ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 ISSN: 1085-6633

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FOR THEY DO NOT AGREE IN
NATURE
SPINOZA AND DEEP ECOLOGY
GAL KOBER
In the Ethics, Spinoza presents a rigorous naturalistic view of humans
and their non-unique position in nature, as an inherent part of nature,
subjects of the very same domain as all other objects and beings, gov-
erned by the same laws. This approach seems open to interpretations
close to those of Deep Ecology, and indeed such connections have been
made between the two views. This paper considers Spinozas view, clari-
fes what is meant by humans being a part of nature, assesses whether
this entails a Deep Ecology-like commitment towards other beings, and
fnally considers what precisely is entailed by Spinozas view, and whether
its licensing of the use of other beings is necessarily entailed.
In the Ethics,
1
Spinoza presents a rigorous naturalistic view of man
and nature. Man is a part of nature, a subject of the same domainnot
a domain separate from it, nor a domain within that of nature. Man can-
not act against nature or in an unnatural way; in comparison with any
other part or creature of nature, man is not special, more important or
qualitatively different. All general laws of nature apply equally to animals,
inanimate objects, humans, God, the mind, and the affects. Nature can be
explicated based on necessary causes, and there are no extra-natural fac-
tors that affect it or anything in it: no supernatural power or metaphysical
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 44
principles create or regulate it, and no separate methods of explanation
are needed.
In light of that, one might expect to fnd in Spinozas writing an ap-
proach to nature and its inhabitants close in spirit to the view and move-
ment that have come to be called Deep Ecology. According to this view,
humans are an equal and inherent part of nature, which should not be
considered anthropocentrically, and has intrinsic value apart from its use-
fulness to humans. It seems plausible that based on the equal natural sta-
tus they share, humans, animals and natural resources will be regarded
as deeply connected, respectful of one another, sharing in a pan-natural
fraternity, from which a commitment could perhaps be derived towards
the life and existence of one another.
In this paper I discuss Spinozas view of nature, and try to ascertain
whether such a view and that kind of commitment to nature indeed follow
from it. I start by explaining what is meant by man is a part of nature
and the naturalistic approach from which this dictum is derived. I then go
on to evaluate some of the main points on which the Deep Ecology view
is based in light of Spinozas concept of nature, and evaluate their compat-
ibility with Spinozas system. I then go on to explain how the license to use
nature for human beneft is justifed. Finally, I try to assess whether these
positionsthat humans are a part of nature, and that nature can be used
for human beneftare incompatible, or in what way the seeming tension
between them could be reconciled.
1. PART OF NATURE
The Ethics opens with a series of defnitions and axioms which ground
the key concepts and their relations to one another. I will now try to fol-
low the thread leading to the concept of nature and man within it.
Spinoza defnes substance as what exists in itself, and is conceived with-
out requiring a concept of anything else (I D3). A substance has attributes,
which are what the intellect perceives as the essence of a substance (I D4),
such as thought or extension. As a matter of fact, a substance cannot be
perceived by any intellect without its attributes.
2
A substance also has
modes, which are affections of the substance, and are conceived through
other concepts, they are derived from one another (I D5). A substance
is prior in nature to its affections ( I P1), which follows from the defni-
tions: a substance does not require anything else to exist, it is independent
of any other concept or thing, while its affectionsits modespresup-
GAL KOBER FOR THEY DO NOT AGREE IN NATURE 45
pose the existence of a substance. Hence it is clear that substance indeed
precedes its affections.
Two things that are different and separate would either have differ-
ent attributes, that is, the perceived essence of them as substances would
be different (by defnition), or they would differ in their affections (I P4).
That is the case, since whatever is, is either in itself or in another (I A1),
and attributes are the impression in the intellect of a substances essence
which is outside the intellect,
3
and so, of what is not in the intellect but
outside it, the other distinguishing criterion would be affections (the sub-
stances could be different as well, but that would be noticeable through
their different attributes, and in any case cannot be observed otherwise,
which leaves these as one of the two effective measures, along with af-
fections). Since two substances could differ either by their affections or
by their attributes, and affections (modes) are inessential and contingent
while attributes are essential and testify to the nature of the substance of
which they are, it should be the attributes that determine the difference;
and so if two substances display the same attribute(s), they are one and
the same substance, even if the perceived affections differA true idea
must agree with its object (E I A6). Hence, there can only be one sub-
stance of the same nature and thus of the same attribute (I P5).
God is defned as a substance consisting of infnite attributes, each
expressing an infnite and eternal essence of this substance (I D6). Since
things that have nothing in common cannot be the cause of one another (I
A5, A6, P3), and no two substances can have something in common, one
substance cannot be produced by another substance (I P6). As in nature
there are only substances and their affections, and substances precede af-
fections so they could not possibly be caused by them, and no substance is
caused by another substance, it must be the case that substance is its own
cause. By I D1, the essence of what is its own cause necessarily involves
existencethat is, its nature is conceived as necessarily existing, and hence
substance, which is its own cause, necessarily exists (I P7).
Substance cannot be fnite, because that would mean it is limited by
something else of the same nature (D2), which cannot be the case since
that would mean the other substance also exists necessarily, and no two
substances can share the same attribute. So [e]very substance is neces-
sarily infnite (I P8), and has infnitely many attributes which express
necessity, or eternity, and infnity (I P10 S).
4
Since such a substance neces-
sarily exists, as was shown above, and no two substances with the same
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 46
attribute could exist, then this one substance with infnite attributes and
necessary existence is the only substance which exists. God, by defni-
tion, is precisely that kind of substance, and thus God is substance and
exists necessarily (I P11). Such a substance is indivisible, since if it could
be divided into fnite parts it would mean it is fnite, and it could cease to
exist, which is contradictory to its nature (it cannot be divided into infnite
parts, since there could be only one infnite substance). And so, [e]xcept
God, no substance can be or be conceived (I P14), and since no other
substance could exist, nor any modes or attributes of another substance, it
follows that [w]hatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived
without God (I P15).
