Sie sind auf Seite 1von 83

JURISPRUDENCE ON REMEDIAL LAWS

Courts and their


Jurisdiction:

JURISDICTION; Supreme Court; Exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in criminal cases where the penalty imposed by the lower court is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, even if the same decision further imposes a lesser penalty or penalties for crimes arising out of the same occurrence.

Limpangog v. C , !" #$%&&', (ov. &), #'''.

Same; Court of Appeals; *t has jurisdiction over all ,irol v. -on. appeals from decisions of the +mbudsman in .andiganbaya administrative disciplinary cases. n Justices, !" #$/'#$, (ov. %, #'''. Same; Sandiganbayan; ,he .andiganbayan had no ntiporda v. jurisdiction where the original information did not mention -on. that the offense committed is 0office1related.2 -owever, !architorena, estoppel applies when jurisdiction was not raised. !" #$$&3', 4ec. &$, #'''. Same; Same; 5nder " 3&%', the .andiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused public officials +(L6 when they occupy positions corresponding to .alary !rade &7 or higher. " 7838 w9 respect to plunder cases to fall w9in the .andiganbayan:s jurisdiction is impliedly repealed. Same; Same; 5t !lass muni!ipality mayors fall under t e original and e"!lusi#e $urisdi!tion of t e Sandiganbayan; lthough municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration under .ection %.a. of "epublic ct (o. 7'7/, Congress, nevertheless, provided a catchall proviso in paragraph ;/< thereof: 0 ll other national and local officials classified as !rade &7 and higher under the Compensation and =osition Classification ct of #'3'. =ursuant thereto, ". . (o. )7/3 laid down the criteria and then authori>ed the 4epartment of ?udget and @anagement ;4?@< to prepare the *ndex of +ccupational .ervices, =osition ,itles and .alary !rades. @unicipal mayors are assigned .! &7 in its two editions of #'3' and #''7. ,he fact that L 65. is getting an amount less than that prescribed for .! &7 is entirely irrelevant for purposes of determining the jurisdiction of the .andiganbayanA ,hat L 65. is receiving a rate within .! &/ should not, however, be construed to mean that she falls within the classification of .! &/. +rgano v. .andiganbaya n, !" #$)'#), 4ec. #%, #'''. Layus v. .andiganbaya n, !" #$%&7&, 4ec. 3, #'''.

Same; Regional Trial Courts; *t has jurisdiction over an @odina v. C , action to rescind a sale made upon prior authority of a !" #8'$//, probate court. ,his does not constitute an interference or +ct. &', #'''. review of a co1eBual court since the probate court has no jurisdiction over the Buestion of title to subject properties. Same; Same; ,he amended complaint sought to enjoin petitioners from rescinding the contract and taCing over the property. Dhile possession was a necessary conseBuence of the suit, it was merely incidental. ,he main issue is the rescission of the agreement, a dispute incapable of pecuniary estimationA hence, w9in the jurisdiction of the ",C. Same; Same; ,he original complaint ;for specific performance and damages< of E against F was w9in the jurisdiction of the trial court. ,he amended complaints w9 .?@ v. 5niversal *nt:l. !roup of ,aiwan, !" #$#)38, .ept. #%, &888. Fue v. C , !" #$/%%&, ug. $#,

regard to F alleged substantially the same causes of action against F and new causes of action against ! ;the condominium project developer< and its officers. *nsofar as the causes of action directed against F, they were still w9in the jurisdiction of the trial court. 6et, w9 regard to the causes of action against ! and its officers, the -L5"? had jurisdiction over them pursuant to .ec. #, =4 #$%%. nyway, the filing of the first amended complaint did not result in ousting the trial court of its jurisdiction over the entire case because it retained jurisdiction over the cause of action filed against F.

&888.

Same; Same; %O&D'D()ARTUR( ORD(RS; .C 4eparture Circular $'1'7 dated #', #''7 limits the authority to the +rder *ssued ",C in criminal cases w9in its exclusive jurisdiction. ?y Judge balos, @ ''1'1#%#1 @,CC, (ov. &/, #'''. Same; O#er t e Sub$e!t *atter; it is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. .uch jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the Buestion of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. Same; Same; ,he issue is whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint is vested w9 the regular courts or the E"?. ,he complaint does not charge any violation of either currency exchange rate adjustment ;CE" < or power cost adjustment ;=C <. "espondents only alleged that petitioner charged them w9 the full rate of electric consumption despite absence of any increase in the cost of energy. -ence, the subject matter of the complaint is w9in the jurisdiction of the regular trial court. ,he ",C is a court of general jurisdiction. +n the other hand, " )#7$, as amended by =4 #&8), empowered E"? to regulate and fix power rates to be charged by electric companies. ,he power to fix rates of electric consumption does not carry w9 it the power to determine whether or not petitioner is guilty of overcharging customers for consumption of electric power. ,his falls w9in the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Same; *etropolitan Trial Courts ; *n a damage suit w9 prayer for writ of replevin, the amount claimed as actual damages ;unpaid rentals< and the value of the forClift ;object of replevin< must be taCen together in determining the jurisdiction of the court, considering that these claims were specifically sought in the complaint. ;,otality "ule< .ps. "oman Cru> v. .ps. ,orres, !" #&#'$', +ct. %, #'''.

Cagayan Electric =ower and Light Co. v. Collera, !" #8&#3%, pril #&, &888.

@overs1 ?aseco =ort .ervices v. Cyborg Leasing Corp., !" #$#7//, +ct. &/, #'''. Gernande> v. *nternational Corporate ?anC, !" #$#&3$, +ct. 7, #'''. Ching Eian v. China

Same; Same Jurisdiction is determined by the amount of the claim alleged in the complaint, not by the value of chattel sei>ed in ancillary proceedings.

Same; Con!urrent; ,he FC court and the @anila court have concurrent jurisdiction over the case. -owever, when

the FC court acBuired jurisdiction over the case, it excluded all other courts of concurrent jurisdiction from acBuiring jurisdiction over the same. ,he @anila court is, therefore, devoid of jurisdiction over the complaint filed resulting in the herein assailed decision w9c must perforce be declared null and void.

(ational Cereals +il and Goodstuffs *mport and Export Corp., !" #$#/8&, June 3, &888. ,he @anila -otel Corp. v. (L"C, !" #&8877, +ct. #$, &888.

Forum Non Conveniens ; =hilippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it C-++.E. to do so provided : HiI ,he =hil. Court is one to w9c the parties may conveniently resort toA HiiI ,he =hil. Court is in a position to maCe an intelligent decision as to the law and the factsA and HiiiI ,he =hil. Court has or is liCely to have power to enforce its decision. *n this case, all the incidents occurred outside the =hilippines. ll acts complained of tooC place in China. nd the decision of the (L"C would have no binding effect on the employer, w9c was incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served w9 summons. -owever, if private respondent were 0overseas contract worCer2, a =hilippine forum, specifically the =+E , not the (L"C, would protect him. C*J*L ="+CE1 45"E: +rdinary Civil ction

+(N(RA& )RINCI)&(S; &iberal Interpretation of )ro!edural Rules; ,he general aim of procedural law is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedural rules are created not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Courts in the exercise of their functions, and in rendering decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict itself to literal interpretations of words, phrases and sentencesA a complete and holistic view must be taCen in order to render a just and eBuitable judgment. *t is far better to dispose of the case on the merits which is a primordial end rather than on a technicality, if it be the case, that may result in injustice. Considering that the instant case involves a si>able sum of money, the overriding consideration of a judgment based on the merits should prevail over the primordial interests of strict enforcement on matters of technicalities.

@aunlad .avings and Loan ssn v. C , !" ##%'%&, (ov. &%, &888.

Same; Same; *n the interest of substantial justice, 6ao v. C , procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms !" #$&%&3, of compliance may be relaxed. *n other words, if strict +ct. &%, &888. adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice or where the merit of a partyKs cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non1 compliance with certain formal reBuirements, procedural rules should definitely be liberally construed. party1 litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities. CAUS( O, ACTION; Definition and (lements- cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other. ,he elements of a cause of action are: ;#< a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is createdA ;&< an obligation on the part of the named defendant to "elucio v. Lope>, !" #$3%'7, Jan. #), &88&.

respect or not to violate such rightA and ;$< an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or approved. Same; *otion to Dismiss; *n order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lacC of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. Same; RU&( ON S)&ITTIN+ A SIN+&( CAUS( O, ACTION; ,he landmarC case of ?achrach @otor Co. v. *carangal, )3 =hil &37 is still good law and has not been overruled that La party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies. Dhile alternative remedies are available under the rule, a party may opt to exercise only one of them so as not to violate the rule. 4ulay v. C , &%$ .C" &&8 H#''/I.

?anC of merica v. merican "ealty Corp., !" #$$37), 4ec. &', #'''.

Same; *otion to Dismiss; ,he trial court and the C lberto v. C , should not have been too rigid in applying the rule that in !" ##'833, resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to June $8, state a cause of action, only the averments of the &888. complaint and no other are to be considered. ,he rule admits of e"!eptions: ;#< all documents attached to the complaint, the due execution and genuineness of w9c are not denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint, w9o need of introducing evidence thereonA and ;&< other pleadings submitted by the parties, in addition to the complaint, may be considered in deciding whether the complaint should be dismissed for lacC of cause of action. Same; .ased on Do!ument; .ec. 7, "ule 3 of the #''7 "ules of Civil =rocedure should be read in conjunction w9 .ec. ' of "ule #$8 of the "evised "ules of Evidence. Dhile the specific denial in the original answer was not under oath and thus gave rise to the implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of the contents of the promissory note, private respondent, thru his testimony, was able to put in issue and present parol evidence to controvert the terms of the promissory note, which are essentially the bedrocC of his defense. ,he presentation of the contrariant evidence for and against imputations of genuineness and due execution undoubtedly cured, clarified or expanded, as the case may be, whatever defects in the pleadings or vagueness in the issues there might have been as presented in the original answer. JOIND(R O, CAUS(S O, ACTION; ,he joinder of two causes of action is mandated by the need to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice. Dhile the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should be some unity in the problem presented and a common Buestion of law and the fact involved M subject always to the restrictions regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. @aunlad .avings and Loan ssn v. Ca, &888.

?ernardo v. C , !" ###7#/, June 3, &888.

)arties; R(A& )ART/ IN INT(R(ST; real party in "ule $, .ec. interest is one who stands Nto be benefited or injured by &, "evised the judgment of the suit. "ules of Court. .alonga v. Darner ?arnes O Co., Ltd., 33 =hil. #&/ H#'/#IA "epublic v. .andiganbaya n, &8$ .C" $#8 H#''#I. Same; Same; *t is the partnership, not its officers or agents, w9c should be impleaded in any litigation involving property registered in its name. guila v. C , !" #&7$%7, (ov. &/, #'''.

Same; Same; s Creditor, he does not have any material dorable v. interest to sue for rescission of the contract entered into by C , !" his debtor. -is right against the debtor is only personal ##'%)), (ov. right to receive payment for the loanA it is not a real right &/, #'''. over the lot subject of the deed of sale. Same; Same; ,he widow of the assured of mortgage redemption insurance may file the suit for insurance claim against the insurer. !"E= L*GE v. C , !" ##$3'', +ct. #$, #'''.

Same; Same; deceased person or his estate cannot be Jentura v. sued as defendant in an action for a sum of moneyA w9c -on. @ilitante, does not survive the deceased. !" )$#%/, +ct. /, #'''. Same; Same; if petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. =etitionerKs participation is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering lberto J. Lope> to maCe an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve lberto J. Lope>K conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit lberto J. Lope>K share in property co1owned by him and petitioner. .uch judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against lberto J. Lope>. "elucio v. Lope>, !" #$3%'7, Jan. #), &88&.

Same; INDIS)(NSA.&( )ART/; n indispensable party "ule $, .ec. is one without whom there can be no final determination of 7, "evised an action. "ules of Court. Same; Same; in an action for Buieting of title, recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land, and damages, the mortgagee of the eBuipment and other improvements on the land is not an indispensable part, if the said mortgage does not claim any right to ownership or possession of such real estate. Same; Transfer of Interest 0Se!1 23 Rule 43 ROC5; transferee pendenet lite is a proper party M not an indispensable party. .uch transferee does not have to be impleaded in order to be bound by the judgment because the action may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the "epublic v. -eirs of @agdato, !" #$73/7, .ept. ##, &888. ?anC of merica v. merican "ealty Corp., !" #$$37), 4ec. &',

transferee. Same; N(C(SSAR/ )ART/; necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. Same; Same; (or can petitioner be a necessary party. "espondent would be accorded complete relief if lberto J. Lope> were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co1 ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with respondent. Same; )arty bound by !ounsel; s a "5LE, a party is bound by the mistaCes of his counsel. ,he EPCE=,*+(. are: ;#< the negligence or mistaCe of counsel is so gross that the client is denied his day in court and is deprived of property w9o due process of lawA ;&< the rule is, that parties should be given every opportunity to present their sideA and ;$< the petitioner appears to have a meritorious defense. Same; D(AT% O, )ART/; Absen!e of Noti!e of Deat ; 5nder .ec. &# of "ule $ of the "evised "ules of Court, the action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, has to be dismissed if the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of Girst *nstance, w9o prejudice to the plaintiff thereafter presenting his claim as a money claim in the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant. *n the present case, records do not show that any notice of death was filed by the counsel of record of the deceased defendant. ,hus, the court or the other party was made aware of such death. bsent such notice, the trial court could not be expected to Cnow or taCe judicial notice of the death of the defendant. ,he failure of said counsel of record to serve notice on the court and the adverse parties regarding his client:s death binds herein petitioners as much as the client himself could be so bound. ,rue, a judgment may be annulled for want of jurisdiction or lacC of due process of law. ?ut while petitioners were not properly substituted for the deceased party as defendant, absent any notice of his death, it could not be said that petitioners were deprived of due process of law. Gor as far as the trial court is concerned, they were not the parties to the case. ,o rule otherwise would be a more obvious and grievous transgression of sue process. Same; Same; 5nder .ec. #), "ule $ of the "ules of Court, only in a pending case is the counsel of a party reBuired to inform the court in case the client dies or becomes incapacitated or incompetent. pending case necessarily implies that the court has already acBuired jurisdiction over the person of the party who died or became incapacitated or incompetent. 6(NU(; n objection to an improper venue must be made before a responsive pleading is filed. +therwise, it will be deemed waived. Same; Improper 6enue; *t is not a ground for the

#'''. "ule .ection "evised "ules Court. $, 3, of

"elucio v. Lope>, !" #$3%'7, Jan. #), &88&.

mil v. C , !" #&/&7&, +ct. 7, #'''.

-eirs of Lorilla v. C , !" ##3)//, pril #&, &888.

(ery v. Leyson, !" #$'$8), ug. &', &888.

Gernande> v. *nt:l. Corporate ?anC, .upra "udolf Liet>

dismissal of the complaint motu proprio, as the same may -oldings v. be waived, unliCe absence in jurisdiction. "egister of 4eeds, !" #$$&%8, (ov. #/, &888. )&(ADIN+S; ,he allegations in the pleadings determine the nature of the action and the court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for. ,hus, even if the complaint seeCs the declaration of nullity of the contract, the C correctly ruled that the factual allegations contained therein ultimately seeC the return of the excess interest paid. ?anco Gilipino .avings and @ortgage ?anC v. C , !" #&'&&7, @ay $8, &888.

Same; 6(RI,ICATION; ,he reBuirement regarding 5y v. L?=, verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. .uch !" #$)#88, reBuirement is simply a condition affecting the form of July &%, &888. pleading, the non1compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Jerification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. ,he court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacCing or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. ,he court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacCing or act on the pleading although it is not verified. Same; C(RTI,ICAT( O, NON',ORU* S%O))IN+; ,he reBmt to file such certificate ; dmin Circular (o. 8'1'%, now .ec /, "ule 7, "+C< is @ (4 ,+"6. ,he reBuirement applies to any complaint, petition, application, or any initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the party filing has actually committed forum shopping. ,his reBmt is separate from, and independent of, the avoidance of forum1shopping itself. (on1compliance w9 this reBmt cannot be excused by the fact that plaintiff is not guilty of forum shopping. .ubseBuent compliance therewith does not excuse a party:s failure to comply in the first place. s to the imposable sanction, failure to comply w9 the certification reBmt is merely a cause for dismissal w9o prejudice of the complaint or initiatory pleadingA on the other hand, forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and constitutes direct contempt. Same; Same; ,he provisions of dmin Circular (o. 8%1'% reBuiring the inclusion of a certification of non1forum shopping do not apply to compulsory counterclaims. @elo v. C , !" #&$)3), (ov. #), #'''.

.ps. =onciano v. -on. =arentela, !" #$$&3%, @ay ', &888.

Same; Same; ,he lacC of certification against forum 5y v. L?=, shopping, on the other hand, is generally not curable by !" #$)#88, the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. .ec. July &%, &888. /, "ule %/ of the "ules of Court provides that the failure of petitioner to submit the reBuired documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. *n some cases though, the Court deemed the belated filing of the certification as .5?., (,* L C+@=L* (CE. H#I filing of the certification, a day after the

filing of an election protest and while within the reglementary period QLoyola vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 477 (1 5!RA H&I the submission of the certification after the filing of the petition since dministrative Circular 8%1'% was then in effect for only a little over a month when the complaint was filed Q"avinta vs. Castillo, #r., 24 SCRA $%4 (1 5!R. ,he admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. *n those cases where the Court excused non1compliance with the reBuirements, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons maCing the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. Same; Same; Certification executed by lawyers of the petitioners is not correct and could have warranted the outright dismissal of their actions. ?ut the Court relaxed the rule in order to resolve the petitions on their merits as a matter of social justice involving labor and capital. 4amasco v. (L"C, !" ##/7//, 4ec. %, &888A @actan1Cebu *nt:l. irport uthority v. C , !" #$''%/, (ov. &7, &888. Lima v. ,ransway .ales Corp, !" #8)778, +ct &&, #'''.

Same; COUNT(RC&AI*; counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. ;.ection ), "ule ), #''7 "evised "ules on Civil =rocedure<. *t partaCes of the nature of a complaint or cause of action against the plaintiff.. *t is an independent action, separate and distinct from the original complaint. -ere, the respondent corporation established that it suffered moral and exemplary damages, retained the services of a lawyer to protect its interest and paid the costs of litigation as a result of the malicious filing of petitionersK Complaint. Same; Compulsory Counter!laims; counterclaim is compulsory if: ;a< it arises out of or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of opposing partyKs claimA ;b< it does not reBuire for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acBuire jurisdictionA and ;c< subject to the Bualification on the jurisdictional amount with regard to counterclaims raised in the "egional ,rial Courts, the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. =etitioner:s complaint was for collection of sum of money based on a promissory note executed by private respondent arising out of the non1payment of the products obtained on credit by virtue of the exclusive distributorship agreement. +n the other hand, private respondentKs counterclaims were for storage fees and damages premised on a violation of the same distributorship agreement. ,he claims of petitioner and private respondent arose from the same exclusive distributorship agreement, and the rights and obligations of the parties, as well as their potential liability emanated from the same contractual relation. Considering that the counterclaims of private respondent are compulsory in nature, payment of docCet fees is not reBuired and the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the same. Same; Same; compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate action but it should instead be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence, which gave rise to it. ,o determine whether a

?ayer =hils. v. C , !" #8'&)', .ept. #/, &888.

Ginancial ?uilding Corp. v. Gorbes =arC ssn, !r

counterclaim is compulsory or not, we have devised the #$$##', ug. following tests: ;#< re the issues of fact or law raised by #7, &888. the claim and the counterclaim largely the sameS ;&< Dould res judicata bar a subseBuent suit on defendantKs claim absent the compulsory counterclaim ruleS ;$< Dill substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendantKs counterclaimS and ;%< *s there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaimS ffirmative answers to the above Bueries indicate the existence of a compulsory counterclaim. Same; Not Compulsory Counter!laim; ,he cause of action pleaded in the second case are different from those raised in the first case and such causes could not have been raised as compulsory counterclaims therein, as they arose after the filing of the complaint in the first case. Same; A*(ND*(NT O, )&(ADIN+; amendment is discretionary with the court. renas v. Ca, !" #&))%8, (ov. &$, &888.

.ubstantial Tarate v. ",C, !" #8&$8/, +ct. #$, #'''. Jentura -on. @*litante, supra. v.

Same; Same; Amendment !annot be allo7ed so as to !onfer $urisdi!tion upon a !ourt t at ne#er a!8uired it in t e first pla!e1 ,he court should refuse amendment and order its dismissal when it is evident that the court has no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter and that the pleading is fatally defective as not to be susceptible of amendment, or that to permit such amendment would radically alter the theory and the nature of the action.

Same; Same; Not Allo7ed; Dhen evidence is offered on .ps. an issue not alleged in the pleadings and objected to by @ercader v. the other party. 4?=, !" #$)8)'', @ay #&, &888. Same; )eriod of ,iling; &ast Day of ,iling; s early as &$ January #''$, the Court has issued an order directing court officers closed on .aturdays so that when the last day of a pleading falls on a .aturday, the same should be done on the following @onday, provided the latter is not a holiday. Same; (ffe!t of ,ailure to )lead; "emedies for an order of default. 5nder the "ules of Court there are several remedies available to a defaulted party, namely: K;a< ,he defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistaCe or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defensesA ;.ec. $, "ule #3< K;b< *f the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under .ection #;a< of "ule $7A K;c< *f the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under .ection & of "ule $3A and K;d< -e may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him ;,iburcio vs. Judge Castro, !.". (o. L1 -erbosa v. C , !" ##'83), Jan. &/, &88&.

@adrigal v. C , !" #&''//, (ov. &), #'''.

/3''7, @ay &3, #'33<N Same; ("!usable Delay in ,iling Ans7er; ny error mpeloBuio v. imputable to the trial court in not declaring a defendant in C , !" default can be reviewed in an appeal from the final #&%&%$, June decision on the merits of the case M not by certiorari as a #/, &888. special civil action. Same; D(,AU&T; s clearly stated in .ec. ), when the defendant fails to answer the complaint w9in the period provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint. Same; SU**ONS; Ser#i!e of; )ersonal and Substituted ser#i!e; .ection ), "ule #% of the "ules of Court, reBuires that summons must be served personally on the defendant. -owever, should personal service be unattainable, substituted service may be availed of under .ection 7, "ule #%, which provides that *f, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected ;a< by leaving copies of the summons at the defendantKs residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or ;b< by leaving the copies at defendantKs office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.N *n a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of serviceA why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. ,he pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or +fficerKs "eturnA otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. *t bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acBuisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Gailure to do so would invalidate all subseBuent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds. dministrative Circular (o. /' was precisely issued by this Court to stress the importance of strict compliance with the reBuisites for a valid substituted service. Same; Same; (9TRA'T(RRITORIA& S(R6IC( O, SU**ONS; Dhen the defendant is an non1resident and is not found in the country, summons may be served on him extra1territorially in accordance w9 .ec. #7, "ule #% of the "ules of the Court. ,here are only four instances when extra1territorial service of summons is proper: ;#< when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffA ;&< when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property w9in the =hils., in w9c the defendant claims a lien or interest, actual or contingentA ;$< when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the =hils.A and ;%< when the defendant non1 resident:s property has been attached w9in the =hils. in these instances, service of summons may be effected by ;a< personal service out of the country, w9 leave of courtA ;b< publication, also w9 leave of courtA or ;c< any other manner the court may deem sufficient. .ordan v. Judge 4e !u>man, .@. (o. @,J1881 #&'), +ct. /, &888. @adrigal v. C , !" #&''//, (ov. &), #'''.

?anco de ?ra>il v. C , !" #&#/7)81 73, June #), &888.

Same; Same; Same; ,here can be no dispute that service 5mandap

v.

of summons upon the defendant is necessary in order that .abio, !" a court may acBuire jurisdiction over his person. ny #%8&%%, ug. judgment without such service in the absence of a valid &', &888. waiver is null and void. =ursuant to .ect. ), "ule #% of the "evised "ules of Court, the general rule in this jurisdiction is that summons must be served personally on the defendant. -owever, when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed, substituted service may be made under .ect. 7, "ule #% of the "evised "ules of Court. he two modes for effecting substituted service of summons are: ;a< by leaving copies of the summons at the defendantKs residence with some person of suitable age and discretionA and ;b< by leaving copies at defendantKs office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. mong these two modes of substituted service, the sheriff or the process server may choose that which will more liCely insure the effectiveness of the service. Same; S(R6IC( O, )&(ADIN+S AND OT%(R )A)(RS; Ser#i!e of Noti!e; Dhen a party is represented by counsel, service of notice should be made upon counsel and not upon the party. Same; Same; Dhere it is reBuired by the rules to be furnished to the parties must be made at their last Cnown address on record. *f they are represented by counsel, such notice shall be sent instead to the counsel:s last given address on record in absence of a proper and adeBuate notice to the court of a change of address, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. @ancenido v. C , !" ##3)8/, pril #&, &888. ,hermochem v. (aval, !" #$#/%#, +ct. &8, &888.

