Friday cases digest

1. Arceo vs People

Facts:
Petitioner obtained a loan from private complainant Josefino Cenizal in the total
amount of P150,000.00.
Cenizal did not deposit the check immediately because Arceo promised that he would
replace the check with cash. Such promise was made verbally seven (7) times. When
his patience ran out, Cenizal brought the check to the bank for encashment. The
check bounced because of insufficient funds. As a consequence, Cenizal executed his
affidavit and submitted documents in support of his complaint for estafa and violation
of BP 22 against petitioner. After due investigation, this case for violation of BP 22 was
filed against petitioner. The check in question and the return slip were however lost by
Cenizal as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence on. Cenizal executed an
Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the check in question and the return slip. Arceo
was found guilty in the trial and on appeal.
He claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite the failure
of the prosecution to present the dishonored check during the trial.
Issue: Whether or not the best evidence rule applies in the instant case and that the
presentation of the check in evidence is necessary as a condition sine qua non for
conviction under BP 22

Ruling:
The best evidence rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject
of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the
circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless
check.
6
Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the
check, not its content.
Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established.
Cenizal testified that he presented the originals of the check, the return slip and other
pertinent documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he
executed his complaint-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. The City
Prosecutor found a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed
the corresponding information based on the documents.
2. FELINO EBREO, SPOUSES ANTONIO and EVELYN P. BERAA, IGNACIO EBREO and
ELEUTERIA CUETO, Petitioners, vs.GIL EBREO, represented by His Attorney-in-Fact,
FELIXBERTO EBREO, FLAVIANO EBREO and HOMOBONO CUETO, Respondents.
Facts:
Felipe Ebreo died intestate in 1926 leaving behind as heirs his five children, Gil, Flaviano,
Felino, Ignacio, and Felipa.
1
Subsequently, Felipa died leaving behind her heirs,
Genoveva, Homobono and Eleuteria all surnamed Cueto. Genoveva died in 1991
without any issue. Defendants-spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn Beraa are the son
and daughter-in-law, respectively, of defendant Felino, one of the five children of
Felipe Ebreo.
As agreed upon by these heirs, subject lot, shall remain under the co-ownership of Gil,
Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the heirs of Felipa Ebreo. However, plaintiffs were surprised
to discover that subject lot was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
defendant Antonio Ebreo. Based on plaintiffs recitals, they alleged that they never
sold, ceded, conveyed or transferred their rights, share and co-ownership over subject
lot.
Answering the complaint, the defendants countered that after the execution of the
Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa, by and among the heirs of the late Felipe Ebreo,
subject was sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo. By virtue of this sale, the corresponding
Real Property Tax Declaration was transferred in the name of Santiago Puyo as owner.
However, the deed of sale evidencing this transaction was never presented.
Defendants further alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale of the lot by the heirs of
Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo was executed and ratified sometime in 1968 before
Attorney Doroteo M. Chavez of Batangas City. Then it was sold by Santiago Puyo by
way of Absolute Sale, to defendant Antonio Ebreo was duly executed and ratified
before one Attorney Meynardo L. Atienza.
The deed of Sale Annotated in the Tax declaration of the Puyo could no longer be
found in the Office of the Municipal Assessor for the building was burned.
Felino alleged that his copy of the deed was borrowed by his niece Eleuteria Cueto
who is the daughter of one of the heirs, Felipa Ebreo.According to Felino, Eleuteria
refused to return the document and even got angry when he tried to demand its
return.From Felinos account,there are three copies of the missing deed of sale.
Lamentably, petitioners failed to present any one of them.
Issue: Is the secondary evidence admissible considering that the primary evidence
cannot be found?

Held:
The defendant-appellants rely on the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by the heirs of
Felipe Ebreo in favor of Santiago Puyo. However, defendant-appellants failed to
produce the alleged Deed of Sale in violation of the Best Evidence Rule.
The best evidence rule, applied to documentary evidence, operates as a rule of
exclusion, that is, secondary (or substitutionary) evidence cannot inceptively be
introduced as the original writing itself must be produced in court, except in the four
instances mentioned in Section 3. Defendant-appellants miserably failed to prove that
their case is included among the exceptions to the Rule.
The testimony of Felino Ebreo regarding the execution of the Deed of Sale cannot be
given credence. Defendant-appellants did not even look for a copy of the deed of
sale on the notarial registry of Atty. Chavez, the notary public who allegedly notarized
the deed of sale. Neither did they look for a copy in the archives of the Court where it
should have been submitted as required by the notarial law. In the words of the trial
court, "the decisive documentary evidence remains an elusive phantom and
conspicuously unproven." The controversial deed of sale not having been produced as
required by the rules of evidence, Santiago Puyo acquired no rights whatsoever to Lot
subject lot.
3. SSS v AGUAS
Facts:
Pablo Aguas, SSS pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. His surviving spouse Rosanna
Aguas filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits. In her claim, Rosanna indicated that
Pablo was survived by his minor child Jeylnn. Her claim was approved on February 13,
1997.
In April 1997, deceased sister, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac contested Rosannas claim,
saying that Rosanna abandoned the family abode about 6 years earlier and that she
was living with another man. Leticia further alleged that Pablo did not have any
children with Rosanna but Rosanna had several children with a certain Romeo dela
Pena. SSS suspended the payment of the pension and conducted an investigation. The
investigation confirmed that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna and that
Pablo was incapable of having children based on the certification of Dr. Manuel
Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile.
It was on this ground that the SSS denied Rosannas request to resume payment and
ordered Rosanna to refund to SSS the Php10,350.00 death benefits already released to
her and Jeylnn.
When Rosanna filed a petition with the Social Security Commission, Janet H. Aguas also
claiming to be a child of the deceased, joined Rosanna and Jeylnn as claimants. As
proof, the petition included a photocopy of Jeylnn and Janets certificates of live birth.
SSS denied their claims but decided to conduct hearings. During the hearings, the SSC
found sufficient proof that Rosanna contracted marriage with Romeo dela Pena while
still being married to Pablo; that Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Pena while still
married to Pablo (as evidenced by the baptismal certificate presented to the court for
Jenelyn H. dela Pena showing that the showing that she was the child of Rosanna
Hernandez and Romeo dela Pena)
The SSC ruled that because of her adultery, Rosanna was no longer entitled to support
from Pablo. As for Jeylnn, the SCC ruled that Jeylnn was not Pablos legitimate child,
even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo. The SSC deduced from the records
that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person. Janet on the other hand was
only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna but with no legal papers.
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling based on the birth certificates of Janet and
Jeylnn showing that they were children of the deceased.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may be considered primary beneficiaries of the
deceased for his SSS pension and therefore entitled to the SSS death benefits due to the
presentation of their birth certificates.
Held: Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate showing the signature
of Pablo as her father authenticating that Jeylnn was born on October 29, 1991.
Records show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 which
continued, as far as the records are concerned, until the death of Pablo on December
8, 1996. Based on the records, Jeylnn was born during the marriage of Rosanna and
Pablo. Since Jeylnn was conceived or born during the marriage of the parents, she is
considered legitimate.
Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo dela Pena during her marriage to Pablo. A wife who
is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent
from support upon the husband
Even if the records show that the spouses adopted Janet, there were no legal papers to
prove it. She therefore does not qualify as a primary beneficiary.
4. Vallarta vs. CA
Facts: Accused, Vallarta, was appointed as a warehouseman-cashier in the National
Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC), as the agent-in-charge and disbursing officer of
the NARIC and accountable for property and funds of the corporation, he was
charged with the crime of malversation after the NARIC auditor found shortage in cash
and items under his custody. He was later found guilty.
A motion for new trial was filed by the accused, alleging that errors of law or
irregularities were committed during the trial prejudicial to his substantial rights but the
trial court denied the motion. The accused elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate affirmed the trial court's decision. Accused-appellant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was also denied by the respondent appellate court hence it
appeal to the Supreme Court.
Vallarta`s motion for new trial before the trial court, he sought to present, as additional
evidence, the testimonies (affidavits) of Messrs. Pedro Esquivel and Pedro Perez, to
rebut the claim of Missing 6,000 empty sacks.
He also assail as erroneous is the respondent court's appreciation of exhibit 2, the
charge order of one Flavio Vasquez for 353 cavans and 50 kilos of rice worth P 8,171.68.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals was correct in not
appreciating the affidavits of Mr Esquivel and Perez
2. Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals was correct

