'Carnivalization' of News.

A study on Satire and Media

in Europe.
Submitted in IulIillment oI the requirements Ior degree
oI Master oI Arts at the University oI Hamburg
Submitted to:
ProI. Dr. Irene Neverla
and
ProI. Dr. Katharina Kleinen-von-Knigslw
Submitted by:
Thomas Seymat
born in Lyon, France
Hamburg, November 2010.
!"#$%&'()*(+($,
'Analyzing humor is like dissecting a Irog. Few people are interested and the Irog dies
oI it. E.B White, The Elements of Stvle, 1959.
I would like to thank my supervisors ProI. Dr. Irene Neverla and ProI. Dr.
Katharina Kleinen-von-Knigslw. Available even at the busiest oI time, they always
provided me with their precious guidance and advices. I would also like to mention the
persons responsible Ior the Erasmus Mundus program Ior their availability and
kindness, among many, Dr. Monika Pater, Sabine HoIIkamp in Hamburg and Bettina
Andersen in Aarhus, whose help was crucial in my admission in this program. To my
Mundus Iellows and Iriends, I am grateIul to have been part oI your lives Ior the last
two years; we truly are a extra-ordinary group oI people. Thank to the generous
scholarship I received Irom the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst which
Iacilitated so much my year in Hamburg. My Iinal thanks go to my Iriends and Iamily in
France, especially my mother. Without her indeIectible and endless motivating support,
I doubt that I would have manage to produce a thesis I am really proud oI.
I would like to dedicate this thesis to Walid Hassan, who has been called Iraq's Jon
Stewart
1
. This Iraqi satirist, who worked Ior the comedy show Caricature on al-
Sharqiya, Iraq's Iirst privately owned satellite TV channel, was killed in Baghdad at the
worst time oI the post-invasion insurgency. AIter his death, UNESCO's director-general
condemned his murder and said he, had been "killed Ior exercising his Ireedom to speak
his mind, which includes the Ireedom to use humor."
2
At worst, Western satirists risk to
bomb with a Iailed joke, not actually risk their lives.
1 http://www.Ioreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/18/theworldsjonstewarts?page0,2 04/11/10
2 http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-
URLID23497&URLDODOTOPIC&URLSECTION201.html 04/11/10
TabIe of Content
Chapter 1. Humor, Media and Europe............................................................................... 1
1.1. Humor, a powerIul social phenomenon................................................................. 1
1.1.1. Public laughter as a cohesion-creating Iactor.................................................1
1.1.2. Humor as a coping strategy in time oI crisis.................................................. 2
1.1.3. Public laughter, unity and opposition.............................................................3
1.1.4. Humor as a catalyst oI social change............................................................. 5
1.1.5. Public laughter, collective actions and group identity...................................7
1.1.6. Politics, satire and journalism........................................................................ 7
1.2. Relevance oI the research...................................................................................... 9
1.2.1 The media and the democratic deIicit in Europe.............................................9
1.2.2. The European public sphere and entertainment media................................10
1.3. Research Question .............................................................................................. 13
1.4. DeIinitions and thesis outline...............................................................................15
1.4.1. A theoretical thesis grounded in reality........................................................ 15
1.4.2. Some deIinitions...........................................................................................16
1.4.3. Thesis outline............................................................................................... 17
Chapter 2: Conceptualizing satire and the public sphere in Europe................................ 19
2.1. Twenty centuries oI European satire.................................................................... 19
2.1.1. From the Roman origins to the Middle Ages............................................... 19
2.1.2. From the Middle Age to the 18th century.................................................... 21
2.1.3 Satire, part and parcel oI today's European media landscape......................24
2.2. Investigating the emergence oI the public sphere in Europe...............................30
2.2.1. The origin oI the concept oI public sphere...................................................30
2.2.2. A concept attracting a lot oI criticisms......................................................... 31
2.2.3. Which materialization Ior the European public sphere ?.............................34
2.3. Habermas, Bakhtin and the language...................................................................39
2.3.1. No place Ior humor in the Habermasian public sphere ............................... 39
2.3.2. Heteroglossia, carnival, public laughter and the public sphere....................42
Chapter 3: Television, audience and the carnivalization oI news....................................49
3.1. Typologies oI the carnivalization oI news........................................................... 50
3.1.1. Where the carnivalization oI news stands.................................................... 50
3.1.2. Nuancing the typologies...............................................................................53
3.2. Satirical journalism as the carnivalization oI news..............................................57
3.2.1. A presentation oI the TV programs carnivalizing news..............................57
3.2.2. Adapting Bakhtin to modern Iake news....................................................... 59
3.3. Virtues and vices oI the carnivalization oI news .................................................62
3.3.1. Parody, irony, satire, laughter and the carnivalization oI news.................... 62
3.3.2. EIIects oI the carnivalization oI news on audience's knowledge.................64
3.3.3. The carnivalization oI news as a televised artiIact.......................................69
3.3.4. The carnivalization oI news as a media critic.............................................. 71
3.3.5. Limits and Iailures oI the carnivalization oI news....................................... 73
Chapter 4. Satire, Media and the European democratic deIicit....................................... 77
4.1. Imagining a pan-European satirical TV show......................................................78
4.1.1. Characteristics and beneIits..........................................................................78
4.1.2. Challenges Iacing Eurosatire........................................................................80
4.2.Carnivalization oI news, journalism and the European Union.............................82
4.3. Can carnivalization oI news bridge the European democratic deIicit?................83
4.3.1. Educating the European citizens.................................................................. 83
4.3.2. Nurturing European citizenship and the European Public Sphere...............84
4.3.3. Reclaiming the European identity................................................................ 86
Conclusion:...................................................................................................................... 90
ReIerences:...................................................................................................................... 92
Statutory declaration:........................................................................................... 104
Chapter 1. Humor, Media and Europe
1.1. Humor, a powerfuI sociaI phenomenon
1.1.1. PubIic Iaughter as a cohesion-creating factor
As Iar as studying the human behavior goes, humor
1
should not be seen as a
laughing matter. Historically, laughter, as well as other maniIestations oI human
emotions, used to be looked down upon by scholars. 'Most historical sociologists oI the
1970s and 1980s looked upon emotions as irrational and leIt them aside while they
concentrated on studying social structures, (.). For a couple oI decades emotions
dropped out oI sight. (Hart, 2007, p.11). However, there has been a recent shiIt in the
way social scientists consider human emotions. 'Since the 1990s, (...), social scientists
have not any more viewed emotions as antithetical to rationality. Frustration, Iear, anger,
alienation, and joy are taken into serious consideration.(ibid.) They Iound ways and
made space available in their respective scholarly Iields to allow a critical and scientiIic
examinations oI those social phenomenons.
Among them lies humor. Humor is eminently, and quite exclusively, a social
activity. It seems obvious to state, but you cannot tell yourselI a joke. 'Henri Bergson`s
Iamous theory on the group-characteristics oI humor stressed: 'Our laughter is always
the laughter oI a group. You would hardly appreciate the comic iI you Ielt yourselI
isolated Irom others', and Konrad Lorenz stated: 'Laughter Iorms a bond' ' (op.cit., p.6)
So not only is a group necessary Ior humor, but experiencing humor, and its
consequence that is laughter, within a given social group will create and tighten links
between the individuals oI this group, Iostering its creation and nurturing its existence
through improved cohesion.
Along with the bonding eIIect, laughter has a myriad oI other potential eIIects,
beneIicial or not, Ior societies and individuals alike. In the coming section, we will
1 To the attention oI the readers: we will use American English in this thesis , hence the spelling oI
'humor', diIIerent Irom the British English 'humour'. Quotes with the BE spelling have been modiIied
accordingly Ior consistency. The same goes Ior other words with a dispute spelling between AE and
BE. The AE spelling will always be preIerred.
1
address some oI them to show their diversity and broad range oI impacts. We will see
how public laughter is helping to cope with crisis, how it can create cohesion and/or
rejection, catalyze social change and apparition oI common identity and threaten even
modern-days politicians.
1.1.2. Humor as a coping strategy in time of crisis
Humor, and the maniIestation oI its public success that is laughter, can help both
societies and individuals to deal with brutal events or crisis, such as terrorism. Indeed,
'|c|omedy has a special role in helping societies manage crisis moments, and the U.S.
media paid considerable attention to the proper role oI comedy in public culture aIter
the 9/11 tragedies (Achter, 2008, p.276) Rudy Guliani, New York City's mayor at the
time oI the attacks, appearing on Saturdav Night Live's (SNL) Iirst episode oI its 27
th
season, on September, 29
th
2001, gave a symbolic blessing to kick oII the new season oI
the comedy institution that is SNL. On stage, the host 'asked Giuliani, 'Is it okay to be
Iunny again?' Giuliani`s response, 'Why start now?' led by example, and was widely
seen as a sanction oI comedy and oI the value oI laughter in public culture. (Achter,
2008, p.275) It was as iI Giuliani 'had now mobilized a comic institution in the service
oI a country`s need to laugh. In other words, 'comedy aIter 9/11 could be useIul to
audiences, and artists and comedians had a duty to provide it. (ibid.) Laughter here
perIorms a soothing Iunction Ior the society close to the conceptualization Bergson
made oI humor. For him, laughter is a mechanism 'designed to correct` or punish`
behavior that was not in harmony with its environment. Laughter was thus a corrective`
that ensured stability and peace in society. (Rger, 2009, pp.25-26) With this
understanding oI public laughter, iI the terror attacks oI 9/11 were too brutal, almost
unthinkable, Ior the American population to make sense out oI them, laughter would
help process the meaning oI the event while simultaneously condemn the deviant
behavior that were the attacks and paciIy the American public.
Public laughter is not limited to a helpIul soothing role when dealing with
terrorism. A report authored by a think-tank named 'Demos' advocates satirizing violent
radical movements such as al-Qaeda to 'help strip the glamour (Bartlett, Birdwell &
King, 2010, p.40) the mystique and the image oI coolness oII oI these organizations in
the mind oI radical youths who have yet to join their ranks and commit violent actions.
2
The report reminds us that 'both the Ku Klux Klan and the British Fascist party in the
1930s were seriously harmed by sustained satire but also warns '|o|I course,
governments cannot be seen to satirize terrorist movements, but can oIIer support and
inIormation to those who might.(ibid.) Satire could hence help make violent
radicalization seems uncool and would deter recruitment oI young normally appealed by
the symbolic image oI such movements.
On a more individual level, in addition to laughter being a tool to dissolve the
potential oI seduction oI terrorist organizations and prevent attacks, it can also be used
as a therapeutic tool to cure traumatisms caused by such attacks. 'Freud (1928)
described gallows humor as a type oI purposeIul humor that unconsciously meets one`s
psychic needs by attempting to deal with morbid or tragic situations. One thereby gains
a sense oI mastery over them. (Pasquali, 2003, p.402) It also allows to release the
stress and the tension created by tragic events such as terrorist attacks. The author
concludes by stating that '|h|umor is a holistic, noninvasive strategy that can be used to
help heal the trauma oI both survivor-clients and the disaster personnel who are working
with them. (op.cit., p.411)
1.1.3. PubIic Iaughter, unity and opposition
Yet, when one look Iurther in the analysis oI laughter, nuances appear. Humor
may actually promote not one, but indeed two speciIic but apparently opposite kinds oI
reactions. In an analysis oI Berlin during World War I, Rger (2006) reminds us that a
scholarly debate is going on, with two opposing views. The Iirst position, 'strongly
inIluenced by Bakhtin, sees laughter as intrinsically subversive and in conIlict with
authority. (Rger, 2009, p.27). Here, laughter would create cohesion in a group created
by opposing an authority.
In the contrary, some scholars argue that 'public laughter |is| supportive oI
hierarchies and oIIicial agendas.(ibid.) In this view, humor serves as a cohesion-
creating Iactor around a central Iigure oI authority. It becomes a trigger in the rally-
around-the-Ilag eIIect which happens in times oI war. 'The need Ior laughter in war
(.) involved the 'mobilization' oI humor, a way oI putting humor at the service oI the
war eIIort (Le Naour, 2001 in ibid.). In this situation 'humor constituted a saIety
valve` that reduced dissatisIaction.(...) Rather than challenging the authorities, it played
3
into their hands, stabilizing the status quo and oIIering a welcome instrument oI
propaganda. (ibid.) Police Iorces in Berlin were sending memos reminding the caIes
and cabarets oI their duties and licenses were denied to businesses Iailing to meet
criteria oI seriousness and patriotism. (op.cit., p.31) By 1917, German propagandists,
realizing the Iailure oI traditional propaganda, began to 'promote exactly the sort oI
light entertainment` that the Kaiser and radical conservatives (.) despised as un-
German` (op.cit., p.33) to increase the nation's morale.
While the two eIIects are apparently going in opposite direction, it may not be
mutually exclusive and may show a much more dynamic reality. Rger eventually
argues that the meaning oI the 'public laughter in Berlin were in Ilux and oIIicial
attitudes could change very much in response to developments Irom below`.(op.cit.,
p.36). Drawing on this Iinding, he call Ior a reexamination oI the 'subversive' versus
'supportive' dichotomy when studying humor. Looking at a comedian as a case study,
Rger assesses: 'his perIormances was an inherent ambivalence: the laughter that he
provoked could be read as both subversive and supportive oI those leading the war
eIIort and that authorities, by giving more space Ior such perIormances 'acknowledged
that they could not impose the Kaiser`s demand Ior seriousness on the city`s
population. (op.cit., p.37) Another example is how joke-telling in Nazi-occupied
Czechoslovakia was a medium to express 'opposition to the |Nazi|regime, unit|e| the
Czech nation through language and humor and stok|e| a hatred oI all things
German(Bryant, 2006, p.150) in the citizens' oppressed everyday liIe. Here, public
laughter contain 'subversive' elements maniIested by the rejection oI an oppressive
authority but also contains elements 'supportive' oI another authority, even iI it is yet to
be established, and promoting an agenda oI national liberation.
Both examples show how humor is oIten not creating a single 'either unity/or
opposition' eIIect but that its eIIects may be complex, composite. It is moreover a
phenomenon dynamic in time. In Israel, the young, the 'third-generation' survivors oI
the Holocaust are starting to poke Iun, not at the Holocaust itselI, but at its place in the
israeli national identity and collective memory. For example, 'the satirical television
show The Chamber Quintet, criticizes established Israeli discourse surrounding (or
possibly exploiting) the memory oI the Holocaust.( Zandberg, 2006, p.562) Clashing
with the traditional remembrance oI the Holocaust in Israel, the show, using in a series
oI episodes rarely used a genre, satire, to talk about the Shoah, addresses the
politicization, 'the use oI the Holocaust memory by Israeli oIIicials and their emphasis
4
on Jews/Israelis as victims in order to gain political proIits (op.cit., p.571) and
commercialization oI the Holocaust memory, causing its trivialization. The
perIormances oI these young Israeli comedians is a prime example oI the temporally
and dynamic characteristics oI humor, set in speciIic, moving, cultural context.
Ultimalety, with their jokes, 'third-generation commemorators do not look back in Iear
(like the survivors), or in anger (like the survivors` children), but rather in a critical selI-
reIlexiveness(op.cit., p.576), a selI-reIlexivity made more appealing and impacting
thank to the use oI humor.
1.1.4. Humor as a cataIyst of sociaI change
With its bounding power, humor can be used when great cohesion within a group
is needed Humor can also Ioster cohesion during in social conIlicts. Social science
scholars indeed acknowledge that 'humor and laughter can serve as a powerIul tool in
social protest. (Hart, 2007, p.1), up to the point when polarization reaches such high
level that '|s|eriousness and a strong emphasis on the righteousness oI the claims inhibit
laughter and joy (op.cit., p.2). Nevertheless, humor in social conIlict can maniIest as
joke-telling, like on striking shipyards during the Solidarity movement in Poland at the
beginning oI the 1980's (ibid.), or take another Iorm. One prominent example oI this is
the character oI the street theater's spectacle, and eponymous character, named Guignol,
Irom Lyon, France.
It appeared at the beginning oI the 19
th
century, scholars are still debating,
between 1808 and 1820. According to Saunier (1992) the spectacle, probably inspired
by Italian puppetry, was developed by Laurent Mourguet (1769-1844), a silk-weaver
turned tooth-puller who needed to distract its patients while perIorming his painIul duty
and attract new customers turned away by the scream oI the aIorementioned patients.
The puppet spectacle soon grew out oI Mourguet's creative control and colonized the
caIes and cabarets oI the Croix-Rousse, a working-class neighborhood oI Lyon with
high concentration oI silk-weavers, known locally as the canuts.(op.cit)
Napoleon III's authoritarian Second Empire (1852-1870), requiring written
transcripts oI any public artistic perIormances Ior censor's scrutiny, allowed many oI the
period's Guignols plays to reach us today, unaltered. Many oI those plays were then
considered as raunchy and immoral Iarces (op.cit). The plot almost always revolves
5
around a witty canut named Guignol who get into troubles, mainly Ior monetary
reasons, with the Iemale character La Madelon, at times his landlady or his wiIe, or with
the gendarme, the local policeman, Ior small larcenies. Plays end up with one oI the
character being clubbed by the others as moral punition, but the authority Iigure does
not always win. Guignol's sidekick, Gnafron, is also a highly deviant and 'amoral'
character, at times a hobo, sometimes a journalist, he is know Ior his street-level
philosophy and his love oI the Beaujolais wine (op.cit). Because oI the topic the plays
tackled and the place they were perIormed, the audience was mainly working-class
adults, the audience enjoyed seeing Guignol satirize social and economic issues they
were all too Iamiliar with. Later this century Guignol became a (middle class) children
show (op.cit) with a chastised version serving with a whole diIIerent moral ediIication.
Guignol's district oI origin, the Croix-Rousse, was to give a whole additional level
oI meaning to the puppet, turning it into a socio-political symbol. Two silk-workers
uprisings, in 1831 and 1834, took part in this area oI Lyon. It started as a dispute oI
wages and tariIIs between the canuts, or weavers, and the merchants owning the silk
threads and Iabric and grew to a Iull-scale uprising. Both time, several dozens canuts
where shot dead by the French National Guard sent to Lyon to crush the strikes. These
two uprisings are seen as the Iirst major contemporary, Industrial Revolution-era,
workers unrests, and are said to have inIluenced Saint-Simon and Karl Marx in their
reIlexions and conceptualization oI socialism. (Benot, 1999)
It is unclear up to what extent Guignol's wits and satire catalyzed the uprisings but
it is very likely that the plays have been reIlecting, and served as an echo chamber Ior,
the rebellious mood oI the Croix-Rousse at that time, using humor to ediIy the working
class and address its daily struggles. (Saunier, 1992) Guignol hence became a political
being, embodying the Iighting canut spirit. So much that, at the beginning oI the 20
th
century, every political Iactions in Lyon try and made him their Ilag-bearer.
Conservatives described the puppet as a no-nonsense 'reactionary' resisting the Parisian,
central, facobin power and socialists made him the hero oI the proletariat (op.cit). Even
today, Guignol's persona is being reclaimed by the local political power. For his 200
th
birthday, a text put on Lyon's municipal librasry's website was celebrating the puppet as
a prime example oI 'the 'lyonnais' independence, thanks to its satirical and insolent
eloquence and decrying the injustice, the bourgeois arrogance and the abuses oI the
power (BM Lyon, 2007).
6
1.1.5. PubIic Iaughter, coIIective actions and group identity
Humor can come in handy Ior the Iraming oI the collective action, a concept
understood by social movements scientists as a process that 'translate ideological
belieIs into an existing, practical Iramework, giving events and experiences meaning so
that they are connected with each other. |It must also include a| prescription oI how to
solve the problem (Hart, 2007, p.9). Linked to the bounding eIIect oI laughter, one oI
the consequence oI engaging in a successIully Iramed collective action to challenge the
status quo, possibly using humor, is that it will create a collective identity on each side
oI the issue. This identity will be based on individual positions on the topic, acting as
Iault line, polarizing the population involved.
Once established, the collective identity will be oI much help to label both side oI
the dispute, reinIorcing the dualism, the 'us' versus 'them' aspect oI the conIlict. 'An
example oI a strong collective identity bolstered by humor is the separatist movement oI
the Canadian west against the Iederal government in Ottawa in the early 1980s. As a
strategy to mark the boundaries oI the in-group and the out-group, |they made| bumper
stickers with The West Needs Ontario, Quebec and Trudeau Like a Fish Needs a
Bicycle.`` (Hart, 2007, p.10). People seeing those stickers would not necessarily be sure
whether or not they really meant it, but they would nonetheless be exposed to the point
made. With the nuance that sometimes in-group humor can be too obscure and selI-
reIerencing to Iurther the collective identity, and thus promote the cause, outside oI the
in-group, (op.cit.), humor deIinitely has a role in play in social conIlicts, whether as a
help to Irame the collective action or to establish and reinIorce the collective identity
born out oI this conIlict.
1.1.6. PoIitics, satire and journaIism
We have brought to our readers' attention several historical and contemporary
examples oI public laughter's powers. A phenomenon at the intersection oI many oI
these powers (rejection-triggering, subversion, catalyzer) made international headlines
this year. On August 24
th
2010, a video news piece was posted on the Al-Jazeera English
Youtube account reported that the election committee in Brazil were about to invoke a
military dictatorship-era law severely punishing, with Iines up to 100,000 US$ per
7
inIractions, any instances oI mockery and caricatures against any politicians during a
three-month period previous to the October 2010 elections. (A-Jazeera English, 2010)
SpeciIically targeted by the law is a satirical news program called CQC 'one oI the
countries most popular weekly comedy shows (.) where hosts dish out edgy comedy,
the most popular segments are when the comedian-reporters use humor to conIront and
ridicule the country's politicians(op.cit)
For the politicians being poked Iun at, a limitation oI Ireedom oI speech becomes
the only line oI deIense they can think oI when they become the butt oI the jokes. It is
true that '|j|okes oIten weaken the deIenses oI an audience and render the listeners
more amenable to persuasion (Hart, 2007, p.8) which makes them particularly eIIicient
rhetorical tools in a public debate. Nonetheless, going as Iar as de Iacto,seeing the
amount oI the Iines, suspending Ireedom oI speech, a Ioundation oI democratic
countries, tell citizens and scholars alike the powers modern-days politicians bestow to
public laughter and political satire. For them, these popular and mediated expressions
are real threats they Iear, Ior they endanger their re-elections, and may have a long term
impact on the liIe and organization oI the polis.
So Iar, we have listed many examples oI the eIIects oI humor and public laughter
on individuals and population alike, especially in dire or critical times. We do not claim
our list is exhaustive, other works (such as Speier, 1998) provide useIul resources
concerning the relationships between wit and politics. Nevertheless, among the eIIects
oI humor we listed, the reactions to a segment oI entertainment TV, which Iormat is oI
political satirical journalism, were undoubtedly the starkest, clearest and simultaneously
most tangible and most unabridged maniIestations to the power oI humor. Bearing this
assessment in mind, political satire appears to be particularly interesting to research in
an academic context, to try and Iind how it can trigger such strong reactions in society.
Thus, this master's thesis will thoroughly investigate how political satirical journalism
processes the news, in terms oI both Iormat and content, and the consequences it has
both on the production and reception level. We label this phenomenon the
'carnivalization oI news', an expression we will deIine later in this chapter.
8
1.2. ReIevance of the research
The analysis oI the 'carnivalization' oI news is not, however, the main goal oI this
master's thesis. The process oI carnivalization we will highlight while investigating the
'carnivalization' oI news will however help us, and hopeIully provide guidance Ior
Iuture researches as well, to shed a new light on the major scholarly debate going on in
the socio-political and geographical Iramework known as the European Union: the
search Ior solutions to bridge the the European 'democratic deIicit'.
Loosely deIined, the 'democratic deIicit' is a gap, some say it is increasing,
between the European Union, more speciIically its political institutions, and the citizens
oI the member-States. As we said, this notion is at the center oI an on-going scholarly
and intellectual debate concerning its existence in the European Union, its causes,
consequences and the solutions to close it.
1.2.1 The media and the democratic deficit in Europe
Until now, scholars and organizations have oIIered a broad range oI explanations
concerning the democratic gap. The reasons most Irequently cited in the media to
explain the legitimization problem oI the EU are well-know: 'the unelected
commissioners, the weakness oI the Parliament, the complicated decision-making
process (Baisnee, 2002, p.108)
Indeed, it seems that as the main actor, the European Union is partially to blame
Ior the disconnection between the European institutions and the citizens oI the member-
States. As a matter oI Iact, the EU itselI seems to certainly believe so. Former European
Commission Vice- President Margot Wallstrom, stated that 'the European Union has
grown up as a political project but has not Iound a place in people`s hearts and
minds(European Commission, 2006). At this occasion, the European deciders moved
Iorth with a series oI 'steps that the Commission would take to reIorm its own
communication activities, to get closer to citizens and to be more responsive to their
concerns.(idib.) More recently, the European Parliament (2010) adopted a resolution
concerning new media and journalism. The text, reminding the readers oI the low voter
turnout Ior the 2009 European elections and oI the evidences oI UE citizens being
9
under-inIormed, highlights 'the need to continue eIIorts to overcome the distance
between the EU and its citizens and 'calls on the Commission to strengthen its
communication policy(op.cit) as a way to bridge the democratic deIicit.
Media makers and journalists, including European correspondents working in
Brussels, are also criticized in the role, they play in covering, or Iailing to cover, the
European Union Ior their national audiences. It represents a 800 'people in Brussels
whose job it is to scrutinize the EU, to interpret it and to make it public, (Baisnee,
2002, p.108), though a more up-to-date Iigure would be 752, dropping Irom 1,300 Iive
years ago (Youthmedia.eu, 2010). For Baisnee, somewhere in their journalistic
production, these oIIicial EU correspondents may Iail, with dramatic consequences:
'until the EU political system has been given social visibility, it will probably remain a
'cold monster' in the opinion the European citizens.(Baisnee, 2002, p.108). Aware oI
these Iacts, the European Parliament (2010) 'Iinds the recent decrease in the number oI
accredited journalists in Brussels extremely worrying and 'urges journalists and other
media proIessionals (.) to discuss and consider the European journalism oI tomorrow.
