Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Report
April 30, 2014
South Asia remained a front line in the battle against terrorism. Although al-Qaidas (AQ) core in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been seriously degraded, AQs global leadership continued to operate from its safe ha en in the region and struggled to communicate effecti ely !ith affiliate groups outside of South Asia. AQ maintained ties !ith other terrorist organi"ations in the region, such as #ehrik-e #aliban Pakistan (##P) and the $a%%ani &et!ork ($Q&). #hese alliances continued to pro ide the group !ith additional resources and capabilities. 'n ()*+, terrorists in South Asia carried out operations in hea ily populated areas and continued to target regional go ernmental representati es and ,.S. persons. -n numerous occasions, ci ilians throughout South Asia !ere !ounded or killed in terrorist e ents. Afghanistan, in particular, continued to e.perience aggressi e and coordinated attacks by the Afghan #aliban, $Q&, and other insurgent and terrorist groups. A number of these attacks !ere planned and launched from safe ha ens in Pakistan. Afghan &ational Security /orces (A&S/) are no! pro iding security across all of Afghanistan as the transition to full Afghan leadership on security continues in anticipation of the ()*0 dra!do!n of ,.S. and 1oalition /orces (1/). #he A&S/ and 1/, in partnership, took aggressi e action against terrorist elements in Afghanistan, especially in 2abul, and many of the eastern and northern pro inces. Pakistan continued to e.perience significant terrorist iolence, including sectarian attacks. #he Pakistani military undertook operations against
groups that conducted attacks !ithin Pakistan such as ##P, but did not take action against other groups such as 3ashkar-e-#ayyiba (3e#), !hich continued to operate, train, rally, and fundraise in Pakistan during the past year. Afghan #aliban and $Q& leadership and facilitation net!orks continued to find safe ha en in Pakistan, and Pakistani authorities did not take significant military or la! enforcement action against these groups. 3e els of terrorist iolence !ere similar to pre ious years. 'ndia remained se erely affected by and ulnerable to terrorism, including from Pakistanbased groups and their affiliates as !ell as left-!ing iolent e.tremists. #he 4o ernment of 'ndia, in response, continued to undertake efforts to coordinate its counterterrorism capabilities more effecti ely and e.panded its cooperation and coordination !ith the international community and regional partners. 5angladesh, an influential counterterrorism partner in the region, continued to make strides against international terrorism. #he go ernments ongoing counterterrorism efforts ha e made it more difficult for transnational terrorists to operate in or use 5angladeshi territory, and there !ere no ma6or terrorist incidents in 5angladesh in ()*+. #he ,nited States and 5angladesh signed a 1ounterterrorism 1ooperation 'nitiati e on -ctober ((, ()*+, to enhance bilateral cooperation. #he potential challenges to stability that could accompany the changes of the international force presence in Afghanistan in ()*0 remained a significant concern for the 1entral Asian leaders. Additionally, terrorist groups !ith ties to 1entral Asia 7 notably the 'slamic 8o ement of ,"bekistan and the 'slamic 9ihad ,nion 7 continued to be an issue e en as they operated outside of the 1entral Asian states. #he effecti eness of some 1entral Asian countries efforts to reduce their ulnerability to percei ed terrorist threats !as difficult to discern in some cases, ho!e er, due to failure to distinguish clearly bet!een terrorism and iolent e.tremism on one hand and political opposition, or non-traditional religious practices, on the other. A/4$A&'S#A& - er ie!: Although responsibility for security in Afghanistan has transitioned from ,.S. and international forces to the Afghan &ational Security /orces (A&S/), the ,nited States remains committed to continued political, diplomatic, and economic engagement in Afghanistan as a strategic partner. ,.S. forces retain the capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, but increasingly these operations !ere being carried out in con6unction !ith Afghan units or solely
by Afghan units. 'n ()*+, the ,nited States fully supported Afghan efforts to professionali"e and moderni"e the security forces and !ill continue to train, ad ise, and assist the Afghan forces in these efforts. #he 4o ernment of Afghanistan;s response to the increase of insider attacks in ()*( led to ne! procedures to et and train security force personnel, !hich likely contributed to a dramatic reduction in the number of insider attacks in ()*+. ()*+ #errorist 'ncidents: 'n ()*+, insurgents conducted a significant number of large ehicle-borne impro ised e.plosi e de ice (<5'=>) attacks, targeting 1oalition /orces (1/) bases, military con oys, and Afghan go ernment buildings, mostly in southern and eastern Afghanistan, including 2abul. 'nsurgents across Afghanistan used a ariety of tactics to target Afghan security personnel and 1/ in ma6or cities and rural areas, seeking to e.pand their territorial influence and further disrupt ci il go ernance. 'n ma6or cities, attacks !ere often !ell-coordinated and comple., !ith the intention of garnering media attention? in rural areas, they targeted the A&S/. 'nsurgents carried out se eral targeted assassinations of pro incial Afghan leaders. As in pre ious years, a greater number of attacks occurred during the summer months. $elmand, 2andahar, 4ha"ni, and @ardak represented the most dangerous pro inces for Afghan security personnel and 1/. $igh-profile attacks included: -n 9anuary *A, insurgents conducted a comple. attack against the Afghan 'ntelligence $ead%uarters in 2abul city, killing *0 and !ounding +(. -n 9anuary (A, a suicide bomber killed *) policemen and in6ured *B other security personnel and ci ilians in the northeastern Afghan city of 2undu". Among the ictims !ere the city;s counterterrorism and traffic police chiefs. -n /ebruary (A, a group of *C Afghan 3ocal Police (A3P) recruits !ere shot to death after being drugged by #aliban infiltrators. -n 8arch *+, a suicide bomber detonated his est at a sports e ent in 'mam Sahib >istrict, 2undu" Pro ince !hich resulted in the death of the se en spectators, including the >istrict 1hief of Police, and the !ounding of fi e other ci ilians. -n April +, a group of militants detonated a suicide <5'=> outside a 6udicial building in /arah 1ity, follo!ed by an assault on the /arah 1ourt 5uilding by hea ily-armed suicide bombers in an attempt to free accused #aliban fighters standing trial. #he attack resulted in the deaths of +0 ci ilians, including *( members of the security forces, along !ith nine insurgents. 8ore than *)) others !ere in6ured. -n April A, a suicide bomber detonated a <5'=> near /-5 Smart in Dabul. #he attack resulted in deaths of fi e Americans including three ,.S. soldiers
and a State >epartment diplomat. An additional *E personnel !ere also in6ured. -n 8ay *A, a suicide <5'=> targeted a &A#- con oy on Foute 1rimson in 2abul city, killing si. ,.S. personnel. -n 8ay (0, a suicide attack on an 'nternational -rgani"ation for 8igration ('-8) compound follo!ed by a gun battle killed fi e and !ounded *0, including '-8 staff. -n 9une +, a suicide bomber targeting a 6oint ,.S. and Afghan 3ocal Police dismounted patrol in Samkani >istrict, Paktia Pro ince detonated his e.plosi e-packed motorcycle killing t!o ,.S. soldiers, an Afghan police officer, and *) children from a nearby school. At least t!enty others !ere in6ured by the blast. -n 9une **, t!o suicide bombers detonated <5'=>s in front of Afghanistan;s Supreme 1ourt building in a hea ily fortified area of 2abul. #he attack, !hich targeted buses !ith court employees, killed at least *C people and left do"ens more in6ured. -n 9une (E, a group of eight #aliban fighters !earing American uniforms cleared t!o security check points to enter a hea ily-restricted area in 2abul to assault the Presidential Palace and nearby ,.S. =mbassy facilities. Se en =mbassy local guards !ere killed, as !ell as all eight #aliban fighters. -n August +, a suicide bomber detonated his est outside the 'ndian 1onsulate in 9alalabad killing nine children studying in an ad6acent mos%ue, and !ounding an additional (+ persons in the area, including students. #he three attackers in ol ed !ere also killed. -n August +), a suicide attack at a mos%ue in Qarlugh <illage in 2undu" resulted in the death of the >istrict 4o ernor, his body guard, and *) ci ilians attending a memorial ser ice. An additional (( locals !ere !ounded. -n September *+, suicide bombers detonated a large <5'=> at the entrance to the main gate of the ,.S. 1onsulate in $erat. Shortly after, a second blast occurred !hen an e.plosi es-laden an detonated. Additional suicide bombers then breached the outer perimeter and opened fire on security forces inside, but !ere killed in the ensuing gunfight. =ight ,.S. 1onsulate $erat local national guards !ere killed in this attack. -n -ctober *G, insurgents conducted a suicide <5'=> attack outside of 4reen <illage in 2abul city. #he attack killed t!o American citi"ens and !ounded si.. -n &o ember *A, a suicide bomber in a <5'=> detonated his e.plosi esladen ehicle at a security checkpoint in the icinity of the Afghan 3oya 9irga (a traditional assembly of tribal elders and national and pro incial leaders) site in 2abul. At least *) people !ere killed and as many as () in6ured.
