IB History HL Internal Assessment:

To what extend can Germanys declaration of war in 1914

be justified?

Vilnius Lyceum
Modestas iugda
Candidate Number: 000978-0039
Word Count: 1984
000978-0039
2
Contents page

Section Page
A. Plan of the investigation 3
B. Summary of evidence 3-4
C. Evaluation of sources 4-5
D. Analysis 5-6
E. Conclusion 6-7
F. Bibliography 8


































000978-0039
3
A. Plan of the investigation

The event that defined the 20th century and immensely changed the structure of todays world is
the First World War, and at this point in time most historians agree that its outbreak was not
solely Germanys fault, therefore the question arises to what extent can Germanys
declaration of war to France and Russia in August 1914 can be justified. In this
investigation, Germanys actions in the period of around the July crisis will be put against the
actions taken by the Entente, which might have provoked Germany in such a way. This internal
assessment will not try to investigate the deep-rooted causes of the war, but will specifically
focus on the actions taken by the great powers after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on the
28th of June 1914. In this investigation multiple recent History books will be consulted, which
are primarily based on analysis to get a deeper insight into the subject.


B. Summary of evidence

In the years prior to the war, diplomatic treaties and alliances had been formed between the great
powers of Europe. This manifested in the formation of two belligerent alliances; the Triple
Alliance (comprising the German Empire, Austria-Hungary and Italy) and the Triple Entente
(France, Russia and Great Britain) finalized in 1882 and 1907 respectively. This meant that a
continental war could easily be ignited by a smaller conflict between two of the antagonizing
powers due to offensive obligations that each country had made to each other.
1

Regarding Russia:
This international situation prevailed up to the faithful year 1914 when the First World War
started. On August 23, Austria presented Serbia with an ultimatum, which would allow the
Austrian military inspectors to enter Serbia and so humiliate the country.
2
Germany encouraged
Austrian military intervention in order to preserve their alliance with them. At the same time,
Russia supported Serbia out of fear of losing its foothold in the Balkans.
3
This of course created
a difficult situation where Russia undertook partial mobilization to show its support for Serbia,
both France and England supported this action.
4
At the same time Germany saw this as a
provocation and due to its anxiousness and limited preparation of alternative strategies pushed
for the implementation of the Schlieffen Plan, which intended attack on both fronts by firstly
crushing France and then Russia, Great Britain was left out from these calculations.
5

Before the implementation of the military plan, Germany refused to enter into negotiations with
the European powers as proposed by Britain, and ignored British threats of standing by their

1
Layton, Geoff. From Bismarck to Hitler: Germany 1890-1933. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2002, p. 51.
2
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 209
3
MacMillan, Margaret. The War That Ended Peace. London: Profile Books, 2013. (Ch.19)
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
000978-0039
4
allies.
6
At the same time Germany demanded Russia to seize mobilization, which was ordered on
both on the 29th and 31st of July.
7
It must also be noted that Russia also mobilized its Baltic
fleet, which did not make sense in a partial mobilization against Austria, since Russia only
competed with Germany in the Baltic Sea.
8

France:
At the same time Germany was receiving mixed signals about the French positions in this
conflict, they remained ambiguous, and vaguely stated that France will follow its interests.
9

Some French diplomats even openly encouraged Russia to take action against Germany
10
; this
alarming information reached the Germans through Italian diplomats and caused great concern in
the country.
11
It must be noted that Germany demanded France to give up two of its fortresses in
order to prove its neutrality in the conflict, which the later of course refused, as this would have
significantly lessened her defensive possibilities.
12
Germany, which was surrounded by two
enemies, saw the Schlieffen Plan as the only solution to a Russian mobilization. At the same time
as Russia was partially mobilizing through such measures as the promotion of officers, and
relocation of soldiers closer to its European borders, Britain also started fleet maneuvers which
seemed threatening to Germany even if they only had a defensive purpose, and similar things
were happening in France, where retired officers were being drawn back into service and the
shop started selling more war gear.
13
Meanwhile Germany refused to negotiate peace through a
conference as suggested by Britain.
14


C. Evaluation of sources

Diplomacy by Henry Kissinger is an in depth analysis of the history of international relations
from the 18th to the 20th centuries. The book provides clear insights into specific political events
of world history, even if the author puts more emphasis on analysis then on the presentation of
facts. The books purpose is to give the reader analytical insights into the main turning points of
world history from the standpoint of the decision makers. The values of this work are the fact
that the events are thoroughly analyzed by a renowned expert in the field of international
relations. Diplomacys limitations lie in the fact that it is a book covers 300 years of international
relations and therefore the analysis regarding the outbreak of the First World War might not be
as detailed as in a monograph dedicated to that one specific topic. The books focus on
international relations allowed for the essay to gain insights into the leadership of the great

6
Ibid.
7
Kissinger, op. cit., p. 215.
8
Clark, op. cit., (Part 3, Ch. 11)
9
Ibid., p. 216
10
Kissinger, op. cit., p. 215
11
MacMillan, op. cit., (Ch. 19)
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
000978-0039
5
powers of Europe at that time and so see their true motivations and logic behind their decision-
making.

