truth in a way that the person contemplating it with equanimity is not. We could also say that, morally speaking, he understands his action better than the other does. He appreciates better the actions deplorableness and its significance for the victim. Because emotions color their objects in values, they can misinform as well as deepen our understanding. That is why I qualified the claim in the first sentence of the preceding paragraph with the words when well formed. When Huck Finn feels burning guilt about abetting his friend Jims escape from slavery, he sees himself as having wronged Miss Watson, Jims owner (The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Ch. 16). Prior to his feeling of guilt, if anyone had asked Huck, in a cool moment, whether his helping Jim escape was wrong, he could have put a couple of his beliefs together and inferred the answer that his sense of guilt now burns with immediacy into his consciousness. So the emotion precipitates this false belief, makes it explicit, and does so in a very forceful way so forceful, indeed, that Huck undertakes, with moral effort, to correct his mistake. Hucks emotion dispositions have been partially malformed by the surrounding slave-holding culture, and to that extent are not reliable guides to moral truth. So some of his moral emotions are illusory. The lesson here seems to be that emotions have an important moral epistemic function primarily that of enabling an appreciative understanding of the value

of things but that, like other human epistemic faculties, they will be oriented to truth only if they have been properly trained. However, adult human beings are not helpless victims of their malformed emotions. If we are reflective (as Huck, being a child embedded in a slave-holding culture, is not), we often know which of our emotions to trust and which not to trust, as regards the values they intimate to us.

Motivational
Emotions often motivate, moving their subjects toward actions. Fear moves us to avoid what we fear, anger or resentment moves us to retaliate against the perpetrator whose action or omission angers us, remorse or guilt moves us to make amends to the one against whom we have transgressed and to act better in the future, hope encourages us to pursue ends that without hope of success we would only wish for, envy moves us to demean the rival whose superiority threatens our sense of ourselves, gratitude moves us to return good to those who have blessed us. Other emotions, like joy and admiration, are less specific in what they move us to, though they too move us. When an emotion moves us to an action, it features in what we might call the moral identity of the action. For example, Nietzsche thinks that some actions that most people would describe as acts of compassion for example, providing meals for the homeless in downtown Chicago are in fact acts of resentment against, or envy of, powerful, life-affirming, and self-confident people. Perhaps Nietzsche is right about this, in at least some cases. The very same movements ladling soup, soliciting donations at street corners, making beds, and so forth are very different actions, varying in moral value, depending on whether they are to be explained as expressing resentment or compassion. Another possibility is that they express both emotions. Human actions are often complicated and emotionally overdetermined, and if my point about emotions determination of actions moral identity is correct, some actions may not admit of any simple moral identification. Novelists and sensitive biographers may be better equipped than philosophers, by the narrative tools of their trade, for sketching the moral identity of such actions, for displaying what a person is really doing in doing such-and-such.

Relational
A third way that the moral life, broadly conceived, involves emotions is their partially constitutive role in our interpersonal relationships. Our friendships and enmities, our family relations, our collegialities and civic relationships (for example, with our neighbors) are all what they are, for better or worse, largely because of our emotions. Emotions can be directed in three relevant ways: at the relational other, toward oneself, and at other things that have some bearing on the other and oneself. As examples of the first, consider the roles of gratitude and anger. Friends, family members, and colleagues who feel grateful to one another for help given tend to be more generous with their own help, and thus to foster a cycle of gratitude and good will toward one another. They are bonded in this willing mutual dependency. They value

one another, and the sense of being valued by the other is gratifying to each. Gratitude is, in a way, the symmetrical opposite of anger, gratitude being a response to being given good with a desire to give back good, while anger is a response to being given bad with a desire to give back hurt. Just as gratitude tends to bond the parties to one another, anger tends to alienate them, pushing in the direction of enmity and estrangement. Just as we like to be seen as good by others, as proper objects of benevolence and aid, not necessarily out of vanity or ambition but out ofan instinct for friendship, so we dislike being seen by others as worthy of condemnation and punishment, not just because we want to be off the hook but out of a desire to be esteemed. Of course, generosity and gratitude are more than attitudes: we expect them to be expressed in material action. But the attitude that such material actions express is at the very heart of the relationship. No amount of material aid, given in the absence of a benevolent attitude, will constitute friendship, or good collegial or civic relations. Our examples have been gratitude and anger, but emotions of many other types also go into our relationships with one another. We bond also by rejoicing with one another over successes and regretting and deploring one anothers defeats. Envy of the others accomplishments or invidious pride of our own undermines our friendships and family love. Sharing one anothers hopes and fears builds our relationships, while fearing what the other hopes for and hoping for what the other fears tear them down.