Ruling:
1. Yes. The use of affidavits should be regulated by the hearsay rule to safeguard
every opportunity to cross examine the affiants with regard to their contents and
due execution. The statement of Pedro Esquivel submitted to the court is not signed;
consequently, the same could not be considered by it, because upon the face of
the instrument, the due execution thereof has not been established. More than this,
the two affidavits could not be relied upon by this court for the same are hearsay.
Unless and until the two supposed affiants of said instruments are presented in this
court, their testimonies as to the contents of their sworn statements are inadmissible
in evidence. Furthermore, the affidavits of Perez and Esquivel attached to the
motion for new trial of the accused does (sic) not show that they borrowed a total
of 6,161 empty sacks.

2. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Exhibit 2 was not signed and
duly authenticated; it is a mere carbon copy and no explanation was given why
Flavio Vasquez was not presented as a witness. A signed carbon copy or duplicate
of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate
original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-
production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting
to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public
officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy. The accused did not request for a
copy and exhibit the same before the trial court. The non-production by the
accused of the original document, unless justified under the exceptions in Section 2,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, gives rise to the presumption of suppression of
evidence" adverse to him.
5. Trans Pacific v CA
Facts: In a case for collection of a sum of money, the defendant put up then defense
that his obligation has been fully discharged by presenting in evidence duplicates of
the promissory notes which were stamped PAID. The Court of Appeals, however,
disregard the evidence on the theory that Art. 271 (1
st
paragraph) of the civil code
which reads:
Art. 271. The delivery of a private document evidencing a credit made
voluntarily by the creditor to the debtor implies the renunciation of the action which the
former had against the latter.
applies to the original copy, not its duplicate.
Issue: Is the appallate court correct?
Held:
NO. In relation to Rule 130 Sec 4(b) of the Rules of Court, it was held in People v. Tan,
105 Phil 1242 that:
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper
so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheets, including the signature of the
party to be charged thereby, producing a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such
signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of pen which made the surface or
exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals
and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the
non-production of the others.
A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in evidence when the original is in
the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice (SEC. 2b, rule 130), as in the case of respondent
bank. Further, it must be noted that respondent bank itself did not bother to challenge
the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by the petitioner.

6. Ramos v CA
Facts:
In a prosecution for several counts of estafa filed by a bank against its Acting Branch
Manager arising from her act of allowing the drawing against uncleared check
deposits (DAUD), the bank auditor testified based on the worksheets he prepared in the
process of his investigations. The worksheets were presented together with account
ledgers of the other co-accused, including inter office correspondence between
accused and her superiors as well as the uncleared checks.
The accused contends that such evidences which constitute of audit worksheets and
xerox copies of the dishonored checks and check return slip are inadmissible because
they do not constitute the best evidence.

Issue:
Are the entries in the account ledgers of the depositors admissible in evidence?

Held:
Yes. The entries in the account ledgers of the depositors which are on file on the bank
may be regarded as originals under paragraph c, Sec. 4 Rule 130 of the rules of Court.
Section 4(c). When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one
being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are
likewise equally regarded as originals.

SC sees no error on the part of the trial judge in admitting the testimony of the bank
auditor based on the worksheets he prepared in the process of his investigation
regarding the unauthorized DAUD extended by the petitioner to her accused. These
worksheets, are organized data culled from the pertinent bank documents which are
not intended to supplant the probative value of said documents. But together with the
other evidence presented such as the account ledgers of petitioner's co-accused, a
number of interoffice correspondence between the petitioner and her superiors as well
as the xerox copies of the uncleared checks deposited to the FSB and the checks
issued by the latter corresponding to the withdrawals against said uncleared checks,
they present indubitable proof that DAUD was allowed by petitioner even after that
practice was prohibited.