Same; Same; Ser#i!e by Registered *ail; it is complete brajano v. upon actual receipt by the addressee. ,he best evidence C , !" to prove this mode of service is a CE",*G*C ,*+( G"+@ #&7873, +ct. ,-E =+.,@ .,E" not only that the notice was issued or #$, &888. sent but also as to -+D, D-E(, and ,+ D-+@ the delivery was made. Same; Same; Re8uirement of (9)&ANATION O, .ecurity ?anC S(R6IC(; .ervice by registered mail 0due to limitations in v. Cuenca, time and distance2 is sufficient. !" #$3/%%, +ct. $, &888. Same; NOTIC(3 S(R6IC( AND R(TURN O, *OTIONS; . "5LE, motions must comply w9 .ecs. %, / and ) of "ule #/ of the "ules of Court, reBuiring notice to be sent at least $ days before the hearing ;$ days1notice rule<, directed to the parties concerned, stating the time and place of hearing of the motion, w9 proper proof of notice thereof. (on1compliance w9 such reBuirements renders the motion a mere scrap of paper. Same; Same; .ame reBuirements apply to motion for reconsideration. "eBuierme, Jr. v. 6uipco, .@. (o. ",J1 '31#%&7, (ov. &7, &888A @aunlad .avings v. C , supra. =C* ?anC v. C , !" #&87$', July &8, &888.

Same; Same; ("!eption to t e Rule; *n this case where ?asco v. Ca, the life and liberty of the petitioner are at staCe. ,he trial !" #&/&'8, court has sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion ug. ', &888. perpetua and his conviction attained finality on the basis of mere technicality. *t is but just that petitioner be given the

opportunity to defend himself and pursue his appeal. Same; NOTIC( O, LIS PENDENS; 5nder "ule #$, .ec. #% of the #''7 "ules of Civil =roc. nd .ec. 7) of =4 #/&', it is clear that such notice is proper only in actions: H#I to recover possession of real estateA H&I to Buite titleA H$I to remove clouds of doubt thereonA H%I for partitionA and H/I any other proceedings in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon. (otice of Lis &endens may be cancelled only on two grounds: HaI if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse partyA or HbI when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. Same; ANS:(R; ,he period to file an answer is not interrupted by a petition for certiorari, unless a ,"+ or writ of prelim. *njunction is issued against further proceedings in the case. n application for certiorari is an independent action w9c is not part or continuation of the trial that resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of. Same; *OTION ,OR (9T(NSION O, TI*( TO ,I&( *OTION ,OR N(: TRIA& OR R(CONSID(RATION; (o such motion may be filed w9 the @etropolitan or @unicipal ,rial Court, ",C or C . .aid motion may be filed only in cases pending before the .C. ;(ote: 4octrine of prohibition to file extension of time to file @" or (ew ,rial.< A!tion; In Rem, Quasi In Rem and In Personam A!tion ("plained; Extra1judicial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem, an action against the thing itself instead of against the personA or in an action 'uasi in rem, where an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. ,his is so inasmuch as, in rem and Buasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prereBuisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acBuires jurisdiction over the res. -owever, where the action is in personam ;one brought against a person on the basis of his personal liability<, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Dhen the defendant is a non1resident, personal service of summons w9in the state is essential to the acBuisition of jurisdiction over the person. ,his cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acBuire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. Same; Same; ny relief granted in rem or 'uasi in rem actions must be confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against the defendant. Clearly the publication of summons effected by private respondent is invalid and ineffective for the trial court to acBuire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, since by seeCing to recover damages from petitioner for alleged commission of an injury to his person or property caused by petitioner:s being a nuisance defendant, private respondent:s action became in personam. 6ared *larde, ##%7$&, #, &888. v. !" ug.

.ps. 4ia> v. 4ia>, !" #$/33/, pril &3, &888.

-eirs of Cristobal v. C , !" #$/'/', @ay ##, &888. ?anco de ?ra>il v. C , !" #&#/7)81 73, June #), &888.

?anco de ?ra>il v. C , !" #&#/7)81 73, June #), &888.

DIS*ISSA& O, ACTION; &a!; of Cause of A!tion; s a Jergara v. ground, it must appear on the face of the complaint itself, C , !" meaning that it must be determined from the allegations of ##7'&', (ov.

the complaint and from none other. Same; Same; *na motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any Buestion of fact or doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of acts, simply because there no findings of fact in the first place. Dhat the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. ,herefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause of action necessarily precludes a review of the same decision on Buestion of fact. Same; )res!ription of A!tion ; dministrative and civil actions for failure to remit ... contributions prescribed in &8 years from the time the delinBuency is Cnown or the assessment is made by the ..., or from the benefit accrues, as the case may be. Criminal actions for violation of the ... law prescribe in % years. Same; Same; :arsa7 Con#ention; ,he Darsaw Convention does not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier for the misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damages. *t does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. Gor misconduct of carrier:s officers and EE:s, complaint may be filed w9in & years. Dith respect to breaches under the Civil Code, under rt ##%) on ,orts prescribes in % years. nd for loss or damage, the & year limitation is counted from the date of arrival at the place of destination. EPCE=,*+( to & year limitation is that where the carrier employed delaying tactics.

&), #'''. China "oad and ?ridge Corp. v. C , !" #$73'3, 4ec. #/, &888.

Lo v. C , !" #&3))7, 4ec. #7, #'''.

5nited irlines v. 5y, !" #&77)3, (ov. #', #'''.

Same; Same; An A!tion for Re!on#eyan!e based -eirs of upon an Implied Trust prescribes in #8 years from the JoaBuin registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title. ,eves v. C , !" #8'')$, +ct. #$, #'''. Same; Same; ,he issue of prescription and laches cannot be resolved on the basis solely of the complaint. 5nder .ec $, "ule $ of the #''7 "ules of Civil =roc., deferment of the resolution is no longer permitted. ,he court may either grant the motion to dismiss, deny it, or order for the amendment of the pleading. (* v. C , !" #&'#)', (ov. #7, #'''.

Same; ,orum S opping; =etition for the ex1parte @elo v. C , issuance of a writ of possession involves a different cause supra. of action from the complaint of *njunction. Dhile the respondent sought to enjoin the consolidation of title. =etitioner:s action is founded on C, $#$/ w9c gives the purchaser at public auction the right to have possession of the property sold to him during the redemption period even if eventually they do not succeed in consolidating their title to it. +n the other hand, private respondent:s action is based on " $$7 w9c gives a mortgagor the right to redeem the property sold at foreclosure sale w9in # year thereof. Same; Same; Dhere a motion is filed in the trial court and then a petition to the C , a clear case of forum shopping. ,he motion and the petition pertain to the same subject. Gorum shopping occurs not only when a final judgment in one case will amount to res (udicata in another, but also Fuinsay v. C , !" #&78/3, ug. $#, &888.

when the elements of litis pendencia are present. ,he filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment amounts to forum shopping. Same; Same; ,here is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeCs a favorable opinion ;other than by appeal or certiorari< in another. Same; Same; party is not permitted to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora. ,his practice ridicules the judicial process. =lays havoc w9 the rules of orderly procedure, and is vexatious and unfair to the other parties to the case. Same; Same; Gorum shopping is extant when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial remedies in different venues, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances, all raising substantially the same issues and involving exactly the same parties. *n the case at bar, ,he proper remedy of the respondents of the decision of the @,C is to appeal to the ",C under "ule %8, .ec. # of the "ules of Court. -owever, assailing the @,C:s order of execution may be too slow and inadeBuate to prevent the injurious effect of respondent:s imminent dispossession of the property. ,hus, filing of a petition for certiorari on the execution order of the lower court is proper. ?ut such petition of the respondent:s was not limited for said purpose as they liCewise assailed the main decision of the @,C. ,his is improper as appeal is still their appropriate remedy under the rules. Dhat compounded the mateer is that the respondents had already a pending notice of appeal w9 the @,C. Clearly, by appealing the decision of the @,C and the subseBuent petition for certiorari, respondents are guilty of forum shopping w9c carries the sanction of dismissal of both the petition and the appeal. Same; &a! es; s to the defenses of laches and prescription, they are evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and must not be resolved in a motion to dismiss. ,hose issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses. 5nder the rule the deferment of the resolution of the said issues was, thus, in order. n allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. *n the instant case, the issue of prescription and laches cannot be resolved on the basis solely of the complaint. *t must, however, be pointed that under the new rules, deferment of the resolution is no longer permitted. ,he court may either grant the motion to dismiss, deny it, or order the amendment of the pleading. Same; Same; (stoppel; Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time, to do that w9c, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting the presumption that the right holder has abandoned that right or declined to assert it. ,his inaction or neglect to assert a right converts a valid claim into a stale demand. Laches prevents a litigant from =ET v. Jian>on, !" #$#8&8, July &8, &888. -eirs of =enaverde v. -eirs of =enaverde, !" #$##%#, +ct. &8, &888 Candido v. Camacho, !" #$)7/#, Jan. #/, &88&.

(* v. C , supraA -eirs of JoaBuin ,eves v. C , supra.

.tilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, !" #$$'#$, +ct. #&, #'''.

raising the issue of lacC of jurisdiction. Same; Litis Pendencia; "eBuisites: ;#< identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actionsA ;&< identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for founded on the same actsA and ;$< the identity of the two cases where judgment rendered in one amounts to res (udicata in the other. third1party claim against a drawee banC and the ancillary claim against the drawee banC in another case constitute litis pendencia. Same; Res Judi!ata; "eBuisites: ;#< a judgment has become finalA ;&< such judgment was rendered on the meritsA ;$< the court that rendered it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the partiesA and ;%< there is identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action between the previous and subseBuent actions. ,here is identity of !ause of a!tion between a case for nnulment of ,itle and one for nnulment of Judgment.Causes of action are identical when there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. *f the same facts or evidence can sustain either, the two actions are considered the same, so that the judgment in one is a bar to the other. Cebu *ntl Ginance Corp. v. C , !" #&$8$#, +ct. #&, #'''.

.tilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, !" #$$'#$, +ct. #&, #'''.

Same; Same; "es judicata is a ground for dismissal of an Cru> v. C , action when as between the action sought to be dismissed !" #$/#8#, and the other action these elements are presentA ;#< @ay $#, &888. identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actionsA ;&< identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same factsA and ;$< identity in the two particulars is such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful amount to res (udicata in the action under consideration. *t must be stressed that absolute identity of parties is not a condition sine Bua non for res (udicata to apply. shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoCe the coverage of this principle. Same; No res $udi!ata 7 en t e pre#ious order in 8uestion is interlo!utory because it reBuired the parties to perform certain acts for final determination. Same; Con!lusi#eness of Judgment; ,he rule precludes the relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties based on a different claim or cause of action. ,he previous judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. Same; Same; ,he doctrine of res (udicata has two aspects, to wit: ;#< the effect of a judgment as bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of actionA and ;&< preclude re1litigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. Res Judicata<Stare Decisis; Distinguis ed from t e Do!trine of t e &a7 of t e Case; ,he doctrine of the law of the case has certain affinities w9, but is clearly distinguishable from, the doctrines of res (udicata and stare decisis, principally on the ground that the rule on the law of the case operates only in the particular case and =ere> v. C , !" #877$7, +ct. #, #'''. "i>al .urety O *nsurance v. C , !" ##&$)8, July #3, &888.

.errano v. C , !" #&&'$8, Geb. ), &88&.

yala Corp. v. "osa14iana "ealty and 4ev. Corp., !" #$%&3&, 4ec. #, &888.

only as a rule of policy and not as one of law. ,he ruling covered by the doctrine on the law of the case is adhered to in the single case where it arises, but is not carried into other cases as a precedent. +n the other hand, under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a point of law has been established by the court, that point of law will, generally, be followed by the same court and by all courts of lower ranC in subseBuent cases where the same legal issue is raised. Same; *otion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter!laim; In!ompatible Remedies1 *n the event that a defending party has a ground for dismissal and a compulsory counterclaim at the same time, he must choose only one remediy. *f he decides to file a motion to dismiss, he will lose his compulsory counterclaim. ?ut if he opts to set up his compulsory counterclaim, he may still plead his ground for dismissal as an affirmative defense in his answer. ,he latter option is obviously more favorable to defendant. Same; Same; %earing; preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses may be allowed only when no motion to dismiss has been filed ;.ec. ) of "ule #) of the #''7 "ules of Civil =roc.<. .ec. ) should be viewed in the light of .ec. $ of the same ruleA w9c reBuires the courts to resolve a motion to dismiss and prohibits them from deferring its resolution on the ground of indubitability. Clearly, .ec. ) disallows a prelim hearing of affirmative defenses once a motion to dismiss has been filed. Same; Same; Same; n +rder denying motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus. ,he remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer and interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss. =roceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to timely file appeal. INT(R6(NTION; *t may be granted only where its allowance will not unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the original parties to a case. !enerally, it will be allowed 0before rendition of judgment by the trial court,2 as "ule #', .ec. & expressly provides. fter trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. Certainly, it cannot be allowed on appeal w9o unduly delaying the disposition of the case and prejudicing the interest of the parties. Same; ,he allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. ,he discretion of the court, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus, save in instances where such discretion has been so exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Ginancial ?uilding Corp v. Gorbes =arC ssn., !" #$$##', ug. #7, &888.

California and -awaiian .ugar v. =ioneer *nsurance and .urety Corp., !" #$'&7$, (ov. &3, &888. GE?,C v. C , !" #$//%3, .ept. &', &888.

Limpo v. C , !" #&%/3&, June #), &888.

.@C v. .andiganbaya n, !" #8%)$71$3, .ept. #%, &888.

Same; =etitioner:s contention that respondents cannot id. intervene as the case is not an action or suit cannot merit the assent of the Court. "egardless of its nature as an action or suit, the fault of the Joint =etition precisely lies in the attempt to bypass parties w9 legitimate interests on the subject shares. ,he existence of these parties was Cnown to the petitioners yet they were not impleaded. ,heir failure to be impleaded is bad enough but worse still is petitioners: submission that since they were not

impleaded, ergo, they could not intervene. *t is now a must principle of justice that a right cannot arise from a wrong. Same; motion for intervention must be filed before rendition of judgment. party cannot be allowed to intervene as his interest was already represented by his predecessor in interest. Same; t the execution stage of the decision, *t is not appropriate for petitioner to intervene. .eveses v. C , !" #8&)7/, +ct. #$, #'''. ?oncodin v. C , !" #$87/7, Jan. #3, &88&. Ley Construction and 4evelopment Corp. v. 5nion ?anC of the =hils., !" #$$38#, June &7, &888.

SU**AR/ JUD+*(NT; !enuine *ssue has been defined as an issue in fact w9c9 calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue w9c is sham, fictitious, contrived or patently unsubstantiated as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. *n proceedings for summary judgment, the court is merely expected to act chiefly on the basis of what is in the records of the case. ,he hearing contemplated in the rules is not de ri)uer as its purpose is merely to determine whether the issues are genuine or not, and not to receive evidence on the issues set up in the pleadings. ,he reBmt. *n "ule $/, .ec. $ that the opposing party be furnished a copy of the motion #8 days before the time specified for the hearing applies to the motion for summary judgment itself and not to the motion to resolve such motion. Same; ,un!tion of t e Court; 5pon a motion for summary judgment, the sole function of the court is to determine whether or not there is an issue of fact to be tried, and nay doubt as to the existence of an issue of fact must be resolved against the movant. JUD+*(NT ON T%( )&(ADIN+S distinguis ed from SU**AR/ JUD+*(NT; ,he existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings . *n a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending partyKs answer to raise an issue. +n the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist U i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or BualificationA or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer U but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. *n other words, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proven by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. s such, even if the answer does tender issues U and therefore a judgment on the pleadings is not proper U a summary judgment may still be rendered on the plaintiffs motion if he can show that the issues thus tendered are not genuine, sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, or patently unsubstantial. ## ,he trial court can determine whether there is a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits and9or counter1affidavits submitted by the parties to the court.

!arcia v. C , !" ##78$&, July &7, &888.

(arra *ntergrated Corp. v. C , !" #$7'#/, (ov. #/, &888.

Same; trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment even if there is pending before the same court, a third1party complaint. Admission by Ad#erse )arty; :ritten Re8uest for Admission 0Se!tion =3 Rule >? of t e Rules of Court5; ,here is no reason to strictly construe the phrase Nthe party to whom the reBuest is directedN to refer solely or personally to the petitioners themselves. ,he written reBuest addressed to a party:s counsel may be answered by said counsel in behalf of his client. ,he application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court. *n the same vein, the determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply with the modes of discovery rests on the same sound judicial discretion. *t is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to determine the applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an expeditious administration of justice. *t need not be emphasi>ed that upon the courtKs shoulders liCewise rests the burden of determining whether the response of the reBuested party is a specific denial of the matters reBuested for admission. )R('TRIA&; is indispensable in any civil or criminal action as clearly laid out in "ule #3 and "ule ##3 of the "+C. *t is a procedural device to limit the issues to be tacCled and proved at the trial, in Ceeping w9 the mandate of the Constitution to accord every person the right to a speedy disposition of their cases. Same; Stipulations of ,a!t; party may be allowed to show that an admission made in a stipulation of facts is the result of a 0palpable mistaCe2 that can easily be verified from the stipulated facts themselves and from other incontrovertible pieces of evidence admitted by the other party. D(*URR(R TO (6ID(NC(; Dhen a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is reversed on appeal, the reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceedings. "ather, it should render judgment on the basis of the evidence proferred by the plaintiff. JUD+*(NTS3 ,INA& ORD(RS; s a rule, the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof. Exception to the rule. Same; ,INA&IT/ O, JUD+*(NT; Immutability )rin!iple; Dhen a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable and any amendment or alteration ;including the entire proceedings held for that purpose<, w9c substantially affects a final and executory judgment, is null and void for lacC of jurisdiction. writ of execution must conform to the judgment to be executed and must adhere strictly to the very essential particulars. n +rder of execution w9c varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. Same; Same; ,he trial court could not award for payment of attorney:s fees through a motion filed for more than #$ years after finality of judgment and long after the court has lost its jurisdiction over the case.

id.

LaVada, J. Ca, !" #8&$'8, Geb. #, &88&.

bubaCar v. bubaCar, !" #$%)&&, +ct. &&, #'''.

tlas Consolidated @ining v. C*", !" #$%%)7, (ov. #7, #'''. "adiowealth Ginance Co. v. .ps. Jicente, !" #&37$', July ), &888. Espina v. C , !" ##)38/, June &&, &888. EBuitorial "ealty 4ev. Corp. v. @ayfair ,heatre, !" #$)&&#, @ay #&, &888.

Li>ardo v. @ontano, !" #$333&, @ay #&, &888.

Same; Same; judgment becomes final upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed. ,he trial court need not pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by operation of law. ,he trial court cannot even validly entertain a motion for reconsideration filed after the lapse of the period for taCing an appeal. ,hus, it does not matter that the opposing party failed to object to the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration or that the court denied the same on grounds other than timeliness, considering that at the time the motion was filed, the order had become final and executory. Same; Same; Rationale and )rin!iple; HiI =ublic policy dictates that when a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party (*uerta Al+a Resort v. Ca, ,R 12-5$7, Sept. 1, 2%%%!A HiiI Courts are duty1bound to put an end to controversies. ny attempt to prolonged, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly strucC down. ,he system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and executory judgments (.uaya v. Stron)/old 0nsurance, ,R 11 %2%, 2ct. 11, 2%%%! A HiiiI decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case, regardless of any claim that is erroneous ;id.<. Same; Same; It !an no longer be disturbed3 altered3 or modified; and this rule applies regardless of any possible injustice in a particular case. Gacts or events bearing on the substance of the obligation subject of the action should ordinarily be alleged during the issue1formulation stage or otherwise by proper amendment, and proved at the trialA if discovered after the case has been submitted but before the decision is rendered, these must be proved after obtaining a reopening of the caseA and if discovered after judgment has been rendered but before it becomes final, must be substantiated at an new trial w9c the court in its discretion may grant on the ground of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to "ule $7, "ules of Court. Remedy+nce the judgment becomes executory, the only other remedy left to attempt a material alteration thereof is that provided in "ule $3 of the "ules of Court ;governing petitions for relief from judgments<, or an action to set aside the judgment on account of extrinsic, collateral fraud. ,here is no other permissible mode of preventing or delaying execution on eBuitable grounds predicated on facts occurring before finality of judgment. Same; INT(R(ST; )rin!iples go#erning its !omputation- ;#< Dhen an obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e. loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that w9c may have been stipulated in writing. Gurthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. *n the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be #& W per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of rt. ##)' of (CC. ;&< Dhen an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of ) W per annum. (o interest, however,

,estate Estate of ?iascan v. ?iascan, !" #$37$#, 4ec. ##, &888.

=acific @ills v. =adolina, !" #%#8#$, (ov. &', &888.

Grancisco v. C , !" ##)$&8, (ov. &', #'''.

shall be adjudged on unliBuidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established w9 reasonable certainty. Dhen such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made ;at w9c time the Buantification of damages may be deemed to have reasonably ascertained<. ,he actual bases for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be the amount finally adjudged. ;$< Dhen the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under par. # or par. & above, shall be #& O per annum, from such finality until its satisfaction M this interim period being deemed to be by then an eBuivalent to a forbearance of credit. INT(R&OCUTOR/ ORD(RS; ,hey are always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. *t is immaterial that the judge who exercises such powers is not the one who issued the rescinded or amended order since the former is not legally prevented from revoCing the interlocutory order of another judge in the very litigation subseBuently assigned to him for judicial action. ,INA& JUD+*(NT OR ORD(R distinguis ed from @INT(R&OCUTOR/A ORD(RS; final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do in respect thereto M such as adjudication on the merits, w9c, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and w9c party is in the right, or a a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground of res judicata or prescription, for instance. Dhile an order that is 0interlocutory2, is one that does not finally dispose of the case, such as an order denying a motion to dismiss, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading. s such, only final judgment or orders ;as opposed to interlocutory orders<, are appealable. Ley Construction and 4evelopment Corp. v. 5nion ?anC of the =hils., !" #$$38#, June &7, &888. *ntramuros ,ennis Club v. =, , !" #$/)$8, .ept. &), &888A Corona *nt:l v. Ca, !" #&73/#, +ct. #3, &888.

@,INA&A JUD+*(NT OR ORD(R distinguis ed from a id. @,INA& AND (9(CUTOR/A JUD+(*(NT OR ORD(R; final judgment or order in the sense just described above becomes 0final and executory2 upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom where no appeal has been duly perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taCen, the judgment of the appellate court in turns becomes final. *t is called 0G*( L (4 EPEC5,+"62 J54!@E(, because execution at such point issues as a matter of right. N(: TRIA&; Ne7ly Dis!o#ered (#iden!e; ,he reBuisites for newly discovered evidence as a ground for a new trial are: ;#< the evidence was discovered after the trialA ;&< such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligenceA and ;$< that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. *n the instant case, it would put no end to litigation as every accused could simply wrangle an affidavit of desistance and treat said desistance as newly discovered evidence from a principal witness to seeC a new trial or to prolong one. *t is settled Jillanueva v. =eople., !" #$/8'3, pril #&, &888.

that affidavits of recantation made by a witness after the conviction of the accused deserve only scant consideration. @oreover, there is nothing in said affidavit, which would support a different conclusion. Same; Same; ll three ;$< reBuisites must characteri>e the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial. ,he second reBuisite reBuires reasonable diligence in obtaining such evidence during the trial but could not. *n this case, the reBuirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. *t has been held that a lacC of diligence is exhibited where the newly discovered evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was made to secure itA there is a failure to maCe inBuiry of persons who were liCely to Cnow the facts in Buestion, especially where information was not sought from co1partiesA there is a failure to seeC evidence available through public recordsA there is a failure to discover evidence that is within the control of the complaining partyA there is a failure to follow leads contained in other evidenceA and, there is a failure to utili>e available discovery procedures. ,hus the testimony of Judge 4urias cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial. s early as the pre1trial of the case, the name of Judge 4urias has already cropped up as a possible witness for herein respondents. ,hat the respondents chose not to present him is not an indicia per se of suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to choose who to present as his witness. (either can Judge 4uriasK testimony in another case be considered as newly discovered evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge 4urias w9c were existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by the petitioners at the trial. ,he testimony of Judge 4urias has been in existence waiting only to be elicited from him by Buestioning. Same; Same; ,he basic ground for the grant of a new trial is that there has been a miscarriage of justice and that the new trial will be in the interest of justice. Dhere an injustice has been done, and a further trial is necessary to secure justice, courts have not only the fright and inherent power, in its discretion, but also the duty, to grant a new trial. R(&I(, ,RO* JUD+*(NT3 Orders or Ot er )ro!eeding; Stri!tly Construed; Gor a petition for relief to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has strictly complied w9 the provisions of "ule $3, that the said petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than ) months after the judgment of final order was entered, or such proceeding was taCen. ,he reglementary period is recConed from the time the party:s counsel receives notice of the decisionA for notice to counsel is notice to the party for purposes of .ec. $, "ule $3. Same; &iberal Approa! in t e interest of Justi!e; =etitioners should not suffer the conseBuences of their counsel:s negligence. *t necessarily follows then that petitioner:s period to file the petition for relief should be counted from their C,5 L (+,*CE of the order, w9c was sometime in pril #'''. ,he petition for relief filed on @ay @ende>ona v. +>ami>, !" #%$$78, Geb. ), &88&.

