Niveluri si reductie vs. emergenta 1.

Niveluri In explicarea cognitiei, e tipic pentru filosofi sa gandeasca in termeni de niveluri micro- (nivelul neuronal) si macro (nivelul mental). Sunt 2 tipuri de interactiuni: intraniveluri (interactiuni orinzontale) adica interactiuni intre componentele la acelasi nivel, si interniveluri (interactiuni verticale) adica interactiuni intre niveluri. Daca su stante! implica interactiuni orizontale (adica uniunea lor), niveluri implica relatii ontologice sau epistemologice verticale (vertical referindu-se la ontologic, organizational, metodologic, de analiza sau epistemologic). Sunt deci niveluri ontologice, organizationale (mecanisme sau sisteme), epistemologice sau de descries au analiza. 2. Reduction and emergence Istoria emergentei" este destul de complicata pentru ca are multe interpretari.2 #mergence involves certain vertical relations$ips et%een lo%-level and $ig$-level properties. &$e notion of levels! implies t$e concept of emergence. '$en %e tal( a out reduction or emergence, %e need to specif) %$at is reduced to %$at or %$at emerges from %$at. 'e can reduce one propert) or level to anot$er or one propert) or one level can emerge from anot$er. *n t$e one side, %e can relate reduction and epistemological levels+properties and epistemological emergence to identit) t$eor) and even to eliminative materialism. ('ee( ,) -ccording to van .ulic(, emergence is /0s are more t$an 1ust 2s/ and t$at 30s are somet$ing over and a ove 2s./! 4e distinguis$es as classes of emergence et%een properties and causal po%ers or forces. (van .ulic( 255") &$e emergent features go e)ond t$e features of parts from %$ic$ t$e) emerge (p. "6) and it can e categorized as metap$)sical emergence! (it refers to t$e relation et%een real t$ings) or epistemic emergence! (cognitive explanator) relations a out real %orld items). '$at does over and a ove! or emergent features go e)ond t$e features of parts!
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7im %rote Since around "885, t$e idea of emergence $as een ma(ing a ig come ac(, from decades of general neglect and disdain on t$e part of mainstream anal)tic p$ilosop$).! (7im 2556, p. 9:;) 2 7im again: 3#mergence/ is ver) muc$ a term of p$ilosop$ical trade< it can prett) muc$ mean %$atever )ou %ant to mean=! (7im 2556, p. 9:>)

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mean? #arlier t$an van .ulic(, t$ere %ere ot$er people insisting upon t$e difference et%een ontological and epistemological emergence considering t$at people man) times conflate t$em. (Sil erstein and @c.eever "888< */Aonnor and 'ong 2552) #mergence $as t$e same properties as nonreductive p$)sicalism: distinctness and dependence. (Arane 255") It involves t$e %$ole-part relations$ips. Bo%, some properties are simpl) com inations of parts at t$e same level, as it %ere. &$e emergent properties are different from t$e sum of t$eir parts< t$e) presuppose novelt). It is Cuite difficult to define t$is novelt)!. In Arane/s definition, t$e novel properties of an o 1ect %ould e t$ose determina le properties %$ose determinates are not $ad ) all of t$e o 1ect/s parts.! (p. >) Drom t$is perspective, surface colour and %etness are novel properties. 4o%ever, in order to distinguis$ emergent properties from reductive properties, novelt) is not enoug$. -ccording to Arane, a stronger notion of emergence conceives of it as a propert) of a %$ole %it$ po%ers t$at are not related to t$e po%ers of its parts. &$is strong notion of emergence denies t$at t$e emergent properties of a %$ole are supervenient upon t$e properties of its parts. - dependent propert) implies t$at t$e properties of t$e %$ole supervene on t$e properties of its parts. &$erefore, for Arane emergence is strongl) related to t$e supervenience of a %$ole/s properties on t$e properties of its parts. (Arane 255", p. 8) 4o%ever, for an emergentist, suc$ properties %ould e over and a oveE t$e p$)sical properties. *ne essential dic$otom) is t$e difference "888< */Aonnor and 'ong 2552) 2.1 Ontological emergence -ccording to van .ulic(, metap$)sical emergence $as t$ree forms: (") Specific value emergence (&$e %$ole and its parts $ave features of t$e same kind ut $ave different specific subtypes or values of t$at (ind.! 4e offers t$e example of a ronze statue and t$e molecular parts %it$ common propert), t$e mass. (2) @odest (ind emergence: &$e %$ole $as features t$at are different in (ind from t$ose of its parts =! (#xamples are color and life.) (,) Gadical (ind emergence: &$e %$ole $as features t$at are ot$ ") Different in (ind from t$ose $ad ) its parts and 2) *f (ind %$ose nature and existence is not necessitated ) t$e features of its parts, t$eir mode of com ination and t$e la%-li(e regularities governing t$e features of its parts.! (van .ulic( 255", p. ";) 2 et%een epistemological and ontological emergence. Feople man) times conflate t$em. (Sil erstein and @c.eever

