3:isÁaÇ» Ÿnwyar pÁit-inrap¹a pirxd

Vemirkan ŸpãisehÆF ŸSx s†Fa kern bŸF, ikÇ» ik ik isÁaÇ» Ÿnebn ta inàBr kŸr
National Security Council , taek ik Ÿmema paifeyeC tar ˆpr| †rak ZueÁr pr …kTa
kaera Ajana Ÿn† ŸZ, jatIy inrap¹a pirxd ŸpãisehÆFek †raekr gnibÁ„sI Aeó½r ˆpr
ŸZ Ÿmema paifeyiCl, ŸsiF ìDu º›iFpUàN † ny, sÚpUàn† Bul | …† Bul ŸTek† ZuÁ ìr›| …Fa
†¬Cakát na AsabDanbSt, ta iniëct Baeb janŸt Vera ikCuidn AepQa krŸt HŸb|

Vemirkar jatIy inrap¹a pirxd 26ŸS jul a†, 1947 sael 80-253 tm Vemirkan
gnV†en gift Hy| mUl lQY samirk baiHnI …b„ ibedSnIit meDY smnÓy saDn| maen ha¸a
idey fa¸a krar drkar VeC ikna, ŸsFa ifk kra| Vemirkan ŸpãisehÆF …r ŸcyarmYan|
Vera 6 jn óùayI sdsY VeCn| Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and
the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. Vemirkan ŸpãisehÆF kar kTay
clebn ŸsFa ŸpãiseheÆFr bYi¹¡gt sÚpeàkr ˆpr inàBrSIl! …† 6 jn óùayI sdsY Caraw,
CIA pãDan …b„ Vera 8 iF §Ðcr s„óùar kàta bYi¹¡edr pãeyajn ibeSex haka Hy| 24
hours, ALIAS …r mt isiryael, NSC r pãcur imiF„ …r dâSY VeC, ŸZKaen ŸdKa Zaeb ŸZ
ŸpãishÆF §Ðcr s„óùar pãDan kàtaedr pãcur Dmkae¬Cn Î tTYr ABaeb isÁaÇ» Ÿnwya Zae¬C
na| baó»ebw …rkmFa Hy| 1962 sael, 13 idenr ikˆba imSa†l s„kŸFr duàÁ xY clicºayn
"13 days". pircalk pIFar Vlm¸| …Kaen pñ ŸdKa Zaeb, inrap¹a pirxd ŸkenhIr ˆpr
ZueÁr jnY AsÝb cap otrI kra se¹Ôw, ŸkenhI º¡eëceBr saeT …kFa smJta krar
inrls Ÿcöa caileyiCeln …b„ ŸSex sPlta Ves| pâiTbIr pãTm Vnibk ZuÁ ZKn
VsÊ, Hajar pãŸracna kaiFey ŸkenhI SaiÇ»r ptaka wRaet sQm Hn|
HYair FäumYan inàBr krŸtn Ÿseº¡FarI wb ŸöFesr ˆpr| V†ejnHawyar Vbar imilFarIr
kàta bYi¹¡edr kTay ibSÿas krŸtn ŸbSI| ŸkenhI pãTem Ÿseº¡FarI wb ŸöFesr ˆpr
inàBrSIl iCeln-÷aDInŸcta ŸkenhI Aicer† ŸbaeJn inrap¹a pirxed seàxr mŸDY† But
VeC| º¡magt ÷aDIn isÁaÇ» iney, inrap¹a pirxdek pãay iniõy kŸr ideyiCeln| Kub
ŸbSIidn cll na-Aicer† tar BblIla saªg Hl ba ker Ÿdwya Hl| ŸpãisehÆF jnsn,
ŸkenhIr peTr piTk Hn- itinw inrap¹a pirxd ŸTek tƒar ikCu rajEnitk ibeSx¯edr
ˆpr inàBr krŸtn ŸbSI|

in¤n …b„ ŸPaeàhr Vmel, inrap¹a pirxdŸk Vbar baRaena Hl| Vsl naeFr §r›iF
ŸHnrI ikis²ar| in¤n Vdet KƒutKƒuet Ÿlak, pãcur tTY Vr ibSåxn ca†etn| kYaipFal
iHel rajEnitk ibeSx¯edr tKn rmrma bajar! ŸpãisehÆF kaàFaerr Vmel inrap¹a
pirxdŸk Vera Qmta Ÿdwya Hy-…b„ inrap¹a pirxd ibedS nIitr ŸSx kTa bel
ŸGaixt|