The War that ended Peace by Margaret MacMillan, an award winning Canadian historian,
presents the reader with a detailed analysis of the political and social events just before the
outbreak of the First World War. In the book, the author aims to give a balanced account of the
events, by thoroughly analyzing all actors of those happenings, in regards to their motives,
worldviews and faults. The books value lies in the fact that it is deeply focused on the topic of
the outbreak of the First World War, and on its precise implementation of quotes by the
politicians of that time, which gives the reader insights into the thoughts of the people who had
the power during that crisis, and why they failed to prevent the conflict or why they pushed for
war. Some minor limitations of the book might be the abundance of different factors while trying
to explain the war, ranging from Nietzsche to Spiritualism, which might make it harder to extract
the main causes of the war in regards to Germany. The book was very useful for this essay due to
its balanced approach regarding the actions of both sides and its tendency to look for more
profound causes of the conflict.

D. Analysis
In order to analyze to what extent the actions taken by the German leadership were based on
reasonable assumption one must judge their actions from the political situation and knowledge
that was available at that time. Clark points out the mutual suspicion of the great powers and
defends Germanys claim for taking on military actions in spite of Russias mobilization.
15
He
sees that Germanys actions were in tune with the spirit of that time as the other powers would
have done the same in case of a sudden German mobilization and therefore Russia is to blame
for such developments.
16
However, it must be also considered that by encouraging Austria to act
out fear of losing its alliance Germany committed itself, and knew the dangers of a possible
conflict with the Russian Empire. This commitment to alliances; however, also could be
observed on the other side of the barricade where England and France did not try to restrain the
Tsar out of fear of Russia making a deal with Germany, which would have resulted in a severe
strategic loss for them.
17

It is logical to assume that diplomatic exchanges between French and Russian diplomats could
have influenced Germany to take hasty assumptions, and this of course lead to bold German
actions. Germanys push for the implementation of the Schlieffen plan could be seen as an act of
desperation, while facing impending danger, as Cark believes that from the French perspective
the Franco-Russian alliances only purpose was to wage war against Germany due to no other
strategic benefits to gain, which can justify Germanys paranoia.
18


15
Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. New York: HarperCollins, 2012. (Part
3, Ch. 11)
16
Ibid.
17
MacMillan, op. cit., (Ch. 19)
18
Clark, op. cit., (Part 2, Ch. 3)
000978-0039
6
However, it can also be said that Germanys actions could not be fully justified politically due to
it feeling threatened by some broad assumptions about Frances designs. For instance, Kissinger
argues that France had the right to act in its national interests when Germany made preposterous
demands in order to secure its neutrality.
19
Yet these demands seem more realistic when
perceived from a strategic view, considering the strong anti-German sentiment in France and the
ambiguous signals it was sending towards Russia. It can be assumed that Germanys decisions in
trying to weaken Frances strategic position were in tune with the ideas of safety of those times,
as Germany could not start a war against Russia, while allowing France to remain lurking at their
western frontiers. This is evident from the fact that due to the alliance system French intervention
had been expected. German generals believed that France could only be defeated through a
preemptive strike through which Moltke thought a conflict could be shortened and the losses
minimized. This traces back to the Bismarckian way of thinking about war as effective political
tool and it was prevalent in the minds of the German Generals.
20
However, it must be noted that
Moltke Senior initially believed in a defensive war against France with the help of the Rhine as a
barrier and attack on Russia first in order to achieve a quick peace, which would strengthen
Germanys position politically, and therefore Germany did possess the strategic possibilities of
only mobilizing against Russia and therefore being viewed as the victim of Entente aggression.
21

However, this was not possible due to the military and political decision making institutions in
Germany being separated, therefore only the strategic consequences in regards to attacking
France through Belgium in order to maximize the chances of success where made, while the
political implications of invading a neutral country were not considered. After all Belgium was a
sovereign state, protected by Britain, yet the generals were only concerned with efficiency and
not rightfulness, therefore following their national interests was their utmost priority and this
involved a swift victory against France.
22


E. Conclusion

In conclusion, most of today's historians agree that the outbreak of World War I was caused
collectively by all European powers; however, while assessing the validity of Germanys
declaration of war the responsibilities of other countries, which opposed Germany must be
considered. It can to no extent be claimed that Germanys actions were completely fair since they
were the party to declare war. However, the Entente also knew that any mobilization would
cause a continental conflict and Russia is to blame for starting mobilization, which also includes
the French encouragements during the crisis. At the same time, Germany is guilty for declaring
war on France due to it not fulfilling ridiculous German demands and at the same time attacking
neutral Belgium. Germany is to blame for the separation of its political and military planning
which lead to it taking unreasonable decisions, and overemphasis on the Schlieffen plan made

19
Kissinger, op. cit., p. 215
20
MacMillan, op. cit., (Ch. 11)
21
Keegan, John. The First World War. London: Hutchinson Random House, 1998.
22
Kissinger, op. cit., p. 205
000978-0039
7
Germany act impulsively and ignore the prospects of an international conference to solve the
issues. However, the alliance systems made widespread conflicts more probable and, yet Russia
ignored this danger, which concludes that at least Germany acted rationally while declaring war
on the mobilizing Russia.





































000978-0039
8
F. Bibliography
Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. New York:
HarperCollins, 2012. EPUB.

Keegan, John. The First World War. London: Hutchinson Random House, 1998. EPUB

Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. Print.

Layton, Geoff. From Bismarck to Hitler: Germany 1890-1933. London: Hodder & Stoughton,
2002. Print.

MacMillan, Margaret. The War That Ended Peace. London: Profile Books, 2013. EPUB