Other scholars have pointed out the role oI the media in diIIerentiating
appreciations and opinions about not only the current state oI the EU, but also about the
path it is taking, in terms oI enlargement, allowing the introduction oI dynamic trends in
the study oI the democratic deIicit. 'A key to understanding why ideas about and
trajectories oI the Iuture development oI the EU diIIer between the elites and the public
is the role oI the media (Maier and Rittberger, 2008, p.262). Those statements illustrate
that the role oI media in the democratic deIicit is indeed a legitimate Iield oI research
and there is already a important background oI researches to help with our own.
1.2.2. The European pubIic sphere and entertainment media
It is clear now that we aim to set our theoretical research work in the current
Iramework oI the discussion about the democratic deIicit in the European Union, and
aim to bring additional explanations and solution to bridge it. In order to do so, we will
Iocus on the role oI media, and the 'carnivalization' oI news, can play to bridge the gap
between the EU institution and the citizens oI the member-States.
But why Iocus on the role oI media, beside the Iact that we are writing a media
studies thesis? And why chose the process oI 'carnivalization' oI news and entertainment
10
media content ?
In the European institution's view, there is a concept, intertwined with the one oI
the 'democratic deIicit', originating in the work oI German scholar Jrgen Habermas
labelled the 'public sphere' (more on that in Chapter 2). As closely intertwined as it is,
the concept oI the 'public sphere' is nonetheless seen as a solution to the European
'democratic deIicit', a way Ior the EU to gain publicity and legitimacy in the member-
States' citizens. The EU's current understanding oI the public sphere is:
'a space in which public policies may be better understood by, and
discussed with, all EU citizens and all sections oI the population, in all its
diversity, with a view to meeting their expectations more eIIectively, and
whereas it must be a venue both Ior the provision oI inIormation and Ior
wide-ranging consultations transcending national borders and Iostering the
development oI a sense oI shared public interest throughout the EU.
(European Parliament, 2010)
In layman's terms, 'the European public sphere becomes the prerequisite Ior better
governance, legitimacy and citizen`s participation in the emerging European polity.
(Trenz, 2005, p.408). Once a European Public Sphere will exist, the democratic deIicit
will reduce gradually. The media, responsible oI the 'the provision oI inIormation'
aIorementioned, has thus a key role to play in the apparition oI a public sphere on the
European level. Apparition only because, so Iar, the European Union is not convinced it
already exists. Right now, it only acknowledge national public spheres but the political
will to see a European Public Sphere (later shortened EPS) emerge is strong. The
European Parliament assesses 'that it must be the goal oI the EU institutions to create
together a European public sphere which is characterized by the opportunity Ior all EU
citizens to participate. (European Parliament, 2010). Yet, political will is not the only
thing the EU can do to investigate the appearance oI an EPS. Scholars, coming Irom
diIIerent Iield oI study and motivated by the incentives, such as grants Irom the EU, are
at work too to uncover evidences, and hints oI the apparition oI a EPS. So Iar, their
Iindings do not concur in a concordant series oI explanations, mechanisms or evidences
highlighting the apparition oI the EPS (see Trenz, 2005 Ior an example oI a multi-
disciplinary review oI books on the topic).
11
Moreover, Ilaws and bias are not absent Irom researches about the EPS and the
role oI media in the Europeanization oI national public spheres. It appears that most oI
the researches in this speciIic media-related Iield are Iocusing on the apparition oI an
EPS in quality press only, disregarding other Iormat in print press and other media and
with limited success so Iar. As Trenz puts it, 'the existing literature is rather biased
towards the empirical analysis oI quality newspapers (Trenz, 2005, p.410) but he
explains it: '|t|his preIerence oI textual data sources is easily understood in light oI the
serious constraints that are put on the analysis oI audiovisual data both in terms oI
methodology and data accessibility.(ibid.). Perhaps the best example oI how prevalent
the bias is, is the meta-analysis oI content analysis conducted by Machill, Beiler and
Fischer (2006). They looked at 17 diIIerent studies, each one analyzing on average 12
media (print or TV), in up to 3 diIIerent languages (English, German and French), that
'concern themselves with the phenomenon oI the European public sphere (Machill,
Beiler and Fischer, 2006, p.66). Facing the comprehensive sample oI European media
they have, they note that '|t|here is an imbalance in the media represented in the
studies: newspapers, which are distributed nationwide and have an elite readership, are
analyzed more oIten than other media. (op.cit., p.69)
Other scholars have noted this bias too and call Ior change: 'models explaining
support Ior the EU and European integration should pay more attention to the mass
media (Maier and Rittberger, 2008, p.262). Even the European Parliament reminds us
that 'EU news coverage must be provided by all types of media, in particular the mass
media, (...) which is a central prerequisite Ior generating pan-European debate and (.)
a European public sphere (European Parliament, 2010) (Emphasis our own).
To sum up, there is clearly a lack oI diversity in the Iormats studied in previous
researches Ior the European Public Sphere and incidentally on the 'democratic deIicit', a
contrast made starker by the statement oI the European Union. Trying to Iind elements
oI a European public sphere, researchers Iocus too oIten on quality newspapers, with
their hard news content and narrow and elite readerships, and too little on mass media
and soIt news, such as TV.
As a result oI this, our research, while Iirmly set up in the Iield oI media study and
searching Ior ways to promote a European public sphere and thus Iind solutions to the
European democratic deIicit, will not Iall victim oI the same bias as the researches
aIorementioned. In the contrary, it will Iocus on mass media, more precisely television
and even more precisely entertainment content on TV. Moreover, as we highlighted in
12
Section 1.1, we identiIied public and/or mediated laughter, as a powerIul element.
ThereIore, we dare to add that we are hopeIul to discover Iindings in this previously leIt
out Iields, encouraged by the Iact that '|e|xposure to |genres oI entertainment TV|
seems to not only educate viewers about political candidates and realities, but also helps
them Iorm deeper attitudes regarding the political world (TsIati et al. 2009, p.416)
which could possibly have impacts on the European public sphere and the democratic
deIicit in Europe. One oI the maniIestation oI mediated public laughter, the
'carnivalization oI news', can even trigger real-liIe consequences Ior the journalists,
politicians and the political liIe as well. Thus, we think that mediated laugher, and the
'carnivalization oI news', is worthy oI academic investigation, especially since we have
demonstrated that scholars so Iar have greatly ignored the eIIects oI televised and/or
entertainment content on the debates concerning the European public sphere and the
European 'democratic deIicit'. We intend to redress those wrongs and correct those lacks
by investigating what may happen at the intersection oI the 'carnivalization oI news'
phenomenon and the European public sphere.
Consequently, looking at Section 1.1 and 1.2, we hypothesize that the process
known as 'carnivalization oI news', in the Iorm oI a political satirical journalism show,
can have an impact on the European public sphere and ultimately on the democratic
deIicit.
1.3. Research Question
In order to conIirm our hypothesis stated above, we Iormulate the Iollowing
research question, with its sub-questions in a threeIold manner.
Research Question: What eIIects can a political satirical TV show potentially
have on the EPS? And through which means can it achieve such eIIects?
Sub-question 1: What are the respective characteristics oI satire and oI the
European public sphere?
Sub-question 2: What are televised satire's impacts in national public spheres
in general?
Sub-question 3: How can a political satire TV show participate in the
bridging oI the European democratic deIicit?
13
1.4. Definitions and thesis outIine
1.4.1. A theoreticaI thesis grounded in reaIity
To answer those questions, we will not conduct content analysis, whether
qualitative or quantitative, nor will we study directly the impacts oI the 'carnivalization
oI news' on audiences, thanks to survey, Iocus groups or interviews or other means. We
intend to produce a thesis, because oI the central topic public sphere we will discuss,
that will remain theoretical in that that we will not conduct any empirical analysis on
our own. There would be too many logistical, linguistic, methodological and practical
obstacles to conduct a content or audience eIIects analysis oI a Iormat (TV show) and a
content (political satirical) in every member-States, and since such a show does not exist
(yet) on a pan-European level, it would be illusionary to hope to Iind clues about its
presumed eIIect.
Yet, notwithstanding this voluntary absence oI primary empirical experiences, it is
oI prime importance, we ought it to academic rigor in one hand and to intellectual
honesty, to stay well within the borders oI the realm oI the real. Thus, we intend to keep
the thesis Iirmly empirically grounded, providing all along our work abundant Iacts,
Iigures and Iindings Irom secondary sources that investigated on, among others, the
public sphere, its europeanization or the eIIects oI satirical TV show. In this thesis, we
aim at cross-examining and synthesizing academic productions that have yet to be mix,
such as works on the EPS and about satirical media content, while at the same time
paying extra attention not to compare apples and pears, or draw similar conclusions
Irom dissimilar studies.
Believing that the whole is greater than the sum oI the parts, we are conIident that
Irom this synthesis oI Iindings coming Irom all these diIIerent Iields, which is
something so Iar unheard oI Ior the question we aim at tackling, new, innovative
solutions to the European democratic deIicit will arise. Moreover, staying constantly in
touch with previous Iindings and academic discussions is a way Ior the thesis not to get
lost in an aporetic intellectual process, disconnected Irom reality, or at least to previous
researches related to topics we discuss.
14
1.4.2. Some definitions
Terms such as 'humor', 'satire', 'parody', 'irony', 'satirical journalism' and
'carnivalization oI news' need to be precisely and concisely deIined, being the core oI
the thesis, to avoid misunderstandings and highlight their nuances and similarities.
In the particular context oI a mediated communication, humor is a process:
'that would tend, through a complex semiotic construction oIten
involving several layers (verbal, iconic, sound) directed to one or
many addressee to trigger a local perlocutionary eIIect oI complicity
based on the oIten discrepant characteristics oI an utterance and its
enunciation.
2
(Chabrol, 2006, p.7)
The characteristic oI a perlocutionary eIIect is that it results in the creation oI
emotions in the audience receiving the mediated communication in opposition to
illocutionary and locutionary eIIects that transmit inIormations at the expense oI a
distinct third party, which is the target. It is the gap, or shiIt, between what is uttered and
the conditions oI enunciation that creates a special relation between the speaker and
his/her addressees. When the latter realize the particular conditions oI enunciation oI the
message uttered by the Iormer, Ior instance intended absurdity or paradox (remember
the 'Iish on a bicycle' joke Irom section 1.1.5), it triggers a Ieeling oI complicity with
the speaker in the audience (Chabrol, 2006). This newly created emotion can maniIest
itselI through a smile, a laugh, but not necessarily.
For satire, a 'trenchant wit, irony, or sarcasm used to expose and discredit vice or
Iolly (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2010) it has been described 'as a playIul
distortion oI reality (Feinberg 1967 in LaMarre, Landreville, & Beam, 2009, p.215).
For other scholars, one must not lose track oI the historical construction and the
diversity behind the term:
'Although some critics separate satire in gentle satire, or 'Horatian'
satire (...), and biting satire, or 'Juvenalian satire', the satirical scale
2 Translation oI texts originally in French to English here, oI Iurther in this thesis, are my own and I
alone bear the entire responsibility Ior possible mistakes and imprecisions.
15
ranges Irom mere mild teasing and (destructive) cynicism to sharp
invective with a moral and/or a political purpose.(Lockyer, 2006,
p.766)
For some, satire is speciIic in that 'the real essence oI satire lies in neither its Iorm
nor its Iunction but rather in the way both these are perceived. (Kuyper, 1984, p.459)
According to his 'perceptual theory oI satire', three elements are 'responsible Ior the
perception oI satire: |a| perceived intent to alter the perceiver`s view oI some state oI
aIIairs, a similarity oI Iorm oI the satire with some other artiIact, and the perceiver
Iinding the satire humorous. (ibid.)
Parody has some common ground with satire. It also needs an element oI
similitude with an existing element to Iunction and produce humor. Parody can be
broadly deIined as 'a literary or musical work in which the style oI an author or work is
closely imitated Ior comic eIIect or in ridicule. (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
2010.) However, it Iocuses on the Iorm, or Iormat, rather than the content or deeds,
which are the target oI satire that aim to correct them. Indeed, 'parody Iocuses on
aesthetic conventions (...), and through exaggeration mocks the style oI the original and
raises questions about its content (Nilsen and Nilsen, 2000 in Lockyer, 2006, p.766)
whereas 'satire draws on and critiques social conventions and behavior (ibid.).
For irony, the most concise deIinition Ior our work is 'the use oI words to express
something other than and especially the opposite oI the literal meaning (Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, 2010). A similarity strike us here between characteristics oI
humor and irony. It is the notion oI discrepancy or gap between two realities. Here the
gap lies between the literal meaning oI the utterance and the true meaning implicitly
behind this utterance. Like Ior satire, ambiguous enough as a Iorm oI comedy that it
requires 'audiences to apply cognitive eIIort in processing the jokes (LaMarre,
Landreville, & Beam, 2009, p.215-216), understanding the implicit meaning oI irony
requires not only a complicity between the speaker and its audience, but also an eIIort
Irom this audience. That being said, irony, while still an humorous discourse, does not
necessarily convey the same corrective or reIormative mission as satire does. With
irony, the speaker 'attempts to simply highlight something, or someone, as ridiculous
( Lockyer, 2006, p.766)
Eventually, motivated by 'what literary satirist, Jonathan SwiIt, called 'saeva
indignatio' (savage indignation) (ibid.) at heart, satirical journalism choose to 'targets
16
stupidity, corruption, wrongdoing and dishonesty by politicians, public institutions,
large corporations, the media and public Iigures(ibid.). To work, the satirical journalist
uses humor, wits and exaggeration and turn the production oI news into a 'socio-moral
instrument involving social and political observation and sharp critical commentary, the
satirical journalist is oIten sensitive to the gap between what is and what might be
(ibid.). This time again, at the core oI the mechanism, lies a gap. Here, it is the
discrepancy between the reality and the ideal world the journalist would like to see (a
world that reIlects his own values and ideals), between what is and what should be to
rephrase Lockyer, that triggers the journalist's motor, his/her savage indignation. The
satirical journalism`s ultimate goal is to 'provoke readers to criticize and condemn those
issues or persons it attacks through instigating a range oI emotions including laughter,
contempt, anger and hate.(ibid.) Those emotions emerge thanks to the perlocutionary
eIIect oI the humor used by the journalist to reach his/her audience or readership, the
same way it created a Ieeling oI complicity.
Although not a neologism we made up, see Morris (1995) Ior a use oI this
expression in media studies, or Langman (2002) Ior a use oI it in sociology, we Ieel the
need to clariIy a deIinition oI 'carnivalization' oI news. Inspired by the Bakhtinian
view on 'carnival' (more on that later), we see it as the process through which a TV
show host or a journalist, produce a non-traditional version oI the news both in content,
thanks to rhetorical tools such as humor, satire and irony, and in Iormat, thanks to a
parody oI traditional Iormats. This subverted reporting goes Iurther than simply
inIorming or entertaining, but also carries on with it the powers oI laughter we have
identiIied: the news become a tool to cope, catalyze social change or unite groups while
being at heart subversive and critical oI authority.
1.4.3. Thesis outIine
AIter this introductory chapter, the thesis' second chapter will present and discuss
the theoretical Ioundations oI our research. The aims oI this chapter 2 are dual. It will
Iirst explain by paying great care to literature and thoughts history, among many things,
that satire, as a genre, is, and has been through the millennia, an prominent iI not
essential Ieature oI the European intellectual and media landscape. Then, we engage in a
discussion concerning the conceptualization oI the term 'public sphere', Iirst to deIine it
17
and inquire into the modes oI europeanization oI said public sphere. As Ior the second
part oI the discussion, we aim to choose which one oI the concepts oI public sphere is
the more pertinent, between the ones inherited Irom the Habermasian understanding oI
the public sphere and the ones drawn Irom the Bakhtinian view oI the carnival plaza as
a public sphere, Ior a research about satire and the 'carnivalization oI news'.
The Iirst task the third chapter we will carry out is to draw models oI the relations
between political communication, entertainment content on TV and satirical journalism.
Those typologies will clariIy the characteristic oI each elements and their combinations.
Then, we will examine how Bakhtin's literary analysis oI Rabelais proves itselI
extremely valuable and accurate to analyze the contemporary political satirical shows.
The third part oI the chapter will consist in a synthesis oI the eIIects, positive as well as
negative, theoretical researches have identiIied in Iour diIIerent political satirical TV
shows involved in the carnivalization oI news.
In the Iourth chapter, having previously highlighted the eIIects oI carnivalized
news on national public sphere, we will investigate to know to what extents those
eIIects are transposable and applicable, thanks to a hypothetical pan-European political
satire show, on the European Public Sphere. We will begin by addressing the challenges
such a show would Iace to exist and thrive. Then we will argue that a pan-European
political satire show would serve as a potent media critic to redress the journalists'
malpractices arising when covering European aIIairs. Eventually, the beneIits oI satire
terms oI political interests, political knowledge and political behavior in Europe will be
discussed, so will be the potentiality oI a European heteroglossia providing a space
where citizens could be empowered to deIine their European identity in a bottom-up
Iashion, in opposition to the centralized, top-down labeling oI the European institutions.
A conclusive chapter will synthesize our research while oIIering space Ior selI-
reIlexivity and name some oI the most recent examples in the news in terms oI
interactions between satire, media and public sphere, Ior Iuture researchers to work on.
18
Chapter 2: Conceptualizing satire and the public sphere in
Europe
This chapter lays the theoretical Ioundations oI our research, both in terms oI
making explicit the 'Europeaness' oI satire thus increasing its relevance Ior this study
and oI deIining the scope oI the debate around the public sphere, its Europeanization
and discuss its most useIul conceptualization when it comes to analyze it in its relations
with satire.
2.1. Twenty centuries of European satire
While we do not dispute that cultures outside oI Europe have been successIully
using satire in mediated contexts (see Ior instance Eko, 2007 Ior a study oI caricatures
in AIrican satirical publications), it is both impactIul and relevant Ior our research to
underline how much the genre oI satire is truly European and how much the European
audiences have been exposed to satirical texts since ancient times. Realizing it makes
the lack oI research about satirical content and the European Public Sphere all the more
striking, not to say intriguing.
In order to shed lights on this millennium-long connection in this section, we
trace a historical perspective oI satire in Europe, Irom Ancient Rome to its rebirth
during the Enlightenment paralleling the rise oI and getting enmeshed with the
aIorementioned public sphere. We will then look at how much satire is present and
signiIicant in today's European media landscape.
2.1.1. From the Roman origins to the Middle Ages
It is not during Ancient Greece, despite being the Iertile point oI origin oI both
genres oI tragedy and comedy, but indeed later in Ancient Rome that scholars trace
the apparition oI satire as a literary genre. Due to the old period, Iragmented and
uncompleted sources makes it hard to pinpoint a clear genitor oI the genre. Yet, some
names can be associated with the beginning oI the biting variation oI what then was
19
considered poetry. 'Aside Irom entertainment |the poet |Lucilius' main purpose clearly
was criticism oI his contemporaries, sharp criticism oI individuals oI his time (Classen,
1988, p.96), criticisms he enunciated in his name and not through third-person texts or
Iables. Established as a genre, satire is the target oI some oI its authors' selI-reIlexivity,
as shows the work oI 'Horace, oI whose eighteen satires three are about the writing oI
satires (.) |an| extraordinary emphasis on selI-deIense or selI-reIlection. (ibid.)
Horace, while deIining loosely satire as 'benevolent criticism oI contemporary society
and its shortcomings - or should one say vices? (op.cit. p.96-97), engages in a reIlexion
concerning 'his own poetry, its tradition, its Iorm, its eIIects, its purpose (...) to his own
reasons Ior writing in such a manner. (idib.) His goal is to make clear and
understandable Ior his readers what the aims oI his ediIying work are, '|t|he purpose is
serious, the ludus |humor| is meant to guarantee eIIect (op.cit. p.98), as the poet had
evaluated that ridicule was his most eIIicient tool. He sums up his view on the topic, in
Latin, with the verse 'ridiculum acri Iortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res.
(Jesting oIt cuts hard knots more IorceIully and eIIectively than gravity) (op.cit. p.99).
The genre, however, does undergo some evolutions with the time and new
Roman poets, modiIying, or creating a diverging understanding and method oI making
satire:
'|Persius and Juvenal| subject almost all aspects oI the liIe oI
Roman society (Ior Juvenal not contemporary society) to a critical
examination, and they unmask, though with less understanding and mercy
than Horace, Iaults and Iailures, ambitio and avaritia, luxuria and voluptas
and especially the decline or perversion oI such traditional Roman values
or institutions as religio, pietas, amicitia, and cliens (.) |Persius and
Juvenal| seem to lack Horace's ease, and his jokes and amusement give
way to scorn and derision. (op.cit. p.100)
This divergence oI humoristic methods to produce satire would eventually lead
to the distinction between 'Horatian' and 'Juvenalian' satire, the Iormer soIter than the
latter, more biting and merciless. II diIIerences in methods exist, diIIerences oI goals
also appear between Horace, Persius and Juvenal. Persius and Juvenal, to the diIIerence
oI Horace, attack but are little inclined to help those they ridicule. They don't steer them
towards a good, or right behavior, they just scorn them. Juvenal especially 'describes
20
reality in the hope that reality as such, unmasked and exposed in its brutal nakedness
(.) will make an impression on his readers and will make them react (op.cit)
Later on, early Christian writers are not absent oI the development oI satire in
those times. St. Jerome, 'who has oIten been called a satirist, perhaps already in
Antiquity (op.cit. p.106) despite the Iact that he rejected this label, is prompt to invoke
or quote previous satirists such as Lucillius, Persius or Horace in his own letters or
writings. Even though he sees his role in religious terms, such as 'it is the Iate oI
prophets who tell the truth that they are made to suIIer, because the spiritual doctors,
operating on the Iaults oI the sinners, exhort them to penitence - by removing what is
diseased and Iaulty (op.cit., p.108), his vision is strikingly similar to the
aIorementioned satirist's view oI their role, unmasking vices and exposing sensible
truths through jest and ridicule.
2.1.2. From the Middle Age to the 18
th
century
Several centuries later, during the Middle Age, another Christian writers, Isidore,
Bishop oI Sevilla produced an encyclopedia that demonstrates that satire is a genre Iar
Irom being Iorgotten, despite him never deIining it per se. He writes 'there are two
kinds oI comic poets, the old ones, Plautus, Accius, Terence, who were Iunny through
joking; the new ones, also called satirici, by whom Iaults were censured in general, e.g.
Horace, Persius, Juvenal and others (Lindsay, 1911 in Classen, 1988, p.109) One can
note he accumulates names Ior lack oI a correct deIinition Ior the substance oI satire. He
does however provide his readers with his explanation Ior the origin oI the term, Ior
him, it is 'the derivation oI the name Irom the Satvroi who have impunity Ior what they
say when drunk. (op.cit.p.109)
At this time, medieval satire existed under a Iamiliar Iorm: 'a striking Ieature oI
satires in the Middle Ages is their Irequent reIerences to the |Ancient| tradition.(...) the
idea that the author himselI is included |in the satire|, iI also guilty, is (...) alive (op.cit.,
p.110). But aIter centuries, the reactions oI some oI the readers have not changed: '|a|s
in antiquity, medieval satire encountered criticism, when it was regarded as unIair in its
personal attacks(op.cit., p.112) Although not a satirist himselI, the bishop is
nonetheless one oI the authors keeping the memory oI Ancient satirists alive at a time
where the Catholic Church is the main cultural institution in Europe. Yet, despite this
21
cultural hegemony, satirists Ieel Iree to attack this power: 'many medieval satires were
directed against the Church, the clergy or monastic liIe (op.cit.p.113). Classen explains
that the Church accepting, and not persecuting, satire was due to the 'righting wrongs
and censoring vices' goal oI the genre, elements the Church saw as potentially
converging with its own objectives.
Let us skip a couple centuries here, Ior our goal is not to set an exhaustive
portrait oI the literary genre that is satire throughout the ages, but rather to underline the
common history the genre shares with the intellectual development oI Europe. When
printing technologies was discovered and spread rapidly in Europe, satire blossomed in
the wake oI this intellectual revolution. AIter the Middle Ages, satire was:
'|a| genre so much alive |it| did not require any particular incentive Ior
revival during the Renaissance. It Ilourished more than ever, and the
humanists used their wit to cultivate it and their scholarship to investigate
its nature. (Classen, 1988, p.113)
Classen then argues that with the rise oI the vernacular languages in Europe and
the weakening oI the poets' respects oI the old and traditional criteria oI satire some
untouched since the Ioundation during the days oI Ancient Rome along with the
increasing theorizing oI the genre thanks to the burgeoning universities across Europe
led to the disintegration and dilution oI the old understandings and practices related to
this genre, only to see 'various aspects oI satire surviving as 'satirical Ieatures' in many
diIIerent literary genres. (op.cit., p.114).
Satire as its old poetic Iorm was perhaps dead but the Iollowing centuries would
not be void oI satire. The technologies to spread satire were now widely available and
political changes, it seems, were liberalizing Ireedom oI speech in certain European
countries, such as England. Or at least that is how the general opinion's common sense
sees it, as summarized by this scholar:
'|F|rom 1695 censorship was abolished and it is Irom this time that
Habermas has dated the beginnings oI a public sphere oI unconstrained
rational political discussion. Coincident with this is what is regarded as a
golden age oI English satire. (Condren, 2002, p.80)
22
Although Condren describes the situation in those terms, it is to admonish the
persons who would consider it to be true. For the scholar, the situation in more nuanced,
perhaps even more complicated. Does satire, deIined loosely as an 'idiom oI criticism,
correction and reIorm, most readily identiIiable by its use oI humor (ibid.) needs a
greater degree oI liberty and Ireedom oI speech or in the contrary does it thrive
particularly in a socially constrained environment?