.errano v. C , !" #&&'$8, Geb. ), &88&.

@ercury 4rug Corp v. C , !" #$3/7#, July #$, &888.

.ala>ar v. C , !" #%&'&8, Geb. ), &88&A !.*. v. ?engson Comm.

&7, #''' was well w9in the )81day period prescribed in ?uildings, !" "ule $3, .ect. $ of the a''7 "ule sof Civil =roc. ,he #$7%%3, Jan. instant case ivolves the possible loss of property w9o due $#, &88&. process of law. @ore particularly, petitioners stand to lose their land w9o being allowed to defend their title from the adverse claims of private respondents. -ence, in the interest of substantial justice, the reopening of the case is ordered to allow defendants, petitioners herein, an opportunity to present evidence in their behalf. Annulment of $udgment; *t is in effect a second cycle of review regarding a subject matter w9c has already been finally decided. second cycle of review is prohibited. Dhat has been once irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle in an earlier final judgment continues to be the law of the case between the same parties in another suit, as long as the facts predicated on such decision continues to be the facts of the other case. Same; 5nder "ule $3 of "ules of Court, a final and executory judgment may set aside through a petition for relief from judgment w9in the period prescribed therefore. -owever, even beyond such period, a party aggrieved by a judgment may petition for its annulment on two ;&< grounds: ;#< that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lacC of due process of lawA or ;&< that it has been obtained by fraud. ,he nullity of a judgment based on lacC of jurisdiction may be shown not only by what patently appears on the fact of such decision but also by documents and testimonial evidence found in the records of the case and upon w9c such judgment is based. Same; +rounds; ,wo grounds for an action for annulment of judgment, to wit: H#I the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lacC of due process of lawA or H&I the judgment has been obtained by fraud. n action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is EP,"*(.*C or C+LL ,E" L in character. ,he decision of the trial court cannot be annulled on the basis of petitioner:s allegation that the purported deed of sale of the property under scrutiny was dubious and forged, for this Cind of fraud, *f there is any, is intrinsic, and not extrinsic. ,he use of forged instrument or perjured testimonies during the trial is not extrinsic fraud, because such evidence does not preclude the participation of any party in the proceedings. Same; ,raud as a ground; Graud has to be extrinsic or actual. *t is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated. *t is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside the trial w9c prevent a party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy. 4eliberately failing to notify a party entitled to notice constitute extrinsic fraud. n action for annulment hall be brought w9in % years from discovery of fraud. Same; Same; Extrinsic fraud contemplates a situation where a litigant commits acts outside of the trial of the case. 0 the effect of w9c prevents a party from having a trial, a real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court , or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in w9c it was .tilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, !" #$$'#$, +ct. #&, #'''.

?ernardo v. C , !" ###7#/, June 3, &888.

?obis v. Ca, !" ##$7'). 4ec. #%, &888.

.tilianolulos v. City of Legaspi, supra.

"exlon "ealty !roup v9 C , #&3%#&. @arch #/, &88&.

procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy.2 ,he overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. Same; ("!lusi#e Jurisdi!tion; ,he C has exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of trial court decisions. n ",C has no authority to annul the final judgment of a co1eBual court. Same; trial court cannot M apart from reconsidering its decision, granting new trial or allowing a relief from judgment M review much less set aside a decision on the merits. .uch power pertains exclusively to the appellate courts. (ery v. Leyson, !" #$'$8), ug. &', &888. Ley Construction and 4evelopment Corp. v. 5nion ?anC of the =hils., supra.

Same; ,here is no such remedy as annulment of the tty. Cole v. judgment of the -L5"? or the +ffice of the =resident by C , !" the C . ssuming ar)uendo that the annulment petition #$7//#, 4ec. can be treated as a petition for review under "ule %$ of the &), &888. #''7 Civil =roc., the same should be dismissed by the C . because no error of Judgment is imputed to the -L5"? and the +ffice of the =resident. Graud and lacC of jurisdiction are beyond the province of petitions under "ule %$, as it covers only errors of judgment. Same; :rit of )ossession; ,he issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function and summary in nature. *t cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits but simply an incident in the transfer of title. -ence, a separate case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis pendencia or res (udicata. (9(CUTION3 Satisfa!tion and (ffe!t of Judgment; Dhen a judgment becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment. -owever, a writ of execution may be refused on eBuitable grounds as when there was a change in the situation of the parties that would maCe the execution ineBuitable or when certain circumstances w9c transpired after judgment become final rendered execution of judgment unjust. "espondent:s contention that there was a change in the situation of the parties maCing execution ineBuitable because petitioner accepted employment from another agency w9o resigning from respondent is patently w9o merit. (ow, the rule is that bacC wages awarded to an illegally dismissed EE shall not be diminished nor reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. Same; *otion for ("e!ution; !enerally, no notice or even prior hearing of such motion for execution is reBuired before a writ of execution can be issued when a decision has become final. -+DEJE", there are circumstances in this case ;the execution of the decision is a contentious matter< w9c made a hearing and the reBuisite $1day notice of the same to the adverse party necessary. Same; :rit of ("e!ution; ,he issuance of a writ of execution is a ministerial duty of the court after judgment becomes final and executory and leaves no room for the exercise of discretion. writ of mandamus lies to compel the issuance of a writ of execution. .ps. +ng v. C , !" #&#%'%, June 3, &888.

,orres v. (L"C, !" #878#%, pril #&, &888.

4e Jesus J. +bnamia, .@. (o. @,J1881#$#%, .ept. 7, &888.

Lumapas v. Judge ,amin, .@. (o. ",J1 ''1#/#', June &7, &888.

Same; Same; *t must conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. Execution that is not in harmony w9 the judgment is bereft of validity. *t must conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision. *n the case at bar, the dispositive portion of the decision subject of the assailed order and writ of execution specifically limited the liability of private respondent and did not include the payment of interest. -ence, the writ of execution of the decision cannot @+4*G6 the same by ordering private respondent to pay interest. Same; (nfor!ement of a ,oreign Judgment; !enerally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another countryA however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civili>ed states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. *n this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recogni>ed insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that: HiI there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdictionA HiiI that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence liCely to secure an impartial administration of justiceA and HiiiI that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Same; )eriod of Redemption; Real )roperty sold on ("e!ution; 5nder the #')% "ules of Court, the #&1moth period of redemption under .ec. $8, "ule $', is eBuivalent to $)8 days. *t is erroneous to eBuate the phrase 0#& months2 w9 one year of $)/ days. ?ut an honest mistaCe on a Buestion of law. @oreover, .ec. &3, "ule $' of the #''7 "ules of Civil =roc. (ow provides that the period of redemption shall be 0at any time w9in #1year from the date of registration of the cert. of sale. Same; Same; Same; ,he rule on redemption must be liberally construed in favor of the original owner of the property. ,he policy of the law is to aid rather than to defeat him in his exercise of his right of redemption.

.olid?anC Corp. J. C , !" #$3#$#, @arch #&, &88&.

=hilippine luminum Dheels v. Gasgi Enterprises, !" #$7$73, +ct. #&, &888.

6smael v. C , !" #$&%'7, (ov. #), #'''.

6smael v. C , !" #$&%'7, (ov. #), #'''A "epublic v. (L"C, !" #&7#)7, (ov. #3, #'''. ?egornia v. Judge !on>ale>1 4ecano, @ ''1)'&1",J, +ct. &', #'''.

Same; Same; ("e!ution need not 7ait for re!ords to be remanded to Court of Origin; ll that the law reBuires is that the appeal be duly perfected and finally resolved before execution may be applied for.

Same; Same; 5nder .ection &', "ule $' of the "ules of Court, real property sold on execution may be redeemed by: ;a< ,he judgment debtor, or his successor1in1interest in the whole or any part of the propertyA
xxx xxx xxx

Jillanueva v. -on. @alaya, !" '%)#7, pril #&, &888.

,he Nsuccessor1in1interestN contemplated by the above provisions includes a person to whom the judgment debtor has transferred his right of redemption, or one to whom he has conveyed his interests in the property for purposes of redemption, or one who succeeds to his property by operation of law, or a person with a joint interest in the property, or his spouse or heirs. compulsory heir to the judgment debtor Bualifies as a successor1in1interest who can redeem property sold on execution. ,he right of redemption over property sold on execution may be exercised within twelve months from the date of registration of the certificate of sale . Dhere tender is made of the redemption price within the period to redeem and the same is refused, the same constitutes a valid exercise of the right to redeem and it is not necessary that it be followed by the deposit or consignation of the money in court. (o interest after such tender is demandable on the redemption money. Same; ("e!ution )ending Appeal or Dis!retionary ("e!ution; . !E(E" L "5LE: the execution of a judgment should not be had until and unless the judgment has become final and executory, i.e., the period of sppeal has lapsed w9o an appeal having been taCenA or appeal having been taCen, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin, in w9c event, execution 0.- LL *..5E . @ ,,E" +G "*!-,.2 Same; ("e!ution not a *atter of Rig t; Execution pending appeal in accordance w9 .ec. & of "ule $' of the "ules of Court is, therefore, the exception. ,he reBuisites for the grant of a motion for execution pending appeal are: H#I there must be a motion by the prevailing party w9 notice to the adverse party: H&I there must be a !++4 "E .+( for execution pending appeal: and H$I the good reason must be stated in a special order. .uch reBuisites must be strictly construed. ,hus, anent the reBuisite that there must be good reason must constitute superioe circumstances demanding urgency w9c will outweigh the injury of damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Dhat may constitute good reasons is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Same; Same; Ginding of good reasons or superior or urgent circumstances to warrant discretionary execution and mere putting up of a bond is not sufficient reason to justify the plea for execution pending appeal. Same; Same; *t may be allowed subject to the ff. conditions: H#I there must be a judgment or final orderA H&I the trial court must have lost jurisdiction over the caseA H$I there must be Xgood reasons: to allow executionA and H%I such good reasons must be stated in a special order after due hearing. Same; Same; s provided on .ec. & ;&<, "ule $' of the #''7 "ules of Civil =roc., discretionary execution is Gortune !uarantee and *nsurance Corp. v. C , !" ##878#, @arch #&, &88&.

Gortune !uarantee and *nsurance Corp. v. C , !" ##878#, @arch #&, &88&.

?aVe> v. ?aVe>, !" #$$)&3, Jan. &$, &88&. *ntramuros ,ennis Club v. =,a, supraA Coraona *nt:l v. C , supra. =lanters =roducts, *nc

permissible when !++4 "E .+(. exist for immediately executing the judgment before its finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the time to appeal. Same; Same; +OOD R(ASON consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution, lest the judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may after the lapse of time become unable to enjoy it. ,hat 0the appeal was merely dilatory because the assailed L+* is unconstitional2, does not constitute 0good reason2 to justify execution pending appeal. Same; Same; it is not for the trial court to determine the merit of a decision it rendered as this is the role of the appellate court. *t is not w9in the competence of the trial court in resolving the motion for execution pending appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as the basis for finding good reason to grant the motion.

v. C , !" #8)8/&, +ct, &&, #'''. =lanters =roducts, *nc v. C , !" #8)8/&, +ct, &&, #'''.

=lanters =roducts, *nc v. C , !" #8)8/&, +ct, &&, #'''.

Same; Same; @ere issuance of a bond to answer for =lanters damages is no longer considered a good reason for =roducts, *nc execution pending appeal. v. C , !" #8)8/&, +ct, &&, #'''. Same; Same; Stay of ("e!ution; Supersedeas bond to stay execution should not outweigh the circumstances justifying execution. ,he latter is paramount over the security offered by the supersedeas bond. Same; Same; ,he prevailing doctrine, as provided for in .ec. & ;$< of "ule $' of the #''7 "ules of Civil =rocedure is: 0exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the period of appeal. 0!++4 "E .+(.2 consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution lest judgment become illusory, or the prevailing party after the lapse of time be unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may apparently have no case but to delay. +ne good reason is the deteriorating condition of the subject matter ;a vessel< of the case. Same; Same; n order for execution pending appeal is not appealable pursuant to par. &;f<, .ec. #, "ule %# of the "evised "ules of Court. ,his provision enumerates the judgments or final orders that may be appealed from. *t also specifies the interlocutory or other orders from w9c no appeal can be taCen. *n the latter instance, the aggrieved party may resort to a special civil action under "ule )/. Same; ("e!ution long O#erdue; ,he execution of the writ of possession in favor of respondent banC has long been overdue. =etitionersK refusal to heed our previous orders has taxed the patience of the courts. Counsel ought to advise petitioners that any further misuse and abuse of court processes will be dealt with more severely. :RIT O, )OSS(SSION Rule 423 Se!1 443 Re#ised Rules of Court5; ,he obligation of a court to issue an e34 parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the =lanters =roducts, *nc v. C , !" #8)8/&, +ct, &&, #'''. 6asuda v. C , !" ##&/)', pril #&, &888.

id.

.ps. !erardo v. Ca, !" #&##8%, (ov. &7, &888.

debtor9mortgagor. s such, a third person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed realty, who claims a right superior to that of the original mortgagor, may not be dispossessed on the strength of a mere e34parte possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary ejectment in violation of the basic tenets of due process. *n the same vein, respondents are not obliged to prove their ownership of the foreclosed lot in the ex1parte proceedings. ,he trial court has no jurisdiction to determine who between the parties is entitled to ownership and possession of the foreclosed lot. LiCewise, registration of the lot in petitioner:s name does not automatically entitle the latter to possession thereof. =etitioner must resort to the appropriate judicial process for recovery of the property and cannot simply invoCe its title in an e34parte proceeding to justify the ouster of respondents. )ro!eedings 7 en )roperty Claimed by T ird )erson; third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a decision against a judgment debtor is afforded w9 several alternative remedies to protect its interests: H#I Gile a ,-*"4 = ",6 CL *@ w9 the sheriff and H&I *f the third party claim is denied, the third party may ==E L the denial. .uch alternative remedies may be availed of cumulatively and the third party is not precluded from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in the event he fails in the remedy first availed of. Even if a third party claim is denied, athird party may still file the ="+=E" C,*+( w9 a competent court ,+ "EC+JE" +D(E".-*= of the property illegally sei>ed by the sheriff. Same; @T(RC(RIAA *n .ec. #), "ule $' of the "ules of Court, a third party claimant may also avail of the remedy Cnown as 0terceria2 by serving on the officer maCing the levy an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. ,he officer shall not be bound to Ceep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnifies the officer against such claim by a ?+(4 in a sum not greater thatn the value of the property levied on. n C,*+( G+" 4 @ !E. may be brought against the sheriff w9in #&8 days from the filing of the bond. ,he aforesaid remedies are neverthe less w9o prejudice to any 0proper action2 that a third party claimant may deem suitable to vindicate his claim to the property. .uch 0proper action2 is, obviously, entirely distinct fromt hat explicitly prescribed in .ec. #7, "ule $' and would have for its object the recovery of ownership or possession of the property sei>ed by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the allegedly wrongfull sei>ure and detention thereof despite the third party claimA and it may be brought against the sheriff and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded w9 him in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself. +arnis ment; ,or!ed Inter#enor; !arnishment consists in the citation of some stranger to the ltitigation, who is a debtor to one of the parties to the action. ?y this meansm such debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenorA and the court, having acBuired jurisdiction over his person by means of citation, reBuires him to pay his debt, not to his former creditor, but to the new creditor, who is creditor in the main litigation. *t is merely a case of involuntary novation by the substitution of one creditor for another. 6upangco Cotton @ills v. C , !" #&)$&&, Jan. #), &88&.

6upangco Cotton @ills v. C , !" #&)$&&, Jan. #), &88&.

=(? @adecor v. "O" @etal Casting and Gabricating, *nc., !" #$&&%/, Jan. &, &88&.

,here is no need for the institution of a separate action under "ule $', .ec. %$, w9c contemplates a situation where the person allegedly holding property of ;or indebted to< the judgment debtor claims an adverse interest in the property ;or denies the debt<. (ffe!ts of Judgments; Res Judicata; 0nterest repu+licae ut sit finis litium U it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. Grom this overwhelming concern springs the doctrine of res (udicata U an obvious rule of reason according stability to judgments. "es judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decidedA a thing or matter settled by judgment. *n res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as to every matter offered and received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and all other matters that could have been adjudged therein. ppeals )etition to be allo7ed to Appeal as )auper; ,he restrictive policy enunciated in the #')% "evised "ules of Court was not carried over to the #''7 "ules of Civil =rocedure. =etition to be allowed as pauper may be entertained by the appellate court. ,he Court resolved to apply the present rules retrospectively in this case. @E" LC+ v. =hil. Consumers Goundation, !" #8#73$, Jan. &$, &88&.

@artine> v. =eople, !" #$&3/&, @ay $#, &888.

Do!;et ,ees; =ayment of docCet fees and other legal fees La>aro v. C , w9in the prescribed period is both mandatory and !" #$77)#, jurisdictional. Gailure to do so is a ground for the dismissal pril ), &888. of an appeal. ,he bare invocation of 0the interest of substantial justice2 is not a magic wand that will automatically compel the court to suspend procedural rules. Same; D9 the exception of .ec. # ;b< w9c refers to the failure to file notice of appeal or the record of appeal w9in the reglementary period, the grounds enumerated in "ule /8, .ec. #, are merely directory and not mandatory. 4espite the jurisdictional nature of the rule on payment of docCet fee, the appellate court still has the discretion to relax the rule in meritorious cases, as in this case, where the appellant was, from the start, ready and willing to pay the correct docCet fee, but was unable to do so due to error of an officer of the court in computing the correct amount. Same; ,he failure to pay the appellate docCet fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal or affect the court:s jurisdiction, the dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. Gurthermore, under .ec. / of "ule #%# of the "ules of Court, the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docCet fees if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for his failure to pay the correct amount of docCet fees w9in the prescribed period. Same; ,he power of discretionary dismissal of appeal should be used in accordance w9 the tenets of justice and fair play and w9 a great deal of circumspection, taCing into consideration all attendant circumstances. yala Land, *nc. v. .pa. Carpo, !" #%8#)&, (ov. &&, &888.

6ambao v. C , !" #%83'%, (ov. &7, &888.

,edora v. Ca, !" #%&8&#, (ov. &', &888.

)eriod of Appeal; ,he #/1day period for filing an appeal rgel v. C , is (+(1EP,E(4*?LE. Giling of a motion for extension of !" #&338/,

time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration is prohibited in all courts, except the .C. ,here is no exception to this rule. &ate Appeal; motion contesting a late appeal may be filed before the appellate court even after the transmittal of the records therein. ,he legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court, and the latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground of its being out of time. recognition of the merit of the petition does not necessarily carry w9 it any assumption or conclusion that it has been timely filed. Noti!e of Appeal; ,he #''7 "ules of Civil =roc., w9c tooC effect on July #, #''7, provide that a notice of appeal must be filed #9in #/1day reglementary period from receipt of the decision or order appealed from and the docCet and other lawful fees must also be paid w9in the same period.

+ct. #&, #'''.

@anila @emorial Center v. C , !" #$7#&&, (ov. #/, &888.

Chan v. C , !" #$37/3, July ), &888A ?gry. &% of Legaspi City v. *mperial, !" #%8$&#, ug. &%, &888.

Noti!e to file AppellantBs .rief must be given to the party guam v. C , appellant and not his9her counsel. !" #$7)7&, @ay $#, &888. (le#ation of Re!ords of Case; (o error was committed by the C when it ordered the trial court to elevate the orig. record of the case and to desist from proceeding any further in said case. +nce a written notice of appeal is filed, appeal is perfected and the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and subject of the case. @ancenido v. C , !" ##3)8/, pril #&, &888.

Certifi!ation of Non',orum S opping; Certification in a .ps. 4ar v. petition for review signed by only one of the spouses was lon>o, !" held sufficient as the decision assailed by them relates to #%$8#), ug. a case filed against petitioner1spouses over property in w9c $8, &888. they had a common interest. AppellantBs .rief; ,he C may dismiss an appeal for guam v. C , failure to file appellant:s brief on time. -owever, the supra. dismissal is directory, not mandatory. ,his discretion must be exercised w9in the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case. :rong *ode of Appeal; -aving availed the wrong mode 6ao v. C , of appeal and had not instituted the correct one before the !" #$&%&3, lapse of the period prescribed by law, his right to appeal is +ct. &%, &888. now lost. Same; petition filed under rule %/ alleging that the appellate court and the ",C 0acted w9 grave abuse of discretion amounting to lacC of jurisdiction,2 should be dismissed outright, for being a wrong remedy. (evertheless, in the interest of justice, the Court considered the petition and the issues therein as if they were properly brought by way of a special civil action for certiorari under "ule )/. .ps. !erardo v. Ca, !" #&##8%, (ov. &7, &888.

)etition for Re#ie7 from t e RTC to t e CA; Copies of Lee v. C , Assailed De!ision; petition for review filed before the !" #$)%&#, C must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original (ov. &$,

copy of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Same; Same; -owever, the other supporting papers attached to the petition are not reBd. to be certified true copies as well. *n this case, the Contract to .ell, w9c9 is the center of the controversy, was reproduced verbatim in the @,C 4ecision, a duplicate original of w9c was attached to the petition. @oreover, a certified true copy of the Contract was attached to the motion for reconsideration. -ence, the appellate court erred in denying due course to the petition. Same; Same; ,he petition should be denied for failure to attach an authentic copy of the decision of the C 4ecision.

&888. Cusi1 -ernande> v. .ps. 4ia>, !" #%8%$), July #3, &888.

?uaya v. .tronghold *nsurance, !" #$'8&8, +ct. ##, &888

Same; Same; Substantial Complian!e 7< t e 5y v. ?*", !" re8uirement; ,he submission of a document together with #&')/#, +ct. the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial &8, &888. compliance with .ection $, "ule %) of the "ules of Court. nd also when it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right. ,he rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical senseA rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. *f a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be defeated. Same; Same; Same; 5nder the circumstances, respondent appellate court should have tempered its strict application of procedural rules in view of the fortuitous event considering that litigation is not a game of technicalities. -agonoy @arCet Jendors ssn. v. -agonoy, !" #$7)&#, Geb. ), &88&.

Appeals from Cuasi'Judi!ial Agen!ies to t e CA; t .amaniego v. the time petitioner:s brought their case to the C , the guila, !" procedure governing appeals to said court from Buasi1 #&//)7, June judicial agencies was embodied in the "evised &7, &888. dministrative Circular (o. #1'/, w9c relevantly provides that the petition for review need not implead the court or agency either as petitioner or respondent. ,he +ffice of the =resident is included w9in the scope of said circular. ,he +ffice of the =resident in this case ;involving the issue of whether a private land should be exempted from the coverage of =4 &7< is not an indispensable party but merely a pro forma party. Issues Raised in t e *R )roper on Appeal; *t is not pro forma just because it reiterated the arguments earlier passed and rejected by the appellate court. ,he Court has explained that a movant may raise the same arguments, precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous. )etition for Re#ie7 on Certiorari 0Rule D55; ,he proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the C is a petition for "eview under "ule %/ w9c is not similar to a petition for Certiorari under "ule )/ of the "ules of Court. s provided in "ule %/ of the "ules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the C in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, amy be appealed to the .C by filing a petition for review, w9c would be a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. +n the other hand, a .ecurity ?anC v. Cuenca, !" #$3/%%, +ct. $, &888. Gortune !uarantee and *nsurance Corp. v. C , !" ##878#, @arch #&, &88&.

special civil action under "ule )/ is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a !E(E" L "5LE, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under "ule %/. ccordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright. Same; proper issues to be raised are Buestions of law and not Buestions of fact. Crucillo v. * C, !" )/%#), +ct. &), #'''. merican =resident Lines v. Ca, !" ##83/$, July $#, &888A ,elefunCen .emiconducto rs EEs 5nion1 GGD v. C , !" #%$8#$1 #%, 4ec. #3, &888. v.

Same; Gactual Buestions may not be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.

Same; Only errors !laimed and assigned by a party bubaCar 7ill be !onsidered by t e !ourt3 EPCE=, affecting its bubaCar, jurisdiction over the subject matter or errors affecting the supra. validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein. Same; ,a!tual Issues; T e SC is not a trier of fa!ts do!trine; ,he Buestion presented is factual and is not reviewable by the .C in an appeal via certiorari under "ule %/ of the "ules of Court.

