The Web Site for Critical Realism (WSCR)

WSCR Glossary
Louis Irwin
[The following notes are copyright 1997-98 by Louis Irwin and are reproduced here with
permission.
http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/glossary/glossary.txt
Introduction
These notes are intended to ac!uaint those new to "has#ar$s wor#s with some of the basic
concepts "has#ar uses to formulate his positions% not to state the positions themsel&es% and I
hope they will be useful as an entry point for new readers. 'ne aim is to state the concepts as
clearly as possible in order to enable new readers to orient themsel&es% therefore many nuances
are not addressed. (n attempt has been made to state the point of a concept and relate it to the
philosophical tradition and)or to other of "has#ar$s concepts.
I cannot pretend to be completely successful in these aims. The material is not meant as a
comprehensi&e glossary nor to co&er the same ground as those which "has#ar pro&ides in *+,
and +-% which &ary in their difficulty. It is more in the nature of a primer.
,inally% I should stress that these notes represent my own particular bac#ground and path into
critical realism and may not be entirely congenial to those with a different bac#ground% especially
those who prefer historical approaches to concepts.
I welcome suggestions% corrections and criticisms regarding both accuracy% nuances% and the
points of concepts. +lease feel free to distribute these notes to whome&er you wish% as long as
they are preceded by this paragraph. This &ersion is an incomplete draft based on my marginalia
and includes page references to specific wor#s which will be e.cised in later &ersions as I correct
errors. /eferences to +'0 and +I, are lac#ing% because the former is una&ailable to me and I
ha&e not had time to read the latter. --Louis Irwin
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(ll 2or#s by /oy "has#ar3
4/T5 6 ( /ealist Theory of 5cience
4+'0 6 The +ossibility of 0aturalism
45/7- 6 5cientific /ealism and 7uman -mancipation
4// 6 /eclaiming /eality
4+I, 6 +hilosophy and the Idea of ,reedom
4*+, 6 *ialectic3 The +ulse of ,reedom
4+- 6 +lato -tc.
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("5-08-
"has#ar argues that the world cannot be concei&ed without absences% to which we constantly refer
and presuppose. The idea is not that we add fictional entities li#e 5anta 8laus% unicorns or caloric
to the presences that we already recogni9e in our factual discourse: it is rather that reality e&en at
the e&eryday le&el is inundated with absences ;an empty glass% a missing wallet% the failure of a
monsoon to ha&e effect% etc.< ;+- =>-7<. "has#ar does recogni9e fictional entities as part of
fictional as opposed to factual discourse% but e&en in factual discourse we do not ha&e to accord
e.istence in the form of absence to things we tal# about% such as caloric ;*+, ?@-?1<. Aenerally%
absences are causally efficacious% such as the absence of health% in contrast% say% to the non-
e.istence of caloric.
"has#ar understands absences both as product ;something not there< and process ;ma#ing
something absent% or BabsentingB<. 7e also uses iterable hybrids of these3 process-in-product ;for
e.ample% the causal efficacy of the past or things at a distance<% product-in-process ;the e.ercise
of causal powers% as in ongoing social acti&ity< ;*+, C9: +- ==-><.
"has#ar argues that absence is a concept that is alien to the classical conception of the world
which stri&ed to ensure that all action ta#es place by contiguous contact% yet that conception is
incoherent without absence ;+- =7<. ,or e.ample% the transfer of momentum from one billiard ball
to another re!uires spaces in between them. Dore generally% absence is closely related to change
and hence to cause. ,or a change in something is the absence of something that was present% or
the presence of something that was absent: and to cause something is to ma#e a change% either of
the first sort% which is what "has#ar calls BabsentingB something% or of the second sort% which
"has#ar calls Babsenting absence.B -ither way% to cause something is to ma#e something--either a
presence or an absence--absent ;+- =><.
0ow there might appear to be a symmetry between absence and presence% so that e&ery absence
can be regarded as the presence of something else% and &ice &ersa. The absence of hair would be
regarded as the presence of baldness% etc. -&en this tri&ial e.ample lac#s symmetry% because we
understand BbaldnessB as meaning absence of hair% whereas we do not understand BhairB as
meaning absence of baldness. 0on-tri&ial e.amples% such as the absence of health% bring out
deeper asymmetries. In a narrow sense the absence of health% say T"% could mean the presence
of certain microbes% such as is occurring in (merica$s inner cities% but as in the baldness e.ample
the symmetry brea#s down3 we do not understand the presence of those specific microbes as
meaning the absence of T" ;we could identify them in an independent fashion<.
There is a broader asymmetry as well% because the absence of health in general cannot be
e!uated with the presence of disease. The presence of disease manifests itself in a number of
ways% such as the presence of microbes% &iruses% carcinogens% etc.: howe&er% these presences are
caused by the absence of health practices% which is in turn tied to politics. 8onsider another
e.ample3 the absence of freedom e!uated to the presence of oppression. The e!uation brea#s
down% because the presence of oppression is manifested in many ways ;death s!uads%
disappearances% Eails% etc.<% but the underlying causes of those manifestations can only be
described as an absence of freedom.