7. People vs. Tandoy

Facts: Police officers conducted a buy-bust operation where one officer posed as a
buyer and waited for a pusher near a store. Tandoy approached him and right away
asked him if wanted to some drugs. The officer paid a P10 bill and two P5 bills (marked
money) for two rolls of marijuana. Then the other officers arrested Tandoy. They made a
body search and found 8 more rolls. They brought him to the police station to be
investigated. Tandoy remained silent after being read his rights.

Accused was charged for the illegal sale of marijuana in the amount of Php 20.00. The
prosecution, however, marked only a photocopy of the Php 10.00 which was used by
the police in the buy-bust operation.


However, Tandoy contends that he was playing cara y cruz with 15 other people
when somebody suddenly said that the police were making arrests. The people
grabbed the bet money and scattered. He was arrested and the money they found on
him was from the game. He and a fellow player were taken to the police station and
mauled to induce them to give up the identity of other pushers. The trial court believed
the police officers story over the defendants. Applying the presumption that they had
performed their duties in a regular manner, it rejected Tandoy's uncorroborated
allegation that he had been manhandled and framed.

Issue: Did the trial court violate the best evidence rule when it admitted the photocopy
of the money?

Ruling: No, the marked money is not an ordinary document falling under Sec. 3, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary
evidence except in the five instances mentioned therein. The best evidence rule
applies only when the contents of the document are subject of inquiry. Where the issue
is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence is admissible.
Since the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of
establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitute evidence, like a
photocopy thereof. It is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the
original.
8. THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA, petitioner, vs.HERMOGENES REYES, Judge of
First Instance of Pampanga, and ANDRES GUEVARRA, respondents.
Facts:
The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres
Guevarra. The informations alleged that the defendant, with malicious intent, published
on page 9 of the weekly paper Ing Magumasid in its issue of July 13, 1930, a squib in
verse, of which a translation into Spanish was included therein, intended to impeach
the honesty, integrity, and reputation of Clemente Dayrit and of Mariano
Nepomuceno.
The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the prosecution, the copies of the Ing
Magumasid containing the libelous article with the innuendo, another article in the
vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. However the
judge refused to accept the newspapers as evidence.

Issue:Is the copies of the newspaper admissible?
Ruling:
Yes. The rule of procedure which requires the production of the best evidence, is
applicable to the present case. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the
libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the
libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of an article published in it.
9. Heirs v. Comorposa
Facts:
In 1965, when Francisco Comorposa was terminated in his job which affects the
relocation of his house, he asks for Adolfo Saezs help for him and his family to occupy
the land of Adolfos father Marco Saez. Out of pity, they were allowed.
Later, Francisco left for Hawaii, thus he was succeeded in his possession by his heirs who
likewise stayed to the said land without rent and through the Saezs tolerance.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the
premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the
legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessor[s] of the premises. They
alleged that they entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid
and lawful claimants, possessors and owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to
the present time; that they have acquired just and valid ownership and possession of
the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional Director of
the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession over the land in question when
it ruled that they [were] the rightful claimants and possessors and [were], therefore,
entitled to the issuance of a title.
Among the evidence presented by the defendant in an unlawful detainer case was a
CENR Certification bearing a facsimile signature of the CENR officer.
On appeal, the petitioners contend that that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits
of their witnesses. They also claim that the failure of respondents to file their position
paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.

Issue: 1. Is the evidence Admissible being the signature merely in facsimile?
2. Does CA erred in disregarding affidavit of petitioners witnesses?

Held:
1. Yes. While pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and
are not considered admissible in evidence, the certification bearing a
facsimile of a signature of the CENR office is admissible. The one referred to
here is a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by
mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial and business
transactions. Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the certification.
In fact, the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as
reference in one of his orders.
2. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are
to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of
whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
Furthermore, while in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the
witnesses' respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply
does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven.
10. Hernaez vs. McGrath
Facts: Rafael Alunan and Pedro Hernaez formerly were registered owners in equal
share of a land subject of the dispute. In Feb. 1943, a deed of sale, on which Alunan's
and Hernaez names were signed as sellers and the Hakodate Dock Co., Ltd., a
Japanese commercial firm, as buyer, in consideration of P170,000, was presented for
registration in the office of register of deeds, and new TCT`s in the name of the
purchaser were issued in lieu of the old TCTs, which were totally cancelled. On the
strength of this registration, the lots and all improvements still existing thereon were
vested as property of an enemy national by the Philippine Alien Property Administration,
a US Government instrumentality.
The issue was complicated by the theft after liberation from the office of the register of
deeds, of the deed of sale, the transfer certificates of title by virtue thereof, and other
papers pertaining to the last registration. only one unsigned copy of the aforesaid
deed, which had been secured from the file of the Hakodate home office in Hokaido,
Japan, was introduced. Hakodate's signed copy is said to have been lost or destroyed
in the bombing of Tokyo in 1945 along with the company's office in that city. And the
copy or the copies which had been kept by the notary public before whom the
document was acknowledged had also been burned with his other papers during the
fight for liberation of Manila. As a result, defendant's proofs on the controverted
execution of the lost deed are only the entries thereof in the registrar's office, collateral
documents, and parol testimony, some direct, some circumstantial, but none precise or
unequivocal in term. The principal witness for the defendant on the dispute sale were
Satoru Watanabe, Napoleon Garcia and Jose Ma. Recto.
Watanabe testifies that he was in the Philippines in the early part of the war as acting
manager of the Manila Branch of the Hakodate Dock. Co., Ltd. He recalls the
transaction between the Hackodate Dock Co., Ltd., on the one hand and Messrs.
Pedro C. Hernaez and Rafael R. Alunan on the other.
Napoleon Garcia, an assistant in the office of Attorney Jose Ma. Recto, declares that
he was a notary public and recall that, as such, he ratified a document in which Alunan
and Hernaez and the Hakodate Dock. Ltd., were the parties.
Jose Ma. Recto testifies that during the Japanese occupation he recalls a transaction
between Alunan and hernaez on the one hand and the Hakodate Dock. Ltd., on the
other. He thinks that he drew a deed of sale and that the document was signed in his
office; that he was in the same room.
On the other hand Hernaez was the lone witness on his behalf and for his co-plaintiff.
The gist of Hernaez' testimony is that if any document was presented the register of
deeds' office purporting to have been executed by him and his co-owner, that
document was a forgery.