3egislation, 3a! =nforcement, and 5order Security: #he Afghan Attorney 4eneral;s -ffice in estigates and prosecutes iolations of the la!s on crimes against the internal and e.ternal security of the state (*BCA and *BGC), iolations of the 3a! on 1ombat Against #errorist -ffences (())G), and the 3a! on /irearms, Ammunition and =.plosi es (())E), including la!s that prohibit membership in terrorist or insurgent groups as !ell as la!s that forbid iolent acts committed against the state, hostage taking, murder, and the use of e.plosi es against military forces and state infrastructure. #he Antiterrorism Prosecution >epartment handled a total of 0))E cases in ()*+ on both the primary and appellate le els. #he current Afghan Penal 1ode, enacted in *BCA, has gaps, a lack of definitions, disproportionate mandatory fines and sentences, and strict minimum imprisonments that result in o ercro!ded prisons. #he President of Afghanistan has issued a decree re%uiring the 8inistry of 9ustice to reorgani"e and consolidate the penal code. #hat !ork has been undertaken by the 1riminal 3a! Feform @orking 4roup (13F@4), chaired by the 8inister of 9ustice, and staffed by arious international and Afghan partners, including the ,nited States. #he 13F@4 is acti ely discussing ho! the ne! penal code !ill address Sharia la!, gender-related crimes, crimes in ol ing children, and compliance !ith international obligations regarding human rights and other international treaties to !hich Afghanistan is a party. Although the draft 1riminal Procedure 1ode (1P1) !as pending in Parliament at year;s end, it is important to note that se eral pro isions !ithin the draft 1P1 continued to be problematic. 'n particular, the 8inistry of 9ustice inserted ne! pro isions restricting the testimony of family members against the accused. #he 3a! on the Structure and 9urisdiction of the Attorney 4eneral;s -ffice !as enacted in -ctober ()*+, and codified the structure and funding of the e.isting Antiterrorism Protection >irectorate in the Attorney 4eneral;s -ffice, permitting the in estigation and prosecution of terrorist and national security cases using internationally accepted methods and e identiary rules. ,nder the current structure, the A&S/ has demonstrated an ade%uate capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations, in part due to contributions from the international community and pressure from international partners. #he 4o ernments of Afghanistan and the ,nited States in estigated a ariety of criminal acts, including kidnappings and conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. -n se eral occasions, ,.S. la! enforcement bodies assisted the 8inistry of 'nterior, the &ational >irectorate of Security, and other Afghan authorities, !hich enabled them
to take actions to disrupt and dismantle terrorist operations and prosecute terrorist suspects. Afghanistan continued to process tra elers on entry and departure at ma6or points of entry !ith the Personal 'dentification Secure 1omparison and = aluation System (P'S1=S). @ith ,.S. support, Afghan authorities continued to e.pand P'S1=S installations at additional locations. @ith assistance from ,nited States 1entral 1ommand, the >rug =nforcement Administration and the ,.S. >epartment of $omeland Security mentor and support Afghan la! enforcement bodies in interdicting illegal narcotics and arms? the proceeds from smuggling enterprises often support terrorist and insurgent groups. Afghanistan remained an important partner nation in the >epartment of State;s Antiterrorism Assistance (A#A) program, !hich continued to focus on building broader, self-sustaining Afghan security force capacity to protect national leadership, go ernment facilities, and diplomatic facilities, and to impro e Afghan security force agencies coordination and cooperation in response to terrorism-related crisis incidents. 'n addition to a suite of tactical response courses, the A#A program pro ided instructor de elopment and mentorship to Afghan officers to build and institutionali"e a sustained capacity in antiterrorism skills, so they could share lessons learned !ith la! enforcement colleagues tasked !ith counterterrorism response. 'n 8ay, the ,.S. $omeland Security 'n estigations AttachH to =mbassy 2abul and the @orld 1ustoms -rgani"ation (@1-) conducted a counterimpro ised e.plosi e de ice training seminar in support of its 4lobal Shield program for Afghan la! enforcement officers. #he 4lobal Shield course pro ided participants !ith a comprehensi e understanding of risk assessment, targeting, identification of precursor chemicals, basic in estigati e techni%ues, and Afghan prosecution procedures. #hroughout ()*+, $omeland Security 'n estigations ($'S) training led to an increased number of sei"ures of illicit materials by Afghan counternarcotics and counterterrorism police forces. 1ountering the /inancing of #errorism: Afghanistan is a member of the AsiaIPacific 4roup on 8oney 3aundering, a /inancial Action #ask /orce (/A#/)-style regional body. 'n 9une ()*(, Afghanistan !as publicly identified by /A#/ as a 6urisdiction !ith strategic anti-money launderingIcountering the financing of terrorism (A83I1/#) deficiencies. #he 1entral 5ank of Afghanistan confirmed by letter the go ernments high-le el commitment to implement an action plan to address these deficiencies. 'n -ctober ()*+, the /A#/ noted key deficiencies that had not yet been addressed, including: ade%uately criminali"ing money laundering and terrorist financing? establishing and implementing an ade%uate legal frame!ork for identifying,
tracing and free"ing terrorist assets? implementing an ade%uate A83I1/# super isory and o ersight program for all financial sectors? establishing and implementing ade%uate procedures for the confiscation of assets related to money laundering? establishing a fully operational and effecti ely functioning financial intelligence unit? and establishing and implementing effecti e controls for cross-border cash transactions. 'n addition to the problems /A#/ identified, the ast narcotics trafficking trade and bulk cash smuggling ha e been significant sources of re enue for terrorist groups. /oreign terrorist organi"ations !ere operating in Afghanistan and neighboring countries and both fundraised and sent funds from Afghanistan. #errorist finance in estigations in Afghanistan ha e continued to be hampered by a !eak or non-e.istent legal and regulatory regime, coupled !ith lack of capacity and political !ill. /or further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the ()*0 'nternational &arcotics 1ontrol Strategy Feport ('&1SF), <olume (, 8oney 3aundering and /inancial 1rimes: http://www.state. ov/!/inl/rls/nr"rpt/inde#.htm. Fegional and 'nternational 1ooperation: Afghanistan consistently emphasi"ed the need to strengthen 6oint cooperation to fight terrorism and iolent e.tremism in a ariety of bilateral and multilateral fora. &otable among such meetings !ere the regular discussions of the ,.S.-AfghanistanPakistan 1ore 4roup? the 'stanbul Process? and meetings of the -rgani"ation of 'slamic 1ooperation, the ,& Fegional 1entre for Pre enti e >iplomacy for 1entral Asia, the ,& -ffice of >rugs and 1rime, the Shanghai 1ooperation -rgani"ation, and other bodies. Afghanistan shares the lead on the 1ounterterrorism 1onfidence 5uilding 8easure (158) of the 'stanbul Process, !orking closely !ith #urkey and the ,nited Arab =mirates. 'n August ()*+, the 158 Fegional #echnical 4roup met to discuss '=> Precursors in Abu >habi and identified strategies to !ork together !ith Pakistan to help eliminate the shipment of precursors o er the border into Afghanistan. 1ountering Fadicali"ation to <iolence and <iolent =.tremism: Afghan go ernment programs to counter iolent e.tremism continued through increased engagement !ith religious communities. According to most estimates, o er B) percent of Afghan mos%ues and madrassas, operated independently of go ernment o ersight, !ith some promoting a iolent e.tremist ideology. #he 8inistry of $a66 and Feligious Affairs (8o$FA), as
!ell as the >epartment of 'slamic =ducation at the 8inistry of =ducation, continued efforts to register more mos%ues and madrassas !ith limited success. #he 8o$FA also disseminated peaceful messages in its /riday sermons to both its affiliated mos%ues and some non-registered ones. #he &ational ,lema 1ouncil, a %uasi-go ernmental body of religious scholars established by President 2ar"ai in ())(, became more ocal in condemning suicide attacks as un-'slamic. #he Afghanistan Peace and Feintegration Program (APFP) continued to reintegrate lo!- and mid-le el insurgents back into their communities. #he APFP is a &ational Priority Program of the Afghan go ernment, is managed by the $igh Peace 1ouncil ($P1), and e.ecuted at the national le el by the 9oint Secretariat (9S). #he $P1 and 9S !ork !ith the Pro incial Peace committees and Pro incial 9oint Secretariat teams to effecti ely e.ecute the program at the pro incial le el. 5y 6oining the program, the former fighter makes the commitment to renounce iolence and se er all ties !ith the insurgency, and to abide by the 1onstitution of Afghanistan. #his includes accepting the 4o ernment of Afghanistan;s la!s on !omen;s rights. Since its inception, the APFP has successfully reintegrated o er C,0)) former combatants across Afghanistan.
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- er ie!: #he 4o ernment of 5angladesh has demonstrated political !ill and firm commitment to combat domestic and transnational terrorist groups, and its counterterrorism efforts made it harder for transnational terrorists to operate or establish safe ha ens in 5angladesh. 5angladesh and the ,nited States signed a 1ounterterrorism 1ooperation 'nitiati e to enhance counterterrorism cooperation as an important element of its bilateral partnership and engagement. 'n ()*+, ,.S. assistance supported programs for 5angladeshi ci ilian, la! enforcement, and military counterparts to build their capacity to monitor, detect, and pre ent terrorism. 3egislation, 3a! =nforcement, and 5order Security: 5angladeshs criminal 6ustice system !as in the process of fully implementing the Antiterrorism Act of ())B. 'n ()*+, Parliament passed into la! e.tensi e amendments to the A#A. #he amendments, !hich !ere drafted !ith technical assistance from the >epartment of 9ustice and e.perts from the ,.S. >epartment of #reasury, bring 5angladesh into greater compliance !ith international standards. Significant impro ements ha e been made to the la!, including more e.tensi e criminali"ation of terrorist financing, prohibitions on supporting indi iduals (rather than simply organi"ations) !ho engage in terrorist acti ity, and an ability to promptly free"e funds and assets of those
engaged in or supporting terrorism. Parliament also enacted the 1hildren Act in ()*+, !hich pro ides for capital punishment of those con icted of e.ploiting children to commit terrorist acts and pro ided for the appointment of a 1hildrens Affairs -fficer in e ery police station. 'n 9anuary, 5angladesh police arrested three suspected #ehrik-e #aliban Pakistan (##P) terrorists. 5angladesh cooperated !ith the ,nited States to further strengthen control of its borders and land, sea, and air ports of entry. 5angladesh continued to participate in the >epartment of State;s Antiterrorism Assistance (A#A) program, and 5angladesh &ational Police (5&P) officers recei ed training in crisis response, border security, and in estigations. An A#A program team met !ith 5angladeshi la! enforcement and ,.S. embassy officials in September, and the outcomes of these meetings !ill contribute to the de elopment of A#A program ob6ecti es to build 5angladeshi incident management and e.pand 5angladesh 5order 4uards (554) security capacity. 'n &o ember, a senior le el delegation representing a cross section of 5angladeshi security and public safety entities tra eled to the ,.S. to participate in a fi e-day crisis management seminar. #he course included table top e.ercises designed to help participants effecti ely prepare for, manage, control, and support a coordinated response to a critical incident of national importance. 5angladesh also cooperated !ith the >epartment of 9ustices efforts to pro ide prosecutorial skills training to its assistant public prosecutors, encourage greater cooperation bet!een police and prosecutors, and institute community policing in targeted areas of the country. 1ountering the /inancing of #errorism: 5angladesh is a member of the AsiaIPacific 4roup on 8oney 3aundering, a /inancial Action #ask /orce (/A#/)-style regional body. #he 5angladesh 5ank (the central bank) and its financial intelligence unitIanti-money laundering section lead the go ernment;s effort to comply !ith the international sanctions regime. Significant impro ements to its Antiterrorism Act ha e allo!ed 5angladesh to start the path of successfully e.iting the /A#/ 'nternational 1ooperation Fe ie! 4roup process. #he presence and large-scale use of informal alue transfer systems such as ha!alas and the hundi system of remittances pro ide channels for e.ploitation by terrorists. 'n the formal financial sector, la! enforcement rarely uses its po!ers to free"e and confiscate assets. /or further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the ()*0 'nternational &arcotics 1ontrol Strategy Feport ('&1SF), <olume (, 8oney 3aundering and /inancial 1rimes: http://www.state. ov/!/inl/rls/nr"rpt/inde#.htm. Fegional and 'nternational 1ooperation: 5angladesh is acti e in the full range of international fora. 5angladesh is party to arious counterterrorism
protocols under the South Asian Association for Fegional 1ooperation and is bringing the countrys counterterrorism efforts in line !ith the four pillars of the ,& 4lobal 1ounter-#errorism Strategy. 5angladeshs foreign and domestic policies are hea ily influenced by the regions ma6or po!ers, particularly 'ndia. 'n past years, the 'ndia-5angladesh relationship has pro ided openings for transnational threats, but the current go ernment has demonstrated its interest in regional cooperation on counterterrorism. 't has signed memoranda of understanding !ith a number of countries to share e idence regarding criminal in estigations, including in estigations related to financial crimes and terrorist financing. 1ountering Fadicali"ation to <iolence and <iolent =.tremism: 5angladesh uses strategic communication to counter iolent e.tremism, especially among youth. #he 8inistry of =ducation o ersees madrassas and is de eloping a standard national curriculum that includes language, math, and science modules, as !ell as minimum standards of secular sub6ects to be taught in all primary schools, up to the eighth grade. #he 8inistry of Feligious Affairs and the &ational 1ommittee on 8ilitancy Fesistance and Pre ention !ork !ith imams and religious scholars to build public a!areness against terrorism. #he 4o ernment of 5angladesh is also acti ely e.panding economic opportunities for !omen as a stabili"ing force against iolent religious e.tremism.
'&>'A
- er ie!: According to the &ational 1onsortium for the Study of #errorism and Fesponses to #errorism (S#AF#), appro.imately 0)) people !ere killed as a result of terrorist attacks in 'ndia in ()*+. #his figure is some!hat higher than in ()*(, demonstrating that 'ndia remains sub6ect to iolent terrorist attacks and continued to be one of the most persistently targeted countries by transnational and domestic terrorist groups. 'ncluded in the total number of fatalities !ere appro.imately ()) deaths ascribed to the 1ommunist Party of 'ndia (8aoist) or 8aoistI&a.alite iolence, !hich the 'ndian go ernment considers its most serious internal security threat. #o date, these groups ha e not specifically targeted ,.S. or other international interests. 'n ()*+, 'ndian sources continued to attribute iolence and deaths in 9ammu and 2ashmir to transnational terrorist groups that 'ndia alleges are backed by Pakistan. 1ontinued allegations of iolations of the 3ine of 1ontrol bet!een 'ndia and Pakistan (the border along 9ammu and 2ashmir), Pakistans failure to bring the perpetrators of the ())G 8umbai attacks to 6ustice, and acti ities of Pakistan-based terrorist groups remained serious concerns for the 'ndian go ernment.
