FIRST DIVISION MARIETTA DUQUE, Complainant, A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2027 Present: pUNO, C.J.

, Chairperson, CARPIO, Corona, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION,* JJ. Promulgated: February 27, 2009

- versus -

JUDGE CRISOSTOMO L. GARRIDO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City [presently assigned as Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Carigara, Leyte], Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: In a verified letter-complaint1[1] dated February 7, 2006 complainant Marietta Duque charged respondent, Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban City, Leyte, with gross violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond ninety (90) days in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 entitled People v Reynaldo Caones y Royo Sr., et al. Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in the aforementioned Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580. She claimed that the respondent Judge violated Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond the 90 day reglementary period without requesting an extension of time from this Court. She alleged that the prosecution filed its Memorandum submitting the case for resolution on August 10, 2005, but the respondent issued a Decision on December 12, 2005 which was promulgated on January 27, 2006. Complainant further alleged that neither the offended party nor the handling prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.

In a 1st Indorsement2[2] dated March 22, 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required respondent Judge to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. In his Omnibus Comment3[3] dated May 18, 2006, respondent judge denied the accusation that the decision in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 was rendered beyond the 90-day period as prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. He explained that while the last pleading - the Memorandum for the Prosecution was filed on August 10, 2005, the Order declaring the case submitted for resolution was issued on September 13, 2005. Respondent further explained that the Decision dated December 12, 2005 was promulgated only on January 27, 2006 because he was on official leave from December 15, 2005 to January 15, 2006 as he left for the United States. Respondent maintained that there was no impropriety or procedural infirmity in the promulgation of the decision even though the complainant and the handling prosecutor, Robert M. Visbal, were not present at that time. He reasoned that the complainant is not entitled to be notified of the promulgation as she is neither the private complainant nor a witness, while the prosecution was duly represented during the promulgation by Prosecutor Edgar A. Sabarre who was also assigned in the RTC. Respondent pointed out that the court had already set the schedule of the promulgation. Hence, when Prosecutor Visbal opted not to attend, it was for a reason only known to him. Reacting to respondent's explanation regarding Prosecutor Visbal, the complainant attached to her Reply4[4] an Affidavit5[5] executed by said prosecutor wherein the latter averred that he was never informed of the date of the promulgation and that he was surprised to learn that respondent judge promulgated the decision in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 with Prosecutor Sabarre appearing in his behalf. In his Rejoinder6[6] respondent Judge claimed that his track record in deciding cases filed with the OCA bear out that no case of his had been decided beyond the 90-day reglementary period, as some were even decided within thirty (30) and sixty (60) days from the date the case was submitted for decision

In a Report7[7] dated September 6, 2006, the OCA found respondent judge administratively liable for rendering a decision beyond the 90-day period in violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Additionally, respondent was found to have violated the franking privilege under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 26. The OCA thus recommended: 1. That the instant administrative case be Re-docketed as a regular administrative matter. 2. That respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido be found Guilty of Undue Delay In Rendering A Decision, in which case he should be meted with a penalty of Fine in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) with a Stern Warning that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely. 3. That respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido be Admonished for violating the franking privilege in filing his rejoinder to this administrative case.8[8] In the Resolution9[9] dated October 9, 2006, the Court noted the lettercomplaint, the comment of the respondent judge, the complainants reply, respondents rejoinder thereto and the report of the OCA. Subsequently, by Resolution dated December 11, 200610[10], this Court required the parties to manifest, within ten (10) days from notice, their willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. In compliance thereto, both parties submitted their respective manifestations which the Court duly noted in the Resolution dated March 12, 200711[11]. We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA. Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official duties.

Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days, to wit: (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. (Emphasis ours) Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as follows: Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory.12[12] The Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts.13[13] Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.14[14] As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the Memorandum for the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 200515[15]. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the decision should have been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However, respondent issued it only on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months after the case had been submitted for decision. Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed for the lower courts.

Whenever a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he has to do is to ask the Court for a reasonable extension of time to resolve it.16[16] In this case, granting that it was for a justifiable reason to render a decision or resolve a matter beyond the reglementary period, the respondent could have sought additional time by simply filing a request for extension. Respondent, however, did not avail of such relief. Respondent did not proffer any tenable justification for the delay in rendering the decision. He insisted that it was proper and procedural to first resolve the parties' memoranda before the case may be considered submitted for decision. He, thus, would want the Court to consider his Order17[17] dated September 13, 2005 resolving the memoranda of the parties and declaring the case submitted for resolution as the starting point of the 90-day period for deciding the case and not on August 10, 2005, the date when the last pleading was filed. Administrative Circular No. 28 issued by this Court on July 3, 1989 regarding the submission of memoranda for purposes of deciding cases, clearly provides: x x x The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. (Emphasis ours) A judge cannot even justify his delay in deciding a case on the excuse that he was still awaiting the parties' memoranda. In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,18[18] the Court held: x x x judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit memoranda within the given periods. Non-submission of memoranda is not a justification for failure to decide cases. The filing of memoranda is not a part of the trial nor is the memorandum itself an essential, much less indispensable pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. As it is merely intended to aid the court in the rendition of the decision in accordance with law and evidence - which even in its absence the court can do on the basis of the judges personal notes and the records of the case - non-submission thereof has invariably been considered a waiver of the privilege. (Emphasis ours)

Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a disciplinary sanction.19[19] Under Section 9(1)20[20], Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) 21[21] of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. In a case, we held the respondent judge administratively liable for gross inefficiency for delay in the disposition of cases and fined him P20,000.00 considering that he failed to act promptly and decide eight (8) cases within the time prescribed by law and it was not the first time that an administrative case was filed against said judge.22[22] In another, the respondent judge failed to decide three (3) cases and resolve eleven (11) motions within the reglementary period. Considering that it was the judge's first offense, the Court imposed a fine of P15,000.00.23[23] For failure of respondent judge in this case to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the prescribed period and taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that it was his first offense, we impose on him a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). We agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent must also be penalized for violation of P.D. No. 2624[24] because he filed his Rejoinder to this administrative case taking advantage of the franking privilege. Although such privilege is extended to judges, the same refers only to official communications and papers directly connected with the conduct of judicial proceedings which shall be transmitted in the mail free of charge. The respondent, in mailing his Rejoinder, made it appear that the same is an official court process as the envelope used bears his station and the

words FREE FROM POSTAGE. We concur with the OCA that respondent be admonished for such violation. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido is hereby found GUILTY of GROSS INEFFICIENCY for delay in the disposition of a case and for which he is FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Presidential Decree No. 26 for which he is ADMONISHED. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of the decision be attached to his personal record.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.M. No. RTJ-07-2045

January 19, 2010

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. JUDGE HARUN B. ISMAEL, Respondent. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: On April 25 to May 14, 2005, a judicial audit was conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22, presided over by respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael. The judicial audit resulted in the issuance of a memorandum dated June 9, 2005 by the Office of Court Administrator (OCA)1 directing respondent to explain his failure to decide and act on current and inherited cases, as well as to resolve incidents in various cases pending before him, within the reglementary period provided by law.2 Respondent was likewise directed to inform the OCA if cases already submitted for decision or resolution had in fact been decided or resolved within the reglementary period.3 Consequently, respondent was ordered to immediately cease hearing cases in his sala and confine himself to deciding or resolving cases submitted for decision or resolution. In respondents stead, Judge Edilberto G. Absin was directed to handle active cases, other than cases submitted for decision, until respondent could comply with the directives or until he retired. The OCA likewise directed Atty. Insor A. Pantaran to explain the results of the audit, as was required of respondent. Atty. Pantaran was the clerk of court of the RTC of Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 22 during respondents tenure. Atty. Pantaran complied with the June 9, 2005 memorandum in a letter dated May 19, 2006.4 In its memorandum dated February 26, 2007,5 the OCA noted that respondent failed to fully comply with its directives in the June 9, 2005 memorandum. Neither did he ask for extensions of time within which to comply with the subject directives. On examination of Atty. Pantarans May 19, 2006 letter/compliance, the OCA found that respondent had partially complied with the directives of the June 9, 2005 memorandum, having already decided or resolved some of the cases he was directed to act on. Nonetheless, the OCA established that respondent committed gross inefficiency when he unduly delayed actions in a huge number of cases. The OCA recommended that respondent be fined P20,000. Furthermore, the OCA recommended that Judge Absin be directed to decide and resolve the cases pending in respondents sala. The OCA likewise directed the designation of Judge Loreto C. Quinto6 as assisting judge. The factual findings of the OCA are well-taken. However, we vary the penalty imposed in the light of the circumstances of the case. It is settled that failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency7 and is not excusable. It is a less serious charge8 and is punishable by either suspension from office without salaries and benefits for not less than one month but not more than three months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.91avvphi1 The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.10 Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code11 admonishes all judges to

dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases12 within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution.13 We emphasize that the administration of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer.14 As aptly held in Salvador v. Judge Limsiaco:15 A judges foremost consideration is the administration of justice. Thus, he should follow the time limit set for deciding cases. xxx Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. It also undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute. Decision making, among other duties, is the most important duty of a member of the bench. (citations omitted) Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,16 this administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar.17 Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 118 and 1219 as well as Rules 1.0320 and 12.0421 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Harun B. Ismael is hereby found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary for which he is FINED in the amount of P20,000. Respondent is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03, 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is FINED in the amount of P10,000. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of Administrative Services, the Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED. RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Chairperson WE CONCUR: PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice JOSE C. MENDOZA Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION

JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, Complainant,

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2248

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, - versus PERALTA, PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ.

JUDGE MARIA ELISA SEMPIO DIY, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 225, Respondent. September 29, 2010
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

Promulgated:

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment and dismissal from judiciary service filed by complainant Judge Adoracion G. Angeles (Judge Angeles) against respondent Hon. Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Judge Sempio Diy), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 225, which stemmed from consolidated Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 entitled People of the Philippines v. Proclyn Pacay and People of the Philippines v. P/Insp. Roberto Ganias, respectively. Judge Angeles charges respondent Judge Sempio Diy with Violations of Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; Section 2, Canon 2 and Section 5 Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary; Rule 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; Number 6 of the Code of Judicial Ethics; Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; Section 4 paragraph b of Republic Act No. 6713 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; Falsification of Official Documents; and Dishonesty. Complainant urges the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to examine the numerous violations allegedly committed by the respondent and to make an assessment if, indeed, she is

still worthy to wear the judicial robe or, if her continued presence on the bench would unduly tarnish the image of the judiciary.25[1]

In her Comment, 26 [2] respondent Judge Sempio Diy vehemently denies the material allegations in the complaint. She claims that complainants charges are harsh, rash and baseless, calculated merely to harass and destroy the reputation of a younger sister in the profession.27[3]

As synthesized by the OCA in its Report28[4] dated May 7, 2010, the facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant Judge Angeles alleges that she is the private complainant in the above-mentioned cases which, by order of respondent Judge Sempio-Diy dated 20 June 2008, were submitted for decision, and the promulgation of judgment was set for 11 September 2008. In a subsequent Order dated 8 September 2008, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy moved the promulgation of judgment to 17 September 2008, for the reason that she had a previously scheduled medical consultation concerning a neck ailment. Thereafter, the promulgation of judgment on 17 September 2008 was cancelled and reset to 17 October 2008, with respondent Judge Sempio-Diy citing voluminous case records and health problems as grounds to support her request before the Court of a thirty (30)-day extension.

On 17 October 2008, the promulgation of judgment was once again cancelled and reset to 14 November 2008 on account of a second request for extension of time based on the ground that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy had just recently arrived from a trip to the United States where she attended a symposium on religious freedom. Following a third request for extension of time, the promulgation of judgment was reset for the last time to 12 December 2008. Finally, the Joint Decision in the subject criminal cases was promulgated on 12 December 2008, wherein all the accused, except for accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino, were acquitted. To complainant Judge Angeles, the said Decision was belatedly rendered because there was a lapse of six (6) months from the time it was submitted for resolution to the time it was promulgated. She further avers that her personal examination of the case records revealed that no requests for extension of time to decide the subject cases were made by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy. Likewise, she notes that the case records do not show that requests for extension of time, if any had indeed been made by respondent Judge SempioDiy, were granted by the Supreme Court. It is her opinion that such requests and Resolutions of the Supreme Court granting the same should be made integral parts of the case records. As for the reasons proffered by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy for the repeated cancellation and resetting of the dates for promulgation of judgment, complainant Judge Angeles argues that: (1) respondent Judge Sempio-Diys medical check-up could have been done on any other day that would not conflict with the scheduled promulgation; (2) the neck ailment was not as serious as it was made to appear because respondent Judge Sempio-Diy was able to travel abroad to attend a symposium; and (3) the claim that she needed time to study the voluminous case records is not a valid excuse because respondent Judge Sempio-Diy found time to travel abroad instead of attending to her pending cases. In fine, complainant Judge Angeles is adamant in her contention that the Joint Decision in the subject criminal cases was rendered way beyond the 90-day period prescribed by the Constitution. In addition, complainant Judge Angeles raises another instance where respondent Judge Sempio-Diy is supposed to have incurred unjustifiable delay. As it happened, convicted accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino assailed the Joint Decision by filing an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on 5 January 2009, which the prosecution countered in its Opposition filed on 14 January 2009. However, it was not until 30 July 2009, or more than six (6) months later, that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy issued an Order submitting the incident for resolution, it appearing that the accused through counsel has failed to file the necessary pleading despite the period given by the Court . Less than a month later, or on 24 August 2009, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy resolved the pending matter by denying the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Despite the denial of the said Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, things did not sit well for complainant Judge Angeles. For her, the Resolution dated 24 August 2009 was belatedly issued by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy. First and foremost, she contends that the incident should have been submitted for resolution upon the filing of the prosecutions Opposition on 14 January 2009.

And yet, it was more than six (6) months later, or only on 30 July 2009, that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy issued the Order submitting the said incident for resolution. Secondly, complainant Judge Angeles asserts that there was no basis for the trial court to have to wait for more than six (6) months before submitting the motion for resolution considering that there exists no order in the case records directing the accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino, through counsel, to file the necessary pleading. Asserting that there was no basis for submitting the incident for resolution only after the lapse of six (6) months, complainant Judge Angeles further contends that the Resolution issued by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy on 24 August 2009 denying the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise delayed for a total of more than seven (7) months. To support her assertions, complainant Judge Angeles attached to her COMPLAINT a Certification issued by Benedict S. Sta. Cruz, Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 225, Quezon City, wherein the latter attested that, based on the record of People vs. Proclyn Pacay, et al., Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690, it appears that there is no order from the Court directing the defense to file a reply to the Comment/Opposition (to the Motion for Reconsideration) filed by the prosecution on January 14, 2009 . She also points out that there appears to be an irregularity in the face of the Order submitting the incident for resolution. In particular, she refers to the date of its issuance July 30, 2009which is written in a different font when compared to the rest of the contents of the said Order. She, therefore, contends that the said date was merely typewritten in lieu of another date which was snowpaked. By failing to decide/resolve the subject cases and the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration within the period mandated by law and jurisprudence, as well as in falsifying official documents, complainant Judge Angeles now stresses, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, New Code of Judicial Conduct, Code of Judicial Ethics, Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials. For her part, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy belies the accusations hurled at her by complainant Judge Angeles in the latters COMPLAINT. In her COMMENT dated 2 December 2009, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy counters that she decided the subject cases in due time and within the extended period granted by the Supreme Court. She maintains that the orders resetting the promulgation of judgment were issued in good faith and in the interest of full transparency, pursuant to her request to decide the subject cases expeditiously.

For starters, she notes that she merely inherited the subject cases which had already been previously handled by three (3) other judges from the time they were filed in 1995. Thus, the case records were voluminous.