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(8TF(LI5D ;5/7- G8<
The reduction of causal laws to patterns of e&ents% a position associated with 7ume and classical
empiricism. "has#ar holds by contrast that causal laws ha&e a real e.istence as tendencies which
generate the phenomena ;e&ents and situations< in which patterns are detected and which are
subEect to empirical obser&ation or &erification. The patterns are reflections of the tendencies% but
the latter cannot be reduced to the former.
"has#ar designates phenomena generated by real mechanisms and tendencies as Bactual%B but
such mechanisms and tendencies may or may not manifest themsel&es in actual phenomena%
depending on what else occurs ;and such manifestations may or may not be empirically
ascertained<. The distinction between real and actual pertains to positi&ism% the distinction
between actual and empirical pertains to subEect)obEect identity. This is a #ey concept for "has#ar
and is closely related to stratification. ;5ee *I,,-/-0TI(TI'0 (0* 5T/(TI,I8(TI'0: see also
8L'5-* (0* '+-0 5H5T-D5% 5T/'0A (0* 2-(I (8TF(LI5D% and ,(8T5.<
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87(0A-
"has#ar uses this term in a technical% rather than e&eryday% sense. Fnderlying the e&eryday
assertion BThere has been a change in the weather%B some philosophical theories see no change
in&ol&ed e&en if the statement is true. Hesterday$s weather% today$s weather% and tomorrow$s
weather are &iewed as e&ents which e.ist outside time and thus are Beternal.B (t most% a
statement that there has been a change in the weather in&ol&es a switch in subEecti&e attention
from one eternal e&ent ;yesterday$s weather< to another ;today$s weather<% or from one aspect of a
single unchanging +armenidean one to another.
"has#ar wants to reinstate the temporal aspects of reality% and he characteri9es such theories as
unable to conceptuali9e change% which re!uires &iewing the significant elements of reality as
tensed processes comprising irreducible internal and e.ternal temporal relations ;*+, ?=<. The
absence of change shows up in a number of ways in different theories. To#en monism is the &iew
that the world consists of unchanging to#ens% each one a monad% an isolated +armenidean one
;*+, ??<. ,or e.ample% inde.icalism ;the world as a series of atomistic e.periences<% punctualism
;the world as a set of atomistic e&ents or facts<% bloc#ism ;the world as a closed set of all past%
present and future facts% all e!ually determinate< ;*+, G=G-?<. Type monism is the &iew that the
world consists of unchanging types and hence does not admit emergence.
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8L'5-* (0* '+-0 5H5T-D5 ;5/7- G7<
( closed system is one restricted in such a way that laws ha&e uniform effects. (n open system is
one that is not closed. 8losed systems do not usually occur spontaneously in nature and generally
re!uire human inter&ention% such as in laboratory e.periments. (ll sorts of inter&ening causes may
pre&ent a causal mechanism or tendency from ha&ing its normal effect. The concept of closure
plays an important role in refuting determinism% because a determinist case cannot be sustained
without the regularity that comes with closed systems% and ultimately it is shown that the
assumption of closure is an article of faith.
8lassical field theories in physics ;gra&ity% electromagnetism% mechanics< assumed a pure world
containing only a single field and showed how% gi&en any initial state of the field% all subse!uent
states of the field were determined. The !uestion of what happens when se&eral of the fields are
assumed to e.ist and interact created problems for the determinism that was irrefutable under the
assumption that only a single field e.ists and is operati&e. Laplacean determinism e.trapolated
this narrow truth to all of reality. 8losure is also closely connected to the understanding of laws
other than as merely patterns of e&ents3 that identity can be sustained only so long as systems are
assumed to be closed.
It is important to reali9e that a closed system is not the same as a spatially isolated system. To
achie&e closure one must assure that there are no counter&ailing causes ;of a #ind pertaining to
the phenomena being in&estigated<. "eing cut off from e.ternal influences is in general insufficient
to rule out internal counter&ailing causes. ,or e.ample% a system free of e.ternal influences is
ne&ertheless open in respect to 0ewtonian mechanisms if it contains !uantum phenomena ;/T5
>9<. Juantum phenomena are treated by determinists as irrele&ant at some macro le&el.
8ountere.amples li#e a switch that is thrown and thereby causing some macro e&ent if and only if
a geiger counter shows an e&en number at a designated time are considered e.ceptions3
determinism applies only in closed systems% which will by ;circular< definition e.clude such
e.ample situations. ( potential field is deterministic% other things being e!ual% that is% e.cluding
!uantum phenomena% not to say other potential fields which are also deterministicK ;5ee
*I,,-/-0TI(TI'0 (0* 5T/(TI,I8(TI'0 and 5T/'0A (0* 2-(I (8TF(LI5D.<
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8'D+L-TI'0
( completed science would mean that no further cogniti&e transformation is needed to ac!uire
whate&er scientific #nowledge is a&ailable ;/T5 =8<. This does not mean that e&erything would be
already #nown% merely that there is a uni&ersal% obEecti&e% and unchanging set of concepts
sufficient for all #nowledge ac!uisition.