#he ,nited States and 'ndia maintained counterterrorism capacity building efforts and cooperation. 'n 8ay ()*+, the Second ,.S.-'ndia $omeland Security >ialogue took place in @ashington, >1, and 'ndian and ,.S. leaders reaffirmed their commitment to, and the importance of, bilateral counterterrorism cooperation. 'n >ecember, 'ndia hosted the ,.S.-'ndia $omeland Security >ialogue Police 1hiefs 1onference, a landmark e ent that brought together ,.S. and 'ndian la! enforcement officials to share best practices and lessons learned in detecting, pre enting, and responding to threats facing large cities, including terrorist threats. 'ndian officials participated in courses pro ided through the >epartment of States Antiterrorism Assistance (A#A) program and through other regional capacity building programs. 'n addition, the ,.S. /ederal 5ureau of 'n estigation, through the =mbassys -ffice of the 3egal AttachH, conducted e.changes !ith 'ndian la! enforcement personnel. ()*+ #errorist 'ncidents: Significant terrorist incidents included the follo!ing: -n /ebruary (*, terrorists e.ploded t!o bombs in >ilsukhnagar, a cro!ded shopping area !ithin $yderabad. #he bombs e.ploded !ithin ++) feet of each other, killing *C and in6uring at least **B. Authorities determined that the 'ndian 8u6ahideen ('8) carried out the attack. -n April *C, a motorcycle bomb !as detonated in front of the 5haratiya 9anata Party (59P) head%uarters in the 8alles!aram district of 5angalore, in6uring *G people. /ollo!ing the blast, authorities arrested *E suspects !ith alleged links to the al-,mmah terrorist organi"ation. -n 8ay (E, &a.alite insurgents belonging to the 1ommunist Party of 'ndia (8aoist) attacked a con oy of 'ndian &ational 1ongress party leaders in the >arbha <alley in the Sukma district of 1hhattisgarh, 'ndia. #he attack killed (C, including former state minister 8ahendra 2arma as !ell as 'ndias former 8inister of =.ternal Affairs <idya 1haran Shukla. -n 9uly C, a series of *) bombs e.ploded in and around the 8ahabodhi #emple comple., a ,&=S1- @orld $eritage Site in 5odh 4aya. /i e people, including t!o 5uddhist monks, !ere in6ured by the blasts. 5omb-disposal s%uads defused three other de ices at a number of locations in 4aya. Authorities determined that '8 !as responsible for the bombings. -n September (A, Pakistan-based terrorists entered 9ammu and 2ashmir and attacked a police station in $iranagar, killing fi e? and an 'ndian army camp in Samba, killing *), including an army officer. #he attacks took place 6ust ahead of a planned meeting bet!een 'ndian Prime 8inister 8anmohan Singh and Pakistani Prime 8inister &a!a" Sharif in &e! Jork. -n -ctober (C, '8 operati es detonated a series of bombs at a political rally for the 59P, and its prime ministerial candidate, &arendra 8odi, in Patna,
5ihar. #he attacks killed at least si. and in6ured GE. 3egislation, 3a! =nforcement, and 5order Security: 'ndia passed no ne! counterterrorism la!s in ()*+. #he country continued to apply pre iouslyenacted measures, including the ,nla!ful Acti ities (Pre ention) Act (*BAC), the SAAF1 1on ention on Suppression of #errorism Act (*BB+), and arious state-le el la!s. /ollo!ing the ())G 8umbai terrorist attacks, 'ndia enhanced efforts to counter terrorism through agencies including the 1entral 5ureau of 'n estigation (15'), the &ational Security 4uard (&S4), and the &ational 'n estigation Agency (&'A). 'ndias efforts to counter terrorism are seriously hampered by impediments to coordination and information sharing bet!een agencies. 'n addition, la! enforcement organi"ations display a limited command and control capacity. 'ndia has launched initiati es to address some of these challenges, including through a 8ulti-Agency 1entre for enhancing intelligence gathering and sharing. 't also plans to implement the &ational 'ntelligence 4rid (&A#4F'>), a system for linking databases in different go ernment departments and ministries for use by intelligence agencies. #he 'ndian go ernment had proposed to create a &ational 1ounterterrorism 1entre, but state-le el officials ha e opposed this initiati e and it has not been implemented. -n >ecember *A, the ,.S. #ransportation Security Administration and the 'ndian 5ureau of 1i il A iation Security signed a Sensiti e Security 'nformation-sharing agreement to enhance cooperation on a iation security, increase collaboration on security-related technologies, increase reciprocal isits for airport security assessments, and facilitate the e.change of ideas and best practices for security at airport points of entry. 'ndian airport officials already utili"e biographical databases for counterterrorism screening. 'n an effort to boost its border security, 'ndia continued to build fences along its borders !ith Pakistan and 5angladesh, although rural areas remained susceptible to illegal border crossings. 'ndias maritime boundaries, as !ell as its border !ith &epal, remained e.tremely porous. 'ndia continued to participate in the >epartment of States A#A program, and recei ed training and e%uipment designed to build 'ndian police counterterrorism capacity. A#A training focused on issues related to securing infrastructure, conducting in estigations, and responding to critical incidents. 1ountering the /inancing of #errorism: 'ndia is a member of the /inancial Action #ask /orce (/A#/) and t!o /A#/-style regional bodies, the =urasian
4roup on 1ombating 8oney 3aundering and #errorist /inancing and the AsiaIPacific 4roup on 8oney 3aundering. 'ndias financial intelligence unit is also a member of the =gmont 4roup of /inancial 'ntelligence ,nits. 'ndia has criminali"ed terrorist financing in accordance !ith international standards. 'ndian officials monitor and regulate money transfers, re%uire the collection of data for !ire transfers, oblige non-profit organi"ations to file suspicious transaction reports, and regulate and monitor these entities to pre ent misuse and terrorist financing. $o!e er, the go ernment does not ha e procedures in place for free"ing and confiscating terrorist assets !ithout delay and does not routinely distribute ,& lists of designated entities to financial institutions. 'n &o ember ()*(, the 4o ernment of 'ndia passed amendments to the Pre ention of 8oney 3aundering Act (P83A) that aligned the la! to international standards. #he degree of training and e.pertise in financial in estigations in ol ing transnational crime or terrorist-affiliated groups aries !idely among the federal, state, and local le els and depends on the particular 6urisdictions financial resources and percei ed necessities. ,.S. in estigators ha e had limited success in coordinating the sei"ure of illicit proceeds !ith their 'ndian go ernment counterparts. @hile intelligence and in estigati e information supplied by ,.S. la! enforcement authorities ha e led to numerous money sei"ures, a lack of follo!-through on in estigational leads has pre ented a more comprehensi e offensi e against iolators and related groups. #he 'ndian go ernment is taking steps to increase financial inclusion through Ksmall LbankingM accounts,N and issuing a biometric-enabled uni ersal identification number. 'nternational e.perts ha e urged 'ndia to further the de elopment and e.pansion of alternati e money transfer ser ices in the financial sector, including mobile banking, domestic funds transfer, and foreign remittances in order to allo! broader financial inclusion of legitimate indi iduals and entities and reduce o erall A83I1/# ulnerabilities. 'ndias reporting structure only protects principal officersIcompliance officers of institutions !ho file suspicious acti ity reports in good faith. #he lack of protection for staff or employees of these institutions !ho report may limit the number of reports recei ed. /or further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the ()*0 'nternational &arcotics 1ontrol Strategy Feport ('&1SF), <olume (, 8oney 3aundering and /inancial 1rimes: http://www.state. ov/!/inl/rls/nr"rpt/inde#.htm.
Fegional and 'nternational 1ooperation: 'ndia is a founding member of the 4lobal 1ounterterrorism /orum (41#/) and participated in 41#/ and ,& forums on counterterrorism. #he ()*+ arrests of high-profile terrorists Abdul 2arim #unda and Jasin 5hatkal cast a spotlight on 'ndias counterterrorism cooperation !ith neighbors, in this case, &epal. 'ndia sought greater cooperation !ith &epal in managing the t!o countries shared border, and it appeared that &epal !as taking steps to achie e this. >uring ()*+, the 'ndian and 5angladeshi go ernments continued their cooperation under their bilateral 1oordinated 5order 8anagement Plan to control illegal cross-border acti ities and announced the strengthening of bilateral cooperation in the field of security and border management through additional cooperation agreements. 1ountering Fadicali"ation to <iolence and <iolent =.tremism: 'ndias counter-radicali"ation and iolent e.tremism efforts are mostly directed by state and local authorities. @hile there is no comprehensi e national policy for countering radicali"ation or iolent e.tremism, the go ernment has implemented some initiati es to counter iolent e.tremism, such as offering %uality and modern education in madrassas. 'n addition, the go ernment has programs to rehabilitate and integrate arious groups, mostly insurgents, back into the mainstream of society, such as the KScheme for Surrender cum-Fehabilitation of militants in &orth =ast.N @hile not a 1<= program per se, it is directed at disaffected members of 'ndian society !ho support separatist and at times iolent mo ements. 'ndian go ernment officials ha e raised concerns about ho! social media and the internet can be used to stir communal unrest and radicali"ation.
2ADA2$S#A&
- er ie!: #he 4o ernment of 2a"akhstan passed ne! counterterrorism legislation and continued to de elop its national program for countering terrorism and !hat it refers to as Kreligious e.tremism,N !ith efforts to establish ne! interagency counterterrorism bodies at the national, regional, and local le els. #he national program outlines the responsibilities of each go ernment agency and ministry to pre ent andIor respond to acts of terrorism, !ith a strong focus on social and educational programs that are intended to form a "ero-tolerance approach for citi"ens, especially youth, against the influence of terrorist or Ke.tremistN ideas. 5road, ague definitions of terrorism and so-called Kreligious e.tremismN sometimes led to the arrest and prosecution of indi iduals and religious groups that are peaceful.