Elements oI answer may be Iound in the Iact that European countries, some oI
them close to be Iull-Iledged nation-states, were enjoying very diIIerent level oI
Ireedom oI speech at the turn oI the 18
th
century and later on, England being one oI the
most liberal countries at the time. It did not seem to slow down the expansion oI satire
in European's intellectual circles, reinIorcing the idea that social constraint is not
necessarily limiting utterances oI satirical Ieatures in cultural products. As Hazard puts
it in his book La pensee europeenne au XJIIIe siecle: 'the 17
th
century had ended with
the disrespect, the 18
th
century started with the irony. The old satire didn't stay idle;
Horace and Juvenal resuscitated (.) novels were turning satirical, and comedies,
epigrams, pamphlets (.) were swarming. (Hazard, 2005, p.8)
Authors oI the period, such as Montesquieu, Olivier Goldsmith, Nikolas
Klimius, Jonathan SwiIt or Voltaire each wrote biting satires and to do so summoned
Iictional Iigures oI the traveler (with Gulliver and Candide) or the Ioreigner (with
Montesquieu's letters oI a Persian visitor in France). Those characters, oIten exterior
observers to avoid censorship and bring a sense oI Ialse objectivity, were nonetheless
cruel and astute critics oI their time. Their main objective is to 'show how absurd was
liIe in England, in Germany, in France, in |the Netherlands| and generally in all the
countries supposedly civilized (op.cit., p.10) and how good liIe would be iI mankind
would Iollow the rules oI reasons instead oI Ialling victims to its vices and
shortcomings. Hazard underlines that, albeit this apparent disappointed melancholy, 18
th
century novel satire is more about social worries than a pessimistic conception oI the
human condition and that it even contains 'an obscure Iaith in a possible
progress(op.cit., p.336). For the author, satire's omnipresence during the 18
th
century is
one oI the elements that make him label it the 'century oI the universal critique', a
century that would eventually end with the successive and successIul American and
French revolutions, climactic challenges to the political status quo oI their time.
The criticisms oI those satirists, as they challenge the status quo, also represent
Iundamentals shiIts working towards the emergence oI a public critical discourse
23
Iueling political debates. It is a threshold oI something previously more or less
unknown in 18
th
century Europe, the emergence, according to Habermas, oI key
elements oI the public sphere. The explanation is worth quoting at length:
'The year 1726 is oI particular importance in this regard, because its
summer saw the publication, in rapid succession, oI three great Tory
satires: Jonathan SwiIt's Gullivers Travels, John Gay's Fables, and
Alexander Pope's Dunciad. For Habermas this is a watershed moment. He
sees in these polemics the opening volleys oI the opposition's literary
Ilank, in which the critical exercise oI public reason is given the polished
respectability oI belles lettres. Collectively, he argues, SwiIt, Pope, and
Gay worked to establish the idea that a ruling body could be criticized
publicly, in print, as part oI a sustained debate about the legitimacy oI
authority. (Thorne, 2001, p.532-533)
For Habermas, now that print interrogates the central discourse oI the
institutions in power, it allows the public sphere to emerge in England. Never mind that,
according to Thorne, '|t|he Tory satire that Habermas sees as typical oI the public
sphere may be political, but its politics, aIter all, is one oI disaIIection (op.cit., p.540),
and that one oI their core values is skepticism toward any instances oI modernity.
According to the German scholar, conceptualizer oI the public sphere, the Tory writers,
Iighting the Whig power in 18
th
century England are 'are Iorerunners oI the West's
Iinest journalistic traditions. They are 'exemplary oI the critical press' (op.cit.p.533).
And this phenomenon, we have seen, was not limited to England but occurred in other
European countries where literary satires oIIered a public voice Ior a critical political
discourse.
2.1.3 Satire, part and parcel of today's European media landscape
AIter the emergence oI a public critical political discourse and the radical
changes triggered by the revolutions at the end oI the 18
th
century, including the
Industrial Revolution which mechanized the press and allowed the creation and the
24
diIIusion oI the printed mass media, satire was still very present in Europe. AIter poetry
and Enlightenment-era novels, satire shiIted to the print mass media as early as the Iirst
halI oI the 19
th
century and was widely available in several European countries. Fors
instance, Lockyer, quoting Collins (1996) establishes that '|t|he world`s Iirst satirical
daily newspaper, Le Charivari, began publishing in France in 1832 (.), and Irom 1881
to the beginning oI the First World War, 200 satirical newspaper titles were available in
France. (Lockyer, 2006, p.765). It is not only strictly speaking satirical publications
that are available and popular throughout Europe, but also satirical Ieatures inside
regular newspapers. With this enmeshing phenomenon, the line between hard news on
one side and soIt news or entertaining satirical content on the other gets blurry, with Ior
instance satirical political cartoon-strips, oIt with great eIIects. Lockyer argues that 'the
rise oI democracy in the 18th and 19th centuries went hand in hand with the rise oI
inIluential political cartoonists (op.cit., p.766), the Iight to be able to publish those
irreverent drawings targeting sensitive power Iigures was establishing benchmarks Ior
Ireedom oI the press at the time. In authoritarian regimes today, mocking in drawing
oIIicials oI said regime is still looked down upon, iI not simply restricted. In Vietnam,
currently under strict Communist media control laws, '|e|ditors oI satirical publications,
such as Tuoi Tre Cuoi, are prohibited Irom drawing the Iaces oI their leaders, and
likening leaders to animals, Ior example through caricature, is strictly oII limits.
(Keenan 1997 in op.cit., p.767).
Despite those limitations and struggles Ior press Ireedom, satirical publications
is a successIul Iormat in Europe, and it seems in countries that are Iormer colonies or
still have ties, i.e. are part oI the Commonwealth, with European colonial powers such
as France and England as well. Please note that we are here more than careIul as to not
aIIirm the existence oI a link between colonization, colonized countries subjected to
their colonizers' cultural imperialism and a transIer oI a 'culture oI satirical publication'
that would have never seen the light oI day iI it weren't Ior colonization. It is not the
topic oI the this research to discuss this issue, and we do not possess the resources nor
the time necessary to answer this question. Nevertheless, Iacts are what they are and:
'|s|atirical newspapers and magazines, or publications with substantial
satirical sections, are staple ingredients in many markets: Grnkpings
veckoblad (Sweden);Nebelspalter (Switzerland); Feconews (Netherlands);
Acta Humoristica (Belgium); Charlie Hebdo (France); (.) Krokodil
25
(Russia); Tuoi Tre Cuoi (Vietnam); Chaser (Australia); The Toque
(Canada). These satirical publications are signiIicant contributors to their
respective journalistic markets and are widely read Ior example, Krokodil
has a circulation oI 234,000 (Benn`s Media, 2005) and Tuoi Tre Cuoi a
circulation oI 200,000 (Keenan, 1997). (Lockyer, 2006, p.766)
Those publications are important, iI not key player in their respective media
systems. The most probable successIul example is the British satirical and investigative
magazine 'Private Eye', launched in the early 1960's, selling 300 copies then, which
turned to a national institution selling 200,872 copies per issue, with an average
readership oI 667,000 per issue in 2005. This success makes it the only British printed
publication vehicle Ior satire that has survived since the 1960s, at time oI blossoming
Ior political satirical publications. (Lockyer, 2006). BeIore investigating other media, it
is important to underline that all the European publications we mentioned are set in a
tradition that dates back to the poems oI Horace and Juvenal, two millenia ago.
Satire was not however leIt out oI newer media. In television, a medium who
became widely popular in Europe only aIter the Second World War, satirical content too
was getting its Iair share oI the airwaves:
' The British Have I Got News for You, the Russian Kuklv (Puppets), the
Dutch Dit was het nieuws (This was the news), the Danish De aktuelle
nvheder, the Finnish Uutisvuoto (Newsleak), the Iormer Czech Be: Obalu
(Unwrapped) and the Polish ZOO represent only a small share oI the
|satirical| television programs across Europe.(Kavaliauskaite, 2006, p.70)
However, it did Iace the same diIIiculties as caricaturists did in their time. Since
the 1960's England had 'television programs (Ior example, BBC`s That Was The Week
That Was) (Lockyer, 2006, p.770) and in France, '|t|he 1970s gave a new boost to
satirical programs with Le Petit Rapporteur (...). However, always threatened with
government surveillance, television satire dealt cautiously with politics. (Collovald and
Neveu, 1999, p.341) Despite no absolute evidence oI causality between the two parallel
phenomenon, more liberty oI tone would arrive come the waves oI deregulations and
commercialization oI the European media systems. Still in France, 'the state monopoly
in broadcasting was deeply entrenched and was not liberalized until 1982 (Chalaby,
26
2004, p.1202-1203) and TV would have to wait a bit to see the same liberalization,
'with the end oI the state monopoly in television and a shiIt in the balance oI power
aIter 1986 in Iavor oI commercial and privatized channels. (Collovald and Neveu,
1999, p.341). They even note that 'the loosening oI political control and the
institutionalization oI successive independent regulatory authorities were moves in the
same direction.(ibid.)
Satirical content was quickly used to use the newly created and liberalized air
time. TF1, one oI the new privatized channels, launched a bestiary oI political puppets,
inIluenced by United Kingdom's own Muppet Show (inIluences Irom the UK are not
limited to this, as we will see later), 'the Bebte Show |which |was broadcast on a daily
basis Irom 1984 (.) the presidential election oI 1988 marking the apex oI its golden
age. (ibid.). The satirical triggers were not innovative, caricatures, exaggerations, at
times coarse humor: '|l|aughter came Irom the discrepancy between the Iormal and
respectable public behavior oI politicians on the one hand and the coarseness and
cynicism oI their conversation in the 'private' space oI the bar on the other.(ibid.) On
Canal , another newly created commercial channel, this one being pay-per-view, satire
was present as a business model to attract young, hip, urban subscribers. Since its
creation in November 1984, the channel had hired some oI the most Iamous comedians
oI the time to host a couple oI shows:
'|French comedian Coluche| treated current events with biting irony in a
mock news bulletin. For commercial reasons and strategies connected to
its positioning in the media market, Canal Plus Iavored this style oI satire.
Nulle Part Ailleurs, which lampooned the journalistic world, appeared in
August 1987 and drew its inspiration Iorm the comedian group Les Nuls
(Coluche had passed away in a motorcycle accident), who created the
news parodies Obfectif Nul, TJN 595 and Iinally the Journal televise des
Nuls. Inspiration also came Irom the British !"#$$#%& ()*&+ (oI the
commercial channel ITV), created in 1983. Finally, in 1988 the leading
satirical program oI the Canal Plus became Les Arenes de linfo which
gave birth to Les Guignols de linfo. (Collovald and Neveu, 1999, p.343)
(Emphasis added to highlight the British inIluence)
27
In the lapse oI time when the Bebte Show viewership Iigures would decline
the show was cancelled at the beginning oI the 1990's the Guignols, named aIter the
puppet show mentioned in section 1.1.4, grew more and more popular and became the
most successIul satirical TV show in France, and still is aIter 22 years on the air and
more than 4.000 Iake news bulletins broadcasted. Their audiences ratings reached a
record oI 3.6 million viewers during the French presidential election oI 2007. (Gaitet,
2009) Les Guignols, iI it acknowledges an inIluence Irom the British Spititing images,
has become a model oI its own. Its success has made it a popular Iormat and it has been
exported in 12 countries. There is one oIIicial version broadcasted by the Spanish
branch oI Canal , entitled 'Las noticias del Guiol, as well as 11 unoIIicial versions
very similar in Iormat, a Iake news bulletins satirizing the events oI the day and using
computer generated images or latex puppets in countries such as India, Israel, Russia,
Colombia, Tunisia, South AIrica, Australia but also in other European countries with
Portugal, Belgium, England and Germany. (ibid.)
The success oI this Iormat oI Iake news show hosted by parodying puppets
along with spawning oI oIIicial and unoIIicial copies and the existence oI a strong
satirical press all around in Europe, as dailies or magazines, are a excellent illustration
oI the ubiquitous presence oI satire in the European media landscape nowadays. This
means that European audiences are Iamiliar to the genre that is satire, and have been Ior
centuries, whether under the Iorm oI a poem Irom Horace, a novel Irom SwiIt or a TV
show 'carnivalizing' the daily news, that is parodying a newscast and presenting the
daily event in a satirical Iashion.
Where does this historical section leave us? It shows that the genre, as hard as it
is to clearly deIine it, has evolved quite a bit Irom its origin as Iar as the Iorm is
concerned. At Iirst, there were poems and verses, then satire became Ieatured in
literature and satire is nowadays almost omnipresent in various kind oI media reaching
audiences in Europe and worldwide. Because the changing Iorm and vehicles, some
scholars are skeptical that political satire still holds any power nowadays; in other terms
'predominant political reactions to satire have shiIted partly because our sense oI what
humor expresses has changed and partly as satire has become so ritualized, so much oI
it a mainstream part oI mass entertainment. (Condren, 2002, p.98) Those scholars Iear
it has been to diluted in Western culture, thus losing its edge and Iighting only saIe
Iights, too aIraid to stir up threatening reactions similar to the ones The Satanic Jerses
28
triggered. A good and more recent example might can be the reactions on European soil
to Denmark's Jvllandsposten Muhammad cartoons controversy when partisans oI
Ireedom oI speech and partisans oI religious tolerance, two values Europe prides itselI
to possess and deIend, clashed in the public discourse, and violent reactions abroad
(however, the issue might be more complex, see Anselmi & Hogan 2006, Ior a critical
study oI the controversy). Has satire become a watered-down, selI-censored and
commercialized version oI what it once was during Ancient time ?
We argue that, even iI it is now part oI the mass media industry, whether on
print, online or broadcast as show the huge commercial success oI products such as
Private Eve or Les Guignols, satire still holds a great deal oI power; we see the recent
case oI Brazilian politicians threatening to punish jokes made by satirical shows on TV
as a prime counter-example to the criticisms oI timorous and weakened satire.
Moreover, it is clear that the content, the corrective and censoring aims oI satire, are
relatively consistent since Antiquity. The same goals that were central to original satire
are still very much key in the instances oI mediated satire, or satirical journalism, we
have listed. Whether we look at the deIinition oI satirical journalism we gave in the
introductory chapter (see section 1.4.2 ) or iI we understand satirical journalists as
persons who 'attempt to look beneath the surIace oI issues and are intolerant oI what
they perceive as human shortcomings. These shortcomings are exposed and made to
look ridiculous (Lockyer, 2006, p.765-767), we Iind elements that would not be turn
down by satirists oI Iormer times such as Juvenal or SwiIt.
With similar aims to right wrongdoings , similar tools humor, exaggeration
and with the slight diIIerences oI the vehicle used to reach its audience, contemporary
satire is not only a worthy heir oI the satire oI yesteryears but a genre European
audiences are well acquainted with. Moreover, iI the extensive historical perspective we
took the time to gather and set up, drawing Iorm a proIusion oI sources Irom various
Iields, taught us anything, it is that satire is truly and intrinsically a part oI 'Europe's
cultural heritage |that ought to be| saIeguarded and enhanced (OIIicial Journal oI the
European Union, 2007,p.13) and oI the common European culture 'drawing inspiration
Irom the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance oI Europe(op.cit., p.12), both core
concepts oI the European identity according to the so-called Treaty oI Lisbon.
Keeping in mind these characteristics, some may say qualities, will be useIul
when we will debate whether or not satire on a European level can have positive eIIects
on the democratic deIicit oI the European Union.
29
2.2. Investigating the emergence of the pubIic sphere in Europe
To address the question oI the EU democratic deIicit and the potential eIIects oI
satire on it, it is important to invoke the concept oI the public sphere. Indeed, since we
hypothesized that a European public sphere improved through satire could impact the
democratic deIicit, the idea oI a public sphere becomes central to our argument.
Accordingly, we ought to trace the concept back to its origin, explore the scholarly
debate around its various deIinitions and see iI, and how, can a public sphere emerges
on a European level.
2.2.1. The origin of the concept of public sphere
We could begin this sub-section by assessing that, Ior the amount oI research in
communication science, 'the concepts oI the 'public sphere', 'public opinion' and the
'public use oI reason' have a long and complex genealogy (Crossley & Roberts 2004,
p.1). For them, Jrgen Habermas' The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
(1962, translated in English in 1989) is simultaneously 'trac|ing| much oI that
genealogy and, with some oI Habermas' latest researches, 'set|ting| the agenda Ior
much oI the debate on these issues(idib.). As a matter oI Iact, in his seminal book,
Habermas presents the Iirst deIinition oI the concept as such:
'The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the
sphere oI private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the
public sphere regulated Irom above against the public authorities
themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing
relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere oI
commodity exchange and social labour. The medium Ior this political
conIrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people`s
public use oI their reason (ffentliches Rsonnement). (Habermas, 1989,
p.27)

Starting Irom this quote, the aim oI this thesis is not to rediscover this intricate
30
genealogy, nor is it to become involved in academic exegesis, Ior both have been carried
out more skillIully and more exhaustively by others scholars. Discussions on the
concept are ongoing, so to deIine the public sphere is hard as interpretations oI
Habermas' seminal work, as well as his most recent writings, diIIer, are debated etc.
Nevertheless, among the debates, a common skeleton tends to emerge around shared
characteristics oI this public sphere, 'a domain oI open, critical and Iree discussion,
|which| depends upon the absence oI constraints that inhibit uniIormly shared
inIormation and the development oI commonly held standards oI rational debate.
(Corden, 2002, p.82) For others, a public sphere exists when 'the critical reasoning oI
the public constitutes an eIIective steering Iorce in both society and polity (Crossley &
Roberts, 2004, p.4). Thus, among the common elements in between the diIIerent
deIinitions are the idea that a public sphere in a prerequisite Ior a rational, critical
discussion or debate, and that said discussion should have an impact on the social and
political world. More commonalities will emerge once criticisms are taken into
accounts, so we can reach an actual deIinition.
2.2.2. A concept attracting a lot of criticisms
Habermas' pioneering work has drawn the Iire oI critics who see his central
theory oI the public sphere as biased at best, iI not simply unrealistic. Here as well, the
objective oI this sub-section is not to list exhaustively all those criticisms. This type oI
works too has already been published, in a more thorough and synthesizing Iashion that
we would be capable oI with our limited resources. II we were to invoke just one
compiling research, it would be Craig Calhoun's, editor oI Habermas and the Public
Sphere (1992) which was among the Iirst to call Ior a collection oI the most vocal
critics oI Habermas' concept. The critics were coming Irom various Iields oI research,
with communication sciences oI course involved with the sections by Nicholas
Garnham. history was represented with GeoII Eley, philosophy appeared as well with
Nancy Fraser who reached the Iollowing statement critical oI the public sphere:
'(...) a public sphere adequate to a democratic polity depends upon both
quality oI discourse and quantity oI participation. Habermas develops the
Iirst requirement in elaborating how 4 the classical bourgeois public
31
sphere oI the seventeenth and eighteenth century was constituted around
rational critical argument, in which the merits oI arguments and not the
identities oI arguers were crucial. (Calhoun, 1992, p.2)
Leaving out the identities oI the arguers meant that Habermas did not take into
consideration the variations in the audience's and arguers' race, gender and class etc. in
his deIinition. In the eyes oI many oI his critics, Habermas is guilty oI having
conceptualized an expression and giving it a universal reach when, because he based his
conceptualization on an historical study oI a very speciIic situation in time 18
th
century Europe concerning a very speciIic, and limited, sample oI social actors. The
core oI the criticisms is that he generalized and turn into an ideal oI democratic
participation results he Iound investigating only the upper-class, white, in majority
Christian and overwhelmingly male intellectual circles oI that time, leaving out women,
minorities, the lower classes and less educated.
Habermas disregarding Iirstly the diversity oI the public made critical
researchers commenting on his Iindings Iormulate their careIully phrased, more
inclusive understanding oI a 'public sphere'. For instance, it becomes 'a space where
citizens in practice: an elite oI citizens discuss issues with each other in the presence
oI a public that itselI has (at least theoretically) the chance to intervene and participate.
(Van De Steeg, 2006, p.609-610) Despite the nuances, we Iind common elements to the
aIorementioned loose deIinition oI the public sphere: the discussion in public, the
possibility oI taking part Ireely in this discussion. Less speciIic, Thorne (2001) notes
that there is an underlying paradox, or contradiction, within the concept itselI. On one
hand the public sphere is, in theory, supposed to be empty oI the hierarchical
stratiIication, inherited Irom the private space, between its participants, all should be on
an equal Iooting. But in practice, it is rarely the case and the exercise oI critical
discussion is eventually limited, some categories oI the population behind barred Irom
the debate.
Those criticisms, inspired Irom post-colonial, gender or critical studies, are not
the only kind directed at Habermas concept. Skeptics are less trying to nuance
Habermas original point than to prove him wrong. Pragmatically, a modern political
discourse cannot usually stand the comparison with Habermas idealized concept, Ior the
Iormer 'lacks equality oI participation, trust or credibility by philosophical standards oI
discourse, and is marked by anything but a Iree Ilow oI relevant inIormation.
32
(Condren, 2002, p.93). According to Condren, it is then unrealistic to hope to see
emerge a public sphere. Other critics have even harsher words to dismiss the concept:
'Habermas is interested in the public sphere as a promise that is never
IulIilled. Subsequent scholars have not had his dialectical patience.Terry
Eagleton, Ior instance, pointedly dismisses the public sphere as the
idealized selI-image oI the eighteenth-century merchant class, as a pretense
oI reason that merely masks the chummy accommodation oI aristocratic
and capitalist interests characteristic oI the age (...). This antagonism is
even more pronounced in Michael Warner's work, where the classical
public sphere is rarely anything other than a cruel abstraction, the vacuous
power play oI disembodied subjects (Thorne, 2001, p.542)
Facing this volley oI criticisms, it should be noted that 'Habermas has himselI
accepted many oI these critiques. Indeed, as his own thought has developed, he has in
many cases moved beyond them. according to Garnham (2007, p.201) This scholar
gathered in this research article a compilation oI some criticisms oI Habermas,
including Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts (2004) and oIIers an Habermasian
rebuttal or counter-point to prove them wrong or at least to underline the weaknesses in
their respective arguments.
2.2.3. Which materialization for the European public sphere ?
The quest to analyze the emergence oI European public sphere is keeping
European institutions and scholars alike very busy. All are well aware that, as 'the
European public sphere becomes the prerequisite Ior better governance, legitimacy and
citizen`s participation in the emerging European polity. (Trenz, 2005, p.408), Iinding
and studying burgeoning elements oI this EPS will improve the knowledge on the
communication processes between the UE and its citizens and ultimately help bridge the
democratic deIicit overshadowing the UE legitimacy.
At heart, the idea that it may exist a public sphere on a European level is divided
in two positions that are apparently irremediably irreconcilable. The questions is to
know whether or not can a stand-alone European public sphere exists, on its own, or are
33
the only way to reach something close to a EPS is the Europeanization oI national
public spheres. For instance, scholars (such a Machill, Beiler, & Fischer, 2006) make a
diIIerence between a EPS that would emerge independently oI national states, and a
'European public sphere that emerges as a result oI the Europeanization oI the national
public spheres. (op.cit. p.61) The same scholars underline major preconditions missing
today that are preventing the emergence oI a EPS independent oI national states.
Machill, Beiler, & Fischer (2006) drawing Irom an extensive body oI research, highlight
some lacking elements: the lack oI a common European language, the existence oI mass
media (or other public Iorums) with an EU-wide reach and even the lack oI a uniIorm
journalistic and media culture in the EU states. According to them, there can be no EPS
independent oI national public sphere.
They are not the only ones to hold this position. Trenz (2005), in a extensive book
review looking at 5 researches coming Irom diIIerent disciplinary Iields gives us a Iair
idea oI how the scholarly debate on the EPS unIold. Among the result oI this multi-
disciplinary glance at the ongoing debate, he notes that in reason oI a lack oI a uniIied
linguistically, yet not necessarily monolingual, European media landscape, 'the
European public sphere is sought entirely within the national media systems (Trenz,
2005, p.410) by scholars whose 'analysis is in Iact |oI| the Europeani:ed public sphere
measured in terms oI quantity and quality oI European political communication within
the national media. (ibid.) Prime examples oI this kind oI empirical content analysis
Ior europeanization oI national public sphere is the content analysis researches led by
Van Der Steeg (2006) or Trenz (2004) concerning the europeanization oI the content oI
Europe's quality newspapers. Other media are getting increasingly europeanized too, Ior
instance 'the television already contributes to a europeanization oI national public
spheres and the minds oI citizens. (Gripsrud, 2007, p.489). By europeanization oI news
texts, we understand a threeIold phenomenon. It represents an increase in:
'European news characterized by the shared meaning oI European events
and issues; (...) Europeanized news characterized by the secondary impact
oI European events and issues on national news coverage; and (.) national
news on domestic events and issues characterized by evolving Iorms oI
European monitoring and rhetorics. (Trenz, 2004, p.291)
34
In the same piece oI work by Trenz (2004, p.313), he comes to the conclusion that
his results are hinting at 'the existence oI a transnational resonance oI political
communication in Europe that is organized around particular actors and institutions, a
specialized media sector and an unknown number oI attentive publics. For him, this
transnational resonance happens Iirst and Ioremost in European quality newspapers,
participating in the europeanization oI national public spheres.
Habermas himselI believes the Iirst step to a EPS is the europeanization oI
national public spheres. Regarding the topic oI the European Union, he thinks that 'the
Iormation oI European public opinion should come in the Iirst instance through the
mechanism oI national media reporting Ior their national audiences on debates in other
European polities (Garnham, 2007, p.210) We shan't be surprised, this process is
consistent with him who 'sees democracy not as an ideal normative Iorm to be imposed,
but as an historical learning process within which common norms are Iashioned and
reIashioned (ibid.). Accordingly, installing a public sphere in the cosmopolitan political
entity that is the UE will always a lengthy, evolving, long-term procedure.
Concerning the other actor very interested in this debate that are the European
Union's institutions, they have established a clear and comprehensive deIinition oI a
public sphere on a European level:
'|it| can be understood as a space in which public policies may be better
understood by, and discussed with, all EU citizens and all sections oI the
population, in all its diversity, with a view to meeting their expectations
more eIIectively, and whereas it must be a venue both Ior the provision oI
inIormation and Ior wide-ranging consultations transcending national
borders and Iostering the development oI a sense oI shared public interest
throughout the EU, (European Parliament, 2010).
However, as 'there is no overarching European public sphere at present (ibid.),
this deIinition actually precedes the emergence oI this deliberative space on a European
scale. For the European Parliament, a EPS doesn't quite exist yet. And, contrary to the
scholars investigating the question, they don't see the Europeanization oI national public
spheres as the only legitimate path to establish a EPS. As a matter oI Iact, they state that
'the creation oI a European public sphere is closely related to the existence oI pan-
35
European or transnational media structures (ibid.). In order to see the birth oI such
media transcending national boundaries, the report oI the European Parliament, while
acknowledging 'very lively national public spheres between which synergies should be
developed, invokes 'the Franco-German television channel Arte.
The European Union does not want to see a EPS emerges Ior the sake oI it, or
out oI generosity and benevolence, there are political interests at stake in this question.