For another, the first resetting of the promulgation of judgment from 11 September to 17 September 2008 was occasioned by her illness, which assertion she substantiated by way of a Medical Certificate. She points out that the setting

of the promulgation of judgment on 17 September 2008 is still within the Constitutionally-prescribed 90-day period for deciding the subject cases. As for the three (3) subsequent re-settings, she avers that she timely asked for extensions of the period, all of which were granted by the Supreme Court. To support her claim that she did not incur delay in the promulgation of judgment, she appended to her COMMENT certified true copies of her first and second letters/requests addressed to the then Assistant Court Administrator, Jesus Edwin A. Villasor (now Deputy Court Administrator) and other related documents. These requests were favorably considered by the Court and she was granted an extension of a total of ninety (90) days from 18 September 2008. She likewise attached to her COMMENT a copy of her third letter/request to prove that this was filed prior to the lapse of the original 90-day extended period granted to her. In fine, she insists that there was no unjustified delay when the Joint Decision was finally promulgated on 12 December 2008 as the same was still within the original 90-day extended period reckoned from 18 September 2008. The Courts granting of her third request for an additional thirty (30) days in a Resolution dated 16 February 2009 had, by then, become moot and academic. While she admits that her letters/requests for extension and the Supreme Court Resolutions granting the same were not attached to the voluminous records of the subject cases, she nevertheless manifests that these were kept in a separate folder. With regard to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, she points out that the delay was inadvertently incurred in good faith. During the hearing of the said motion on 29 January 2009, the request of the defense for time to file the necessary pleadings was granted, for which reason, she says, the said motion could not yet be submitted for resolution. She deemed it prudent to give the parties a reasonable period of time within which to submit their adversarial pleadings. To substantiate this contention, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy attached to her COMMENT the transcript of stenographic notes taken on that day and the Minutes of the proceedings of the same day. In the light of the foregoing, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy discredits the import of the Certification issued by the Branch Clerk of Court, Benedict S. Sta. Cruz, by arguing that, while there is no order appearing in the case records directing accused SPO1 Carino to file his Reply to the prosecutions Comment to his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the said directive appears in the Minutes of the hearing conducted on 29 January 2009. She likewise notes that during the said hearing, the said Branch Clerk of Court was not present.

Respondent Judge Sempio-Diy likewise attributes the inadvertent delay to the unfortunate crises that befell her, her mother, and the courts personnel sometime in May to July of 2009. She reported to the Office of the Court Administrator that they received a series of death threats which caused, among others, disorientation. Thus, it was only on 30 July 2009, after the semi-annual inventory, that an Order submitting the matter for resolution was issued. She stresses that the incident was resolved within thirty (30) days from its

submission. As for the snowpaked correction of the date of the said Order, she avers that this was simply due to a typographical error.29[5]

Complainant Judge Angeles filed her Reply to respondents Comment and, thereafter, respondent Judge Sempio Diy filed her Rejoinder in amplification of their respective claims. Later, complainant filed her SurRejoinder on February 9, 2010 while respondent filed her Reply to the SurRejoinder on February 18, 2010.

In its evaluation, the OCA found that Judge Sempio Diy cannot be held guilty of unreasonable delay in rendering the Joint Decision in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 given her seasonably-filed requests for extension of time. The requests were all granted by this Court in the November 24, 2008 Resolution, giving respondent a total extension period of ninety (90) days from September 18, 2008. The OCA, however, opined that respondent should be administratively sanctioned for incurring delay in the resolution of accused Carinos Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter against Judge Sempio Diy and that she be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for her delayed action on a motion for reconsideration

with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.30[6]

After a judicious review of the records of the case, this Court determines that the findings of the OCA are well-taken. However, We modify the recommended disposition in light of the circumstances of the case.

The Court finds no evidence to sustain the charges of delay against Judge Sempio Diy in rendering the Joint Decision in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690. It is the stance of the complainant that Judge Sempio Diy merely sat on the cases for an unreasonable length of time and failed to resolve them within the constitutionally prescribed 90-day period. This constituted gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions. Judge Angeles accuses respondent of concocting requests for extension and making it appear that these requests were granted by this Court. Complainant avers that she perused the records of the consolidated criminal cases but respondents alleged requests for extension and the Courts Resolutions allowing them were nowhere to be found.

Complainants contentions fail.

Records reveal that Judge Sempio Diy timely sought for three successive extensions31[7] of the period to decide the consolidated criminal cases. All requests were favorably considered by this Court. 32 [8] Respondent was granted a total extension period of ninety (90) days to be reckoned from September 18, 2008 or until December 18, 2008. So, the promulgation of Joint Decision on December 12, 2008 was made well within the 90-day extension period. Complainant should have first verified the veracity and accuracy of her allegations from the records of Branch 225, this Court and the OCA, before hurling accusations of dishonesty and slothful conduct against respondent. Truly, respondent was charged with a litany of imagined sins relative to her alleged undue delay in deciding the subject consolidated criminal cases without sufficient proof.

We hold, however, that there was indeed delay in resolving accused Carinos Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed on January 5, 2009.

Respondent Judge Sempio Diy claims that the delay in submitting accuseds motion for reconsideration was due to inadvertence and without bad faith on her part. She explains that she opted to wait for the defense to

file its reply to the prosecutions comment on the motion for reconsideration because the offense of which accused was convicted was serious and his liberty was at stake. She adds that the death threats she and the members of her judicial staff received from May to July 2009, caused them disorientation and contributed further to the delay in the resolution of the subject motion. She readily admits that it was only after the semi-annual inventory that the pending incidents in the consolidated criminal cases were considered submitted for resolution in the July 30, 2009 Order.

Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct33[9] admonishes all judges to dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution.34[10] This is supplemented by Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, requiring judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.35[11]

A careful perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes36[12] and the Minutes37[13] of the hearing held on January 29, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690, would clearly show that respondent indeed gave the defense ten (10) days to submit its reply to the prosecutions comment on the motion for reconsideration and, thereafter, she would resolve all pending incidents in said consolidated cases. As correctly observed by the OCA, the reglementary period to resolve the motion in question began to run from February 8, 2009 or after the lapse of ten days from January 29, 2009. Respondent, however, did not act on the matter and allowed a hiatus in the consolidated criminal cases. A judge cannot choose to prolong the period for resolving pending incidents and deciding cases beyond the period authorized by law. Let it be underscored that it is the sworn duty of judges to administer justice without undue delay under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Judges should act with dispatch in resolving pending incidents, so as not to frustrate and delay the satisfaction of a judgment.38[14]

Judge Sempio Diy, having been a member of the judiciary for several years, should not have any trouble disposing the courts business and resolving motions for reconsideration within the required period. Otherwise, she should formally request this Court for an extension of the deadline to avoid administrative liability. Unfortunately, she failed to do that in these

cases. Delay in resolving motions and incidents within the reglementary period of 90 days fixed by the law cannot be excused or condoned.39[15]

Respondents claim of death threats on her and her staff, even if real, would not constitute a valid excuse for her inaction. After all, as member of the judiciary, she must display diligence and competence amid all adversities to live up to her oath of office. Besides, when said threats were received from May to July 2009, the three-month mandatory period for resolving the motion had already expired. Accordingly, respondent cannot rely on said predicament to exonerate her from administrative liability for incurring undue delay in resolving the subject motion. Although it is true that Judge Sempio Diy finally issued a resolution 40 [16] denying accused Carinos motion for reconsideration on August 24, 2009 or within 30 days from the time the incident was submitted for resolution on July 30, 2009, her inaction on the motion for more than 6 months is not excused.

It appears that respondent has simply forgotten about the pending motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 after said cases became inactive due to the failure of the defense to submit its reply. The realization of the blunder came only during the semiannual inventory of the courts cases. This situation could have been avoided had respondent adopted an effective system of record management and

organization of dockets to monitor the flow of cases for prompt and efficient dispatch of the courts business. Elementary court management practice requires her to keep her own records or notes of cases pending before her sala, especially those that are pending for more than 90 days, so that she can act on them promptly and without delay. In Ricolcol v. Judge Camarista,41[17] the Court declared:
A judge ought to know the cases submitted to her for decision or resolution and is expected to keep her own record of cases so that she may act on them promptly. It is incumbent upon her to devise an efficient recording and filing system in her court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court management is as much her responsibility. She is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of her official functions.

The Court reminds the respondent of her duty to closely supervise and monitor the monthly docket inventories to forestall future occurrences of this nature. Pertinently, the Court held in Gordon v. Judge Lilagan:42[18]
The physical inventory of cases is instrumental to the expeditious dispensation of justice. Although this responsibility primarily rests in the presiding judge, it is shared with the court staff. This Court has consistently required Judges for a continuous inventory of cases on a monthly basis so that a trial judge is aware of the status of each case. With the assistance of the branch clerk of court, a checklist should be prepared indicating the steps to be taken to keep the cases moving. In Juan v. Arias [72 SCRA 404 (1976)], the Court underscored the importance of this physical inventory stressing it is only by this that the judge can keep himself abreast of the status of the pending cases and informed that everything is in order in his court.

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, 43 [19] this administrative case against respondent shall also be considered a disciplinary proceeding against

her as a member of the bar.44[20] Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 145[21] and 1246[22] as well as Rules 1.0347[23] and 12.0448[24] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In determining the sanction to be imposed on errant magistrates, the Court considers the factual milieu of each case, the offending acts or omissions of the judges, as well as previous transgressions, if any. In the instant case, there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive that could have compelled respondent to delay the resolution of the subject motion. In fact, when respondent found out about the unresolved subject motion in the consolidated cases, she immediately ordered its

submission for resolution on July 30, 2009. In the absence of malice, the delay could only be due to inadvertence. It is significant to note that respondent resolved the motion within thirty days from its submission date which clearly showed her effort to zealously attend to her duties. Lastly, it appears that this is her first infraction and the first time for her to face an administrative complaint of this kind.

Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order constitutes a less serious charge punishable by either suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of not more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. However, considering that this is her first infraction due to inadvertence, We believe that admonition will suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Maria Elisa Sempio Diy is found to have been in delay in the rendition of an order in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 and is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in observing the reglementary period for disposing of motions.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

EN BANC

CITY OF CEBU,

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2111

Complainant,

(Formerly A.M. No. 05-2207-RTJ)

Present:

PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,* - versus CORONA,* CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ. JUDGE IRENEO LEE GAKO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional

Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City, Respondent.

Promulgated:

May 7, 2008 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by the City of Cebu against now retired Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr.49[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Cebu City, for serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, willful violation of rules and laws, judicial interference, tolerating forum-shopping, and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

Following established procedure, the Court initially referred the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.50[2] The OCA later found the respondent judge

administratively liable for undue delay in deciding Civil Case No. CEB29570, and for gross ignorance of the law, which is tantamount to grave abuse of judicial authority, when he violated the doctrine of non-interference in Civil Case No. 30684. The OCA, therefore, recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; the respondent judge be fined P11,000.00 and be suspended without pay for 6 months; and the motion to direct the respondent to compulsorily inhibit himself from all cases pending in his court in which complainant is a party-litigant be denied for being judicial in character.51[3]

Subsequently, the Court designated Court of Appeals Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas to further investigate and evaluate the charges leveled against the respondent. As summarized by the said Investigating Justice, the factual backdrop of the charges is as follows:

1) Serious Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law on Two Counts 1.a) In Civil Case. No. CEB-26607: Spouses Roque and Fatima Ting vs. City of Cebu, complainant charged respondent judge for having arrogated unto himself the duty which pertains to that of a counsel, when respondent judge called to the witness stand a certain Mr. Darza as witness of the court, when neither parties lawyers in the said civil case were interested to present said person as their witness. During the appointed hearing, respondent judge, by himself, conducted the lengthy examination, without even making an offer of the purpose for which the witness testimony is presented, while the counsels refused to propound any question to the witness. xxxx 1.b) The 2nd count under this charge of misconduct, etc., arose from the proceedings in Civil Case No. CEB-29570: Cebu Ports Authority (CPA) vs. City of Cebu.

Plaintiff in this case sought a temporary and permanent declaration from the court of respondent judge to enjoin Cebu City from further proceeding with the auction sale of the port and plaintiffs other properties owing to the notice and warrant of levy issued against CPA after the latter refused to pay the real property taxes assessed by the city against it. CPA claimed being exempted from its coverage. Complainant City of Cebu accused respondent judge of procrastinating and virtually sitting on the main case of injunction, which he voluntarily promised to resolve before the end of the month (December 2003). The Order dated 12 December 2003 of respondent judge shows that he suggested not to issue a Temporary Restraining Order, but, nevertheless and quite confusingly, enjoined the parties to observe the status quo, since the decision of the court on the main case of injunction is forthcoming at the end of the month. However, the decision came only on 6 December 2004 after complainant filed an Omnibus Manifestation on 10 October 2004, reminding the judge to make good his former and own commitment. This delay cost the city of Cebu to sustain substantial damages as it miserably failed to collect real property taxes. Complainant additionally accused respondent judge of having calculatingly failed to take judicial notice of a decided case [Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) vs. City of Ilo-Ilo, G.R. No. 109791, July 14, 2003 ] which the city invoked as case law for the dismissal of the complaint and, at the same time, relied upon by plaintiff CPA to champion in the latters main cause of action. Had the respondent judge considered the case with utmost circumspection, he would have resolved the main issue at the earliest possible time in the citys favor, the main issue in the case of CPA v. Cebu City having been squarely ruled upon already in the cited PPA case. xxxx 2) Willful Violation of Rules and Laws, on Four (4) Counts including Two (2) Counts of Judicial Interference. This involves four distinct actions perpetrated in separate incidents involving four cases, namely: 2.a) Civil Case No. CEB-26066: Roy Feliciano, et al. vs. City of Cebu, et al. This case is one for Injunction, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction by reason of the defendant-city of Cebus issuance and implementation of a Demolition Order against the houses/structures of Feliciano, et al., the plaintiffs, the latter having physically and publicly occupied a road lot and sidewalk at the North Reclamation Area in Cebu City. During the hearing for the application of TRO, Feliciano, one of the plaintiffs, who took the witness stand, admitted in open court their occupancy of the sidewalk. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which, among others, obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street. The law allows the summary demolition or removal of the structures considered as public nuisance. Thus, on the basis of plaintiffs judicial admission, that they are occupying a sidewalk, the city of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Instead of dismissing the complaint, respondent judge proceeded with the trial. It is for this act that complainant Cebu City in this administrative case accuses respondent judge of willful violation of the foregoing laws and rules. It is further complained that respondent judge in this Feliciano case granted plaintiffs demand to be relocated absent any law to support therefor or lacking proof in plaintiffs pleadings that they were qualified and not disqualified beneficiaries for the

relocation and settlement, as required under Sections 16 and 17 of Republic Act. No. 7279; that the afore-cited laws were completely disregarded by the respondent judge, as if they never exist. It is advanced that the act of respondent judge of tolerating plaintiffs violation of certain requirement of the law amounts to his own violation thereof. xxxx 2.b) Civil Case No. CEB-29550: Colon Transport Terminal, represented by its Operator, Engr. Renato C. Asegurado, and Inter Urban PUV Terminal, represented by its Operator, Jessie S. Lasaleta, vs. Cebu City Police Traffic Group, et al. (For: Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Mandatory Injunction), referred to hereinafter as, first case. Civil Case No. CEB-29730: Mr. Jessie S. Lasaleta, doing business under the trade name and style Inter Urban PUV Terminal, vs. City of Cebu, et al. (For: Declaration of Nullity of City Ordinance No. 1958, as amended with Prayer for Permanent Injunction), second case for brevity. 2.c) Civil Case No. CEB-30411: Simplicio Giltendez, doing business under the name and style Central PUV and V-hire Terminal vs. Cebu City, et al. (For Declaration of Unconstitutionality of City Ordinance No. 1958) third case, hereinafter. Believing that Mr. Lasaleta, the plaintiff in the second case, is guilty of forumshopping, which position is bolstered by his admission in the Verification and Certification attached to his complaint in the second case, a portion of which states that he reserves to withdraw his name in the first case after the filing of the second, Cebu City posits that the first and second case, or at least one of them should have been dismissed outright by respondent judge, failing which, judge Gako is guilty of willfully violating the rules proscribing forum shopping and for tolerating an act which amounts to direct contempt of court. The city asserts that this issue was raised in its Motion for Summary Judgment in the foregoing consolidated terminal cases. xxxx Referring to the third terminal case, additional charge is posed by complainant against the judge in granting plaintiffs application for TRO, being unfounded and without legal basis. Cebu City, as defendant therein, contended that plaintiff in said case was operating without a business permit, did not comply with the requirements of the local ordinance regulating the operation of the terminal, did not have a Memorandum of Agreement with the city to operate as such, and did not possess the necessary building permit for the structures that were being used in the operation of his business. Judge Gakos act of issuing TRO, therefore, constitutes another violation of the provisions concerning the requirement of granting injunctive relief under the Rules of Court. Likewise, the above Order of respondent judge, granting the application for a TRO, also makes him guilty of interference and total disrespect of what the Court of Appeals (CA) has decided in CA-G.R. SP No. 74053. The CA in this cited case upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 1837. In that CA decision, it was acknowledged that the city of Cebu is authorized to sort out a re-routing of the traffic flow in the spirit of the orderly implementation of the subject ordinance. Said city ordinance was the very basis of the citys re-routing scheme. xxxx 2.d) Civil Case No. CEB-30684: Cebu 3rd District V-Hire Operators & Drivers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, represented by Gina Virgilia A. Sanchez, vs. City of