#he 4o ernment of 2a"akhstan has e.pressed an interest in increasing counterterrorism cooperation !ith the ,nited States, particularly in the areas of information sharing and la! enforcement cooperation, and in the de elopment of 2a"akhstani capability to conduct special counterterrorism operations. 3egislation, 3a! =nforcement, and 5order Security: 2a"akhstani legislation criminali"es terrorist acts and e.tremist Kpropaganda.N 5road, ague definitions of terrorism and religious e.tremism sometimes lead to the arrest and prosecution of indi iduals and groups that are engaged in apparently peaceful acti ities. &e! legislation adds the forfeiture of property to the potential sentences for all terrorism-related crimes. 'n 9anuary, President &ursultan &a"arbaye appro ed changes and amendments to 2a"akhstans e.isting counterterrorism legislation that pro ided ne! definitions for se eral legal terms relating to terrorism and iolent e.tremism, assigned counterterrorism roles and responsibilities to (A go ernment agencies, and created a frame!ork for the go ernments national counterterrorism program, including the establishment of national, regional, and local counterterrorism centers. #he go ernments ambitious ne! counterterrorism plan en isions e.tensi e interagency cooperation and coordination, but cooperation, coordination, and information-sharing are limited in practice and certain go ernment agencies dominate counterterrorism operations. #here are four special counterterrorism detachments under the 8inistry of 'nternal Affairs and one under the &ational Security 1ommittee. #he ne! state program for la! enforcement de elopment pro ides for the creation of ne! counterterrorist detachments and enhanced training for such units. >etails of the implementation of the national counterterrorism program are being defined primarily through specific byla!s, e.ecuti e orders, and go ernment decrees. /or e.ample, the go ernment issued decrees identifying facilities ulnerable to terrorist threats, a public outreach system that includes codes corresponding to current threat le els, and procedures for compensating ictims of terrorist acts. &e ertheless, a lack of capacity and the go ernments general lack of respect for human rights constrained more effecti e 2a"akhstani go ernment counterterrorism efforts in ()*+. 3a! enforcement units demonstrated the capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist plots? la! enforcement officials made numerous arrests of people belie ed to be terrorists or iolent e.tremists, but also of peaceful religious figures. 2a"akhstan continued to participate in the >epartment of States Antiterrorism Assistance program and recei ed training in incident
response. 2a"akhstans security forces, including military and la! enforcement, are undergoing a process of professionali"ation and reform !ith the goal of more effecti ely discharging their duties. #o date, ho!e er, security forces ha e a poor record of accountability and respect for human rights. Parliamentarians critici"ed la! enforcement bodies for the tendency to KeliminateN or kill members of suspected terrorist groups rather than capture them for %uestioning, but there is a lack of transparency about the specific circumstances of counterterrorism operations. @e refer you to the State >epartments 1ountry Feports on $uman Fight Practices for ()*+ for further information:http://www.state. ov/!/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanri htsreport/inde#.htm$ wrapper. 2a"akhstani officials announced the arrest and prosecution of numerous indi iduals and groups on charges of terrorism or e.tremism. #rials of small groups of alleged e.tremists ha e become fre%uent throughout 2a"akhstan. Sentences typically range from fi e to *E years in prison. -ne group !as accused of planning to attack senior host go ernment officials and bomb se eral landmark sites in the capital. As a testament to 2a"akhstans gro!ing cooperation !ith the ,nited States, the Prosecutor 4eneral of 2a"akhstan tra eled to @ashington in >ecember ()*+ and met !ith heads of federal la! enforcement agencies. 'n a meeting !ith the /5' >irector, the t!o parties discussed bilateral 6udicial cooperation in countering terrorism. 1ountering the /inancing of #errorism: 2a"akhstan belongs to the =urasian 4roup on 1ombating 8oney 3aundering and the /inance of #errorism (=A4), a /inancial Action #ask /orce-style regional body. #he /inancial 8onitoring 1ommittee under the 8inistry of /inance recorded +A) cases of terrorist financing in ()*+. #he latest =A4 e aluation, done in ()**, found 2a"akhstan non-compliant in reporting suspicious transactions. #here is no re%uirement for non-profit organi"ations to file suspicious transaction reports. A further e aluation !as scheduled, but !as postponed by 2a"akhstan in order to properly prepare for the e aluation. /or further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the ()*0 'nternational &arcotics 1ontrol Strategy Feport ('&1SF), <olume (, 8oney 3aundering and /inancial 1rimes: http://www.state. ov/!/inl/rls/nr"rpt/inde#.htm. Fegional and 'nternational 1ooperation: #he 2a"akhstani Prosecutor 4enerals -ffice cooperated !ith the -S1= on countering iolent e.tremism
and terrorism through 6oint !orkshops. 1ountering Fadicali"ation to <iolence and <iolent =.tremism: #he go ernments counterterrorism efforts focused hea ily on the pre ention of radicali"ation, !ith particular efforts to educate youth and pro ide positi e alternati es through social programs and economic opportunities, but the results of these nascent programs are unclear. 2a"akhstans legislation on religious beliefs and practices is unnecessarily restricti e, and might engender iolent resistance from peaceful religious groups that e.perience go ernment repression. @e refer you to the >epartment of States Annual Feport to 1ongress on 'nternational Feligious /reedom (http://www.state. ov/!/drl/ir%/rpt/inde#.htm) for further information. 2a"akhstans recent strategy in countering radicali"ation and religious e.tremism focuses on pre enti e messaging to ulnerable groups, primarily young people and prison inmates. State-sponsored &4-s and local officials offer lectures to students in secondary schools, ocational schools, and uni ersities. #he lectures focused on religious groups the go ernment considers to be Kdestructi e,N !hich include peaceful Knon-traditionalN religious groups. #he program aims to make young people KimmuneN to religious e.tremism and includes go ernment publications on KproperN religious alues. 8edia ha e aired inter ie!s !ith former terrorists !ho publicly state that they regret their deeds, including an inter ie! !ith young men !ho said they illegally crossed the #urkish-Syrian border to fight alongside Syrian insurgents because of the influence of Kinternet propaganda.N -ne of 2a"akhstans national ne!s agencies aired a segment that sho!ed the men repenting of their actions and appealing to 2a"akhstani 8uslims not to follo! in their footsteps.
2JF4JDS#A&
- er ie!: 'n ()*+, there !ere no reported terrorist attacks in 2yrgy"stan. $o!e er, 2yrgy"stani security forces arrested se eral indi iduals suspected of affiliation !ith terrorist organi"ations and terrorist acti ities abroad. Security forces became more a!are of increased recruitment of citi"ens for terrorist acts in Syria. -n >ecember (A, the 4o ernment of 2yrgy"stan arrested one fighter !ho reportedly returned from Syria. #he 4o ernment of 2yrgy"stan is committed to pre enting terrorist attacks and reaches out to international organi"ations and foreign go ernments that can pro ide training and technical assistance. #he country remains ulnerable, ho!e er, especially in the south !here conflicts on the border
!ith #a6ikistan and ,"bekistan and lack of central go ernment control of the mountainous border are an issue. #he 4o ernment of 2yrgy"stan is also concerned about the potential for an influ. of terrorist elements into its territory follo!ing the !ithdra!al of 'SA/ troops from Afghanistan in ()*0. 3egislation, 3a! =nforcement, and 5order Security: 'n ()*+, the State 1ommittee for &ational Security (42&5) remained the main go ernment organi"ation tasked !ith countering terrorism. 't arrested se eral indi iduals based on their alleged connections to terrorist organi"ations, including those linked to $i"b-ut-#ahrir, !hich the 2yrgy"stani go ernment designated as a terrorist organi"ation in ())+. =mbassy officials report positi e cooperation !ith 2yrgy"stans main counterterrorism bodies 7 the 42&5 and the 8-'. 'n &o ember ()*+, the 2yrgy"stani Parliament appro ed a la! aimed at impro ing interagency cooperation and regulations in the field of counterterrorism. #he la! addressed the integration of international agreements and impro ements in streamlining regulations for counterterrorism acti ities. #he ne! legislation also reduced the number of people re%uired in order for a mass gathering to recei e additional security and protection from terrorist attacks. #his !ill allo! more e ents to %ualify for an increased police presence. Although the 42&5s antiterrorism unit has demonstrated the capacity to %uickly react to bomb scares or other potential terrorist threats, it has limited capacity to act to counter the threat in practice. 't lacks both speciali"ed training and e%uipment. #here remains strong political !ill and desire for increased capacity building and ac%uisition of e%uipment and all la! enforcement entities demonstrated a desire for cooperation !ith international organi"ations. 2yrgy"stani police officers continued to participate in the >epartment of States Antiterrorism Assistance (A#A) program, and recei ed training focused on enhancing la! enforcement capacity to secure 2yrgy"stans airports and conduct terrorism-related in estigations. #he A#A program continued to focus on strengthening police capacity to secure the countrys borders. #he border guards and customs ser ice also cooperated closely !ith =mbassy 5ishkeks =.port 1ontrol and Felated 5order Security Assistance (=O5S) office. =O5S is funding construction of additional border to!ers and pro iding reno ations and enhancements to e.isting border to!ers along the southern borders of 2yrgy"stan !ith ,"bekistan and #a6ikistan. #he -S1=, through its 1ommunity Security 'nitiati e (1S') continued to support
an embedded police ad isor !ith la! enforcement agencies in each region of 2yrgy"stan, !hich began follo!ing ethnic clashes bet!een ethnic 2yrgy" and ,"beks in ()*) in the southern regions of -sh and 9alalabad. Along !ith community policing, the ad isors train local la! enforcement officials on ho! to identify potential terrorist attacks. #he 4o ernment of 2yrgy"stan does not maintain a terrorist screening !atch list. 't also does not ha e biographic or biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry. Although internal information sharing !ithin the host go ernment increased in ()*+, it still needs impro ement. 'nformation sharing !ith other countries happened rarely and usually only by re%uest in the conte.t of a human trafficking or other organi"ed crime in estigation. #he 4o ernment of 2yrgy"stan does not collect ad ance passenger name records on commercial flights. 'n August, the 42&5 arrested t!o citi"ens of 2yrgy"stan and a citi"en of 2a"akhstan !ho !ere suspected members of a terrorist cell in southern 2yrgy"stan. According to 42&5, the suspects intended to e.ecute a series of attacks in 2yrgy"stan on behalf of foreign sponsors. #he suspects purchased !eapons, e.plosi e materials, and communication e%uipment. 'n September, 42&5 Special /orces facilitated the repatriation of t!o 2yrgy"stani recruits from Syria, !orking in collaboration !ith relati es of the recruits. 't is not clear ho! many 2yrgy"stani nationals remain in Syria. -n >ecember (A, an alleged fighter !ho returned from Syria !as arrested in 5atken pro ince under suspicion of attempting to recruit local 2yrgy"stani citi"ens for membership into an unnamed terrorist group. >eterrents to more effecti e host go ernment la! enforcement measures against terrorism include interagency ri alries, a lack of coordination bet!een the 42&5 and the 8-', and budgetary constraints. 'nefficient So iet-era bureaucratic structures, lo! salaries, and fre%uent personnel turno er hampered la! enforcement efforts. 2yrgy"stani counterterrorist units remained largely untested in real-life situations. 1ountering the /inancing of #errorism: 2yrgy"stan belongs to the =urasian 4roup on 1ombating 8oney 3aundering and the /inance of #errorism (=A4), a /inancial Action #ask /orce (/A#/)-style regional body. 'n -ctober ()**, 2yrgy"stan made a high-le el political commitment to !ork !ith the /A#/ and =A4 to address its strategic anti-money launderingIcounterterrorist finance (A83I1/#) deficiencies. Since then, 2yrgy"stan has taken steps to!ards impro ing its A83I1/# regime. $o!e er, the /A#/ called for the country to address its remaining deficiencies: the criminali"ation of money laundering in accordance !ith international standards? impro ing the frame!ork for free"ing terrorist assets? and impro ing the A83I1/#
super isory program. 'n ()*(, the 4o ernment of 2yrgy"stan established a 1ommission on 1ombating the /inancing of #errorism but it !as largely inacti e in ()*+. /or further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the ()*0 'nternational &arcotics 1ontrol Strategy Feport ('&1SF), <olume (, 8oney 3aundering and /inancial 1rimes: http://www.state. ov/!/inl/rls/nr"rpt/inde#.htm. Fegional and 'nternational 1ooperation: 'n ()*+, 2yrgy"stan participated in counterterrorism acti ities organi"ed by the -S1=, the 1ommon!ealth of 'ndependent States (1'S) Antiterrorism 1enter, and the 1ollecti e Security #reaty -rgani"ation (1S#-). #he ,.S. military conducted eight counterterrorism training e ents !ith the 42&5, the 'nterior 8inistry, the >efense 8inistry, and the 5order Ser ice. #hese e ents !ere designed to teach units to perform typical military tasks !hile respecting human rights and the safety of noncombatants.
