Karl Vincent B.

Raso ALS D-2012

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EVIDENCE DIGESTS
Justice Bernabe


RULE 130 RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY (C. Testimonial Evidence cont.: Conduct and
Character as Evidence Exceptions to Hearsay Rule)
1. CSC v. Belagan
The case stems from two separate complaints filed by Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of
the Mother and Child Learning Center, and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del
Pilar Elementary School against Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of
Education of Culture and Sports (DECS) in Baguio. Magdalena charged Dr. Belagain with sexual
indignities and harassment while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various
malfeasance. In Magdalenas case, in an inspection conducted by Dr. Belagain in relation to an
application she filed with the DECS Office, while descending a staircase, the latter suddenly
placed her arms around her and kissed her cheek. Fearing that doing something might jeopardize
her application, she kept quiet. In a separate incident, when Magdalena followed-up her
application with Dr. Belagan, the latter told her Mag-date muna tayo, to which she declined.
When she read from a local newspaper that certain female employees from DECS were charging
Dr. Belagan, she wrote a letter-complaint to the DECS Secretary. On the part of Ligaya, she
alleged that in four separate occasions, Dr. Belagan touched her breasts, kissed her cheek,
touched her groins, embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the
lower part of her back. After conducting a joint investigation, the DECS Secretary found Dr.
Belagan guilty of 4 counts of sexual indignities or harassments against Ligaya and 2 counts of
sexual advances and indignities against Magdalena, thereby dismissing him from service. The
CSC modified the Secretarys ruling by affirming the case by Magdalena stating that the acts
constitute grave misconduct while dismissing the complaint of Ligaya. In his defense, Dr. Belagan
said that he has never been charged of any offense in his 37 years of service while Magdalena
was charged with a litany of cases before the MTC of Baguio City (22 Criminal Cases) as well as
a comparable number of complaints in the barangay (23 Complaints) and that the cases cast
doubt on Magdalenas character, integrity and credibility. The CSC denied Dr. Belagans
contention while the CA reversed, stating that Magdalena was an unreliable witness. In reversing
the CA and finding Magdalena as credible, the Supreme Court held that generally, the character
of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy. One statutory exception
is Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we states that:
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.

(a) In Criminal Cases:
x x x x x x
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged."

It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to
administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be
applied here, still, the Court cannot sustain Dr. Belagans position. Not every good or bad
moral character of the offended party may be proved under this provision. Only those
which would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged. This means
that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the
type of offense charged. The Court also took note that settled is the principle that evidence
of ones character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in
question. In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the
person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the
commencement of the suit. Hence, to say that Magdalenas credibility is diminished by proofs

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of tarnished reputation existing almost a decade ago is unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that
a person who has wandered from the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps
again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform. Karl Vincent B. Raso
2. People v. Lee
Noel Lee was charged of the murder of 26-year-old Joseph Marquez. While in the living room of
their house, Herminia, the victims mother, saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open
window behind Joseph. She looked up and saw Lee peering through the window and holding the
gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window,
and simultaneously, Lee fired his gun hitting Joseph in the head, instantly killing him. Three more
shots were fired and Herminia ran to the window and saw Lee in a blue sando flee to the direction
of his house. Herminia told the police that her son was shot by Lee and proceeded to the
Caloocan City Police Headquarters to give her sworn statement about the shooting. A complaint
was thereafter filed against the accused. It should be noted that Lee is a well-known figure in their
neighborhood and has several criminal cases pending against him Caloocan City and that he was
previously charged with frustrated homicide and attempted murder. On the other hand, Lee
alleged that Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as well as a thief, where he
caught Joseph attempting to steal his car stereo, and a drug addict, even presenting a letter by
Herminia addressed to the Mayor surrendering her son for rehabilitation. The trial court convicted
Lee. As part of his defense, Lee makes capital on Josephs bad reputation in their community. In
affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court stated that the general rule is that the character or
reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that
evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be
influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have
the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After
all, the business of the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may have a
righteous cause. There are exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the
exceptions in both criminal and civil cases. In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51
of Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove his good moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. When the accused presents
proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and
where good character and reputation are established, an inference arises that the accused
did not commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory that a person of good
character and high reputation is not likely to have committed the act charged against him. Sub-
paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the accused
except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who might otherwise be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad character. The offering of
character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and the prosecution
cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to produce such evidence. Once the
defendant raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer
evidence of the defendants bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation,
would have a license to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal. Both
sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of the accused.
And this evidence must be "pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged," meaning,
that the character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of the act charged, e.g., on
a charge of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of assault, character for peacefulness or
violence; on a charge for embezzlement, character for honesty and integrity. Sub-paragraph (3)
of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of the offended party. Character evidence,
whether good or bad, of the offended party may be proved "if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged." Such evidence
is most commonly offered to support a claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide
case or a claim of consent in a rape case. In the instant case, proof of the bad moral
character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his
killing. Lee has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-