Cebu, et al. (For Declaration of Unconstitutionality of City Ordinance No. 1958, Mandamus with Injunction, and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order). This is the fourth count, of Cebu Citys charge against judge Gako, for willful violation of laws and rules, at the same time, a second count of violation for judicial interference. Relevant to this case is Civil Case No. CEB-27643: Cebu 3rd District V-Hire Operators & Drivers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, represented by Msgr. Jose Diapen, vs. City Counsel of Cebu City, et al. (For Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction), which was raffled to Branch 58, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, where plaintiffs applications for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction were denied by the presiding judge therein, in the Orders dated 3 July 2002 and 21 October 2002. The main case being one for Injunction, the mentioned orders of denial had the effect of disposing the same, and plaintiff neither having appealed therefrom nor questioned said orders, the same already became final and executory. Here, it is contended by Cebu City that despite its effort to bring this fact to the attention of respondent judge, the latter, in open display of judicial arrogance, interfered with these orders of a coordinate and co-equal court by giving due course to Civil Case No. CEB-30684, a case filed in 2004 subsequent to CEB-27643. Respondents act herein likewise constitutes disrespect of a final ruling of the Court of Appeals ( CA-G.R. SP No. 74053). Worse, said complainant, Judge Gako granted plaintiffs application of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. (3) Other Violations. Complainant is referring to the alleged practice of respondent judge of resorting to injunction-for-sale with the active meddling of a family member; allowing parties to write decisions for him; and failure to rule on Cebu Citys motions for Consolidation and Summary Judgment in the transport cases above-mentioned while allowing the other party to present evidence to prove damages, in effect, proceeding to trial proper without pre-trial. xxxx (4) Violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. Complainant claims that the foregoing acts of respondent also infringe various canons in the Code of Judicial Conduct, viz.: In the Ting case above, Civil Case No. CEB-26607, in addition to being constitutive of willful misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, the act of respondent judge in acting as litigants lawyer, by obtaining the testimony of a person despite the fact that both counsels were not interested in introducing said person as their witness; and the judges act of conducting, by himself, the direct examination thereof, violate Canon 2, Rule 2.01. of the Code of Judicial Conduct: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.; and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach. Likewise, in the CPA case, Civil Case No. CEB-29570, respondent judges actuation of reneging to his declaration to resolve the case within a specified period

infringes Canon 1, Rule 1.02 of the same Code: A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. Finally, to complainant, all of the foregoing charges relative to the comportment of respondent judge during the proceedings in the cited cases, which earn him the charges of Serious Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law, Willful Violation of Rules and Laws, Judicial Interference on several counts, demonstrate grave incompetence; running afoul to Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the cited Code: A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. x x x x 52[4]

After weighing the arguments and the evidence of the parties, the Investigating Justice found the respondent judge liable only for undue delay in deciding Civil Case No. CEB-29570, and recommended the following:

WHEREFORE, the above-discussed circumstances considered, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5, be SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for two (2) months, for undue delay in rendering a decision in Civil Case No. CEB-29570: Cebu Ports Authority vs. Cebu City. As regards the motion for respondents inhibition, Judge Ireneo Lee Gako is advised to voluntarily inhibit from hearing or taking cognizance of the cases pending before him, where complainant is a party-litigant; only with respect to those cases involved in this administrative case. x x x x53[5]

The Court upholds the findings and conclusions of the Investigating Justice, but modifies the recommended penalty.

On the charge that the respondent judge unduly arrogated unto himself the duty of a counsel, in Civil Case No. CEB-26607, by calling a witness to the stand and conducting the latters direct testimony even if the respective counsels were not interested or did not intend to present said person as their witness, the Court finds nothing irregular in the same. Revealed in the hearings of the said case is that the respondent judge intended to obtain enlightenment from the said witness, the project director of one of the signatories to the contract being litigated.54[6] In not a few cases, this Court has declared that the trial judge, if he is not satisfied after hearing all the evidence adduced by the parties, may, in the exercise of sound discretion, on his own motion and in furtherance of justice, call additional witnesses or recall some or the same witnesses for the purpose of questioning them himself to enlighten him on particular facts or issues involved in the case.55[7]

As to the four charges of willful violation of laws and rules, the Court finds them without merit. The complainant failed to clearly prove error or ill will on the part of the respondent judge in denying the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-26066. Granting that respondent erred in denying the motion, the complainant should have appealed or petitioned for the issuance of a writ of certiorari. Fundamental is the rule that where the remedies of

appeal and/or certiorari are available, recourse to an administrative complaint for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety is improper.56[8]

We extend the same treatment to the other charges leveled against the respondent particularly those involving his acts in Civil Case Nos. CEB29550, CEB-29730, CEB-30411 and CEB-30684. The Court finds neither malicious nor corrupt motive in respondents non-dismissal of Civil Case Nos. CEB-29550 and CEB-29730 on account of forum shopping. No viciousness can further be presumed from respondent judges is suance of a temporary restraining order in Civil Case No. CEB-30411, considering that the grant of the injunctive relief in that case was preceded by a thorough consideration of the positions of the parties after the conduct of a hearing.57[9] On the charges of judicial interference and disrespect towards a decision of the appellate court, specifically those involving Civil Case Nos. CEB-30411 and CEB-30684, we find the same unavailing. The city ordinance being assailed in these civil cases, as shown by the parties pleadings, is different from those in the earlier 2002 case (Civil Case No. CEB-27643) and in the CA decision alleged to have been interfered with. 58 [10] With regard to the respondent judges failure to rule on complainants motion for consolidation and summary judgment, the facts

and circumstances are inadequate to conclude that there was irregularity or misconduct in the said act.

We note at this point that, for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order of the judge must not only be erroneous, but most importantly, its issuance is motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motives; because mere error of judgment is not a ground for disciplinary proceedings.59[11] To follow a different rule will mean a deluge of complaints, legitimate or otherwise, and our magistrates will be immersed in answering charges against them rather than performing their judicial functions. As we said earlier, appropriate judicial remedies are available to the complainantan appeal or a petition for certiorari to assail the allegedly erroneous orders; hence, recourse to an administrative action against the judge is improper.

As to the other violationsthe purported injunction-for-sale and the writing of decisions by the parties themselves, we dismiss the accusations for being hearsay. Other than the bare allegations of the complainant, no evidence has been introduced to support the charges. The presumption of regularity in the respondents performance of his official duties remains.

The Court, nonetheless, finds respondent to have transgressed Canon 360[12] of the Code of Judicial Conduct when he did not resolve Civil Case No. CEB-29570 within the constitutionally mandated time frame. His insistence

that his decision was not delayed because a settlement between the parties was imminent, thus, he need not render a decision, does not persuade the Court. The records show that on December 12, 2003 the respondent judge declared that he would resolve the case within the month as the issue involved was purely legal. He then ordered the parties to observe the status quo despite his further declaration that he would not rule on the application for injunction.61[13] By this order, the parties were made to understand that the case was already for final resolution or decision.

The records, nevertheless, are devoid of any order from the respondent judge, from December 12, 2003 to September 26, 2004, that suspended the proceedings on account of the possibility of a compromise by the parties. We note that the discussion on a settlement came about only on September 27, 2004 when a party-plaintiff offered P25M to the defendant to buy peace.62[14] Taking into consideration the 90-day period to decide the case,63[15] we conclude that the respondent judge should have resolved it within December 12, 2003 to March 12, 2004. Respondent, however, rendered his decision only on December 6, 2004, or after a delay of almost 9 months. The Court finds no valid justification for the said delay, thus, respondent judge is adjudged guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision in the said civil case.

Section 9(1), Rule 14064[16] of the Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case as a less serious charge, which warrants any of the sanctions in Section 11(B) of the same rule

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

As aforesaid, the Investigating Justice, in this case, recommended the penalty of suspension for 2 months without salary and other benefits. The Court cannot, however, adopt the said recommended penalty considering that the respondent already retired from the judiciary on September 20, 2006. The Court emphasizes at this point that respondents retirement from office does not render the present administrative case moot and academic; neither does it free him from liability. Since complainant filed the case when respondent was still in the service, the Court retains the authority to investigate and resolve the administrative complaint against him.65[17]

Were it not for his retirement, we would have been inclined to adopt the heavier penalty of suspension in view of our previous warnings to him not to commit further infraction.66[18] In lieu thereof, the Court imposes a fine of P40,000.00 on the respondent. The fine that we impose shall then be deducted from his retirement benefits.

Incidentally, during the pendency of this case, complainant by motion67[19] sought an order from this Court directing respondent judge to inhibit himself from handling all the pending cases in his branch in which the complainant is a party-litigant. In view, however, of the respondents retirement, this issue has already become moot and academic.

As a final note, we reiterate our incessant reminder that all members of the bench should comport themselves blamelessly in order to advance public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, retired Judge Ireneo Lee Gako of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5, is hereby found GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision in Civil Case No. CEB-29570. Respondent is

ORDERED to pay the FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice

On leave ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

On leave RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

EN BANC

IMELDA R. MARCOS, Complainant,

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062

Present:

CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, - versus BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ. JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Respondent.

Promulgated: January 18, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
Per Curiam:
The judiciary cannot keep those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. This being so, in the performance of the functions of their office, judges must endeavor to act in a manner that puts them and their conduct above reproach and beyond suspicion. They must act with extreme care for their office indeed is burdened with a heavy load of responsibility.68[1]

At bench is an administrative case filed by Imelda R. Marcos (Marcos) against Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan (Judge Pamintuan), Presiding Judge, Branch 3, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City (RTC), for Gross Ignorance of the Law.

THE FACTS:

From the records, it appears that on November 15, 2006, Marcos filed a complaint-affidavit charging Judge Pamintuan with Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final and executory order of then Acting Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes (Judge Reyes) dated May 30, 1996 (and modified in the September 2, 1996 order), in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as the exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of the Philippines v. Jose D. Roxas, et al.

Judge Reyes dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R in an order, dated May 30, 1996, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and further, for failure to comply with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994 on forum shopping, the petition is DISMISSED.

It is further ORDERED that the Buddha statuette in the custody of this Court be immediately RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to decedents brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas. SO ORDERED.

The parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the said order but both motions were denied by the RTC for lack of merit in its June 24, 1996 Order.

On June 25, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own motion for reconsideration which was also denied in a court order dated September 2, 1996.

Ten (10) years later, in an order dated May 9, 2006, Judge Pamintuan set the case for hearing on June 29, 2006 purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden Buddha to its rightful owner. Marcos was one of the subpoenaed parties, being a person with interest in the case.

On August 15, 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated September 2, 1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of the

estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estates administrator. This Court further rules that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one, or a mere replica of the original Golden Buddha which has a detachable head, which has been missing since 1971 up to the present, or for a period of thirty five (35) years by now, and has been in unlawful possession of persons who do not have title over it, nor any right at all to possess this original Golden Buddha.

Marcos averred that the act of Judge Pamintuan in reversing a final and executory order constituted gross ignorance of the law. In her complaint, citing A.M. No. 93-7-696-0, she argued that final and executory judgments of lower courts were not reviewable even by the Supreme Court. Judge Pamintuan reversed a final and executory order not upon the instance of any of the parties in Civil Case No. 3383-R but motu proprio. He even failed to indicate where he obtained the information that the Golden Buddha sitting in his sala was a mere replica. Marcos claimed that his order was in conflict with Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a judgment or final order shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it (his order) is based xxx.

In his Comment, Judge Pamintuan argued that Marcos could have just filed a pleading manifesting lack of interest or moving for the recall of the subpoena, but she did not. In fact, her counsel, Atty. Robert Sison, entered his appearance and actually appeared in court. With her appearance through counsel, she subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the court. She should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 15, 2006 Order instead

of filing an administrative complaint. As she did not, Judge Pamintuan opined that her lost judicial remedies could not be substituted with the filing of this case.

Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, stated that she was not a party in Civil Case No. 3383-R, hence, she could not file a motion for reconsideration. She cited Section 1 of Rule 37 which provides that only the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within the period for taking an appeal.

In its Report, dated June 29, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Pamintuan be dismissed from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service, including government owned or controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for violation of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA pointed out that:

As held, execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Bearing this in mind, respondent issued the questioned Order dated August 15, 2006, the pertinent text of which reads:

Despite said Order which was issued almost ten (10) years ago, the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas has not taken possession of the Buddha Statuette or the Buddha replica from the Court, thus, this incumbent Presiding Judge, seeing the necessity of finally disposing of the Buddha Statuette physically,

and finding out the present statue of the late Rogelio Roxas, ordered the hearing on June 29, 2006. (Italics supplied) xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in accordance with the final and executory Order of this Court dated September 2, 1996, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estates administrator.

Clearly, the questioned Order conforms to the directive of the Court in its previous Order dated May 30, 1996, which provides:

It is further ORDERED that the Buddha Statuette in custody of this Court be immediately RELEASED to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas, namely, Henry Roxas and Gervic Roxas and to the decedents brother, Jose Roxas, IN TRUST FOR the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas.

And modified in an Order dated September 2, 1996, which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General is DENIED. The Order of this Court on May 30, 1996 remains insofar as the Buddha statuette is awarded to the state of the late Rogelio Roxas and is at the same time MODIFIED in the sense that the Buddha statuette shall be under the custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas or upon the appointment of his estates administrator.

xxx

xxx

xxx

A normal course of proceedings would have been that respondent Judge waits for the proper party to go to court to ask for the release of the Buddha statuette. x x x.

However, respondent was being overzealous when he ruled that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one, or a mere replica. Notwithstanding that the same may be his and the litigants opinion during the hearing of June 29, 2006. (sic) He should have borne in mind that there were no issues nor controversies left for consideration in Civil Case No. 3383-R. It must be noted that the Order dated May 30, 1996 (and modified on September 2, 1996) has become final and executory. Hence, issues have been settled and the matter laid to rest. As repeatedly ruled by this Court, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Should judgment of lower courts which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals become final and executory before, or without exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they too become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of government.

It is inexcusable for respondent Judge to have overlooked such an elementary legal principle.

Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in its July 31, 2007 Resolution, preventively suspended Judge Pamintuan pending resolution of this administrative case to stop him from committing further damage to the judiciary. Judge Pamintuan moved for reconsideration and eventually filed a Motion for Early Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration and to Submit the Case for Decision.

The matter was referred again to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. In its Memorandum dated November 22, 2007, the OCA

recommended that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent be GRANTED and that the Order of Preventive Suspension dated July 31, 2007, be LIFTED. Thus, in its December 11, 2007 Resolution, the Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Judge Pamintuan and lifted the Order of Preventive Suspension effective immediately.

Judge Pamintuan then sent a letter requesting for his backpay and benefits covering the period of his preventive suspension from August to December 13, 2007. In its June 3, 2008 Resolution, following the recommendation of the OCA, the Court denied said request for being premature and for lack of merit.

Now, the Court resolves the complaint against Judge Pamintuan.

After a thorough study of the case, the Court agrees with the evaluation and recommendation of the OCA.

Doubtless, the May 30, 1996 Order, which was modified on September 2, 1996, in Civil Case No. 3383-R, has long become final and executory. In his assailed August 15, 2006 Order, Judge Pamintuan made express declarations that were not embodied either in the May 30, 1996 Order or in the September 2, 1996 Order. He ruled that the Golden Buddha in the custody of the court was a fake one, or a mere replica of the original.

This may be his opinion or the litigants during the hearing of June 29, 2006 but Judge Pamintuan should have realized that the trial court did not rule on that point in its May 30, 1996 Order (even in its September 2, 1996 Order). Insofar as this issue is concerned, the May 30, 1996 Order pertinently reads:

Albert Umali anchors his claim on the supposed Memorandum of Agreement between him and the late Rogelio Roxas executed on November 25, 1988. He claims that under this agreement, he and Rogelio Roxas will share in the profits of their business venture, that is, treasure hunting and claim for lost treasure. He adds, however, that the Buddha with this Court is not the genuine Buddha. According to him, he has photographs to prove the existence of the real and genuine golden Buddha. To be sure, this Court is baffled by the foregoing submission of Mr. Umali, if the subject Buddha is not the genuine golden Buddha, and therefore a fake one, it cannot be covered by the memorandum of Agreement. Be it noted that the Memorandum of Agreement speaks of treasure hunting and lost treasure which could refer to things of great value. Based on Mr. Umalis own claim the subject Buddha has no appreciable material value. It is therefore outside the scope of the Memorandum of Agreement. This being the case, what right then does Albert Umali have to demand the return of the subject Buddha to him? On this score alone, this Court should already reject the claim of Mr. Umali over the Buddha now in this Courts custody. xxx xxx xxx

Now, as to whether or not there is that controversial golden Buddha different from the one now in custody of this Court, there is none. X x x.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. [Emphases ours]

Judge Pamintuan indeed made a serious error in making such a pronouncement in the challenged order. It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to wit: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.69[2]

It is inexcusable for Judge Pamintuan to have overlooked such basic legal principle no matter how noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the public to be well-informed, thus, they are expected to be familiar with the statutes and procedural rules at all times. When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.70[3]

The Court agrees with the view of OCA that Judge Pamintuan manifested gross ignorance of the law in issuing the questioned August 15, 2006 Order. Verily, he failed to conform to the high standards of

competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that:

Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.

Rule 3.01 - A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.

Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-how with the rules or with settled jurisprudence, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly crucial that judges be acquainted with the law and basic legal principles. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one not even judges.71[4]

Notably, this is not Judge Pamintuans first and sole administrative case. In The Officers and Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Baguio-Benguet Chapter v. Pamintuan,72[5] Judge Pamintuan was charged with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional

Rights of the Accused, Arrogance and Violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and was suspended for one (1) year.

In the case of Atty. Gacayan v. Hon. Pamintuan,73[6] he was found guilty of violating Canons 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which amounted to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of an officer of the judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He was reprimanded and was sternly warned that a repetition of the foregoing or similar transgressions would be dealt with more severely. He was also meted a fine of P10,000.00.

In a much recent case, Biggel v. Pamintuan,74[7] he was charged with manifest partiality, gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, and unjust and malicious delay in the resolution of the incidents in Criminal Case No. 25383-R entitled People of the Philippines v. Emil Biggel, a case for estafa. He was found guilty of violating Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to dispose of court business promptly. The Court imposed upon him a fine in the amount of P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

As of this time, there is another administrative case yet to be resolved against Judge Pamintuan filed by one Peter Cosalan for gross ignorance of the law.75[8] Although, this is not pertinent in the resolution of this case, it is clear from the other undisputed records that Judge Pamintuan has failed to meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe and place of honor reserved for guardians of justice. As held in the case of Malabed v. Asis:76[9]
Respondent Judge must bear in mind that membership in the judiciary circumscribes ones personal conduct and imposes u pon him certain restrictions, the faithful observance of which is the price one has to pay for holding such a distinguished position. x x x His conduct must be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system lest public confidence in the judiciary would be eroded by the incompetent, irresponsible and negligent conduct of judges.

The Court has held time and again that a judge is expected to demonstrate more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is essential that he be familiar with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled doctrines.77[10]

As fittingly stated in the case of Borromeo v. Mariano,78[11] Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who has a mastery of the

principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law. Thus, this Court has had the occasion to hold that:

When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judges dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every partylitigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.79[12]

In this case, the Court finds Judge Pamintuan accountable for gross ignorance of the law. He could have simply been suspended and fined, but the Court cannot take his previous infractions lightly. His violations are serious in character. various infractions, Having been previously warned and punished for Judge Pamintuan now deserves the ultimate

administrative penalty dismissal from service.

The Court doubts if he ever took seriously its previous warnings that a repetition of his offenses would merit a more severe sanction from this Court. His conduct in this case and his prior infractions are grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As shown from the cited administrative cases filed against Judge Pamintuan, he was liable not only for gross ignorance of the law but for other equally serious transgressions.

This Court should, therefore, refrain from being lenient, when doing so would give the public the impression that incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, is DISMISSED from the service. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any official act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

ESPINA & MADARANG CO. & MAKAR AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIAL &

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2257-RTJ)

DEVELOPMENT CORP. (MAKAR), REPRESENTED BY RODRIGO A. ADTOON, Petitioners, Present:

- versus -

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

HON. CADER P. INDAR Al Haj, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Region 12, Cotabato City and its OIC, Branch Clerk of Court, ABIE M. AMILIL,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

December 14, 2011 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative case against respondents Judge Cader P. Indar Al Haj (Judge Indar) and Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Clerk of Court Abie M. Amilil (Amilil), both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Cotabato City, filed by complainants Espina & Madarang Company and Makar Agricultural Commercial & Development Corporation, represented by Rodrigo A. Adtoon (complainants). In a verified complaint80[1] dated April 12, 2005, complainants charged respondents Judge Indar and Amilil with serious misconduct, grave abuse of discretion, oppression, evident bad faith, manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law in connection with the issuance of an Order81[2] dated February 14, 2005 in Special Proceeding No. 2004-074, entitled In the Matter of Insolvencia Voluntaria de Olarte Hermanos y Cia, Heirs of the Late Alberto P. Olarte, etc., Petitioners.

As gathered from the complaint and the subsequent documents filed, the antecedent facts of the case, originally docketed as OCA-I.P.I. No. 052257-RTJ, are as follows:

On August 23, 1929, Olarte Hermanos y Cia (Olarte Hermanos) entered into a contract of loan and mortgage with El Hogar Filipino whereby

the former mortgaged to the latter a parcel of land in Makar, Cotabato City and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 12 to secure a loan of P160,000.00. When Olarte Hermanos defaulted in its payments on the loan, El Hogar Filipino filed an action for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. On August 17, 1932, the mortgage was ordered foreclosed and the decision became final on January 6, 1933.

On August 21, 1933, Olarte Hermanos filed a petition for voluntary insolvency, Insolvency Case No. 90, entitled In the Matter of Insolvencia Voluntaria de Olarte Hermanos y Cia. On August 28, 1933, Olarte Hermanos was declared insolvent and the sheriff was ordered to take possession of all properties, books of accounts, and furniture of the insolvent corporation.

On October 14, 1933, the mortgaged property of Olarte Hermanos was sold at public auction with El Hogar Filipino as the highest bidder. The sale was confirmed by the court on December 24, 1933. Thereafter, El Hogar Filipino sold the land to Salud, Soledad, Mercedes and Asuncion, all surnamed Espina (the Espina sisters). Sometime in 1958, the Espina sisters sold the same to Makar Agricultural Corporation, which in turn sold a portion to Espina and Madarang Company.

The insolvency case was archived without having been terminated with the onset of World War II.

On November 18, 1983, Alberto Olarte, Sr. (Olarte) filed a motion for the appointment as receiver of the insolvent corporation. Judge Eduardo P. Singayao (Judge Singayao), then the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 14, Cotabato City, granted said appointment of Olarte and re-docketed the case as Spl. Proceeding No. 2004-074. Subsequently, Rodolfo Pascual (Pascual) also petitioned the court to be a co-receiver of Olarte Hermanos. As receivers, Olarte and Pascual took possession of the assets of the corporation, among which was the piece of land covered by OCT No. 12. A portion of this land was, however, already registered in the name of herein complainants after the sale from the Espina sisters.

On December 7, 1983, Judge Singayao issued an order82[3] to the Provincial Sheriffs of Maguindanao and Cotabato City to place the receivers in possession of the property covered by OCT No. 12, as well as all subdivisions and portions thereof, its fruits and all proceeds of the sale of any portion of the property, and to submit to the court an inventory of any assets of the insolvent corporation.

Herein complainants then filed a petition for certiorari before the Intermediate Appellate Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 02613 and entitled Espina & Madarang Co. v. Judge Eduardo Singayao. On November 21, 1985, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the said orders of Judge Singayao and declared as permanent the writ of preliminary injunction it issued against Judge Singayao from implementing its orders.83[4] It held thus:

We are of the opinion that the order of 7 December 1983 was issued with grave abuse of discretion as it was issued without affording petitioners and other interested parties a chance to be heard thereon despite the fact that the circumstances demanded such a hearing. The order in effect nullified a mortgage contract entered into more than fifty (50) years ago and which had not been challenged all that time. The order set aside judicial foreclosure proceedings terminated more than fifty (50) years ago which has in its favor at least the presumption of regularity, especially when the proceedings were had in the very same court where the insolvency proceeding was pending. The order nullified the mortgage contract entered into fifty (50) years earlier on the sole representation of private respondent Alberto Olarte that his brother, Jose Olarte, was not authorized to enter into the mortgage contract, and that his (Alberto Olartes) signature in the Board Resolution authorizing the mortgage was forged, without receiving evidence, or hearing petitioners, on the truth of such representation considering the rather belated accusation of Alberto Olarte. The order dispossessed present owners and possessors of the property in question who have held title thereto prior to said order and had been in peaceful and unquestioned possession of their respective holdings all that time, some of whom have not even been made parties to the insolvency case. The order does not only transfer possession of the property to private respondents, but directs that the proceeds of the sales thereof through the years be turned over to private respondents. By this, private respondents would have their cake and eat it too. The respondent Court correctly assessed the prejudicial effects of the questioned order when it set said order aside on 3 January 1984, for the reasons that the right(s) of third parties are affected and considering further that the enforcement of the Order of (the) Court dated December 7, 1983 might

cause deprivation of property without due process of law of third parties who are not impleaded in this case, and for the court to be given an opportune time to review the entire records of the case and hear the parties and their respective counsels. xxxx WHEREFORE, the orders of 7 December 1983 and 12 January 1984 and the first order of 30 January 1984 advising Branch XXII of the RTC of General Santos City to stay all proceedings in Civil Case No. 2866 are declared null and void and are set aside. The portion of the second order of 30 January 1984 denying Makars motion to transfer the insolvency proceedings to the RTC in General Santos City is declared as valid, but the portion lifting the order of 3 January 1984 and directing the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to comply with the order of 7 December 1983, is declared null and void and is set aside. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.84[5]

This decision of the Court of Appeals was appealed to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 73457. On August 13, 1986, said petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Thereafter, the decision of this Court became final and executory on September 22, 1986.

After almost twenty years, in February 2005, new incidents transpired in connection with the case.

In the Order dated February 14, 2005, respondent Judge Indar, now the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 14 of Cotabato City, granted an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the heirs of Olarte to revive the December 7, 1983 Order of Judge Singayao. In full, said order reads:

This is an action for Execution of the Order dated December 7, 1983, directing the registration thereof with the Registry of Deeds of General Santos City, the dispositive portion [of] which is hereunder quoted:
WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the Civil Code and the Insolvency Law, order is hereby issued, to the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, to annotate the deletion on the registry of book and on the face of Certificate of Title No. 12 and all subsequent titles derived therefrom, the annotation of the cancellation thereof by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 886 and annotation of the mortgage by virtue of this order. Further, order is hereby issued to the Provincial Sheriffs of Maguindanao and Cotabato City, to place the receiver appointed by the Court in possession of the property covered by Certificate of Title No. 12 and/or covered by titles derived therefrom and all proceeds of the sale thereof of portions of the same and all its fruits[.] Finally, order is issued to the receiver to register this Order with Register of Deeds of General Santos City, and to take possession of the property covered by Certificate of Title No. 12, all subdivisions and portions thereof, its fruits and all proceeds of the sale thereof or any portion of the same to submit to the Court an inventory of any assets of the insolvent that comes to this possession. SO ORDERED. Given at Cotabato City, Philippines, this 7th day of December 1983. SGD. EDUARDO P. SINGAYAO Regional Trial Court Judge

The issue in the instant case is whether or not the final and executory order can be implemented after the lapse of the 5-year and/or 10-year prescriptive period provided for under Rule 39 Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action.

A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within Five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within Five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

The former Presiding Judge of this Court denied this action and the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of denial on October 7, 2004, which issue was left unresolved that prompted the petitioners to file a Supplemental Motion now submitted for the consideration by this Court; The petitioner posited that Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules on Civil Procedure is not applicable to Special Proceedings in land registration and cited are jurisprudence of the Honorable Supreme Court hereunder quoted: Neither this section is applicable to Special Proceedings such as land registration cases, hence, the right to ask for a writ of possession therein never prescribes (CF Heirs of Marcos vs. De Banwar, L-22110, September 28, 1968, Sta. Ana vs. Menia, L-15564, April 23, 1961). The Five-year limitation rule for the execution on motion of judgment does not apply to special proceedings, like Cadastral proceedings (Rodil vs. Benedicto 95 SCRA, January 22, 1980); Further the petitioners in the Supplemental Motion for Execution argued that while the statute of limitations may constitute a bar to its execution, however, this is thoroughly explained and amplified by petitioners in their petition and in the motion for execution. Consequently, this Court resolves to GRANT the petition. The Order sought to be implemented has become final and executory, and therefore, a ministerial duty of this Court to order its execution directing the Provincial Sheriff to execute the Order dated December 7, 1983.85[6]

On March 4, 2005, respondent Amilil issued a Certificate of Finality86[7] of the Order dated February 14, 2005, stating therein that

neither a motion for reconsideration nor an appeal had been filed within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period.

It appears, however, that on February 28, 2005, complainants as intervenors in the case below, filed by registered mail a Motion for Reconsideration and To Set Aside Order of February 14, 2005.87[8] Said pleading was received by the lower court on March 7, 2005.88[9] Complainants stated that [t]he order dated December 7, 1983 issued by Judge Eduardo P. Singayao in Sp. Case No. 90 was declared NULL AND VOID and set aside by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 02613 entitled, Espina and Madarang Company v. Judge Eduardo Singayao in its decision dated November 21, 1985.89[10] Complainants explained further that the said decision of the Court of Appeals, when appealed to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 73457, was dismissed for lack of merit on August 13, 1986.