8A3>'<=S
- er ie!: 8aldi es, an archipelago consisting of nearly *,()) coral islands grouped into (A atolls, is strategically located close to international sea lanes bisecting the 'ndian -cean. Since ()*), concerns about the acti ities of a small number of local iolent e.tremists in ol ed !ith transnational terrorist groups ha e been mounting. #here has been particular concern that young 8aldi ians, including those !ithin the penal system, may be at risk of becoming radicali"ed and 6oining iolent 'slamist e.tremist groups. 3inks ha e been made bet!een 8aldi ians and iolent e.tremists throughout the !orld. 3egislation, 3a! =nforcement, and 5order Security: 'n ()*+, the 8aldi ian go ernment arrested se eral people possibly associated !ith iolent e.tremism. $o!e er, since e.isting la!s and la! enforcement processes se erely limit the ability of la! enforcement agencies to prosecute such cases, the number of con ictions !as limited. 8aldi es continued to participate in the >epartment of States Antiterrorism Assistance (A#A) program. A#A training focused on building capacity in counterterrorism leadership and management, critical target protection, and crisis management. A#A training included courses in securing maritime and other ital infrastructure from terrorism-related threats. #he State >epartment also pro ided training to more than *)) 8aldi ian immigration officers in fraudulent tra el document recognition. 8aldi es has fe! la!s that effecti ely control the mo ement of people and money in and out of the country. >ue to its spra!ling island geography and
insufficient technological capabilities, the 8aldi ian 1oast 4uard currently cannot effecti ely patrol 8aldi ian !aters. 'n August, the 8aldi ian go ernment !orked !ith the ,nited States to upgrade its border security !ith installation of the P'S1=S system (Personal 'dentification Secure 1omparison and = aluation System) at 8aldi es main international airport and at 8alH Seaport. 1ountering the /inancing of #errorism: 8aldi es is a member of the AsiaIPacific 4roup on 8oney 3aundering, a /inancial Action #ask /orce-style regional body. 8aldi ian authorities belie e that funds are currently being raised in 8aldi es to support terrorism abroad? ho!e er, there is no reliable information regarding the amounts in ol ed. @hile no official studies yet ha e been conducted, the 8aldi ian 1entral 5ank belie es that criminal proceeds mainly come from domestic sources, as a large percentage of Suspicious #ransaction Feports (S#Fs) are related to 8aldi ians. #he 8aldi es 8onetary Authority reports that ha!ala systems (informal money transfer net!orks) are being used to transfer funds bet!een the islands, although the e.tent to !hich these systems are used to launder money is still unclear. #he 8aldi ian go ernment monitors banks, the insurance sector, money remittance institutions and finance companies, and re%uires the collection of data for !ire transfers. /inancial institutions other than banks and intermediaries in the securities sector, ho!e er, are not sub6ect to current anti-money launderingIcountering the financing of terrorism (A83I1/#) obligations. 'nsurance companies and intermediaries, finance companies, money remittance ser ice pro iders, foreign e.change businesses, and credit card companies therefore operate outside the A83I1/# frame!ork. 8aldi es does not currently re%uire non-profit organi"ations to file suspicious transaction reports, nor does it regulate or monitor those organi"ations to pre ent misuse and terrorist financing. #he 8aldi ian go ernment implements ,&S1Fs *(AC (*BBB) and follo!-on resolutions and *+C+ (())*), and monitors and regulates alternati e remittance ser ices, despite the fact that they lie outside the A83I1/# frame!ork. #he 8aldi ian go ernment did not report any efforts to sei"e terrorist assets in ()*+. According to the 8aldi ian go ernment, capacity building of rele ant super isory and regulatory authorities (such as the 8aldi es 8onetary Authority and the 1apital 8arket >e elopment Authority), as !ell as la! enforcement authorities (the Anti-1orruption 1ommission, >epartment of 'mmigration and =migration, 8aldi es 1ustoms Ser ice, and 8aldi es Police Ser ice), and the 6udiciary is needed in order to properly counter money
laundering and terrorist financing. /or further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the ()*0 'nternational &arcotics 1ontrol Strategy Feport ('&1SF), <olume (, 8oney 3aundering and /inancial 1rimes: http://www.state. ov/!/inl/rls/nr"rpt/inde#.htm. Fegional and 'nternational 1ooperation: #he 8aldi ian go ernment cooperated closely !ith 'ndian security forces, !ho offered regular support in the form of assets and training to 8aldi ian security forces. #he 8aldi ian go ernment also cooperated closely !ith the Sri 3ankan go ernment. 1ountering Fadicali"ation to <iolence and <iolent =.tremism: #he 8aldi ian go ernment continued to recogni"e that counter-radicali"ation efforts form a critical component to long-term success against iolent e.tremism and pursued initiati es in this area. 'n ()*+, the 8inistry of 'slamic Affairs conducted more than a do"en seminars and !orkshops on pre enting iolent e.tremism for religious leaders, educators, and local go ernment officials.
&=PA3
- er ie!: &epal e.perienced no significant acts of international terrorism in ()*+, although its open border !ith 'ndia and !eak controls at 2athmandus #ribhu an 'nternational Airport raised concerns that international terrorist groups could use &epal as a transit point. ()*+ #errorist 'ncidents: -n 8arch *+, a group of attackers ambushed a motorcade including ,nified 1ommunist Party of &epal (8aoist) (,1P&(8)) 1hairman Pushpa 2amal >ahal (aka KPrachandaN) en route to a campaign e ent in 2anchanpur. 8edia reported that a landmine e.ploded near the lead car, but nobody !as in6ured. 'n the run-up to the &o ember *B 1onstituent Assembly =lections, one indi idual !as killed and se eral in6ured in sporadic iolence. >uring this period, police and army bomb s%uads disco ered !hat appeared to be more than *)) impro ised e.plosi e de ices ('=>s), of !hich about one-third !ere in the 2athmandu <alley. @hile the ast ma6ority of '=> scares !ere hoa.es, at least fi e actual '=>s e.ploded. #here !ere no fatalities from any of these relati ely unsophisticated '=>s, although on election day, a young child !as seriously in6ured !hen he handled an '=> that he belie ed !as a toy. Also on election day, an '=> in6ured three indi iduals !hen it e.ploded near a polling station in 2athmandu. 'n addition, there !ere at least si. petrol-bomb attacks on long-distance buses and ans. A bus dri er !as killed in one of the attacks, and se eral indi iduals !ere in6ured.
#he police arrested more than ()) indi iduals for in ol ement in the attacks, including do"ens of members of the 1ommunist Party of &epal8aoist (1P&-8) 7 a splinter party that broke from the ,1P&(8) in 9une ()*( and opposed the elections. 1P&-8 leaders denied responsibility for the attacks, although 1P&-8 1hairman 8ohan 5aidya ackno!ledged at a >ecember press conference that some party members, frustrated that demands to call off the elections !ere ignored, may ha e been in ol ed in the petrol-bomb attacks. 3egislation, 3a! =nforcement, and 5order Security: &epali la! criminali"es acti ities related to terrorism, including the financing of terrorism. @hile &epal has speciali"ed units to respond to terrorist incidents, la! enforcement units lack the capacity to effecti ely detect, deter, and identify terrorist suspects. An open border !ith 'ndia and relati ely !eak airport security hamper efforts to implement effecti e counterterrorism policing. &epali police officers continued to participate in the >epartment of States Antiterrorism Assistance (A#A) program. 'n ()*+, the A#A program funded si. training courses to impro e counterterrorism capabilities !ithin &epali la! enforcement agencies. A#A training focused on building &epali la! enforcement capacity to secure the countrys borders from terrorist transit and pre enting terrorists from establishing safe ha ens !ithin &epal. Additionally, the ,.S. >epartment of 9ustice 'nternational 1riminal 'n estigati e #raining Assistance Program ('1'#AP) began training the &epal Police in Polygraph =.amination to impro e criminal in estigations, including in estigations of potential terrorist acti ities. #he ,nited States also sponsored four 6oint training e.ercises !ith the &epal Army to de elop its counter-terrorism force, the 8ahabir Fangers. 1ountering the /inancing of #errorism: &epal belongs to the Asia Pacific 4roup on 8oney 3aundering, a /inancial Action #ask /orce (/A#/)-style regional body. 'n 9une, President Jada signed an additional ordinance to satisfy /A#/ re%uirements for criminali"ing terrorist finance. #he President also appro ed amendments to the 8oney-3aundering Pre ention Act (83PA) that gi e the go ernment broad po!ers to confiscate assets of terrorist organi"ations and financiers. 'n September, &epal fro"e the assets of ((0 entities and A0 indi iduals !ith suspected connections to al-Qaida. 'n -ctober, the /A#/ noted that &epal had largely addressed its action plan and is planning on conducting an onsite re ie! to ensure that the process of implementing the re%uired reforms and actions is under!ay, including addressing deficiencies pre iously identified by the /A#/. &epali la! allo!s the go ernment to free"e and confiscate terrorist assets?
ho!e er, coordination among different institutions remained slo!. #he &epali authorities !ere in the process of installing computer systems to trace suspected terrorist assets and free"e them. #he &epal Fastra 5ank (the 1entral 5ank of &epal, &F5), licenses and monitors business ser ices that recei e remittances. #ransactions by unauthori"ed banks and financial institutions to transfer or recei e money (such as hundi and ha!ala) are considered criminal money laundering offenses, but it is difficult for the &epali go ernment to in estigate these informal money transfer systems. -nly banks can legally transfer money out of &epal. 8oney transfer ser ices in &epal may recei e inbound remittances, but funds must be distributed to recipients through banks, !hich are re%uired to collect data on the originator. #he &F5s /inancial 'nformation ,nit (/',) directi es do not co er non-profit organi"ations, unless there is specific information that they are in ol ed in money laundering and terrorist financing. /or further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the ()*0 'nternational &arcotics 1ontrol Strategy Feport ('&1SF), <olume (, 8oney 3aundering and /inancial 1rimes: http://www.state. ov/!/inl/rls/nr"rpt/inde#.htm.
PA2'S#A&
- er ie!: 'n ()*+, Pakistan continued to confront terrorist groups, including al-Qaida (AQ), #ehrik-e #aliban Pakistan (##P), the Pun6abi #aliban, and 3ashkar ' 9hang i (39), all of !hom mounted attacks against police, military and security forces, or engaged in sectarian iolence and criminal acti ities against all sectors of society. Pakistan did not confront 3ashkare-#ayyiba, ho!e er, !ho continued to operate, rally, and fundraise in Pakistan !ith its front organi"ations. 'n ()*+, terrorists used remote-controlled impro ised e.plosi e de ices ('=>s) in bicycles, motorcycles, parked cars, ricksha!s, donkey carts, and alongside roads, used ehicle-borne '=>s, suicide bombers (including females), targeted assassinations, rocket-propelled grenades, and other armed combat tactics in attacks on mos%ues, churches, markets, 6ournalists, aid !orkers, go ernment institutions and officials. AQ and $Q& continued to plot against ,.S. interests in the region, including ,.S. diplomatic facilities. ##P posed a threat to both ,.S. and Pakistani interests, and carried out numerous attacks against Pakistani armed forces, Pakistani ci ilians, and go ernment institutions.
#he 8ay ()*+ national elections brought in ne! ci ilian leadership, !hich !as re ie!ing a ne! counterterrorism strategy at years end. 'n the preelection period, some terrorist groups forged alliances !ith certain political parties, including religiously-based political parties. Some iolent e.tremists conducted election-related terrorist attacks against political parties, candidates, and go ernment officials. Pakistans go ernment has pursued negotiations !ith ##P !hile also targeting the group militarily. Pakistan continued to support the Afghan peace process. 2arachi continued to suffer from political and ethnic iolence inflicted by different groups, including militant organi"ations, fundamentalist religious groups, and the militant !ings of political parties. Some militant groups !orked to assert control o er political parties and criminal gangs operating in the city and surrounding areas of southern Sindh. #he security situation in 2arachi !as a priority concern for Pakistans president, prime minister, parliament, Supreme 1ourt, and the military and la! enforcement agencies. ()*+ #errorist 'ncidents: >uring ()*+, terrorist groups targeted the Pakistani go ernment and military, engaged in sectarian iolence, and perpetrated attacks against ci ilians. #errorists organi"ed armed assaults on police stations, 6udicial centers, border check posts, military con oys, and polio accination teams. #errorists plotted against and attacked 6udges, prosecutors, police officers, defense la!yers, anti-##P peace committee members, intelligence officers, and elected officials. 'n the months leading up to the 8ay national elections, terrorists attacked and killed political party !orkers and candidates, bombed political rallies, and, after the elections, killed ne!ly elected and appointed officials. #errorists mounted an armed attack on a Pakistan military and 'nter-Ser ices 'ntelligence ('S') office in Sukkur, and days later stormed a ma6or prison, releasing se eral do"en imprisoned high-profile terrorists. 'n separate incidents, terrorists assassinated a high-ranking Army general in the tribal areas, the 2arachi 1hief of Police, and the presidents chief of security. #errorists targeted Shia and other religious minorities in all areas of Pakistan, especially in Sindh, 2hyber Pakhtunkh!a (2P), and 5alochistan. #errorists killed an international team of mountain climbers, including one ,.S. citi"en, on Pakistans famed &anga Parbat 8ountain. As of mid->ecember, o er *,)(E ci ilians and more than 0CE security forces personnel had been killed in terrorist-related incidents in Pakistan during the year. #he presence of AQ, ##P, and other militant groups continues to pose a threat to ,.S. citi"ens throughout Pakistan. #he ##P claimed responsibility for the ma6ority of the fre%uent attacks that targeted ci ilians and security personnel. #errorist incidents occurred in e ery pro ince.