Calusin v. C , !" #&3%8/, June &#, &888. .

Same; Same; Same; ("!eptions to t e Rule; review @arBue> v. of factual findings of the lower court is not a function that is C , !" normally undertaCen in petitions for review on certiorari ##))3', under "ule %/. Gactual findings of the C are conclusive pril$, &888. on the parties and carry even more weight when said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court. ,hus, the Court:s jurisdiction in petitions fro review on certiorari is limited only to reviewing errors of law. re1evaluation of the factual issues by the court is justified only when the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the records or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. Same; Same; Same; Same; H#I Dhen the factual findings complained of are devoid of support of evidence on recordA or H&I the assailed judgment is based on a misappreciation of factsA or H$I when the findings of the ",C and the C are opposite. @etrobanC v. ,onda, !" #$%%$), ug, #), &888A Cordial v. @iranda, !" #$/%'/, 4ec. #%, &888. ,hermochem v. (aval, !" #$#/%#, +ct. &8, &888.

+riginal Cases before the C

,iling of a Comment; 5nder "ule %), .ec. 7 of the #''7 "ules of Civil =roc., when the respondent in an original action filed w9 the court fails to file its comment, the case may be decided on the basis of the evidence on record w9o prejudice to disciplinary action against the disobedient party. Concomitant thereto is the rule that pursuant o "ule

/#, .ec. # ;b<, where no comment is filed upon the expiration of the period to comment in an original action or a petition for review, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision. ?oth provisions are applicable to a petition for review filed w9 the .C as provided in "ule /), .ec. & ;a< of the "ules. ("e!ution of Judgment; No Dis!retionary ("e!ution; ,he C has no authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its own decision. 4iscretionary execution under "ule $', .ec. & ;a< of the "evised "ules of Court, as amended, applies to a judgment or final order of the trial court. +n the other hand, .ec. ## of "ule /# expressly provides that the judgment of the C shall be remanded to the lower court for execution #8 days after entry of judgment, unless notice is given that the decision would be appealed to the .C. ?6 reBuiring the remand of the records to the lower court after the entry of judgment, the rules completely cut off any of the C to directly undertaCe the execution of the final judgment, much less the authority to order its execution pending its finality. =rovisional "emedies ATTAC%*(NT; 5nder the "ules of Court ;.ec 7 HbI, "ule /7<, property sei>ed under a writ of attachment, capable of manual delivery, must be taCen and safely Cept by the 4eputy .heriff, after issuing the corresponding receipt therefore. "espondent:s act of leaving the sei>ed articles in the possession and control of the plaintiff did not comply w9 the rules. -eirs of the Late Justice J?L v. Justice 4emetria, .@. (o. C 1 8#1$&, Jan. &$, &88&A *nsular Life ssurance Company v. 6oung, !" #%8')%, Jan. #), &88&. Cunanan v. 4eputy .heriff, @ (o. =1''1 #$/#, (ov. &%, #'''.

Same; +arnis ment; *t is an attachment by means of w9c Cebu *ntl. the plaintiff seeCs to subject to his claim, the property of Ginance Corp. the defendant in the hands of a third person or money v. C , supra. owed to such third person or garnishee by the defendant. ,he garnishment procedure must be upon proper order of the court who had jurisdiction over the collection suit. ,he confiscation of the drawer:s money by the drawee banC constitute garnishment w9o the parties going through a valid proceeding in court. R()&(6IN; *ortgage )roperty; Dhen a mortgagee Gernande> v. seeCs replevin to effect the eventual foreclosure of *ntl. Corp. mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the ?anC, supra. mortgagor:s default on, the chattel mortgage that among other things, can properly phold the right to replevy the property. n dverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just deprived his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin. Same; Return of )roperty SeiEed and Counterbond; "ule )8 of the "ules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property only. ,he machinery used in a factory and essential to the industry, as in the present case, was a proper subject of a writ of replevin because it was treated as personal property in a contract. 5nder the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. -owever, the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease greement U is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. +n the other hand, the remedy of defendants under "ule )8 was either to post a counter1bond or to Buestion the sufficiency of the plaintiffKs bond. ,he policy under "ule )8 was that Buestions .erg:s =roducts v. =C* Leasing and Ginance, !" #$778/, ug. &&, &888.

involving title to the subject property should be determined in the trial. ,hey are not allowed, to invoCe the title to the subject property, as these Buestions reBuire a determination of facts and a presentation of evidence, both of which have no place in a petition for certiorari in the C under "ule )/ or in a petition for review in this Court under "ule %/. Same; :rit of Reple#in; writ of replevin issued by the @etropolitan ,rial Court may be served and enforced anywhere in the =hils. )R(&I*INAR/ INJUNCTION; Dhen a =* is issued in an action to enforce a contract that prohibits an employee from worCing in a competing enterprise w9in two years from resignation M has the same lifetime as the prohibition M two years also. 5pon the expiration of the said period, a suit Buestioning the validity of the issuance of the writ becomes functus oficio. Same; Re8uisites; ,wo reBuisites are necessary if a preliminary injunction is to issue, namely: ;#< the existence of "*!-, to be protected and ;&< the G C,. against which the injunction is to be directed are J*+L ,*JE +G . *4 "*!-,.. Same; =ursuant to .ec. #, "ule /3 of the "evised "ules of Civil =rocedure, one of the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is a ="++G that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. ,hus, a preliminary injunction order may be granted only when the application for the issuance of the same shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded. ,his is the reason why we have ruled that it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistaCable, and, that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. *n the case at bar, the petitioner applied for the issuance of a preliminary injunctive order on the ground that she is entitled to the use of the trademarC on Chin Chun .u and its container based on her copyright and patent over the same. ,he name and container of a beauty cream product are proper subjects of a trademarC inasmuch as the same falls sBuarely within its definition. *n order to be entitled to exclusively use the same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the user must sufficiently prove that she registered or used it before anybody else did. ,he petitionerKs copyright and patent registration of the name and container would not guarantee her the right to the exclusive use of the same for the reason that they are not appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights. ConseBuently, a preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for the reason that the petitioner has not proven that she has a clear right over the said name and container to the exclusion of others, not having proven that she has registered a trademarC thereto or used the same before anyone did. Same; ,he "ules do not reBuire that issues be joined before a =* may issue. *t may be granted at any stage of Gernande> v. *ntl. Corp. ?anC, supra. ,icc>on v. Jideo =ost manila, !" #$)$%&, June #/, &888.

=ublic Estate uthority ;=E < v. C , !" ##&#7&, (ov. &8, &888. Eho v. C , !" ##/7/3, @arch #', &88&.

=C*?anC v. C , !"

an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. Same; Courts should avoid issuing a writ of prelim. *njunction w9c would in effect dispose of the main case w9o trial. T(*)ORAR/ R(STRAININ+ ORD(R 0TRO5; .upreme Court dministrative Circular (o. &81'/ which states: #. Dhere an application for temporary restraining order ;,"+< or writ of preliminary injunction is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading filed with the trial court, such complaint or initiatory pleading shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse party and in the presence of such party or counsel. &. ,he application for a ,"+ shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty1four ;&%< hours after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. ,he records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle. $. *f the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a ,"+ is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge shall issue the ,"+ effective only for seventy1two ;7&< hours from issuance but shall immediately summon the parties for conference and immediately raffle the case in their presence. ,hereafter, before the expiry of the seventy1two hours, the =residing Judge to whom the case is assigned shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the ,"+ can be extended for another period until a hearing in the pending application for preliminary injunction can be conducted. *n no case shall the total period of the ,"+ exceed twenty ;&8< days, including the original seventy1two ;7&< hours, for the ,"+ issued by the Executive Judge. %. Dith the exception of the provisions which necessarily involve multiple1sala stations, these rules shall apply to single1sala stations especially with regard to immediate notice to all parties of all applications for ,"+. Same; ,here is a difference with respect to the reBuisites for ,-E *..5 (CE +G ,E@=+" "6 "E.," *(*(! +"4E" (4 ,-E L*GE +G ,-E ,"+ when it is issued by an Executive Judge or by a =residing Judge of a court. *f the temporary restraining order was issued by respondent in his capacity as Executive Judge, the ,"+ was good for 7& hours only. Dithin that period he was reBuired to summon the parties to a conference before issuing the ,"+ and then assign the case by raffle ;par. $ of dministrative Circular (o. &81'/<. +n the other hand, if the ,"+ was issued by a judge acting as the branch Judge after the case was raffled to his Court, then he should comply w9 the following provision of dministrative Circular (o. &81'/, par. &: 0,he application for a ,"+ shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted w9in &% hours after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. ,he records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle. Same; Regularity of issuan!e by t e CA; TRO intended as a Collegiate A!t3 Not t e Order of a Single Justi!e1 ,here is no Buestion regarding the authority of the Court of ppeals to issue a preliminary writ of injunction or temporary restraining order pending the resolution of petitions and appeals within its jurisdiction, especially in meritorious cases. Dhile under the rules, a

#8$#%', (ov. #/, &888. @i>ona v. Ca, !" #&8'3/, 4ec. %, &888. @arcos v. Judge gcaoili, .@. (o. ",J1'31 #%8/, pril #&, &888.

dao v. Judge Loren>o, @ (o. ",J ''1 #%'), +ct. #$, #'''.

-eirs of the Late Justice J?L v. Justice 4emetria, .@. (o. C 1 8#1$&, Jan. &$, &88&.

member of the Court of ppeals may issue a temporary restraining order. -owever, he shall advisedly use such power sparingly, in case of extreme necessity where there are compelling reasons to abate or avoid a grave injury to a party. nd, such issuance must be submitted to the Court for ratification at the very next session of the Court. *n this case, only two members of the Court of ppeals, respondents Justices 4emetria, ponente, and ?arcelona, member, concurring, signed the resolution. Justice +mar 5. min, member, did not sign. -ence, the resolution may not be received for filing, much less served on the parties. ,he clear intent of the division members was for the three members to act on the resolution. Dhen the law transgressed is elementary, the failure to Cnow or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. .pecial Civil ctions C(RTIORARI; )etition for Certiorari under Rule ?5; *n order to be granted, it must be shown that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion eBuivalent to lacC or excess of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment. @ere abuse of discretion is not enough M it must be grave. Certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment w9c are correctible by appeal. Same; Same; ,he essential reBuisites for a petition for certiorari under "ule )/ are: ;#< the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or Buasi1judicial functionsA ;&< such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lacC or excess of jurisdictionA and ;$< there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adeBuate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Same; Certiorari cannot be a substitute for lost appeal. 5nder the #''7 Civil "ules of =roc., a petition for certiorari must be filed w9in )8 days from receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution. Same; *f a party invoCes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court:s jurisdiction in the same case. ,omas Claudio @emorial College v. C , !" #&%&)&, +ct #&, #'''. "ivera v. Espiritu, !" #$//%7, Jan. &$, &88&.

@overs1 ?aseco v. C , supra. ,omas Claudio @emorial College v. C , !" #&%&)&, +ct #&, #'''. .antos v. C , !" #&73'', 4ec. &, #'''.

Same; =rivate respondent has the personality to bring a special civil action before the C in regard to the civil aspect of a criminal case. *t is not true that it is only the .tate or the =eople that can prosecute the special civil action.

Same; *t is an original action, independent from the 6asuda v. C , principal action, not part nor continuation of the trial w9c !" ##&/)', resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of. *t pril #&, does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the &888. running of the reglementary periods involved in the proceedings, unless an application for a restraining order or writ of prelim injunction to the appellate court is granted. *t is not a mode of appeal where the appellate court reviews errors of fact or of law committed by the lower court. ,he issue in a special civil action for certiorari is whether the lower court acted w9o jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or w9 grave abuse of discretion. *n an appeal by certiorari under "ule %/, the petitioner and respondent

are also the original parties to the action in the lower court. ?ut in certiorari as an original action, the parties are the aggrieved party versus the lower court or Buasi1judicial agency and the prevailing party, who thereby respectively become the petitioner and respondents. Same; s long as the court acts w9in its jurisdiction, any alleged errors in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment w9c are reviewable by timely appeal and not the special civil action of certiorari. ,he granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alters the theory of the case or that it was made to delay the action. s to the wisdom or soundness of the trial court:s order dismissing petitioner:s affirmative defense of prescription, this involves a matter of judgment w9c is not properly reviewable by a petition for certiorari, w9c is intended to correct defects of jurisdiction solely and not errors of procedure or matters in the trial court:s findings or conclusions. Same; *nstead of appealing the decision, @@4 resorted to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, as a mode of obtaining reversal of the judgment. ,his cannot be done. ,he judgment was not in any sense null and void a+ initio, incapable of producing any legal effects whatever, which could be resisted at any time and in any court it was attempted. *t was a judgment which could or may have suffered from some substantial error in procedure or in findings of fact or of law, and on that account, it could have been reversed or modified on appeal. ?ut since it was not appealed, it became final and has thus gone beyond the reach of any court to modify in any substantive aspect. ,he remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits is appeal. ,his is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lacC of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision. ,he existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of the reBuirements for availment of the latter remedy is precisely that Nthere should be no appeal. s a general rule, special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adeBuate remedy in the ordinary course of law ;.ec. #, rule )/<. ?ut admittedly, there are instances as significant exceptions where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, such as: H#I when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictateA or H&I when the broader interests of justice so reBuire, or H$I when the writs issued are null . . . or when the Buestioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. .ps. "efugia v. -on. lejo, !" #$3)7%, June &&, &888.

@@4 v. Jancom Environmental Corp, !" #%7%)/, Jan. $8, &88&.

Same; ,he C went beyond its authority when, after ?uce v. C , interpreting the Buestioned provision of the lease contract, !" #$)'#$, it proceeded to order the petitioner to vacate the subject @ay #&, &888. premises, where, in this case, the Buestion of possession was not among the issues agreed upon by the parties nor threshed out before the court a 'uo nor raised by private respondent on appeal.

Same; *n the interest of justice, the .C has often treated a petition for review on certiorari under "ule %/ as a special civil action for certiorari. Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse conseBuence of petitioner:s own omission to file the reBuired motion for reconsideration.

.eagull .hipmanage ment and ,ransport v. (L"C, !" #&$)#', June 3, &888. ,ensorex *ndustrial Corp. v. C , #'''.

Same; ,he mere fact that decision of the @,C was appealed to the ",C does not preclude the filing of a special civil action of certiorari w9 the ",C concerning an entirely different incident. ,he availability of an appeal does not foreclose resort to extraordinary remedies, such as certiorari and prohibition, where appeal is not adeBuate or eBually beneficial, speedy and sufficient. Same; )eriod of ,iling; ,he prevailing rule now under .@. (o. 881&18$ .C gives a party a G"E.- )81day period from receipt of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration w9in w9c to file a petition for certiorari. ,his latest amendment tooC effect on .ept. #, &888. ?efore the said amendment, .ec. %, "ule )/, as amended by Circular (o. $'1'3, provided that the )81day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be interrupted by the filing of a motion for reconsideration or new trial. *n the event of the denial of the motion, the petitioner only has the remaining period w9in w9c to file the petition. Same; Same; Retroa!ti#e Appli!ation; ,he new rule under .@. (o. 881&18$1.C should be deemed applicable to this case. .tatutes regulating procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Same; Nature; ction challenging the ",C w9 )rave a+use of discretion may be instituted either in the C or the .C. ?oth have original concurrent jurisdiction. Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only 5/en t/ere is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or ade'uate remedy in t/e ordinary course of la5.

(ar>oles v. (L"C, !" #%#'/', .ept. &', &888 A .ystem Gactors Corp. v. (L"C, !" #%$73', (ov. &7, &888.

.ystem Gactors Corp. v. (L"C, supra. Chua v. Ca, !" #&#%$3, +ct. &$, &888.

Same; +rdinarily, Certiorari is 5( J *L*(! where the id. appeal period has lapsed. ?ut there are EPCE=,*+(.: H#I when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictatesA H&I when the broader interest of justice so reBuiresA H$I when the writs issued are null and voidA or H%I when the Buestioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. ,he Buestioned orders of the probate court nullifying the sale to . after it approved the sale and after its order of approval had become final and executory amount to oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lacC of jurisdiction. Same; ,he writ of certiorari cannot be used to correct a lower tribunal:s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Certiorari as an Original Spe!ial Ci#il A!tion distinguis ed from Certiorari as a *ode of Appeal 0Rule ?5 #s1 Rule D55; ;#< *n appeal by certiorari, the appellate court acts in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and power of reviewA while in certiorari as an .oriano v. ngeles, !" #8''&8, ug. $#, &888. ,ensorex *ndustrial Corp. v. C , #'''.

original action, the higher court exercises original jurisdiction under its power of control and supervision over the orders of the lower courtA ;&< ,he period for filing appeal is shorter than for an original action for certiorari. ConseBuently, where the appealed judgment was renderd by the ",C in the exercise of its orig. jurisdiction, the appeal to the C may be taCen by writ of error or ordinary appeal. *ANDA*US; *t lies to compel the performance of a clear legal duty or ministerial function imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent resulting from office, trust or station. *t cannot be used to compel the .ugar "egulatory dministration to issue rules and regulations governing the importation of sugar in the absence of 0a standard for the control and regulation of sugar importation2 vested on it under the law. Same; *t is not a proper remedy to Buestion the legality of the exercise of the right to top by private respondent. *t does not lie to compel the award of a contract subject of bidding to an unsuccessful bidder. *t may not be availed to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or retract or reverse an action already taCen in the exercise of either. Same; ,he issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal being a clear duty of respondent judge in this case, may be the subject of mandamus. )RO%I.ITION; *t does not lie to enjoin the implementation of a writ of possession. =acheco v. C , !" #&%3)$, June #', &888.

J! .ummit -oldings v. Ca, !" #&%&'$, (ov. &8, &888.

5y v. .antiago, !" #$#&$7, July $#, &888. .ps. +ng v. C , !" #&#%'%, June 3, &888. "ivera v. Espiritu, !" #$//%7, Jan. &$, &88&.

Same; Gor writs of prohibition, the reBuisites are: ;#< the impugned act must be that of a Ntribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, Buasi1judicial or ministerial functionsAN and ;&< there is no plain, speedy, and adeBuate remedy in the ordinary course of lawN. Same; *t is not an appropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. *t is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. INJUNCTIONS; Re8uisites; *njunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a particular act. n applicant for preliminary injunction must file a verified complaint showing facts entitling him to the relief demanded accompanied with a bond which shall answer for all the damages which the party sought to be enjoined may sustain by reason of the injunction. *t may be issued when the following reBuisites are established: #. ,he invasion of the right is material and substantialA &. ,he right of complainant is clear and unmistaCableA $. ,here is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

!on>ales v. (arvasa, !" #%83$/, ug. #%, &888. =ET v. Jian>on, !" #$#8&8, July &8, &888.

Same; Status Cuo Order; ,he Nstatus BuoN is the last id. actual peaceable uncontested situation, which precedes

controversy. .tatus Buo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. *n this instance, at the time of the filing of the case, ..* was still in actual physical possession of the property in Buestion as the lessee thereof. lthough the =ET sent ..* a letter purportedly canceling the lease agreement and demanding the ..* to vacate the premises, said demand was never effectively implemented due to the filing of the present action for injunction. Same; ("e!ution )ending Appeal; Judgments in actions for injunction are (+, ., 6E4 by the pendency of an appeal taCen therefrom. ,his rule has been held to EP,E(4 to judgments decreeing the dissolution of the writ of prelim. *njunction, w9c is immediately executory. Same; ,he remedy of injunction can no longer be availed of where the act to be prevented had long been consummated. +o#ernment Infrastru!ture )ro$e!ts; .ec. # of =4 #3#3 prohibits the courts from issuing injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of government infrastructure projects, liCe housing and resettlement projects. *ntramuros ,ennis Club v. =, , !" #$/)$8, .ept. &), &888. Tabat v. C , !" #&&83', ug. &$, &888. (- v. -on. llarde, !" #8)/'$, (ov. #), #'''.

Same; =4 #3#3 and .C Circulars (os. #$1'$ and )31'% Caguioa v. prohibit the issuance by any court of any injunction that Judge LaviVa, would delay the process of a government infrastructure .@. (o. ",J1 project. 881#//$, (ov. &8, &888. CUO :ARRANTO; *t may be brought +(L6 by the .+L!E(, or a public prosecutor, or a person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. Same; ,he person suing must show that he has a CLE " "*!-, to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. .erg:s =roducts v. =C* Leasing and Ginance, supra. .ec. of Justice v. ?acal, !" #$'$3&, 4ec. ), &888. ?arangay .an "oBue v. -eirs of =astor, !" #$33'), June &8, &888. -uibonhoa v. C , !" '/3'7, 4ec. #%, #'''.

(9)RO)RIATION; Expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation and falls w9in the jurisdiction of the ",C, regardless of the value of the subject property.

(J(CT*(NT; Unla7ful Detainer; *n an action for unlawful detainer, it is sufficient to allege that defendant is unlawfully w9holding possession of the property in Buestion, or refusal to vacate is unlawful M w9o necessarily employing the terminology of the law. ,his action is not abated by remedies w9c the lessee may avail of, liCe actions for annulment of sale, title or document.

Same; Same; Distinguis ed from ,or!ible (ntry; *n ?arba v. C , forcible entry, the plaintiff has ="*+" =+..E..*+( of !" #&))$3, the property and he is deprived thereof by the defendant Geb. ), &88&. through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth ;G*.,.<. *n an unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully

D*,--+L4. =+..E..*+( of the property after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or impliedA hence, prior possession is not reBuired. *n this case, although the phrase 0unlawfully withholding2 was not actually used by petitioner in her complaint, the allegations therein nonetheless amount to an unlawful withholding of the subject property by private respondents because they continuously refused to vacate the premises to that effect. Same; ,he @etropolitan ,rial Court should not have disregarded private respondent:s answer ;though filed out of time< w9c raised the defense of agrarian relations M and should have proceeded to determine whether or not it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Same; *n the case at bar, the @,C 4*.@*..E4 the case for lacC of jurisdiction but, on appeal, the ",C reversed the dismissal and rendered a judgment ejecting the defendants from the parcel of land involved and condemning them to pay damages and attorney:s fees. ,his is not correct. *n case of reversal of orders dismissing a case w9o trial or lacC of jurisdiction, the case shall be "E@ (4E4 to the @,C for further proceedings. ;.ec. 3, "ule %8, #''7 "ules of Civil =rocedure< ,he ",C, in reversing an appealed case dismissing the action, cannot decree the eviction of the defendants and award damages. court cannot taCe judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. ,he court may taCe judicial notice of matters of public Cnowledge, or w9c are capable of unBuestionable demonstration, or ought to be Cnown to judges because of their judicial functions. ?efore taCing such judicial notice, the court must 0allow the parties to be heard thereon.2 ,here can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in Buestion w9o supporting evidence. Same; ("e!ution )ending Appeal; .ec. &# of "ule 78 of the #''7 "ules of Civil =roc. Explicitly provides that the judgment of the ",C in ejectment cases appealed to it shall be immediately executory and can be enforced despite the perfection of an appeal to a higher court. ConseBuently, respondent:s claim that the pendency of defendant:s motion for reconsideration and the re1raffle of the case to another sala does not justify his failure to enforce the writ of execution issued by the court. Dhen a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty to proceed w9 reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate. Same; Same; +nly the execution of the @,C:s judgment pending appeal w9 the ",C may be ., 6E4 by a compliance w9 the reBuisites provided in "ule 78, .ec. #' of the #''7 "ules of Civil =roc. +nce the ",C has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under "ule 78, .ec. &#, be *@@E4* ,EL6 EPEC5,+"6, w9o prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review, to the C and9or the .C. Corpin v. Jivar, !" #$7$/8, June #', &888. -errera v. ?ollos, !" #$3&/3, Jan. #3, &88&.

La:o v. -atab, .@. (o. =1 ''1#$$7, pril /, &888.

5y v. .antiago, !" #$#&$7, July $#, &888.

Same; Remand of ,inal De!ision for ("e!ution; .ince Jason v. the ",C affirmed in toto the decision of the @,C in an Judge 6gaVa, ejectment suit and the affirming decision had become final .@. (+. and executory, the case should be remanded to the @,C ",J1881#/%$, for execution. ,he +(L6 EPCE=,*+( is the execution ug. %, &888. pending appeal, w9c can be issued by the ",C under .ec.