'In its search Ior public legitimacy in the Member States, the EU should Ioster the
establishment oI transnational media that can give Europe a new democratic and
independent dimension (ibid.) (Emphasis added). It is then a selI-avowed 'goal oI the
European institution 'to create together a European public sphere.(ibid.) To hatch and
Ioster this public sphere, the European institutions eventually acknowledge that
member-States, public service and private broadcasters as well have a role to play, so
have cross-border investigative journalism and 'new media', which the European
Parliament (2010) deIines as 'networked digital inIormation and communication
technologies, to create transnational public spheres.
Concerning new media, Ior some, they appear as Iitting tools, relevant Ior new
supra-national here level oI governance. Problems oI public spheres and legitimacy
Ior supra-national level oI governance have been identiIied by scholars: '|a|
transnational and thus poly-centric and pluralist community, such as the European
Union, requires a diIIerent sort oI public sphere in order to promote suIIicient
democratic deliberation. (Bohman, 2004, p.148). OIIering a solution, Bohman argues
that, in order to gain legitimacy Irom its citizen, the European Union 'could then seek to
marriage oI directly deliberative decision making and computer assisted, mediated and
redistributive Iorms oI publicity (op.cit., p.151). We will come back to the impact oI
new media on the European public sphere in the Iourth chapter.
In all Iairness, the European Union is not all alone having Iaith in and Iocusing
on the media outlets reaching across national boundaries. There is some scholars too
who see leads oI an emerging public spheres due to the burgeoning oI transnational
media, especially television, in Europe. This is encouraging because oI the importance
television occupies in the European media landscape. In layman's terms, 'no other
medium is better suited to the task oI inIorming hundreds oI millions oI European
citizens about the views oI their Iellow citizens in other member states than broadcast
television. (Gripsrud, 2007, p.485). For instance, Brggemann and Schulz-Forberg,
who deIine the European public sphere as (2009, p.2) 'an open Iorum |or 'a network oI
36
Iorums| oI exchange among citizens and political elites on matters oI common concern
that transcend the borders oI the European nation states, identiIy 4 types oI
transnational media. Two are still preoccupied with the idea oI the nation, these are the
national media with a transnational mission, such as the Deustche Welle, the other being
the inter-national media like the aIorementioned French-German project Arte. The
remaining two kind oI transnational media see their 'target audience |as| not imagined
as emerging Irom nations (op.cit., p.7), theses are the pan-regional media, like Telesur
in south America and Iinally there is the global media with the likes oI CNN, BBC
World and Al-Jazeera English. For the two scholars, 'transnational media have
multiplied in Europe(op.cit.,p.15) because oI the television boom Iollowing the
deregulation/privatization phase oI the 1980', the creation oI a transnational market Ior
media products in Europe supported by the EU legal Iramework and technological
innovations, such as satellite broadcasting. Despite this explosion, the achievements in
terms oI elements aiming Ior a Europea public sphere exist, but are limited.
They list Deustche Welle, which has adopted in 2004 an European mission in its
status. In addition Arte and Circom are evidences oI tendency oI expending 'bilateral
cooperation with the EU (...) into EU-wide cooperation, thus moving international
media in direction oI pan-European media (op.cit., p.10). The researchers argue that
pan-regional media Irom Europe are where the EPS has the most chance to be Iound,
with media such as European Joice, or Euronews. Yet, the audience Ior the EU-related
websites is too small and the global media don't necessarily cater contents related to UE.
In addition, these media outlets are Iacing cultural diIIerences and logistical
(scheduling) problem those covering politics (not sports or entertainment) attract a
rather elite audience, not a broader European public. Euronews only has almost decent
ratings, the oIIicial Iigures Brggemann and Schulz-Forberg are quoting state that
Euronews reaches '3.5 million viewers in Europe per day, which is more than CNN
International and BBC World combined. (op.cit., p.6). They also highlight two
concerns oI theirs:
'Many transnational media remain heavily dependent on
government subsidies. Euronews, as well as other pan-European media,
has mainly come to liIe with the help and support oI national or EU
authorities. Euronews still receives millions oI euros in subsidies Irom the
European Commission. Many transnational media projects, such as Arte,
37
Deutsche Welle, or Euronews are driven, at least to some extent, by
political interests towards developing a more integrated European space oI
communication ( Brggemann & Schulz-Forberg, 2009, p.15)
Financial dependence on subsidies provided by political institutions and implicit
and not so-implicit political/ideological interests Irom those same political institutions
(even though there are organizational mechanisms to prevent political control) are seen
as challenges Ior those media's editorial independence and sustainability.
38
2.3. Habermas, Bakhtin and the Ianguage
AIter investigating to show the extent oI the 'European-ess' oI satire and its key
place in Europe's cultural heritage, we established that that the 'lowest common
denominator' oI a deIinition oI the Habermasian concept oI the public sphere, taking
into account the heated debate surrounding it, includes common traits such as being a
open, rational and critical discussion oI citizens optimistically hoping Ior an impact on
politics and society. We also looked into how could a public sphere emerge in Europe
and highlighted that there was two views on the topic, either it would go through the
europeanization oI national the public spheres oI the member-States or, and most
scholars think it is less likely, transnational or pan-European media would be created
and with them will arise a truly European public sphere, where EU citizens will argue
and have a common deliberative space to discuss european aIIairs.
Now, iI we aim to, as we stated in the introductory chapter, tackle the questions oI
the potential impacts oI satire and satirical Ieatures on the European public sphere, we
have to conduct a cross-examination oI both concept. Here, as we are about to see, the
question oI the language is most crucial. Indeed, Habermas' understanding oI the
Iunction oI the language in his conceptualization oI the public sphere appears
antagonistic with the very existence oI satire in this space. Accordingly, we shall Iind
another theoretical Iramework allowing us to think conjointly a public sphere and
satirical elements. Bakhtin's writings about the carnival will provide us with such a
Irame work.
2.3.1. No place for humor in the Habermasian public sphere
II the goal oI this thesis is to investigate the eIIects oI satire on the public sphere,
we must come to the realization that Habermas' deIinition is not suitable Ior the rest oI
the research.
It is not only because a historical re-examination oI the period, the 18
th
century
England, in which Habermas says the Iirst public spheres emerged disprove his point, as
Condren (2002, p.93) wrote: 'iI there was a public sphere and satire a part oI it, this is
hardly evidence to support a historical realization oI a Habermasian ideal. Those are
39
the words oI a public sphere skeptic and should be taken as such. No, the true reason
why Habermas' conceptualization oI the open deliberative space is not relevant Ior our
thesis is because oI the delimitations he leaves Ior the language to play its role oI
vehicle oI the public discussions. It is quite straightIorward: Ior Habermas, there can not
be any humorous, let alone satirical, ironic or sarcastic, Ieatures in the language used in
the public sphere. Indeed, Ior him:
'|l|anguage-use is oriented toward reaching a mutual understanding and
rational consensus through the raising vindication oI Iour major validity-
claims (truth, appropriateness, sincerity, and comprehensiveness) that are
intrinsic to the speech-act (.). As is well-known, Habermas regards other
Iorms oI language-use (including humor, irony and parody) as secondary
and 'parasitic', presumably because oI they compromise the lucidity and
openness that ideally marks the communicative process, or introduce
elements oI strategic action (Gardiner, 2004, p.35)
Gardiner explains then that Ior Habermas, words can have one and only one
meaning to be purposeIul in the public sphere. Any other meaning, intended or not,
poses a threat as it can Iool the addressee(s) and skew the rational critical debate
necessary Ior the Habermasian public sphere. For this reason, irony, which we deIined
as 'the use oI words to express something other than and especially the opposite oI the
literal meaning (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2010), is to be proscribe at all
cost to have an honest, open and eIIicient debate capable oI having an impact on the
political or social liIe. For Habermas, the double meaning instituted by irony, and by
parody and satire Ior that matter since the Iormer is an exaggerated copy oI a genre to
imply its ridicule, the latter 'a playIul distortion oI reality (Feinberg 1967 in LaMarre
et al., 2009, p.215) both playing on a hidden meaning are tainting the ideal-type that
represent the 'Iormal criteria, which are simultaneously inclusive and universal, oI what
constitutes (relatively) ideology-Iree dialogue oriented towards genuine consensus with
respect to issues oI public concern (Gardiner, 2004, p.30) necessary in the public
sphere.
It appears clear now that Ior a thesis aiming at looking at the role oI satire and
satirical journalism in the European public sphere, we cannot and will not use Habermas
conceptualization oI the public sphere any longer. His normative, almost authoritative,
40
delimitation oI the Iunction oI language, which ends up restricted to a univocal, unitary
and uniplanar dimension, prevents the citizens to engage in any Iorms oI humorous or
satirical discourses, in absolute contradiction to the millenia-long European traditional
we brought out to the attention oI our readers in section 2.1. Our analysis requires a
more Ilexible and lively theoretical Iramework that will allow us to examine the eIIects
oI wits, puns and parodies on the public debates concerning European aIIairs. We need a
model oI communication as accommodating and prone to evolutions as the human
beings that compose it are prone to wild behaviors and irrational communicative
utterances.
Mikhail Bakhtin's conceptualization oI the language strikes us as being
simultaneously the most relevant and the most Ilexible oI the theoretical Iramework
around to discuss humor, public discussions and Europe. Bakhtin is Irontally opposed to
Habermas' understandings oI language and its Iunction in society, and this, on many
level. As the opposition is central Ior our research, instead oI paraphrasing them, the
explanations oI Gardiner are worth quoting at length to be clear and thorough:
'Whereas Habermas seeks to delineate sharply between particular realms oI
social activity and Iorms oI discourse - between Ior instance public and
private, state and public sphere, reason and non-reason, ethics and
aesthetics, Bakhtin problematizes such demarcations, sees them as Iluid,
permeable and always contested (Gardiner, 2004, p.30)
Moreover, when it comes strictly to the characteristics oI language:
'What Habermas regards as 'parasitic' or derivative in language-use
namely irony, humor or paradox, as well as the rhythms, cadences and
inexhaustible metaphorical richness oI living speech are not only what
Bakhtin would consider to be the most interesting and important Ieatures oI
human communication. They also constitute a crucial resource through
which the popular masses can retain a degree oI autonomy Irom the Iorces
oI sociocultural homogenization and centralization.(op.cit. p.39).
41
The opposition between the two theorists can be summarized as such:
'In contradistinction to Habermas' ideal speech, we cannot have a clear,
unmediated understanding oI either our own oI others' intentions whilst
engaging in communicative acts. Living discourse (as opposed to an
hypostasized ideal language) is necessarily charged with polemical qualities,
myriad evaluative and stylistic markers, and populated by diverse intentions
(.) there is no simple homology between the intentions and motives oI
speakers and the meaning oI the utterance they generate no Habermasian
'identity oI reason with the will'.(op.cit., p.36)
To sum up this intrinsic opposition between the two scholars, Habermas sees
language as a Iundamental tool Ior the public discourse which, as such, has to be Iree oI
polemical elements, cryptic double entendres and semantic traps who are all challenges
to the open, Iree and above all rational discussion necessary to the public sphere. Irony
and other hidden or distorted meanings oI words are installing skews and biases in the
discourses, you have to spot them and know what they implicitly reIer to in order to
interpret them correctly and understand the discourse properly and hence they are
working against the rationality oI the public discourse in Habermas' eyes. That's why
they ought to be excluded Irom the public sphere. This intransigence renders Habermas'
conceptualization oI the public sphere hermetic to plays on words and satire and thus
Ior the most part useless Ior our thesis.
Bakhtin instead take into account the liveliness oI the language, its playIul
possibilities and its powerIul consequences on the political and social world, elements
he identiIied with his analysis oI the Rabelaisian carnival. The next sub-section will take
a longer look at this notion, how it came to be and its relation to another conception oI
the public sphere.
2.3.2. Heteroglossia, carnival, public laughter and the public sphere
The responsible Ior this antagonistic analysis oI the language, Mikhail
Mikhailovich Bakhtin was a Russian scholar who in 'the 1930`s and early 1940`s, (...)
completed some oI his most important studies oI the novel, (...). He also completed his
42
major work on Rabelais, submitted as his doctoral dissertation (...) in 1941. (Zappen,
2000, p.7) The Russian novel theorist's impact on his Iield started when he shed lights
on what he saw as the multiplicity oI voices in the novel. It became one oI his main
topics oI interests and he came to think that the genre oI novel should not be interpreted
as a monologue Irom the author, but rather as a dialogue. More complexly, aIter
working on the deliberative rhetoric styles oI Socrates, Platon and Aristotle, he
conceptualized that rhetoric has to be set Iirmly in reality to be relevant, as it becomes
'shallow and inauthentic when torn Irom reality and Irom the context in which it is
Iramed (op.cit., p.8). This assertion hints at an explanation oI why Habermas and
Bakhtin's conception oI the role oI the language are so Iar apart, since the Russian
scholar reIuses to separate a speech Irom the conditions oI its utterance. So, according
to him, reading a novel, we Iace several voices and interact with them as we enter a sort
oI negotiated dialogue. 'This dialogized or dialogical rhetoric is not only a multiplicity
and diversity oI voices, a 'heteroglossia,' but an act oI (and an active) listening to each
voice Irom the perspective oI the others, a 'dialogi:ed heteroglossia.' (ibid.) In other
words, the 'author oI the polyphonic novel, the characters, and the reader participate as
equals in the creation oI this truth.(op.cit., p.12). This view oI the language and the
novel creates a complete other understanding oI the world possible, since '|Bakhtin's|
discussion oI rhetoric suggests the possibility oI a dialogized (...) that views all human
activity and all human discourse as a complex unity of differences (op.cit., p.8) The
emphasis we added is to underline how similar 'a complex unity oI diIIerence' sounds
with the motto oI the European Union that is 'United in Diversity'.
This parallel makes us believe that Bakhtin's heteroglossia can help make sense,
to some extent, oI the intricacy oI today's Europe and to why and how produce satirical
content Ior it. Indeed, contrary to Iields such as linguistics that Iocus on the uniIying, or
centripetal Iorces oI languages, Bakhtin Iocuses on the opposite Iorce, the centriIugal
tendencies that 'decentralize and disuniIy (.). These centriIugal, stratiIying Iorces oI
heterglossia produce a complex mixture oI languages that is also, and equally, a mixture
oI attitudes or points oI view about the world. (op.cit., p.13) In the domain that interest
us, we think that it is only through a healthy space where heteroglossia can occur that a
media text could then express and represent all the complexity oI the diIIerent points oI
view about Europe.
When it comes to the European Union, it ought to happen in a space separated
Irom the inIluences oI the political communication, which Euro-skeptics would qualiIy
43
as propaganda, coming Irom the centralized European institutions. This communication
Irom the institutions, who main, iI not only, purpose is to increase the European Union's
legitimacy and Ioster European citizenship, truly act, or at least try to, as a centripetal
Iorce, aiming to unite the EU citizens with the institutions as a solution to bridge the
democratic deIicit. As we will see later, satirizing European aIIairs would be a way to
allow an European heterglossia but also, and it is not contradictory, have a positive
eIIect on the democratic deIicit.
In addition to these researches, studying the work oI the Renaissance French
novelist Franois Rabelais, Bakhtin provides his readers with a concept as central as the
one oI heteroglossia to evaluate the power oI public laughter and satire on the European
public sphere. It is the notion oI carnival, developed in his seminal work Rabelais and
His World (1984). To start, we could underline that the carnival is quite a European
event in itselI, and part oI the European cultural heritage too, no matter iI it is called
'the German Fastnacht, the French Mardi Gras, the Spanish Carnaval and Italian
Carnevale, celebrated on the eve oI the Christian Lenten Iast (Lindahl, 1996, p.58)
However, it is not so much the Iestive event in itselI that interest the Russian literary
critic but what it represents. As a context oI speech utterance, carnival is an expression
oI liberty taken Irom oIIicial laws and and social guidelines, ' "a special type oI
communication impossible in everyday liIe," (...) "special forms of marketplace
speech and gesture, Irank and Iree, permitting no distance between those who came in
contact with each other and liberating Irom norms oI etiquette and decency imposed at
other times". (Bakhtin, 1984 in Zappen, 2000, p.12)
It would not be Iar Ietched to assess that Iree marketplace speeches are Bakhtin's
version oI the public sphere, a space were exchanges can happen, Ireed oI the social
constraint otherwise in place in society. As a matter oI Iacts, some scholars have linked
public laughter and public sphere beIore. Kuhn (2007, p.93) aIIirms Ior instance that
'|a|s early as the sixteenth century, Offentlichkeit |Original german word translated in
English as 'public sphere'|was a possible practice in the Iorm oI sometimes clandestine
and almost entirely humorous communication. He bring Iorth as prooI the story oI
Jakob Herbot, mayor oI the city oI Ausburg, in Southern Germany, in the middle oI the
16
th
century. A controversial Iigure, he was a Calvinist parvenu, a Iormer Iurrier and
merchant, who climbs steps oI the social ladder all the way to the highest local oIIice in
a city with Catholic patricians at a time oI inter-religious war, he attracted many
criticisms, among those the luxurious gardens oI his house. 'Herbrot`s garden was burnt
44
down, an event put into writing to be transIormed into a satirical literary text. (Kuhn,
2007, p.79) including:
'the Herbrot-Buch, a manuscript oI some 300 pages, (...) a collection oI
satires related to this Iormer Augsburg mayor. (.) |the| declared intention
oI an eIIort to collect satirical texts regarding Herbrot, as well the textual
qualities oI the material presented, suggest that the circulation oI the content
must have been higher than one would expect in the light oI the number oI
surviving copies. The source allows an analysis oI the early modern public
sphere and its use of humor as a means to communicate views to a wider
audience. (Emphasis added) (Kuhn, 2007, p.79-80)
In this urban milieu where printing press technology was available, there was a
book market, a literate and educated audience with disposable income and a critical
mind ready to read single-leaI prints and other popular media. All those elements
combined had the potential to create a counter-public, unIavorable to the mayor. Kuhn
with the nuance that he is using Habermas' rather dry conception oI the public sphere to
analyze humoristic texts thus not making the distinction we established earlier ,
assesses (20007, p.84) that 'rather than supporting a polemical voice the public seems
to have been imagined as an independent third observer and judge (.) the evidence
suggests that the source`s concept oI a public is similar to the qualitative concept oI the
bourgeois public in Habermas`s pioneer study(...) a social room where the Iree exchange
oI diIIerent views is possible. Herbrot, Ieeling threatened by the jokes and satires
whom he was the target, menaced to take in court everyone who was poking Iun at him.
Kuhn goes as Iar as casting Herbrot as Panurgus, a main character in Rabelais'
Gargantua et Pantagruel, (one oI the novel Bakhtin based his analysis oI carnival) with
whom he shared many characteristic, including greed. In the end, Kuhn sees the role oI
public political laughter in this story in 16
th
century Ausburg as a 'means to make the
public voice attractive to readers, to please or to provoke debate among them (op.cit.,
p.92). This idea is oI tremendous importance Ior our thesis and will be addressed in
depth later on.
Based on humor and public laughter, the carnival draws some characteristics Irom
both, the same qualities we have identiIied in the introductory section oI this thesis. It
catalyzes opposition Irom the centralizing powers that are the Church and the state and
45
is at the same time 'an invitation to become a part oI a complex unity, a bodily
collectivity (emphasis added) (Zappen, 2000, p.12) Here again appear the theme oI the
complex collectivity we saw earlier, which only Iurthers our certitudes that Bakhtin's
theoretical Iramework will be helpIul to think the European Union. In this unity, "the
individual body ceases to a certain extent to be itselI; (...) At the same time the people
become aware oI their sensual, material bodily unity and community" (Bakhtin, 1984 in
Zappen, 2000, p.12) The selI-realization oI being part oI a greater community in another
Ieeling that will be helpIul to prove that satirized news about European aIIairs can aid to
bridge the legitimacy gap.
Creating a sense oI community is not the only consequence oI the carnival, as
there was several type oI humoristic Ieatures present when a carnival occurs, due to the
suspension, iI not reversal, oI the usual codes oI morality in Iavor oI valorizing the
lower body, excreta, bodily Iluids, the proIane, and the obscene (Langman, 2002,
p.514.) Along with this coarse humor which was not void oI political aspects a more
explicitly political humor comes to liIe, this politicized public laughter being
'absolutely Iree in essence and anti-hierarchical to the core. Its primary mode is parody,
its target the ossiIied culture oI the elite ( Lindahl, 1996, p.55). It proceeded as Iollow:

'The transgressions oI moral boundaries were alluring at several levels that
are closely intertwined, Irom the political to the erotic. The 'sacrosanct'
elites oI church and state were typically parodied, mocked, hectored, and
ridiculed. Typical patterns oI hierarchy, deIerence, and demeanor were
ignored. Indeed, they were repudiated in Iavor oI that which was proscribed
and which violated boundaries. Alternative meanings could be negotiated as
resistances to top-down impositions,. (Emphasis added)(ibid.)
Thus, satire comes into play as well, as Lachmann (1989, p.119) analyses:
'Rabelais (.) belong in a common genre tradition having its beginnings in the
Menippean Satire, a tradition which in its thematics, stylistics, and narrative structure
represents a counter-tradition to the "epic"(classical) line oI European prose but which
is, as we have previously shown, is part oI the European cultural heritage nonetheless.
However, there is consensus among researchers that, due to the ritualized aspects
oI those ceremonies, organized and supervised by the central powers oI the time, their
objectives were not revolutionary and the same social structures oI power and social
46
hierarchies that were poked Iun at were never overthrown. 'It was not a riot, not
chaotic, but a ritualized cultural perIormance with its own rules, structures, and
understandings (Langman, 2002, p.514). It was a collective exercise to vent and release
popular 'pressure', not a call Ior arms to launch an insurrection. 'The provocative,
mirthIul inversion oI prevailing institutions and their hierarchy as staged in the carnival
oIIers a permanent alternative to oIIicial culture - even iI it ultimately leaves everything
as it was beIore. (Lachmann, 1989, p.125) The alternative, which exists periodically
during the carnivals, serves as a saIety valve and occasionally as a resort usable by the
citizens when the oppressive nature oI the power structures become too unbearable.
Eventually and simply put, '|c|arnival did not destroy hierarchy, but simply rearranged
its contents. (Lindahl, 1996, p.65)
The Iocus oI the Russian novel theorist on the public laughter would later prove
seminal Ior Iuture researchers. 'By placing carnival laughter at the heart oI the novel,
Bakhtin pushed Iolklore to the centre oI recent critical pursuits (op.cit., p.57) We can
not help but note that, so Iar, instances oI critical studies oI the Iolklore element in the
European Union have lacked visibility. As a matter oI Iact, we could not Iind any.
BeIore concluding, it is worthy oI note that, thanks to Bakhtin, Iolklore got to
Habermas himselI. He commented on Bakhtin's work, not concerning their conIlicting
views on the role oI the language, but rather to acknowledge that, Iar Irom the bourgeois
public sphere, a popular/Iolk culture could sustain itselI and bear some aspect oI a
public sphere challenging social structures:
'Only aIter reading Mikhail Bakhtin`s great book Rabelais and His World
have my eyes become really opened to the inner dynamics oI a plebeian
culture. The culture oI the common people apparently was by no means (...)
a passive echo oI the dominant culture; it was also the periodically recurring
violent revolt oI a counterproject to the hierarchical world oI domination,
with its oIIicial celebrations and everyday disciplines. (Habermas, 1992 in
Downey and Feyton, 2003, p.187)
This statement allow us to think that, iI it weren't Ior the Iundamental diIIerence in
the understanding oI the role oI the language, the conceptions oI the public sphere oI the
two scholars could be amalgamated, iI not uniIied, to create an ideal-type deIinition to
interpret how counter-public spheres work, combining elements oI popular resistance
47
and Iree and open discussions about the struggle and the actions to take.
To sum up this second chapter, we Iirst gathered a millenia-long, yet perIectible,
historical review oI the genre satire in Europe, Irom the days oI Ancient Rome. II it is
true that the genre evolved since this time, losing the strict poetic rules, satirical Ieatures
and mechanisms spread successIully in many a Iormat, Irom 18
th
century literature to
nowadays media, including in periodicals and televised shows. The omnipresence oI
satire in the European media landscape and its rich history allow us to aIIirm that it is
part oI the European cultural heritage and oI Europe common culture.
We went on and investigate the whereabouts oI the concept known as the public
sphere, how Habermas deIined it, the criticisms and nuances that it attracted and most
important how it could materialize in the European Union. Two paths are possible,
either the Europeanization oI national public spheres or the emergence oI a stand-alone
European public sphere, served by media that cross national boundaries.
In the last part oI this chapter, we discussed which theoretical Iramework would
be the most useIul and eIIicient to argue about the role oI satire in a public sphere. As
Habermas Iirmly rejects satirical Ieatures and humoristic traits in the language-use
within the public sphere, his conceptualization will not the one we opt Ior, even though
we can still draw Irom the more inclusive deIinitions critical scholars have craIted aIter
taking the works oI Habermas' critics into account. BeIore investigating in the third
chapter the carnivalized news, its typologies and real liIe occurrences and eventually the
eIIects expect on the public sphere, we are now ready to present our complete deIinition
oI the Bakhtinian public sphere, which we will use later:
Operating, by analogy to the carnivalesque plaza, through the usages
oI humoristic/satirical Ieatures and the inversion oI the society's norms and
values, this public sphere, by mocking hierarchical elites, gives space Ior
the heteroglossia to express itselI under the Iorm oI dialogical marketplace
speeches and gestures that are Irank and Ireed Irom social norms. The
liberated verbalizations create a bodily community oI exchanging,
debating centriIugal voices whose common points are to reject top-down
impositions Irom power structures, such as the church and the state. In this
situation, public laughter is used by this complex unity oI voices as a tool,
not to overthrow those power structures but indeed to Iight and keep a
degree oI autonomy Irom their homogenizing Iorces.
48
Chapter 3: Television, audience and the carnivalization of
news
We have identiIied in section 1.4.2. the concept oI 'carnivalization oI news' as the
process through which a TV show host or a journalist, produce a non-traditional version
oI the news both in content, thanks to rhetorical tools such as humor, satire and irony,
and in Iormat, thanks to a parody oI traditional Iormats. This altered reporting goes
Iurther than simply inIorming or entertaining, but also carries on with it the powers oI
laughter. In the wake oI the previous chapter, we can update this deIinition by adding
that the carnivalization oI news, Ior it is based on the same concept oI carnival, bears
similar Ieatures with the public sphere in the Bakhtinian sense. But we reject the idea
that they are synonyms. Instead, we plan to demonstrate in the coming chapter that
carnivalization oI news is one oI the paths usable to reach a Bakhtinian 'public sphere'.