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defense. There is no connection between the deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his
violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the
claim that because of the victims bad character he could have been killed by any one of those
from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation. Karl Vincent B. Raso
3. People v. Diopita
Dominga Pikit-pikit was on her way home from work when suddenly a man appeared from
behind, looped his arm around her neck and warned her not to shout or else she would die. The
man dragged her through the banana plantation towards the cornfields. Dominga got a good look
at the man, who turned out to be Rafael Diopita, as he sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest
her of her belongings. Thereafter, Diopita announced his desire to have carnal knowledge of
Dominga. After having his way with her, Diopita threatened Dominga not to tell anyone about the
incident or else he would shoot her. Dominga was able to report the incident to the police and
gave the description of the suspect and his possible whereabouts. A colored white/yellow, size 10
slipper was found in the scene of the crime. In a police line-up, Dominga readily pointed to Diopita
which was further bolstered by the fact that when the police had him try the slipper, it easily fitted
him. In his defense, Diopita posed the alibi that he was at an informal Bible session of the
Jehovahs Witnesses at the time of the crime. The trial court convicted Diopita stating that alibi is
a weak form of defense. Among Diopitas arguments is that it was impossible for him to have
committed the crime charged since he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does
the position of Ministerial Servant in the congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, and that he is a
godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the
word of God. The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court , ratiocinating that the fact that
Diopita is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is
innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial
Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous
proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it
is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is
not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and
exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the
basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond
any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more
than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is
unavailing. Karl Vincent B. Raso
4. Bon v. People
Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged of violating Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended (Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license under the
Forestry Reform Code). Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza owns a titled agricultural land in Basud,
Sorsogon, administered by Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being
stolen, cut and sawed into lumber by Bon and her workers, Teresita sent her brother Manuel
Dangalan to investigate. The report was confirmed after the investigation team which includes
Julian Lascano saw stumps of trees in the area. Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of
the trees into lumber, Jeniebre, Jr. was also implicated by witness Oscar Narvaez as the one who
instructed the sawing. The trial court convicted Bon and Jeniebre, Jr. while the CA affirmed. The
accused assails the testimonies of Lascano and Manuel regarding Bons extrajudicial admission,
that it constitutes hearsay evidence and should be deemed inadmissible. The Supreme Court
disagrees stating that Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay
evidence as follows:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. - A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.