From the infnity of infnite attributes of God follows an infnity of
modes (I P16), since God is the only substance, and everything else is a
mode of this one substance (by I P15), and thus God is the effcient cause
of everything, it is their necessary cause, and is thus the absolute frst cause
(I P16). Since infnite things follow from the necessary nature of God, and
everything is in God and nothing could be conceived without it (P15), it
follows that there is nothing outside it, and thus nothing that does not
operate under the same laws of the nature of God, and if there is nothing
outside it, there is also nothing that could determine it, limit it, or set laws
of acting or operating for it. Hence, God acts from the laws of his nature
alone (I P17). Nothing compels God to act except his own nature. Thus
God is again seen to be causa sui, and since it is the only thing that exists
based solely on the necessity of its own naturebecause existence is in its
nature, and it is the only substanceand since it is free in its actions as
they are not determined by anything else but itself, God is a free cause,
and the only one at that.
Since modes are always conceived through another and are in an-
other (by defnition), their essence cannot include existence, otherwise
they would exist in themselves and necessarily. Thus the essence of things
produced by God does not involve existence (I P24). God is therefore
the cause of the being of things (ibid. C). And since nothing could be
conceived without God, God is not only the effcient cause of the exist-
ence of things, but also of their essence (which could not have been con-
ceived without God). Given that everything that exists is in God, must be
conceived through him (P15), and is caused by him (P16), it follows that
God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things (I P18).
GAL KOBER FOR THEY DO NOT AGREE IN NATURE 47
[A]ny thing which is fnite and has a determinate existenceis de-
termined to exist and produce an effect by another cause, which is also
fnite and has a determinate existence; and again and so on, to infnity
(I P28). Everything is caused by something; all fnite things are caused by
other fnite things, put into existence by fnite modes derived from Gods
infnite attributes (I P25C), for fnite things cannot be produced directly
by absolute and infnite things, such as God and his attributes. Every thing
that exists is caused by something, and even those that are not caused
directly (immediately) by God, are still caused by him, for nothing could
exist or be conceived without God. In nature there is nothing contingent,
but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature
to exist and produce an effect in a certain way (I P29).
1.1 Naturalism
As demonstrated above, Gods essence involves existence, he cannot
be conceived as non-existent, and is the cause of itself. Even God who is
the cause of all things and necessarily exists, is presented as being caused.
5

Spinoza presents here a strong naturalistic view: for everything there is
an explanation within nature, there is no external foundation on which
nature is based; all accounts of the world and its natural makeup can be
given in the same theoretical terms. No supernatural powers or explana-
tions are required in order to account for anything natural. For everything
that exists there is a causal explanation, every effect could be traced back
to a determinate and defnite cause, and these are all bound as a whole
system, brought into existence and set into motion by an immanent frst
cause, governed and operating by immanent laws emanating from the frst
cause (I P16). Since nothing exists outside of God (I P15), there is no tran-
scendent source for anything, no non-physical or meta-physical source of
nature or any occurrence within it. Explanations that refer to any such
things are false
6
and senseless, as they simply lack a reference.
7
Furthermore, the same laws apply uniformly to everything that exists:
the laws and rules of Nature, according to which all things happenare
always and everywhere the same. So the way of understanding the nature
of anything, of whatever kind, must also be the same, namely, through
the universal laws and rules of Nature (III, preface). From that follows
another important principle: not only could anything in nature be fully
explained without any reference to a supernatural source or force, but it
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 48
is also clear that everything in it is subject to exactly the same laws, that
is, no part of it could be said to be operating according to any other rules,
opposing or simply different from those which apply to everything else.
Specifcally, Spinoza makes this point regarding human beings in compari-
son with the rest of nature: many who have written about humans and
nature, he says, seem to conceive man in Nature as a dominion within a
dominion (III, preface). But that is not possible, as he has proven, since
everything in nature abides by the same causal laws which have one and
the same source. Man is no different from any other object in nature, is
subject to the same causal laws, and has no special status in relation to the
laws of nature. This uniformity with which the laws of nature apply to all
things reinforces the naturalistic character of Spinozas view: everything
is subject to the same rules in the same way, thus everything is accounted
for by these general rules of nature, and hence, again, no supernatural
foundation, source of causation or of explanation needs to be assumed
or evoked. All beings and all things are parts of nature, equally subjected
to its laws, mankind included: It is impossible that a man should not
be a part of Nature (IV P4), just as it is impossible that water, the angle
at which a body is refected from a surface it hits, or the smell of guavas
would not be a part of nature.
8

1.2 Deus Sive Physical Nature
Spinoza establishes the nature of substance step by step as unique,
infnite, eternal, cause of itself, the cause of all things, and so forth, and
shows how substance is in fact tantamount to God. He then proceeds to
use the term God or Nature, but at no point in the Ethics does he explic-
itly derive the identifcation of God directly with Nature as a whole,
9
and
particularly not with physical nature. There are, however, good reasons to
indeed take this as what Spinoza intends to do.
In I P5 Nature is frst referred to, as that within which things exist,
specifcally as something within which no two substances of the same
kind could not exist. As a name for the totality of what exists, it goes on
being used (e.g. I P8S2IV, I P10S, I Appx.). The identifcation of substance,
God and Nature is not made explicitly, but could be inferred. First, if
indeed in Nature there could not be two substances of the same kind,
and it has been established that there exists only one substance, which is
infnite, then there is a single substance that exists in Nature. And since it
GAL KOBER FOR THEY DO NOT AGREE IN NATURE 49
was established that [e]xcept God, no substance can be or be conceived
(I P14), then it follows that the only substance which exists in Nature is
God. And since there exists only one substance, no other substance could
exist, nor any modes or attributes of another substance, and it follows
that [w]hatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without
God (I P15). Hence whatever there is in Nature, is in God; hence sub-
stance, God and Nature are one and the same.