Complainants also filed a Motion to Withdraw or Revoke Certificate of Finality90[11] dated March 5, 2005, alleging that:

The intervenors, Makar Agricultural Corporation and Espina and Madarang Company by counsel respectfully move the Honorable Court to order the Withdrawal or Revocation of the Certificate of Finality of the Order of this Honorable Court dated February 14, 2005 and in support of this motion respectfully allege: THAT

1.

The Intervenors were not served a copy of the order of this Honorable Court dated February 14, 2005 granting petitioners [the Olarte heirs] motion for enforcement of the VOID order of Judge Eduardo Singayao dated December 7, 1983 declared NULL and VOID by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 02613.

2. The Intervenors whose appearance in the case was approved by the Honorable Court filed a motion for reconsideration on February 28, 2005 by Registered Mail per Registry Receipt No. 3180 of the Gen. Santos City Post Office. Hence, said order has not become final and executory and the Sheriff should not yet comply with the said order which was declared by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court NULL and VOID and permanently enjoined from execution. 3. The Clerk of Court, Abie M. Amilil, should be advised to immediately withdraw his certification. 4. Further, the insolvency case was ordered terminated and closed by Judge Japal Guiani on March 4, 1987 and affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 80784 promulgated on August 2, 1984, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex A.

Thus, in an Order91[12] dated April 12, 2005, respondent Judge Indar reconsidered and set aside his Order dated February 14, 2005 for the execution of the Order dated December 7, 1983 by Judge Singayao.

Respondent Judge Indar also ordered the recall of the Certificate of Finality issued by respondent Amilil.

Not satisfied with the recall of the said orders, complainants filed the instant administrative case charging respondents Judge Indar and Amilil with serious misconduct, grave abuse of discretion, oppression, evident bad faith, manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law. Complainants allege that respondents Judge Indar and Amilil are guilty of violating the permanent writ of injunction which the Intermediate Appellate Court issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 02613 and affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No. 73457, (which voided the December 7, 1983 order of Judge Singayao), by resurrecting the same in an order issued ex parte on February 14, 2005, and directed the implementation thereof, despite knowledge of its nullity.92[13]

In their undated Comment,93[14] respondents Judge Indar and Amilil deny the allegations in the complaint. Respondent Judge Indar claims that since the filing of the petition to revive the case was made on May 3, 2004, neither party made any reference to the fact that the Order dated December 7, 1983 of Judge Singayao had been nullified and set aside by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. He also asserts that he issued the Order

dated February 14, 2005 on the ground that he found the partys motion for execution meritorious. It was only when complainants filed a motion for reconsideration to set aside the said order did he come to know of the said Court of Appeals and Supreme Court decisions. Respondent Judge Indar intimated that he even had to go through six volumes of rollo in the bodega and verify with the Court of Appeals the authenticity of its decision dated November 21, 1986 since what he found attached to the records was an unreadable and uncertified copy of the said decision.

Respondents Judge Indar and Amilil contend that the administrative case filed against them is designed to harass and malign them. They allege that two other complaints have been filed against them by the complainants for indirect contempt before the Court of Appeals, and for graft and corruption before the Ombudsman for Mindanao. Thus, respondents Judge Indar and Amilil also seek the disbarment of complainants counsels for allegedly being dishonest and in bad faith when they filed the instant administrative case.

In the Resolution94[15] dated July 25, 2007, this Court resolved, among others, to re-docket the administrative complaint as a regular administrative matter and to refer the case to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro Station, for raffle among the Justices for

investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of records thereof.

Immediately thereafter, Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybaez of the Court of Appeals, to whom the instant case was raffled, sent notices to the parties for the setting of the hearings on October 17, 18 and 19, 2007.95[16]

Respondents Judge Indar and Amilil filed a Manifestation for the Dismissal of Complaint for Being Moot and Academic and Charging complainants Counsel for Forum Shopping,96[17] stating that respondent Judge Indar would be attending the Philippine Judges Association 2007 Convention in Manila and would then be unavailable for hearing on the said dates.

Thus, on October 17, 2007, only counsel for complainants appeared and submitted a Motion to Withdraw Complaint97[18] dated October 9, 2007. In the meantime, the scheduled settings on October 18 and 19, 2007 were also cancelled.

Respondents Judge Indar and Amilil also filed a Manifestation for Withdrawal of Counter-Complaint Against Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano98[19] dated October 16, 2007, seeking the withdrawal of their counter-complaint against the complainants counsel [a]s a matter of goodwill reciprocity to complainants (sic) counsels good faith.99[20]

In the Resolution100[21] dated November 7, 2007, Investigating Justice Ybaez denied complainants motion to withdraw complaint, arguing that the courts disciplinary authority over its officials and employees cannot be dependent on or frustrated by private arrangements between the parties, and that an administrative complaint cannot be simply withdrawn at any time by the complainants because there is a need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities.

Consequently, schedule for the hearings was again set for November 14 and 15, 2007. Parties were also warned that failure to appear at the hearings and to present their evidence on the said dates shall be construed as a waiver of their right to present evidence, in which event the case will be determined on the basis of available records.

On November 14, 2007, only Rodrigo A. Adtoon, complainants representative, appeared. He informed the Investigating Justice that their counsel was indisposed and reiterated the withdrawal of the complaint but presented no authority to the effect that complainants were no longer interested in pursuing their complaint. Thus, the Investigating Justice considered the case submitted for resolution.101[22]

Thereafter, in a Report102[23] dated December 10, 2007, Investigating Justice Ybaez made the following recommendation:

Recommendation The facts established from the records of the case and the pleadings filed before the Investigating Justice are insufficient to support a finding of gross ignorance of the law on the part of the respondent Judge. To be held liable therefore, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate and malicious. Respondent Judge may have erred in the issuance of the February 14, 2005 Order, but such error has not been shown to be gross or patent. Neither is there any clear and sufficient basis for finding respondent Judge liable for gross negligence and issuance of an unjust interlocutory order. He cannot, however, be completely absolved of administrative liability. The respondent Judge displayed conduct that fell short of the standards expected of a magistrate of the law. A judge should be industriously devoted to the study of the law, for having accepted his position, he owes it to the dignity of the court he sits in. It is indeed demanded that a judge should strive for excellence. To keep the idealism

alive and the passion burning, a judge need not only remind himself of this stirring message on who is fit to be a judge: A man of learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of the law. In the present case, respondent Judge was remiss in his duty to be attentive, patient, studious and careful to diligently ascertain the facts. He should thus be CENSURED because the Code of Judicial Ethics requires him to observe due care in the performance of his official functions and to be the embodiment of, among other desirable characteristics, judicial competence. His Order dated April 12, 2005 setting aside the Order dated February 14, 2005 and recalling the Certificate of Finality dated March 4, 2005 notwithstanding. As regards the respondent OIC Branch Clerk of Court, the records and the pleadings filed before the Investigating Judge have established his administrative liability. From his failure to inform the Judge of the existence of the IAC and SC Decisions nullifying the December 7, 1983 Order of the Court despite knowledge thereof, failure to make sure that parties were furnished a copy of the court orders as OIC Branch Clerk of Court, particularly the February 14, 2005 Order which complainants were not furnished a copy thereof, and questionable haste in the issuance of Certificate of Finality, respondent OIC Branch Clerk of Court should thus be SUSPENDED FOR TWO (2) MONTHS WITHOUT PAY with a stern warning that repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.103[24]

The findings of Investigating Justice Ybanez are well taken. We, however, modify the penalties imposed upon respondents Judge Indar and Amilil, consistent with Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

In Judge Salvador v. Serrano,104[25] we ruled, thus:

This Court stresses once more that the administration of justice is a sacred task; by the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the 1987 Constitution that a public office is a public trust and all public officers must at all times be accountable to the people and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. It condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and would diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Thus, every employee or officer involved in this task should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility and their conduct must, at all times, be above suspicion.105[26]

Here, respondent Judge Indar failed to conform with the high standards of competence and diligence required of judges under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly the following Rules:

Rule 3.01. A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. Rule 3.02. In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interest, public opinion or fear or criticism. Rule 3.08. A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel. Rule 3.09. A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.

In the instant case, respondent Judge Indar failed to exert due diligence required of him to ascertain the facts of the case before he came out with the Order dated February 14, 2005. Had he taken time and effort to read and examine the pleadings and the records of the case, he could have known that the Order dated December 7, 1983 was already nullified and set aside by the Court of Appeals.

We likewise find unsatisfactory the excuses given by respondent Judge Indar that neither the previous judges handling the case nor the parties themselves made any reference to the fact that the Order of December 7, 1983 had already been nullified and set aside, and that there were voluminous records to read and study. Respondent Judge Indar should be reminded of his personal responsibility in the making of his decisions and orders. He should not rely on anybody else for the examination and study of the records to properly ascertain the facts of each case that he handles. He cannot simply pass the blame on his staff and hide behind the incompetence of his subordinates. Moreover, respondent Judge Indar should have been more cautious since the case involved was an old inherited case with voluminous records and what was sought to be executed was an order issued almost twenty (20) years ago. It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient court management system since he is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his functions.

While respondent Judge Indar had already issued an Order dated April 12, 2005 which set aside and recalled the Order dated February 14, 2005 and the Certificate of Finality dated March 4, 2005, he was still remiss of his duties to be circumspect, diligent and careful in the performance of his official functions and be the embodiment of judicial competence.

We emphasized in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.106[27] that:

Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for erroneous judgments rendered in good faith. However, this defense has been all too frequently cited to the point of staleness. In truth, good faith in situations of infallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error. Indeed, while a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.107[28]

Thus, this Court is in agreement with the findings of Investigating Justice Ybanez that respondent Judge Indar displayed conduct that fell short of the standards of competence, integrity and diligence expected of a magistrate of law.

With regard to respondent Amilil, this Court agrees with the Investigating Justice that the records and pleadings filed have established his administrative liability. First, respondent Amilil failed to inform respondent Judge Indar of the existence of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court decisions which have nullified and set aside the Order dated December 7, 1983 which was sought to be enforced. Second, he failed to inform and send the parties their respective notices and court orders particularly the Order dated February 14, 2005. Third, respondent Amilil issued the Certificate of Finality dated March 4, 2005 without verifying if indeed a motion for reconsideration was filed in connection with the case.

To reiterate, complainants filed by registered mail a Motion for Reconsideration and To Set Aside Order of February 14, 2005. It was therefore incorrect for respondent Amilil to certify that the Order dated February 14, 2005 had become final and executory because no appeal had been taken from it nor a motion for its reconsideration filed. The issuance by respondent Amilil of a false certification creates confusion since the facts were neither verified nor confirmed.

In Atty. Legaspi, Jr. v. Atty. Montero III,108[29] this Court expounded on the responsibility of the Clerks of Court, thus:

Under the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, the branch clerk of court as the administrative officer of the court, among others, controls and supervises the safekeeping of court records. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court specifically mandates the clerk of court to safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge. As custodian of the records of the court, it is the duty of the clerk of court to ensure not only that the same are safely kept in his or her possession, but also those [that] will be readily available upon the request of the parties or order of the court. Indeed, the clerk of court is an essential officer of our judicial system. As a ranking officer of the court, he performs delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. As custodian of judicial records, it is incumbent upon the clerk of court to ensure an orderly and efficient court management system in the court, and to supervise the personnel under his office to function effectively. A clerk of court plays a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken his job under one pretext or another. In fact, it has been held that branch clerks of court are chiefly responsible for the shortcomings of subordinates to whom administrative functions normally pertaining to the branch clerk of court were delegated. Hence, clerks of court must be assiduous in performing official duty and in supervising and managing court dockets and records.109[30]

Clearly, it is respondent Amilils duty as OIC Clerk of Court to safely keep all files, pleadings and files committed to his charge. As custodian of these records, it is incumbent upon him to see to it that court orders were sent with dispatch to the parties concerned. Respondent Amilil should ensure an orderly and efficient record management system to assist all personnel, including respondent Judge Indar, in the performance of their respective duties. Unfortunately, respondent Amilil failed to live up to these standards.

As to the penalties to be imposed upon respondent Judge Indar, this Court finds the same too light for the infractions he committed. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include: xxxx 3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including governmentowned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

To our mind, the gravity of the infractions committed by respondent Judge Indar merits a higher penalty than the censure recommended by the Investigating Justice. We likewise note that this is not respondent Judge Indars first offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, we imposed upon him a fine of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos for violating Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, when he issued a preliminary injunction without any hearing and prior notice to the parties. Thus, this Court finds respondent Judge Indar guilty of gross misconduct for committing violations of the Code of Judicial

Conduct, for which we shall impose a fine of Twenty-Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos.

However, with regard to the penalty imposed on respondent Amilil, we find the same commensurate with his infractions. Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order 292, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, provides that:

SEC. 22. Administrative Offenses with its corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave, and light, depending on the gravity of its nature and effect on said acts on the government service. xxxx The following are less grave offenses with their corresponding penalties: (a) Simple Neglect of Duty 1st Offense Suspension for one (1) month and (1) day to six (6) months 2nd Offense Dismissal

Clearly, the acts of respondent Amilil constitute simple neglect of duty for which he must be made administratively liable. Under the Civil Service Rules and the Omnibus Rules implementing it, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense penalized with suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense; and dismissal for the second offense.

Respondents Judge Indar and Amilil are reminded that as public officers, they are recipients of public trust, and are thus under obligation to perform the duties of their offices honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their ability. As held in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Liwanag110[31]:

Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court officials and employees are mandated to observe, in view of their exalted position as keepers of the public faith. They are constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary.111[32]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Cader P. Indar Al Haj GUILTY of gross misconduct for committing violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and is FINED the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos. He is likewise WARNED that a repetition of the foregoing or similar transgressions shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent OIC Branch Clerk of Court Abie M. Amilil is also found GUILTY of neglect of duty and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months

without pay with a stern warning that repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC [A.M. No. 11-190-CA-J : April 24, 2012] COMPLAINT OF EMIL MEDENILLA, PEDRO ANONUEVO, JERICHO INOCENTES, CARLITO SALOMON AND ATTY. JESUS F. ACPAL AGAINST JUSTICE SOCORRO B. INTING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. Sirs/Mesdames: Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated APRIL 24, 2012, which reads as follows:
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"A.M. No. 11-190-CA-J (Complaint of Emil Medenilla,[*] Pedro Anonuevo, Jericho Inocentes, Carlito Salomon and Atty. Jesus F. Acpal against Justice Socorro B. Inting of the Court of Appeals ). RESOLUTION Complainant officers and trustees of Katarungan Village Homeowners Association, Inc., (the Association) of Barangay Poblacion, Muntinlupa City, namely, Emil Medenilla (PRO), Pedro Anonuevo (trustee), Jericho Inocentes (trustee), Carlito Salomon (trustee), and Atty. Jesus F. Acpal (village administrator), filed a complaint-affidavit[1] dated September 30, 2011 against Justice Socorro B. Inting of the Court of Appeals (CA) for grave misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and conduct unbecoming of a Court of Appeals Justice in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Code of Professional Responsibility. The complaint-affidavit alleges in substance that two sets of candidates, one from the Pagbabago Party and the other from the Balisado Performance Team, competed in the June 19, 2011 elections of their Association's officers and trustees. The Pagbabago group won the positions of President, Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor, and PRO while the Balisado group won only the seats of the Vice-President and Business Manager.[2] For the Board of Trustees, however, eight from the Balisado group, including Justice Inting, won the majority of the 14 positions of trustees. The Pagbabago group won the remaining six positions.[3] Complainants further alleged that, soon after the winners took their oath of office, Justice Inting committed the following wrongful acts: a) During the July 9, 2011 monthly regular meeting of the Association's board of trustees and officers, someone introduced a resolution that authorized its President, Fiscal Leoncio D. Suarez, Jr. and Treasurer, Jose A. Abundo, to transact business with its banks. Justice Inting opposed the passage of the resolution, however, claiming that the newly elected officers and trustees had not as yet properly assumed their offices in view of the required 60-day turn-over transition from the outgoing officers provided in Section 6, Rule 11 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act 9904 (R.A. 9904) [4] although these rules did not suppose to take effect yet.[5]

b) Justice Inting joined some members of the association in filing complaints of grave abuse of authority, among others, against its newly elected officers before, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)[6] where her impartiality might reasonably be questioned should the case reach the CA where she worked.[7] c) Justice Inting and other trustees of the Association prodded Evangeline Bersabe, its accountant, to disobey the President's order for her to surrender the association documents and keys in her possession. [8] d) Justice Inting and others in the Board of Trustees supposedly passed Resolution 2011-21, entitled Strengthening the Internal Control and Disbursement Policies of the Association ,[9] when such matter did not appear in the August 27, 20 U special meeting agenda or in its minutes. Nobody proposed such a resolution and the board did not deliberate or vote on it. Since only Justice Inting was the only lawyer in the group, complainants conclude that she prepared that resolution and manipulated her supporters in the board. e) Justice Inting used her title as justice of the CA to justify the supposed board action.[10] When her group displayed tarpaulins announcing the implementation of the challenged board resolution, the Association's security personnel removed and seized the tarpaulins. Reacting to this, Justice Inting went to the Association's office and, standing on the middle of the street, questioned what the security personnel did. Complainants alleged that she arrogantly said on that occasion that she was a CA Justice, conveying the message that her action was proper and cannot be questioned.[11] f) Justice Inting and her cohorts usurped the general and management powers of the Association's President to reassign or reshuffle its employees to other positions or to perform other duties and responsibilities. [12] g) She violated Rule 5.01 (d)[13] and Rule 5.10[14] of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct when she joined the political party of her group and contributed to its party funds. Complainants point out that the elections for the board of trustees and officers of the Association had become so politicized that she, as a CA Justice, ought not to have taken part in them since they detracted from the dignity of that court. [15] In her December 2, 2011 comment,[16] Justice Inting assails the complaint as motivated by ill will, malice, and a desire to prevent her from fulfilling her duties as member of the Association's board of trustees. [17] It was unavoidable, she says, that she and the others in the board had to institute their action against complainants even if there was a chance that the matter could go up to the CA where she worked. But, since she was involved in the case in her personal capacity as a trustee of the Association, she simply would have to inhibit herself voluntarily if such matter be assigned to her Division.[18] Justice Inting claims that the action they filed with the HLURB was not altogether groundless since the HLURB even granted their application for a cease and desist order against complainants' group. [19] She rejects as baseless the charge that the Association's elections partake of political activities. And, although she was active in the affairs of the Association, she excelled in her work as Justice of the CA as borne by its records.[20] In their reply of January 10, 2010,[21] complainants contend that Justice Inting appeared before the HLURB in her personal capacity since she had not been personally aggrieved by complainants' action nor had they violated her rights.[22] They claim that the HLURB cease and desist order appeared questionable, given a report that it was issued because Justice Inting used her influence as a Justice of the appellate court and because her schoolmates at that agency helped her.[23] The issue before the Court is whether or not there is sufficient basis to warrant further administrative investigation of the complaint against Justice Inting. Here, the main thrust of the complaint against Justice Inting is that, as Justice of the CA, she should have desisted from joining the elections for the officers and members of the Board of Trustees of her

homeowners association and gotten embroiled in the issues that animated the two groups which shared the powers of the association, thus getting drawn into a bitter litigation. But joining the judiciary does not mean that a judge should live the life of a hermit. The Code of Judicial Ethics does not bar him from joining associations or institutions that promote the common good. To be sure, no social or moral considerations prevent him from taking active part in organizations that aim to promote the welfare of his family or community, like a homeowners association. Perchance, serious issues could develop even within socially desirable organizations but it cannot be on account of such a risk that the judge should stay off from all forms of human associations. He does not, by becoming a judge, cease to be a human being cast off from the society of men. Such society is his natural habitat. It is membership in questionable organizations or actively engaging in the operation of business organizations while serving as judge that he is enjoined to avoid. [24] As a trustee of her village's homeowners association, Justice Inting has the right to stand her ground on any legitimate issue that might arise in the course of the discharge of her duties. She could of course be wrong on those issues but it is not for this that she can be subjected to administrative action. None of those issues are related to her work as Justice of the CA. Essentially, complainants want the Court to resolve by their present action some of the very issues that they raise against her in the HLURB case. But this is not a function of this administrative case. Only when she purposely uses her position as Justice of the CA to get an advantage over or cause prejudice to others can she be administratively sanctioned. As it happens, there is no clear allegation in the complaint in this case that establishes this. The allegations about her using her judicial rank to her advantage in the HLURB case are admittedly speculative. The closest to her invoking her judicial rank was when she stood on the middle of the street to confront the village security personnel who removed and seized the posters that the Board of Trustees put up to announce the need for the Association to comply with its resolution enjoining compliance with the internal controls and disbursement policies that it had enacted. It is plain that those security personnel used raw force to silence the voice of the Board of Trustees expressed through those posters. And, assuming that Justice Inting mentioned the fact that she was a Justice of the CA when she confronted the security personnel, she appears to have done so spontaneously to show that she knew what she was talking about or to discourage those security personnel from using physical force against her that they seemed quite capable of. While it is the Court's duty to investigate every allegation of wrong-doing against judges and other court personnel, it is also its duty to protect them from frivolous charges.[25]
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WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the present administrative complaint against Justice Socorro B. Inting of the Court of Appeals for want of substance. SO ORDERED." Very truly yours, (Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL Clerk of Court

EN BANC

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, Present:

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232

CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, SERENO, REYES, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

- versus BERSAMIN,

JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, Presiding Judge and Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City and Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, respectively, Promulgated: Respondent. April 10, 2012 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION PER CURIAM: This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao.

This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar. To verify the allegations against Judge Indar, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, where the Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposed by RTCShariff Aguak, Branch 15. Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14. The Audit Team further observed that the case numbers in the list submitted by the Local Civil Registrars are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTCShariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato. At the same time, the Audit Team followed-up Judge Indars compliance with Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jesus Edwin A. Villasors 1st Indorsement, dated 15 February 2010, relative to the letter of Ms. Miren Galloway,
1

Manager-Permanent Entry Unit, Australian Embassy, Manila (Australian Embassy letter), asking confirmation on the authenticity of Judge Indars decision, dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As regards this case, the Audit Team found that Spec. Proc. No. 06-584 does not exist in the records of cases filed, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak.

Subsequently, the Audit Team made the following conclusions:

1. The list in Annexes A; A-1; A-2 and A-3 are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak [Maguindanao] which is based in Cotabato City, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City; 2. There are apparently decisions of cases which are spurious, as these did not pass through the regular process such as filing, payment of docket fees, trial, etc. which are now circulating and being registered in Local Civil Registrars throughout the country, the extent of which is any bodys guess; 3. The authenticity of the signatures appearing thereon could only be validated by handwriting experts of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); 4. The participation of any lower court officials and/or employees could not be ascertained except probably through a more thorough discreet investigation and or entrapment; [and] 5. There is a possibility that more of this (sic) spurious documents may appear and cause damage to the Courts Integrity.
2

Meanwhile, in compliance with DCA Villasors Indorsement and in response to the Australian Embassy letter, Judge Indar explained, in a Letter dated 10 March 2010, that this court is a Court of General Jurisdiction and can therefore act even on cases involving Family Relations. Hence, the subject decision rendered by this Court annulling the marriage of your client is VALID and she is free to marry.
3

In a Memorandum dated 26 April 2010, the OCA recommended that (1) the matter be docketed as a regular administrative matter; (2) the matter be assigned to a Court of Appeals Justice for Investigation, Report, and Recommendation; and (3) Judge Indar be preventively suspended, pending investigation.

In a Resolution dated 4 May 2010, the Court En Banc (1) docketed this administrative matter as A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, and (2) preventively
4

suspended Judge Indar pending investigation of this case. The case was initially raffled to Justice Rodil V. Zalameda of the Court of Appeals, Manila for investigation. The case was re-raffled to Justice Angelita A. Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro due to its proximity to the Regional Trial Courts involved. Justice Gacutan set the case for hearing on several dates and sent the corresponding notices of hearing to Judge Indar at his known addresses, namely, his official stations in RTC-Cotabato and RTC-Shariff Aguak and residence address. The first notice of hearing dated 21 June 2010, which was sent via registered mail and private courier LBC, scheduled the hearings on 14, 15, and 16 July 2010 and directed Judge Indar to submit in affidavit form his explanation. The LBC records show that this notice, which was delivered to Judge Indars official stations, was received by one Mustapha Randang on 28 June 2010. The scheduled hearing was postponed and reset to 20, 21 and 22 July 2010. The notice of postponement was sent to Judge Indar via registered mail on 6 July 2010 to his official stations and was received again by Mustapha Randang on 8 July 2010. Judge Indar failed to attend the hearing as rescheduled and to submit the affidavit as required. Thus, in an Order of 23 July 2010, Justice Gacutan

directed Judge Indar to explain his non-appearance, and reset the hearing to 10 and 11 August 2010. The Order was sent to his residence address in M. Tan Subdivision, Gonzalo Javier St., Rosary Heights, Cotabato City. The LBC report indicated that the Order was received by a certain Mrs. Asok. Justice Gacutan also sent a letter dated 23 July 2010 addressed to Atty. Umaima L. Silongan (Atty. Silongan), Acting Clerk of Court of RTC-Cotabato, directing her to serve the notice of hearing scheduled on 10 and 11 August 2010 to Judge Indar and to report the steps taken to effect service of the same. Atty. Silongan submitted a Return of Service, informing that the notices sent to Judge Indar had remained unserved, as the latter left Cotabato City in April 2010 and his location since then was unknown. In a Resolution of 28 September 2010, this Court directed Justice Gacutan to conduct further investigation to determine the authenticity of the questioned decisions allegedly rendered by Judge Indar annulling certain marriages. The Court required Justice Gacutan to ascertain whether the cases were properly filed in court, and who are the parties responsible for the issuance of the questioned decisions, and to submit a report thereon within 60 days from receipt of the Resolution. In compliance with the Courts Resolution, Justice Gacutan directed the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City and Atty. Silongan to submit certified true copies of the questioned decisions and to testify thereon. Only the Civil Registrars were present during the hearings on 4 and 5 November 2010. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

Testimonies of Ma. Josefina Encarnacion A. Ocampo, City Civil Registrar of Manila TSN, November 4, 2010

As City Civil Registrar, she is mandated to receive all registered documents that will affect the status of the person like the birth, death and marriage contract, court decrees regarding annulment, adoption, legitimization, the affidavit using the surname of the father, naturalization, the selection of citizenship, etc. The documents are forwarded to their office after they are being registered by the concerned parties. In the case of annulment of marriage, a copy of the decision is submitted to the Civil Registrar by the one who had his marriage annulled. Per administrative order, it is the duty of the Clerk of Court to furnish them a copy of the Decision. After the copies of decisions are submitted to them, they are mandated to verify the authenticity of the decision by writing a verification letter to the Clerk of Court before making the annotation or changing the parties status. She identified the list of cases of annulment of marriages and petitions changing status of persons (annexes A-1 and A-2) which all came from a court in Cotabato. All the cases listed in A-2 have already been confirmed or annotated in the records of the Manila Civil Registry. She affirmed that the said cases in the list were certified true by the clerk of court. As their duty to annotate the said decrees to their records are merely ministerial, they do not question the decrees however peculiar they may seem. The cases listed in the document marked as Annex A-2 were also cases that came from Cotabato City for their annotation. Although these cases have been certified true by the Clerk of Court, their annotation and confirmation were held in abeyance due to the on-going investigation of Judge Indar. Testimony of Salvador Cario, Chief of Records Division, City Civil Registrar of Quezon City TSN, November 4, 2010 He generally supervises the retrieval of all the records or documents in their office. He also signs certified true copies of birth, marriage contract, death certificate and certified true copies of Courts decisions furnished to them by different courts. With regards the decisions issued by the Court in provinces, once the Judge issued the decision regarding the annulment, the parties concern

should first register the decision to the Local Civil Registrar where the court is situated. After they receive the decision from the Administrative Division, they would call or write the concerned Local Civil Registrar to authenticate or verify the records. He identified the cases coming from a Cotabato court that were submitted to them for annotation.

The subject decisions listed in the annexes which were decided by a court in Cotabato City were already annotated and verified. However he could not ascertain who from the court verified the authenticity or existence of such decisions as he was not the one who personally called to verify and authenticate them from the court where the listed Decisions/Orders originate.
5

The Civil Registrar of Manila submitted copies of Decisions, Orders and Resolutions, all signed by Judge Indar, in forty three (43) cases for annulment of marriage, correction of entry and other similar cases from RTC-Cotabato City, Branch 15. All the decisions were accompanied by the corresponding Letter of Atty. Silongan, affirming each of the decisions as true and authentic based on the records, while thirty six (36) of such decisions are accompanied by Atty. Silongans certification affirming the genuineness of Judge Indars signature affixed on the Decisions.
6

On the other hand, the Civil Registrar of Quezon City submitted twenty five (25) Decisions, Orders, and Resolutions issued by RTC-Cotabato City, Branch 15, which were transmitted to the Registrars office for annotation and recording. All the Decisions were signed by Judge Indar, and accompanied by Certificates of Finality affirming the genuineness of Judge Indars signature appearing above the name of Judge Cader P. Indar. The Certificates of Finality

were issued by Atty. Silongan and in one case, by Abie Amilil, the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court.
7

Meanwhile, Atty. Silongan, despite notice, failed to attend the hearing. She explained in a Manifestation of 8 November 2010 that she received the Notice only on 8 November 2010 because she was on leave from 1 October 1 to 30 November 2010. Thus, the hearing was reset to 11 and 12 January 2011. However, on the scheduled hearing, Atty. Silongan still failed to appear. Justice Gacutan sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to locate the whereabouts of Judge Indar, as well as of Atty. Silongan. After several exchanges of correspondence, the NBI, in a Letter dated 22 March 2011, provided the residence addresses of both Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan. Meanwhile, Judge George C. Jabido (Judge Jabido), Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, was directed to verify the authenticity of the records of the subject Decisions and to appear at the hearing on 29 March 2011. The hearing was canceled due to the judicial reorganization in the Court of Appeals. This administrative matter was re-raffled to Justice Abraham B. Borreta (Justice Borreta) since Justice Gacutan was reassigned to Manila effective 11 April 2011. Justice Borreta set the hearing on 27 to 29 June 2011. Notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan at the addresses provided by the NBI and at their previous mailing addresses. The registered mails addressed to Judge Indar were returned for the following reasons: (1) addressee out of town, move to another place and (2) addressee unknown.