-ccording to */Aonnor and 'ong, t$ere are different versions of suc$ emergence ut t$e most common versions are as follo%ing:
Predictive: #mergent properties are s)stemic features of complex s)stems %$ic$ could not e predicted (practicall) spea(ing< or for an) finite (no%er< or for even an ideal (no%er) from t$e standpoint of a pre-emergent stage, despite a t$oroug$ (no%ledge of t$e features of, and la%s governing, t$eir parts.

Irreducible-Pattern: #mergent properties and la%s are s)stemic features of complex s)stems governed ) true, la%li(e generalizations %it$in a special science t$at is irreduci le to fundamental p$)sical t$eor) for conceptual reasons. &$e macroscopic patterns in Cuestion cannot e captured in terms of t$e concepts and d)namics of p$)sics.

(*/Aonnor and 'ong 2552)

&$e aut$ors consider t$at epistemological emergence $as applications in particular sciences mainl) regarding t$e relations$ip et%een macro-and micro-levels. In t$eir opinion ontological emergence is eCuivalent to %$at t$e) call supervenience emergentism!. #ven if some of proponents of ontological emergence consider t$at t$e %orld is composed ) fundamental entities, t$e) maintain t$e layered view of nature. asic *ntologicall) emergent properties are not determined or reduci le to too man) p$ilosop$ers %$o ontological emergence.: If %e are tr)ing to relate t$e notions of levels to van .ulic(/s vie% on emergence, %e can sa) t$at ontological levels %ould e correlated %it$ radical emergence, organizational levels %it$ modest emergence, and levels of anal)sis %it$ specific value emergence. &$e last t%o levels can e ot$ divided into %ea( and strong epistemic emergence. &$e pro lem is t$at if %e accept ontologicall) different levels and radical emergence t$en %e collapse into Aartesian dualism t$at is re1ected ) t$e ma1orit) of p$ilosop$ers. Bevert$eless, for saving t$e p$enomena some p$ilosop$ers (mainl) non-reductive materialists) (ne% t$at re1ecting Aartesian
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properties., 4o%ever, ontological emergence is $ig$l) controversial and t$ere are not elieve in t$e existence of ontological levels or

*ne classical example of ontological emergence is Cuantum mec$anics. (Sil erstein and @c.reever "888) : *ntological emergence is applied not onl) to t$e mind- rain topic ut also to t$e macro-micro levels of realit). -ut$ors li(e Frigo1ine and G. H. Iaug$lin - ot$ Bo el laureates- assert t$e irreduci ilit) of certain macroscopic properties to micro-properties. In t$is sense, Frigo1ine introduces t$e dissipative structure! of non-eCuili rium t$ermod)namics and Iaug$lin rings in t$e protected! properties (li(e cr)stalline state) of a $ig$ level of realit) insensitive to microscopic properties. (*/Aonnor and 'ong, 2552)