But what allows the identifcation of God, substance and Nature as
Spinoza describes them with physical nature? Curley claims that under
direct infuence of Descartes, [t]here are places in Spinoza where he does
speak as if his one substance were to be identifed with the whole of na-
ture as was just demonstrated above, and this fts in naturally with the
view that the one extended substance is to be identifed with the totality
of physical things (1988, 33). Evidence for that seems to be found in Eth-
ics I P15S, where Spinoza tries to refute positions which try to remove
corporeal, or extended, substance itself from the divine nature. But since
the fact that extended substance is one of Gods infnite attributes (as was
shown in P14C2), Spinoza claims there is no reason why [matter] would
be unworthy of the divine nature. For (by P14) apart from God there can
be no substance by which [the divine nature] would be acted on. Since
God is all that exists, and all that exists is in God, it seems to almost
trivially follow that extended subject, physical nature, would indeed be
included in God.
In the preface to book IV, Spinoza says: That eternal and infnite
being we call God, or Nature, acts from the same necessity from which he
exists. This indeed has been shown, but it was demonstrated in relation
to God; it was never before attributed directly to nature. For we have
shown (IP16) that the necessity of nature from which he acts is the same
as that from which he exists,
10
as is indeed demonstrated in IP16. The
reason, therefore, or cause, why God, or Nature, acts, and the reason why
he exists, are one and the same (Preface to IV).
1.3 Part and Whole, Man and Nature
The laws of Nature, then, apply equally to everything, since all that
exists is in God, and Gods laws apply to all within it. Humans, too, exist
as part of the totality of nature. They do differ from other animals in
some particular ways, as Spinoza himself notes.
11
But nonetheless, men,
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 50
like the rest, are only a part of nature (letter XXX
12
). What is meant by
that? What does it mean for something to be a part of nature? What is the
relation between a part and the whole which is nature? In what sense can
anything be referred to as a part of nature, given that, by virtue of being
infnite, Nature is indivisible?
13

I do not know how each part of nature agrees with the whole and
how it coheres with the rest (ibid.), Spinoza goes on to say; the idea of
parts that cohere with each other so as to create a whole seems to imply
a teleology: every part has a certain place and a role in relation to the
other parts and to the whole, and thus some kind of necessary position or
function that they have in relation to the operation of the whole, or in its
creation towards some purpose or a fnal form. On this view, man would
have a special role in nature, a specifc designated function in it (as would
all other creatures and objects in it).
A weaker sense of relation between parts and wholes could be a phys-
ical totality/continuum, a spatio-temporal continuity in which every sin-
gular part makes up a piece of some greater body, but with no necessary
relations to the other parts. Another loose sense of parts and wholes is
that in which the parts are an extension of a whole, such as all the things
to which a certain rule or system of laws apply. On that understanding of
part-whole relations, man would be one of the many bodies to which the
laws of nature extend in exactly the same way as to all others.
As could be deduced from what was described above, Particular
things are nothing but affections of Gods attributes, or modes by which
Gods attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way (I P25C).
The whole, based on that, is God, the totality of what exists;
14
particular
things, the parts, are dependent on the whole: they derive their existence
from it. But the whole does not depend on its parts in any way; It precedes
them (A substance is prior in nature to its affections (E I P1)). Since the
whole is infnite, it could not be the case that it is made up of parts that
are defnite. Since modes are defnite, and bodies are modes, the whole in
no way is defned by its parts, nor could they be seen as having a neces-
sary function in its makeup. The whole is not a telos of these parts. From
the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infnitely many things
in infnitely many modes (i.e. anything which can fall under an infnite
intellect) (I P16). God, the whole of Nature, is the effcient cause of eve-
rything,
15
not a fnal cause; it brings things into existence, sets a causal
chain in motion, but is not an end to which they are supposed to amount:
GAL KOBER FOR THEY DO NOT AGREE IN NATURE 51
all fnal causes are nothing but human fctions (I, Appendix, section II).
Only from a limited human point of view, unaware of the causes as they
really are, can one regard particular bodies, which are but fnite modes, to
be ends created by God. It cannot be that God creates things as ends, for
a few reasons. First, because even for God there is no free will to choose
what is created; God acts from the necessity of his nature. Second, if God
were to create something as an end, it would imply that he had been
lacking somethingwhich is impossible, since God is by defnition the
most perfect thing. Third, as the most perfect thing which is the effcient
cause of everything, God causes things whose effects go on to cause more
things, in infnite causal chains; the more immediately a thing is caused by
God, the closer it is to perfection, and its level of perfection diminishes the
more mediating causes there are between it and God (in reversed order).
If it were true that such created things are ends, then they would have
been more perfect than the ones more immediately created by God, as
they would become closer and closer to the fnal, perfect, form. Fourth, it
cannot be that God creates things as ends, since God is its own cause, and
whatever it creates is for its own sake. In sum, this doctrine concerning
the end turns Nature completely upside down. For what is really a cause,
it considers as an effect, and conversely [NS: what is an effect it considers
as a cause] (I App., part II). It has been established then, that the parts of
nature do not amount to a teleological whole. In what way then are they
parts in relation to a whole?
In physical nature, these parts are bodies. These are fnite, and they
determine and limit each other. Spinoza describes the ways in which they
operate on one another and limit one another as motion and rest (since
they are fnite modes of the infnite attribute of extension). Bodiesare
singular things whichare distinguished from one another by reason of
motion and rest; and soeach must be determined necessarily to motion
or rest by another singular thing, namelyby another bodyand this
[body] again (by the same reasoning) by another, and so on, to infnity
(IIP13L3Dem). The whole of physical nature, the whole made up of these
bodies, would then be a continuum of bodies, all affecting each other.