Ÿrgn ŸdKeln, inrap¹a pirxed rajEnitk ibeSx¯ra …kdm Hatuer| ibSÿibdYaly ŸTek
raöäib¯anIedr DŸr Vna Hl| isÁaÇ» Ÿnwyar s„KYatai¹Ôk pÁit tar VmŸl† ìr› Hy|
…† ib¯aniBi¹k pÁitr jnY† Ÿrgenr Vmel, Bul isÁaÇ» Ÿnwya HeyeC sbŸcey km|
†nar gebxnagaerr ib¯anIra, smajtǽek Ÿkan ZuÁ -FuÁ Cara† 'ib¯aniBi¹k' pÁitet
ì†ey Ÿdy-ŸsFa …Kn †itHas| pŸr sueZag HŸl ilKb|

i£nFenr Vmel inrap¹a pirxed Vera itn jn óùayI sdsY Ÿnwya Hy| …ra Heln
ŸpãiseheÆFr AàTonitk ˆpŸdöa, Ÿseº¡FarI Ab ŸFäjarI ( rsd VeC ikna janar jnY!)
…b„ raöäpue² Vemirkar raöädUt| ŸbaJa† Zae¬C i£nFn ŸdeSr AàTnIitek† ibedS
nIitet pãaDanY ideyeCn …b„ suPl ŸpeyeCn Haet naet|
bueSr saeT inrap¹a pirxedr lIlakIàtn Ÿraj† iFiBet Vmra ŸdKiC| ŸlKar ikCu Ÿn†!

…bar Vis ikCu ibeSåxŸn| inrap¹a pirxd ŸpãisehÆFek ŸZ ŸmemaFa pafay ŸsFa ŸdKet ik
rkm, b¹¡bYaFa ikrkm! Vim dueFa ˆdaHrn pafekr kaeC ŸpS krlam|

pãTmFa saiàbyaet Ÿsna pafaena iney Ÿmema| ipãy pafk …iF per lQY kr›n ŸZ

· pãTm icÇ»a He¬C saiàbyaet inejedr ikCu ŸgaCaenar Ÿn†| ta† Ÿsna paifey, Vmaedr
ŸCelra mara Ÿgel ŸZ ibr›p pãitiº¡ya ìr› HŸb, Ÿs† Jƒuik na Ÿnwya† Baela|
· Vemirkar ÷aàTprtar …kFa ŸleBl VeC| BaxaFa pr›n| ÷Ikar kra HŸ¬C VlebnIy
musilmedr saiàbyanra kcu kaFa kreC| ikǼ taet Vmaedr ik …ela Ÿgl?

ibSÿ pirºataedr …† Baxa …b„ Bab pafk lQY kr›n| …rpŸr AbSY VerkiF Ÿmemar
iBi¹et saiàbyaet Ÿsna pafaena Hy …b„ VlŸbinyaet musilm inDn bÉ krar káittÔ
Vemirka dabI krŸt paer|

…bar iÃtIy ŸmemaiF lQY kr›n| 1962 ikˆban º¡a†isesr wpŸr| …iFr ipihP Pa†l,
Vim sÚpadkek idey idi¬C| ˆnara pafkedr jnY ileªk idel baiDt H†|

· …kFa †ÆFaeriö„ bYapar lQY kr›n| bla He¬C Vº¡mn …mn smy krŸt HŸb , ŸZFa
ikˆban caxIedr Psl kaFar smy| Zaet ikˆbaek Baet mara Zay|
· kYaeöäa, º¡eëceBr ˆpr rag VeC buJlam| tar jnY grIb caxIdedr Baet marar
DaÆda?

…er k† Vemirkan ibedSnIit!