AIter the theoretical reIlexions on chapter 2, our reIlexion will be now dealing
much more with existing examples oI 'carnivalized' media content, primarily televised
media content. It will Iirst tackle the categorization oI the carnivalization oI news in
contemporary media landscapes, that is, where we think this particular process oI
subverting traditional news content takes place today. Then we will study how Bakhtin's
theoretical Iramework can be interpreted to allow us to paint Iake news/satirical shows
as a prime example oI a media texts that 'carnivalize' news. We will end the chapter
looking at Iindings Irom previous empirical studies and theoretical reIlexions that
addressed eIIects oI satirical shows on their audiences to see iI we can highlight trends
that may be transposable on a European level.
49
3.1. TypoIogies of the carnivaIization of news
In order to make our categorization oI the carnivalization oI news more
understandable, it is relevant to oIIer our readers a graphically explicit summary oI our
reIlexion process. This is the reason why we choose to model the typologies in which
we are classiIying the carnivalization oI news in under the Iorm oI diagrams or tables.
This way, our deIinition becomes more clear-cut, the nuances appear more clearly and
the thesis as a whole gets more intelligible. The two Iirst categorizations are our own
production, while the third one (Holbert, 2005) is a models we Iound, and which have
already been deemed helpIul by other works on satirical media content (see Boesel,
2007).
3.1.1. Where the carnivaIization of news stands
First, let us explain why we Iocus purely on televised content while looking Ior
carnivalized news. We have seen with the examples oI the Brazilian satirical show or
the French Les Guignols that televised satire is not only very popular but it can have
dramatic eIIects on the political liIe oI the country where it is broadcasted. Moreover,
the existing body oI recent researches that investigate audiences reactions to satirical
shows that exists is more quantitatively important and more relevant than resources we
could Iind concerning eIIects oI print or radio satirical content on audiences. So, since it
is the Iormer that interests us in this thesis, we decided to Iocus mainly on televised
content.
To categorize carnivalized news, it is Iundamental to identiIy that its
characteristics are threeIold. It is not only a humorous program that happens to be
broadcasted on TV. There is also a strong political level in it. This political Ieature has
been acknowledged by scholars working on the topic: '|n|ot only is the study oI
entertainment television relevant to the basic tenets oI political communication
scholarship, but (.) there is a need to study this particular type oI content Irom a
political perspective because the messages being oIIered via entertainment outlets are
qualitatively distinct Irom those provided through news. (Holbert, 2005, p.438)
50
Accordingly, a Venn diagram with three circles represents eIIiciently which
categories the carnivalization oI news belong to:
Figure 1. Carnivali:ation of news at the intersection of televised, political and
humorous content
As the saying goes, X marks the spot; in this diagram X represents where we
place the carnivalization oI news in contemporary media landscapes. It may seems selI-
explanatory but this model means that the process we are studying is at the intersection
oI three diIIerent and distinct categories that are 'humorous content', 'televised content'
and 'political content. II 'televised' and 'political' are quite clear, 'humorous' is to be
understand in its most comprehensive deIinition, including parody, satire, jokes, play on
words... Figure 2 will explore more in depth the separation oI the 'humorous
mechanisms at work. That being said, carnivalized news incorporates characteristics and
Ieatures oI each oI these three categories, and while here is not the place to list and
research them all, we can not help but notice that the hybridization oI its qualities that
renders it very peculiar when it comes to investigate on its eIIects on audiences. We
shall see later than studying eIIects oI carnivalized news involve paying attention to the
potential eIIects on audiences oI each of the categories of content composing it and
51
having identiIied those categories is going to help our study.
Quite similarly, iI we look back at the deIinition we gave oI the carnivalization
oI news in the introduction oI this chapter, we can notice that it is at the intersection oI
three diIIerent types oI mechanisms or perIormances, that interact to operationalize it.
As we deIined the carnivalization oI news as a journalist (or TV host) using, among
other satire and parody to alter the production oI news, we wanted to included those
perIormances news production, satire, parody in another Venn diagram we designed
ourselves, like Figure 1, to help us make our thought process more explicit:
Figure 2. Carnivali:ation of news at the intersection of satire, parodv and fournalism
Here, 'journalism', a term Ior which there is no consensual deIinition (Zelizer,
2004, especially the second chapter), has to be understood in the broad sense oI
production oI 'inIormation and commentary on contemporary aIIairs taken to be
publicly important (Schudson, 2002 in op.cit., p.22). Comically altered by parody,
whether in the Iormat (the newscast, the journalist in situ etc.) or in the discourse, it
creates what we, and other beIore us, label 'Iake news'. News production mixed with
satire gives us unsurprisingly 'satirical journalism' that we deIined in section 1.4.2 and
not so relevant Ior us here, it is comedian and impersonators who enmeshed parody and
satire without necessarily injecting it with current aIIairs. At the heart oI this Venn
diagram lies the carnivalization oI the news, results oI those three diIIerent types oI
52
communicative perIormance. Exactly like with Figure 1., the carnivalization oI news
will incorporate characteristics oI each oI these perIormances, as we will underline later.
3.1.2. Nuancing the typoIogies
AIter making clear that we were looking Ior the carnivalization oI news at the
intersection oI humoristic, televised and political content, hence incorporating
characteristics oI each oI these categories, we seek to hone our analysis grid and
highlight the nuances that may exist within these categories. The Iormat, television, can
hardly be nuanced, and the entertaining aspect as well; the only remaining Ieature that
may be painted in shades oI grey is the political Iacet oI the program. Luckily, other
scholars have provided our Iield oI studies with a table summarizing an eIIective
typology Ior the study oI entertainment TV and politics. It is truly a pitch-perIect
categorization Ior our work since all three categories we mentioned are represented and
that the table makes explicit the variations existing Ior televised entertainment content
depending the the degree Are politics a primary or a secondary topic? and the level
Are politics explicitly or implicitly present in the TV program.
Figure 3. A Tvpologv for the studv of entertainment TJ and politics (Holbert, 2005, p.445)
53
Here, Ior a complete explanation instead oI analyzing it ourselves and
paraphrasing, we rely on Holbert's own description oI his table and his categorization oI
entertainment TV content according to its level and degree oI political content:
'A nine-part typology Ior the study oI entertainment television and politics
is constructed (...). There are three demarcations associated with movement
either vertically or horizontally across the typology. Represented vertically
are the three levels to which audience members expect the content oI a
particular piece oI entertainment television to be either primarily political,
somewhat political, or the sociopolitical elements oIIered on the program are
serving a truly secondary Iunction. Moving horizontally Irom leIt to right on
the typology leads Irom the oIIering oI more explicit political statements, to
a mix oI explicit and implied sociopolitical messages, to those message
types that can only serve to imply certain thoughts or perspectives oI the
sender relative to a given sociopolitical issue or process. OIIered next is a
brieI summary oI each section oI the typology. (Holbert, 2005, p.443-444)
Using this categorization and looking at the shows we will present in more details
later, such as Les Guignols, The Dailv Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report,
we aIIirm that the process oI carnivalization oI news perIorms in a environment where
politics is primarily political. All those programs lampoon politicians without taking
any precautions and while they also mock sports or show business and more
importantly other media (more on the watchdog eIIect oI satire on journalistic practice
later), politics is their daily bread, providing them with the majority oI their comedic
material. Indeed, the 'driving Iorce oI |such| show is the presentation oI political satire
(e.g., The Dailv Show With Jon Stewart) according to Holbert (2005, p.444) who adds
immediately that 'political satire and comedic social commentary in general are 'unlike
traditional Iorms oI political inIormation as they require active audience participation'
(Young, 2004, p.3). Political humor is oIIered to an audience, but audience members
play a very active role in determining the true meaning oI the humorous stories or
anecdotes being oIIered to them (Young, 2004). Drawing Irom these citations, Holbert
concludes that the political messages in those shows are mainly implicit since the
audience has to think in order to understand the jokes, more explicit messages would
not requires such an audience investment in the reception process.
54
While we certainly will not argue that audiences oI shows that 'carnivalize' news
require a very active audience, with the consequence that it is creating a situation where
the back-and-Iorth exchanges that are the succession oI jokes and the positive audience
response, laughter, establishes a non-traditional dialogical Iormat conducive to engage
even Iurther the said audience, we dispute his assumption that these programs carry
mainly, iI not only, implicit political messages. First, even as Iorms oI jokes, political
messages are uttered in those shows in a Iashion Iar Irom implicitness. Secondly, and it
is especially true Ior The Dailv Show (TDS) and The Colbert Report, actual political
Iigures do come and get interviewed on air, leaving them spaces to Iormulated explicit
political messages in all seriousness. We are not alone thinking this; scholars note that
'|a|s presidential campaigning thoroughly embraced alternative media, TDS became a
highly desired venue. This remarkable Ilow oI intriguing, and at times powerIul
interview guests, continued in the months aIter the election. (Baym, 2007, p.94) Those
interviews 'oIIer inIormative examples oI an emerging communication Iorma hybrid
mode oI publicity and political discourse enabled by the new media environment.
(ibid.).
It is not the only kind oI hybridity these interviews create, as their existences
allows us to argue that shows carnivalizing news do not belong only to the 'traditional
satire' section oI Figure 3. Instead, we aIIirm that they contain elements oI both this
latter section, and also oI the 'Entertainment Talk Show. Interviews with politicians'
section, in the upper-leIt corner. Indeed, as prominent politicians are invited on TDS or
The Colbert Report, it Ialls under the category oI 'traditional entertainment-based
outlets |which| have become part oI the public debate, and the particular episodes
containing politicians as guests are dominated by explicit discussions oI politics, (...),
audience members come to expect political topics to be dominant when public oIIicials
are guests on entertainment talk shows. (Holbert, 2005, p.447) In layman's terms,
political interviews, even perIormed in a satirical show and spiced up with humoristic
jabs, are still making explicit the political content.
Eventually, to be thorough when discussing characteristics oI political Ieatures in
entertainment TV content and without getting into the scholarly debate around the
notion oI media genre and the question oI the transposition oI cinema genre theory to
the Iield oI television, we can say that there is another layer oI politics involved with the
genre that is televised political news as there is with every genres. This has been
55
argued by cultural theorists drawing on French philosopher Michel Foucault's thoughts.
'Just as Foucault asserts that discourses are always processes oI power, genres are also
constituted by power relations. Genres are not neutral categories but are situated within
larger systems oI power and thus come 'Iully loaded' with political implications.
( Mittel, 2001, p.19) The author wants genre scholars to stop looking exclusively within
media texts to identiIy television genre but rather to see them as 'clusters oI discursive
processes running through texts, audiences, and industries via speciIic cultural
practices(idib.) and understand genre it its relation with the media text as 'a Iunction oI
discourse that is neither intrinsic nor essential to texts (op.cit., p.8) and, above all,
Iirmly located in a social reality with its real-liIe power struggles. As a content both
implicitly and explicitly political, it is very important to acknowledge that carnivalized
news is not a neutral cultural product and is aIIected by power relations as well. The
example oI the Brazilian TV in the introductory section is a quintessential instance
when a genre is not only the product oI its cultural environment but will also be aIIected
by power conIlicts with said environment.
In this sub-section, we have categorize the carnivalization oI news to be
comprised simultaneously televised content, entertainment content and, last but not
least, political content. We argue that carnivalization oI news can also be seen as the
results oI the interaction oI satire, parody and news production. Thus, it incorporates
characteristic oI all three contents and oI the three perIormances responsible Ior its
existence as well.
We went Iurther and, by using Holbert's (2005) typology oI political content in
entertainment TV, we emphasized the Iact that the carnivalization oI news, as it is taking
place, does not limit itselI to a kind oI program where political is oI primarily concern
but where the message stays implicit. Instead we argued that political messages could be
more explicit, with interviewees using the show as political scenes. Eventually, the
carnivalization oI news as a genre is political because it is involved, whether it likes it
or not, in the power struggles aIIecting society.
56
3.2. SatiricaI journaIism as the carnivaIization of news
AIter brieIly presenting the shows we single out as taking part in the process oI
the carnivalization oI news, we will see how Bakhtin's literary analysis oI Rabelais
proves itselI extremely valuable and accurate to analyze those contemporary Iake
news/satirical shows.
3.2.1. A presentation of the TV programs carnivaIizing news
As we described Les Guignols quite extensively in both the introductory chapter
Ior its origin and the second chapter, we don't see the need to reiterate here. We will
instead Iocus on the two other shows we identiIied as perIorming carnivalization oI
news: the Dailv Show with Jon Stewart (TDS) and the Colbert Report (TCR).
First, The Dailv Show was 'created by Lizz Winstead and Madeleine Smithberg in
1996, was hosted by Craig Kilborn until 1999, when Jon Stewart took over the anchor's
chair. (The Daily Show, 2010). A year-long content analysis oI the show in 2007 (Pew
Project Ior Excellence in Journalism, 2008) identiIied the underlying structure oI the
show. 'The Dailv Show combines elements oI both traditional news shows and late
night variety programs. (op.cit., p.2) It is comprised most oI the time oI three
segments, the two Iirst being presented by Stewart alone, doing a monologue using
audio, photographic oI video Iootages to cover current events and poke Iun. He is then
joined during the third segment by his guest, at time a Iellow show business person on a
promo tour but more oIten a scholar or political Iigures, Ior a circa 10-minutes-long
interview.
Over the 15 years oI existence, the show won many awards, including an Emmy
award and a Television Critics Association Award Ior 'Oustanding Achievement in News
in InIormations' in 2004 (Warner, 2007, p.33). The latter is a prize that may seem rather
strange Ior a comedy show but it is consistent with a survey (Pew Center Ior the People
and the Press, 2007a) which tried to establish the name oI the most admired journalists
Ior the American audience. Jon Stewart was number 4. These two elements are just the
tip oI the iceberg, Ior a very important question about TDS is to know whether or not
57
Jon Stewart qualiIy as a proper journalist and what the show means Ior journalism.
Despite the Iact that Jon and his team have repeatedly claimed they are nothing but
comedians, scores oI studies adressed the topic, Irom a variety oI the point oI view
going Irom TDS representing a paradigmatic shiIt to revive political journalism (Baym,
2005) to the contributing role oI Stewart and TDS to journalistic ethics by acting as
media critics (Borden & Tew, 2007) and the attitude oI the journalistic community
toward Stewart (Teneboim-Weinblatt, 2009).
To retrace the history oI The Colbert Report, I will draw generously Irom the
work oI Boesel (2007) entitled The Colbert Nation. a democratic place to be? Ior her
historical review oI both the character-host Stephen Colbert and his show is
simultaneously concise and thorough. To be honest, we wouldn't have been able to do
better.The author notes that:
'Stephen Colbert Iirst emerged as a blip on America`s political
comedy radar in 1997 when he became a correspondent at Comedy
Central`s The Dailv Show(.). Over the course oI six seasons, Colbert
submitted playIul news pieces and evolved his now well-honed politically
conservative character. By the time he leIt The Dailv Show to helm his
own television program in 2005, he`d become second-in-command to the
show`s present host Jon Stewart, providing a conservative 'ying' to
Stewart`s liberal 'yang' (Sternbergh, 2006). (.) He cemented his place in
the political landscape later in 2006, however, when he was invited to
'lightly roast president George W. Bush at the White House
Correspondent`s Association dinner. Never breaking his Republican-to-
the-bone character, he |destroyed with biting irony the president in Iront oI
the audience| (...) Two days later, clips oI the speech had been viewed 2.7
million times on YouTube and Stephen Colbert had oIIicially registered on
the American political consciousness (Sternbergh, 2006). Today, Colbert
continues to use his conservative character to satirize the current president
and his administration as well as the news media themselves on his
Comedy Central program The Colbert Report (pronounced 'Coal-bear Re-
pore) which airs weeknights aIter The Dailv Show. (Boesel, 2007, p.4-5)
58
II the Guignols is one oI France's most popular satirical shows, the two American
shows are huge commercial successes too. In 2007, 16 oI Americans reported
regularly watching 'comedy news shows like the Dailv Show and the Colbert Report
(Pew Center Ior the People and the Press, 2007a, p.11). A success conIirmed by the
most recent Iigures available Ior the late night talk shows (among viewers, adults 18-49
and adults 25-54) during the month oI October 2010 show that the Comedy Central
program out-perIormed, in terms oI audiences the traditional late night talk-shows that
are The tonight Show and The Late Show Ior the Iirst time ever. According to Hibberd
(2010), Ior October 2010, TDS gathered on average 1.3 million viewers Iollowed in
second place by a tie between The Tonight Show with Jav Leno and the Late Show with
David Letterman, each with an average oI 1.2 million viewers. On the Iourth position,
we Iind TDS's spin-oII The Colbert Report with 900,000 viewers. The TDS taking over
the Iirst place in the ratings Ior this time-slot is historic: 'Jon Stewart's series just
became the Iirst late-night talk show since at least a decade ago to rank #1 in the adult
demo Ior a Iull month average other than The Late Show or The Tonight Show. (op.cit.)
And with TCR on Iourth place, we can aIIirm that satirical news show/the
carnivalization oI news is going very strong in the United States.
3.2.2. Adapting Bakhtin to modern fake news
Asserting, as we did earlier, that carnivalization oI news is one oI the paths usable
to reach a Bakhtinian public sphere may seem Iar-Ietched when you come to think that
Mikhail Bakhtin, as a novel theorist never intended his analysis oI the carnival to be
used and apply in broadcast media, not did he personally mentioned the carnivalization
oI news. To the contrary, as a scholar living in Soviet Russia, Bakhtin, was probably not
as exposed to satire in media and in journalism with the exceptions oI mockery oI the
USSR inside (counter-revolutionaries) and Ioreign (the capitalist West) political
enemies . Coincidently, the Russian scholar, journalism is part oI the set oI instruments
oI linguistic domination identical to what he had described in his analysis oI the
Renaissance carnival with the discourses oI the religious clergy, the intellectual and
academic dignitaries and the political elites, all 'agelasts (the enemies oI laugther)
(Lachmann et al. 1989, p.129) '|Those speakers| oI monologic language |are| trying to
push all the elements oI language, all oI its various rhetorical modes (the journalistic,
59
the religious, the political, the economic, the academic, the personal) into one single
Iorm or utterance, coming Irom one central point(emphasis added) (Klages, 2001).
Journalists are, in in a Bakhtinian understanding, responsible Ior their centripetal
language-use, a Iorce to which is opposed the centriIugal powers oI heteroglossia and
the carnival. Despite this apparent incompatibility between (satirical) journalism and the
Bakhtinian theoretical Iramework, there is a domain where Bakhtin's ideas can shed a
very interesting light on one Iacet oI the carnivalization oI news that is news parody.
Druick (2008), in a very inIluential article Ior our work, throws a solid bridge between
the parodic aspect oI carnivalizing shows and Bakhtin's theories, making him a 'crucial
thinker Ior television studies (op.cit., p.306) For her, a 'Bakhtinian Iramework
provides a very helpIul way oI thinking about the popularity oI a type oI show(idib.).
She explains that 'news parodies indicate the always potentially subversive political
aspect oI dialogism that suIIuses culture and that '|w|hat these shows are able to do is
highlight the role oI genre in Bakhtin`s expanded notion oI it as regulated social text, a
site oI a creative dialogue constrained by rules as well as industrial and policy
Irameworks. News parody has proved popular (...), |she| think|s|, precisely because it
lampoons an oIIicial and sober discourse (ibid). We can draw a parallel between these
shows mocking sober discourses and the role oI carnival Iostering the mocking the
agelasts' monologic, centripetal discourses. Moreover, Druick argues that what we
identiIied as carnivalization oI news hold other 'Bakhtinian-esque' elements:
'news parodies such as Colbert engage the viewer as a cultural participant.
OIIering carnivalesque inversions oI the usual order, these shows use the
cultural knowledge oI genre to upset expectations and deIamiliarize
authoritative and ideological stories about the real world. Through a
canny use oI generic Iorm, news parodies allow various voices in conIlict to
come to the surIace. |they| highlight the potential oI television as a dialogic
medium. Characterized by its chorus of many voices, its topicality, and
sheer volume oI mate-rial, television is in many ways the new novel, the
dialogic medium par excellence, not because it has succeeded as a
democratic space, but because it is always struggling to reIlect the world
back to its inhabitants. (emphasis added) (op.cit., p.305)
60
Acknowledging television as the 'new novel', Druick hence bridges the gap
between Bakhtin's theoretical Iramework and our Iield oI study. Drawing Irom this
breakthrough, coming back at our deIinition oI the carnivalization oI news, we can
update it once more. We deIined it now as Iollow (newer elements in bold): when a TV
host or a journalist, produce a non-traditional version oI the news both in content,
thanks to rhetorical tools such as humor, satire and irony, and in Iormat, thanks to a
parody oI traditional Iormats. This altered reporting goes Iurther than simply inIorming
or entertaining, but also carries on with him the powers oI laughter and of the carnival
- ,+$+-.&/.00#*, dialogism, parodical inversions etc - all oI them perIorming in the
direction oI the establishment oI a 'public sphere' in its Bakhtinian understanding (see
2.3.2) We can also note that iI TDS is a space allowing dialogism on its airtime, the
show itselI introduces elements oI dialogism in the media landscape. 'TDS creates an
alternative voice that utilizes emotion-laden discourse, except that the discourse
employed by the TDS writers is not oI the Iear used by the dominant political brand, but
instead, a satirical version oI humor and laughter. (Warner, 2007, p.33)
Druick's research hasn't been the only one allowing us to link carnivalization oI
news to the concept oI a public sphere, no matter its deIinition. According to Waisanen,
(2009, p.120) Stewart and Colbert 'link playIulness to the 'public sphere', distinguish
themselves Irom a chorus oI oIten mean-spirited media pundits, while also transcending
concerns that they simply engage in meaningless entertainment For the scholar, these
TV hosts are 'more than simply entertainers, they are rhetorical critics, who creatively
guide audiences toward democratic possibilities. (idib.) To develop these democratic
possibilities, Stewart and Colbert 'teach us that a public sphere is healthy to the extent
that participants can engage in vigorous debate and reIlexive advocacy, take the
perceptive oI others, and make critiques in a playIul rather than combative manner (.)
|they| connect every day culture to the public sphere making important political
matters immediate, relevant and engaging. (op.cit., p.135)
We have pointed out that, Ior shows responsible oI the carnivalization oI news,
such as Les Guignols, TDS and TCR, according to an interpretation oI Bakhtin's
theories, they are simultaneously a critique oI genre, a space oI expression Ior the
irreverence & jest and also a beacon to spread dialogism, heteroglossia and parodical
inversions in the society, the same way carnivals were critical spaces oI heteroglossia.
We conclude that those shows work towards the establishment oI a public sphere,
especially under the Bakhtinian understanding oI this concept.
61
3.3. Virtues and vices of the carnivaIization of news
We will now look at other possible eIIects oI the carnivalization oI news, this time
on its audience. To Iirmly ground our thesis in the Iield oI studies analyzing existing
shows representing the carnivalization oI news, it is oI the utmost importance to
critically gather, synthesize and nuance Iindings previous scholars have discovered
while looking at those TV shows. This concerns both theoretical reIlexions on the
perIorming characteristics oI the programs and the empirical studies quantiIying eIIects
on the shows audience's political interest, knowledge and behavior. The motivation Ior
this review oI Iindings is the 'underlying assumption throughout that when satire is
working, laughter will lead to deliberation or critical thinking, which will lead to
something next. Ideally, this is better citizenship, but will we know it when we see it?
(Collins, 2009, p.296). Scholars have engaged in vigorous debates about what come
next, some are extremely pessimistic concerning the eIIects oI carnivalization oI news
on a democratic society, thinking that there is 'a potential Ior TDS to have a wide range
oI potential inIluences on the electorate (Holbert, & Geidner, 2009, p.438) . Hart and
Hartelius (2007) have been as Iar as attacking Jon Stewart, in an essay written, partly
tongue-in-cheek, but with very heavy terms, as the accusatory statement oI a mock trial.
He is incriminated Ior heresy, accused oI promoting political cynicism, a threat to an
healthy democracy. The rebuttal was quick to come, published in the same journal,
Hariman (2007) deIends Stewart. Using irony as well, he pleads '|b|anish the critic in
his Iool`s cap iI you believe that politics has no room Ior laughter; banish him iI you
believe that there can only be one tone to public speech, the tone oI the censor;(...)
banish him iI you believe that journalists today are doing a heck oI a job (op.cit.,
p.276). We hope to overcome here such Irontal oppositions and that elements oI answer
will emerge with our review.
3.3.1. Parody, irony, satire, Iaughter and the carnivaIization of news
Even iI we did already addressed the power oI laughter in the introductory
chapter, we Ieel we may have interesting Iindings to add, related directly to the shows
62
we are studying and to the carnivalization oI news. We also note here that it is relevant
to make a a clear distinction between satire and irony because 'satire seeks simply to
shame and shut down the evil with which it cannot (or will not) identiIy; while irony, to
the degree that it's able to shed satire's selI-protective impulses, seeks always to reveal
error or Iolly or malIeasance and, in so doing, to begin the work oI correcting it.
(Dettmar, 2006, p.134) Laughter; some argue, has an dis-inhibiting and emboldening
eIIect: Ior Bakhtin, it 'demolishes Iear and piety beIore an object, beIore a world,
making oI it an object oI Iamiliar contact and thus clearing the ground Ior an absolutely
Iree investigation (Bakhtin, 1981 in Warner, 2007, p.33). Thus 'Stewart and Colbert
certainly destabilize pieties (Waisanen, 2009, p.135) and allow their audiences to
explore the real world with timidity, nor restriction.
What eIIects parody could have in the Iramework oI the carnivalization oI
news? For some, expectations are very high, 'political humor and particularly its core
modality oI parody are essential Ior an engaged, sustainable, democratic public culture.