Not only are all bodies in nature subject to the same necessary laws, we
now see that they are always interacting with other bodies that determine
them, which also follows from their being fnite modes, and these are al-
ways determined through another. The human body is no different from
any other physical body: The human body, to be preserved, requires a
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 52
great many other bodies, by which it is, as it were, continually regener-
ated (II P13L7 postulate IV). Its very existence depends not only on God
that will cause it, but also continually on other bodies. [T]he human
body is composed of a great many parts of different natures (IVP45S).
The whole would then be a continuum of bodies, all connected and af-
fecting each other, some inside one another, and inside them more bodies
and so on. What Spinoza means by the parts being connected is explained
in a letter to Henry Oldenburg: By connection of the parts, then, I mean
nothing else than that the laws, or nature, of one part adapt themselves to
the laws, or nature, of another part in such a way as to produce the least
possible opposition (Letter XXXII).
16

If all parts are connected, and are within the whole of nature which
is one, how is it then that they can be perceived as separate parts at all?
And as separate bodies interacting, how do they come together as larger
bodies? Spinoza describes different bodies as coming together to create
what would be seen as a whole, another body, when these bodies can be
in close proximity and function together, that is, when their natures, their
particular characteristics, allow them to operate together: With regard
to whole and parts, I consider things as parts of some whole, in so far as
their natures are mutually adapted so that they are in accord among them-
selves, as far as possible (ibid.). But even parts that can affect each other
in this way as to not interrupt and amount to another whole dont lose
their status as separate: but in so far as things differ among themselves,
each produces an idea in our mind, which is distinct from the others, and
is therefore considered to be a whole, not a part (ibid.). That is, our intel-
lect can perceive the characteristics of a certain body and see it as a whole
in itself, and it can also perceive it as a part of another whole, when it
accords with other bodies to form another body. For instance, water and
grains of sand come together as mud; insofar as we perceive that as mud,
water, and grains of sand are parts of something else. But insofar as we
can distinguish them and perceive them as separate things, water would
be considered a whole, as would sand. Other examples of this are a lawn
and the leaves of grass of which it is made up, and a rock, which might
be a piece of a bigger rock, or seen as a whole constituting of molecules
of different minerals, metals, and salts. Spinoza demonstrates that with
the example of the different components of blood. In summary, the rela-
tions between the different bodies that make up physical nature are what
GAL KOBER FOR THEY DO NOT AGREE IN NATURE 53
determines and defnes them. Certain bodies come together with other
bodies with the nature of which they agree, to form new bodies, new
wholes. These in turn combine with others to form other wholes, and so
on. These infnitely many wholes, one within another and one next to the
other make up the totality of Nature. Each body is a part of the whole of
nature, but also on a smaller scale is a part of smaller wholes, and is also
a whole consisting of smaller parts.
Now, all bodies of nature can and should be conceived in the same
way as we have here conceived the blood: for all bodies are sur-
rounded by others, and are mutually determined to exist and to act in
a defnite and determined manner Hence it follows that every body,
in so far as it exists modifed in a certain way, must be considered to
be a part of the whole universe, to be in accord with the whole of
it, and to be connected with the other parts. But I conceive that
in regard to substance each part has a closer union with its whole.
(letter XXXII)
17
It now becomes clearer in what way the human body is a part of
nature. It, too, is part of this vast system of interconnections between
parts and wholes, and like them it abides fully by the laws of nature.
But Spinoza in fact extends this to the mind as well: You see, then, in
what way I think that the human Body is a part of Nature. As regards
the human Mind I think it too is a part of Nature (letter XXXII).
18
The
human mind is a fnite mode of the infnite attribute of thought. It is con-
stituted by a singular idea (II P11), is part of an infnite intellect (II P11C),
but perceives only a fnite part, the human body (II P13).
19
Anything that
happens in the body, is perceived in the mind (II P12). Of each thing
there is necessarily an idea of God, of which God is the cause in the same
way as he is of the idea of the human body. And so, whatever we have said
of the idea of the human body must also be said of the idea of any thing
(II P13s). This seems to suggest a parallel between modes of extension and
modes of thought, where for every mode of extension there would be a
corresponding idea; from these [propositions] we understand not only
that the human mind is united to the body, but also what should be under-
stood by the union of mind and body (ibid.). Not only is the human body
a part of nature, in that it abides by the laws of nature in exactly the same
way as any other part of nature, but also the human mind, united with the
human body, is thus a part of nature in the very same way. Man, then, is a
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 54
part of nature in the sense that it is just one of the infnitely man bodies in
it, fnite modes that like anything else follow necessarily from the nature
of God and are subject to the same rules as anything else in nature: for
the things we have shown so far are completely general and do not pertain
more to man than to other individuals (II P13S).
I now turn to the view of nature which claims to be derived from that
of Spinozas, and will try to discuss its actual relations to it, and the valid-
ity of the conclusions drawn from it.