The Notice sent to Atty. Silongan was also returned and per LBC report, the consignee has moved to an unknown address. Judge Jabido, who was notified of the hearing, testified that:
In compliance with the directive of the Investigating Justice to verify the authenticity of the records of the listed decisions, judgments and orders, he issued memos to the officers of the Court, the Branch Clerk of Court, the docket clerk, directing them to produce and secure copies of the minutes and other documents related therein. He personally checked the records of the RTC. The Records of the RTC are bereft of evidence to show that regular and true proceedings were had on these cases. There is no showing that a docket fee has been paid for each corresponding cases. There is also no showing that the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared. There is also no record that a hearing was conducted. No stenographic notes of the actual proceedings were also made. He could not also determine when the said cases were submitted for decision as it was not calendared for that purpose.
8

Judge Jabido also submitted a report, portions of which read:

The undersigned took extra efforts to locate any record of the cases involving the parties as enumerated in the list. The undersigned even issued Memorandum to the Branch Clerk of Court, the docket clerk and other responsible officers of the Court to produce and secure copies of any pleading/documents related to these cases enumerated in the list but his efforts proved futile, hence: a) to this Court, there is no record on file of all the enumerated cases contained in the list. b) to this Court, it is bereft of any evidence on whether the Hon. Judge Indar conducted a hearing in these cases. xxxx There is absence of any record showing compliance of the same. It is hereby submitted that the manner upon which the questioned annulment and correction cases, as contained herein in the attached list, allegedly decided by the Hon. Judge Indar were commenced are clearly doubtful. Firstly, there is no showing of compliance on the rules prescribed. xxxx

There is no showing that a verified Petition was officially filed in writing and giving (sic) an opportunity for the Respondents to be heard by himself or by counsel. x x x
9

To support his findings, Judge Jabido submitted: (1) copies of the Letters and Memoranda mentioned in the report; (2) the Calendar of Cases in RTCCotabato, Branch 15, on various dates from the period starting April 2007 to 20 October 2009; and (3) the Docket Inventory in Civil Cases, Criminal Cases and Other Cases for the period of January to December 2009 in RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15.

Subpoenas were sent to some of the parties in the questioned decisions, namely: Grace Elizarde Reyes (Special Case No. 1049), Buenaventura Mojica (Apl. Proc. No. 08-1931), Marie Christine N. Florendo (Civil Case No. 519), Jesse Yamson Faune, Jr. (Special Civil Case 08-2366), Rosemarie Tongson Ramos (Special Case No. 08-1871) and Melissa Sangan-Demafelis (Spl. Proc. 07-2262) to determine whether they filed the petitions for annulment of marriage and whether proceedings were actually had before Judge Indars sala in relation to their cases. All the subpoenas were returned to the Court of Appeals. In his Report dated 2 September 2011, Justice Borreta first determined whether the requirements of due process had been complied with since there was no proof that Judge Indar personally and actually received any of the notices sent to him in the course of the investigation. Justice Borreta differentiated administrative due process with judicial due process. He stated that while a day in court is a matter of right in judicial

proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. Justice Borreta noted that all possible means to locate Judge Indar and to personally serve the court notices to him were resorted to. The notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indars known addresses, namely, his sala in RTCCotabato Branch 14 and RTC-Shariff Aguak Branch 15, and at his residence address. However, none of the notices appeared to have been personally received by Judge Indar. Notwithstanding, Justice Borreta concluded that the requirements of due process have been complied with. Justice Borreta stated that Judge Indar was aware of a pending administrative case against him. The notice of this Courts Resolution of 4 May 2010, preventively suspending Judge Indar, was mailed and sent to him at his sala in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15. Justice Borreta proceeded to determine Judge Indars administrative liability, and found the latter guilty of serious misconduct and dishonesty. According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indars act of issuing decisions on annulment of marriage cases without complying with the stringent procedural and substantive requirements of the Rules of Court for such cases clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Indar made it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial, when the records show no judicial proceedings occurred. Moreover, Judge Indars act of affirming in writing before the Australian Embassy the validity of a decision he allegedly rendered, when in fact that case does not appear in the courts records, constitutes dishonesty.

Justice Borreta recommended the dismissal of Judge Indar from service, and the investigation of Atty. Silongan, who is not included as respondent in this case, on her participation in the certification of the authenticity of the spurious Decisions. The sole issue in this case is whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty. We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which govern the conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, clearly provide that technical rules of procedure and evidence do not strictly apply to administrative proceedings. Section 3, Rule I of the Uniform Rules states:
Section 3. Technical Rules in Administrative Investigations. Administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.

In Cornejo v. Gabriel, the Court held that notice and hearing are not
10

indispensable in administrative investigations, thus:

The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be

stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. x x x (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
11

It is settled that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. It is enough that
12

the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process,
13

what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
14

The Court emphasized in Cornejo the Constitutional precept that public office
15

is a public trust, which is the underlying principle for the relaxation of the
16

requirements of due process of law in administrative proceedings, thus:

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office as property. It is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. (Emphasis supplied)
17

In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While there is no proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing were received by one Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTCCotabato, while one of the notices was received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and capable to receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar.

Further, Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against him because aside from the fact that the Courts Resolution suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive suspension was reported in major national newspapers. Moreover, Judge Indar was repeatedly sent notices of
18

hearings to his known addresses. Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of the charges against him. However, Judge Indar still failed to file his explanation and appear at the scheduled hearings. Consequently, the investigation proceeded ex parte in accordance with Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
19

Public office is a public trust. This constitutional principle requires a judge,

20

like any other public servant and more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity. As
21

the visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.
22

Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting standards. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, the Court explained the
23

difference between simple misconduct and grave misconduct, thus:

The Court defines misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.

In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team, the list of case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct. The Court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided marital unions, without conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. Not only that, Judge Indars gross misconduct greatly undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary and betrays public trust and confidence in the courts. Judge Indars utter lack of moral fitness has no place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar deserves nothing less than dismissal from the service. The Court defines dishonesty as:
x x x a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of

fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.

24

In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct any judicial proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge perform official duties honestly. As found by the Audit Team, the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending, or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, which Judge Indar presided. The cases do not likewise exist in the docket books of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato. The Audit Team also noted that the case numbers in the list are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato. Moreover, Judge Jabido, Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, verified the records of the trial court and found nothing to show that proceedings were had on the questioned annulment cases. There was nothing in the records to show that (1) petitions were filed; (2) docket fees were paid; (3) the parties were notified of hearings; (4) hearings were calendared and actually held; (5) stenographic notes of the proceedings were taken; and (6) the cases were submitted for decision.

Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indars Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling. Despite the fact that no proceedings were conducted in the case, Judge Indar declared categorically, in response to the Australian Embassy letter, that the Decision annulling the marriage is valid and that petitioner is free to marry. In effect, Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of the contents of the annulment decree, highlighting Judge Indars appalling dishonesty.

The Court notes that this is not Judge Indars first offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-051953, the Court imposed on him a fine of P10,000 for violating Section 5,
25

Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, when he issued a preliminary injunction without any hearing and prior notice to the parties. In another case, A.M. No. RTJ-072069, the Court found him guilty of gross misconduct for committing
26

violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly fined him P25,000. Since this is Judge Indars third offense, showing the depravity of his character and aggravating the serious offenses of gross misconduct and dishonesty, the
27 28

Court imposes on Judge Indar the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service, with its accessory penalties, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
29

This administrative case against Judge Indar shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This Resolution entitled Re: Automatic Conversion of
30

Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials

Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar, provides:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, Judge Indars gross misconduct and dishonesty likewise constitute a breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act. CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION.

In addition, Judge Indars dishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial and complied with the Rules of Court,

laws, and established jurisprudence violates the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. Such violation is also a ground for disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

In Samson v. Caballero, where the Court automatically disbarred the

31

respondent judge, pursuant to the provisions of AM. No. 02-9-02-SC, the Court held:
Under the same rule, a respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar. The rule does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as a member of the bar, that respondent be required to comment on and show cause why he should not be disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from the order for him to comment on why he should not be held administratively liable as a member of the bench. In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of automatic conversion of administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of

an administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court. It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty, constituting violations of the Lawyers Oath, and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Judge Indar deserves disbarment.

In so far as Atty. Silongan, is concerned, we adopt Justice Borretas recommendation to conduct an investigation on her alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned Decisions. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 14, Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, guilty of Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty for which he is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits due him, except accrued leave benefits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Judge Indar is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered into Judge Indars record as a member of the bar and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to investigate Atty. Umaima L. Silongan, Acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City, on her alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned Decisions on the annulment of marriage cases issued by Judge Indar. Let copies of this Decision be forwarded to the Local Civil Registrars of the City of Manila and Quezon City, the same to form part of the records of Decisions of Judge Indar on the annulment of marriages filed with their offices. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Baguio City

EN BANC

REYNARIA BARCENAS, Complainant,

A.C. No. 8159 (formerly CBD 05-1452)

Present:

PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO JR., - versus NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., MENDOZA and

PEREZ, JJ. ATTY. ANORLITO A. ALVERO, Respondent. Promulgated: April 23, 2010 x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint112[1] dated May 17, 2005 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero filed by Reynaria Barcenas with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1452, now Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8159. The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio (San Antonio), entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount of P300,000.00, which the latter was supposed to give to a certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his deceased father as tenant of a ricefield located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria, Laguna. The receipt of the money was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt113[2] dated May 7, 2004. In the said receipt, Atty. Alvero said that he would deposit the money in court because Amanda Gasta refused to accept the same.114[3] Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of money in cockfights. To check if the money they gave Atty. Alvero was still intact, Barcenas pretended to borrow P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 and promised to return the amount when needed or as soon as the case was set for hearing. However, Atty. Alvero allegedly replied, Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na? Subsequently, Barcenas discovered that Atty. Alvero did not deposit the money in court, but instead converted and used the same for his personal needs. In his letters dated August 18, 2004 115 [4] and August 25, 2004,116[5] Atty. Atty. Alvero admitted the receipt of the P300,000.00 and promised to return the money. The pertinent portions of said letters are quoted as follows:

Dahil sa kagustuhan ng iyong amo na maibalik ko ang perang tinanggap ko sa iyo, lumakad ako agad at pilit kong kinukuha kahit iyon man lang na hiniram sa akin na P80,000.00 pero hindi karakapraka ang lumikom ng gayong halaga. Pero tiniyak sa akin na sa Martes, ika-24 ng buwan ay ibibigay sa akin. Bukas ay tutungo ako sa amin upang lumikom pa ng karagdagang halaga upang maisauli ko ang buong P300,000.00. Nakikiusap ako sa iyo dahil sa ikaw ang nagbigay sa akin ng pera na bigyan mo ako ng kaunting panahon upang malikom ko ang pera na ipinagkatiwala mo sa akin, hanggang ika-25 ng Agosto, 2004. x x x 117[6] Maya-mayang alas nuwebe (9:00) titingnan ang lupang aking ipinagbibili ng Dalawang Milyon. Gustong-gusto ng bibili gusto lang makita ang lupa dahil malayo, nasa Cavinti. Kung ok na sa bibili pinakamatagal na ang Friday ang bayaran. Iyong aking sinisingil na isang P344,000.00 at isang P258,000.00 na utang ng taga-Liliw ay darating sa akin ngayong umaga bago mag alas otso. Kung maydala ng pambayad kahit magkano ay ibibigay ko sa iyo ngayong hapon. xxxx Lahat ng pagkakaperahan ko ay aking ginagawa, pati anak ko ay tinawagan ko na. Pakihintay muna lang ng kauting panahon pa, hindi matatapos ang linggong ito, tapos ang problema ko sa iyo. Pasensiya ka na.118[7]

However, as of the filing of the instant complaint, despite repeated demands, Atty. Alvero failed to return the same. Thus, Barcenas prayed that Atty. Alvero be disbarred for being a disgrace to the legal profession. On March 30, 2005, the IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Alvero to submit his Answer to the complaint.119[8] In compliance, in his Answer 120 [9] dated April 18, 2005, Atty. Alvero claimed that he did not know Barcenas prior to the filing of the

instant complaint nor did he know that San Antonio was an employee of Barcenas. He alleged that he came to know Barcenas only when the latter went to him to borrow P60,000.00 from the amount entrusted to Rodolfo San Antonio who entrusted to respondent. At that time, Atty. Alvero claimed that San Antonio was reluctant to grant the request because it might jeopardize the main and principal cause of action of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) case. Atty. Alvero, however, admitted that he received an amount of P300,000.00 from San Antonio, though he claimed that said money was the principal cause of action in the reconveyance action.121[10] Atty. Alvero stressed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and Barcenas. He, however, insisted that the lawyer-client relationship between him and San Antonio still subsisted as his service was never severed by the latter. He further emphasized that he had not breached the trust of his client, since he had, in fact, manifested his willingness to return the said amount as long as his lawyer-client relationship with San Antonio subsisted. Finally, Atty. Alvero prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed. On June 20, 2005, the IBP-CBD notified the parties to appear for the mandatory conference.122[11]

Meanwhile, in a separate Affidavit123[12] dated September 19, 2005, San Antonio narrated that he indeed sought Atty. Alveros professional services concerning an agricultural land dispute. He claimed that Atty. Alvero made him believe that he needed to provide an amount of P300,000.00 in order to file his complaint, as the same would be deposited in court. San Antonio quoted Atty. Alvero as saying: Hindi pwedeng hindi kasabay ang pera sa pagpa-file ng papel dahil tubusan yan, kung sakaling ipatubos ay nasa korte na ang pera. Believing that it was the truth, San Antonio was forced to borrow money from Barcenas in the amount of P300,000.00. Subsequently, San Antonio gave the said amount to Atty. Alvero, in addition to the professional fees, as shown by an acknowledgment receipt.124[13] San Antonio further corroborated Barcenas allegation that they tried to borrow P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 they gave to Atty. Alvero after they found out that the latter lost a big amount of money in cockfighting. He reiterated that Atty. Alvero declined and stated, Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na. Later on, they found out that Atty. Atty. Alvero lied to them since the money was never deposited in court but was instead used for his personal needs. For several times, Atty. Alvero promised to return the money to them, but consistently failed to do so. San Antonio submitted Atty. Atty. Alveros letters dated August 18, 2004 125 [14] and

August 25, 2004126[15] showing the latters promises to return the amount of P300,000.00. During the mandatory conference, Atty. Alvero failed to attend despite notice. Thus, he was deemed to have waived his right to participate in the mandatory conference. In its Report and Recommendation dated May 21, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Alvero be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for gross misconduct. Atty. Alvero was, likewise, ordered to immediately account for and return the amount of P300,000.00 to Barcenas and/or Rodolfo San Antonio. The pertinent portion thereof reads:
The record does not show and no evidence was presented by respondent to prove that the amount of P300,000 which was entrusted to him was already returned to complainant or Rodolfo San Antonio, by way of justifying his non-return of the money, respondent claims in his Answer that the P300,000 was the source of the principal cause of action of the petitioner, Rodolfo San Antonio, in the above-cited DARAB Case No. R0403-0011-04 as shown by a copy of the Amended Petition, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex 1 and made an integral part hereof. A review of Annex 1, which in the Amended Petition dated October 31, 2004 and filed on November 3, 2004, will show that the Petitioner Rodolfo San Antonio is praying that he be allowed to cultivate the land after the P300,000 is consigned by Petitioner to the Honorable Adjudication Board. Up to the time of the filing of the instant complaint, no such deposit or consignment took place and no evidence was presented that respondent deposited the amount in court. The fact is respondent promised to return the amount (Annex B and C of the Complaint), but he failed to do so. The failure therefore of respondent to account for and return the amount of P300,000 entrusted or given to him by his client constitute gross misconduct and would subject him to disciplinary action under the Code.127[16]

In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification as to penalty the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it ordered that Atty. Alvero be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and, likewise, ordered him to account for and return the amount of P300,000.00 to complainants within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice. The Office of the Bar Confidant redocketed the instant case as a regular administrative complaint against Atty. Alvero and, subsequently, recommended that this Court issue an extended resolution for the final disposition of the case.

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.

Undoubtedly, Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS. Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 16.

A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

In the instant case, Atty. Alvero admitted to having received the amount of P300,000.00 from San Antonio, specifically for the purpose of depositing it in court. However, as found by the IBP-CBD, Atty. Alvero presented no evidence that he had indeed deposited the amount in or consigned it to the court. Neither was there any evidence that he had returned the amount to Barcenas or San Antonio.