(Hariman, 2008, p.248) According to the author, modern public laughter provides a
linguistic training Ior an involved audience. Allowing himselI to make a joke, he aIIirms
'Were every speaker a Pericles and every discussion a model oI rational-critical debate,
we would be in deep trouble (ibid.) because he believes that humor usages are key
assets Ior a healthy public culture. For him, it is parody, a term he deIines as ' as the
comic reIunctioning oI preIormed linguistic or artistic material (Rose, 1993 in
Hariman, 2008, p.250) that has particularly high value Ior society. Not only is public
speech made Iunny, pleasurable and thus enjoyable, as Bratslavsky (2009, p.11) reminds
us: '|s|imilar to Bergson`s point that laughter is a collective activity, pleasure also
comes Irom being on the side oI the joke-maker, not on the side oI the object oI the
joke. Freud notes that there are three components to joke making: the teller, the listener,
and the object. The Iirst two derive the pleasure at the expense oI the object. . But
placing a imitated and comically altered 'linguistic or artistic material' next to the
original perIormance unlock spaces Ior a critical contemplation oI said perIormance and
oI its context oI creation and existence as well. In other word, this process 'puts social
conventions on display Ior collective reIlection. The parodic imitation simultaneously
praises and blames, and one result is to highlight where discourse end. (Hariman, 2008,
p.251) That is, rhetorical tricks and intellectual vulnerabilities are exposed Ior all to see,
judge and laugh about, the whole discourse thus is destabilized.
63
Hariman who sees his work as 'the extension oI |Bakhtin's |insights Irom the
literary genre to the broader Iield oI the public sphere (op.cit., p.253), summarizes his
view on the central role oI parody in public political speech as such:
'Parody creates and sustains public consciousness Iirst and Ioremost by
exposing the limitations oI dominant discourses: it counters idealization,
mythic enchantment, and other Iorms oI hegemony. But that is not enough.
A vital public culture has to include more than a corrective mechanism.
Parody not only reins in other public arts but also spins important threads
in the Iabric oI democratic polity. (ibid.)
On another note, there is a saying that aIIirms that 'imitation is the sincerest Iorm
oI Ilattery'. Quite paradoxically, we could include parody alongside imitation in this
idiom. Indeed, the parodist by repeating and distorting a discourse or an other material,
he acknowledges the social/cultural relevance oI his or her victim. For example, it is
regarded as an accomplishment Ior a French politician to have a puppet mocking him in
Les Guignols on Canal , the latex marionette embodies then the higher status oI public
importance and social recognition the person has achieved. To have his or her own
puppet is as exclusive as entering an elite club, even though it may not always be
solicited and Ior the beneIits oI the new member. As the parodist mocks, he produces
meaning about the world as he establishes a hierarchy; there is the elements important
and recognizable enough to be worthy oI its humoristic wrath, and the rest, protected
Irom the jokes due to their relative anonymity.
3.3.2. Effects of the carnivaIization of news on audience's knowIedge
Satire needs an active audience to be successIul: 'to recognize and understand
satire, the audience must be able to identiIied what is being satirized (Lockyer, 2006,
p.766). This may entail bringing previous knowledges back in memory, asking around
to other viewers and researching on one's own in order to 'get' the joke. Thus, one can
expect that exposure to political comedy or satire and positive reactions laughter to
this exposure will improve the viewer's knowledge on politics. To investigate the eIIects
64
oI the carnivalization oI news on the knowledge oI its audience, we must Iirst look at
what sort oI message can it spread. Researches have shown that carnivalizing shows
have the ability to present to its audience a certain point oI view on the reality or a
Iraming oI an issue. It is what we label 'shaping political perception' and it is, to some
extent, similar to the process oI priming, a phenomenon that would have important
eIIect on the audience, since 'the priming oI (.) concepts through the humorous
exposure should render the acquisition oI topical inIormation less diIIicult. (Xenos &
Becker, 2009, p.320)
In France, Les Guignols have created a puppet, whose Iace is a caricature oI Silver
Stallone, named Mr Silvestre. Through this puppet, and the general theme oI the skits
she acts in, the satirical show has been delivering a not-so-implicit critical political
message about the neIarious eIIects oI neo-liberal globalization. '|Les Guignols|'
strategy has two aspects: Sylvester is never the same character (he occupies various
proIessions or holds various titles depending on the scenario) |he was used to portray
military commanders, various, interchangeable CEOs oI the 'World Company' and even
religious dignitaries|, yet he is always the bearer oI the same message the Market is
omnipotent and its Law reigns supreme.(Rosello, 2003, p.145) Since it is clear that the
carnivalization oI news communicates content and Iacts, we must not look at the
reception oI this content in the audience.
Scholars have identiIied humorous and satirical political content are a source oI
political knowledge: reIlecting on results Irom interviews, researchers comment that 'it
was quite interesting that many oI these young voters suggested they actually obtain a
great deal oI their political inIormation Irom such entertainment sources as Jon
Stewart`s The Dailv Show (Wells & Dudash, 2007, p.1283). But what do empirical
studies say about that? Cao (2008) did Iind that young and/or politically-savvy people
tend to watch political comedy but that these people do not necessarily get involved in
politics; and the other way around, politicalIy active people do not necessarily watch
political comedy Ior their news. He concludes by saying (op.cit. p.60): 'the inIorming
Iunction oI political comedy shows could also be particularly important Ior young
people given both the low interest in politics and the relatively high level oI exposure to
political comedy shows among this demographic. Looking Ior tangible consequences
oI these eIIects, some invoke a oIt quoted survey designed by the Annenberg School oI
Communication in 2004. Some scholars see its results a conIirmation that late-night
comedy are indeed able to increase the knowledge oI its audience. 'Viewers oI late-
65
night comedy programs, especially The Dailv Show with Jon Stewart on Comedy
Central, are more likely to know the issue positions and backgrounds oI presidential
candidates than people who do not watch late-night comedy (Dettmar, 2006, p.141)
The same survey indicates that TDS viewers score higher, in average 16 higher than
'people who did not watch any late-night comedy (idib.)
In their work, Baek and Wojcieszak (2009, p.785) remind us that 'The Dailv
Show conveys nuanced inIormation that is comparable to that in hard news (Baym,
2005; Fox, Koloen, & Sahin, 2007; Young, 2006) and explores policy issues more oIten
than do other late-night comedy programs (Young, 2004) and that 'late-night comedy
may Ioster attention primarily among people who are otherwise not acutely tuned into
politics and who generally do not seek out hard news programs (Baum, 2003b, 2005)
(op.cit., p.786) Willing to go Iurther, they conduct their own quantitative analysis based
on the data oI the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey, a survey Iollowing the
evolution oI the 2004 presidential campaign, 'that is, on average 150 to 300 adult
Americans were surveyed on a daily basis regarding topics related to the campaign and
also to respondents` political attitudes and behaviors. In total, the Iinal NAES 2004
dataset contains inIormation on 81,422 respondents (op.cit., p.789). Their research has
the Iollowing nuanced results:
'watching late-night comedy does increase political knowledge. At the
same time, this increase primarily emerges Ior widely known, thus relatively
easy, political Iacts and issues. Importantly, this generalizes across several
political knowledge domains and across various election stages. (...) it is not
only the easy political knowledge that increases but also this increase is
especially pronounced among the viewers who do not pay close attention
to public affairs.(...) On the other hand, our Iindings suggest that those who
are already attentive do not beneIit, other than perhaps experiencing
diversion and entertainment. (emphasis added) (op.cit., p.797)
However, cautious, they list several limitations, among which the Iact that their
'results only speak to the eIIects that late-night comedy has on inIormation recognition
rather than recall (ibid.) due to the design oI the survey that presents response
alternative. According to the authors, '|l|earning eIIects do exist but are conIined to the
relatively easy or widely known political knowledge and to the politically inattentive
66
citizens. To the elitists` critics, these circumscribed eIIects might Iurther conIirm that the
elites are justiIied to distrust the public (op.cit., p.800)
They conclude by careIully stating that late-night comedy is useIul because, since
there is so much the media can do an educate its audience, viewers who learn some
inIormations through late-night comedy may still be proper citizens and their media
consumption might improve their interest and participation in politics. Indeed, late-night
comedy can activate 'political curiosity among the inattentive citizens, oIIer the context
necessary to understand more complex stories, and ultimately pull those citizens back
into the democratic process. (ibid.) Accordingly, those kinds oI 'programs would serve
' 'as gateways to more traditional news use' and contribute to 'an equalizing eIIect over
time in which political engagement is no longer as strongly correlated with attentiveness
to high-proIile political stories' (Young & Tisinger, 2006 in idib.) The 'gateway
theory', according to consumption oI soIt news and political comedy would lead to
consumption oI hard/traditional news, has been developed Iurther. Feldman and Young
(2008, p.416) have validated the hypothesis that 'exposure to late-night comedy is
associated with higher level oI attention to the presidential campaign in traditional
news, more than non-late-night comedy viewers. Some Iindings addresses speciIically
the Dailv Show viewers: their news attention 'appears more resistant to decline toward
the end oI the primaries (ibid.) that viewers oI other late-night comedy programs. It
may be because TDS' content is political all the time, not just during electoral
campaigns. In other terms, viewers oI shows carnivalizing the news tend to keep
themselves more inIormed and were exposed to content Iound (while more humor than
substance) as substantive and inIormative as the content oI broadcast network newscasts
(Fox et al. 2007) over the same period oI the 2004 presidential election campaign.
Other researches hint at a positive role oI carnivalization oI news on the viewers
sources oI knowledge as well. Xenos & Becker, (2009, p.329), thanks to an
experimental approach, Iinds results consisting with the ideas presented above. That is,
'political comedy can stimulate subsequent attentiveness to news media content among
less politically interested viewers |and| that less politically interested comedy viewers
may also more easily acquire inIormation subsequently encountered in more traditional
news media. So, iI we dare to combine the aIorementioned eIIects, not only the
viewers oI carnivalized news, even iI young or less politicalIy interested, are as well
inIormed as regular network newscast, they are more politically curious and maintain
their interest longer than viewers oI other late-night comedy programs (such as The
67
Late Show, The Todav Show) and their media habits may help them comprehend the
inIormations in traditional media. Even pessimistic results, such as linking exposure to
TDS to increases in cynicism and lower trust in media, the political system and supports
Ior presidential candidates (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006) there seems to be a silver
lining: results show an increasing in the viewers' internal eIIicacy that is, the viewers`
perception that the complex world oI politics was understandable. In addition,
'|i|ncreased internal eIIicacy might, all other things being equal, contribute to greater
participation. Citizens who understand politics are more likely to participate than those
who do not. Moreover, the increased cynicism associated with decreased external
eIIicacy may contribute to an actively critical orientation toward politic ( op.cit., p.362).
In layman's term, iI it doesn't entail greater participation, the carnivalization oI news
may still trigger a 'good' kind oI cynicism, one which is responsibly critical and at the
same time based on a Ieeling oI understanding oI the world, not out oI Iear and lack oI
knowledge.
Many have tried to explain the appeal oI political comedy Ior their viewers,
beyond the pleasurable aspect oI entertainment and laughter. Moyer-Guse, in a
theoretical work published in 2008, discusses the relations between entertainment and
education. She combines the two in what she calls persuasive acts, 'ground in a series
oI propositions that Iocus on audience member connections with TV personalities,
enjoyment oI media content, and overall involvement in the content having an impact
on the persuasive eIIects oI a piece oI entertainment content (Holbert, & Geidner,
2009, p.349). In this theoretical Iramework, 'connections made to Stewart by audience
members also become important in the study oI potential persuasive eIIects oI TDS
(idib.). Because oI that, we can say that iI it weren't Ior the connections the audience has
with Jon Stewart or Stephen Colbert could the perlocutionary eIIect oI humor Iosters
such a connection these shows would be noticeably less successIul. Other elements oI
explanations oI the success, especially among the lesser politically aware oI the viewers
oI these shows have been identiIied by Holbert et al. (2007, p.34). They Iound that
'individuals who perceive themselves to be politically incompetent and ineIIective
become especially attached to the satirical message oI The Dailv Show and what it has
to say about national television news. It is prooI that, aIter Moyer-Guse, there is
another kind oI relationship between these shows and their audience.
68
3.3.3. The carnivaIization of news as a teIevised artifact
We have seen in the topologies in section 3.1 that the carnivalized news was a
televised content. Accordingly, we have identiIied two elements related to television
that are included in carnivalized news and that may create a speciIic eIIects.
The Iirst one is the question to know whether or not consuming carnivalization
oI news as a televised artiIact and a cultural product may help to create a sense oI
identity or community Ior its viewers. We know that the audience is exposed to media
which '|have| a capacity to united scattered individuals within the same large audience
(...) by providing a common set oI values, ideas and inIormation and helping to Iorm
identities (McQuail, 2005, p.89). Watching shows perIorming carnivalization oI news
would hence spread some oI its values, such as rejecting top-down impositions Irom
power structures, within the audience, turned into a community with its own culture.
This culture could be nurtured by the comedic aspect oI the show, since 'the principle oI
laughter guarantees (...) the accumulation oI cultural experience as a collective memory
that maniIests itselI cyclically in the concrete Iorms oI carnival rituals" (Lachmann,
1989, p.134-135) or, in lieu oI carnival rituals, we think that episodes oI the show could
do. Each episode would Ieed and Iuel the culture oI the audience-community, which
would improve the capacity Ior 'private jokes' using intertextuality between the episodes
as a humoristic trigger. Lachmann hints at another element susceptible to promote the
creation oI a common identity around a common experience and a common culture:
'carnivalized speech is a means oI tying together the 'unconscious' and the social
milieu, whereby the opposition oI 'we' experiences and 'I' experiences (which relate to
the corporeal and sexual) is suspended: the ineIIable 'I' and the expressible 'we' merge in
the language oI the carnival collective. ( op.cit., p.146) Individual viewers experiences
merge with the common experience as the community-audience becomes the carnival
collective.
II we keep drawing a parallel between carnival and episodes oI shows
carnivalizing news, we can note that the audience-community will potentially be
composed oI very diIIerent people. Indeed, 'in his treatment oI carnival culture, Bakhtin
argues that (.) it reverses power relationships and permits the Iree aIIiliation oI diverse
kinds oI people (Achter, 2008, p.279) Because oI that, we are conIident that the
carnivalization oI news may encourage the aIIiliation oI diverse kinds oI people in its
69
audience-community. Eventually, we make ours the reIlexion that says that '|carnival|
was a realm where subalterns could Iind communities, dignity, recognition,
empowerment, and meanings apart Irom everyday liIe, the dominant norms and
structures oI elite power. To parody, to mock (.) authority is to give one a sense oI
power over authority, gain recognition by others Ior doing so, and become integrated
into a community of resistance. (emphasis added) (Langman, 2002, p.514-515)
Accordingly, we can expect the audience-community, as a new type oI carnival
collective, is not only composed oI diverse people, but those people gather together
around shared experiences, values, culture, and a common purpose, that is to be
empowered in order to resist the centralizing powers.
Far Irom these considerations inspired by Bakhtinian theories but nonetheless
conIirming what we aIIirm about the identity creation oI the televised carnivalization oI
news, Strelitz Iound us that is it the roots oI identity Ior individals is Iirstly the modern
process oI consumption 'because this is the one domain over which they Ieel they still
have some power. (Strelitz, 2002, p.460). Media and cultural products consumption are
involved in a secondary step: 'individuals have increasingly to Iall back on their own
resources in order to construct coherent identities Ior themselves. Central to this process
oI selI-Iormation the construction oI a narrative oI self-identity` are (.) mediated
symbolic materials. (Emphasis added) (Thompson 1995 in ibid.). For Kellner as well,
media assume a key role in the process oI identity creation. According to him, we now
live in a emerging media culture` that contributes to 'produce the Iabric oI everyday
liIe (.) shaping political views and social behavior, and providing the materials out oI
which people forge their very identities (Emphasis added) (Kellner, 1995 in ibid.). To
sum up, according to both Bakhtinian scholars and other scholars, consuming television
as a mediated cultural product can promote the creation oI a shared identity. We add that
it is the case especially when the viewers watch shows carnivalizing the news, thanks to
the uniting power oI laughter, turning the audience in a resisting community.
Another speciIic aspect oI television aIIecting the carnivalization oI news is the
role played by the televised interviews In his analysis oI the interview segments on the
TDS, GeoIIery Baym (2007, p.95-96) say these interviews invite us to think the issue:
'in terms oI a televisual sphere, an intermediary notion between Habermas` modernist
ideal oI a rational-critical public sphere and a postmodern conception oI the image-
based public screen. The concept (.) recognizes that much political discourse exists on
television and is shaped by tendency toward stylistics and spectacle. It also aIIirms
70
that, simultaneously, elements oI oI rational discourse are still key Ior democratic
practice. As a matter oI Iact:
'the TDS interviews are shaped by discursive border-crossing, the
interweaving oI interpersonal chat, rational-critical argument, marketing,
and oI course, humor. Likewise, the interaction between |Stewart| and |the
guest| is a dynamic exchange, one that is structured as question-and-answer
turn-taking, but marked by a number oI deviations Irom the rules that
traditionally constrain the interview situation. The result is a post-modern
assemblage oI multiple and shiIting voices that simultaneously pursue
diIIerent agendas and achieve a variety oI textual eIIects. (op.cit., p.103)
In addition to these characteristics, we could ask that it is not uncommon Ior
some interviewees, coming in majority oI the entertainment and show business Iield, to
talk about on the air oI a cause, humanitarian or otherwise, they endorse. Researches
(Jackson & Darrow, 2005) have shown that celebrities endorsements tend to increase, in
the audience, the level oI agreement with a political point oI view. It is one other
impact to credit to the shows. Concerning Les Guignols, it is never real persons who
come and get interviewed by the puppet-host. Instead, each interview is written as
another skit Ior the satirical program. Analyzing the presence oI anti-globalization
messages in the show, Rosello (2003, p.149) aIIirms that '|t|he speciIic role oI the
interviews is to allow Les Guignols to articulate a critique oI globalization that is at the
same time a warning against, and a critique oI a critique that would be reduced to a sort
oI anti-liberal mantra. Here as well, we can see interpersonal (or inter-puppets) chat,
rational-critical arguments, humor and diIIerent agendas at play.
3.3.4. The carnivaIization of news as a media critic
The carnivalization oI news taking place on Les Guignols, TCR and TDS also
create a platIorm producing media criticisms, Irom a perspective that is simultaneously
internal and external (Borden, & Tew, 2007). First example, Les Guignols oIt act as
media critics as many oI their skits lampoon the media world and appear as:

71
'a practical criticism oI the highly routinized style oI political journalism.
(.). Political journalists in the media are shown to be the deIerential Ioils
oI political leaders, prisoners oI esoteric debates or oI a political realm
detached Irom the ordinary problems oI citizens. The speeches oI political
journalists are described as tasteless and interchangeable. (Collovald &
Neveu, 1999, p.347)
On the other side oI the Atlantic Ocean, it is the quite similar. We know that the
TDS's writers and the host Jon Stewart have always claimed that they are not journalists,
barely 'perIorming the Iunction oI journalism (Borden, & Tew, 2007, p.301).
However, not only do they acts as court-jesters, speaking truth to power, they are also
sardonic media critics: ' The press itselI is another signiIicant Iocus on TDS. In all, 8
oI the time was made up oI segments about he press and news media (Pew Center,
2008, p.2). Those segments overwhelmingly serve to underline the Ilaws, malpractices
and unethical behavior oI other media and their journalists. And when it is not through
the explicit slap on the wrist given by the admonishing host, criticisms oI the media and
the journalists will come through their parodying (Druick, 2008), which will be critical
oI the Iormat, hence the name oI 'Iake news' ( Borden, & Tew, 2007) more so than the
content.
Scholars have analyzed the potential redressing eIIects oI the critical comments
and parody committed by shows carnivalizing news. Stewart and the parody Colbert are
'idealists who hold or appear to identiIy with traditional journalistic moral
commitments and democratic values (.) cable news TV is their target oI most oI their
criticisms, and they routinely challenge cable news journalists Ior the role-
appropriateness oI their perIormances.(Borden, & Tew, 2007, p.306). Thus, the writers
and hosts oI TDS, Les Guignols and TCR seem to hope that, purposely or not it is hard
to say, '|b|y learning Irom (.) 'Iake' news as a Iorm oI media criticism, journalists can
align their perIormances with the moral commitments that deIine them and thus inhabit
their role with integrity. (op.cit., p.313)
Part oI the role oI media critic is educating the audience, Ior instance managing to
make them realize that 'they have a stake in journalistic integrity (op.cit., p.310)
Moreover, audiences also receive a critical expose on the language-use oI journalists:
thanks to 'Colbert's comic assessment, audiences learn that language is partial, and are
asked to become critically attentive to symbolic inIluences and manipulation.
72
(Waisanen, 2009, p.129) One educator (Stark, 2003) has even argued that he could teach
media literacy to his class through to the use oI satire here the printed publication
MAD but the mechanism stays the same' Once satire has increased awareness among
students |or the audience in general, we add|, it can help students take the nextstep
critical analysis oI what they see and hear (op.cit., p.306)
3.3.5. Limits and faiIures of the carnivaIization of news
First oI all, satire, and political humor in general, can Iall Ilat and Iail to Iind its
audience or simply to be Iunny. It seems obvious, but 'there is such a thing as bad satire
(or satire gone bad, as some authors point out), and even Iailed satire |such as| Fox`s
recently Iailed Iake news show, The Half Hour News Hour. " ( Collins, 2009, p.296)
Without laughter, there will not be any perlocutionary eIIect, or any other oI its powers
we identiIied earlier. A twist to this topic oI satire Iailing to achieve its goal is that,
'|b|ecause satire is oIten ambiguous, biased inIormation processing models provide an
excellent Iramework Ior understanding how audiences see what they want to see in |Ior
instance| Colbert`s political satire (LaMarre et al., 2009, p.213) According to the
authors, there is always the possibility that, since satire and especially the deadpan
(meaning Stephen Colbert never breaks character, he is always the over-the-top
conservative pundit) satire in TCR is not a political source very easy to comprehend, it
leaves room Ior misinterpretation that would prohibit some viewers to 'get' the satirist'
jokes the way he or she intended them to be. They note that, iI liberal and conservative
viewers 'watch |TCR| to be entertained, there are stark diIIerences in how they see the
comedy, who they think is being satirized, and how those diIIerences polarize the
electorate by reinIorcing their own set oI belieIs as valid and the opposing set oI belieIs
as laughable. (op.cit., p.226). As a result, strongly conservative viewers had a tendency
to think that Colbert has political belieIs consistent with their own, when the truth is
Colbert is pushing conservative talking points' logic to the extreme to ridicule them, the
same goes Ior the personage Colbert plays, he also tries to 'out-right wing' many oI the
political pundits he used as inIluences, such as Fox News' Bill O'Reilly. Since
conservatives do not perceive the jokes the way there are intended possibly because
they conIlict with their own worldview and the viewers are only looking Ior Iacts that
conIirm and comIort their worldview Colbert's satire misses its target here.
73
Poorly made or too ambiguous satire/humor and biased reception are not the
only limitation to the genre. Serious national crisis can hamper the Iield oI action oI
satire: 'when the Twin Towers oI the World Trade Center came down, the public
discourse oI irony seemed, Ior a time at least, to be part oI the collateral damage.
(Dettmar, 2006, p.135) The author reminds us that Bill Maher, a late-night talk show
host was Iired in the wake oI 9/11. He had made a joke about the plane hijackers who
obviously died during the attacks not being cowards, by opposition to the US armed
Iorces who were bombing AIghanistan at a saIe distance. It seems that, according to
Dettmar, there was a political motivation behind this Iiring, and to a larger extent behind
the suppression oI dark/gallows humor and irony at the time. 'Right-wing pundits (...)
have simply counterposed irony to civic responsibility and political conscience (op.cit.,
p.142) and in time oI national mourning and rally-round-the-Ilag, dualistic rhetoric,
bordering to jingoism on conservative shows, using irony was willIully portrayed by
conservatives as an un-American activity. Dettmar, however, ends up on a more
optimistic note, triggered by some polls about the audience oI TDS, he aIIirms that
'irony now is the single most responsive and responsible Iorm oI political dis course
available to us. (op.cit., p.141)
Other works echo the sort oI muzzling oI humor and irony aIter a national
catastrophe, such as the attacks oI 9/11, Achter Ior instance tells the story oI the time
when the reaction to 'attack-related jokes were palpable, and crowds sometimes vocal
groaning and complaining, Ior example, when a Seattle comedian told a 9/11 joke and
was ushered oII stage by a club owner (Achter, 2008, p.275) He too Iinishes on a
brighter note, and describes the post-9/11 issue oI the satirical publication The Onion:
'|b|y Ioregrounding 9/11 as a news event, the (.) issue provided a second-world,
carnivalesque perspective that challenged the authority oI the mainstream news to
deIine the event and articulated new ways Ior citizens to conceptualize its
meaning.(op.cit., p.287) Those instances oI exterior events aIIecting the carnivalization
oI news are prime examples illustrating something we have seen earlier, that is how
'genres are not neutral categories but are situated within larger systems oI power and
thus come 'Iully loaded' with political implications. (Mittel, 2001, p.19)
Another limit to the satire is actually more oI a caveat Ior people and scholars
alike and we include ourselI in the category that need to be aware oI this would
would grant satire and the carnivalization oI news with extra-ordinary powers capable to
topple governments with a couple oI devastating humor. Satire is not in its core
74
revolutionary, not is it necessarily on the progressive side oI the political spectrum. It is
interesting to note that, because the indignation is based on an existing set oI norms and
values, Ior some scholars, satirical journalism may be seen as essentially conservative,
not as on a leIt-right spectrum, but as 'maintaining and reinIorcing (...) normative
behaviors and values. (Lockyer, 2006, p.776) In other words, to chastise a behavior
presupposes holding another behavior in higher esteem and normatively ask to imitate
it, which may seems conservative. Similarly, Hariman (2008, p.254), writing about the
characteristics oI parody acknowledges this conservative Iacet and assesses 'parody is
neither radical nor conservative, but both at once. With parody, nothing has changed,
the original material has not been directly modiIied, the humoristic alteration being in
addition highly ritualized. Yet, all is diIIerent, Ior the original material is now the target
oI the public laughter and has lost all seriousness. Moreover, what has been said earlier
about the normative aspect oI satirical journalism can very well apply to parody since
the trigger oI humor, the comical alteration, may lay its Ioundations on a commonly
accepted social behavior and serve Ior a redressing mechanism. Druick (2008, p.306)
doesn't say anything else when she emphasis on the double eIIects oI this 'type oI show
that seems to lay bare, while still reinIorcing, the social, political, and economic power
relationships behind the news and its conventions oI realist reporting.