Issue: WON the signatures of Alunan and Hernaez on the deed of sale are authentic,
thus rendering the sale as binding

Ruling: Yes. It is the contents, which in this case are not in dispute, which may not be
proved by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the
execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and
as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to
be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
The Rules of Court states that, ``There can be no evidence of a writing other than the
writing itself the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, except in the following
cases:x x x x x xWhen the original writing has been lost or destroyed upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the
document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined
from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to
produce the document, when available to establish its execution may affect the
weight of the evidence presented out not the admissibility of such evidence. In spite of
the defects which the trial court noted in Garcia's and Recto's testimony, the same and
Watanabe's leave little or no room for doubt that Alunan and her Hernaez did affix their
signatures to the deed of sale. The evasive answers Hernaez in his cross-examination
cast serious reflection on the truth of the protestations that the stolen document was
forged. Hernaez did not have to be shown the deed to be able to tell that he had not
signed it if that had been the case.

The probabilities of forgery are very remote and the direct evidence for the defendant
has abundantly and convincingly established that the property was sold by its former
owners for valuable consideration. The loss of the pertinent records in the office of the
register of deeds cannot be availed of to bolster the plaintiffs' case or weaken the
defense.

11. MARIA MAHILUM, SALVADOR MAHILUM, ANGEL MAHILUM, EMILIO OGDIMAN,
VICTORIO SALAZAR and TOMAS SALAZAR, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and GORGONIA FLORA DE SOTES, respondents.
Facts:
Pedro Mahilum was the registered owner of a parcel of land, as evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title. Upon his the death, he was succeeded by his six children, namely,
Tomas, Juan, Clemente, Antonia, Juliana and Tomasa who executed a "deed of
definite sale" in favor of Gorgonia Flora, married to Basilio Sotes, whereby in
consideration of P2,000.00, receipt of which was acknowledged by them, they had
ceded and conveyed unto her.
The vendors had acknowledged the deed of sale before Notary Public Nicolas D.
Destua.
According to Tomasa, neither she nor her brothers and sisters appeared before notary
public Nicolas Destua or thumbmarked and/or signed the deed of sale Further more,
According to the plaintiff, Gorgonia Flora Vda. de Sotes, fraudulently taking advantage
of the illiteracy or incapacity of the plaintiff and their brothers and sisters, Tomas,
Clemente and Antonia who were then living, induced them to sign a certain writing,
which writing the defendant, in conspiracy with Notary Public, Nicolas D. Destua ...,
falsely and fraudulently represented to be an acknowledgment of debt of plaintiffs
father, Pedro Mahilum, but which is in fact a Definite Contract of Sale disposing of Lot
No. 2195 as aforesaid.
Issue: Is the Deed of Sale admissible in evidence and be given weight?
Held:
Yes. the lone testimony of Tomasa could not overcome the probative value of a public
instrument. The rule is well settled that clear and positive evidence is necessary to
destroy the credence of a public instrument, especially so where, like in the instant
case, the notary public who ratified the deed of sale took the witness stand and
categorically declared that the thumbarks of the vendors are genuine.
The fact that the deed of sale has not been registered since then does not destroy its
efficacy insofar as they and their own privies are concerned. They delivered possession
to said respondent and no superior rights of third persons have intervened.
12. People v Cruz
Facts:
A case of parricide and frustrated murder was filed against Remegio Cruz for killing his
wife and hacking her sister with bolo.
Cruz was married to Natividad Concepcion in 1953. During their marriage there had
been many times that Natividad left their conjugal abode alleging that the appellant
beat her up. However, the appellant always convince his wife to come back and the
two always reconcile.
In 1956, the appellant brought her wife and daughter in his parents house in
Pampanga. On arriving in the said place, he fetched a physician, however, when he
returned his wife and daughter had left for the latters parents house in Cabanatuan
City. He was so enraged that he slashed a jar of sugar with a bolo.
On June 9, 1956, the appellant followed his wife and daughter in Cabanatuan city to
convince her to go back to Manila with him. During his stay, from June 9-11, the
appellant helped in the household chores, and said to be polite towards his wifes
family and attentive to their daughter.
At about midnight of June 11, Anita and Lourdes, Natividad sisters, were awakened by
the sound of the banging on then wall and shattering of the chinaware in the kitchen.
Rushing down, they saw the appellant holding a bolo knife. When Anita was about to
approach the couple, the appellant hacked his wife with it. She ran out of the house
and cried for help, the appellant chased her and hacked her in the head.
Meanwhile, Daniel Cabunta, the sisters uncle living nearby was awakened and saw
the appellant hacking Anita. He went down to stop the appellant, but the latter swung
his bolo at him. Daniel was able to parried the blow and wrest away the bolo. The
appellant the run towards the city hall, and when arrested by the police why he is
running, he answered that he is very aggrieved.
Defense plead insanity of the accused during the trial based on him being hospitalized
on March 19, 1948, and discharged on April 17, 1948, as unimproved; the diagnosis was
schizophrenia, paranoid type in Hawaii USA and when deported to the Philippines, he
was committed to the National Mental Hospital at Mandaluyong, Rizal, for chizophrenia
on April 20, 1948, and after about twelve days of confinement was released on May 2,
1948, as mentally improved.

Issue: WON the defense of insanity meritorious in the case at bar?

Held:
It is the policy and accepted standard of jurisprudence that the allegation of insanity or
imbecility must be clearly proved. The law always presumes all acts to be voluntary,
and it is thus improper to conclude that acts were executed unconsciously. In order
that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act that the accused acted without
the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude
imputability.

Appellants actions before the killing merely indicate his tendency to be violent when
he is angry. Breaking glasses and smashing dishes are simply demonstrations of an
explosive temper, not clear and satisfactory proof of insanity.