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Under the above rule, any evidence -- whether oral or documentary -- is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of
some other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the
former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay. Lascano and Dangalan
testified that they had heard Bon admit to having ordered the cutting of the trees. Their
testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay for three reasons. First, they were
indisputably present and within hearing distance when he allegedly made the admission.
Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their own
perception. Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the
utterance was actually made by Bon, not necessarily that the matters stated therein were
true. On this basis, a statement attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand is
admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay rule. Gotesco Investment Corporation v.
Chatto[ ruled that evidence regarding the making of such statement is not secondary but
primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of that fact. Third, even assuming that the testimonies were
hearsay, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Dangalans testimony,
because he failed to object to it at the time it was offered. It has been held that when
parties fail to object to hearsay evidence, they are deemed to have waived their right to do
so; thus, it may be admitted. Karl Vincent B. Raso
5. SCC Chemicals Corp. v. CA
SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC), through its chairman Danilo Arietta and vice president Pablo
Bermundo obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc., (SIHI) in the amount of
P129,824.48 with interest at 30% per annum plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the
remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on due date. Arietta and Leopoldo Halili
executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the
obligation on maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan and despite SIHI sending demand letters
to SCC, Arietta and Halili, but no payment was made. This led SIHI to file a case against SCC,
Arietta and Halili with the RTC of Manila. SIHI presented a single witness but after numerous
opportunities, SCC was declared to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness. The RTC
ruled in favor of SIHI while the CA affirmed. The center of the controversy is the allegation that
the competence of the witness was not established and whose personal knowledge was not
demonstrated, citing Section 36 of Rule 130. The Supreme Court generally affirmed the RT and
the CAs ruling stating that SCCs reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is
misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.
However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay
evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be found in
the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-
examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.
However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-
examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. SCC was afforded several opportunities
by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's witness. Its repeatedly failed to take
advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the CA when it sustained the
trial court's finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's
witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence. Nor was the
assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a
competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the
requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony
were satisfied. Karl Vincent B. Raso
6. People v. Guittap
Isagani Guittap, Wilfredo Morelos, Cesar Osabel, Ariel Dador, Luisito Guilling, Decena Masinag
and one Purcino were charged of the crime of robbery with homicide for stealing from and then
killing the spouses Romualdo and Leonila Jael. During trial, Dador was presented as a state

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witness wherein he detailed that Osabel told him that he and Masinag were planning on robbing
the spouses Jael. He further testified that when they executed the plan, it ended bloodily with
Dador given the role of lookout. Osabel came out with his hands bloodied and instructed Dador to
find a tricycle, however, when he returned, Osabel and Purcino were gone. He subsequently
found them in Osabels house counting their loot. Dador executed an extrajudicial confession
admitting complicity in the robbery and killing of the Jael spouses and implicating appellant and
Osabel in said crime with the assistance of counsel. Osabel likewise executed an extrajudicial
confession. Simeon Tabor, a neighbor of the Jaels, testified that he noticed that the victims, who
were known to be early risers, had not come out of their house. He started calling them but there
was no response. He instructed his son to fetch the victims son, SPO1 Lamberto Jael. When the
latter arrived, they all went inside the house and found bloodstains on the floor leading to the
bathroom. Tabor opened the bathroom door and found the lifeless bodies of the victims. The trial
court only convicted Osabel and Masinag as Purcino was still at large. Masinag contends that the
extrajudicial confessions of Osabel and Dador were insufficient to establish with moral certainty
her participation in the conspiracy. She argues that Dador was not present to hear Masinag
instigate the group to rob the Jael spouses. He only came to know about the plan when Osabel
told him on their way home. Thus, Dador had no personal knowledge of how the plan to rob was
actually made and of Masinags participation thereof. In acquitting Masinag, the Supreme Court
ruled that that the testimony of Dador was not based on his own personal knowledge but
from what Osabel told him. He admitted that he was never near Masinag and that he did
not talk to her about the plan when they were at her house. Thus, his statements are
hearsay and does not prove her participation in the conspiracy. Under Rule 130, Section
36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such
testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as evidence not of what the
witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others. The hearsay rule bars the
testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally
or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People, the Court held that when evidence is based on what
was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for being
patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is
inadmissible as evidence. Karl Vincent B. Raso
7. Estrada v. Desierto
The facts in this case are undisputed since first year. During the historic events of EDSA II, then
President Joseph Estrada left Malacanang while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as the
new president of the Republic. Suddenly, Estrada comes out of nowhere to allege that he never
resigned the presidency but was merely on leave. One of the evidences presented to prove that
Estradas state of mind and that he did resign from office was the diary of then Executive
Secretary Edgardo Angara detailing the last few days of the Estrada presidency. The diary was
actually published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. According to Estrada, the Angara diary was
hearsay evidence and as such, should not have been admissible. The Supreme Court didnt find
the argument meritorious and stated that To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court
statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Estrada cannot complain
he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary, as he had all the opportunity to contest the use
of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not
covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in
whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the
witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay
evidence: (1) absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3)
absence of the oath. Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. A
complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the
hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect
examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a

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party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are
hearsay.
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as
admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a
candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff
Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be
opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na
ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful.
Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go.
We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite
the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to
resign has wilted.
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements.
These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or not.
They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and
(2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second
class includes the following:
a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition,
knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;
b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like;
c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of
another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;
d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.