2. DEEP ECOLOGY AND SPINOZISTIC THEMES
Deep Ecology is a movement of ecological activism the members and
founders of which subscribe to a set of views that postulate a moral obli-
gation of humans to nature, derived from their being an immanent part of
it. The idea of deep ecology is put in contrast to what is called by Deep
Ecology adherents Shallow Ecology. The latter is an approach calling
for policies of preservation of the natural environment, conservation of
non-renewable resources, protection of endangered species and of habi-
tats based on the possible beneft to human society resulting from it, or the
harm that would be caused by neglecting to do so, such as the depletion
of natural resources, the dwindling variety in the ecosystem, or the pol-
lution of the environment, which affects foodstuffs or water. The central
objective of this kind of ecological awareness is the health and affuence
of people in developed countries (Nss 1973, 95). As opposed to that ap-
proach, Deep Ecology is the idea that nature should be protected and re-
spected by humans for its intrinsic value, not for its usefulness. The focus
is turned from an anthropocentric to an ecocentric point of view. Humans
are perceived as having an ethical obligation towards nature, and as being
an immanent and equal part of it. The whole of the biosphere is con-
sidered to constitute a totality, an all-encompassing network of intrinsic
relations. In this thoroughly connected system all such related things are
equally important and equally central. Man is then not regarded as having
any priority over other beings a special member of nature; it is a part of it
equal to any other. And at least in principle all components of that system
are egalitarian, insofar as they do not exploit or eat some of the others for
vital purposes; there is no hierarchy of organisms, and they all have an
equal right to live and blossom (Nss 1973, 96). All creatures in nature
are inter-connected and inter-dependent; no one of them is by nature su-
perior to any other, and thus none is entitled to enslaving any of the other
GAL KOBER FOR THEY DO NOT AGREE IN NATURE 55
inhabitants of the bio-system, plant or animal. Ecological equilibrium is
thus considered to be of central importance, and diversity, complexity and
the well-being of all natural creatures should be protected. That is best
done by cutting down human population expansion and use of natural
resources, stopping the exploitation of plants and animals by humans, and
establishing partnership and symbiosis with animals and the ecosystem.
This framework of ecological thought (or ecological philosophy, as
some of its advocates regard it, ecosophy as termed by Nss) has often
been associated with certain interpretations of Spinoza, and was sometimes
presented as a theory that, if not based on his views, is at least compatible
with them. The conception of nature as [a]ll inclusive, creative (as natura
naturans), infnitely diverse, and alive in the broad sense of panpsychism,
but also manifesting structure, the so-called laws of nature (Nss 1977,
46) seems on the face of it to have some points in common with Spinozas
view of nature, or at least recall some of them. I will now follow the main
points of similarity as outlined by Nss (1977; 1980), and will consider
their actual similarity or compatibility with Spinozas views as presented
above. I will then try to determine whether or not the conclusions drawn
by Nss could indeed be derived from Spinozas view.
Deep ecology takes nature to be a complete whole, within which hu-
mans have no preferred standing. As was discussed above, this is indeed
compatible with Spinozas view; nature is an infnite totality, all within
God and subject to the same laws of nature. Man is a part of nature just as
much as any other thing in it is. Metaphysically, man has no preferred po-
sition in nature. The interconnectedness of everything in nature, its being
a network of cause-effect relations connecting everything with every-
thing (Nss 1977, 48) also seems to be in keeping with Spinozas views.
The view according to which nature does not exist for the sake of
human utility, which is at the core of the Deep Ecology perception, is also
quite compatible; nature defnitely does not exist for the sake of humans
or their utility. Being only a part of nature, as described above, humans,
like anything else in nature, are derived from the whole, as they are but f-
nite modes of it (of substance, God). They are derivative of a whole which
is self caused, necessarily in existence, eternal, and infnite. As Spinoza
shows (in the appendix to book I), it is not the case that all things in na-
ture operate for the sake of ends that would beneft man, since God has
created nature to function in this way, nor is it the case that man was cre-
ated in order to worship God. The source of these views, Spinoza says, is
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 56
that men are ignorant of the real causes of things, and having found many
things to be useful for them, since these things did not seem to have been
self-created, nor were they created by men, they assumed they were cre-
ated by some ruler of nature, and since their beneft of these things seemed
so obvious to them, they assumed those things were created for them by
this ruler or nature. As is made clear throughout book I and repeated in
the appendix, to consider things that were created by God as purposes
of any kind, as created for some ends, is an upside-down view of nature.
The particular things observable in nature, whether useful to man or not,
were necessary effects of necessary causes, all proceeding from God, who
I accept this correction as-is is the most perfect. These particulars are out-
comes of the eternal necessity of Nature. and their level of perfection di-
minishes as the chain of causes which brought them about gets longer, the
farther they are from God as the immediate cause. Had they been an end
for the sake of which things are made, they would have had to be more
perfect than what precedes them. This is the opposite from the actual case.
Another reason why it could not be that things in nature were created for
some ends, is that God is the most perfect entity, by defnition, and al-
though he brings about the existence of other things, he does not do so for
any end, otherwise it would have been clear that he is lacking something
which he wanted to supplement himself with. It is then fully compatible
with Spinozas views to claim that nature is not for the sake of humans.
The complexity of an organism, or its level of evolvement, do not en-
tail superiority or added importance in the view of Deep Ecology. It also
holds that there is no hierarchy in nature in terms of beauty, morality, or
perfection. In letter XXXII, Spinoza writes: I do not attribute to Nature
beauty or ugliness, order or confusion.
20
It is only human imagination
which attributes these properties to things in nature. From Gods point of
view, or that of Spinozas, beauty or ugliness are not qualities that are at
all found in nature. As explained above, humans, like any other object or
organism, are parts of nature with exactly the same status. Nothing grants
superior standing of any kind. As to perfection, though, things do differ
in a way: the more immediately caused by God they are, the closer they
are to perfection; but perfection is not taken by Spinoza to mean anything
even remotely moral, or as a value judgment. The closer to perfection
something is, the more real it is (E II D6), since it has more attributes, is
caused by modes that are less derivative from the infnite ones, and so on.
Still, this does not imply a hierarchy of worth or value.