13. People vs. Tan
Facts: Respondents Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and others are charged with the crime
of falsification of the public documents, in their capacities as public officials and
employees, by having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise
were purchased by Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents or
sufferers, in such quantities and at such prices and from such business establishments or
persons as are made to appear in the said public documents, when in fact and in truth,
no such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and supposedly purchased by
said Pacita Madrigal Gonzales in the public and official documents, had ever been
made.
In order to prove the charge of falsification, the prosecution presented to a witness a
booklet of receipts, which was marked Exh. "D", the duplicates to the customers, so that
the triplicate copies remained in the booklet. The booklet contained the triplicate
copies, and according to said witness the original invoices were sent to Manila office of
the company, the duplicates to the customers, so that the triplicate copies remained in
the booklet. Witness further explained that in preparing receipts for sales, two carbons
were used between the three sheets. However, as the witness was explaining the figures
or words appearing on the triplicates, Hon. Bienvenido M. Tan, then presiding in the trial
court, interrupted the proceeding holding that the triplicates are not admissible unless it
is first proven that the originals were lost and cannot be produced.

Issue: Whether or not the duplicates and the triplicates are admissible

Ruling: Carbon copies when made at the same time and on the same machine as the
original, are duplicate originals, and these have been held to be as much primary
evidence as the originals.

14. TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher
of "Balalong," respondents.
Facts:
Thomasa claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was
appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.
Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In
support of his claim, he presented an Order granting the petition for adoption filed by
deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the
deceaseds estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro
questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive
father Alfredo.
Issue:
Is the reconstructed Marriage Contract admissible?
Held:
The primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage
contract.
As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be established
by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the document and
subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is
the due execution of the document and subsequent loss that would constitute the
foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such
document.
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of
the marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of secondary evidence
of the contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently
establish the circumstances of the loss of the original document.
15. Citibank v Teodoro
Doctrine: Before secondary evidence may be admitted to prove the contents of
original documents, the offeror must prove the due execution and the subsequent loss
or unavailability of the original.

Facts:
Teodoro was issued a credit card by Citibank, N.A. Mastercard. When his purchases
reached P191, 693.00 and he was billed by Citibank, he refused to pay claiming that
the amount did not correspond to his actual obligation. During trial, Citibank presented
photocopies of sales invoices bearing Teodoros signatures in the amount of P24, 388.
36 as proof of his purchases.
Issue: Considering that all the invoices or charge slips were only photocopies of the
originals, are they admissible as evidence?
Held:
No. Under Rule 130, Sec 5 of the rules of court, before a party is allowed to adduce
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the
following:
1. The existence or due execution of the original
2. The loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non- production in
court; and
3. On the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of
the original can be attributed.

Before secondary evidence may be admitted to prove the contents of original
documents, the offeror must prove the due execution and the subsequent loss or
unavailability of the original.
In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the
photocopies and the testimonies of the witnesses. Citibank, however, failed to prove
that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable
diligence and good faith in searching for them. While a witness testified that he had
requested the originals from Equitable, he failed to show that he had subsequently
followed up the request. It was established that triplicates were produced, although the
cardholder signed the sales invoice only once. When more than one original copy
exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced
in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one of them.
16. Rodelas vs. Aranza
Facts: appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate
of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in
her favor. The petition was opposed by the appellees, contending that alleged
hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it
would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509. the court set aside its
order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla.

Issue: Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by
means of a photostatic copy

Ruling: Yes, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. A
photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam
vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who
have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved
by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by
other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court"
17. EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., RUFO B. COLAYCO, RUFINO L.
SAMANIEGO, KUOK KHOON CHEN, and KUOK KHOON TSEN, petitioners,
vs.BF CORPORATION, respondent.
Facts: ESHRI contracted with BF Corporation. However, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14
to 19, they did not re-measure the work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment
Certificates, let alone remit payment for the inclusive periods covered. In this regard, BF
claimed having been misled into working continuously on the project by ESHRI which
gave the assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already being processed.
Despite several attempts to collect ESHRI did not pay. In their suit for a sum of money
and damages, BF used the photocopy of Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs as
evidence.
Issue: is the photocopy of Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs admissible?
Held:
Respondent BF, have complied with the laying-the-basis requirement. Defending the
action of the courts below in admitting into evidence the photocopies of the
documents aforementioned, BF explained that it could not present the original of the
documents since they were in the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them over
to BF despite requests.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party
against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The
offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by
giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the
form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the
presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party
in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has
the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to
produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.

18. Gabatan v People
Facts:
An action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession over a 1.1062
hectare parcel of land was filed by Lourdes Pacana against the heirs of Teofilo
Gabatan. This lot was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. Pacana
alleged that she is the sole heir of Juan being the only daughter of her deceased
mother Hermogena Gabatan, who, according to her is the only child of Juan Gabatan
and his wife. Respondent, further alleges that upon Juans death the land was merely
entrusted to Teofilo, Juans brother, and his wife for administration, and before
Hermogenas death she demanded the return of such land but to no avail. Upon the
death of Teofilo and his wife, their heirs took possession of the property despite the
demands for them to vacate the same.

On trial, RTC and CA relied to the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan,
wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan.

Also presented as evidence are the two conflicting birth certificate Pacana, one
typewritten presented by Pacana, wherein her mother name is Hermogena
Clarito Gabatan, the other handwritten, presented by the heirs where Pacanas
mother name is "Hermogena Calarito.

Issue: 1. Which of the birth certificate admissible as evidence?
2. Is the photocopy of the deed of absolute sale admissible?


Held:
1. Both are admissible. SC states that it doesnt mean that if a document is typewritten,
it is more genuine than the handwritten one. Handwritten document doesnt mean it
has a dubious credibility. However, both birth certificates only proved the filiation of
Pacana to Hermogena and not to Juan Gabatan. Respondents mothers
(Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of
Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC.
Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment
categorically evidencing Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan.

2. No. Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.
Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where
the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is
lost or the original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of secondary
evidence must still be established. A party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the
best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first
present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of
the original instrument.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac
Pacana (who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that
she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or
whether it was recorded in any public office.