3, of "ule 78 or by the C or the .C under .ec. #8 of the same rule. .ec. #, "ule $' of the #''7 "ules of Civil =roc. does not authori>e the appellate court w9c has resolved the appeal to order the execution of its own judgment. Dhat is authori>ed is the execution of the judgment of the court of origin even before the remand to the latter by the appellate court of the records of the case, solely on the basis of the certified true copy of the judgment of the appellate court and the entry thereof. Same; Case Deemed Submitted for Resolution; ,here was no error in declaring the ejectment case submitted for decision based solely on the complaint, upon failure of petitioner to appear at the prelim. Conference. 5nder dmin. Circular (o. &3 dated July $, #'3', submission of memoranda is not a @ (4 ,+"6 reBuirement. Gailure of petitioner to submit memoranda after having been reBd to submit the same does not preclude the ",C from rendering judgment on the basis of the entire records of the proceedings in the court of origin. ,he fact that the court also sent a copy of the order to petitioner does not mean that the reglementary period shall be recConed from the date of receipt of the said order by petitioner. ,he rule is that it is the date of receipt by counsel from w9c the reglementary period must be counted, it being the counsel:s responsibility, not the client:s, to file the reBd memorandum in due time. Same; (nfor!ement of :rit of ("e!ution; 5nder the "ules of Court, immediate enforcement of a writ of execution in ejectment cases is carried out by giving the defendant (+,*CE of such writ, and maCing a 4E@ (4 that defendant compy therewith w9in a reasonable period, normally from $ to / days, and it is only after such period that the sheriff enforces the writ by the ?+4*L6 "E@+J L of the defendant and his personal belongings. nd if demolition is involved, there must first be a hearing on motion and due notice for the issuance of a special order under .ec. #% of "ule $'. Same; ("penses in t e ("e!ution; .ec. ', "ule #%# reBuires that the sheriff:s estimate of expenses in the execution of a writ should be approved by the judge. ,ubiano v. "aso, !" #$&/'3, July #$, &888.

Lu v. Judge .iapno, .@. (o. @,J1''1 ##'', July ), &888.

Canlas v. .heriff ?alasbas, .@. (o. =1 ''1#$#7, ug. #, &888.

Same; Distinguis ed from Accion Publiciana or .ps. "oman Plenaria de posesion lthough the action is termed as Cru> v. .ps. one for 0reconveyance of real property2 is actually one for ,orres, supra. recovery of the right to possess. ,his is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a ",C to determine the better right of possession of property independently of the title. .aid action also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the lapse of # year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful w9holding of possession of the realty. Same; Same; .ubseBuent demands were merely in the .ps. "oman nature of reminders or reiterations of the original demand. Cru> v. .ps. *t shall recCon on the original demand to count for the # ,orres, supra. year period. CONT(*)T; ffiants were charged with direct contempt !uillen v. for having violated the writ of preliminary mandatory Judge CaVon, injunction issued by respondent. ,his is contrary to .ec. #, .@. (o.

"ule 7# of the "ules of Court which defines direct contempt as, Nmisbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same . . .N Clearly, the supposed contemptuous acts of affiants fall under the definition of indirect contempt, a disobedience to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt punishable under "ule 7# of the "ules of Court. in cases of indirect contempt, the contemnor Nmay be punished only after a charge in writing is filed and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counselN, and without a hearing, an order citing a person in contempt violates the personKs right to due process ;.alome 4. CaVas vs. Lerio C. Castigador, !.". (o. #$'3%%, 4ecember #/, &888 <. ccording to .ection %, "ule 7#, *f the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall be docCeted, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. Same; Gailure to attend a hearing does not constitute direct contempt. t most, the act constitutes only indirect contempt w9c can be sanctioned only after the proper charge has been filed and the respondent has been given the opportunity to be heard. Same; Indire!t Contempt; .ec. % of "ule 7# of the #''7 "ules of Civil =roc. Explicitly lays down the manner in w9c indirect contempt proceedings may be filed, reBuiring among others that the same be made through a JE"*G*E4 =E,*,*+(. Same; Same; 5nder .ec. ), "ule 7#, the court has the discretion either to impose a G*(E of not exceeding =#,888.88 or *@="*.+(@E(, of not more than ) months, or both, for indirect contempt. .ec. 7 of the same rule provides for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt proceedings to compel a party to comply w9 the order of the court. ,his may be resorted to where the attendant circumstances are such that the non1compliance w9 the court order is an utter disregard of the authority of the court w9c has then no other recourse but to use its coercive power. -owever, the power to punish for contempt should only be exercised on the preservation and not on the vindictive principle. Same; Same; party cannot be held in indirect contempt for disobeying an order w9c is not addressed to him.

@,J18#1#$3#, Jan. #%, &88&.

Tarate v. Judge ?alderian, .@. (o. @,J1881#&)#, pril $, &888. id.

Fuinio v. C , !" ##$3)7, July #$, &888A 5nited -omeowners v. Justice .andoval1 !utierre>, .@. (o. C 1 ''1$8, +ct. #), &888.

CaVas v. Castigador, !" #$'3%%, 4ec. #/, &888A 5nited -omeowners v. J. .andoval1 !utierre>, supra.

.pecial =rocee1 dings

%A.(AS COR)US; *ssuance of the writ being @artin v. extraordinary, are limited to and operative only w9in the Judge jurisdictional area of the ",C who issued such writ. !uerrero, @ (o. ",J1''1 #%''

Same; speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from 5(L DG5L "E," *(,. *ts objective is to inBuire into the legality of one:s detention and, if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee. Same; *t will not issue when the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on +ail or is in t/e custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of judgment or order of a court of record that has jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or maCe the order.

*nre =etition of !arcia, !" #%#%%$, ug. $8, &888. id.

Same; )eriod of ,ling an Appeal; ,he period for ,ung v. perfecting appeals in /a+eas corpus cases is now #/ days "odrigue>, from the notice of judgment or order. !" #$7/7#, .ept. &#, &888. Same; +nce a person detained is duly charged in court, hem ay no longer Buestioned his detention through a petition for the issuance of a writ of /a+eas corpus. -is remedy would be to Buash the information and9or warrant of arrest duly issued. ,he writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. ,he term 0court2 includes Buasi1 judicial bodies liCe the 4eportation ?oard of the ?ureau of *mmigration. Case in#ol#ing ! ild !ustody; *n a case, the petitioner asCed for writ of habeas corpus to return his daughter, who had already reached the age of majority, to her parental home which she left without his consent as father nor the consent of her mother. *n denying the application, the .upreme Court held: X,here can be no Buestion that parental authority, which includes the right to custody, terminates upon a child reaching the age of majority, at which age the child acBuires the right, power and privilege to control his person ;articles $#% and #$7, Civil Code<. ,his right to control one:s person includes the right to choose a separate place of residence and the persons in whose company he desires to live. ,he freedom is incompatible with custodyA no one can be said to have freedom to control his person and at the same time continue subject to someone:s custody. s habeas corpus applies only in cases where the rightful custody of a person is denied to another ;section #, "ule #8&, "ules of Court<, petitioner herein would be entitled thereto only if the right to custody of his daughter is reserved to him by law. Emancipation by majority is always absolute as to one:s personA there is no provision in the law that limits it in any case. rticle $#7 refers to control over property. rticle $&# is not an exception to the effects of emancipation by attainment of the age of majorityA it is a limitation of the right of an emancipated daughter to leave the home of her parents if she is living with them, in the interest of public decorum ;& @anresa, 73)1737<. *t can not, therefore, be said that the daughter, who after majority continues to live with her parents, remains under her parents custody. ,he right to freedom and control of one:s person is a natural rightA no limitation thereto can be imposed or inferred, except by express provision of law. ,he prohibition for daughters from leaving their parental homes, if they live in company with their parents, is a limitation of a natural right and can not be enlarged Commissioner "odrigue> v. Judge ?onifacio, .@. (o. ",J1 ''1#/#8, nov. ), &888.

?alagtas v. C , !" #8'87$, +ct. &8, #'''.

beyond its very limited scopeA it can not be extended by interpretation into a sort of parental authority with its corresponding concomitant of custody. Custody ends with emancipation, and the mere fact that she may have live with them cannot be considered as a continuation of revival of the custody, which had definitely terminated upon her emancipation.:;J1?, Grancisco, ,he "evised "ules of Court *n the =hilippines, )') citing 4y =ico v. "icardo, %7 +.!. /&$&< )RO.AT( O, :I&&; it deals generally w9 the extrinsic validity of wills. *ntrinsic validity is another and Buestions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Same; ,estamentary disposition of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties w9c are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Same; last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory cannot be given effect. 4orotheo v. C , !" #83/3#, 4ec. 3, #'''. 4orotheo v. C , !" #83/3#, 4ec. 3, #'''. 4orotheo v. C , !" #83/3#, 4ec. 3, #'''.

S(TT&(*(NT O, (STAT(; ,he order of the probate Chua v. C , court authori>ing, or subseBuently approving, the absolute !" #&#%$3, sale of property of the estate in favor of a specified buyer +ct. &$, &888. constitutes a final determination of the rights not only of the buyer and the estate but also of any heir or party claiming to be prejudiced by the sale. ("tra$udi!ial Settlement of (state; Re8uisites- ;#< the decedent left no willA ;&< the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paidA ;$< the heirs are all of age, or if there are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal rep.A and ;%< partition is done in a public document or affidavit duly filed w9 the "egister of 4eeds. Same; lthough an heir was not a signatory to the extrajudicial settlement, the partition among the heirs was deemed valid, as it was made in accordance w9 their intestate shares under the law. -eirs of JoaBuin ,eves v. C , supra.

-eirs of JoaBuin ,eves v. C , supra.

Same; ,hough not registered, the extrajudicial settlement -eirs of is legally effective and binding among the heirs, as the JoaBuin decedent had no creditors at the time of his death. ,eves v. C , supra. Same; Every act w9c is intended to put an end to indivision among co1heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise or any other transaction. Judi!ial Settlement of (state; Claims of Compulsory %eirs; .ince the intestate court had ascertain in the settlement proceedings who the lawful heirs are, there is no need for a separate or independent action to resolve claims of legitimate children of the deceased. ,he court first taCing cogni>ance of such proceeding acBuires exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all Buestions concerning the settlement of the estate to the exclusion of all other courts or branches of the same court. -eirs of JoaBuin ,eves v. C , supra. Chan .ui ?i v. C , !" #&'/87, .ept. &', &888.

Same; Claims of title to, or right of possession of, personal or real property, made by the heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or made by third persons, cannot be entertained by the probate court. *n this case, however, private respondent who refused to vacate the house and lot being eyed as part of the estate of the deceased, cannot be considered an 0outside party2 for he is one of the compulsory heirs of the former. . ( EPCE=,*+(, when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the Buestion of title to the property. -ere the probate court is competent to decide the Buestion of ownership.

Cortes v. C , !" ##7%#7, .ept. &#, &888.

(SC%(AT; Nature; Escheat is a proceeding, unliCe that "epublic v. of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue C , #%$%3$, of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal Jan. $#, &88&. property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. *n the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open Ninvitation to self1service by the first comers.N .ince escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time w9in w9c a claim to such property may be made. ,he procedure by w9c the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought. *n this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim Nwithin five ;/< years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estateA but a claim not made shall be barred forever.N ,he /1year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimantA on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would1be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment. Same; .an; Deposits; ,he publication of the list of unclaimed balances is intended to safeguard the right of the depositors, their heirs and successors to due process. @oreover, how would other persons who may have an interest in any of the unclaimed balances Cnow what this case is all about and whether they have an interest in this case if the amended complaint and list of unclaimed balances are not publishedS .uch other persons may be heirs of the banC depositors named in the list of unclaimed balances. ,he fact that the government is in a tight financial situation is not a justification for this Court to dispense with the elementary rule of due process. "epublic v. Ca, !" '//$$, (ov. &8, &888.

Same; Interested )arty; ny person alleging to have a "epublic v. direct right or interest in the property sought to be C , #%$%3$, escheated is liCewise an interested party and may appear Jan. $#, &88&. and oppose the petition for escheat ;@unicipal Council of
.an =edro, Laguna v. Colegio de .an Jose, *nc. (o. L1%/%)8, &/ Gebruary #'$3<. ,hus, in this case a donee has

personality to be a claimant w9in the purview of .ec. %, "ule '#, of the "evised "ules of Court. Same; judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered id. by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies thereto. -owever, a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon

persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. *t follows then that the period of limitation to claim begins to operate. C"*@*( L ="+CE1 45"E: =rosecu1 tion of +ffense

CO*)&AINT; complaint presented by a private person when not sworn to by him, is not necessarily void. ,he want of an oath is a mere defect of form w9c does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits. .uch being the case, it is not persmissible to set aside judgment for such defect. lso, the failure of the prosecution to formally offer in evidence the sworn complaint of the offended party or the failure to adhere to the rule is not fatal and does not oust the court of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. *f the complaint is forwarded to the Court as part of the record of the prelim investigation of the case, the court can taCe judicial notice of the same w9o the necessity of its formal introduction as evidence of the prosecution.

== v. -istorillo, !" #$8%83, June #), &888.

IN,OR*ATION; ,he records disclosed that the accused == v. actually committed more than three acts of rape. -owever, &888. considering that he was charged only for three counts of rape, the Court can only affirm the trial court:s judgment of conviction and its imposition of the death penalty for each of the three counts of rape alleged and proved. Same; *nformation alleging that the dates of the commission of the rape was 0sometime in the month of @ay #'))2 or 0sometime in the month of June #'')2 or 0sometime in the year #'372 M not fatally defective. ,he allegation of the exact time and date of the commission of the crime are not important in a prosecution for rape M as they are not essential elements of rape and have no substantial bearing on their commission. "ule ##8, .ec. ## of the "ules of Court provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at w9c the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at w9c the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. Same; *t is sufficient even when the date of commission of rape is not stated w9 certainty, as the date of the commission is not an element of said crime and what is essential, being the occurrence of rape, not the time of its commission.

lvero,

== v. lvero, !" #$%/$)1 $3, pril /, &888A =p v. Gerolino, !" #$#7$81$#, pril /, &888.

== v. Castillo, !" #$8&8/, July /, &888A == v. Cabigting, !" #$#38), +ct. &8, &888 == v. -onra, !" #$)8#&1 #), .ept. &), &888.

Same; *t is also sufficient even when the rape and frustrated homicide were charged in a single information. *n this case, it is wrongly denominated with Nrape with frustrated homicideN as there is no complex crime of Nrape with frustrated homicideN. rticle %3 of the "=C reBuires the commission of at least two crimes, but the two or more grave or less grave felonies must be the result of a single act, or an offense must be a necessary means for committing the other. (either does this case fall under rticle $$/ of ,he "evised =enal Code which provides for a special complex crime of rape with homicide. (evertheless, while the three informations were captioned

Nrape with frustrated homicideN and alleged the elements of said crimes, it should be noted that the defense did not object to the information despite its imperfection. ,he defect of charging two offenses in one information, that is, rape and frustrated homicide, was 4EE@E4 D *JE4 by accused1appellantKs failure to raise it in a motion to Buash before he pleaded to the information. -ence, conviction for three separate counts of rape and three counts of frustrated homicide may lie. Same; *t is liCewise sufficient where an information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged, but the court cannot pass verdict on the co1 conspirators who were not charged in the information. Same; ?ut when an information for a crime charge is punishable w9 the supreme penalty of death, it must adhere to a higher standard in complying w9 the reBuirements of the law and the "ules of Court. ,he Bualifying circumstance must be alleged w9 more particularity to alert the accused that his life hangs in the balance because of the special circumstance that raises the crime to a higher category. ,hus, when the victim:s minority Bualifies the crime of rape, the exact age of the victim must be specifically alleged in the information to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Same; Amendment of Information; mendment of a criminal charge sheet depends much on the ,*@E when the change is reBuested. Qa< *G ?EG+"E "" *!(@E(,, it is a matter of rightA no leave of court is necessary and the prosecution is free to do so even in matters of substance and in form. ;b< G,E" "" *!(@E(,, not a matter of right anymoreA a prior leave of court is reBuired and at the discretion of the court, only as to matters of form M when the same can be done w9o prejudice to the rights of the accused. *n other words, even if the amendments is only as to matter of form, one other criterion must accompany it for its admission, w9c is, that it should not be prejudicial to the accused. *n essence, matters of substance refer to the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. ll other matters are merely of form. Same; Same; ,he amendment of the information for rape in order to allege the relationship of accused1appellant to the victim is clearly .5?., (,* L in character and can no longer be done w9o violating the constitutional rights of the accused1appellant, who had previously pleaded to the information for simple rape. Same; Defe!ti#e Information; ,he rationale of the rule is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. ,o claim this substantive right, the accused must follow procedural rules w9c were laid down to assure an orderly administration of justice. ,he accused must raise the issue of defective information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form in a motion to Buash or a motion for bill of particulars. n accused who fails to taCe this seasonable step will be deemed to have waived the defect in said information. @oreover, during the trial of this case, the defense never objected to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to prove that the offense was committed in the !arcia v. Ca, !" #$%7$8, .ept. #3, &888. == v. ,agud, !" #%87$$, Jan. $8, &88&.

Jillanueva v. C , !" #%&'%7, @arch #', &88&.

== v. .andoval, !" #$&)&/1$#, 4ec. #3, &888. =p v. "a>onable, !" #&383/1 37, pril #&, &888A == v. .antos, !" #$##8$ O #%$%7&, June &', &888.

middle of June #'37. Same; *n interpreting an information, what controls is the description of the offense charged and not its designation. == v. "ean>ares, !" #$8)/), June &', &888.

Same; Time of Commission of t e Crime; the peculiar == v. Ladrillo, designation of time in the information as 0on or about the !" #&%$%&, year #''&2 violates .ec ##, "ule ##8 of the "ules of Court 4ec. 3, #'''. w9c reBuires that the time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as the information or complaint, as will permit. Same; Designation of Offense; it is not the designation == v. ?anihit, of the offense in the information that is controlling but the !" #$&8%/, allegations therein w9c directly apprise the accused of the ug. &/, nature and cause of the accusation against him. n &888. information is sufficient where it clearly charged the accused of raping his niece, who was a minor, although in the preamble, it stated that the accused is being charged w9 rape of a woman under #& years of age or who is demented. =rosecu1 tion of Civil ction Ci#il A!tion Deemed Instituted; ("!eptions; "ules governing filing of separate civil actionA Jicarious liability of employer for fault or negligence of his employeeA *n negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between ;#< an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under rt. #88 of the "=CA and ;&< a separate action for Buasi delict under rticle &#7) of the (CC. +nce the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. &$ ,his is the rule against double recovery. *n other words, Nthe same act or omission can create two Cinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability Buasi delictoN either of which Nmay be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under rticle &#77 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability.N *n the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on Buasi delict, under rt. &#7) of the (CC. =rivate respondents sued petitioner "afael "eyes ,rucCing Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. 5nder the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law, to wit: HaI rts. &#7' in relation to rt. &#38, w9c would allow an action predicated on Buasi1delict to be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail. -ere, the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. ,he enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action based on rticle &#7) does not reBuire the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily considered !oint tort"easors, is solidary. HbI under rticle #8$ of the "evised =enal Code, provides that an employer may be "afael "eyes ,rucCing Corp. c. =eople, !" #&'8&', pril $, &888.

held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. ,his liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his worC and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged. t bar, *n view of the reservation to file, and the subseBuent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. .uch separate civil action was for recovery of damages under rticle &#7) of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused. =ursuant to the provision of "ule ###, .ection #, paragraph $ of the #'3/ "ules of Criminal =rocedure, when private respondents, as complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused1driver. .uch civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the "evised =enal Code, and damages under rticles $&, $$, and $% of the Civil Code of the =hilippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. )re$udi!ial Cuestion; Re8uisites; civil action for the Ching v. C , declaration of nullity of documents and for damages does !" ##83%%, not constitute a prejudicial Buestion in the criminal case of pril &7, estafa involving trust receipt transactions. ,wo ;&< &888. reBuisites of =rejudicial Buestion: ;a< the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal actionA and ;b< the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Same; ,he pendency of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial Buestion in the case for concubinage. Gor a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter, pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon w9c the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. *n a case for concubinage, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. subseBuent pronouncement of nullity of marriage is not a defense. ,he presumption is that marriage exists for all intents and purposes. ,herefore, he who cohabits w9 a woman not his wife prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risC of being prosecuted for concubinage. ?eltran v. =eople, !" #$7/)7, June &8, &888.

Same; prejudicial Buestion has been defined as one ,e v. C , !" based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but #&)7%), (ov. so *(,*@ ,EL6 C+((EC,E4 w9 it that it determines the &', &888. !5*L, +" *((+CE(CE +G ,-E CC5.E4A and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon w9c the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. ,he rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of the prejudicial Buestion is to avoid two conflicting decisions. ,he concept

of prejudicial Buestion involves a civil and a criminal case. ,here is no prejudicial Buestion when one case is administrative and the other is civil. Same; criminal case for ?igamy was filed against the respondent and thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated w9o a marriage license. "espondent then filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceeding for bigamy, invoCing the pendency of the civil case as a prejudicial Buestion to the criminal case. rt. %8 of the Gamily Code, being the applicable law, reBuire a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of marriage before a party may remarry. ,he clear implication is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. ,hus, the civil case for nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial Buestion. Same; s a rule, a criminal action may be suspended upon a showing that a prejudicial Buestion determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused is the very to be decided in a civil case pending in another tribunal. -owever, such suspension cannot be allowed if it is apparent that the civil action was filed as an G,E",-+5!-, for the purpose of delaying the ongoing criminal action. ,his is especially so in cases where the trial court trying the criminal case has authority to decide such issue, and the civil action was instituted merely ,+ 4EL 6 the criminal proceeding and thereby multiply the suits and vex the court system w9 unnecessary cases. )arti!ipation of Offended )arty in t e )rose!ution of Criminal Case; ,hree instances when the offended party in a criminal case cannot taCe part in the criminal prosecution: ;#< waiver of a civil actionA ;&< reservation to file a separate civil actionA and ;$< a civil action was filed prior to the criminal action. )R(&I*INAR/ IN6(STI+ATION; ("e!uti#e ,un!tion; =relim. *nvestigation is an executive, not a judicial function. .ec. %, "ule ##& of the "ules of Court recogni>es the authority of the .ec. of Justice to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor upon petition by a proper party. Judicial review of the resolution of the .ec, of Justice is L*@*,E4 to a determination of whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lacC or excess of jurisdiction, considering that the full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation. ?obis v. ?obis, !" #$3/8', July $#, &888.

Girst =roducers -oldings Corp. v. Co, !" #$')//, July &7, &888.

4ichaves v. Judge palit, .@. (o. @,J188#&7%, June 3, &888. @etrobanC v. ,onda, !" #$%%$), ug. #), &888.

Same; Absen!e of )reliminary In#estigation; :ai#er == v. 4eang, of; =relim. investigation is generally inBuisitorial, and it is !" #&38%/, often the only means of discovering those who may be ug. &%, reasonably charged with a crime to enable the prosecutor &888. to prepare his complaint or information. *t is not a trial of the case on the merits and serves no purpose except to determine if a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. *t does not place in jeopardy the person against whom it is taCen. *t has been consistently held that the absence of, or incomplete prelim. investigation does not impair the validity of the criminal information or render it defectively. *n this case, C ,L* is deemed to have

waived his right to prelim. investigation when he entered his plea during arraignment. Same; Same; Same; *t does not impair also the complaint or jurisdiction of the court over the case. == v. @adraga, !" #&'&'', (ov. #/, &888. "aro v. .andiganbaya n, !" #83%$#, July #%, &888.

Same; Same; Same; n incomplete preliminary investigation /& or the absence thereof may not warrant the Buashal of an information. *n such cases, the proper procedure is for the .andiganbayan to hold in abeyance any further proceedings conducted and to remand the case to the +mbudsman for preliminary investigation or completion thereof. -owever, granting arguendo that the preliminary investigation was sham and highly anomalous in this case, that defect was cured when the above procedure was in fact observed by the .andiganbayan. Same; Same; Same; ,he right to prelim. *nvestigation is waived when the accused fails to invoCe it before or at the time of entering a plea on arraignment.

== v. =alijon, !" #&$/%/, +ct. #3, &888A == v. 4eang, supra. .amaon v. !uingona, !" #&$/8%, 4ec. #%, &888A ,irol v. C+ , !" #$$'/%. ug. $, &888.

Same; In$un!tion; s a !E(E" L "5LE, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. D9 more reason will injunction not lie when the case is still at the stage of prelim. *nvestigation or reinvestigation. -owever, in extreme cases, the Court laid the ff. EPCE=,*+(.: H#I when the injunction is necessary to afford adeBuate protection to the constitutional rights of the accusedA H&I when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actionsA H$I when there is a prejudicial Buestion w9c is su+(udiceA H%I when the acts of the officer are w9o or in excess of authorityA H/I where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulationA H)I when double jeopardy is clearly apparentA I7 where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offenseA H3I where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecutionA H'I where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeanceA and H#8I when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to on that ground has been denied. "ight to ?ail .AI&; ,he following duties of judges in case an application for bail is filed as speeled out by the =hilippine Judicial cademy, to wit: #. *n all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or reBuire him to submit his recommendation ;.ection #3, "ule ##% of the "ules of Court, as amended<A &. Dhere bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretionA ;.ections 7 and 3, supra< $. 4ecide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecutionA %. *f the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond ;.ection #', supra<. +therwise, the petition should be denied.