Eventually, as correlation rarely equals causality, it is hard to assess exactly
whether the viewers oI carnivalized news are more inIormed because they watch shows
like TDS or iI they watch TDS and the like because they are more inIormed. Some
thinks that the latter opinion is more realistic, the TDS audience is 'highly inIormed, an
indication that the Daily Show is not their lone source oI news |and| most likely to
score in the highest percentile on knowledge oI current aIIairs (Project Ior Excellence
in Journalism, 2008, p.2). It would only make sense, Ior to laugh while watching
carnivalized news, one has to have the context and the knowledge to 'get' the jokes.
Other nuances oI the topic have also been explored by the research oI Young and
Tisinger (2006) who concluded that 'young people are not watching late-night comedy
as their exclusive source oI news or instead oI traditional news(.) watching late-night
comedy is positively and signiIicantly correlated with watch- ing almost all Iorms oI
traditional news(...), young people who report learning Irom late-night comedy shows
are signiIicantly more likely to also report learning Irom other news programs (op.cit.,
p.128). In addition, other researches are more pessimistic concerning the outcomes oI
exposure to carnivalization oI news in terms oI attitudes towards the political system.
75
Some results even 'suggest that exposure to The Dailv Show`s brand oI political humor
inIluenced young Americans by lowering support Ior both presidential candidates and
increasing cynicism. (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006, p.361)
In spite oI these nuances, we maintain that carnivalization oI news has the
potential among the less knowledgable and the less politically interested to draw
them in the political debate and expose them to decent news content and provide
them with the context necessary to decipher and and operationalize it in their
lives as citizens.
76
Chapter 4. Satire, Media and the European democratic deficit
Let put the Iocus back on the European Union Ior this Iorth and last chapter. In
his study oI Rabelais Bakhtin warns its readers about, the 'agelasts', the enemy oI
laughter, (Lachmann. 1989). These individuals, thanks to their mastery oI a centralized
and centralizing language, control and dominate society during the Renaissance. Some
have argued that Bakhtin's work was a criticism in disguise oI the authoritarian Soviet
political system at his time (op.cit.) which Bakhtin had experienced Iirsthand, having
been arrested and exiled Ior Ior religious activities at the end oI the 1920's (Zappen,
2000). From a more up-to-date and less tragic perspective, we believe that these
criticisms may be addressed to some extent to the European Union, the 'cold monster'
Baisnee (2002) talks about, a political entity which appears overly bureaucratic, distant
and lacking simultaneously a human Iace and legitimacy among its citizens, Iacts that
have been labelled 'democratic deIicit'.
So, the objective oI this Iinal chapter is to try and assess the Ieasibility oI a
transposition oI the carnivalization oI news on a European level and Iorecast its impacts,
with an emphasis on the topics oI the European public sphere and the European
democratic deIicit. In other terms, how could TV shows carnivalizing news emerge in
Europe and what would it mean Ior the European Union. As we will see, most oI the
anticipated results oI the carnivalization oI the news on Europe derive directly Irom its
impacts we highlighted in the previous chapter. However, we bring in also our own
reIlexions and additional sources to underline the European Iocus at this stage.
This chapter is voluntarily shorter than those preceding, Ior the academic sub-
Iield the relations oI satire, humor and the European Union we are entering, it is saIe
to aIIirm, is bare oI previous researches. More importantly, we are merely oIIering our
results, which are speculative results, no need to bee too extensive. As a consquence, the
style oI this chapter may appear less academical. Yet, using Iindings oI empirical studies
and theoretical reIlexions on the potentialities oI the carnivalization oI news, we think
we are not asking Ior a leap oI Iaith or anything too unrealistic, even iI it true that all our
aIIirmations here stay in the realm oI the hypothetical.
We however call Ior more experienced researchers than us, who may have been
inspired by those breakthrough results and the Iuture leads oI research we are
77
suggesting, to make our work their own and set up empirical experiments to veriIy the
validities oI our theoretical claims. 4.1. Pan-European satire, concept and limitations
Motivated by the results oI the previous chapters, we want to examine the
potential eIIects oI the carnivalization oI news on the European level. In order to do so,
we are required to put Iorward the hypothesis that a pan-European TV political satirical
show can exist and be broadcasted to a European audience. From now on, the rest oI the
chapter 4 will locate itselI in this hypothesis. But Iirst, we need to describe this show
project more in depth and, Ior intellectual honesty, we will also acknowledge the main
challenges that arise with this show, as well as oIIer ways to address them.
4.1. Imagining a pan-European satiricaI TV show
4.1.1. Characteristics and benefits
For the purpose oI this thesis, we hypothesize here the existence oI a pan-
European televised political satirical show. Similar to Les Guignols, TDS or TCR, this
show, we shall name it Eurosatire Ior simplicity's sake, will thus be a Iake newscast,
with a host using video Iootages and comical Ieatures such as jokes, irony and
exaggeration to take part in the carnivalization oI news as well. It Iocuses solely on
European aIIairs, and we can not underline it enough, Irom a pan-European perspective.
EU members-States (or Ioreign) national news will be relevant only when they get a
European aspect to them, or when other Europeans are involved. To take a recent
example, a French president N.Sarkozy reIorming the tax system and setting up a tax-
cap is not relevant (it would have been Ior satirical commentary with a national
perspective though). However, it may become exploitable by Eurosatire when Sarkozy,
trying to convince French citizens, aIIirms that Germany has a similar Ieature in its tax
system, when in Iact it doesn't exist there. This mistake, (or lie?), introduces a European
dimension that makes it interesting and relevant Ior Eurosatire.
Its pan-European perspective is possible, we argue because the European Union
has reached a point in its development where it truly constitutes a supra-national level
oI governance that aIIects everybody's lives. It may appears Iar above the members-
Sates' citizens head, yet this established level oI governance installs a structured
78
Iramework oI reIerences shared by all UE citizens. These common reIerences may be
composed oI elements such as the political institutions, the legally binding directives or
the broad values being in the European Union means accepting. They constitute the
target at the expenses oI which Eurosatire will make its audience laugh. Since we
deIined humor as process that triggers 'a local perlocutionary eIIect oI complicity based
on the oIten discrepant characteristics oI an utterance and its enunciation. (Chabrol,
2006, p.7), then the shared Iramework oI reIerences and values will be playing Iield
where the emitter chose to make his/her joke by introducing a discrepancy between
his/her utterance and the enunciation. Both the viewers and Eurosatire host, as they
share these reIerences will know what they talk about, which is a prerequisite Ior
successIul humor. Since we hypothesize that all EU citizens share those reIerences, the
consequence is that Eurosatire would be able to make Iun oI European aIIairs and create
laughter in audiences, in a way that is Iunny Ior all European citizens, and equally
important, relying only to a minimum on national stereotypes neither oI the EU or oI
other EU members-States and their citizens. It would be be the Iirst tries at an entirely
European humor.
Furthermore, as Eurosatire contains, like any shows responsible Ior the
carnivalization oI news, elements oI satirical journalism, its main motivation will be to
pin down the 'stupidity, corruption, wrongdoing and dishonesty by politicians, public
institutions, large corporations, the media and public Iigures (Lockyer, 2006, p.766).
To Iuel its motivation and indignation, Eurosatire, like any satirical journalism, is
'sensitive to the gap between what is and what might(ibid.), between what is and what
should be. In our case, this translates by the gap between the oIIicial discourse oI the
EU and other European actors and their actions in the real world. Accordingly, the
reason why we argue that the kind oI humor Eurosatire is doing is quintessentially and
Europtimistic, not Euro-skeptical, is because it based its comedic Ieatures and
motivation on the very same values the European Union tries to deIend and promote
throughout its members-States. Not only Eurosatire will held accountable the
European Union and other European actors by pointing its Ilaws, but will go even
Iurther and held the EU to a higher standard highlighting its hypocrisy between its
institutional discourse and its deeds which don't match said European values.
Because it uses carnivalization oI news, Eurosatire will be Iostering a truly
European public sphere, laughter Irom the citizens constituting one oI the prerequisites
to see the emergence oI a EPS: 'an eIIective channel oI communication with EU
79
politicians and bureaucrats. (Cerruti, 2003, p40) II it may not be the ideal-type oI
rational-critical discussion Habermas wishes Ior, the dissenting voices oI the European
heteroglossia are nonetheless using their bursts oI laughter to proclaim to the EU what
is on the minds oI its citizens.
4.1.2. ChaIIenges facing Eurosatire
OI course, a show like Eurosatire remains at the level oI an hypothesis because
producing it would mean encounter several challenges:
Maybe the most obvious is the choice oI the language Ior Eurosatire. As many
agree, 'to think oI an integrated |European public |sphere with relevant transnational
media and a lingua franca is premature. (Cerruti, 2003, p.40) What language should
Eurosatire be broadcasted in? Could English be the lingua franca Cerruti is talking
about? We don't think it would be a very good solution iI the show would be strictly
broadcasted in English, Ior it would only attract a elite English-speaking audience, more
likely to already be Iully Europeanized. Perhaps could we imagine the show to be
originally produced in English, then dubbed or more likely subtitled (a more common
and cheaper translation practice in smaller nations and language communities such as
Denmark) in all or several oI the 23 oIIicial languages oI the European Union. We can
even imagine crowd-sourcing the realization oI subtitles, that is to give the
responsibility to translate the show into their national languages the community oI
viewers oI Eurosatire. Such crowd-sourcing is already in place, with great success, in
some online communities where Ian oI a TV series oI movie take the initiative to, aIter
having illegally downloaded the newest episode in the original language, to translate it
Ior the rest oI the Ian community.
Then comes the question oI the logistics. On which sorts oI channel could
Eurosatire be broadcasted so it reaches it target audience? Let us assume that a news
show like Eurosatire will not be cheap to produce, and at the beginning, a risky
investment. This hinders its appeal to commercial channels, because since the
liberalization oI the European media landscape, commercial channels have a tendency
to produce and broadcast on cheaper programs (Biltereyst, 1992). In spite oI the Iact
that this competition has caused public service broadcasters to adopt progressively part
oI this strategy, Bardoel and d`Haenens (2008, p.352) are conIident that 'the European
80
concept oI PSB as a universal and comprehensive service, reIlecting Europe`s cultural
diversity, and independent Irom both the state and the market will still be able to be
put into practice throughout Europe. The omnipresence oI PSB is Europe, as well as its
many social missions and responsibilities as it's not a Ior-proIit organization play in
PSB's Iavor to be used as a platIorm Ior Eurosatire. In this case, the show would be sold
to every national public broadcasting channels to be broadcasted in their respective
countries and not Irom a central point. II we may suggest, in addition to pitching the
show to trans-national and pan-European channels (see Brggemann & Schulz-Forberg,
2009 or Chalaby, 2005, Ior their descriptions, characteristics and challenges they Iace)
or a interesting and potentially cheap solution could be using a Web-based platIorm to
broadcast the show. Some media outlets, whether they are catering satirical content
3
or
solely Iocused on European aIIaires, like EuroparlTV
4
, are already using the Web to
make their content available online. It would increase the accessibility to the show's
content and give the possibility to share said content online, on social media and blogs,
which would in return increase the audience and stimulate the sense oI community
among the viewers.
Last but not least, one serious obstacle would be the lack oI Iamous Iaces, or
recognizable politicians in European aIIairs, and that European aIIairs are too technical
to be Iun. We acknowledge this comment to be valid, but we nuance it with two ideas.
First oI all, Jon Stewart does not necessarily rely on high-proIile Iigures to poke Iun at
the problems at the system, Brewer and Marquadt (2007, p.265) conducting a content
analysis oI TDS, Iound it 'regularly addresses world aIIairs suggests that exposure to
the program has the potential to Ioster attention to and knowledge about international
events, particularly those that can be presented in entertaining ways. In addition, they
highlighted that unlike 'its late-night peers, then, The Dailv Show Irequently reIerred to
political Iigures with whom many members oI the general public might not have been
Iamiliar. (op.cit., p.260) and the authors argued that TDS had thus the potential to
increase the knowledge about lesser known politicians, a Iinding that is extremely
relevant Ior us here. Secondly, it is unIair not to see that political Iigures are emerging
Irom Brussels, their names becoming more known: Barroso oI course, but also
European Parliament Jerzy Buzek or High Representative oI the Union Ior Foreign
AIIairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton. They too can be targets oI Eurosatire.
3 http://www.theonion.com/ 20/10/10
4 http://www.europarltv.europa.eu/en/home.aspx, 20/10/10
81
4.2.CarnivaIization of news, journaIism and the European Union
We have established in chapter 3 that satire can be eIIicient to improve the media
literacy oI the audience. In addition, satirical content, no matter the Iormat, target oIten
media-related issues, whether on their organizational structures and ownership or their
journalistic (mal)practices. A strong pan-European satirical show would act as a critique
oI the genre (TV news bulletins) and also mean exposing the aIorementioned problems
and serve as an incentive to redress and realign the media outlets' perIormances on the
moral and values compass held by the society and voiced through the satirist. It brings
an answer to the 'Iailed role oI the media and EU correspondents' mentioned in the
introduction.
Indeed, we had mentioned that several scholars had pinpointed the Iailed role oI
media as one oI its causes. As Statham (2008, p.398) puts it, 'Media perIormance is
oIten held responsible Ior the European Union perceived 'democratic deIicit', and its
lack oI visibility, resonance and legitimacy in the 'hearts oI minds' oI citizens. The role
oI media is nonetheless as crucial to the question oI the European democratic deIicit
than it is complicated: 'the diIIiculty oI a multilingual, multicultural reality brought into
a cohesive system is less oI a problem than how to deal with the way individuals are
being inIormed by technology. (Anselmi & Hogan, 2006, p.138) Statham (2008,
p.399) oIIers some hints to improve the situation. For him, to tame the 'communication
deIicit' and create a public sphere oI public, is required 'the dissemination oI a
European news agenda that becomes part oI the everyday news-consuming habits oI
European audiences. However, Ior journalists, covering European aIIairs entail Iacing
many challenges (op.cit., p409): limitation oI resources Ior news gathering and research,
weak access to EU inIormations, poor knowledge oI the journalist in Ioreign language
and in the UE, the unattractive aspects oI European politics, editorial choices placing
priorities on topics other than European aIIairs, the omnipresence oI the national Irame
and political agenda oI the media they are working Ior. Eurosatire would not be Iacing
most oI this diIIiculties, Ior it would be overwhelmingly Iocusing on European aIIairs
and spicing up the coverage with carnivalization, it will make its coverage more
attractive and thus disseminate a European news agenda it the citizens daily lives, only
covered with a comedic angle. EU citizens will be exposed to more news about the EU,
and they will be engaged to think about it in a critical Iashion.
82
We hope that through these changes in the media coverage thanks to the
redressing eIIects oI carnivalization and Eurosatire's own coverage oI the EU, would
happen what Cerruti (2003, p.40) wished Ior, that EU aIIairs become 'more visible and
accountable, that is more debated, opposed or supported by the Europeans, who learn to
regard what is decided in the EU instances as their own direct concern as much as they
do with what happens in the national capitals. Oppose or support, the important aspect
is the debate allowing the expression oI a the diversity oI voices, the heteroglossia that
Ireed itselI Irom the monological discourse oI the EU institutions. As a consequence, a
carnivalized show like Eurosatire would help implement a Bakhtinian public sphere in
Europe.
4.3. Can carnivaIization of news bridge the European
democratic deficit?
In addition to reIorm the way journalists cover European aIIairs and oIIering an
alternative, more engaging and critical coverage oI this topic, we think that Eurosatire
holds many other positive eIIects Ior the emergence oI the European public sphere and
its corollary the reduction oI the democratic deIicit.
4.3.1. Educating the European citizens
Our aim here is not to copy-paste all the results oI the section 3.3., especially the
sub-section 3.3.2 that tackled at length the eIIects oI carnivalization oI news on the
audiences' knowledge. We hypothesize that all those results can, to some extent, be
transposed as such on the audience oI Eurosatire.
However, we can add speciIics to the European/trans-national situation.
According to Bennet et al. (1996, p.24), to explain their Iindings showing the good
perIormance oI citizens Irom the United Kingdom, France and especially Germany in
knowledge oI Ioreign aIIairs, the authors hypothesized that being 'members oI the
European Union (...) |may| create additional incentives Ior their citizens to Iollow
Ioreign aIIairs; Ior them, the costs oI acquiring and retaining inIormation about the
83
world Iar outweigh the perceived beneIits by opposition to American citizens. Even
though this study concludes that Irequent viewers oI 'entertainment shows on television
know little about Ioreign aIIairs (ibid.), we note that those results take entertainment
TV in its broadest understanding and not only political comedy nor carnivalized news
The Dailv Show was not even on the air at the time oI the study. Taking a closer look at
the knowledge aIIairs oI views oI this type oI shows, with their eIIects we pointed out in
Section 3.3. would without a doubt modiIy the results.
In addition, what we keep Irom the study is that the demand Ior inIormations
about Ioreign aIIairs is apparently positively link to being a European citizen, a status
that create 'incentives' to learn about the world. And, concerning learning about the
European Union, the demand exists. A qualitative research, with the provision that it has
been ordered by the European Commission (Optem, 2004) has shown that, lamenting
the lack in quantity and the poor quality dull, abstract, unappealing oI programs
dealing with European issues in their own countries, the interviewees aspired Ior TV
programs that would help get to know the other countries in Europe better as well as,
more important Ior us, help them gain 'a greater insight into and understanding oI the
European Union itselI (op.cit., p.10)
As a result, we argue that a pan-European satirical show would precisely do that;
cater to the EU citizens' demand oI more inIormations on European aIIairs; and in a
innovative, engaging Iashion that would not only entertain but also educate them. For
the viewers, especially the younger audiences, there's a clear distinction between any
serious hard news program and what they Iully acknowledge as being soIt news 'junk
TV', which doesn't prevent them to watch either oI them, a paradox highlighted by
Meijer (2007). A interviewee in this study had the Iollowing response: 'News is like a
whole-wheat sandwich: you eat it because it is healthy, not because it is tasty. (Iris,
college student, age 25) (Op.cit., p.96). We do hope that Eurosatire, while not be
considered 'junk TV' will be able to spice up that bland whole-wheat sandwich.
4.3.2. Nurturing European citizenship and the European PubIic Sphere
We have already established that 'laughter demolishes Iear and piety beIore an
object, beIore a world, making oI it an object oI Iamiliar contact and thus clearing the
ground Ior an absolutely Iree investigation (Bakhtin 1981 in Warner, 2007, p.33)
84
Consequently, laughing about the European Union will not only increase the knowledge
oI the viewers, as we have seen earlier, but it will also bring the UE much closer to the
viewers. Moreover, as Hariman (2008) sees it, political parody is a way to engage the
spectators by creating public consciousness, which is necessary Ior democratic society.
Around the same idea, Bakthin sees 'dialogicalization' as another tool Ior a Iree
investigation oI the European Union; "in the realm oI culture, 'outside-ness' is a most
powerIul Iactor in understanding. It is only in the eyes oI another culture that Ioreign
culture reveals itselI Iully and proIoundly" (Bakhtin, 1979 in Zappen, p.12)
Accordingly, it is through dialogized heterglossia that a pan-European satirical
show could shape the (political) culture oI the European audiences and oI the European
institutions as well. Making Iun oI them will present European aIIairs as a more Ioreign
culture that it actually is, since we, as European citizens are part oI it to some extent
but this doing so will help the audiences apprehend and comprehend the signiIicance oI
those elements. Thanks to the use oI Bakthin's conceptualization oI the public sphere,
we can extract values Irom the genre oI satire, among others media watchdog, educating
and requiring knowledge Irom its audience, dis-inhibiting, Iorming communities with
identities and potentially dissenting voices Irom the oIIicial views. Those community-
audiences, armed with the tools (political knowledge, eIIicient media, critical voices)
appear like a 'prerequisite Ior better governance, legitimacy and citizen`s participation
in the emerging European polity (Trenz, 2005, p.408), which is according to Trenz, a
normative synonym Ior 'European Public Sphere', here Iragmented by still present.
McGuigan, invoked by Kavaliauskaite (2006), reIlecting on the concept oI
Habermas' bourgeois public sphere oIIers its modern, more inclusive equivalent under
the concept oI a 'cultural public sphere':
'It includes the various channels and circuits oI mass-popular culture and
entertainment, the routinely mediated aesthetic and emotional reIlections
on how we live and imagine the good liIe. The concept oI a cultural public
sphere reIers to the articulation oI politics, public and personal, as
contested terrain through aIIective (aesthetic and emotional) modes oI
communication. (McGuignan, 2005, in Kavaliauskaite, 2006, p.66)
In this Iramework, the carnivalization oI news really does have a place to help
with the European 'cultural' Public Sphere, which seems to be located halIway between
85
the Habermasian and Bakhtinian conceptualization oI the public sphere.
In a less theoretical level, it has been established that, concerning the main
political expression oI the citizenship (the vote), that 'exposure to traditional news
sources such as newspapers or television news as well as Internet use and engagement
in political discussions all contributed positively and signiIicantly to European
Parliament elections turnout (Esser, de Vrees, 2007, p.1209). While it only addresses
the use oI news media, the study acknowledge the debate concerning the eIIects oI
entertainment content, including late-night comedy. We hope to have gathered enough
evidences that may think that comedy content, especially iI it is as substantive as The
Dailv Show will have part, iI not all, oI those mobilizing eIIects. Carnivalization oI
news will thus have nurturing eIIects on the European public sphere, perhaps not in the
purest sense oI a Habermasian rational-critical discussion, but it would nonetheless help
to create a sphere oI exchange, where the European publics could interact, discuss and
express centriIugal opinions. It is not contradictory with nurturing the idea oI a
European citizen, Ior we think that exposure to the substantive content oI Eurosatire,
and the eIIects oI the carnivalization oI news, will motivate viewers to possibly vote
more, but certainly get more involved politically in Europe because they will perceive it
to be not so intimidating and re-appropriate the European debate with a critical, but
motivated, eye. In other terms, Eurosatire will not create perIect citizens overnight but
rather critical, opinated minds Ior whom Europe is important but imperIect. Everytime
they will think and laugh, it will be as iI they will voice their concerns and their
attachment to the European values that are being treaded on. We can only hope that it
will trigger discussions to try and think a solution through.
4.3.3. RecIaiming the European identity
As Cerutti (2003, p.35) underlines: in "the general theory oI politics, identity is a
precondition, or rather meta-condition, Ior legitimizing a polity or regime. Seeing
Eurosatire actually Iosters European identity would be quite an achievement, and we
argue it might happens, or at least, work in this direction. The main issue is how to
conceptualize the identity Ior a political entity sui generis like the European Union. The
theoretical Iramework put in place by works like Anderson's (1983) study oI the links
between the rise nationalism and mass media is only oI limited help to analyze the
86
relationship between media consumption and the emergence oI a European identity.
Scholars are aware that they are Iacing a new model, and new media industries.
'Developments in media industries have made us more aware oI what was being taken
Ior granted in old models oI cultural space though perhaps no more than aware, and
thereby disconcerted about possibilities oI cultural Iragmentation and secession.
(Askoy & Robins, 2003, p.369)
We reject the idea that Eurosatire will have a Iragmenting eIIect on the European
cultural space. It would be quite the contrary actually. One main characteristics oI
Eurosatire, the polemical and politicizing esssence oI satirical journalism will carry out
beneIicial eIIects: politicization, scholars argue 'increases the salience oI the EU in the
perception oI the citizens. Hence controversies about EU politics are not bad Ior
European identity; they can actually increase the sense oI community among
Europeans (Risse & Maier, 2003, p.10) Instead oI Iragmenting Europe, Eurosatire
could actually put Europe more to the center oI the viewers lives, and tighten their sense
oI belonging to its community.
The literature discussing the issue oI a European identity has grew considerably
over the last years. Whether they are Iocusing on a comparison oI the Europeanization
oI national identities (Robyn, ed. 2005), on the political identity (Cerutti, 2003), on the
role oI the media (Collins, 2007) or tackling the question with a very multi-disciplinary
perspective (Herrmann et al. Eds. 2004), scholars Irom all sorts oI Iields have try to
investigate the possible existence oI a European identity. Unsurprisingly, we can come
to the same conclusion with those works than with the study oI humor and satire on the
European public sphere. That is, we could not Iind exploitable researches studying the
carnivalization oI news, or even satire and humor, to this question oI the European
identity. The closest we got was the somewhat dry debate over the role oI culture and
cultures on the European identity, which we have not the resources nor the will to take
on in this thesis. So Iar, there is no consensus on the existence oI a shared identity in the
European Union, not even a consensual deIinition oI the concept itselI.
The problem, as we conceive it, is that the EU institutions' discourse
necessarily centripetal and normalizing iI we Iollow Bakhtin theoretical Iramework
concerning the European identity is not only misplaced but also counter-productive.
Through various channels oI communication (such as the EU press services, events and
spoke-persons) that carries its words in the most un-challenged Iashion, the European
Union, as a polity, imposes its monological view oI what it means to be a European
87
citizen. This attempt at setting a monopoly on labeling the correct European citizenship
and deIine the Europe culture as well, according to us, backIires and actually turns
people away Irom the EU. Indeed we think that, by doing so, the EU itselI dispossesses
its citizens Irom the power to decide their own deIinition, Iunctions and create their own
culture. We advocate that the European citizens should reclaim this identity and we are
conIident that Eurosatire may help them do so.
Some scholars have comparable diagnosis about the workings oI the European
Union in terms oI identity and culture, albeit they do not prescribe the same remedy as
us and instead push Ior more real-liIe joint-actions between Europeans to create the
adequate identity: 'Europe has yet to come to terms with the condition oI post-modern
pluralism which it inhabits. It can best do so (.) by seeking to build social cohesion
through a Iunctionalist emphasis on practical measures oI co-operation (.) rather than
a grossed up nationalism staking all on cultural homogeneity. ( Collins, 2002, p.39)
The author seems to have an interesting and valid point, however it is not the Iocus oI
our thesis to discuss it. Furthermore, when it comes to the culture and norms linked to
an identity, 'trust in democratic values is not enough to build |the European| identity
(Cerutti, 2003 p.35) AIter this thought-provoking assertion Cerutti goes Iurther and
explains his idea. Values and principles 'do not by themselves shape the identity oI the
citizens as individuals Ieeling and acting in their diversity: they need to be interpreted,
to be reread and translated into the speciIic language oI citizens, generations and
communities (Cerutti, 2003, p.28) This is precisely where we think shows like
Eurosatire could have beneIicial eIIects.
We have identiIied in the previous chapter that consuming carnivalization oI
news entails the creation oI an audience-community, new type oI carnival collective.