Eudaimonic
It is characteristic of eudaimonistic ethics to suppose that living well morally tends to coincide with flourishing or happiness (though happiness in this sense is compatible with some suffering) (see happiness). The application of the foregoing discussion to the eudaimonistic idea is that emotions that put us in touch with truth about values, motivate us correctly, and constitute healthy relationships with our fellow human beings will ipso facto be characteristic of a flourishing human life. However, in a world that is out of joint, the emotions characteristic of flourishing will not be uniformly pleasant. When their job is to give us appreciation of evils, they will be of such distressing types as regret, indignation, sadness, guilt, shame, and grief. By virtually the same token, painful emotions will motivate the flourishing person for the frequent corrective actions that he or she will be called on to perform, though she will also experience hope for their success, gratitude for the help of others in her work, and gladness when some corrective endeavor succeeds. Since she is imperfect herself, and her family, friends, colleagues, and neighbors are also flawed, her relationships will sometimes be marred by resentment, envy, invidious pride, and ingratitude, either on her part or on the others. Because of these obstacles, it seems unlikely that anybodys eudaimonia will be complete in this life. At the same time, eudaimonia is pretty clearly not entirely beyond our reach. And the gist of the present essay is that those who want to understand it will want to pay attention to the place of emotions in the moral life. Those who seek it for themselves and others will also want to attend to the possibility

of educating the emotions, a topic that I have barely touched on (see moral development; moral education).

Aretaic
I have noted that Aristotle thought some of the virtues (notably courage, temperance, and mildness) to be dispositions to respond with emotion that is right with respect to object, occasion, aim, intensity, and duration. Other virtues, such as justice and liberality, are dispositions to perform the virtues characteristic actions with pleasure presumably something like emotional pleasure. Aristotle does not regard the ability to control wayward anger, fear, envy, joy, hope, shame, guilt, and so forth, as fully virtuous, though it is certainly better than being a complete slave to ones passions. Most of us will probably be more liberal than Aristotle in what we allow as virtuous. We will allow that the ability to master or control our emotions, when they are wayward, is an important part of moral virtue. What do we mean by master or control? We can mean either of at least two things. First, if I find myself enjoying malicious gossip, I may be able to turn off the emotion, that is, stop myself enjoying the gossip, perhaps by imagining how the gossipee would feel were she present, or by focusing on my participation under thedescription treachery. Second, controlling an emotion may mean withholding the behavior or action that it motivates. If I find myself angered by what someone says, but in a situation that I would worsen by expressing my anger, I may be able to stifle the behavior without much changing the anger itself. In either case, emotional control requires ongoing evaluative monitoring of ones emotional state vis--vis ones larger and smaller social situation, and some managing of either the emotion or the emotions expression (probably both). The ability to do the self-monitoring is a kind of self-knowledge, and the ability to manage the state or behavior is a kind of skill. The two combine to make up a kind of virtue different from the ones that Aristotle stresses. A full account of the virtues in their connection to emotions would include both of these kinds of virtues, and probably others. As with the other moral dimensions or connections of the emotions, the trait-related dimension can be morally deleterious as well as salubrious.