@ar>an1 !elacio v. Judge Glores, .@. (o. ",J1 ''#%33, June &8, &888.

,he procedural necessity of a hearing relative to the grant of bail can not be dispensed with especially in this case where the accused is charged with a capital offense. 5tmost diligence is reBuired of trial judges in granting bail especially in cases where bail is not a matter of right. Certain procedures must be followed in order that the accused would be present during trial. s a responsible judge, respondent must not be swayed by the mere representations of the partiesA instead, he should looC into the real and hard facts of the case. ,o do away with the reBuisite bail hearing especially in those cases where the applicant is charged with a capital offense Nis to dispense with this time1tested safeguard against arbitrariness.N *t must always be remembered that imperative justice reBuires the proper observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. *n this regard, it needs be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in capital offenses hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. Same; Not a *atter of Rig t; Dhere the person charged w9 a crime the penalty for w9c is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death when the evidence of guilt is strong. Dhen the bail is discretionary, a -E "*(!, whether summary or otherwise, should be conducted by the court. Same; Contrary to prescribed procedures, respondent judge approved the applications for bail of accused whose cases were not only pending in other courts but who were liCewise arrested and detained outside his territorial jurisdiction and it does not appear that the judges having jurisdiction over the case were absent or otherwise unavailable to act upon their applications for bail. Dorse, respondent judge ordered the release of the accused w9o the corresponding bail bond being posted. == v. !aCo, J"., !" #$/8%/, 4ec. #/, &888.

.antiago v. Judge Jovellanos, .@. (+. @,J1881#&3', ug. #, &888.

Same; @oreover, in this case the trial court scheduled == v. ntona, several hearing dates for the petition for bail. ,he !" #$7)3#, prosecution asCed for reasonable opportunity to present Jan. $#, &88&. evidence. -owever, the trial court denied postponement, ostensibly to give the accused a speedy trial. *nstead, the trial court proceeded to hear the evidence for the defense, despite vigorous objection from the prosecution. *n granting the petition for bail w9o giving the prosecution adeBuate oppoetunity to adduce evidence, the trial court acted w9 grave abuse of discretion. rrest :ARRANT O, ARR(ST; ,he #'37 Constitution reBuires the judge to determine probable cause 0personally2 maCing it the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. Determination of )robable Cause; +nly courts could decide the Buestion of probable cause since the students were not being arrested in flarante delicto. ,he arrest therefore, is null and void. Same; )robable Cause determined by a Judge Distinguis ed from )robable Cause determined by a Cru> v. Judge reola, .@. (o. ",J18#1 #)%&, @arch ), &88&. =osadas v. +mbudsman, !" #$#%'$, .ept. &', &888. Cru> v. Judge reola, .@.

)rose!utor; ,he determination of probable cause by the (o. ",J18#1 prosecutor is for a =5"=+.E different from that w9c is to #)%&, @arch be made by the judge. Dhether there is a reasonable ), &88&. ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecution passes upon. ,he judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. .ince their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. judge fails in this constitutionally mandated duty if he relies merely on the certification or report of the investigating officer. *n this case, the fact that the respondent judge ordered the re1investigation of the case does not in any way maCe him liable for ignorance of the law. ARR(ST :<O :ARRANT; : en &a7ful; H#I *n Glagrante 4elicto rrest under .ec. /;a<, "ule ##$A H&I Dhen an offense has just been committed and the arresting officer or person ;civilian< has probable cause to believe based on 0personal Cnowledge2 of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it ;.ec. / ;b<, "ule ##$. ,he arrest in this instance must be based upon 0probable cause,2 w9c means 0an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion.2 *n these cases, the crime tooC place in 4ec. #'') but accused1appellant was arrested only a weeC after the occurrence of the crime. s the arresting officer were not present when the crime was committed, they could not have 0personal Cnowledge of the facts and circumstances of the commission of the crime2 so as to be justified in the belief that accused1 appellant was guilty of the crime. ,he arresting officers had no reason for not securing a warrant. Sear! in!idental to a la7ful arrestA ,hat appellant was caught transporting a prohibited drug in fla)rante delicto. ConseBuently, a peace officer or any private person, for that matter, may, without warrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offenseA and the person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. -ence, the warrantless search in this case, being an incident to a lawful arrest, is in itself lawful. &egality of Arrest; *t only affects the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused and will not negate the validity of his conviction duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. Defe!t of Arrest; n accused is E.,+==E4 from Buestioning any defect in the manner of his arrest if he fails to move for the Buashing of the information before the trial court, or if he voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea, and by participating in the trial. "ight of the ccused Independent Counsel; @unicipal ttorney cannot be an independent counsel as reBuired by the Constitution. s a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality == v. Escordial, !" #$3'$%1$/, Jan. #), &88&.

== v. ?aludda, !" ##%#'3, (ov. #', #'''.

== v. !opio, !" #$$'&/, (ov. &', &888. == v. @adraga, !" #&'&'', (ov. #/, &888A == v. =alijon, supra ==. Culala, !" 3$%)), +ct. #$, #'''.

in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. *t is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertaCe the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. -e is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations. rraign1 ment An a!!usation by t e State is ne#er synonymous 7< guilt1 Even when an indictee enters a plea of guilty, an adherence to the constitutional precept is not dispensed w9, and the courts are neither excused from their duty to act w9 greatest caution in seeing to the lawful interest of the accused. "ule ##) of the "ules of Court have set exacting standards to be strictly complied with. ?y the trial court in the arraignment of the accused. Impro#ident )lea; judge who fails to observe the mandatory procedure in case of an accused entering an improvident plea of guilty to the offense charge commits grave abuse of discretion. Same; Dhile the Court in a cantena of cases set aside convictions based on a plea of guilt in capital offenses because of the improvidence of the plea, it did so only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. == v. ,i>on, !" #&)'//, +ct. &3, #'''.

== v. ?ello, !" #$8%##1 #%, +ct. #$, #'''. == v. @agat, !" #$88&), @ay $#, &888.

)lea of +uilty; plea of guilty must be an unconditional == v. !aballo, admission of guilt. *t must be of such nature as to !" #$$''$, foreclose the defendant:s right to defend himself from said +ct. #$, #'''. charge, thus leaving the court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law. Ob$e!tions before )lea; ny objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acBuisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Suspension of Arraignment; Dhen the accused appears to be suffering from an 5nsound @ental Condition. *t lies w9in the discretion of the trial court. ,he test is whether the accused, even w9 the assistance of counsel, would have a fair trial. ,his is @present insanityA w9c9 refers to the competency to stand trial and relates to the appropriateness of conducting the criminal proceeding in light of the defendant:s present capacity to participate meaningfully and effectively therein. ,he test is whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position, understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate, communicate w9, and assist his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed. *n this case, by depriving the appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived him of a fair trial and violated the basic reBmts of due process. ,he proceedings before the said court must be nullified. Same; =rocedurally speaCing, after the filing of the information, the court is in complete control of the case and any disposition therein is subject to it .+5(4 4*.C"E,*+(. ,he decision to suspend arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal w9 the .ec. of Justice is an exercise of such discretion. == v. Legaspi, !" ##738&, pril &7, &888. == v. Estrada, !" #$8%37, June #', &888.

.olar ,eam Entertainment v. -ow, !" #%83)$, ug. &&, &888.

)&(A O, +UI&T TO CA)ITA& O,,(NS(; Re8uirements; ,he trial court is enjoined: ;#< to conduct a .E "C-*(! *(F5*"6 into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the conseBuences of the pleaA ;&< to reBuire the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpabilityA and ;$< to asC the accused if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires. ,he rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. @oreover, the reBuirement of taCing further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea. Same; Same; ,hree things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered by the accused: H#I conduct a .E "C-*(! *(F5*"6 into the J+L5(, "*(E.. and G5LL C+@="E-E(.*+( of the conseBuences of his pleaA H&I reBuire the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability through the reBuisite Buantum of evidenceA and H$I asC the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. .aid procedure is @ (4 ,+"6 and any judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of discretion. lthough there is no definite rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper 0searching inBuiry2, it would be well fort he trial court, for instance, to reBuire the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him, or by maCing him re1 enact the manner in w9c he perpetrated the crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court the missing details of significance in order to determine, once and for all, his liability for the crime. Same; Same; S(ARC%IN+ INCUIR/A ,he searching inBuiry must determine whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and informed judgment. -ence, it must focus on ;#< the voluntariness of the plea, and ;&< the full comprehension of the conseBuences of the plea. lthough there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a Nsearching inBuiry,N we have held that the following guidelines should be observed: #. scertain from the accused himself ;a< how he was brought into the custody of the lawA ;b< whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigationsA and ;c< under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. ,his is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent Buarters or simply because of the judgeKs intimidating robes. &. sC the defense counsel a series of Buestions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and conseBuences of a plea of guilty. $. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio1economic status, and educational bacCground, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of

== v. @agat, !" #$88&), @ay $#, &888A == v. =astor, !" #%8&83, @arch #&, &88&.

== v. ,emplo, !" #$$$/)', 4ec. #, &888A == v. -ermoso, !" #$8/'8, +ct. #3, &888.

== v. =astor, !" #%8&83, @arch #&, &88&.

guilty. %. *nform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Gor not infreBuently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. *t is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaCen impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment. /. *nBuire if the accused Cnows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Gailure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process. ). ll Buestions posed to the accused should be in a language Cnown and understood by the latter. 7. ,he trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. ,he accused must be reBuired to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details. ,he second reBuirement prescribes that the trial court must order the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused1appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Same; Same; Same; ,here is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper 0searching inBuiry2. Same; Same; Same; Dhere the trial court inadeBuately discharged the duty of conducting a searching inBuiry is null and void. Same; Same; Same; ,he searching inBuiry, which must be recorded, reBuires the court to maCe it indubitably certain that the accused is fully apprised of the conseBuences of his plea. ,he court must let the accused reali>e that a plea of guilty will not, particularly in reference to " 7)/', affect or reduce the death penalty as he may otherwise perceive and so come to believe. n accused, not infreBuently, would plead guilty in the hope or expectation of a lenient treatment or of a lighter penalty, a situation that should compel the judge to maCe sure that the accused does not labor under these false impressions. ,he bottomline rule is that the plea of guilty must be predicated on a free and informed judgment and conviction must not be based on an improvident plea or incriminatory admissions of the accused during arraignment. Dhere the trial court has inadeBuately discharged its duty in this regard, a plea of guilty to a capital offense can be rightly discarded and held legally inconseBuential. )lea on Non'Capital Offenses; plea of guilty not merely joins the issues of the complaint or information, but amounts to an admission of guilt and of the material facts alleged in the complaint or information and in this sense taCes the place of the trial itself. .uch plea removes the necessity of presenting further evidence and for all intents == v. ?ello, !" #$8%##1 #%, +ct. #$, #'''. == v. !aballo, !" #$$''$, +ct. #$, #'''. == v. "odrigue>, !" #$$'3%, Jan. $8, &88&.

== v. Glores, !" #$7%'#, (ov. &$, &888.

and purposes the case is deemed tried on its merits and submitted for decision. Dhen the accused pleads guilty to a non1capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed. Dhile the present "ules of Court maCes it @ (4 ,+"6 for the court, when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, to taCe additional evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime after the entry of the plea of guilty, that is not so in non1capital offenses. . *n the latter, the reception of evidence is 4*.C"E,*+( "6 w9 the court. Conditional )lea of +uilty; +ne that is entered by the == accused on the condition that a certain penalty be @adraga. imposed upon him, is eBuivalent to a plea of not guilty .upra. reBuiring a full1blown trial before judgment may be rendered. v.

)&(A .AR+AININ+; *n this case, the accused pleaded == v. @agat, guilty to the offense charged and only bargained for a !" #$88&), lesser penalty. ,he order of the trial court convicting said @ay $#, &888. accused on his plea of guilt is void a+ initio. ,he only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the "ules is when an accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense. ?ill of =articulars *t is the remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the offense w9 sufficient definiteness. ,he failure to move for specifications or the Buashal of information on any grounds provided for in the "ules of Court deprives the accused of the right to object to evidence w9c would be lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general terms but w9c sufficiently charges the accused w9 a definite crime. t any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to Buash the information on any of the grounds for a motion to Buash. Gailure to assert such grounds before the accused pleads to the information, either because he failed to file a motion to Buash or failed to alleged such grounds in his motion, shall be deemed a D *JE" thereof, EPCE=, the ff.: HiI no offense is charge in the informationA HiiI the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense chargedA HiiiI the offense or penalty therefore has been extinguishedA and HivI the accused would be twice put in jeopardy. ,he special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to Buash an information. == v. @arBue>, !" #$7%831#8, 4ec. 3, &888.

@otion to Fuash

"aro v. .andiganbaya n, !" #83%$#, July #%, &888.

,rial

Deemed Trial in Absentia; ,he trial court did not render == v. Listerio, judgment against the accused, notwithstanding that he !" #&&8'', was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to both charges. July /, &888. 5nder the circumstances, he should be deemed to have been tried in a+sentia and, considering the evidence presented by the prosecution against him, conviction of the crime charge is evident. TRIA& IN A#SEN$IA; *t cannot apply to the accused who have not been "" *!(E4. == v. ,aliman, !" #8'#%$, +ct. ##, &888. == v. @ayor =eralta, Ex1 !"

DISC%AR+( O, ACCUS(D TO .( A STAT( :ITN(SS; ,he discharge of an accused in order that he may be utili>ed as a state witness is expressly left to the sound

discretion of the court. Same; "ule ##', .ec. #7 of the "ules of Court expressly reBuires the presentation of evidence in support of the prosecution:s prayer for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness. Same; *f the discharged witness should lacC some of the Bualifications enumerated by .ec. ', "ule ##' of the "ules of Court, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, be discarded or disregarded. .tated differently, the improper discharge of an accused will not render inadmissible his testimony nor detract from his competency as a witness. +nce the discharge is ordered, any future development showing that any, some, or all, of the five conditions have not been actually fulfilled, may not affect the legal conseBuences of the discharge, and the admissibility and credibility of his testimony if otherwise admissible and credible. D(*URR(R TO (6ID(NC(; (ffe!t of its +rant; ,he grant of demurrer to evidence by the ",C constitute a valid acBuittal and any further prosecution of petitioners on the same charge would expose them to being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable. Same; Denial of; Grom a denial of demurrer to evidence, appeal is the proper remedy, not certiorari, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. ConseBuently, if the denial of the demurrer to evidence is attended by grave abuse of discretion, the denial may be assailed through a petition for certiorari. *n the instant case, there is no sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilt against the petitioners. ll documentary evidence submitted by the private complainant were uncertified photocopies, the signatures on w9c were either unidentified or unauthenticated. ,he due execution not having been proved, and since they were mere photocopies, the loss of the originals of w9c was not previously established, the same are clearly inadmissible in evidence. ,he prosecution:s evidence is grossly and patently insufficient to support a finding of guilt. Dithal, it was grave abuse of discretion fort he @,C to consider that there was a prima facie case against petitioners. Judgment )romulgation of Judgment in Absentia; !E(E" L "5LE: ,he judgment in a criminal case must be promulgated in the presence of the accused. Except where it is for a light offense, in w9c case it may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative, and except where the judgment is for acBuittal, in w9c case the presence of the accused is not necessary. judgment of conviction cannot be executed and the sentence meted to the accused cannot be served w9o his presence. EPCE=,*+(: "egardless of the gravity of the offense, promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed, subject to the ff. reBuisites: H#I the judgment be recorded in the criminal docCetA and H&I a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel. ll means of notification must be done to let the absent accused Cnow

#&#'7#, +ct. #), &888. @erciales v. C , !" #&%#7#, @arch #3, &88&. == v. ?ariBuit, !" #&&7$$, +ct. &, &888.

+ng v. =eople, !" #%8'8%, +ct. '. &888.

+ng v. =eople, !" #%8'8%, +ct. '. &888.

=ascua v. C , !" #%8&%$, 4ec. #%, &888.

of the judgment of the court. *n this case, the solemn and operative act of recording was not done. -ence, even if the second notification was satisfied, the promulgation of judgment in a+sentia was invalid. .uch that the period of appeal did not begin to run. ,he subseBuent service of the copy of the judgment upon the petitioner does not in any way cure the invalid promulgation of judgment. Even though said decision was recorded in the criminal docCet later, such piecemeal compliance w9 the "ules will not validate the initial promulgation that was invalid at the time it was made. ,he reBuirements for a valid promulgation of judgment in a+sentia must concur. (ew ,rial ,he Court has occasionally relaxed the strict application of brajano v. the rule that the acts of counsel bind the client in criminal C , !" cases, where the defendants, having otherwise a good #&8737, +ct. case, were able to satisfy the Court that acBuittal would in #$, &888. all probability have followed the introduction of certain testimonies, w9c were not submitted at the trial under improper or injudicious advice of incompetent counsel. Dhere there are very exceptional circumstances, a new trial may be granted. Same; new trial is justifiably denied where only impeaching evidence is sought to be introduced. ,he failure of the defense to present a witness by reason of the alleged inexperience of his lawyer is not a sufficient ground for a new trial. ppeal Re#ie7 of t e Case ; ,hrows the whole case open for review an dit becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whehter it is made the subject of an assignment of error or not. == v. Jillanueva, !" #$/$$8, ug. $#, &888. == v. Lab1eo, !" #$$%$3, Jan. #), &88&A == v. .alva, !" #$&$/#, Jan. #8, &88&. == v. =acaVa, !" '7%7&17$, (ov. &8, &888A == v. ?altar, Jr., !" #&/$8), 4ec. ##, &888. .alvatierra v. C , !" ##/''3, June #), &888. == v. =ajo, !" #$/#8'1 #$, 4ec. #3, &888.

Appeal of Se#eral A!!used; n appeal taCen by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, EPCE=, insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

Same; Dhen taCen by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal EPCE=, insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is G J+" ?LE and ==L*C ?LE to the latter. Appeal to CA and SC; 5nder .ec. # ;b<, "ule #&& of the "ules on Criminal =rocedure, the appeal of a judgment rendered by the ",C in its original jurisdiction sentencing the accused to other than life imprisonment or death must be taCen to the C by the filing of a notice of appeal w9 the court w9c rendered the judgment or order appealed from, and by serving a copy thereof to the adverse party. ,he appeal to the .C in cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for w9c the penalty of death or life imprisonment is imposed shall be by filing a notice of appeal and serve a copy thereof as in the case of the C . *t is only incases where the accused is sentenced to death when the appeal of the decision to the .C is automatic.

Appeal from Denial of Demurrer to (#iden!e; Dhen an adverse interlocutory order is rendered as in demurrer to evidence, the remedy is not to resort to certiorari or prohibition but to continue w9 the case in due course and when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to taCe appeal in the manner authori>ed by law. :ai#er on Double Jeopardy; Dhen the accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, w9c is then called to render judgment as the law and justice dictates. NOTIC( O, A))(A&; it is only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death that the trial court must forward the records of the case to the .C for automatic review. *n +therwise, notice of appeal is necessary in order that the decision is tolled from becoming final and unappealable.. (s!ape from )rison or !onfinement< Jumping of .ail< or ,leeing to a ,oreign Country; *t results in the outright dismissal of his appeal. ?y such acts, appellant loses his standing in court.

"esoso v. .andiganbaya n, !" #&%#%8, (ov. &/, #'''. == v. "ondero, !" #&/)37, 4ec. ', #'''A == v. lacheca, !" '%%$&, +ct. #&, #'''. !arcia v. =eople, !" #8)/$#, (ov. #3, #'''.

== v. 4el "osario, !" #87&'71'3, 4ec. #', &888A == v. @atignas, !" #&)#%), @arch #&, &88&. == v. 4el "osario, !" #87&'71'3, 4ec. #', &888.

Appellate Jurisdi!tion; *n this case, the Court deemed it proper for the C to have continued to exercise jurisdiction over their appeals even if the appellants filed faCe bail bonds but was only discovered when the C had already affirmed, reversed or modified their sentences. *t would resort to absurdity if the appellants would enjoy the lower sentences imposed by the trial court because of the faCe bail bond. nd appellants having mocCed and trumped the judicial process by filing faCe bail bonds, they must be considered to have waived or forfeited their right to further review of the decisions of the trial court and the C , respectively. .earch Darrant Sear! :arrant issued by one !ourt and eard by anot er; Dhen a search warrant is issued by one court but the criminal case by virtue of the warrant is raffled off to a branch of the court other than the one w9c issued the warrant, all incidents relating to the validity of the warrant should be consolidated w9 the branch trying the criminal case.

!araygay v. =eople, !" #$//8$, July ), &888.

"5LE. +G EJ*4E(CE : Dhat (eed (ot be =roved

JUDICIA& NOTIC(; -earing is reBd. for matters not falling under mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, such as age of the victim, despite absence of objection of defense counsel. !enerally, the age of the victim may be proven by his birth certificateA or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence, sufficient for the purpose.

== v. ,undag, !" #$/)'/1 '), +ct. #&, &888.

"ules of dmissibi1 lity

Ob$e!t (#iden!e; ) ysi!al (#iden!e; "evolver and its ,angan v. C , @echanism. *t belies petitioner:s version of the incident as !" #8/3$8, an accidental shooting. revolver is not prone to Jan. #/, &88&. accidental firing. *t will not fire unless uncocCed, then considerable pressure on the trigger to fire the revolver. =hysical evidence is a mute but eloBuent manifestation of truth. "egarded as evidence of the highest order. Do!umentary (#iden!e; .(ST (6ID(NC( RU&(; ,he == v. ?ago, rule cannot be invoCe unless the content of a writing is the !" #&&&'8, subject of judicial inBuiry, in w9c case, the best evidence is pril ), &888. the original writing itself. ,he rule pertains to the admissibility of secondary evidence to prove the contents of a document. Same; Same; NotariEed Do!uments; Except Last Dill and ,estaments, notari>ed documents are public documents and are evidence of facts that gave rise to their execution and of their date. .iguan v. Lim, !" #$%)3/, (ov. #', #'''. v.

Same; Same; @ere preponderance of evidence is not -emedes sufficient to overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the C , #'''. effect that the grantor executed a certain document and acCnowledged the fact of its exiecution before him. ,o accomplish this result, the evidence must be so clear, strong, and convincing as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the certificate, and when the evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld. Same; Same; Dhile only photocopies of the documents are submitted to the court, the record shows that the originals of these documents were presented during the trial. -ence, it is not accurate to say that the original exhibits were not presented before the trial court.

D1"ed Construction and 4ev. Corp v. C , !" #&&)%3, ug. #7, &888.

Same; Same; *n the absence of evidence to prove that the Concepcion v. original copies of the document were lost or destroyed or tty. Gandino, cannot be otherwise produces, photocopies of said dm. Case document are inadmissible. (o. $)77, June &#, &888. Same; Same; Re8uisites for Se!ondary (#iden!e to be Admissible; ?efore a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of the deed, the offeror is mandated to prove the following: ;#< the execution and existence of the originalA ;&< the loss and destruction of the original or its non1 production in courtA and ;$< unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror.N ;Grancisco, "ules of Court, =art *, Jolume J**, #''7 ed. at page #/%< Dhere there are two or more originals, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced before secondary evidence can be given of any one. 5nder these circumstances, the rule is that no secondary evidence of the contents of either is admissible until it is shown that originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one.N ;@oran, Comments on the "ules of Court, Jolume J, #'78 ed. at pages '81'#< .antos v. .antos, !" #$'/&%, +ct. #&, &888.

Testimonial (#iden!e; )ARO& (6ID(NC( RU&(; .ec.', "ule #$8 of the "evised "ules of Court expressly reBuires that for parol evidence to be admissible to vary the terms of the written agreement, the mistaCe or imperfection thereof or its failure to express the true agreement of the parties should be put in issue by the pleadings. Same; :ITN(SS; ,hat a witness is not listed as a prosecution witness in the information does not necessarily maCe him an 0eleventh hour witness.2 ,he list is not exclusive since it states 0and others2 were to be presented. @oreover, the prosecution has the prerogative to call witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information as, in any case, the defense still has the opportunity to cross examine. Same; Same; Dhere an ordinary witness cannot establish the value of jewelry and the trial court can only taCe judicial notice of the value of goods w9c is a matter of public Cnowledge or is capable of unBuestionable demonstration.

=ilipinas ?anC v. C , !" #%#8)8, .ept. &', &888.

== v. Candare, !" #&'/&3, June 3, &888.

== v. "ean>ares, !" #$8)/), June &', &888.