As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect
his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains
statements of Secretary Angara from which the Court can reasonably deduce Estradas
intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. Karl
Vincent B. Raso
8. People v. Gaddi
Nerio Gaddi was accused of the murder of Augusto Esguerra by stabbing. According to one of
the prosecutions witnesses Ernesto Guzman, he saw Gaddi and Esguerra drinking gin and the
next day, Gaddi told Guzman that he killed Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet pit. Also,
while being arrested by Corporal Rogelio Castillo, Detective Rodrigo Salamat and Pat. Jesus
Patriarca, Gaddi told Corporal Castillo that he killed the victim and where he buried the body, Pat.
Patriarca, on his part, took down the confession of Gaddi. The RTC of Quezon City found Gaddi
guilty. Gaddi claims that Guzmans testimony on his confession of the crime to Guzman cannot
be given credence for being hearsay. The Supreme Court still found Gaddi liable, albeit modifying
the crime to homicide, and ruled that proof that a person confessed to the commission of a
crime can be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay rule under Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which only prohibits a witness from testifying as to
those facts which he merely learned from other persons but not as to those facts which he
"knows of his own knowledge: that is, which are derived from his own perception." Hence,
while the testimony of a witness regarding the statement made by another person, if
intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay
evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to
establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Here, when
Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably was bothered by his conscience,
admitted the killing to him, there was no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was

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testifying to a fact which he knows of his own personal knowledge; that is, he was
testifying to the fact that the appellant told him that he stabbed Augusta Esguerra and not
to the truth of the appellant's statement. Karl Vincent B. Raso
9. People v. Garma
Herminigildo Isidro aka Remy, heard two gunshots from a distance and afterwards, heard his
uncle Sixto Selma crying Remy, will you come to my rescue in the local dialect. Thinking that his
uncle has been shot, Sixto immediately ran towards their house to inform his relatives of what he
heard. Maria Isidro, Sixtos sister, also heard the gunshots and Sixtos subsequent call for
assistance. She forthwith awakened Gil Morales, her son-in-law, who, with Perlita Gazmen-
Selma, sought the assistance of Councilor Jose Ardesani. However, since the latter is himself
afraid of the assailants, this left Gil, Perlita, Herminigildo and Maria no recourse but to gather
their wits and proceed to the place where they heard Sixto moaning. They found Sixto lying on
the ground wounded and upon seeing them, Sixto promptly complained I am hit and when
asked about the identity of the assailant, Sixto replied: They were three but I recognize[d] only
Alex Garma. Sixto would later die but it was on the basis of Sixtos statement that Garma and an
unidentified accused was charged of murder. The trial court convicted Garma while the CA
affirmed. The Supreme Court, affirming the trial court and CA decisions, found that Sixtos
statement qualifies as both dying declarations and as part of res gestae. There are four (4)
requisites which must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible in
evidence, to wit: (a) it must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of
an impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration
was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the decedent was
the victim. In this case, the foregoing requirements are undoubtedly present. First, Sixto's
statement that "they were three (3) but I recognize[d] only Alex Garma," is a statement of the
surrounding circumstances of his death as the same refers to the identity of his assailants .
Second, Sixto gave such declaration under the consciousness of an impending death as shown
by the serious nature of his wounds, which in fact resulted in his death several hours later. Third,
prior to his death, Sixto was competent to be a witness in court. And fourth, Sixto's dying
declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where he was himself the victim. Karl Vincent
B. Raso
10. People v. Santos, et. al.
Francisco Santos was charged with the murder of David Amber who was killed with a gunshot.
Corazon Dayao went to see his husband Pedro, who was the driver of Mr. and Mrs. David Amber.
While she was in the terrace of the Ambers house, she heard five successive gunshots and saw
David fall prostrate to the ground. Seeing that David wanted to say something, she called Lolitas
attention and said in the local dialect, Ate, it looks like Kuya has something to tell you. She
pulled Lolita towards the victim where Lolita asked her husband who had shot him and the latter
answered, It was Pare Pran. Lolita then gave a sworn statement implicating only Asuncion, then
during preliminary investigation the following day, disclosed that her husbands assailant was
Francisco Santos aka Pran. The trial court convicted Santos and considered the words of David
as a dying declaration. In affirming the conviction, the Court said that Davids statement to Lolita
is a dying declaration and is part of res gestae. A dying declaration is entitled to the highest
credence because no person who knows of his impending death would make a careless
and false accusation. As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its
admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration is made by the deceased under the
consciousness of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a
witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarants death; and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the
declarants death is the subject of inquiry. It must be shown that a dying declaration was
made under a realization by the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence -- not
so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at hand. This may be proven by the statement