dualism involves t$e acceptance of some anomalies. &$erefore t$e) consider t$e $uman eing as a limited entit) t$at $as limited (no%ledge (@c.inn) or t$e) see( refuge under t$e ontolog)-epistemolog) distinction (%it$ levels of anal)sis and t$e corresponding epistemic emergence, %ea( and strong) or t$e) introduce organizational levels (related to la)ered vie% of nature). Dor A$almers, a strong emergent propert) is one in %$ic$ t$e $ig$-level p$enomenon arises from a lo%-level domain, ut trut$s concerning t$at p$enomenon are not deduci le even in principle from trut$s in t$e lo%-level domain.! (A$almers 2556) If t$e strong emergent p$enomena cannot e deduci le from t$e la%s of p$)sics, for instance, t$en %e need ne% la%s of nature for explaining suc$ p$enomena. &$e onl) (no%n p$enomenon t$at cannot e explained ) p$)sical la%s is consciousness. &$e examples for supporting t$is idea are t$ose of t$e color lind scientist and zom ies. 4o%ever, consciousness is correlated %it$ or supervenes on p$)sical, neural states. 2.2 Epistemological emergence @ore complex is t$e status of epistemic emergence (%ea( and strong). Dor Sil erstein and @c.eever, Step$an, van .ulic(, */Aonnor and 'ong, A$almers, and 7im, epistemic emergence is related to our incapacit) to explain and predict suc$ a propert) of a %$ole s)stem in terms of its parts. 4o%ever, t$e propert) of t$e %$ole is determined ) t$e properties of parts. Dor van .ulic(, epistemic emergence is su 1ective and t$ere are %ea( and strong emergences t$at c$aracterize predictive and explanator) emergence and representational emergence. Dor Sil erstein and @c.eever, %e can anal)ze epistemological emergence onl) from a vie%point given ) t$e relations$ip et%een $uman (no%ledge and simple or complex s)stems. &$is concerns t$e functional or descriptive+anal)sis of emergence. - propert) of an entit) is an epistemological emergent if t$at propert) is determined to or deduci le from t$e intrinsic properties of t$e fundamental entities t$at compose t$e o 1ect. 4o%ever, it is difficult to explain or predict suc$ a propert) in terms of its fundamental constituents. (Sil erstein and @c.eever "888) #pistemologicall) emergent properties are novel onl) at a level of description.! (Sil erstein and @c.eever "888, p. ">6) Dor A$almers, a $ig$-level p$enomenon represents a weak emergence in relation to a lo%-level domain %$en t$at p$enomenon is unexpected! in accord %it$ t$e la%s or principles from lo%-level area. H) unexpected! $e means t$at emergent :

properties are some$o% deducti le from lo%-level properties (%it$ initial conditions). #xamples of suc$ emergence are t$e game of life!, connectionist net%or(s, evolution (for intelligent creatures) and $ig$-level patterns in cellular automata. A$almers/ definition of %ea( emergence is (a) $ig$-level properties are t$ose properties of a s)stem t$at are not possessed ) an) of its part ( ) deducti ilit) %it$out reduci ilit). - more complicated investigation of t$e notion of emergence is made ) -c$im Step$an. (Step$en 2552, "88>) 4e distinguis$es several t$eories of emergence: weak, synchronic, and diachronic emergence. -ccording to %ea( emergentism, t$e properties of a s)stem are emergent if t$e) elong to t$e s)stem as a %$ole, ut not to t$e parts of t$at s)stem. &$is (ind of emergentism is eCuivalent to propert) reductionism ecause t$e emergent structures are explaina le and completel) defina le in terms of t$e com ination of parts alread) defined. &$e s)stem as a %$ole is t$e sum of parts plus t$e organization or cooperation of parts. - t)pical example of %ea( emergentism is connectionist net%or(s ut t$is emergentism is also applica le to t$e t$eories of self-organization and artificial intelligence. (Step$en 2552, "88>) -ccording to Step$en (2552), %ea( emergentism $as t$ree c$aracteristics. &$e first is p$)sical monism: all entities, properties and structures emerge from certain fundamental p$)sical parts. &$e second c$aracteristic consists in s)stemic properties. &$ere are t%o classes of properties: t$e properties t$at t$e parts of t$e s)stem also $ave (e.g., velocit)) and t$e properties t$at do not elong to t$e parts of t$e s)stem (e.g., pain). &$e la%s properties represent t$e second feature. &$e t$ird feature is s)nc$ronic determination (or mereological supervenience), and reflects t$e relations$ip et%een asic structure and emergent properties. &$e last properties depend on t$e parts/ properties and t$eir arrangement. (A$almers 2556) &$e main c$aracteristics of diac$ronic properties are t$e novelt) and t$e unpredicta ilit) of t$e s)stem t$at evolves. (Step$en 2552, "88>) &$e difference et%een %ea( and diac$ronic emergence is t$e unpredicta ilit) of properties. &$e difference et%een diac$ronic and s)nc$ronic emergence is t$e irreduci ilit) of properties. @oreover, if one propert) or entit) $as not existed efore and suddenl) comes into existence, it means t$at t$e propert) or entit) is diac$ronicall) ne%. S)nc$ronic novelt) is time independent. (Sc$olz 255:, p. 2) &$ese t%o (inds of irreduci ilit) produce eit$er do%n%ard causation or epip$enomenalism. -n irreduci le propert) means one t$at (a) does not follo% from t$e e$avior of t$e 9

s)stem/s parts t$at $as t$is propert) and ( ) does not follo% from t$e e$avior of t$e s)stem/s parts in constellations simpler t$an t$e s)stem. Jualia are t$e t)pical cases of s)nc$ronic emergent properties.