ŸkenhI …† Ÿmema AnuZayI kaj kern in| kŸreCn inejr manbtaek pãSÈ ker| buS Vr
ŸsFa krŸln k†? Ÿmemaet ŸlKa VeC, †raek gNibÁ„sI Aó½ gRagiR Zae¬C, …t…b
itinw †raek ŸD† ŸD† kŸr gda mareln| Vim buSek …† jenY bil BIm-maTa† buiÁ na†|
ŸÅapdI (inrap¹a pirxd) Zaek maret bel, Vg ipCu na ŸBeb ˆin gda calan|

ŸkenhI Vr bueSr …† obprItÔ buJet Hel Vmaedr öIePn SYalemr p‚ Si¹¡r t¹Ô
buJet Heb|
[cleb]

pirixö1: saiàb yar bYapaer inrap¹a pirxedr Ÿmema

THE WHITE HOUSE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
To: The President
From: The National Security Advisor
Subject: Responding to the Serbian Reprisal in Kosovo
August 4, 1998
Issue for Decision
Last Thursday, Serbian police massacred eighty ethnic Albanians, including
women and children, in the Serbian region of Kosovo. The attack was in
retaliation to the assassination of three Serbian magistrates July 12. Vivid
CNN reports have fueled American public and congressional pressure for a
robust reaction against Serbia. We need to formulate our position prior to
Ambassador Robert Gelbard's meeting with Serbian leader Slobodan
Milosevic in Belgrade next week.
Background
Historic tensions between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo have
intensified since Milosevic rescinded Kosovo's autonomy in 1989. The
Albanians, who constitute 90% of the Kosovo's population, have become
increasingly violent in their quest for independence. Albanian paramilitary
attacks against Serbian officials have trebled during the last six
months--leading to this most recent Serbian response to what they perceive
as terrorist acts.
The problem has regional ramifications. Kosovo borders on Albania–and on
Macedonia and Montenegro both of whom have significant Albanian
populations. A civil war in Kosovo could embroil all three and destabilize
their already weak governments. Greece and Bulgaria, in these circumstances,
would be tempted to pursue outstanding claims against Macedonia.
--stimulating a military response from Turkey in defense of Muslim brethren
under attack by Christian orthodoxy. At risk is another Balkan war.
For Serbs, Kosovo is the soul of their national spirit. While they were
prepared to see Slovenia, Croatia and even Bosnia go their separate ways,
this will not be the case with Kosovo. Serbs are prepared to wage holy war
to hold on to the region--and to reject any leader who entertains secession.
Our European allies and Russia seem to understand this and are exerting
pressure on both sides to conduct negotiations on Kosovo autonomy within
the broader Serbian state.
US Interests
Certainly it is in the interest of the United States to deter another Balkan war,
as it is to discourage brutal Serbian treatment of ethnic Albanian citizens.
These interests are not, however, vital to American security. We should
accordingly rule out unilateral commitments of major American political and
economic resources or American lives. Americans citizens should not be
asked to bear such costs. The European states, specifically Russia,
Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy, for reasons of history and
proximity, have a greater stake than we in the peaceful resolution of the
Kosovo problem. We should encourage their involvement. We have 654 US
service personnel assigned to UN and OSCE currently stationed in
Macedonia.
Options
Kosovo cannot be contained by bluster or military action, much less
unilateral American strikes. What we need is Milosevic's agreement to restore
autonomy and to protect the rights of Serbs and Albanians alike--and ethnic
Albanian acceptance of a solution short of full independence. The
appropriate tool is political influence exerted in conjunction with interested
European powers. This should be augmented by economic sanctions and
incentives. Non-partisan observers from the UN, the OSCE should be
deployed to stabilize and add transparency to the situation in Kosovo while
the political process moves forward.
Recommendation
That instructions consonant with the above be prepared for Ambassador
Gelbard's use with Milosevic; that the principal points of the instructions be
shared with European allies, including Russia, and with appropriate
international organizations--soliciting their support and comment; that detailed
briefings be arranged for Jesse Helms and other senior Congressional
leaders; and that the public be informed of the broad outlines and rational
behind this policy though press briefings and backgrounders and public
presentations.
Approve ________
Disapprove______
CC: State:S/S
JCS/OP
CIA/DIR
SecDef/EXEC/C
Treasury:OS
SECRET