Not only is it composed oI diverse people, but those people gather together around
shared experiences, values, culture, all elements that constitute both the Iramework and
the consequences oI the humoristic material they are exposed to. As a result, the
audience-community Ieels empowered to resist the centralizing powers. In the European
Iramework we are currently setting our work, it means that the viewers will now have
the tools to take back the power to critically deIine who is a European, what constitutes
the European culture and the European identity. Opening a space Ior diverse and
dissenting voices are quintessentially a role oI the carnivalization oI news
Furthermore, drawing Cerutti here, we add that we are convinced carnivalization
oI news may be the vehicle thanks to which the European citizens, viewers oI
88
Eurosatire, will interpret, reread and translated the values and principles oI the
European Union, and through this process, they absorb those values and make them
their own in their everyday liIe, as individuals and as part oI communities. For instance,
we expect tremendous diIIerences in terms oI impacts between the EU institutions
strongly asserting its attachment to, let's say the democratic rule and electoral
participations in press campaigns and other PR operations, uttered in a bureaucratic and
dull language and a segment on Eurosatire, demonstrating the same attachment Ior the
same value/principle but expressing its aIIection with a satirical joke picking at the lack
oI direct democracy in the European institutions and mocking abstention levels Ior
European elections along the line oI 'we barely get a say in the EU |jab at the low level
oI direct democracy in the EU|, but when we are asked, some persons still decide to stay
home and sulk in a corner |jab at the non-voter|.
Basically, these two utterances have the same get-out-the-vote content, but one
discourse is normative and imposing a behavior Irom the top-down, while the other is
playIul, engaging (thanks to the perlocutionary eIIect oI laughter) and coming Irom the
bottom, going up (and horizontally). In terms oI impacts, according to our thought-
process elaborated in this thesis, we expect the Iormer to Iail to have an noticeable
impact other than having Eurocrats pat themselves on the back, proud oI their Ieel-good
but ineIIectual call to vote, when the latter may not necessarily increase dramatically the
voters turnouts but will not only have viewers think about the issue(we have seen that
understanding a joke, especially satire, needed cerebral resources) but, and it is equally
important, they will have translated in their own experiences and lives the philosophical
concept that is the democratic rule and the behavior it entails.
89
Conclusion:
In the introduction oI her seminal book Entertaining the citi:en, Liesbet van
Zoonen asks 'Can politics be combined with entertainment? Can political involvement
and participation be Iun? Can citizenship be pleasurable? (2004, p.1) We hope to have
answered, in our own way, her interrogations with our own research questions.
Is it clear now that the carnivalization oI news is no laughing matter Ior the
European Union, its public sphere and its democratic deIicit. First oI all, this
phenomenon, and entertainment media texts as a whole, should not be brushed aside by
media and communication scholars looking Ior elements oI a public sphere on a
European level. Yet, to do so, one must bend the deIinition oI the public sphere, leave
the Habermasian understanding oI the term and look more closely at Bakthin's
conceptualization oI the idea. Secondly, a pan-European carnivalized/satirical news
show, despite encountering some challenges, may very well convey potentials Ior
improvements oI the audience's interest, knowledge and behavior when it comes to
European politics. We Iorecast these eIIects to be improving signiIicantly the quality oI
the more general understanding oI the European citizenship making citizens more
inIormed, more interested and more critical and cynical, which may not be a bad thing,
especially when the only other alternative is blatant disinterestedness. Moreover,
according to Bakthin's theory, the dissenting voices emerging Irom the laughter directed
at the EU, this heteroglossia, can challenge the order and cohesion imposed by the
power in a top-down manner and trigger citizens to reclaim the meaning oI an European
identity, a deIinition which will then be written in a bottom-up approach by active
citizens.
Finally, the pan-European satirical news show, in addition to oIIer an alternative,
more engaging news coverage, would also serve as a reIorming watchdog Ior
journalistic practices related to European issues, possibly improving the news coverage
about Europe. This improvements would trigger a virtuous circle to improve the
knowledge about European aIIairs, and would translate hypothetically in increased
European elections turnout.
90
BeIore our last words we would like to add that our research is extremely timely.
Recently, Companhia de Ideias, a Portuguese media company launched EuroTwit, a
Web-based TV show with a strong Iocus on Europe. Their website called Ior
contributions oI short skits and humorous sections concerning the EU. Yet aIter I asked
Portuguese-speaking Iriends oI mine to take a brieI look at the shows, they told me that
the humoristic content is almost nonexistent. This only emphasizes the diIIiculty oI
making this kind oI humor, but the mere Iact that Companhia de Ideias tried should be
an encouragement Ior Iuture media-makers, and Ior the scholars who will research the
Iield oI Europe-related entertainment media texts. Even more recently, on the 13
th
oI
October 2010, Zsolt Nemeth oI MTV Hungary won the TV award category oI the
European Parliament Journalism Prize Ior his "EuIoria" program
5
, which presents the
history oI the European Union in an understandable and entertaining way to younger
people and those unIamiliar with EU aIIairs. According to this press release, the jury
praised the program's quality and also its imagination, something oIten missing Irom
TV projects on the EU. Above all, the program manages to be "attractive, Iunny and
educational at the same time". Even though satirical content is not at all at the heart oI
'EuIoria, which is primarily a education program, it shows that even the European
institutions acknowledge that entertainment content can play an innovative role in the
coverage oI EU aIIairs.
Our concluding words will be a caveat about our work to the attention oI our
readers: "many academics and journalists were avid viewers oI The Daily Show with
Jon Stewart. In a mock trial oI Stewart conducted at the 2006 NCA annual
convention political communication scholar Lance Bennett opened his speech with
the Iollowing question: 'Esteemed members oI the jury: is there anyone here who is not
a Ian oI Jon Stewart? (.) No hands were raised. As some oI the examples cited above
suggest, many journalists share this sentiment. This raises the understudied question oI
scholars as Ians (.), as well as the even-less-studied question oI journalists as
audiences oI particular shows, genres, or media Iigures." (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2009,
p.434) Both as a journalist and as the author oI this modest scholarly work, I can not
disassociate myselI with this very valid criticisms. I enjoy watching such shows and I
am deIinitely a Ian oI Jon Stewart, Stephen Colbert and Les Guignols. I had to come
clean, admit this bias and warn the readers that it may have inIluenced my results and
rendered me quite optimistic concerning their potential eIIects. You shall be the judge.
5 http://euroalert.net/en/news.aspx?idn10744 25/10/10
91
References:
Achter, P. (2008): 'Comedy in UnIunny Times: News Parody and Carnival AIter 9/11'
Critical Studies in Media Communication, 25(3): 274-303.
Al-Jazeera English. (2010): Ban on mocking bra:il politicians
( http://www.youtube.com/watch?vzU5N3FcUEY, 08/10/10)
Anderson, B. (1983): Imagined Communities. London: Verso.
Anselmi, W., Hogan, L. (2006): 'An economy oI European identity: What culture?'
Spaceofidentitv, 6(2): 133-149.
Askoy, A., Robins, K. (2003): 'The enlargement oI meaning. Social demand in a
transnational context' Ga:ette. the international fournal for communication studies,
65(45): 365388.
Baek, Y.M., Wojcieszak, M.E. (2009): 'Don`t expect too much Learning Irom late-night
comedy and knowledge item diIIiculty' Communication Research, 36(6): 783809.
Baisnee, O., (2002): 'Can Political journalism exist at the EU level?' in R. Kuhn & E.
Neveu, eds. Political fournalism. New Challenges, new practices. London: Routledge.
Bakhtin, M. (1984): Rabelais and His World. Trans. Helne Iswolsky. 1968 (English,
Massachusetts Institute oI Technology). Bloomington: Midland-Indiana University
Press.
Bardoel, J., d'Haenens L. (2008): 'Reinventing public service broadcasting in Europe:
prospects, promises and problems' Media, Culture & Societv, 30(3): 337-355.
Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J., & King, M. (2010): The edge of violence a radical approach to
extremism. London: Demos.
92
Baumgartner, J., Morris, J.S. (2006): 'The Dailv Show eIIect. Candidate evaluations,
eIIicacy, and American youth' American Politics Research Jolume, 34(3): 341-367.
Baym, G. (2005): 'The Daily Show: discursive integration and the reinvention oI
political journalism' Political Communication, 22: 259276.
Baym, G (2007): 'CraIting new communicative models in the televisual sphere: political
interviews on the Dailv Show The Communication Review, 10(2): 93115.
Bennett, S.E., Flickinger, R.S., Baker, J.R., Rhine, S.L. and Bennett, L.M.L (1996):
'Citizens' knowledge oI Ioreign aIIairs' The Harvard International Journal of
Press/Politics, 1(2) 10-29.
Benot, B. (1999): Lidentite politique de Lvon. Entre violences collectives et memoire
des elites (1786-1905). Paris: L'Harmattan.
Biltereyst, D.(1992): 'Language and culture as ultimate barriers? An analysis oI the
circulation, consumption and popularty oI Iiction in small European countries'
European fournal of Communication, 7: 517-540.
BM Lyon. (2007): 'Bon anniversaire Monsieur Guignol '
(http://www.pointsdactu.org/article.php3?idarticle1008, 14/09/10)
Boesel, K. (2007): The Colbert Nation. a democratic place to be? MSc Dissertation in
Global Media and Communication at the London School oI Economics supervised by
Dr. Panagiota Alevizou, compiled by ProIessor Robin Mansell, Dr. Bart Cammaerts.
MediaLSE: London
Bohman, J. (2004): 'Expanding dialogue: the internet, the public sphere and prospects
Ior transnational democracy' in After Habermas. new perspectives on the public sphere
(Crossley, N. & Roberts, J.M. eds.) OxIord: Blackwell : 130-155.
Borden, S.L., Tew, C.(2007): 'The role oI journalist and the perIormance oI journalism:
ethical lessons Irom 'Iake news (seriously)' Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 22(4): 300-
93
314.
Borneman, J., Fowler, N. (1997): 'Europeanization' Annual Revue of Anthropologv, 26:
487-514
Bratslavsky, L.(2009): 'Examining Humor in 30 Rock Irom Four Perspectives: Bergson,
Frye, Freud, and Bakhtin' Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for
Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Sheraton Boston, Boston, MA, Aug
05, 2009: ( http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p376206index.html, 21/10/10)
Brewer, P.R, Marquardt, E. (2007): 'Mock news and democracy: analyzing The Dailv
Show' Atlantic fournal of communication, 15(4): 249267.
Brggemann, M., Schulz-Forberg, H. (2009): 'Becoming pan-European? Transnational
Media and the European Public Sphere' The International Communication Ga:ette,
71(8): 120.
Bryant, C. (2006): 'The Language oI Resistance? Czech Jokes and Joke-telling under
Nazi Occupation, 1943-45' Journal of Contemporarv Historv, 41(1): 133-151.
Calhoun, C. ed. (1992): Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT
Press.
Cao, X. (2008) 'Political comedy shows and knowledge about primary campaigns: the
moderating eIIects oI age and education' Mass Communication and Societv, 11(1): 43-
61.
Cerutti, F. (2003): 'A political identity oI the Europeans?' Thesis Eleven, 72: 26-45.
Chabrol, C. (2006): 'Humour et medias. deIinitions, genres et cultures' Questions de
communication, 10: 7-17.
Chalaby, J.K. (2004): 'Scandal and the Rise oI Investigative Reporting in France'
American Behavioral Scientist, 47(9): 1194-1207.
94
Chalaby, J.K, (2005): 'Deconstructing the transnational: a typology oI cross-border
television channels in Europe' New media & societv, 7(2): 155-175.
Classen, C.J. (1988): 'Satire, the elusive genre' Svmbolae Osloenses, 63(1): 95-121.
Collins, R. (2002): Media and identitv in contemporarv Europe. consequences of global
convergence, 174p. Bristol UK, Portland OR. USA.: Intellect (Google Book version
Irom http://books.google.Ir/books?idLdLrvBBZOgoC&lpgPP1&dqMedia20and
20identity20in20contemporary20Europe3A20consequences20oI
20global20convergence&pgPP1#vonepage&q&IIalse, 12/10/10)
Collins, S. (2009) 'Book Review: Gray, J., Jones, J. P., & Thompson, E. (2009). Satire
TJ. Politics and Comedv in the Post-Network Era. New York: NYU Press' Journal of
Communication Inquirv, 33: 291-296.
Collovald, A., Neveu, E. (1999): 'Political satire on French television' Modern &
Contemporarv France, 7(3): 339-349.
Condren, C. (2002): 'Between social constraint and the public sphere: on misreading
early-modern political satire' Contemporarv Political Theorv, 1: 79101.
Crossley N. & Roberts J.M, ed. (2004): After Habermas. New perspectives on the
public sphere. OxIord: Blackwell.
Daily Show (2010): 'About the show'. (http://www.thedailyshow.com/about,
10/01/2010)
Dettmar, K.J.H. (2006): ' 'Authentically Ironic: Neoconservatism and the Backlash'
the Journal of the Midwestern Modern Language Association, 39(1): 134-144.
Downey, J. & Fenton, N. (2003): 'New Media, Counter Publicity and the Public Sphere'
New Media Societv, 5(2): 185-202
95
Druick, Z. (2009): 'Dialogic Absurdity: TV news parody as a critique oI genre'
Television new media, 10(3): 294-308
Eko. L. (2007): 'It's a political jungle out there. How Four AIrican Newspaper Cartoons
Dehumanized and Deterritorialized` AIrican Political Leaders in the Post-Cold War Era'
International Communication Ga:ette, 69(3): 219238.
Esser, F., de Vreese, C.H. (2007): 'Comparing young voter's political engagement in the
United States and Europe' American Behavioral Scientist, 50(9): 1195-1213.
European Commission (2006): Commissions white paper on european communication
policv. Debating europe - involving citi:ens.
(http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reIerenceIP/06/103&IormatHTML&aged0&languageEN&guiLanguageen,
10/01/2010)
European Parliament (2010): European parliament resolution of 7 september 2010 on
fournalism and new media creating a public sphere in Europe.
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubReI-2F2FEP2F
2FTEXTTAP7-TA-2010-03070DOCXMLV02F2FEN&languageEN,
10/09/2010)
Feldman, L., Young, D.G. (2008) 'Late-night comedy as a gateway to traditional news:
an analysis oI time trends in news attention among late-night comedy viewers during
the 2004 presidential primaries' Political Communication, 25(4): 401-422.
Fox, J.R., Koloen, G., Sahin, V. (2007): 'No joke: a comparison oI substance in The
Dailv Show with Jon Stewart and broadcast network television coverage oI the 2004
presidential election campaign' Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 51(2):
213-227.
Gaitet, G. (2009): '20 ans de Guignols, latex story' Maga:ine, 90: 10-12.
Garnham, N. (2007): 'Habermas and the public sphere' Global media and
96
communication, 3(2): 201214.
Gardiner M.E. (2004): 'Wild publics and grotesque symposiums: Habermas and Bakhtin
on dialogue, everyday liIe and the public sphere' in After Habermas. New perspectives
on the public sphere (Crossley N. & Roberts J.M. eds.) OxIord: Blackwell
Gripsrud, J. (2007): 'Television and the European Public Sphere' European Journal of
Communication, 22(4): 479-492.
Habermas, J. (1989): The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere Trans.
Burgerand, T. & Lawrence, F. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hariman, R. (2007): 'In deIense oI Jon Stewart' Critical Studies in Media
Communication, 24(3): 273-277.
Hariman, R. (2008): 'Political parody and public culture' Quarterlv Journal of Speech,
94(3): 247-272.
Hart, M. (2007): 'Humor and Social Protest: An Introduction' International Review of
Social Historv, 52: 1-20.
Hart, R.P., Hartelius E.J. (2007): 'The political sins oI Jon Stewart' Critical Studies in
Media Communication, 24(3): 263-272
Hazard, P. (2005): La pensee europeenne au XJIIIe siecle De Montesquieu a Lessing. 1
st
ed. Boivin et Cie, Paris, 1946, 2005 ed. Universite du Quebec Chicoutimi, Quebec,
Canada.
Herrmann, K.R., Risse, T., Brewer, M.B. eds (2004): Transnational identities.
Becoming European in the EU, 320 p. OxIord, UK, Lanhman, MD, USA: Rowman &
LittleIield (Google Books version Irom http://books.google.com/books?idn-
WU50VdQOsC&printsecIrontcover&hlIr#vonepage&q&IIalse, 15/09/10)
Hibberd, J. (2010): Dailv Show Beats Leno, Letterman for First Time
97
(http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/blogs/live-Ieed/daily-show-beats-leno-letterman-
35776, 5/11/10)
Holbert, R.L. (2005): 'A typology Ior the study oI entertainment television and politics'
American Behavioral Scientist, 49(3): 436-453.
Holbert, R.L., Lambe, J.L., Dudo, A.D., Carlton, K.A (2007) 'Primacy eIIects oI the
Dailv Show and national TV news viewing: young viewers, political gratiIications, and
internal political selI-eIIicacy' Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 51(1): 20
38.
Holbert, R.L., Geidner, N. (2009): 'The 2008 election: highlighting the need to explore
additional communication subIields to advance political communication'
Communication Studies, 60(4): 344-358.
Irony (2010): Merriam-Webster Online Dictionarv. (http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/irony, 14/09/10)
Kavaliauskaite, J. (2006): 'Seriocomic television: the public sphere la Colbert Report'
Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook, 1: 54-86.
Klages, M. (2001): Mikhail Bakhtin.
(http://www.colorado.edu/English/courses/ENGL2012Klages/bakhtin.html, 15/02/10)
Kuhn, C. (2007): 'Urban laughter as a counter-public`` sphere in Augsburg: the case oI
the city mayor, Jakob Herbrot (1490/95 1564)' International Review of Social Historv.
52: 77-93.
Kuiper, K. (1984): 'The nature oI satire' Poetics, 13: 459-473.
Lachmann, R.(1988-1989): 'Bakhtin and Carnival: Culture as Counter-Culture' Trans.
Eshelman, R. & Davis, M. Cutlural Critique, 11:115-152.
LaMarre, H.L., Landreville, K.D., Beam, M.A. (2009): 'The irony oI satire: political
98
ideology and the motivation to see what you want to see in the Colbert Report' The
International Journal of Press/Politics, 14(2): 212-231.
Langman, L.(2002): 'Suppose they gave a culture war and no one came. Zippergate and
the carnivalization oI politics' American Behavioral Scientist, 46(4): 501-534.
Lindahl, C. (1996): 'Bakhtin's Carnival Laughter and the Cajun Country Mardi Gras'
Folklore, 107: 57-70.
Lockyer, S. (2006): ''A Two-Pronged Attack?' Exploring Private Eye`s satirical humour
and investigative reporting' Journalism Studies, 7(5): 765-781.
Machill, M., Beiler, M., & Fischer, C. (2006): 'Europe-topics in Europe's media: the
debate about the european public sphere: a meta-analysis oI media content analyses'
European Journal of Communication, 21(1): 57-88.
Maier, J., Rittberger, B. (2008): 'ShiIting Europe's boundaries: mass media, public
opinion and the enlargement oI the EU' European Union Politics, 9(2): 243267.
McQuail, D. (2005): Mass communication theorv. 5th ed. London, Thousand Oaks,
New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Meijer, I.C. (2007): 'The paradox oI popularity' Journalism Studies, 8(1): 96-116.
Mittel, J. (2001): 'A cultural approach to television genre theory' Cinema Journal, 40(3):
3-24
Morris, R.N. (1995): The carnivali:ation of politics. Quebec cartoons on relations with
Canada, England, and France, 1960-1979 |148p.|. (Google Book version Irom
http://books.google.com/books?
idoJZ5NRmXZQwC&lpgPP1&otsy70vr5QX3S&dqcarnivalization20oI
20news&hlIr&pgPP1#vsnippet&q&IIalse, 20/10/10)
OIIicial Journal oI the European Union (2007): Treatv of Lisbon amending the Treatv on
99
European Union and the Treatv establishing the European Communitv, 50: 1-272.
Optem (2004): Attitudes and expectations of viewers in terms of television programmes
with a European content. Qualitative studv in the 25 member States of the European
Union, ( pdI version Irom
http://europa.eu.int/comm/publicopinion/quali/qleutven.pdI 14/05/2010)
Parody (2010): Merriam-Webster Online Dictionarv. (http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/parody, 13/01/10)
Pasquali, E.A. (2003): 'Humor: an antidote Ior terrorism' Journal of Holistic Nursing,
21(4): 398-414.
Pew Project Ior Excellence in Journalism (2008): Journalism, satire or fust laughs?
'The Dailv Show with Jon Stewart`, examined. Pew Research Center.
( http://www.journalism.org/node/10953, 14/02/10)
Pew Research Center Ior the People and the Press (2007a): Todavs fournalists less
prominent. Pew Research Center Ior the People and the Press (http://people-
press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID309, 15/02/10)
Pew Research Center Ior the People and the Press (2007b): What Americans Know:
1989-2007 Public Knowledge oI current aIairs changed little by news and inIormations
revolutions. Pew Research Center.
Risse, T., Maier, M.L., eds (2003): IDNET Final Report. Europeani:ation, Collective
identities and public discourses Florence, Italy : Robert Schuman centre Ior advanced
studies at European University institute.
Robyn, R. ed. (2005): The changing face of European identitv. A seven-nation studv of
(supra)national attachments, (1
st
edition) 256p. Oxon, UK, New York, NY, USA:
Routledge. (Google Books version Irom http://books.google.Ir/books?idCJQFxqkh-
zcC&printsecIrontcover#vonepage&q&IIalse, 01/09/10)
100
Rosello, M. (2003): 'Globalization or 'Guignolization' : derision and liberalism' French
Cultural Studies, 14(2): 139156.
Rger, J. (2009): 'Laughter and war in Berlin' Historv Workshop Journal, 67: 23-43.
Satire (2010): in Merriam-Webster Online Dictionarv. (http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/satire, 01/10/10)
Saunier, P-Y. (1992): 'De la poupee de bois l`emblme patrimonial: guignol de Lyon'
Monde Alpin et Rhodanien, 3(4): 57-88.
Speier H. (1998): 'Wit and politics: an essay on laughter and power' The American
Journal of Sociologv, 103(5): 1352-1401.
Stark, C. (2003): ' 'What? Me worry? Teaching media literacy through satire and MAD
magazine' The Clearing House, 76(6): 305-309.
Statham, P. (2008): 'Making Europe news. How journalists view their role and media
perIormance' Journalism, 9(4): 398-422.
Strelitz L.N. (2002) 'Media consumption and identity Iormation: the case oI the
homeland` viewers' Media Culture Societv, 24: 459-480.
Teneboim-Weinblatt, K.(2009): 'Jester, Iake journalist, or the new Walter Lippman?:
Recognition processes oI Jon Stewart by the U.S. journalistic community' International
Journal of Communication, 3: 416-439
Thorne, C. (2001): 'Thumbing our noses at the public sphere: satire, the market and the
invention oI literature' PMLA, 116(3): 531-544.
Trenz, H-J. (2004): 'Media coverage on European governance. Exploring the European
public sphere in national quality newspapers' European Journal of Communication,
19(3): 291319.
101
Trenz, H-J. (2005): 'The European Public Sphere: contradictory Iindings in a diverse
research Iield' European Political Science, 4: 407-420.
TsIati, Y., Tukachinsky, R. & Periky Y. (2009): 'Exposure to news, political comedy, and
entertainment talk shows: concern about security and mistrust' International Journal of
Public Opinion Research, 21(4): 399-423.
Van De Steeg, M. (2006): 'Does a public sphere exist in the European Union? An
analysis oI the content oI the debate on the Hader case' European Journal of Political
Research, 45(4): 609-634.
Waisanen, DJ. (2009): 'A citizen's guide to democracy inaction: Jon Stewart and
Stephen Colbert's comic rhetorical criticism' Southern Communication Journal, 74(2):
119-140.
Warner, J. (2007): 'Political culture jamming: the dissident humor oI the Dailv Show
with Jon Stewart' Popular Communication, 5(1): 17-36.
Xenos, M.A., Becker, A.B. (2009): 'Moments oI Zen: eIIects oI the Dailv Show on
inIormation seeking and political learning' Political Communication, 26: 317332.
Young, D. G. (2003): 'The counterargument-disruption model oI political humor in the
context oI late-night programming'. Paper presented at the annual meeting oI the
National Communication Association, Miami Beach, FL.
Young, D. G. (2004): 'Late-night comedy in election 2000: Its inIluence on candidate
trait ratings and the moderating eIIects oI political knowledge and partisanship' Journal
of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 48: 1-22.
Young, D.G., Tisinger, R.M (2006): 'Dispelling late-night myths: news consumption
among late-night comedy viewers and the predictors oI exposure to various late-night
shows' The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 11(3): 113-134.
Youthmedia.eu. (2010, August 2): Call for participants. workshop for voung fournalists
102
- 'the fournalist. an endangered species?`(http://www.youthmedia.eu/posts/149-call-
Ior-participants-workshop-Ior-young-journalists-the-journalist-an-endangered-species- ,
17/09/2010)
Zandberg, E. (2006): 'Critical laughter: humor, popular culture and Israeli holocaust
commemoration' Media, Culture & Societv, 28(4): 561579.
Zappen, J.P. (2000): 'Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975)' in Twentieth-Centurv Rhetoric and
Rhetoricians. Critical Studies and Sources, (Moran, M.G. and Michelle BalliI, M. eds.)
Westport: Greenwood Press: 7-20.
(http://www.rpi.edu/zappenj/Bibliographies/bakhtin.htm, 13/09/10)
Zelizer, B. (2004): Taking Journalism seriouslv. News and the Academv. 1
st
ed.
Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Zoonen, L. van (2005): Entertaining the citi:en. When politics and popular
culture converge, 192 p. Rowman & LittleIield: OxIord. (Google Book version
Irom http://books.google.com/books?
idnnTFLqP1VnoC&lpgPP1&hlIr&pgPP1#vonepage&q&IIalse,
08/10/10)
103
Statutory decIaration:
I hereby declare on oath, that I authored this thesis independently and that I did
not use any sources other that the ones cited in the list oI reIerences especially not any
other Internet sources that have not been mentioned.
The thesis has not been submitted to any other boards oI examiners beIore and has
not been published yet.
The printed version is consistent to the electronic version.
Direct or indirect quote Irom other works are clearly marked, indicating the
source.
I hereby agree that my thesis is made available Ior later inspection in the library.
Lyon, France, the 10/11/2010
104