19. Cruz vs. CA
Facts: Salonga filed complaint for collection and damages against Cruz alleging that
Cruz borrowed from him P35,000 evidenced by a receipt. Cruz claimed that only
P20,000 was paid, leaving balance of P15,000. He said that he and Salonga agreed
that Salonga would grant him exclusive right to purchase the harvest of certain
fishponds leased by him in exchange for certain loan accommodations. Salonga
delivered to Cruz various loans totaling P15,250 evidenced by 4 receipts and P4,000
receipt of which was lost. Cruz failed to comply by refusing to deliver the alleged
harvest of fishpond and his indebtedness. Cruz denied contracting any loan; he alleged
that he was a lessee of fishponds owned by Yabut and that he agreed w/ Salonga that
Salonga would purchase fish from the fishpond. Salonga would also sublease the same
fishpond.

Cruz admitted having received P35,000 but said these were received not as loans, but
as consideration for the pakyaw agreement and payment for the sublease.

Salonga claimed that aside from the P35,000, etc., he also delivered P28,000 which is
the consideration for the pakyaw agreement, evidenced by receipt; 2.) Cruz testified
that out of the P35,000 he received, P28,000 covered full payment of the pakyaw
agreement while P7,000 is advance payment for sublease.

The trial court ruled in favor of Cruz but the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered Cruz
to pay Salonga. CA also found that the amounts were not payments for pakyaw and
sublease, but for loans extended by Salonga to Cruz.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Exhibit D is covered by the parol evidence rule
2. Whether or not Exhibit I is covered by the parol evidence rule

Ruling:
1. No. The reason for the rule is the presumption that when parties have reduced their
agreement to writing they have made such writing the only repository and memorial of
the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing is deemed waived or abandoned.
The rule is not applicable because it is predicated on existence of document
embodying terms of agreement. Exhibit D doesnt contain an agreement. It is only a
receipt, not the sole memorial of the agreement. At most, it is a casual memorandum.
A receipt will, in general, fall outside the line of the rule. Usually a receipt is merely a
written admission of a transaction, independently existing.
2.No. The exhibit I does not make categorical declaration that the P28,000 was
received by Cruz on the same date. The date then cant be conclusive. A distinction
should be made between statement of fact expressed in the instrument and the terms
of the contractual act. The former may be varied by parol evidence, not the latter. The
statement in Exhibit I of the petitioners receipt of P28,000 is just a statement of fact, not
a part of the agreement. Thus, parol evidence may be introduced to explain Exhibit I.
The Court is satisfied that P35,000 was received by Cruz as payment for pakyaw and
sublease agreements.

20. Inciong Jr. V CA
Facts:
A promissory note was issued by petitioner together with 2 others jointly and severally,
to make them liable to PBC. Thereafter was a default on the payment of the note. PBC
proceeded against Inciong and in the action filed by the bank.
The petitioner alleged that he was only a co-maker to the loan.
Petitioner further alleged that five (5) copies of a blank promissory note were brought to
him by Campos at his office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, he
indicated that he bound himself only for the amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by
trickery, fraud and misrepresentation that he was made liable for the amount of
P50,000.00.
Issue: Does Parol evidence rule apply where the document whose terms are supposed
to be modified or altered is a private, not a public document?
Held:
Yes. Sec 9. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does not specify that the written agreement
be a public document.
What is required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on
long experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that
which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have
expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control
and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract from
that expressed in the writing signed by them. Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply,
a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a
general rule, bills, notes, and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be
varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.
21.VICTORIA LECHUGAS v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

Facts:
Victoria Lechugas allegedly bought the subject properties from Leoncia Lasangue, as
evidenced by a public Deed of Absolute Sale which was registered with the Register
of Deeds. Lechugas claimed that the Lozas, by means of fraud, intimidation, strategy
and stealth, unlawfully entered said properties and appropriated the produce thereof
for themselves, refusing to surrender the same despite demands. The Lozas, however,
deny that the properties which Lechugas bought from Lasangue in 1950 was the same
subject land. They claimed that their predecessor, Hugo Loza, had bought a parcel of
land from one Victorina Limor, and another adjoining land from one Emeterio
Lasangue. The remaining portion of the lot bought from Limor was allegedly the one
bought by Lechugas. This was corroborated by Lasangue in her testimony, who,
although illiterate, was able to specifically point out the land sold to Lechugas. Such
testimony, however, was contrary to the contents of the deed of sale executed
between Lasangue and Lechugas.

Issue: Should parole evidence have been admitted to determine the land bought by
Lechugas?

Held:
Yes. The Parole Evidence Rule does not apply where the controversy is between one of
the parties to the document and third persons. While the deed of sale was executed
between Lasangue and Lechugas, the dispute over what was actually sold was
between Lechugas and the Lozas. Lasangue, therefore, is a stranger to the dispute and
is not bound by the rule.

The Parole Evidence Rule applies only as between parties to the written agreement or
their privies, and not to strangers. It does not apply where either one of the parties
between whom the question arises is a stranger to the written agreement and does not
claim under or through one who is party to it.

Doctrine: The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by
either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the
suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not
base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the
relation established thereby.

22. Remalate vs. Tibe
Facts: In a complaint filed before the trial court, private respondent Cornelia Tibe, as
plaintiff, sought the annulment of certain contracts and other documents which
became the bases for the transfer of six (6) parcels of land from private respondent to
petitioner Paciano Remalante, the defendant below. Private respondent claimed that
petitioner, through fraud, deceit, abuse of confidence and misrepresentation, induced
her to sign three (3) affidavits of transfer (Exhibits I-3, K and M), purported to be bail
bonds, that transferred three (3) parcels of land under Tax Declaration Nos. 20280,
20273 and 20274 to petitioner. Petitioner thereafter presented the affidavits to the
Provincial Assessor and caused the three (3) parcels of land to be declared under Tax
Declaration Nos. 20323, 20324 and 20325.
Private respondent also claimed that petitioner forged her signature in a deed of
absolute sale (Exhibit 22) whereby her other three parcels of land described under Tax
Declaration Nos. 13959, 17388 and 16999 were transferred to petitioner's name.
Petitioner in his answer denied the allegations of private respondent and claimed that
he is the absolute owner of the six (6) parcels of land described in the complaint. He
further claimed that the first three (3) parcels of land mentioned were bought by him
from Silvino Alminario and that it was private respondent, who, by means of fraud and
misrepresentation caused the transfer of the three (3) parcels of land to her name, and
declared them under Tax Declaration Nos. 20280, 20273 and 20274, purportedly so that
she can use the land as collateral to secure a loan from a bank in Leyte. Petitioner also
claimed that he bought the three (3) parcels of land described under Tax Declaration
Nos. 13959,17388 and 16999 from private respondent, as evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale (Exhibit 22) executed by her in his favor.
The trial court awarded three (3) parcels to petitioner and the other three (3) to private
respondent, but the Court of Appeals, on appeal, awarded all six (6) to private
respondent. Hence the instant petition by Remalate.