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of the deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedents
wounds, or other relevant circumstances.
The victims declaration consisted of the words Pare Pran. Under the circumstances, however,
he could not have been expected to articulate his awareness of something so obvious -- the
inevitability of his demise -- or to have the energy to do so. The nature and extent of said injuries
underscored the seriousness of his condition and they later proved by themselves that the
utterances of the deceased were made under a consciousness of an impending death. That his
demise thereafter came swiftly, although not instantaneously, further emphasized the victims
realization of the hopelessness of his recovery.
We stress that when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and
the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. It was the height of
jocularity for appellant to have suggested that it was highly possible that the deceased mentioned
his name to Lolita so that she would tell him to come to decedents succor, or for another reason.
Such conjecture finds no basis on record. On the other hand, this speculation is belied by the
clear, straightforward testimonies of Lolita and Corazon. Despite several attempts, counsel for
the defense failed to make Lolita admit that the victim mentioned appellants name for a vague
and undefined purpose, other than to identify his assailant. Lolita adamantly stuck to her
testimony that her husband told her that he was shot by Pare. The unrebutted testimony of
Corazon further clarified that the victim said those words in answer to his wifes question as to
who shot him. Davids condemnatory antemortem statement naming appellant as his assailant
deserves full faith and credit and is admissible in evidence as a dying declaration. Karl Vincent B. Raso
11. Fuentes, Jr. v. CA
Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a
benefit dance when Alejandro Fuentes, Jr. stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen. Before he died,
Malaspina muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr. stabbed him. Fuentes, Jr. denied this stating that
it was his cousin Zoilo Fuenter, Jr. alias Jonie who knifed Malaspina who said that Jonie
admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match, the latter
punched him. The Regional Trial Court found Fuentes, Jr. guilty of murder while the CA affirmed.
Fuentes, Jr. argues that Jonies confession was given to Fuentes, Jr.s uncle Felicisimo, who said
that the Jonie even showed him the knife he used, and in turn relayed it to P/Sgt. Benjamin
Conde, Jr and that as a declaration against penal interest, is an exception to the hearsay. The
Supreme Court, in affirming the conviction, held that one of the recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at
the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be
received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third
persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and
trustworthiness. There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a
declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the
declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances
must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed. However, the supposed
declaration of Jonie wasnt considered admissible by the Court since Jonie, the declarant,
is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated
or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the
jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under the rule. Karl Vincent B. Raso
12. Philippine Free Press v. CA
Philippine Free Press, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the publication of Philippine Free Press
Magazine, one of the widely circulated political magazines in the Philippines. Philippine Free
Press purchased a parcel of land in Pasong Tamo Street, Makati and upon taking possession of