Fepresentati e incidents include: -n 9anuary *), a string of bombings in Quetta killed o er *)E people and in6ured an estimated *AB more. 'n one attack, there !ere t!o e.plosions *) minutes apart, !ith most fatalities occurring !hen police and media responded to the first bombing. #he banned Sunni group, 39, claimed responsibility for the t!in attack, !hich took place in a predominantly Shia neighborhood. -n the same day, a bomb e.ploded under a military ehicle at a busy market area, killing *( and in6uring 0C people. A 5aloch nationalist group claimed responsibility. -n 9une *E, (E people died in a sectarian-related coordinated attack on a !omens college in Quetta along !ith the medical comple. !here ictims !ere subse%uently taken for treatment. #he attack !as notable for its use of a female suicide bomber, the first such occurrence in 5alochistan. 3ater the same day, terrorists attacked and torched the historical landmark Diarat residence CE miles east of Quetta. -n 9une (+, terrorists !earing paramilitary uniforms attacked a mountaineering base camp on &anga Parbat in 4ilgit-5altistan and killed *) foreign climbers, including one ,.S. citi"en. #hree security officials sent to in estigate the murders !ere also killed by terrorists. -n 9uly *), a terrorist suicide bomber attacked the con oy of the chief of the presidential security detail in 2arachi, killing the chief of security for President Dardari and t!o others. -n 9uly (0, suicide bombers and armed militants attacked the regional office of the 'S' in a high security "one in Sukkur. #hree 'S' officials, and *) Sindh police and Fangers personnel !ere killed, and E) other people !ere in6ured during the ensuing battle. -n 9uly (B, terrorists stormed the 1entral Prison at >era 'smail 2han in 2P, forcing the release of imprisoned high- alue terrorists. #!enty-four people died during the attack. -n September ((, t!o suicide bombers attacked an historic 1hristian church in Pesha!ar? **B persons !ere killed !ith o er *0E others in6ured. #he bombers detonated their ests at the end of a church ser ice. -n September (B, 0( people !ere killed and o er *)) in6ured after a car bomb blast in the cro!ded 2issa 2ha!ani 5a"aar in Pesha!ar. -n -ctober *A, the ne!ly appointed 2hyber Pakhtunkh!a la! minister and *) others died after a suicide attacker e.ploded a bomb at the ministers residence in >era 'smail 2han. 3egislation, 3a! =nforcement, and 5order Security: Pakistan enacted additional amendments to the Antiterrorism Act of *BBC, and promulgated se eral ne! la!s to empo!er the national go ernment to address terrorism !ith enhanced la! enforcement and prosecutorial po!ers. Pakistans go ernment is in the process of implementing four significant la!s passed
in ()*+: the &ational 1ounterterrorism Authority Act, the /air #rial Act, amendments to the Antiterrorism Act of *BBC, and the Protection of Pakistan -rdinance of ()*+ (PP-). #he Pakistan go ernment continued to make use of the reinforced counterterrorism legislation? ho!e er, the 6udiciary mo ed slo!ly in processing terrorism and other criminal cases in general. Pakistan took steps in ()*+ to address challenges in in interagency cooperation and coordination. 'n ()*+, Pakistan engaged in structural reforms on counterterrorism, designed to centrali"e coordination and information sharing. #he &ational 1ounterterrorism Authority (&A1#A) !as empo!ered by ne! legislation in April, but !as not fully acti ated in ()*+. &A1#A is en isioned as facilitating increased coordination and collection of counterterrorism intelligence among security agencies and pro incial police, and pro iding a ehicle for national policy and strategy formulation for all aspects of counterterrorism. #he 'ntelligence 5ureau ('5) has nation!ide 6urisdiction as a ci ilian agency, and is fully empo!ered under the PP- to coordinate !ith pro incial and territorial counterterrorism units. 'ntimidation by terrorists against !itnesses, police, ictims, prosecutors, defense la!yers, and 6udges contribute both to the slo! progress of cases in Antiterrorism 1ourts and a high ac%uittal rate. Prosecutors often lacked resources needed to conduct successfully prosecutions in the trial phase. 9urisdictional di isions among and bet!een military and ci ilian security agencies continued to hamper effecti e in estigation and prosecution of terrorism cases. Pakistan promulgated ne! legislation in ()*+ that supports the in estigation and prosecution of terrorism offenses. #he ne! enhanced tools pro ided by the /air #rial Act of ()*( and the &A1#A la! are in the process of being implemented by the go ernment. #hese la!s are designed to pro ide the necessary legal tools to detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist acti ities and organi"ations to intelligence agencies, la! enforcement agencies, and prosecutors. #he PP- augments the Antiterrorism Act of *BBC (as amended) and creates a federally-empo!ered infrastructure !ith special federal courts, prosecutors, police stations, and in estigation teams for the enforcement of () specially delineated categories of offenses. Pakistans ()*+ amendments to the Antiterrorism Act of *BBC increase protections for !itnesses, ictims, and 6udges in terrorism cases, pro ide for admissibility of electronic e idence in court, and set guidelines for detention and 6udicial re ie!. Pakistan is implementing biometric collection in national databases and screening at border land crossings !ith the 'nternational 5order 8anagement Security ('58S) system. #he &ational Automated >atabase Fegistration Authority (&A>FA) maintains a national biometric database of
citi"ens, residents, and diaspora Pakistanis, !hich is continually sub6ect to upgrades. #he /ederal 5oard of Fe enue (/5F), Pakistans customs and ta. authority, continues to maintain currency detection units in Pakistans *( international airports to counter bulk cash smuggling. #he /5F has impro ed information sharing protocols on arrests and sei"ures. #he Antiterrorism 1ourts in Pakistan ha e limited procedures for the admission of foreign e idence. Pakistans prosecution of se en suspects accused in the ())G 8umbai terrorist attack is ongoing, !ith !itnesses recording statements before the court. A Pakistani 6udicial commission made a second isit to 'ndia to obtain e idence and cross-e.amine four !itnesses in ol ed in 'ndias prosecution of A6mal 2asab? ho!e er, it is unkno!n !hat impact 'ndias e.ecution of 2asab in ()*( might ha e on the prosecutions ability to introduce 2asabs confession in the trial. Pakistani military forces conducted significant counterterrorism operations in the tribal areas, and ci ilian and other forces conducted operations in Sindh, 5alochistan, 2P, and Pun6ab. Some AQ- affiliated terrorist groups !ere disrupted in Pun6ab, and some ##P leaders !ere killed during security operations. Security forces intercepted large stockpiles of !eapons and e.plosi es and disco ered bomb-making facilities and sophisticated telecommunication net!orks. Pakistan continued to arrest terrorists and initiate prosecutions throughout ()*+. 1ooperation !ith Pakistans security establishment on information sharing and la! enforcement continued. 3a! enforcement cooperation continues !ith respect to terrorist attacks and plots against the embassy and personnel in 'slamabad and the ,.S. 1onsulates 4eneral and personnel in 3ahore, 2arachi, and Pesha!ar. Pakistani security ser ices continued to acti ely in estigate indi iduals and organi"ations behind the threats to the ,.S. 1onsulate in 3ahore and ha e partnered !ith the ,nited States for information e.change and enhanced security cooperation. Pakistan continued to participate in the >epartment of States Antiterrorism Assistance (A#A) program. A#A training and e%uipment focused on building capacity to respond to critical terrorism-related incidents 7 including e.plosi es-related incidents 7 and to conduct counterterrorism in estigations. #he A#A program !as able to successfully deli er crisis response training in the latter part of ()*+. - erall, ho!e er, delays in issuance of Pakistani isas to A#A trainers significantly impeded program implementation. 1ountering the /inancing of #errorism: Pakistan is an acti e participant in the AsiaIPacific 4roup on 8oney 3aundering, a /inancial Action #ask /orce
(/A#/)-style regional body. 'n /ebruary ()*(, /A#/ identified Pakistan on its public statement because Pakistan failed to address strategic deficiencies in anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance (A83I1/#). 'n -ctober, the /A#/ noted Pakistans substantial steps to!ards impro ing its A83I1/# regime, including by issuing a Statutory Fegulatory -rder that addresses the definition of terrorism and an Antiterrorism Amendment -rdinance to establish procedures for the identification and free"ing of terrorist assets. @hile /A#/ praised the content of the Antiterrorism Amendment -rdinance, it encouraged Pakistan to take the necessary steps for s!ift ratification of the ordinance by its legislature. ,&-designated terrorist organi"ations in Pakistan continue to a oid sanctions by reconstituting themsel es under different names, often !ith little effort to hide their connections to pre iously banned groups. Although Pakistan added some named groups to its proscribed organi"ations list, there !as still concern about the !eak implementation of ,&S1Fs *(AC (*BBB) and *BGG (()**) and their follo!-on resolutions. @hile Pakistan has taken steps o er the past year to implement ,&S1F *(AC, it still falls short of /A#/s international standards regarding the identification and free"ing of terrorist assets under ,&S1F *+C+ (())*). #he go ernment has the ability to free"e assets but cannot confiscate assets unless an indi idual or entity is con icted of a crime. Pakistan issued a ,&S1 =nforcement -rder of ()*( setting out a range of sanctions for non-compliance in the implementation of ,&S1F *(AC but has not yet applied this authority. #he /A#/ has recommended that Pakistan increase the administrati e monetary penalty a ailable or legislate for additional criminal sanctions to meet the international standards. 3ack of capacity, resource constraints, and effecti e 1/# training for all participants in the criminal 6ustice system are deterrents to an effecti e go ernment response. /urther, delays or denials of isas for ,.S. la! enforcement and 6udicial officials seeking to engage in A83I1/# capacity building ha e furthered hampered efforts in this area. #errorist groups such as the $a%%ani &et!ork continued to raise funds in Pakistan. /or further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the ()*0 'nternational &arcotics 1ontrol Strategy Feport ('&1SF), <olume (, 8oney 3aundering and /inancial 1rimes: http://www.state. ov/!/inl/rls/nr"rpt/inde#.htm. Fegional and 'nternational 1ooperation: Pakistan acti ely participated in counterterrorism efforts in both regional and international enues. Pakistan is an acti e member of the 4lobal 1ounterterrorism /orum (41#/) and attended 41#/ meetings and supported 41#/ initiati es. Pakistan is a
partner in the ,2s 1ounterterrorism Prosecution Feform 'nitiati e (1aPF'), and pro incial go ernments contributed to rule of la! programs in 8alakand and Pun6ab. Pakistan participated in South Asian Association for Fegional 1ooperation (SAAF1) meetings on counterterrorism? is a member of 'nterpol and the -rgani"ation of 'slamic States (-'1)? and participated in multilateral groups !here counterterrorism cooperation is discussed, including the Shanghai 1ooperation -rgani"ation (S1-) (as an obser er) and the >-G, a group of de eloping nations !ith large 8uslim populations. Pakistan participated in ,& Security 1ouncil meetings on sanctions and counterterrorism, and co-hosted a ,& 1ounter-#errorism 1ommittees =.ecuti e >irectorate regional !orkshop for South Asian 6udges, prosecutors and in estigators in 'slamabad. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the ,nited States held high-le el meetings on regional security, including efforts to combat iolent e.tremism in the border region and to promote an Afghan reconciliation process. Pakistan also participated in bilateral meetings !ith a number of other nations on security cooperation and counterterrorism, including #urkey and the Peoples Fepublic of 1hina. 1ountering Fadicali"ation to <iolence and <iolent =.tremism: 'n ()*+, Pakistans &A1#A started consultations !ith 8alaysia, #urkey, and 'ndonesia on strategies for countering iolent e.tremism 'ntegration of militants into society after peace agreements remained a ma6or priority for the go ernment. Pakistans military !orked !ith ci il society to operate the Sabaoon Fehabilitation 1enter, a de-radicali"ation program for youth in a military camp in 8ingora, S!at. 8ilitancy-e.posed youth are rehabilitated through a combination of education and counseling. Sabaoon centers claim success in reintegrating militant youth into society, and there are no! nine such centers operating in 2P and /A#A.