From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.128[17] These, Atty. Alvero failed to do.

Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client in the course of his professional

employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon demand. In the instant case, respondent failed to account for and return the P300,000.00 despite complainants repeated demands.129[18]

Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed no attorney-client relationship between him and Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed, or otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.130[19]

Atty. Alveros failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. It gave rise to the presumption that he converted the money for his own use, and this act constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 131 [20] They constitute gross misconduct and gross unethical behavior for which he may be suspended, following Section 27,

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Small v. Banares,132[21] the respondent was suspended for two years for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for failing to file a case for which the amount of P80,000.00 was given him by the client, and for failing to return the said amount upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are attendant in this case, the Court finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on respondent a two-year suspension to be in order. As a final note, we reiterate: the practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.133[22] For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and

meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the privilege to practice law.134[23]

WHEREFORE, Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008 of the IBP-CBD Board of Governors, which found respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero GUILTY of gross misconduct, is AFFIRMED. He is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty. Alvero as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

JESSIE R. DE LEON, Complainant,

A.C. No. 8620

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ.

-versus -

ATTY. EDUARDO G. CASTELO, Respondent.

Promulgated:

January 12, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case, which Jessie R. De Leon initiated on April 29, 2010, concerns respondent attorneys alleged dishonesty and falsification committed in the pleadings he filed in behalf of the defendants in the civil action in which De Leon intervened.

Antecedents

On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the purpose of correcting the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering two parcels of land located in Malabon City then registered in the names of defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu due to their encroaching on a public callejon and on a portion of the Malabon-Navotas River shoreline to the extent, respectively, of an area of 45 square meters and of about 600 square meters. The suit, entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, Gorgonia Flores, and the Registrar of Deeds of Malabon City, was docketed as Civil Case No.

4674MN of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, in Malabon City.135[1]

De Leon, having joined Civil Case No. 4674MN as a voluntary intervenor two years later (April 21, 2008), now accuses the respondent, the counsel of record of the defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN, with the serious administrative offenses of dishonesty and falsification warranting his disbarment or suspension as an attorney. The respondents sin was allegedly committed by his filing for defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu of various pleadings (that is, answer with counterclaim and cross-claim in relation to the main complaint; and answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim) despite said spouses being already deceased at the time of filing.136[2]

De Leon avers that the respondent committed dishonesty and falsification as follows:

xxx in causing it (to) appear that persons (spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu) have participated in an act or proceeding (the making and filing of the Answers) when they did not in fact so participate; in fact, they could not have so participated because they were already dead as of that time, which is punishable under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.

Respondent also committed the crime of Use of Falsified Documents, by submitting the said falsified Answers in the judicial proceedings, Civil Case No. 4674MN; Respondent also made a mockery of the aforesaid judicial proceedings by representing dead persons therein who, he falsely made to appear, as contesting the complaints, counter-suing and cross-suing the adverse parties. 12. That, as a consequence of the above criminal acts, complainant respectfully submits that respondent likewise violated: (a) His Lawyers Oath: xxx (b) The Code of Professional Responsibility:137[3] xxx

On June 23, 2010, the Court directed the respondent to comment on De Leons administrative complaint.138[4]

In due course, or on August 2, 2010,139[5] the respondent rendered the following explanations in his comment, to wit:

1. The persons who had engaged him as attorney to represent the Lim family in Civil Case No. 4674MN were William and Leonardo Lim, the children of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu; 2. Upon his (Atty. Castelo) initial queries relevant to the material allegations of the Governments complaint in Civil

Case No. 4674MN, William Lim, the representative of the Lim Family, informed him: a. That the Lim family had acquired the properties from Georgina Flores; b. That William and Leonardo Lim were already actively managing the family business, and now coowned the properties by virtue of the deed of absolute sale their parents, Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, had executed in their favor; and

c. That because of the execution of the deed of absolute sale, William and Leonardo Lim had since honestly assumed that their parents had already caused the transfer of the TCTs to their names. 3. Considering that William and Leonardo Lim themselves were the ones who had engaged his services, he (Atty. Castelo) consequently truthfully stated in the motion seeking an extension to file responsive pleading dated February 3, 2006 the fact that it was the family of the defendants that had engaged him, and that he had then advised the children of the defendants to seek the assistance as well of a licensed geodetic surveyor and engineer; 4. He (Atty. Castelo) prepared the initial pleadings based on his honest belief that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were then still living. Had he known that they were already deceased, he would have most welcomed the information and would have moved to substitute Leonardo and William Lim as defendants for that reason; 5. He (Atty. Castelo) had no intention to commit either a falsehood or a falsification, for he in fact submitted the death certificates of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in order to apprise the trial court of that fact; and 6. The Office of the Prosecutor for Malabon City even dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification brought

against him (Atty. Castelo) through the resolution dated February 11, 2010. The same office denied the complainants motion for reconsideration on May 17, 2010.

On September 3, 2010, the complainant submitted a reply, 140 [6] whereby he asserted that the respondents claim in his comment that he had represented the Lim family was a deception, because the subject of the complaint against the respondent was his filing of the answers in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu despite their being already deceased at the time of the filing. The complainant regarded as baseless the justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor for Malabon City in dismissing the criminal complaint against the respondent and in denying his motion for reconsideration.

The Court usually first refers administrative complaints against members of the Philippine Bar to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and appropriate recommendations. For the present case, however, we forego the prior referral of the complaint to the IBP, in view of the facts being uncomplicated and based on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Thus, we decide the complaint on its merits. Ruling

We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Accordingly, we dismiss the patently frivolous complaint.

I Attorneys Obligation to tell the truth

All attorneys in the Philippines, including the respondent, have sworn to the vows embodied in following Lawyers Oath,141[7] viz:

I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyers Oath, providing:142[8]

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

The foregoing ordain ethical norms that bind all attorneys, as officers of the Court, to act with the highest standards of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness. All attorneys are thereby enjoined to obey the laws of the land, to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients. Being also servants of the Law, attorneys are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation by others.143[9] The least they can do in that regard is to refrain from engaging in any form or manner of unlawful conduct (which broadly includes any act or omission contrary to law, but does not necessarily imply the element of criminality even if it is broad enough to include such element).144[10]

To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest value, for, as the Court has said in Young v. Batuegas:145[11]

A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.

Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only the presumption of regularity in the discharge of their duties, but also the immunity from liability to others for as long as the performance of their obligations to their clients does not depart from their character as servants of the Law and as officers of the Court. In particular, the statements they make in behalf of their clients that are relevant, pertinent, or material to the subject of inquiry are absolutely privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor. Such cloak of privilege is necessary and essential in ensuring the unhindered service to their clients causes and in protecting the clients confidences. With the cloak of privilege, they can freely and courageously speak for their clients, verbally or in writing, in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal prosecution or actions for damages.146[12]

Nonetheless, even if they enjoy a number of privileges by reason of their office and in recognition of the vital role they play in the administration of justice, attorneys hold the privilege and right to practice law before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative tribunals or offices only during good behavior.147[13]

II Respondent did not violate the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility

On April 17, 2006, the respondent filed an answer with counterclaim and cross-claim in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the persons whom the Government as plaintiff named as defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN.148[14] He alleged therein that:

2. The allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint are ADMITTED. Moreover, it is hereby made known that defendants spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had already sold the two (2) parcels of land, together with the building and improvements thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (148805) 139876 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal, to Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim,

of Rms. 501 502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza del Conde, Binondo, Manila. Hence, Leonardo Lim and William Lim are their successors-in-interest and are the present lawful owners thereof. In order to properly and fully protect their rights, ownership and interests, Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim shall hereby represent the defendantsspouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu as substitute/representative parties in this action. In this manner, a complete and expeditious resolution of the issues raised in this case can be reached without undue delay. A photo copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property, executed by herein defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in favor of said Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, is hereto attached as Annex 1 hereof. xxx 21. There is improper joinder of parties in the complaint. Consequently, answering defendants are thus unduly compelled to litigate in a suit regarding matters and facts as to which they have no knowledge of nor any involvement or participation in. 22. Plaintiff is barred by the principle of estoppel in bringing this suit, as it was the one who, by its governmental authority, issued the titles to the subject property. This action is barred by the principles of prescription and laches for plaintiffs unreasonable delay in brining this suit, particularly against defendant Flores, from whom herein answering defendants acquired the subject property in good faith and for value. If truly plaintiff has a clear and valid cause of action on the subject property, it should not have waited thirty (30) years to bring suit.

Two years later, or on April 21, 2008, De Leon filed his complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN.149[15] He expressly named therein as defendants vis--vis his intervention not only the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the original defendants, but also their sons Leonardo Lim, married to Sally Khoo, and William Lim, married to Sally Lee, the same persons whom the respondent had already alleged in the answer, supra, to be the transferees and current owners of the parcels of land.150[16]

The following portions of De Leons complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN are relevant, viz:

2. Defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, are Filipino citizens with addresses at 504 Plaza del Conde, Manila and at 46 C. Arellano St., San Agustin, Malabon City, where they may be served with summons and other court processes ; 3. Defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee are all of legal age and with postal address at Rms. 501-502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza del Conde, Binondo, Manila, alleged purchasers of the property in question from defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu; 4. Defendants Registrar of Deeds of Malabon City holds office in Malabon City, where he may be served with summons and other court processes. He is charged with the duty, among others, of registering decrees of Land Registration in Malabon City under the Land Registration Act; xxx 7. That intervenor Jessie de Leon, is the owner of a parcel of land located in Malabon City described in TCT no. M-15183 of the Register of Deeds of Malabon City, photocopy of which is attached to this Comp laint as Annex G, and copy of the location plan of the aforementioned property is attached to this complaint as Annex H and is made an integral part hereof; 8. That there are now more or less at least 40 squatters on intervenors property, most of them employees of defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee who had gained access to intervenors property and built their houses without benefit of any building permits from the government who had made their access to intervenors property thru a two panel metal gate more or less 10 meters wide and with an armed guard by the gate and with permission from defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and/or and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee illegally entered intervenors property thru a wooden ladder to go over a 12 foot wall now separating intervenors property from the former esquinita which is now part of defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chus and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoos and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lees property and this illegally allowed his employees as well as their relatives and friends thereof to illegally enter intervenors property through the ladders defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu installed in their wall and also allowed said employees and relatives as well as friends to build houses and shacks without the benefit of any building permit as well as permit to occupy said illegal buildings; 9. That the enlargement of the properties of spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had resulted in the closure of street lot no. 3 as described in TCT no. 143828, spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu having titled the street lot no. 3 and placed a wall at its opening on C. Arellano street, thus closing any exit or egress or entrance to intervenors property as could be seen from Annex H hereof and thus preventing intervenor from entering into his property resulted in preventing intervenor from fully enjoying all the beneficial benefits from his property;

10. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and later on defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee are the only people who could give permission to allow third parties to enter intervenors property and their control over intervenors property is enforced through his armed guard thus exercising illegal beneficial rights over intervenors property at intervenors loss and expense, thus depriving intervenor of legitimate income from rents as well as legitimate access to intervenors property and the worst is preventing the Filipino people from enjoying the Malabon Navotas River and enjoying the right of access to the natural fruits and products of the Malabon Navotas River and instead it is defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee using the public property exclusively to enrich their pockets; xxx 13. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee were confederating, working and helping one another in their actions to inhibit intervenor Jessie de Leon to gain access and beneficial benefit from his property ;

On July 10, 2008, the respondent, representing all the defendants named in De Leons complaint in intervention, responded in an answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim,151 [17] stating that spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu xxx are now both deceased, to wit:
xxx 2. The allegations in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Complaint are ADMITTED, with the qualification that defendants-spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo Lim, William Lim and Sally Lee Lim are the registered and lawful owners of the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-35929, issued by the Register of Deeds for Malabon City, having long ago acquired the same from the defendantsspouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, who are now both deceased . Copy of the TCT No. M-35929 is attached hereto as Annexes 1 and 1 -A. The same title has already been previously submitted to this Honorable Court on December 13, 2006. xxx

The respondent subsequently submitted to the RTC a so-called clarification and submission,152 [18] in which he again adverted to the deaths of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, as follows:

1. On March 19, 2009, herein movants-defendants Lim filed before this Honorable Court a Motion for Substitution of Defendants in the Principal Complaint of the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DENR; 2. The Motion for Substitution is grounded on the fact that the two (2) parcels of land, with the improvements thereon, which are the subject matter of the instant case, had long been sold and transferred by the principal defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu to herein complaint-in-intervention defendants Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale , a copy of which is attached to said Motion as Annex 1 thereof. 3. Quite plainly, the original principal defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, having sold and conveyed the subject property, have totally lost any title, claim or legal interest on the property. It is on this factual ground that this Motion for Substitution is based and certainly not on the wrong position of Intervenor de Leon that the same is based on the death of defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu. 4. Under the foregoing circumstances and facts, the demise of defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu no longer has any significant relevance to the instant Motion. To, however, show the fact of their death, photo copy of their respective death certificates are attached hereto as Annexes 1 and 2 hereof. 5. The Motion for substitution of Defendants in the Principal Complaint dated March 18, 2009 shows in detail why there is the clear, legal and imperative need to now substitute herein movants-defendants Lim for defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in the said principal complaint. 6. Simply put, movants-defendants Lim have become the indispensable defendants in the principal complaint of plaintiff DENR, being now the registered and lawful owners of the subject property and the real parties-in-interest in this case. Without them, no final determination can be had in the Principal complaint. 7. Significantly, the property of intervenor Jessie de Leon, which is the subject of his complaint-in-intervention, is identically, if not similarly, situated as that of herein movants-defendants Lim, and likewise, may as well be a proper subject of the Principal Complaint of plaintiff DENR. 8. Even the plaintiff DENR, itself, concedes the fact that herein movantsdefendants Lim should be substituted as defendants in the principal complaint as contained in their Manifestation dated June 3, 2009, which has been filed in this case.

WHEREFORE, herein movants-defendants Lim most respectfully submit their Motion for substitution of Defendants in the Principal Complaint and pray that the same be granted. xxx

Did the respondent violate the letter and spirit of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in making the averments in the aforequoted pleadings of the defendants?

A plain reading indicates that the respondent did not misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the contrary, the respondent directly stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim, supra, and in the clarification and submission, supra, that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were already deceased.

Even granting, for the sake of argument, that any of the respondents pleadings might have created any impression that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, we still cannot hold the respondent guilty of any dishonesty or falsification. For one, the respondent was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when he filed the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. As such, his pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action against him as an attorney. Secondly, having made clear at the start that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual owners of the affected properties

due to the transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and that the actual owners (i.e., Leonardo and William Lim) needed to be substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the pleadings became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer living. His joining in the action as a voluntary intervenor charged him with notice of all the other persons interested in the litigation. He also had an actual awareness of such other persons, as his own complaint in intervention, supra, bear out in its specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William Lim, and their respective spouses. Thus, he could not validly insist that the respondent committed any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to any other party.

III Good faith must always motivate any complaint against a Member of the Bar

According to Justice Cardozo,153[19] xxx the fair fame of a lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a calling is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored.

A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The Court, whose officer every lawyer is, must shield such fragility from mindless assault by the unscrupulous and the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting down any patently frivolous complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good faith from whoever brings any accusation of unethical conduct. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice.

The complainant initiated his complaint possibly for the sake of harassing the respondent, either to vex him for taking the cudgels for his clients in connection with Civil Case No. 4674MN, or to get even for an imagined wrong in relation to the subject matter of the pending action, or to accomplish some other dark purpose. The worthlessness of the accusation apparent from the beginning has impelled us into resolving the complaint sooner than later.

WHEREFORE, we dismiss the complaint for disbarment or suspension filed against Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.