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the land, the corporation constructed an office building thereon to house its various machineries,
equipment, office furniture and fixture and made it its main office. Due to numerous articles that it
printed against Marcos and his administration, soldiers surrounded the office building, forced out
its employees at gunpoint and padlocked the establishment. Consequently, publication of the
Philippine Free Press ceased. On separate occasions, Atty. Crispin Baizas approached Teodoro
Locsin Sr., the President of Philippine Free Press, with offers to acquire the corporation by then
President Marcos to which the Locsin Sr. refused. Another offer was made by Marcos, this time
through Brig. Gen. Hans Menzi, stating that Marcos cannot be denied and insisted that he has
no choice but to sell. Knowing this, Locsin Sr. made a counter-offer that he will sell the land, the
building for P5,750,000 and but he will keep the name of Philippine Free Press, Inc., to which
Marcos was amenable. Locsin Sr. thereafter used the proceeds to pay the separation pay of the
corporations employees and buyout the shares of minority stockholders. However, after the
Marcos regime was deposed, Philippine Free Press Inc. filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale
against Liwayway and the PCGG before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on the grounds of
vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of purchase price. The trial court dismissed the claim
while the CA affirmed. One of the testimonies made by the Locsins in proving the vitiation of
consent is Gen. Menzis statements mentioned above regarding the offer. The Supreme Court
affirmed the RTC and the CAs decision, stated that such statements are considered as
hearsay and while it is unmindful of the exception to the hearsay rule provided in Section
38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, in assessing the probative value of Gen. Menzi's
supposed declaration against interest, i.e., that he was acting for the late President Marcos
when he purportedly coerced Mr. Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free Press property, we are
loathed to give it the evidentiary weight petitioner endeavors to impress upon us. For, the
Locsins can hardly be considered as disinterested witnesses. They are likely to gain the
most from the annulment of the subject contracts. Moreover, allegations of duress or
coercion should, like fraud, be viewed with utmost caution. They should not be laidlightly
at the door of men whose lips had been sealed by death. Jurisprudence instructs that
evidence of statement made or a testimony is hearsay if offered against a party who has
no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely
because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to
cross-examine the persons to whom the statements or writings are attributed.[15] And
there can be no quibbling that because death has supervened, the late Gen Menzi, like the
other purported Marcos subalterns, Messrs. Baizas and De Vega, cannot cross-examine
the Locsins for the threatening statements allegedly made by them for the late President.
Karl Vincent B. Raso
13. People v. Gado
Rey Gado was accused of killing Melencio Manalang, Jr. Melencio Jr. and some of his friends
were having a drinking session at the house of Juanito Vicente. Shortly thereafter, Melencio Jr.
decided to leave and was accompanied by Gado and Vicente, as well as a certain Emma and her
brother. While walking, his companions suddenly held him while he was stabbed by Gado. He
was chanced upon by barangay tanod Fernando Reyes who offered to help him get home. Upon
reaching home, Melencio Jr. asked his father, Melencio Sr. to bring him to the hospital, and upon
his fathers query, he identified Gado as his assailant. On the way to Perpetual Help Hospital at
Las Pinas, the victim once more related what happened to him, however despite being given
medical attention, he still expired. The trial court acquitted Emma Gallos but convicted Gado.
Gado assails the courts admission of the testimony of Melencio Sr. who testified in regard to the
statements and declarations of his son concerning his assailants, claiming that the said
declarations are not in the nature of dying declaration for the simple reason that they were not
made under a clear consciousness of an impending death. The Supreme Court disagrees with
Gados contention, stating that from the established facts in the case at bar, the trial court
correctly considered the declaration of the victim a dying declaration and, therefore, admissible.
The declarant was conscious of his impending death. This may be gleaned not only from the
victim's insistence right after he reached their house that he should immediately be brought to the
hospital and that he was becoming weaker by the moment, but also from the serious nature of his
wounds and the fact that the victim died shortly afterwards. Even assuming that the victim's