Issue: Whether or not parol evidence may be invoked by the petitioner to prove that he
is the absolute owner of the disputed land.

Ruling: No. Petitioner cannot invoke the parol evidence rule to argue that the affidavits
of transfer (Exhibits I-3, K and M) constitute conclusive evidence that petitioner is the
absolute owner of the three parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 20323,
20324 and 20325 and that the fact that Silvino Alminario testified that he did not sell said
parcels of land to petitioner will not vary the terms of said affidavits. As stated in Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court: Sec. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When
the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the
contents of the writing, except in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, of its failure to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the
pleadings; (b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement"
includes wills.
In the case at bar, the parol evidence rule finds no application because, precisely, the
validity of the affidavits of transfer (Exhibits I-3, K and M) is the very fact in dispute, the
action instituted in the trial court being one for the annulment of the documents of
transfer. To adopt petitioner's theory would render nugatory the remedy founded on
the basic rule in the law on contracts that "a contract where consent is given through
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable" (Art. 1330, Civil
Code).

23. Limketkai Sons Milling Inc. V. CA

Facts:
Philippine Remnants Co., Inc. constituted the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) as its
trustee to manage,administer, and sell its real estate property. On 23 June 1988,
PedroRevilla, Jr., a licensed real estate broker was given formal authority by BPI to sell
the lot for P1,000.00 per sq.m. This arrangement was concurred in by the owners of the
Philippine Remnants. Broker Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim of Limketkai Sons Milling (LSM)
who agreed to buy the land and BPI was informed of this sale. The parties agreed that
the lot would be sold at P1,000.00 per sq.m. to be paid in cash. Notwithstanding the
final agreement to pay P1,000.00 per sq.m. on a cash basis, Alfonso Lim asked if it was
possible to pay on terms. The bank officials stated that there was no harm in trying to
ask for payment on terms because in previous transactions, the same had been
allowed. It was the understanding, however, that should the term payment be
disapproved, then the price shall be paid in cash. It was Albano who dictated the terms
under which the installment payment may be approved, and acting thereon, Alfonso
Lim, on the same date, 11 July 1988, wrote BPI through Merlin Albano embodying the
payment initially of 10% and the remaining 90% within a period of 90 days. 2 or 3 days
later, LSM learned that its offer to pay on terms had been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to BPI
on 18 July 1988 and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 but it was refused. BPI
sold the subject lot to NBS but the sale was declared null and void.

Issue: Where a party invokes Statute of Frauds as a defense but cross-examines the
witnesses of the adverse party on the alleged oral contract, what is the effect of said
cross- examination?

Held: In the instant case, counsel for respondents, cross-examined petitioners witnesses
at length on the contract itself, the purchase price, the tender of cash payment, the
authority of the representatives and other details of the litigated contract. Under the
Abrenica rule, even assuming that parol evidence was initially inadmissible, the same
became competent and admissible because of the cross examination, which elicited
evidence proving the existence of a perfected contract.

The cross- examination on the contract is deemed a waiver of the defense of the
Statute of Frauds. The reason for the rule is that as pointed out in Abrenica, if the
answers of those witnesses were stricken out, the cross- examination could have no
object whatsoever and if the questions were put to the witnesses and answered by
them, they could only be taken into account by connecting them with the answers
given by those witnesses on direct examination.

24. Bonilla v Aranza

Facts:
On January 11, 1977, Marcela Rodelas petition for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The appellees
opposed such petition on the ground that what only is presented is a photostatic copy
or Xerox copy of the said holographic will and not the original one. Furthermore, they
contend that lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary
evidence unlike ordinary wills.

Issue: May Photostatic holographic will be admissible for probate proceedings?

Held: Yes. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the
allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate
may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required
and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three
identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or
destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the
best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that
there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and
the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may
be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the
testator.
Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court.

25. BPI vs. Fidelity
Facts: The purpose of this action is through the reformation of a written instrument of
guaranty upon the ground of mistake the alleged mistake consisting of the
substitution of the words "Laguna Coconut Oil Co." for "Bank of the Philippine Islands"
to obtain for the Bank of the Philippine Islands a judgment for P55,000, with interest,
against the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands.
Laguna Coconut Oil Co. executed a promissory wherein it promised to pay the
Philippine Vegetable Company, Inc., or order, P50,000. Fidelity and Surety Company of
the Philippine Island made a notation on the note as follows: For value, received, we
hereby obligate ourselves to hold the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. harmless against loss for
having discounted the foregoing note at the value stated therein. Philippine
Vegetable Oil Company endorsed the note in blank and delivered it to BPI. After
maturity of the note, demand for its payment was made on the Laguna Coconut Oil
Co., the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, and the Fidelity and Surety Company of
the Philippine Islands, all of whom refused to pay, the first being admittedly insolvent.
The correspondence of the bank with the Fidelity and Surety Company is in the record,
and is emphasized by the plaintiff as indicative of responsibility assumed by the
defendant, but is objected to by the defendant as for minor importance.
BPI filed a case against the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. and the Fidelity and Surety
Company. The Fidelity and Surety Company interposed a demurrer to the plaintiff's
complaint twice and was sustained twice. BPI appealed to the SC where the ruling was
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Back in the trial court, Laguna Coconut Oil Co. made no defense, and judgment by
default was obtained against it. The case as to Fidelity and Surety Company was
submitted to the court upon a stipulation of facts. The trial court rendered judgment
against the Fidelity and Surety Company for the full amount of the note, with interest.
Fidelity and Surety Company appealed alleging that the action involved a reformation
of the contract of guaranty, which was not put in issue by the pleadings. Judgment was
reversed and the action dismissed, without prejudice to the bringing of another action
upon the same cause.