GAL KOBER FOR THEY DO NOT AGREE IN NATURE 57
Deep Ecology holds that the distinction between mind and matter,
or between soul and body, is irrelevant. It also maintains that regarding
these dyads as having different values, where the latter ones are consid-
ered inferior to the former, or cruder than they are, does not hold. Indeed
for Spinoza that would not be a relevant distinction, and doubly so: frstly,
the idea of the human body is the mind,
21
these are simply two aspects of
the same thing. Thus the mind or soul attributed to some objects of na-
ture would have no role in granting them any preferred standing in rela-
tion to others. Secondlyassigning different values to these is not simply
irrelevant (given that there is no pertinent distinction between them), but
is also something he explicitly opposes, on the same grounds as he does
the assigning of beauty, ugliness etc.
Nss writes: every being strives to preserve and develop its specifc
essence or nature (ibid.). This rings similar to Ethics III P6: Each thing,
as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being. Since
singular things are modes expressing Gods attributes, and are determinate
expressions of Gods power, unless they are destroyed or terminated by
another thing, they will not cease to exist. As long as it is not interrupted,
every thing will endure. Many principles on which ecological thinking of
the deep kind is based are indeed very similar to, or at least compatible
with, Spinozas view of nature. But it is not at all clear that the imperatives
Nss and other deep ecologists derive from them are valid Spinozistic
conclusions.
The unity of man with nature, or mans being an integral part of na-
ture was indeed established above as following from Spinozas depiction.
We are ourselves part of nature, with no privileged position that would
allow us to claim exemption from its necessities (Lloyd, 1994, 155). All
particular things are manifold expressions of nature, of God. For Spinoza,
that is all they are, modes, expressions of the power of God. The more
we understand singular things, the more we understand God (V P24).
All parts of nature are equally important, and are equally pertinent to
the understanding of it. But Deep Ecology would take that a step further,
and would derive from it a certain commitment between these parts. The
notion that there is kinship between all creatures is quite senseless for
Spinoza, especially if that kinship is to be derived from the interconnect-
edness of nature. It is a logical fact, but with no moral implications. That
everything strives to persevere is yet another such fact; for Nss this is
taken as grounds for refraining from harming any natural being or object.
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 58
For Spinoza this is again only an added detail regarding the fnite modes,
or the nature of substance. That is precisely why, despite the similar basic
assumptions regarding nature and mans place in it, the conclusions of
Deep Ecology cannot be derived from Spinozas Ethics. Metaphysically,
there could be total agreement, but where Deep Ecology seeks to derive
moral obligation or commitment, it fails to adhere to Spinoza, and in fact
strays away from him in essential ways. For Spinoza no ought could be
posed; not only does he not derive any such imperatives himself,
22
but
because this is not anything his system allows for. If nature is all inter-
connected bodies with equal stature, it is because of the necessity of the
nature of God; these things are necessary,
23
not a product of choice, and
there is no scale for their evaluation, moral or other
24
.
Deep Ecology presents an ecocentric point of view which is to be
preferred over the anthropocentric one. Such a distinction involves a few
presuppositions. First, it must be assumed that man is somehow separate
from nature, or could posit himself separately from it, and chose a focus,
whether himself or the ecosystem. It has become clear from all that was
said above that this is not at all an option in Spinozas view. He writes
explicitly against the anthropocentric view of nature (in the appendix to I)
as mistaken view, based on ignorance of real causes. Further, for Spinoza,
man cannot be seen as separate from nature, but a part of it; but that is
not to say that thus the view of nature has to be ecocentric; in fact, the
distinction between these two positions seems nonsensical within Spino-
zas worldview. Man, animals, and the rest of the biosphere are all nothing
in themselves but modes of the attributes of God. Within the Spinozistic
nature, all creatures are equally central or marginal. It is God, Nature,
substance, which is the frst and effcient cause, the source of all that ex-
ists, and eternal, and thus the only worthy center of the world, or at least
of attention, if anything is to be that.
A similar problem arises with the view of man as exploiting nature,
resources or animals. Since the Spinozistic nature is a system of inter-
dependencies between bodies, an all-encompassing network of neces-
sary causal relations, it is hard to see how any value could be assigned
to certain relations between these bodies, and what could be a source
for evaluating these relations. It is also impossible to attribute different
classifcation to certain acts or operations as natural versus artifcial,
or against nature if all phenomena are necessarily caused and abiding
GAL KOBER FOR THEY DO NOT AGREE IN NATURE 59
by the same natural laws. Calling something artifcial establishes a dis-
tinction between what is naturally caused and what is made by man, but
not only is there no human free will, there also is no causation in nature
that is not necessary and originating in God; the distinction thus cannot
be made at all. The fully naturalistic system which Spinoza presents also
effectively does not allow for any moral discourse; just like truth is its
own standard(II P43s), there is no sense in talking about any parts of the
causal chain as bearing value; there is nothing in this system to ground a
standard of values like that.
Nss writes: Every life form has in principle the right to live
and blossom. As the world is made, of course, we have to kill in order
to eat, but there is a basic intuition in deep ecology that we have no
right to destroy other living beings without suffcient reason. we will
grieve when living beings, including landscapes, are destroyed. For
deep ecology, there is a core democracy in the biosphere. (Nss 1993a,
18485)
Somewhat surprisingly, the implication that everything in nature is
animate is not that far-fetched in relation to Spinoza. It could be claimed
that because of the unity of body and mind everything is equally animate
or inanimate. Spinoza says, in his discussion of minds and bodies: the
things we have shown so far are completely general and do not pertain
more to man than to other individuals, all of which though in different
degrees, are nevertheless animate (II P13S). The same laws of nature hold
for everything, and animation is attributed to anything of which there is
an idea (a mind). The different degrees refect the distance from the eff-
cient cause, the degrees to which it is removed from the individual object.