Same; Same; *ental Retardate as 7itness; (ot == v. Lubong, disBualified from testifying in court by reason of such !" #$&&'/, handicap alone. @ay $#, &888. Same; Same; Rape 6i!tim as :itness1 .heila testified == v. Jeloso, with candor and in a straightforward manner. -er narration !" #$8$$$, of the sexual assault is clear and consistent. ,here is no pril #&, iota of doubt that she was telling the truth. ,he alleged &888. inconsistencies in .heilaKs testimony are inconseBuential considering that they refer to trivial details which have nothing to do with the essential fact in the crime of rape which is carnal Cnowledge through force or intimidation. *ndeed, these minor inconsistencies are sometimes indicia of truth rather than badges of falsehood. Gor they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. Same; Same; Same; ge of victim of rape must be id. established by birth or baptismal certificate and not merely on the basis of the victim:s as well as her father:s testimony. Same; Same; Same; s a general rule, the Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court on matters relating to the victim:s credibility. Same; Same; Same; ,hat it tooC the complaint more than / years from the time the first rape was allegedly committed to report the incident to her mother and to the police M did not affect her credibility. .uch delay was explained in this case, where the complainant was below #& years old when she was raped for the first time by her own father. == v. "amos, !" #&8&38, pril #&, &888. == v. .antos, !" #$##8$ O #%$%7&, June &', &888.

Same; Same; C ild'#i!tim of rape3 as :itness; 4elay in == v. filing cases does not necessarily impair the credibility of "a>onable, the victim. ,here are circumstances that justifies the delay. !" #&383/1 37, pril #&, &888. Same; Same; C ild as a :itness; child, regardless of == v. @ucam,

age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive and, perceiving, can maCe Cnown his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts upon w9c he is examined.

!" #$7&7), July #$, &888A == v. Librando, !" #$&&/#, July ), &888. == v. =ajo, !" #$/#8'1 #$, 4ec. #3, &888. == v. Graga, !" #$%#$81 $$, pril #&, &888. == v. ?aring, !" #$7'$$, Jan. &3, &88&.

Same; Same; Same; ,he determination of the competency and credibility of a child to testify rest primarily w9 the judge who sees the witness, notices her manner, her apparent possession or lacC of intelligence, as well as her understanding of the obligation of an oath. Same; Same; Same; ,heir testimony is generally accorded full weight and credit.

Same; Same; Same; .ec. && of the "ule on Examination of a Child Ditness, C+""+?+" ,*+( shall not be reBuired of a testimony of a child. -is testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusions, or judgment subject to the standard proof reBuired in criminal and non1criminal cases. Same; Same; Illiterates; *t must be treated w9 the broadest understanding, w9o in any way sacrificing the Buest for truth. Same; Same; Same; *ntellectual weaCness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness, so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. Same; Same; Deaf'*ute; deaf1mute is not incompetent as a witness. ll persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can maCe Cnown their perception to others, may be witnesses. 4eaf1mutes are competent witnesses where they ;#< can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oathA ;&< can comprehend facts they are going to testify onA and ;$< can communicate their ideas through a Bualified interpreter.

== v. 4e la Cru>, !" ##3')7, July #%, &888. == v. ,relles, !" #$7)/', .ept. #', &888. == v. ,uangco, !" #$8$$#, (ov. &&, &888.

Same; Same; *entally ill; (otwithstanding her mental == v. ?aid, illness, complainant showed that she was Bualified to be a !" #&'))7, witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of July $#, &888. maCing Cnown her perceptions to others. #3 -er testimony indicates that she could understand Buestions particularly relating to the incident and could give responsive answers to them. Same; Same; .iased 7itness; witness is said to be -emedes biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is C , #'''. such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false. Same; Same; Same; witness is said to be biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false. v.

== v. 5lgasan, !" #$#3&%1&), July ##, &888.

Same; Same; Same; ,he fact that the doctor was hired by the family of the complainant to give expert testimony as a psychiatrist did not by that fact alone maCe her a biased witness.

== v. supra.

?aid,

Same; Same; Co'!onspirator; ,he general rule is that == v. Fuibido, the testimony of a co1conspirator is not sufficient for !" #$)##$, conviction unless supported by other evidence. ?y way of ug. &$, EPCE=,*+(, the testimony of a co1conspirator may, even &888. if uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is show to be sincere in itself, because it was given unhesitatingly and in straightforward manner, and is full of details w9c by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. Same; Same; Relations ip; ,he weight of the testimony of witness is not impaired by their relationship to the victim when there is no showing of improper motive on their part. == v. ?irayon, !" #$$737, (ov. &', &888A == v. 4e !u>man, !" #$738), 4ec. #%, &888. == v. @aramara, supraA == v. @anegdeg, supra A == v. pelado, supra.

Same; Same; Same; (othing in this jurisdiction disBualifies a person from testifying in a criminal case in w9c a relative is involved, if the former was really at the scene of the crime and witnessed the execution of the criminal act. ,he presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit, unless there is evidence to indicate that the witnesses were actuated by improper motive. @ere relationship of the witness to the victim does not necessarily impair credibility ;== v. 4ianos, !" ##'$##, +ct. 7, #''3<. Same; Same; Relati#e of t e 6i!tim as :itness1 5nless there is a showing of improper motive on the part of the witnesses for testifying against the accused, the fact that they are related to the victim does not render their clear and positive testimony less worthy of credit. +n the contrary, their natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating other persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the latter would thereby gain immunity. Same; Same; &a7 (nfor!ers as :itnesses; Credence is accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers. ,he law grants them the presumption of regularly performing their duty in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. Same; Same; &one :itness; ,he testimony of a single witness positively identifying the accused as the one who committed the crime, when given in a straightforward and clear1cut manner is sufficient to sustain the conviction by the trial court.

== v. Glora, !" #&/'8', June &$, &888.

== v. Clemente, !" ##&$78, +ct. #$, #'''. == v. de Labajan, !" #&'')31)', +ct. &7, #'''A == v. Caratay, supraA == v. Jergel, supraA == v. ,abion, supraA == v. Jillablanca, supra.

Same; Same; Same; ,estimony of a lone witness was found credible, positive and sufficient to convict. Gor the truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the Buality of their testimony.

== v. Tinampan, !" #&)73#, .ept. #$, &888A == v. @atibag, !" ##8/#/, July #3, &888A == v. @acaliag, ug. ', &888A == v. ?angcado, !" #$&$$8, (ov. &3, &888 .ebastian, .r. v. !architorena, !" ##%8&3, +ct. #3, &888.

Same; T%( %(ARSA/ RU&(; witness can testify only on those w9c he Cnows of his personal Cnowledge, that is, w9c are derived from his own perceptions. Dhile the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence.A it is otherwise if the purpose of placing said statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the same was made or the tenor thereof. Same; Same; witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. .uch testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. .uch is the hearsay rule w9c applies not only to oral testimony or statements but also to written evidence as well.

Country ?anCers *nsurance v. Lianga ?ay and Community @ulti1=urpose Coop., !" #$)'#%, Jan. &/, &88&. id.

Same; Same; ,he sworn statements of Jose and Ernesto are inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay, inasmuch as they did not taCe the witness stand and could not therefore be C"+..1EP @*(E4. SameA Same; -earsay evidence, whether objected to or not, possess no probative value.

== v. Jalde>, !" #&77/$, 4ec. ##, &888. == v. @aramara, !" ##8''%, +ct. &&, #'''A == v. =eVa, !" Geb. #$, &88&.

Same; ("!eptions to t e %earsay Rule; D/IN+ D(C&ARATION; Gor a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, these reBuisites must concur: ;#< that death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that factA ;&< that the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such deathA ;$< that the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify toA ;%< that the declarant thereafter diesA and ;/< that the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant:s death is the subject of inBuiry. Same; Same; Same; ,he significance of a victimKs reali>ation or consciousness that he was on the brinC of death cannot be gainsaid. .uch ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order because at the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled. ,he utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be considered the incident speaCing through the victim. *t is entitled to the highest credence.

== v. =eVa, !" Geb. #$, &88&.

Same; Same; Same; ,here is no rule that a person who hears something cannot testify on what she heard. dying declaration need not be particularly directed only to the person inBuiring from the declarant. nyone who has Cnowledge of the fact of what the declarant said, whether it was directed to him or not, or whether he had made inBuiries from the declarant or not, can testify thereto. Same; Same; Same; Dell1settled is the rule that delay in reporting the ante mortem declaration does not automatically render the testimony doubtful. Gailure to reveal or describe the assailantKs identity at once does not necessarily affect, much less impair, the credibility of said witness. *t is eBually established that an ante1mortem statement or a dying declaration is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to the utmost credence because no person who Cnows of his impending death would maCe a careless and false accusation. t the brinC of death, all thoughts of concocting lies are banished. Same; Same; Same; Dhere evidence of the prosecution is only the dying declaration of the victim but is in conflict w9 physical evidence of wound testified to by an expert witness. 4ying declaration was not establish because medical findings of 4r. ranas and his expert testimony on the effect of the nature of the necC injuries of the victim on the latterKs ability or inability to speaC should prevail over the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution witness, "omel !aon. =hysical evidence is a mute but eloBuent manifestation of truth, and it ranCs higher in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. ,he prosecutionKs evidence must rise and fall on its own weight. lthough the testimony of the prosecution witness was straightforward, and he has no ill motive against the appellant, it cannot prevail vis1Y1vis the physical evidence on hand. ,he prosecution has not adeBuately discharged the burden of proof reBuired for the conviction of the appellant.

== v. Jalde>, !" #&77/$, 4ec. ##, &888.

== v. Corte>ano, !" #%87$&, Jan. &', &88&.

Same; Same; R(S +(STA(; declaration is deemed as == v. part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as @anegdeg, an exception to the hearsay rule when the following #'''. reBuisites concur: ;#< the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrenceA ;&< the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or deviseA and ;$< the statements must concern the occurrence in Buestion and its immediately attending circumstances. ,he declaration made by the victim immediately after he was stabbed that NHtIhe companion of @ang .using was the one who stabbed me and his name is ntonio @anegdegN is admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after a startling incident and the victim had no opportunity to contrive. Same; Same; Same; ,he rule of res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not testify provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies with the following reBuisites: ;#< that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrenceA ;&< the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehoodA and ;$< that the statements must concern the occurrence in Buestion and its immediate attending circumstances Same; Same; Dying De!laration and )art of t e Res == v. +posculo, !" #&%/7&, (ov. &8, &888.

==

v.

%estae; ,he same declaration may even be considered Corte>ano, as part of the res )estae. "odericCKs declaration was !" #%87$&, made spontaneously after a startling occurrenceA his Jan. &', &88&. statements were made before he had time to contrive or deviseA and his statement concerned his attacCer and the immediately attending circumstances of the attacC. ,hus, the statements of "odericC, uttered shortly after he was shot and hours before his death identifying the accused1 appellant as the gunman Bualifies both as a dying declaration and as part of the res )estae. Same; Same; IND()(ND(NT R(&(6ANT STAT(*(NT; (o error committed by the trial court in admitting the respective testimonies of 4orothy and Eit that @aritess told them that accused1appellant had fired a warning shot in the early morning of July 3, #''/, since the same were offered not to establish the truth of @aritess: statement, but +(L6 ,+ .-+D ,- , @ "*,E.. 5,,E"E4 ,-E . @E. Same; Same; D(C&ARATION A+AINST INT(R(ST; *t is not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. .uch declarant should be confronted w9 the statement against interest as a prior inconsistent statement. Same; Same; )(DI+R((. ,he reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of its members may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. ,he word NpedigreeN includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, and the dates when, the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. -ence, the testimonies of the victim and her mother are sufficient to prove the victimKs age Same; Same; (NTRI(S IN O,,ICIA& R(CORD; ,o be admissible in evidence, however, three ;$< reBuisites must concur, to wit: ;a< that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do soA ;b< that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by lawA and ;c< that the public officer or other person had .5GG*C*E(, E(+DLE4!E of the facts by him stated, which must have been acBuired by him personally or through official information. ,he third reBuisite was not met in this case since no investigation, independent of the statements gathered from Jose Lomocso, was conducted by =fc. rturo J. Juarbal. *n fact, as the petitioner itself pointed out, citing the testimony of =fc. rturo Juarbal, the latterKs .pot "eport Nwas based on the personal Cnowledge of the caretaCer Jose Lomocso who witnessed every single incident surrounding the facts and circumstances of the case.N ,his argument undeniably weaCens the petitionerKs defense, for the .pot "eport of =fc. rturo Juarbal relative to the statement of Jose Lomocso to the effect that (= rebels allegedly set fire to the respondentKs building is inadmissible in evidence, for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in the said report, for being hearsay. == v. (orrudin. !" #&'8/$, Jan. &/, &88&.

CeBuena v. ?olante, !" #$7'%%, pril ), &888. == v. !opio, !" #$$'&/, (ov. &', &888.

Country ?anCers *nsurance Corp. v. Lianga ?ay and Community@ ulti1=urpose Coop., !" #$)'#%, Jan. &/, &88&.

Same; Same; Same; Entries in a police blotter are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries and should not be given undue significance or probative value for they are usually incomplete and inaccurate.

== v. @anegdeg, !" ##/%78, +ct. #$, #'''.

Same; Same; Same; Either the testimony of a == v. La>aro, representative of, or a certification from, the =(= Girearms !" ##&8'8, and Explosive +ffice attesting that a person is not a +ct. &), #'''. licensee of any firearm suffices to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearms. .aid certification is competent and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. Same; Same; (9TRAJUDICIA& CON,(SSION; .tatement to the witness w9c constitute an Extrajudicial dmission of the accused dmissions and Confes1 sions )rin!iple; Gor as long as constitutional safeguards are adeBuately complied with, a confession constitutes evidence of the highest order for it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will deliberately and Cnowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. (9TRAJUDICIA& CON,(SSION; 4irect evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. ,he rules on evidence and case law sustain the conviction of the accused through circumstantial evidence when the following reBuisites concur: ;#< there must be more than one circumstanceA ;&< the facts from which the inferences are derived are provenA and ;$< the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. Same; 5nder "ule #$$, .ection $ of the "ules of Court, an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be a sufficient ground for conviction, 5(LE.. corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. s defined, it means the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, means a crime has actually been committed. pplied to a particular offense, it is the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. Same; confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four fundamental reBuirements: ;#< it must be voluntaryA ;&< it must be made w9 the assistance of competent and independent counselA ;$< it must be expressA and ;%< it must be in writing. *n providing that during the taCing of an extrajudicial confession the accused:s parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by the accused may be present. " 7%$3 does not propose that they appear in the alternative or as a substitute for counsel w9o any condition. *t is explicitly stated therein that before the abovementioned persons can appear, two conditions must be met: ;#< counsel of the accused must be absentA and ;&< a valid waiver must be executed. == v. @ayorga, !" #$/%8/, (ov. &', &888. == v. =rio, !" ##7&8&, Geb. #$, &88&.

== v. ,aboga, !" #%%83)1 37, Geb. ), &88&.

=eople v. "obles, $$$ .C" #87, ##':H&888I, citing =eople v. @antung, supra. == v. +rdoVo, !" #$&#/%, June &', &888.

Same; Re8uisite of 6oluntariness; confession is =eople ="E.5@E4 to be voluntary until the contrary is proved Buino, and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his .C" confession is involuntary and untrue. ;#'''<.

v. $#8 %$7

Same; Same; ,he voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details U w9c could be supplied only by the accused U reflecting spontaneity and coherence w9c, psychologically, cannot be associated w9 a mind to which violence and torture have been applied, it may be considered voluntary.

.antos v. .andiganbaya n, $%7 .C" $3), %#%1%#/ H&888I, citing == v. Jillanueva, &)) .C" $/), $)& H#''7I. == v. =orio, !" ##7&8&, Geb. #$, &88&.

Same; Re8uisite of Assistan!e of Competent and Independent Counsel; ,he rights to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel may be D *JE4 by the accused provided that the constitutional reBuirements are complied with. *t must appear clearly that the accused was beforehand accorded his right to be informed of such rights. *n addition, the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. Same; Same; Dhen assisted by the municipal @ayor ;who cannot be considered an independent counsel< is inadmissible. Even assuming that the right to counsel was orally waived during custodial investigation, still the defect is not cured, as the Constitution reBuires that the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. Same; Re8uisite of Confession is ("pli!it and Categori!al; confession is an acCnowledgment in express words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the main fact charged, or some essential parts thereof. +wing to its very definition, there is no such thing as an implied confession. *t is always 4*"EC, (4 =+.*,*JE CE(+DLE4!@E(, +G !5*L,. Same; T e Re8uisite of Confession is in :riting; ppellantKs 0.inumpaang .alaysay2 is not only in writing, it also written in the language which appellant speaCs and understands.

== v. ,aliman, !" #8'#%$, +ct. ##, &888.

== v. =orio, !" ##7&8&, Geb. #$, &88&.

id.

Same; *n a criminal prosecution, in order to warrant a id. conviction, the .tate is reBuired to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. n extra judicial confession made by an accused is a sufficient ground for conviction if corroborated by the evidence of the corpus delicti. ,he existence of the corpus delicti and the legality of appellantKs extra1judicial confession having been duly proven by the .tate, appellantKs conviction is, therefore, in order. ,o reiterate, a confession constitutes evidence of the highest order as long as constitutional safeguards are adeBuately complied with, as in this case. Taped Inter#ie7; *t is deemed admissible in evidence under the ff. circumstances: ;#< it was the original copy of the taped interviewA ;&< it was not alteredA ;$< the voices therein were the voices of the accusedA and ;%< the defense never submitted anything to the contrary. Same; De do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the Cnowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. *ndeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniBues and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to == v. +rdono, !" #$&#/%, June &', &888. =eople v. Endino, !" #$$8&), Geb. &8, &88#.

maCe sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. Confession +i#en to a .arangay Captain; Dhere the accused was already singled out as the author of the crime, comes w9in the purview of custodial investigation. @ade w9o the assistance of counsel, said confession is inadmissible in evidence. -owever, as the accused did not object promptly when the ?arangay captain was presented as a witness for the prosecution or when specific Buestions were asCed regarding the confession, the accused is deemed to have D *JE4 his right to object to the inadmissibility of such testimony. Confession +i#en to a Radio Announ!er; 4uring the inBuest3 a written extra1judicial confession for ,aboga was made. -owever, ,aboga refused to sign the confession upon the advice of his lawyer. ,he following day, pril &, #''3, @r. @ario Contaoi, a radio announcer of 4T(., went to the @agsingal @unicipal =olice .tation to interview the suspect, Edralin ,aboga. gain, ,aboga admitted Cilling the deceased and setting her and her house on fire. ,he Court finds the admission to be valid as there is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused1appellant. .uch confession did not form part of custodial investigation. *t was not given to police officers but to a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy. ,he record even discloses that accused1appellant admitted to the ?arangay Captain that he clubbed and stabbed the victim even before the police started investigating him at the police station. ?esides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily asCed help from the newsman. Same; .tatements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. ?y analogy, statements made by herein accused to a radio announcer should be held admissible. ,he interview was not in the nature of an investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer to Buestions asCed by the radio reporter, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Dhen the accused talCed to the radio announcer, they did not talC to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was notA hence, their uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional rights. .ec. #& ;#< and ;$<, rt. *** of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions of the two ;&< accused to the radio announcer. Dhat the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. Confession +i#en to a )ri#ate )erson; ,he "ules state that 0the declaration of an accused acCnowledging his guilt of the offense charge, or any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.2 *n this case, ?atocan:s confession to "osas, who is not a police officer, is admissible in evidence. ?atocan:s verbal declarations are not covered by .ec. #& ;#< and ;$< of rt. *** of the Constitution, because they were not extracted while he was under custodial investigation. &ie Dete!tor Test; ,he procedure of ascertaining the truth by means of a lie detector test has never been accepted in == v. -ermoso, !" #$8/'8, +ct. #3, &888.

== v. ,aboga, !" #%%83)1 37, Geb. ), &88&.

== v. +rdono, !" #$&#/%, June &', &888.

== v. .uela, !" #$$/781 7#, Jan. #/, &88&.

== v. "ean>ares,

our jurisdictionA thus, any findings based thereon cannot be considered conclusive. ("tra$udi!ial Confession #s1 Judi!ial Confession; it may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co1accused as they are deprived of the right to cross1examine him. Judicial Confession is admissible against the declarant:s co1accused since the latter are afforded the opportunity to cross1examine the former. @oreover, when several accused are tried together fort he same offense, the testimony of an accused implicating his co1accused is competent evidence against the latter. I*)&I(D AD*ISSION; plea for forgiveness is analogous to an offer to compromiseA w9c may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt in a case for rape. Offer of Compromise; *t may be considered as an implied admission under .ec. &7, "ule #$8 when made by the accused itself. *n this case, even if the purpose of the visit by the relatives of the accused1appellants were to negotiate a settlement, accused1appellants had nothing to do w9 it. )lea for ,orgi#eness; *t may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise, w9c may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt, pursuant to .ec. &7, "ule #$8 of the "ules of Court. ?urden of =roof and =resump1 tions

!" #$8)/), June &', &888. == v. -ermoso, !" #$8/'8, +ct. #3, &888.

== v. ,abanggay, !" #$8/8%, June &', &888. == v. ?angcado, !" #$&$$8, (ov. &3, &888. == v. 6parraguire, !" #&%$'#, July /, &888.

Disputable )resumption; SU))R(SS(D (6ID(NC(; it -emedes v. is a legal presumption that evidence willfully suppressed C , supra. would be adverse if produced. Gailure of private respondents to refute the due execution of the deed of conveyance by maCing a comparison w9 Justa:s thumbmarC necessarily leads one to conclude that she did in fact affix her thumbmarC upon the deed of donation in favor of her stepdaughter. Same; Same; .ec. $ ;e<, "ule #$# of the "ules of Court on suppression of evidence is only a disputable presumption and does not apply in the present case as the evidence allegedly omitted is accessible9available to the defense. Same; Same; Dhen the evidence tends to prove a material fact w9c imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence w9c from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on facts, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice and support the case of his adversary. Same; )R(SU*)TION O, R(+U&ARIT/ O, A )U.&IC DOCU*(NT; ?eing a notari>ed document, the 04eed of .ale w9 ssumption of @ortgage2 has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderantA otherwise the document should be upheld. Same; Same; Dhile it is true that official documents liCe == v. "ean>ares, !" #$8)/), June &', &888. @etrobanC v. C , !" #&&3'', June 3, &888.

?ernardo v. C , !" #877'#, @ay #&, &888.

?abiera

v.

petitioner:s birth certificate enjoy the presumption of Catotal, !" regularity, the specific facts attendant to this case, as well #$3%'$, June as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, #/, &888. sufficiently negate such presumption. Same; )resumptions of Regularity in t e )erfornman!e of Offi!ial Duty; ,he presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. .urden of )roof; ,he correct *4E(,*G*C ,*+( of the author of a crime and the C,5 L*,6 +G *,. C+@@*..*+( must be proved by the .tate beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its own evidence and w9o solace from the weaCness of the defense. ; Corpus 6elicti "ule<. C&RP'S DELIC$I; *ts two elements are: ;#< that a certain result has been provedA ;&< that some person is criminally responsible for the act. Corpus delicti need not be ascertain beyond reasonable doubt, unliCe the very fact of commission of the crime and its author. =roducing the body, as well as proving its disposal, is not necessary for a murder or homicide conviction. *t is enough to show that a person was Cilled w9o justification. == v. ,an, !" #$$88#, 4ec. #%, &888. == v. rapoC, !" #$%'7%, 4ec. 3, &888.

== @arcelino, supra.

v.

)rose!ution; )resentation of :itness; *t is the == v. "onato, prosecution w9c determines who among the witnesses to a !" #&%&'3, crime should testify in court. *t is definitely not for the +ct. ##, #'''. courts, much less the defense to dictate what evidence to present or who should taCe the witness stand. =resenta1 tion of Evidence *odes of Dis!o#ery; D()OSITIONS; ,he general rule (orthwest on examination of witnesses under "ule #$& of the "ules irlines v. of Court reBuires that said examination be done in court Cru>, !" following the order set therein. #$7#$), (ov. $, #'''. Aut enti!ation and )roof of Do!uments; ANCI(NT CeBuena DOCU*(NTSA n ancient document is one that is ;#< ?olante, more than $8 years old, ;&< found in the proper custody, &888. and ;$< unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. *t must on its face appear to be genuine. (ot all notari>ed documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. ,hus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. Gurthermore, the affidavit in Buestion does not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred from .inforoso @endo>a to @argarito @endo>a. ?y itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acBuiring ownership. v.