Conclusion
The Kantian narrowing of the field of moral emotions, as well as the Stoic rejection of all emotions from the life of virtue, have seemed extreme to most recent thinkers about morality and the emotions; and the tendency that most decisively distinguishes sentimentalism, namely the project of basing morality on the emotions, has not eventuated in any clear and convincing version of the theory. Of the major options in the history of philosophy the oldest, namely the classical view represented by Plato and Aristotle, is the one that still seems most plausible. That view allows that a wide range of emotion types (joy, anger, respect, hope, regret, fear, confidence, guilt, shame, love, and so forth) can have a moral character, and that there can be both

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morally good and morally bad instances of any of these types. It allows that the particular moral quality that any particular instance of emotion has is strongly associated with that emotions cognitive content, and therefore that emotions in general are some kind of cognitive state (taking cognitive in a broad sense). Apersons anger or fear is typically about or of something, and the object has to be taken in a certain describable way for the emotion to be anger or fear rather than, say, envy or hope. On this view, therefore, emotions can be correct or incorrect, fitting or not, true or false of what they areabout. As to the origin of the standards by which an emotion may be morally appropriate or inappropriate, that question could be settled in a variety of ways without affecting the general Aristotelian treatment of the place(s) of emotions in the moral life. Asuper-philosopher might generate the standards by simply creating a conception of human nature, in the way that Nietzsche seems to commend (1966 [1886]: VI, 136). Or the standards might derive from a supposed divine revelation and its development over many centuries into a unified understanding of human nature, in the manner of the Hebrew-Christian tradition. Aristotle himself seems, on the surface of his text (but see NE 6.1, 1138b2132), to think that his doctrine of the mean provides the rules of propriety of emotions, but this cant be right, since he explains an emotions being in the mean by reference to its being right in various ways. If we attend to the way he actually derives the standards for fear and confidence (NE 3.69), for example, it looks as though he gets them from consulting what the wise and the many of his culture think about them, and then processing these opinions by critical dialectic, applying his own philosophical, psychological, and social reasoning to them. All in all, a particular conception of human nature emerges which supplies rough standards of propriety for the emotions. see also: aristotle; ayer, a. j.; gratitude; happiness; hobbes, thomas; hume, david; kant, immanuel; moral development; moral education; non-cognitivism; plato; reason and passion; respect; sentimentalism; sentiments, moral; shaftesbury, third earl of; smith, adam; stoicism; utilitarianism; weakness of will
REFERENCES
Aristotle 1926. Art of Rhetoric, trans. J. H. Freese. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Aristotle 1980. Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross, rev. J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cooper, John M. 1996. An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions, in A. O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotles Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press. DArms, Justin, and Daniel Jacobson 2003. The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (Or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism), in Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. de Sousa, Ronald 2010. The Minds Bermuda Triangle: Philosophy of Emotions and Empirical Science, in Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Gibbard, Alan 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hume, David 1978 [173940]. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kant, Immanuel 1996 [1785]. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In Mary Gregor (ed. and trans.), The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41108. Kant, Immanuel 1996 [1797]. The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of The Metaphysic of Morals. In Mary Gregor (ed. and trans.), The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 507603. Nietzsche, Friedrich 1966 [1886]. Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House. Nussbaum, Martha C. 1996. Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion, in A. O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotles Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rawls, John 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Roberts, R. C. 2010. Emotions and the Canons of Evaluation, in Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 56183. Seneca 1995. Seneca: Moral and Political Essays, ed. J. M. Cooper and P. F. Procop. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sherman, Nancy 1990. The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality, in Owen Flanagan and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Identity, Character, and Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 14970. Smith, Adam 1969 [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. E. G. West. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.

FURTHER READINGS
Ayer, A. J. 1936. Language, Truth, and Logic, 2nd ed. London: Gollancz. Bandes, Susan (ed.) 1999. The Passions of Law. New York: New York University Press. Corrigan, John (ed.) 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Deigh, John 2008. Emotions, Values, and the Law. New York: Oxford University Press. Ellington, J. (ed. and trans.) 1983. [Kants] Ethical Philosophy, Indianapolis: Hackett. Goldie, Peter (ed.) 2010. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kant, Immanuel 1963. Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield. Indianapolis: Hackett. Kant, Immanuel 1974 [1798]. Anthropologie from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Mary Gregor. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Roberts, R. C. 2003. Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roberts, R. C. 2009. Emotional Consciousness and Personal Relationships, Emotion Review, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 27986. Rorty, A. O. (ed.) 1996. Essays on Aristotles Rhetoric. Berkeley: University of California Press. Sorabji, R. 2000. Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williams, Bernard 1976. Morality and the Emotions, in Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.