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utterances were not made under a firm belief of an impending death, the victim's
statements may, at the very least, form part of the res gestae. For the admission of
evidence as part of the res gestae, it is required that (a) the principal act, the res gestae, be
a startling occurrence, (b) the statements forming part thereof were made before the
declarant had the opportunity to contrive, and (c) the statements refer to the occurrence in
question and its attending circumstances. The Court has ruled that while the statement of
the victim may not qualify as a dying declaration because it was not made under the
consciousness of impending death may still be inadmissible as part of the res gestae if it
was made immediately after the incident. Definitely, the victim's statement in the case at
hand was made immediately after the incident, before he could even have the opportunity
to contrive or concoct a story. Of relevance, too, is the fact that on two occasions, first at
their house, and later while he was being brought to the hospital, he identified one and the
same person as his assailant. Where the elements of both a dying declaration and a
statement as a part of the res gestae are present, as in the case at bar, the statement may
be admitted as a dying declaration and at the same time as part of the res gestae. Karl Vincent B.
Raso
14. Capila v. People
Pepito Capila was a security guard of the Lanting Security and Watchman Agency assigned in
the Meralco Collection Office in J.P. Rizal, Makati. Ariel Arellano and Lani Imperio, both
employees of the Pilipinas Bank, Libertad Branch, went to the Meralco Collection Office to
receive and deposit cash collections from Meralcos 27 collectors. While waiting for Pilipinas
Banks armored car to arrive, two men suddenly entered the Meralco Collection office, hit Dimas
dela Cruz, another security guard from Lanting Security, and took from Arellano and Imperio the
duffle bag containing Meralcos cash collections. After the robbers fled, Dimas told Arellano that
Capila was one of those that robed the office. Then Dimas called the Makati Police, the Meralco
Security Division and Lanting Security to report the incident. Dimas also told SPO4 Maximo
during the investigation that one of the robbers was Capila. After the incident, Capila fled to his
hometown in Northern Samar. When the police was able to apprehend Capila, SPO4 Maximo
interrogated Capila who admitted that he participated in the commission of the crime and that the
mastermind was Dimas. The trial court found Capila guilty of robbery while the CA affirmed. The
prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of SPO4 Maximo that immediately after the incident,
Dimas reported to him that one of the robbers is Capila while the CA said that Dimas statement
was part of res gestae. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and the CAs ruling stating that
res gestae is a Latin phrase which literally means 'things done. As an exception to the
hearsay rule, it refers to those exclamations and statements by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were
made as spontaneous reactions or utterances inspired by the excitement of the occasion,
and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and fabricate a false
statement. The reason for the rule is human experience. It has been shown that under certain
external circumstances of physical or mental shock, the state of nervous excitement which occurs
in a spectator may produce a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and
perceptions produced by the external shock. As the statements or utterances are made under the
immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, such
statements or utterances may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts
he just observed. The spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration itself may be
regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather than the declarant speaking for
himself.
The rule on res gestae is provided under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court, thus:
SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. ' Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence
is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also

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statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be met: (1)
that the principal act or the res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is
spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and the
statement is made during the occurrence or immediately or subsequent thereto; and (3)
the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.
The Court of Appeals found that all the above requisites are present, thus: First, the principal act
is a startling occurrence which is the robbery in question. Second, Dimas Dela Cruz informed the
investigating officers that it was appellant who robbed the Meralco office immediately after the
incident occurred and before he had the time to contrive a story. Further, immediately after the
robbers fled, dela Cruz informed Ariel Arellano (the bank representative detailed at the Meralco
office) that appellant was one of those who robbed the office. In other words, statement of dela
Cruz was spontaneous as correctly observed by the trial court. Third, The statement of dela Cruz
refers to the robbery or incident subject matter of this case.
The Court is in accord with the Court of Appeals in its conclusion that all the requisites of the rule
on res gestae are present. The principal act, which by any measure is undoubtedly a startling
occurrence, is the robbery of which petitioner is being charged. Immediately after the robbery,
Dimas dela Cruz, the security guard then on duty, informed Ariel that one of the perpetrators is
herein petitioner. Dimas likewise reported at once the incident to the police and to the security
agency. When questioned by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas, who was still shocked, named petitioner
herein as one of the robbers. His statements to Ariel and SPO4 Maximo were made before he
had the time and opportunity to concoct and contrive a false story. We note that Dimas personally
knows petitioner considering that both worked in the same security agency and assigned in the
same office. Karl Vincent B. Raso