The frst problem which arises here is the notion of rightthere is noth-
ing to ground a right of any sort. Since everything in nature is necessary,
the most that could be said is that things are simply as they are; nothing
beyond a description of states of affairs could be given. There is no tran-
scendent source of value, right or morality. Even God is not transcendent,
and the Spinozistic God is not one that occupies himself with any such
issues altogether. The notion of democracy in the biosphere seems to as-
sume a certain equality between the components of this sphere, which as
said above, might be said to exist. But if a democracy of that sort implies
any sort of freedom or of choice, then this is again a nonsensical claim in
the Spinozistic world view, where the will cannot be called a free cause,
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 60
but only a necessary one (I P32) since it, too, like motion and rest or any
other natural phenomenon, follows necessarily from God.
Although the general view of Nature on which Deep Ecology grounds
itself is quite compatible with that of Spinozas, and is sometimes that very
same view, Spinoza does not arrive at the same conclusions at which Deep
Ecology does. As discussed above, these conclusions do not quite follow
directly from the view of nature they are based on, and some added no-
tions are necessarily added to them, some that would no longer be in
keeping with Spinozas thought, such as moral obligations, imperatives, or
rights and values that follow from the state of necessarily caused things.
I will now turn to Spinozas own views regarding mans relation to other
animals, and try to evaluate what moral standing towards nature could be
derived from them, and whether or not they are consistent with his view
of man as a part of nature.
3. AT YOUR DISPOSAL: SPINOZAS RELATION TO ANIMALS
Spinoza describes what is commonly referred to as moral behavior
altruism, compassion, help and so onas grounded in utility and self-ben-
eft. Helping one another is a useful way for people to provide themselves
much more easily with the things they require (IVP35S). The more one
seeks ones own advantage,
25
the greater ones power of acting is, and the
more one is useful to others (IV P35C2). But that only applies in relation
to other human beings. [W]hat is most useful to man is what most agrees
with his nature (IV P35C1), and that is other human beings.
Animals can feel, but their feelings differ from those of man inasmuch
as their natures are different; we cannot in any way doubt that the lower
animals feel things (IIIp57s), but this does not oblige us to any form of
behavior towards the feeling creatures. In fact, there is actually no good
reason to refrain from killing animals, or using anything in nature in any
way we might wish to do so:
Apart from men we know no singular thing in nature whose Mind
we can enjoy, and which we can join ourselves in friendship, or some
kind of association. And so whatever there is in nature apart from
men, the principle of seeking our own advantage does not demand
that we preserve it. Instead, it teaches us to preserve or destroy it ac-
cording to its use, or to adapt it to our use in any way whatever. (IV,
Appendix XXVI)
GAL KOBER FOR THEY DO NOT AGREE IN NATURE 61
Our commitment is only towards what is like us, and since animals
do differ from humans in their nature, we need not regard them as any-
thing but potentially useful objects. Nothing can be considered good for
us, except insofar as it agrees with our nature (IV P31C); and so, [t]he
rational principle of seeking our own advantage teaches us to establish
a bond with men, but not with the lower animals, or with things whose
nature is different from human nature (IV P37S1). Refraining from kill-
ing animals is thus not reasonable, but only based on empty superstition
and unmanly compassion (ibid.). Humans right to act is defned by his
virtue or power (ibid.),
26
thus a greater ability to act entails a greater
right to act; and men have far greater right against the lower animals
than they have against men (ibid.), because humans have reason, which
allows them to understand more of nature; in comparison with animals
they understand more and can do more. In addition to that, our power of
acting cant be affected by something whose nature is completely different
from ours (IV P29).
27
It is not that animals are completely different from
us; had that been the case, we would also not have been able to act on
them at all. But they are different enough to license their use by humans.
Spinoza says he does not deny that the lower animals have sensations.
But I do deny that we are therefore not permitted to consider our own ad-
vantage, use them at our pleasure, and treat them as is most convenient to
us. For they do not agree in nature with us, and their affects are different
in nature from human affects (IV P37S1). That difference is enough to
set us apart from animals. Although they are not completely different such
that we would not be able to acknowledge their feelings, their natures
are different enough from ours so that we do not need to consider them
the same. Certain feelings we can have are only considered inasmuch as
they are felt towards humans (e.g. hate, E IVP45S). Even though we can
identify feelings in animals, there is no imperative to be compassionate.
Pity is irrational and useless (IV P50), one should help if one can, instead
of feeling pity. But that, again, is true only in relation to humans. And if
that could be said in relation to animals, it of course applies even more
strongly to the rest of nature than is not taken to be sentient.
Spinoza claims that animals can feel, very differently from Descartess
view on the matter.
28
They are different from humans, but it is more of
a quantitative difference than it is one of quality; their feelings are also
different from us, but are still legible to us insofar as we are similar. Given
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 62
Spinozas account of the unity of body and mind, there is no ground for
assuming a sharp divide between the feelings of humans and those of other
creatures, as they are still both subject to the same laws of nature, created
necessarily of the same initial cause, and are both modes of the same at-
tributes and substance. All this means that the possession of reason does
not separate human beings out from the rest of nature. Rather, it makes us
aware of our integration with it (Lloyd 1994, 155). Still, this integration
with nature does not entail a moral obligation of any kind to the rest of
nature. Lloyd (1980) tries to account for this seeming tension by introduc-
ing the idea of a moral community of humans, within which such obliga-
tions could exist, but which excludes non-humans. Animals may feel, but
as their sensations are different, they cannot be seen as fully agreeing with
our nature, and thus they are not part of the human moral community
inside which humans are acting in a way that is useful to one another in
order to secure their own benefts. In relation to animals and the rest of
nature, humans can attain their benefts without needing to take others
considerations into account. While some rights may be derived from each
creatures striving to exist and power to act, moral rights are a separate
level of rights, species-relative, ones that apply within a moral community
of creatures who collaborate with each other in the pursuit of reason in
a way which is particular and common only to humans.