SF' 3A&2A
- er ie!: #he Sri 3ankan go ernment defeated the terrorist 3iberation #igers of #amil =elam (3##=) in ())B. 1oncerns remain that !idely reported allegations of atrocities and iolations of international la! committed by both the go ernment and the 3##= during the ci il !ar ha e not been addressed. Partly as a result, counterterrorism cooperation and training !ith the ,nited States !as limited in ()*+. &o arrests related to terrorism !ere made, but the 4o ernment of Sri 3anka remained concerned that the 3##=s international net!ork of financial support !as still functioning. #he Sri 3ankan go ernment continued to maintain a strong military presence in post-conflict areas and continued to oice concern about the possible re-
emergence of pro-3##= sympathi"ers. Sri 3ankan police did not participate in the >epartment of States Antiterrorism Assistance (A#A) program in ()*+. 3egislation, 3a! =nforcement, and 5order Security: 1ounterterrorism legislation in Sri 3anka has historically focused on eliminating the 3##=. 'n ()*+, the 4o ernment of Sri 3anka continued to implement the Pre ention of #errorism Act (P#A), enacted in *BG( as a !artime measure, !hich gi es security forces s!eeping po!ers to search, arrest, and detain indi iduals. #he go ernment sometimes used the P#A to stifle dissent among political opponents or others critical of the go ernment. Although ,.S. antiterrorism assistance to Sri 3anka has generally been limited, in ()*+ the Sri 3ankan go ernment !as a proacti e partner !ith the ,.S. >epartments of State, $omeland Security, >efense, and =nergy on securing its maritime border. #he ,.S. 1oast 4uard, under the >epartment of States =.port 1ontrol and Felated 5order Security program, continued to train Sri 3ankan 1oast 4uard and &a y personnel on border and e.port control matters, and the go ernment of Sri 3anka continued to cooperate !ith ,.S. 1ustoms and 5order Protection through the 1ontainer Security 'nitiati e. 5order security remained a significant issue for the Sri 3ankan 4o ernment in ()*+. 'n ()*+, the ,.S. State >epartment trained (E Sri 3ankan immigration officials on fraudulent document recognition, !hile the 'nternational -rgani"ation for 8igration ('-8) trained 0) immigration officers in techni%ues to impro e border sur eillance and combat human trafficking. '-8 also continued to !ork !ith the Australian go ernment to pro ide speciali"ed training to Sri 3ankan immigration personnel on profiling, identification of iolators, and arrests and prosecutions, among other border control-related training. 5eginning in late ()*(, the Sri 3ankan go ernment began partnering !ith the 1anadian 1ounterterrorism Program on t!o border security related pro6ects: the 'nterpol >atabase system, used to store and share profiling information in real time, and the 3ost and Stolen Passport program, !hich addresses the large-scale border control issues the Sri 3ankan go ernment faces. Also in ()*+, the Sri 3ankan go ernment collaborated !ith the =, 'mmigration >epartment on the Ad anced Passenger 'nformation system, !hich transmits passenger information to 4o ernment of Sri 3anka immigration officials upon arri al. 1ollaboration !ith the Australian go ernment has resulted in the de elopment of a passport fingerprinting
program scheduled to go online in ()*0. #he data generated from these collection systems !ill be significant assets to the Sri 3ankan go ernment in its efforts to control and combat illegal migration? ho!e er, the issue of maritime border security is one that needs additional action and must be considered !ithin a regional conte.t. 1ountering the /inancing of #errorism: Sri 3anka belongs to the =urasian 4roup on 1ombating 8oney 3aundering and the /inance of #errorism (=A4), a /inancial Action #ask /orce (/A#/)-style regional body. 'n 9une, the /A#/ !elcomed Sri 3ankas progress in impro ing its anti-money launderingIcounterterrorist finance (A83I1/#) regime and remo ed the country from /A#/s monitoring process. Sri 3anka !as, ho!e er, encouraged to continue the implementation of its procedures to identify and free"e terrorist assets. @hile neither an important regional financial center nor a preferred center for money laundering, se eral factors make the country ulnerable to money laundering and terrorist finance. #hese include a lack of transparent tender mechanisms in go ernment pro6ects, past e.perience !ith terrorism, ta. e asion, and a large informal economy. 3egal remittance flo!s through the formal banking system ha e increased sharply in recent years. Femittances originate primarily from Sri 3ankas substantial o erseas !orkforce. 5efore its defeat in ())B, the 3##= had used a number of non-profit organi"ations for fundraising purposes. Sri 3anka continued its efforts to search for other financial links to the 3##=, e en many years after the !ar ended. #here !ere criticisms that this search for terrorists !as e.tended !ell beyond its utility and e.panded to target legitimate political opponents of the go ernment. /or further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the ()*0 'nternational &arcotics 1ontrol Strategy Feport ('&1SF), <olume (, 8oney 3aundering and /inancial 1rimes:http://www.state. ov/!/inl/rls/nr"rpt/inde#.htm. Fegional and 'nternational 1ooperation: 'n &o ember, the Sri 3ankan go ernment held the 4alle >ialogue, !hich featured multilateral discussion by international security force representati es on issues of regional security in South Asia. 'ssues co ered during the conference included maritime terrorism and the trafficking of narcotics, !eapons, and people.
#A9'2'S#A&
- er ie!: 'n ()*+, #a6ikistan continued to address !eaknesses in its counterterrorism strategy and demonstrated its ability to conduct
counterterrorism operations. #a6ikistans counterterrorism policies !ere focused on marginali"ing iolent 'slamist e.tremist groups in #a6ikistani society. 'n ()*+, #a6ikistan conducted arious meetings !ith its fello! 1ollecti e Security #reaty -rgani"ation (1S#-) and Shanghai 1ooperation -rgani"ation (S1-) member countries to enhance cooperation in the sphere of counterterrorism and border security. #a6ikistan sought to increase military and la! enforcement capacity to conduct tactical operations through bilateral and multilateral assistance programs, including !ith the ,nited States. 3egislation, 3a! =nforcement, and 5order Security: #he #a6ikistani go ernment prosecuted terrorists under the 3a! on 1ombating #errorism, the 3a! on Anti-8oney 3aundering, the 3a! on 1urrency Fegulation, the 3a! on &otary, and the 1riminal 1ode of the Fepublic of #a6ikistan. Fesource constraints, corruption, lack of training for effecti e la! enforcement and border security officials, and general capacity issues continued to plague the #a6ikistani go ernments ability to interdict possible terrorists. #hroughout ()*+, #a6ikistan !as an acti e participant in the >epartment of States Antiterrorism Assistance (A#A) program, and other ,.S.-sponsored counterterrorism training programs.A#A focused on deli ering training and e%uipment to build #a6ikistani capacity to secure the countrys borders. A#A assistance also included instructor de elopment courses to impro e the abilities of #a6ikistani officers to share lessons from A#A training !ith their colleagues. #a6ikistan continued to make progress in impro ing border security !ith bilateral and multilateral assistance, although effecti ely policing the #a6ikistaniIAfghan border !as a difficult task re%uiring more resources and capabilities than !ere a ailable to the #a6ikistani go ernment. 'n ()*+, the #a6ikistani go ernment established an interagency Secretariat, !hich met regularly throughout the year to coordinate implementation of #a6ikistans ()*) &ational 5order 8anagement Strategy. #he 'nternational -rgani"ation for 8igration and the -S1= !orked to impro e tra el document security. #he -S1= also pro ided funding to link #a6ikistans e.isting passport data scanners at airports and land ports of entry to the 'nterpol database. #he 5ureau of 'nternational &arcotics and 3a! =nforcement, the 5order 8anagement Program in 1entral Asia, and the ,& -ffice on >rugs and 1rime !orked to impro e border infrastructure, promote inter-agency cooperation, pro ide direct training, and e.pand training capacity in #a6ikistan. 1orruption in the 6udicial system and misuse of counterterrorism statutes to
suppress legitimate political opposition hampered the effecti eness of the go ernments counterterrorism efforts. 1ountering the /inancing of #errorism: #a6ikistan is a member of the =urasian 4roup on 1ombating 8oney 3aundering and /inancing of #errorism (=A4), a /inancial Action #ask /orce (/A#/)-style regional body. 'n 9une ()**, #a6ikistan made a high-le el political commitment to !ork !ith the /A#/ and =A4 to address its strategic A83I1/# deficiencies. 'n -ctober, the /A/# noted that #a6ikistan has taken steps to!ards impro ing its A83I1/# regime but called on the country to address its remaining deficiencies: ensuring ade%uate procedures for free"ing terrorist assets? implementing ade%uate procedures for the confiscation of funds related to the full range of money laundering predicate offences? and addressing the remaining issues relating to customer due diligence measures. #he =A4 has pro ided #a6ikistan !ith assistance to impro e its legislati e and regulatory frame!orks and operational capabilities. 'n ()*+, #a6ikistan amended portions of its legislation pertaining to money laundering and financial crimes, bringing its la!s closer to compliance !ith international recommendations -utstanding deficiencies in the financial crime enforcement and regulatory sector included: lack of ade%uate record keeping? the lack of an effecti e financial intelligence unit? and poor coordination, staffing, and training among #a6ikistani agencies that deal !ith money laundering, !hich impeded the #a6ikistani go ernments ability to conduct effecti e in estigations. =ndemic corruption also hampered reforms in this area. #a6ikistan successfully prosecuted terrorists under the 3a! on 1ombating #errorism in ()*+. #hree suspects faced anti-money laundering (A83) charges, and (G faced charges related to countering the financing of terrorism (1/#), resulting in t!o A83- and *+ 1/#-related con ictions. 'n total, #a6ikistan sentenced 0E members of prohibited organi"ations, *E on finance-related charges. #he #a6ikistani go ernment confiscated property in one A83 and fi e 1/#-related cases. /or further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the ()*0 'nternational &arcotics 1ontrol Strategy Feport ('&1SF), <olume (, 8oney 3aundering and /inancial 1rimes:http://www.state. ov/!/inl/rls/nr"rpt/201&/inde#.htm. Fegional and 'nternational 1ooperation: #a6ikistan is an acti e member of the -S1=, !here it focuses on border security issues, and is also a member of the Fussia-led 1ollecti e Security #reaty -rgani"ation and the 1hina-led
Shanghai 1ooperation -rgani"ation (1S-). #he ,nited States, Fussia, 9apan, and the =, pro ided funding for border security programs in #a6ikistan. 'n 9une ()*+, #a6ikistan participated in regional counterterrorism e.ercises !ith S1- partner nations. 1ountering Fadicali"ation to <iolence and <iolent =.tremism: Stemming iolent e.tremism and radicali"ation in #a6ikistan is a top priority for the #a6ikistani go ernment. 8any of the go ernment;s measures, ho!e er, had a negati e impact on religious freedoms, including prohibiting children under *G from attending mos%ue or other public religious ser ices and banning !omen from !orshiping in mos%ues. @e refer you to the >epartment of States Annual Feport to 1ongress on 'nternational Feligious /reedom (http://www.state. ov/!/drl/ir%/rpt/inde#.htm) for further information.
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- er ie!: #he 4o ernment of #urkmenistan continued its efforts to impro e the capacity of la! enforcement agencies to combat terrorism, ensure border security, and detect terrorist financing. #he 4o ernment of #urkmenistan has been reluctant to !ork !ith the State >epartment, ho!e er, participating in only t!o out of fi e Antiterrorism Assistance courses offered in the past three years. 1ounterterrorism cooperation continued to focus on building the trust and relationships necessary for future effecti e, !idespread training and capacity building. 5road, ague definitions of terrorism and so-called Kreligious e.tremismN are sometimes used by the go ernment to target internal dissent. 3egislation, 3a! =nforcement, and 5order Security: #he countrys legal system as it pertains to counterterrorism centers on the ())+ counterterrorism la! that defines !hich crimes are considered terrorist in nature. #his la! is supplemented by articles (C*-(C+ of the criminal code, !hich pertain to terrorist acts and terrorist financing and are used to prosecute terrorism-related offenses. #he 8inistries of &ational Security, 'nternal Affairs, >efense, and State 5order Ser ice perform counterterrorism functions and share information through an interagency commission. #he countrys la! enforcement capacity needs impro ement, as la! enforcement units ha e a poor record of accountability and respect for human rights. Prosecutors, ho!e er, do play a significant role in the in estigation phase of a case, and speciali"ed la! enforcement units e.ist to conduct in estigations. #hese units possess speciali"ed e%uipment but usually only use the e%uipment for official ceremonies and demonstrations as opposed to daily operations.