Same; Same; 73critura de Compra y 8enta is admissible Lubos v. even if not translated from its .panish text because it was !alupo, !" (+, +?JEC,E4 ,+ and *. ( (C*E(, 4+C5@E(,. #$'#$), Jan. #), &88&. ("amination of :itness; I*)(AC%*(NT O, AD6(RS( )ART/BS :ITN(SS; =revious extrajudicial statements cannot be employed to impeach the credibility of a witness unless his attention is first directed to the discrepancies, and he must then be given the opportunity to explain them. *t is only when the witness cannot give a reasonable explanation that he shall be deemed == v. Corte>ano, !" #%87$&, Jan. &', &88&.

impeached. O,,(R AND O.J(CTION; n allegation that does not == v. rillas, merit any credence need not be rebutted. !" #$8/'$, June #', &888. Same; Ob$e!tion to (#iden!e; 5nder .ec. $), "ule #$& of the "ules of Court, objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. *n this case, the photocopy of the birth certificate was formally offered in evidence and marCed to prove the fact of birth of the victim, and the fact that the victim was below #& years old when she was ravished. ,he defense objected to the purpose for w9c the said evidence was being offered, but did not object to the presentation of the photocopied burth certificate. -aving failed to raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence, the same became primary evidence, ands was deemed admitted and binding on the other party. Same; Same; +bjections to evidence must be as soon as the grounds therefore become "E .+( ?L6 == "E(,. *n ,he case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable Buestion is asCed or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answerA otherwise, the objection is D *JE4 and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and complete evidence. ,he trial court cannot just disregard evidence w9c would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto. Deight and .ufficiency of Evidence Suffi!ien!y of (#iden!e; *n this suit involving insurance claim, the medical findings were not conclusive as there was no autopsy on the body of the insured. CIRCU*STANTIA& (6ID(NC(; 4efined as Nthat which indirectly proves a fact in issue an inference which the factfinder draws from the evidence established. "esort thereto is essential when the lacC of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free.N Same; 4irect evidence is not only the matrix, wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had even on circumstantial evidence so long as a combination of all the circumstances proven produces a logical conclusion w9c suffices to establish accused:s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Gor circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent w9 each other, consistent w9 the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at the same time, inconsistent w9 the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Same; Gor an accused to be convicted of murder, he must be positively identified as the assailant. =ositive identification reBuires essentially proof of identity and not per se an eyewitness account of the very act of committing the crime. witness may identify an accused as the perpetrator of the crime by direct evidence, i.e., an eyewitness account of the commission of the crime. ,here are instances, however, when a witness may not have == v. ?oras, !" #&7%'/, 4ec. &&, &888.

@aunlad .avings and Loan ssn. v. C , !" ##%'%&, (ov. &%, &888.

!"E= L*GE v. C , #'''. == v. @atignas, !" #&)#%), @arch #&, &88&. == v. +rti>, supraA == v. .uelto, supraA == v. !uarin, !" #&/')%, +ct. &&, #'''A == v. !aballo, supraA == v. ?ravo, !" #$//)&, (ov. &&, #'''. == v. ?aniega, !" #$'/73, Geb. #/, &88&.

actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, but he may still be able to identify the accused as the perpetrator as when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. *n the case at bar, the positive identification forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taCen together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroCen chain, leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. +therwise, if circumstantial evidence could not be resorted to in proving the identity of the accused when direct evidence is not available, then felons would go scot1free and the community would be denied proper protection. ,he rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence when the following reBuisites concur: ;#< there must be more than one circumstanceA ;&< the inference must be based on proven factsA and ;$< the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused. Same; Dhen circumstantial evidence constitute an unbroCen chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by doubtful evidence submitted by the accused1appellants, such as alibi. Same; "eBuisites for judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence to be upheld. == v. ?ago, !" #&&&'8, pril ), &888A == v. .antos, !" #&&'$/, @ay $#, &888. == v. 4e !u>man, !" #&%$)3, June 3, &888A == v. doc, !" #$&87', pril #&, &888.

Same; .ec. %, "ule #$$ of the "evised "ules of Court == v. +rcula, provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for !" #$&$/8, conviction if: ;#< there is more than one circumstanceA ;&< July /, &888. the facts from w9c the inferences are derived are provenA and ;$< the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Dharton suggests "our basic (uidelines in t)e appreciation o" circumstantial evidence, to wit: ;#< it should be acted upon with cautionA ;&< all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guiltA ;$< the facts must exclude every other theory but that of guiltA and ;%< the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense. ,he peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutini>ing just one particular piece of evidence. *t is more liCe a pu>>le which, when put together, reveals a convincing picture pointing towards the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime. Same; Fuantum of evidence sufficient to convict the accused is when when, ;#< there is more than one circumstanceA ;&< the facts from which the inferences are derived are provenA and ;$< the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. == v. .irad, !" #$8/'%, July /, &888.

Same; Gor conviction based on circumstantial evidence to prosper, the prosecution must establish more than one circumstance indubitably linCing the accused to the commission of the crime.

== v. ?alta>ar, !" #&'$38, +ct. #', &888A == v. "endaje, !" #$)7%/, (ov. #/, &888. == v. Glora, !" #&/'8', June &$, &888.

)ROO, .(/OND R(ASONA.&( DOU.T; ccused1 appellant maCes much of the fact that the witness used the words 0probably2, 0maybe2, 0* guess.2 -owever, conviction in criminal cases does not entail absolute certaintyA neither does it exclude the possibility of error. Dhat is reBuired is moral certainty or that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Same; .ole credible testimony of rape victim is enough for conviction.

== v. -ofilena, !" #$%77&, June &&, &888. == v. ,aliman, !" #8''#%$, +ct. ##, &888. == v. !iganto, !" #&$877, July &8, &888A == v. Castillo, !" #$8&8/, July /, &888. == v. Jarandilla, !" ##/'3/13), ug. $#, &888. == "endaje, &888. v.

*OTI6(; Cey element when establishing guilt through circumstantial evidence. Coupled w9 enough circumstantial evidence from w9c it mat be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. Same; Dhen the evidence of the prosecution is weaC, or merely circumstantial, it is necessary to prove motiveA otherwise, the guilt of the accused becomes open to reasonable doubt.

Same; bsence of motive for committing the crime does not preclude conviction therefore where there were reliable witnesses who fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony. Same ; =roof of motive is not essential even in the absence of direct evidence to establish the identity of the accused. pprecia1 tion of Evidence *n the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is the basic tenet that the prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for all the offenses charged U ei incum+it pro+atio 'ui dicit, non 'ui ne)at. -e who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. ,he conviction of accused1appellant must rest not on the weaCness of his defense but on the strength of the prosecutionKs evidence. CR(DI.I&IT/ O, :ITN(SS; Test of Credibility; ,here is no single test to determine w9 all exactitude the probity of testimony and the courts can only give conformity to the Buotidian Cnowledge, observation and experience of man. ,he most positive testimony may be contradicted by the fact it is contrary to common observation or experience or the common principles by w9c the conduct of manCind is governed. ,he courts are not reBuired to believe that w9c they judicially Cnow to be incredible.

== v. ,aboga, !" #%%83)1 37, Geb. ), &88&.

== v. ?acalso, !" #&'8//, .ept. &/, &888.

Same; Same; Evidence to be believed must not only == v. come from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself !iganto, be credible. supraA == v. ?aula, !" #$&)7#, (ov. #/, &888. Same; Trial CourtBs (#aluation; s a rule, the trial court:s assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is binding on appellate courts, absent any fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may have been overlooCed, misapprehended or misapplied. Dhen the appeal primarily hinges on the issue of credibility of witnesses, the Court has held that, except for C+@=ELL*(! "E .+(., it cannot disturb the manner the trial court calibrated the credence of witnesses because of their direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. Same; Same; -owever, this rule does not apply where one judge heard the testimony of the eyewitness and another penned the assailed decision. *n such cases, the assessment on the credibility of witnesses would have to be received w9 caution on appeal. Same; In!onsisten!ies; Dhere it refers only to @*(+" 4E, *L. and C+LL ,E" L @ ,,E". do not affect the veracity and weight of the testimonies, where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. witness: testimony may liCewise contradict that of another witness. s long as the contradiction involves minor details and collateral matters, the credibility of both witnesses will not be impaired. Same; Same; *nconsistencies such as these in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses have been Cnown to happen, and indeed acBuittals have been the result where the inconsistencies and self1contradictions dealt with material points as to altogether erode the credibility of the witness. +n the other hand, discrepancies which are minor in character may also serve to add credence and veracity to a witnessKs testimony, and enhance her credibility in the process. ,he latter rule we find applicable to the instant case, for the inconsistencies pointed out by the defense do not alter the substance of EsgrinaKs testimony U which is that accused1appellant attacCed a defenseless Emerson 5mandam. Same; Same; Dhere eyewitnesses contradict themselves on a vital Buestion, such as the identity of the offender, the element of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be lightly disregarded. Same; Dis!repan!ies; between the ffidavit and the ,estimony of a Ditness in +pen Court do not necessarily impair credibility of the testimony, for affidavits are generally taCen e3 parte and are often incomplete or even inaccurate for lacC of searching inBuiries by the investigating officer. == v. lverio, !" #$/8$/, (ov. &', &888A == v. Grancisco, !" #$)&/&, +ct. &8, &888A == v. ?antayan, !" #$7)'$, 4ec. #%, &888. == v. ?aula, supraA == v. ,orres, !" #$38%), 4ec. 3, &888. == v. @ercado, !" ##)&$', (ov. &', &888A == v. Cabigting, !" #$#38), +ct. &8, &888.

== v. ,ane>a, !" #&#))3, June &8, &888A == v. Gerolino, !" #$#7$81$#, pril /, &888.

== v. ranas, !" #&$#8#, (ov. &&, &888. == v. .abredo, !" #&)##%, @ay ##, &888.

Same; Same; ,he alleged inconsistencies between the == witnesses: sworn statement and their testimonies in open @arcelino, court are immaterial, sufficiently explained by them and do #'''.

v.

not affect their credibility as witnesses. Same; Same; ,he failure of one witness to mention an utterance or a word w9c another recalls in a separate testimony is not sufficient to affect the credibility of the two witnesses. s a matter of common observation and Cnowledge, the reaction or behavior of persons when confronted w9 a shocCing incident varies. ,estimonial discrepancies are caused by the natural ficCleness of memory w9c tend to strengthen rather than weaCen credibility, as they erase suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. == v. .uelto, #'''A == v. Lachica, #'''.

Same; Same; 4iscrepancies between the affidavit of a == v. ,emplo, witness and his testimony in court does not necessarily !" #$$/)', discredit the witness because it is a matter of judicial 4ec. #, &888. experience that affidavits, being taCen e34parte, are almost always incomplete and inaccurate. Same; Same; ,he contradiction between the date of the commission of the crime as alleged in the information and the testimony of the witness in this case was of de minimis importance. ,he testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety. Same; Same; .o long as the witnesses: testimonies agree on substantial matters, the inconseBuential contradictions and inconsistencies dilute neither the witnesses: credibility nor the veracity of their testimonies. Same; Same; ,rial court:s assessment of the credibility of witnesses should be upheld, if it is not tainted w9 arbitrariness or oversight of some facts or circumstance of weight and influence w9c, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case. == v. ?ergonio, !" #$$'3#, .ept. #$, &888. == v. gomo1 o, !" #$#3&', June &$, &888. == v. !atchitorena, !" #$#$/7, pril #&, &888A == v. lvero, supraA == v. lcartado, !" #$&$7'13&, June &', &888. == v. Jergel, !" #&33#$, +ct. %, #'''A == v. Jillablanca, supra. == v. Grancisco, !" #$8%'8, June #', &888.

Same; Same; *ndeed, they should be taCen as indicia of truth rather than as badges of falsehood, for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. fter her traumatic experience, the victim is not expected to remember vividly the appellant:s threats or each and every ugly detail of the sexual assault. Same; Relations ip; ,he fact that the witness is the wife of the victim does not maCe her testimony less believable. (o law disBualifies a person from testifying in a criminal case in w9c her relative is involved if the former was really at the scene of the crime and witnessed the execution of the criminal act. Same; Same; Credibility is not affected by relationship to the accused. ccused1appellant points to his cousin Eduardo as the real culprit and Buestions why the police did not investigate and file charges against him. ?ut, as testified to by the police officers, Eduardo did not admit that he was the one who shot the victim. -e confided to the police officers that he was only forced by accused1 appellant to surrender the gun to the police officers. ,hese findings are bolstered by the fact that @elecia and

== v. "onato, supra.

.antiago "omano did not mention the name of Eduardo as the one who shot Ludovico when their initial statements were taCen by the police. Same; Same; D(&A/ does not affe!t Credibility of :itness; ,he witness: fear constrained him for #8 years from revealing the crime and identifying the perpetrators to the authorities. .uch delay did not in any way taint his credibility in this case. Same; Same; .he immediately reported to her mother what . LJ 4+" had done to her on 7 July #''#A she even repeated her story the following day. -er mother Lydia, however, refused to believe her, so she just Cept to herself and cried. .he considered confiding to her siblings, uncles and teacher, but thought against it when she remembered . LJ 4+":s threats. @oreover, if her own mother was indifferent, how could she expect anyone else to sympathi>e with herS -er failure to recount the unfortunate incident at once, far from impairing her credibility, bolstered it, because it is not uncommon for young girls to vacillate in such instances when threatened by their ravisher, more so when the latter is a housemate. ?esides, this Court held in the case of =eople v. @anggasin, that even a delay of eight years is permissible. Same; Same; *n this case, the infirmity in the testimony of a witness strengthened it and erased the suspicion that it has been rehearsed. Gourteen hour lag before the witness disclosed the identity of the Ciller did not impair said witness: credibility. Same; Same; *t tooC complainant more than #& years to finally decide to charge accused1appellant of rape allegedly committed in #'3%. ,he long delay in reporting the incident maCes it difficult for the Court not to have compelling doubts on the veracity of the episode. == v. "imorin, !" #&%$8', @ay #), &888.

== v. ,orio, !" #$&&#) and #$$%7', (ov. #7, #'''.

== v. Lo>ada, !" #$8/3', June &', &888. == v. 4e la Cru>, !" #$$'&#, June &', &888.

Same; ,ailure to immediately re#eal ID(NTIT/ of == v. !riminal; *t is settled that failure to reveal at once the @anegdeg, identity of the perpetrator of a felony does not impair the #'''. credibility of witnesses more so if such delay has been adeBuately explained. Lorie bian had adeBuately explained that she did not identify the assailant to the police and barangay authorities when they came over to her house several hours after the incident upon the advice of her husband who feared for their safety in the remote area where their house was situated. Same; Same; 4elay in revealing the names of the malefactors does not, by itself, impair the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies. ,ime and again, this Court has ruled that Nthe nondisclosure by the witness to the police officers of accused1appellantKs identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. == v. Corte>ano, !" #%87$&. Jan. &', &88&.

Same; Cou! ed :itness; ,he witness: testimony == v. "oche, detailed the events leading to the victim:s death w9 such !" ##/#3&, thoroughnessA it raises the suspicion that it had been pril ), &888. rehearsed. -er testimony sounds so perfect that instead of inspiring belief, it becomes suspect. ,ime and again, the Court upheld the primacy of physical evidence over biased and uncorroborated testimony.

Same; Same; ,he argument that the victim had lost her credibility since she admitted that she was coached by her grandmother has no merit. ,he victim, an innocent and guileless /1year old when the crime was committed against her, cannot be expected to recall every single detail of the brutal experience that she went through in the hands of the accused. t the time of her testimony, she had stopped schooling and did not have the gift of articulation. ?esides, she testified on her harrowing experience & years after the incident. Same; Testimony Credible in )art; ,he witnesses: identification of erstwhile accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime was not given credence by the trial court. ,hat, however, did not entirely impugn her credibility as a witness as regards her identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. ,he settled rule is that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part as the corroborative evidence or improbabilities of the case may reBuire. Even where the witness has been found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not reBuired that the whole of his testimony be rejected. )OSITI6( ID(NTI,ICATION; Gull faith and credence is accorded to the positive identification made by spouses Charlie and @arilyn =ajarillo. Jurisprudence recogni>es that victims of criminal violence have a penchant for seeing the faces and features of their attacCers and remembering them. ,he most natural reaction of victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. ,he witnesses need not Cnow the names of the accused as long as they recogni>e their faces. Dhat is important is that the witnesses are positive as to the perpetratorsK physical identification from the witnessesK own personal Cnowledge.

== v. @ayorga, !" #$/%8/, (ov. &', &888.

== v. lvare>, !" #&#7)', (ov. &&, &888.

== v. 4inamling, !" #$%)8/, @arch #&, &88&.

Same; (egative evidence cannot prevail over the id. affirmative testimony of the prosecution witnesses who positively identified the accused1appellants. A&I.I; ,he defense of alibi is inherently weaC and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused1 appellants as the offenders. $# ?esides, to establish alibi the accused must show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity when the crime was perpetrated. Same; Gor alibi to proper, is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, it must liCewise be shown that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of commission. libi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. == v. 4inamling, !" #$%)8/, @arch #&, &88&. == v. +rti>, !" ##3)&%, +ct. 3, #'''A == v. .antiago, !" #&'$$', 4ec. &, #'''A == v. ,abion, !" #$&7#/, +ct. &8, #'''A == v. Jillablanca, !" 3'))&A +ct. #, #'''A == v. (arido, !" #$&8/3, +ct. #, #'''A

== v. @arcelino, !" #&)&)', +ct. #, #'''A == v. Gloro, !" #&8)%#, +ct. 7, #'''A == v. pelado, !" ##%'$7, +ct. ##, #'''A == v. Lacheca, supra. Same; *t becomes less plausible as a defense when it is invoCed and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and his immediate relative9s. .uch defense should have been corroborated by a disinterested but credible witness. Same; Dhen an accused:s alibi can only be confirmed by his relatives and friends who may not be impartial witnesses, his denial of culpability merits scant consideration, especially in the face of affirmative testimony of an eyewitness as to the accused:s presence in the crime scene. == v. Glora, &888.

== v. @acaliag, supraA == v. .irad, supraA == v. "endaje, .upra.

D(NIA&; 4enials of the accused, unless supported by == v. .uelto, clear and convincing evidence, are negative self1serving !" #8$/#/, evidence w9c deserve no weight in law and cannot be +ct. 7, #'''. given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible and disinterested witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. ,&I+%T; as evidence of guilt. *n this case, the three accused fled from the city where the crime was committed and never went bacC to worC. == v. !uarin, supraA == v. !aballo, supraA == v. =adam, !" #$&#$7, +ct. #, #'''. == v. .abado, !" #$/')$, (ov. &8, &888.

Same; ,hrough flight, one derogates the course of justice by avoiding arrest, detention, or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. *n this case, appellant was able to evade arrest for more than three years. Clearly, his flight evinced a consciousness of guilt and a silent admission of culpability. *ndeed, Nthe wicCed flee, when no man pursueth, but the innocent are bold as a lion.2

Same; Glight is often indicative of guilt. ,he converse is == v. not true, however. -ence, the failure of appellant to flee ?antayan, !" does not prove his innocence. #$7)'$, 4ec. #%, &888. )O&IC( .&OTT(R; Entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of the performance of duty, are (+, C+(CL5.*JE ="++G of the truth of such entries and should not be given undue significance or probative value, for they are usually incomplete and inaccurate. bsence of any entry therein regarding any report or complaint on a particular incident and date is not conclusive proof that no such incident occurred in the locality on that date. == v. 5lgasan, !" #$#3&%1&), July ##, &888.

,INDIN+S O, T%( TRIA& COURT; Gindings of the lower court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the singular opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness when they testified during the trial, absent any showing that certain facts of note and substance had been overlooCed, misinterpreted or misapplied below, w9c if, considered, could affect the outcome of the case.

== v. Lacheca, supraA == v. Caratay, !" ##'%$)1$7, +ct. /, #'''A == v. Clemente, !" ##&$78, +ct. #$, #'''A == v. pelado, supra. -emedes v. C , supraA == v. +rti>, supraA == v. .uelto, supraA == v. (ablo, !" ##77##, 4ec. ), #'''.A =acheco v. C , !" #&))78, 4ec. &, #'''. == v. ?asBue>, !" = #%%8$/, .ept. &7, &88#A == v. Jaberto, $87 .C" '$, @ay #&, #'''A == v. 4eleverio, &3' .C" /%7, pril &%, #''3. == v. .omodio, !" #$%#$'1%8, Geb. #%, &88&.

Same; ,he factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the appellate court, carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal, EPCE=, under certain circumstances. +ne such circumstance is when the lower court manifestly overlooCed certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and w9c, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Same; .ettled is the rule that where the culpability or the innocence of the accused hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, the findings of trial courts are given the highest degree of respect. ,his is because of its uniBue opportunity to observe them firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. -ence, their findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooCed, misapprehended or misinterpreted.

A,,IDA6IT O, D(SISTANC(; ffidavits taCen ex parte are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court, and affidavits of recantation have been invariably, regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, for monetary consideration or through intimidation and are most liCely to be repudiated afterwards. Falsus in 'no, Falsus in &mnibus ; ,he maxim deals only w9 the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law or an inflexible rule of universal application. @odern trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility whenthe testimony of a witness may be partly believed and partly disbelieved, depending on the corroborative evidence presented at the trial. Dhere the challenge testimony is sufficiently corroborated in its material points, or where the mistaCes arise from innocent lapses and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the rule may be relaxed. *dentifica1 tion of ccused CRI*( SC(N(; ,he issue of illumination of the crime scene or its visibility is indispensable in the identification of a criminal offender. ,hat the witness was able to recogni>e appellant by the light of the gas lamp is not far fetch.

== v. ,orio, supraA == v. Costelo, !" #&%$##, +ct. #$, #'''.

== v. 4e la Cru>, !" ##3')7, July #%, &888.

)ARA,,IN T(ST; n (?* chemist:s finding that the paraffin test on the person of the appellant is negative is not conclusive to show that said appellant has not fired a gun. )O&IC( &IN('U); ,here is no law reBuiring a police line1 up as essential to proper identification. ,hus, even if there was no police line1up, there could still be proper identification as long as such identification was not suggested to the witness by the police. Same; *n resolving the admissibility of and relying on out1 of1court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, vi>: ;#< the witnessK opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crimeA ;&< the witnessK degree of attention at that timeA ;$< the accuracy of any prior description given by the witnessA ;%< the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identificationA ;/< the length of time between the crime and the identificationA and ;)< the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Nshow1upN may be suggestive, but it is not by itself a sufficient reason to reject a witnessK identification of the accused.

== v. Legaspi, !" ##738&, pril &7, &888. == v. Lubong, !" #$&&'/, @ay $#, &888.

== (avales, #$/&$8, 3, &888.

v. !r ug.

Same; pplying this totality of circumstances test to the == v. .irad, case at bar, we rule that there is no violation of the supra. constitutional rights of accused1appellants. ,he witnesses positively identified the three accused inside the jail. ,he three accused were in the company of other inmates. ,hus, they were in a group. ,he police officers did not in any way influence the witnesses. ll they did was to asC the witnesses to identify the three accused they saw riding the motorcycle. ,he identification tooC place on Gebruary #8, #''&, only a few days after the incident. ,he uncounselled identification made at the police station, however, did not foreclose the admissibility of the independent in1court identification. Same; Dhere only pictures of accused1appellant were shown for identification, the supposed positive identification was regarded as tainted almost liCe an uncounselled confession. == v. Gaustino, !" #&'&&8, .ept. ), &888.

Same; *n another case, the identification of the accused == v. rapoC, by means of a show1up, fell short of the Z totality of !" #$%'7%, circumstance [ test. .pecifically, there was no prior 4ec. 3, &888. description given by the witness to the police at any time after the incidentA and the possibility that the police might have influenced the identification could not have discounted. *n cases such as the instant one, when the identification made by the principal eyewitness was uncertain, a little extra effort on the part of the prosecution to acBuire appropriate corroborative evidence would go far towards achieving the proper ends of justice. Dhatever flaw attended the out1of1court identification of the accused1 appellant could have easily been cured by a subseBuent positive identification in court. .tated in another way, inadmissibility or unreliability of an out8of1court identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in1court identification. Same; ,he assistance of counsel is not essential during a police line1up. == v. ,oress, Jr., !"

#$38%), 4ec. 3, &888. #''# "evised "ule on .ummary =rocedure T e Rules apply to Criminal Cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charge is imprisonment (+, EPCEE4*(! ) @+(,-. or a fine (+, EPCEE4*(! =#,888, or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or the civil liability arising therefrom. Jurisdi!tional Amount; ppellants contended that, since the complaint sought damages in the amount of =##3,888.88, summary procedure would not apply. Clearly, petitioners cited and relied upon the old rule of summary procedure, w9c limited the application of the rule to ejectment suits involving damages or unpaid rentals not exceeding =&8,888.88. ,his rule was no longer in effect at the time the civil case was filed. *otion for ("tension of Time to ,ile )leading; it is not allowed in cases covered by this rule. guilar v. 4alanao, .@. (o. @,J1881 #&7/, June 3, &888. .ta. Lucia "ealty and 4ev. J. C . !" #&8)'7, +ct. #), &888.

Jillanueva v. EstoBue, .@. (o. ",J1''1 #%'%, (ov. &', &888