29
Spinozas ac-
knowledgement of the fact that animals could feel, is then by no means a
basis for concern for the well-being of animals or of nature.
As Nss (1980) points out, concepts as moral right, moral commu-
nity and the like are foreign to Spinozas system. Thus, as he points out,
Lloyds account does not quite reconcile Spinozas derivation of animals
equal stature in nature and their having feelings with the differentiating
approach to their well-being. As he shows, since humans and animals are
not said to be altogether different, but in fact do have some traits in com-
mon, that at least does not preclude humans acting for the beneft of
animals (Nss 1980, 318), in a manner similar to that of people acting
for the beneft of humans who do not share in their reason: babies, the in-
sane, and the debilitated. As Nss concludes, despite the fact that Spinoza
presented a speciesist view, his system does not necessarily entail such a
position. (Nss 1980, 323).
GAL KOBER FOR THEY DO NOT AGREE IN NATURE 63
NOTES
1 All references to Spinozas work are to the Ethics, unless otherwise noted; all
quotations from the Ethics are from Spinoza 1994.
2 Curley 1988, 1215.
3 It is disputed whether attributes are objective facts regarding the substance or
whether they are subjective perceptions of it, some intra-intellectual refection
of the substances essence, as was pointed out e.g. by Garrtett (2003, 23); it
seems less consistent with the rest of Spinozas views that it would be the lat-
ter. I take them to mean something perceived by the intellect in direct relation
to the objective trait of the substance (by I A6).
4 Infnitely many attributes is understood as all possible attributes in order
for these inferences to hold; this is indeed the common way of understanding
it (Curley 1988, 10)
5 Garrett 2003, 24.
6 E I A6 : A true idea must agree with its object, and these ideas would agree
with no object.
7 Garrett 2003, 30.
8 Garrett 2003, 30; Bennett 1984, 29. See below for a discussion of man as part
of nature.
9 In the earlier non-geometric draft of the Ethics, Spinoza does equate the two,
nature and God, explicitly: [S]ince Nature or God is one beingit is neces-
sary thatthere isan infnite idea which contains in itself objectively the
whole of Nature Short Treatise, Second Appendix, (in A Spinoza Reader, p.
59).
10 He here seems to refer to God, as in the original proposition.
11 They have reason and more power/virtue; I return to that later.
12 Letter XXX, to H. Oldenburg, Sept. or Oct. 1665. Spinoza 1966, 205.
13 I P13
14 By reality and perfection I understand the same thing (II D6).
15 I P16C1
16 Letter XXXII, to H. Oldenburg, Nov. 20 1665, Spinoza 1966, 210.
17 Ibid., pp. 21112.
18 Ibid., Spinoza 1966, 212.
19 Also Spinoza 1966, 212.
20 Spinoza 1966, 210.
21 II P13, Spinoza 1966, 212.
22 On Spinozas view regarding the relation to animals and nature see below.
23 Nothing is contingent in nature (I P29); even the will is not free, but a nec-
essary cause (I P32), because everything is caused by the necessity of Gods
nature.
24 Spinoza 1966, 210.
ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 64
25 That is, its own preservation, as best as possible: [e]ach thing, as far as it can
by its own power, strives to persevere in its being (III P6)
26 Ones virtue and power to act are expressions of ones essence, and are equal
to ones striving to persevere and preserve oneself by acting (IV D8, III P7).
27 The reasoning is similar to the way in which bodies (or even, hypothetically,
substances) can limit and defne one another but cannot determine something
with which they have nothing in common.
28 That animals are automata, purely mechanical, with no mind associated with
their bodies. They cannot feel, nor do they have any trace of reason whatso-
ever. (Discourse on Method, AT VI 5859). Indeed, as pointed out by Sessions
(1977), this difference stems from a far more fundamental one: Contrary to
Descartes (as well as Bacon, Leibniz, and the entire project of Enlightenment)
Spinozas inquiry was intended primarily to promote self-knowledge and
knowledge of God as nature, rather than towards a mastery of this nature as
a means for human progress.
29 Lloyd 1980, 29697, 301, 303.
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ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 18(1) 2013 ISSN: 1085-6633
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Katy Fulfer recently completed a PhD in philosophy from the University
of Western Ontario, where she is also a member of the Rotman Institute
of Philosophy. As of August, she will be the Libman Professor of the Hu-
manities at Hood College. She specializes in feminist applied ethics. Katys
work is particularly interested in the intersection between globalization
politics, reproductive ethics, and justice towards the environment. E-mail:
ksmit285@uwo.ca
John Hadley is Research Lecturer in Philosophy in the School of Humani-
ties and Communication Arts at the University of Western Sydney. He was
formerly Lecturer in Communication Ethics in the School of Communica-
tion and a lecturer in philosophy in the School of Humanities and Social
Sciences, Charles Sturt University. E-mail: j.hadley@uws.edu.au
Myra J. Hird is Professor and Queens National Scholar in the School
of Environmental Studies, Queens University, Canada (www.myrahird.
com). Professor Hird is Director of the genera Research Group (gRG), an
interdisciplinary research network of collaborating natural, social, and
humanities scholars, and Director of Waste Flow, an interdisciplinary re-
search project focused on waste as a global scientifc-technical and socio-
ethical issue (www.wastefow.ca). Hird has published eight books and
over ffty articles and book chapters on a diversity of topics relating to
science studies. E-mail: myrahird@me.com
Gal Kober is an assistant professor in the department of philosophy at
Bridgewater State University. Her work is centered mostly in Applied Eth-
ics and in Philosophy of Biology. She graduated from Boston University in
2010, having completed a dissertation on the concept species in evolution-
ary biology and its dysfunction. E-mail: gal.kober@bridgew.edu
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