#urkmenistan also participated in ,.S. and international-sponsored training programs, including a ,& -ffice on >rugs and 1rime program on international counterterrorism instruments and a ,.S. training program on combating transnational threats. #urkmenistan remained a partner nation for the >epartment of States Antiterrorism Assistance (A#A) program, and the A#A program pro ided a successful crisis management seminar for la! enforcement leaders in ()*+. #he State 5order Ser ice (S5S) continued to operate frontier garrisons on its borders !ith 'ran and Afghanistan and managed eight radiation portal monitors along its borders, !hich !ere donated by the >epartment of =nergy through its Second 3ine of >efense program. #he State 8igration Ser ice maintains a terrorist screening !atch-list and possesses biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry. #urkmenistans political !ill to counter terrorism and ensure border security is e ident in the go ernments continued emphasis on maintaining stability abo e all other concerns. -n border security, the 4o ernment of #urkmenistan has increased its cooperation !ith the ,nited States ia participation in the =.port 1ontrol and Felated 5order Security (=O5S) Program, and for the first time, participated in programs pertaining to legalIregulatory reform and the creation of a strategic trade control regime to counter the proliferation of !eapons of mass destruction. Petty corruption, ho!e er, sometimes hampered effecti e la! enforcement. /or e.ample, in -ctober, President 5erdimuhamedo dismissed the 1hairman of the State 5order Ser ice (S5S), !ho !as imprisoned shortly thereafter on bribery charges. Additionally, international cooperation !ith the go ernment is often hampered by a bureaucracy that operates according to an opa%ue set of rules and that fre%uently deems public information Kstate secrets.N 1ountering the /inancing of #errorism: #urkmenistan is a member of the =urasian 4roup on 1ombating 8oney 3aundering and /inancing of #errorism (=A4), a /A#/-style regional body. /or further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the ()*0 'nternational &arcotics 1ontrol Strategy Feport ('&1SF), <olume (, 8oney 3aundering and /inancial 1rimes: http://www.state. ov/!/inl/rls/nr"rpt/inde#.htm. Fegional and 'nternational 1ooperation: #urkmenistan go ernment officials participated in -S1=-sponsored trainings on border security, countering the financing of terrorism, and protecting human rights !hile combating terrorism.
1ountering Fadicali"ation to <iolence and <iolent =.tremism: #urkmenistan;s la! enforcement and security agencies e.ercise stringent control o er the population. #he #urkmen go ernment reportedly ie!s conser ati e 'slam !ith suspicion. Since the country;s independence, mos%ues and 8uslim clergy ha e been state-sponsored and financed. #his le el of go ernment sur eillance suggests that any iolent e.tremist groups e.isting in #urkmenistan !ould be small, underground, and disparate. $o!e er, the se ere curtailment of basic freedoms, gro!ing economic ine%uality, an ideological oid among young people, and the perception of corruption could cause people to be attracted to iolent e.tremist ideologies. @e refer you to the >epartment of States Annual Feport to 1ongress on 'nternational Feligious /reedom (http://www.state. ov/!/drl/ir%/rpt/inde#.htm) for further information.
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- er ie!: As !ith other 1entral Asian go ernments in ()*+, the 4o ernment of ,"bekistan remained concerned about the possibility of a gro!ing terrorism threat connected to changes in the number of international forces in Afghanistan past ()*0, and it continued to seek to reduce its ulnerability to this percei ed threat. A central concern is the possibility that terrorist groups that ha e pre iously operated in ,"bekistan, notably the 'slamic 8o ement of ,"bekistan ('8,) and 'slamic 9ihad ,nion ('9,), could return from Afghanistan and pose a greater threat. @hile ,"bekistans go ernment remains confident that it can control its border !ith Afghanistan, it is less sure about its neighbors ability to do so and is particularly concerned !ith infiltration of e.tremists through ,"bekistans long, rugged border !ith #a6ikistan. #he 4o ernment of ,"bekistan restricts information on internal matters, making it difficult to analy"e both the e.tent of the terrorist threat and the effecti eness of ,"bekistani la! enforcements efforts to combat it. Additionally, resource constraints, corruption and lack of modern la! enforcement training continue to hamper the go ernments ability to respond to terrorist attacks. /urthermore, ,"bekistans counterterrorism effecti eness is undermined by its lack of respect for fundamental human rights, ineffecti e and o erly bureaucratic institutions, and slo! progress in establishing the rule of la!. #hese factors increase the countrys ulnerability to the appeal of iolent e.tremism. ()*+ #errorist 'ncidents: -n -ctober (A, independent, Prague-based press outlet -"odlik reported that (E year-old >oniyor -ripo detonated an impro ised e.plosi e de ice in a restroom of a restaurant in Samarkand, killing himself and !ounding his *G year-old brother >amir -ripo .
,"bekistani authorities did not release any information on the incident. 3egislation, 3a! =nforcement, and 5order Security: #he 4o ernment of ,"bekistan in estigates and prosecutes terrorist-related acts under its 3a! on 1ombating #errorism, passed in ())) and re ised in ())0. #he 3a! on 1ombating #errorism identifies the &ational Security Ser ice (&SS), the 8inistry of 'nterior, the State 5order 4uards 1ommittee (operating !ithin the &SS command structure), the State 1ustoms 1ommittee, the 8inistry of >efense, and the 8inistry on =mergency Situations as the go ernment entities responsible for countering and responding to terrorism. #he &SS is the lead counterterrorist la! enforcement agency, !ith primary responsibility for the coordination and super ision of the interagency efforts. 3a! enforcement in ,"bekistan continued to arrest, prosecute, and con ict an unkno!n number of people under charges of e.tremism in ()*+. =.ternal security threats and Kreligious e.tremismN pro ide the primary 6ustifications for ,"bekistans restricti e border control and often indiscriminate police actions. 8oreo er, the security sector in ,"bekistan, led by the &SS, prioriti"ed the narro! goal of securing the regime against internal dissent and utili"ed broad enforcement methods to maintain internal security. As a result, its policy is to brand any 'slamic groups that it broadly determines to de iate from the state-sponsored ersion of 'slam as Ke.tremistN and to criminali"e membership in such groups. 3a! enforcement fre%uently uses the terms KterrorismN or Ke.tremismN interchangeably and ie!s alleged ties to !hat the go ernment considers e.tremist organi"ations as grounds to arrest, prosecute, and con ict people. 't is possible that the ,"bekistani security forces ha e neutrali"ed legitimate threats in course of conducting indiscriminate and broadly targeted anti-e.tremist or politically moti ated operations? ho!e er, a lack of reliable information makes it difficult to differentiate bet!een legitimate counterterrorist la! enforcement actions and politically moti ated arrests aimed at indi iduals on the basis of their religion or opponents of the go ernment. 5elo! are kno!n e.amples from ()*+ in !hich la! enforcement arrested and prosecuted suspects under charges of alleged e.tremism or terrorism. As !ith many cases like this, it is difficult to determine if the arrests and con ictions !ere truly terrorist- or iolent e.tremist-related or simply used to suppress e.pressions of political or religious beliefs.
A court sentenced to fi e to *( years in prison ** adherents of the banned 9ihadisti (9ihodchilar) group from &amangan Fegion for attempting to o erthro! the constitutional order and Kinciting interethnic and
interreligious hatred.N Authorities 6ailed nine indi iduals for membership in the banned #abligh 9ammat group, as !ell as for teaching religion to others !ithout proper education. A court sentenced eight indi iduals from eight to *G years in prison for alleged membership in a K@ahhabiN group and for possessing banned religious literature. Authorities brought charges against &o osti ,"bekistana ne!spaper for Kconsciously promoting terrorismN and banned its publication. #he charges related to a picture that the ne!spaper published in its -ctober *) edition. #he file photograph, taken from the internet for an article about the Andi6on local go ernment, reportedly sho!ed armed indi iduals during the ())E Andi6on e ents. A court sentenced (A-year-old 8urodali 'sroilo to se en years in prison for conspiring !hile in Fussia to create a clandestine e.tremist organi"ation !ithin ,"bekistan to build an 'slamic state and implement K@ahhabiN doctrine. An international &4- and family members reported that 2a"akhstan e.tradited to ,"bekistan +G-year-old 2hayrullo #ursuno . 2ashkadaryo Fegion 1riminal 1ourt sentenced #ursuno to *A years in prison on 9une A on Kreligious e.tremismN charges. 'n 9uly ()*+, Amnesty 'nternational released a report focusing on the practice of forcible e.traditions in 1entral Asia, highlighting numerous cases !here ,"bekistani citi"ens !ere e.tradited from other 1ommon!ealth of 'ndependent States member states, often forcibly and !ithout due process of la!, to face charges of Kreligious e.tremismN in ,"bekistan. As part of an end-of-year amnesty of prisoners announced by the Senate in >ecember in honor of the (*st anni ersary of the adoption of the 1onstitution, the ,"bekistani go ernment included a group of prisoners identified as Kindi iduals !ho !ere con icted for the first time of participation in banned organi"ations and the commission of crimes against peace and security or against public security and !ho ha e firmly stood on the path to reco ery.N $o!e er, the decree also included stipulations that prisoners con icted of Kparticipating in banned organi"ations and those con icted of participating in crimes against the public order,N terms used in the past for prisoners con icted of e.tremism, !ould be e.cluded from those being released. #he 4o ernment of ,"bekistan continued issuing biometric passports to citi"ens for tra el outside of ,"bekistan. #he biometric data includes a digital photo, fingerprints, and biographical data. 1ountering the /inancing of #errorism: ,"bekistan belongs to the =urasian
4roup on 1ombating 8oney 3aundering and /inancing of #errorism (=A4), a /A#/-style regional body. 'n ()*+, ,"bekistans 1abinet of 8inisters designated the >epartment on /ighting #a., 1urrency 1rimes and 3egali"ation of 1riminal 'ncome under Prosecutor-4eneral;s -ffice as the body responsible for implementation of =A4 agreements. 3egally, money laundering needs to be linked to a predicate offense. As such, in estigators and the 6udicial system do not often pursue money laundering charges. 'n estigators ha e three months to finali"e in estigations. @ith the intense pressure to sol e cases, this three month time frame does not lea e much time to understand the comple.ities andIor to learn of the players in ol ed in the money laundering. /or further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the ()*0 'nternational &arcotics 1ontrol Strategy Feport ('&1SF), <olume (, 8oney 3aundering and /inancial 1rimes: http://www.state. ov/!/inl/rls/nr"rpt/inde#.htm.
-fficial go ernment media continued to produce documentaries, ne!s articles, and full-length books about the dangers of 6oining iolent 'slamist e.tremist and terrorist organi"ations. #he message is generally targeted to the *E-0) year old, male demographic, !hich the go ernment considers the most susceptible to recruitment to iolent e.tremist groups, although some media has focused on keeping !omen from falling into the traps of iolent e.tremists. 'n /ebruary and 9uly, state #< aired programs !arning parents of the danger of sending their children to hu6ras, traditional religious schools outla!ed in the country, and declaring that the roots of religious e.tremism, dogmatism, and terrorism lay in pri ate religious classes. $o!e er, some &4-s continued to suggest that greater freedom to circulate mainstream, non-e.tremist 'slamic and other religious materials could be more effecti e in countering e.tremism than the current policy of maintaining a go ernment monopoly o er religious publications. @e refer you to the >epartment of States Annual Feport to 1ongress on