BPI filed a new case wherein it attempted to connect the promissory note with an
existing obligation of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company in the form of another
promissory note. The evidence was also intended to demonstrate that a clear error had
been committed when reference was made to the Laguna Coconut Oil Co., instead
of Bank of the Philippine Islands in the notation on the note.

The trial court finally rendered judgment, holding the note could not have been
discounted by the Laguna Coconut Oil Co., and this must logically have been done by
BPI. Thus, judgment was rendred in favor of the BPI for P50,000 plus interest, attorney's
fees, and costs. Thus, Fidelity appealed before this court.

Issue: WON reformation of the note, and thereafter, its enforcement, is justified.

Ruling: No. To justify the reformation of a written instrument upon the ground of mistake,
the concurrence of three things are necessary, the misake: (1) should be of a fact; (2)
should be proved by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) should be common to
both parties to the instrument.

According to section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a written agreement is
presumed to contain all the terms of the agreement. The Civil Code has articles to the
same effect. However, the Code of Civil Procedure permits evidence of the terms of
the agreement other than the contents of the writing in the following case: Where a
mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties, is put in issue by the pleadings.

The correspondence between the parties fails to disclose either an express or implied
admission that the defendant had executed the guaranty in question in favor of the
plaintiff bank. There is nothing in these exhibits from which any such admission can be
inferred. An attempt to interpret the correspondence merely leads open further into the
field of speculation. Yet the rule is that an admission or declaration to be competent
must have been expressed in definite, certain, and unequivocal language. Here the
exhibits are couched in language which is neither definite, certain, nor unequivocal for
nowhere do they contain an admission of a guaranty made by the defendant
company for the protection of the BPI.

There may have been a mistake here. It would, however, seem to be straining the
natural course of events to hold the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine
Islands a party to that mistake.

Our local decisions have applied the rule that the amount of evidence necessary to
sustain a prayer for relief where it is sought to impugn a fact in a document is always
more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. In this case, BPI was not successful
in meeting the required quantum of evidence

26. MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 9, CEBU CITY, MELBA LIMBACO, LINDA C.
LOGARTA and RAMON C. LOGARTA, respondents.
Facts of the case:
National Airport Corporation informed the owners of the various lots surrounding the
Lahug Airport that the government will purchase their lands for the expansion of the
airport. The landowners were convinced to sell their properties, otherwise, the
government will be forced to institute expropriation proceedings in courts. They were
also assured that their properties will be turned to them when these are no longer being
used by the airport. Inez Ouano sold the property and bare in mind the condition in
such sale. Nonetheless, during her lifetime, Inez used to remind her granddaughter
Melba Limbaco, who was living with her, about the assurance by the NAC officials that
the properties will be returned. Inez also made Melba understand that the latter can
recover the land herself should Inez die before the proper time arises. Upon learning
that other landowners were able to recover their properties and that the then Pres.
Aquino had ordered that the airport be transferred to Mactan, the appellees tried to
repurchase the properties originally owned by their grandmother. They were denied
because the deed of sale covering the properties does not contain any condition
relating to the right to repurchase.
As one of the evidence presented, Eufemio Vercide, one of the affected landowners,
testified that he had signed the Deed of sale only after the rider which would indicate
that the land will be returned to him should it not be used by the airport.
Issue: was the rider in the sale of land of Eufemio Vercide applicable to sale of Inez and
shall be admissible in evidence?
Held:
An agreement allowing the right of repurchase, was established after admitting the
parol evidence presented by private respondents.
The fact which private respondents seek to establish by parol evidence consists of the
agreement or representation made by the NAC that induced Inez Ouano to execute
the deed of sale; that the vendors and their heirs are given the right of repurchase
should the government no longer need the property. Where a parol contemporaneous
agreement was the moving cause of the written contract, or where the parol
agreement forms part of the consideration of the written contract, and it appears that
the written contract was executed on the faith of the parol contract or representation,
such evidence is admissible. It is recognized that proof is admissible of any collateral
parol agreement that is not inconsistent with the terms of the written contract though it
may relate to the same subject matter. The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or
contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of existing
evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the
parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written
agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the
action is at law or in equity.

27. Borillo v. CA

Facts:
Plaintiff filed an action for recovery of several parcels of land. Defendants, on the other
hand, claimed that the parcels were sold to them by the husband of the plaintiff. As
evidence, defendants presented, among others, a document showing receipts of the
purchase price for P40.00 but it contains no reference as to what property was being
sold. The other document appears to be undated and unsigned deed of sale in lead
pencil and grade paper making reference to some tax declarations over certain
parcels.

Issues:
Can the ambiguities in the documents be cured by parol evidence?

Held:
No. Before parol evidence may be admitted in order to identify, explain or define, the
subject matter of a writing, it must first be shown that the writing itself already contains a
description sufficient to serve as a foundation for the admission of such parol evidence;
the evidence should also be consistent with the writing. Otherwise stated, in order to
admit parol evidence to aid in the description of the subject matter of a dead or other
writing, there must be a description that will serve as a foundation for such evidence;
the writing must at least give some data from which the description thereof is so vague
as to amount to no description at all. In other words, parol evidence, is not permitted to
supply a description, but only to apply it.

In his commentary on the rules of court, former Chief Justice of patent Moran explains
the rule in the event of patent ambiguity:

the rule is that if the words of a document are so defective as to be unmeaning, no
evidence can be given to show what the author of the document intended to say. The
reason for the rule, in the language of mr. Justice story, is that if the language is too
doubtful for any settled construction, by the admission of parol evidence you create
and do not merely construe the contract. You attempt to do that for the party which
he has not chosen to do for himself; and the law very properly denies such authority to
courts of justice.. A case of patent ambiguity is that of a deed wherein a parce of
land without description is donated. The donation is void. The uncertainty cannot be
explained by parol evidence.