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8'05T-LL(TI'0
( dialectical structure in which a part of reality is seen to be a component of a broader%
encompassing reality ;*+, 19<. "has#ar spea#s of an emergent entity as being constellationally
identical with the ground from which it emerged. ( constellational closure means closure of the
totality constituting a constellation of phenomena. (ccording to "has#ar% 7egel made matter a
determinant constituent of a closed spiritual totality. 5ince nothing can emerge from a closed
totality% matter has to be present ;or at least determined< from the start ;*+, G?<. "has#ar by
contrast &iews mind as ha&ing emerged from an open material totality.
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8/ITIJF- (0* T/(058-0*-0T(L (/AFD-0T
'n "has#ar$s &iew% philosophy is not the result of pure cogniti&e acti&ity: it% li#e all #nowledge% is a
social institution ;see T/(05ITIL- (0* I0T/(05ITIL- *ID-05I'05< and relies on
presuppositions about the nature of the world in which it is embedded. +hilosophical dilemmas are
sustained by presuppositions% whose e.posure can lead to their reEection and the dissolution of the
dilemmas ;+- 9-11<. 5uch resolution is an e.ample of what "has#ar terms Be.planatory criti!ue%B
which is a form of transcendental argument.
( transcendental argument establishes a categorical necessity as a presupposition of e.isting
practices ;+- C9<. "has#ar focuses on what he terms denegation3 affirming in practice what is
denied in theory% to deny in a theory something whose truth is presupposed by the theory ;5/7-
G97-8<. "has#ar &iews theories as social constructs whose e.istence ha&e presuppositions. ,or
e.ample% the simple theory B0othing e.istsB could be true only if it is false% because the e.istence
of the theory is a counter e.ample to what the theory asserts. Dore generally% human acti&ity
includes theory construction% so the e.istence of theories about human acti&ity may ha&e
presuppositions that conflict with what the theory asserts about humans and theory construction. (
tri&ial e.ample of this would be the theory B7uman theory does not e.ist.B Dore generally yet%
human acti&ity includes attempts to understand human acti&ity% so the e.istence of theories about
human acti&ity may ha&e presuppositions that conflict with what the theory asserts about humans
and their self-understanding. (n e.ample would be B7uman acti&ity and #nowledge is completely
determined by the laws of physics.B This e.ample is not tri&ial li#e the other two and re!uires
arguing that the construction of such a theory about human action re!uire that reasons be causes
;see /-(5'05 (5 8(F5-5<% something denied by the theory.
8riti!ues are different forms of transcendental arguments. (n immanent criti!ue is the refutation of
a theory by showing that practices presupposed by the theory are in conflict with the practices
described by the theory ;5/72 1?<. 5uch conflicts are termed a.iological inconsistencies ;5/7-
1><. "y orienting criti!ues to a.iological inconsistencies% "has#ar a&oids the 7egelian idealist &iew
of the world as a de&eloping self-contained system of thought ;5/7- 1=<. "has#ar sees
philosophy as dependent upon e.tra-philosophical commitments ;a.iological standpoints and
interests< which are re!uired to form subEecti&e beliefs and the broader supporting discourses
;5/7- 18<. ( metacriti!ue is the identification of Bcausally significant absencesB in theories which
lead to transformation of the practices that sustain them ;5/7- G=<. ( metacriti!ue may or may
not include an e.planation of the absence. If so% then an e.planatory criti!ue may follow on to lead
to a negati&e e&aluation on the causes and so lead to correcti&e action ;see ,(8T)L(LF-<. (n
(chilles 7eel criti!ue is a metacriti!ue that not only e.plains why there is an absence% but also
e.plains why the theory is blind to the absence.
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*-T-/DI0I5D ;// 1>1-G<
Fbi!uity determinism is the &iew that e&ery e&ent has a real cause ;/T5 7@<. /egularity
determinism ;5/7- G18< is the &iew that e&ery e&ent of a gi&en type has an effect of a related
type ;/T5 7@% where he seems to get it bac#wards<. /egularity determinism can only be supported
by the assumption of closed systems% which ensures a regular pattern of conEunction of e&ent
types. "has#ar supports ubi!uity determinism% but he stresses that the fact that an e&ent was
caused does not entail that the e&ent was predetermined. (lthough in fact% say% e&ent y caused
e&ent .% between the occurrences of y and . there could ha&e been some other e&ent which would
ha&e inhibited y from causing .. /egularity determinism has to assume that there are no
phenomena which could inhibit y from causing .% so it has to ta#e the future at the time of y ;and
hence the future at any time< to be fi.ed and determinate. Ta#ing the future in this way% though% is
simply to assume predetermination. The inference of predetermination from ubi!uity determinism
would re!uire the additional assumption of closed systems. *oes the world consist of Eust
regularities% or does it also include mechanisms which cause regularities% and which permit the
manifestation of regularities to be defeatedM
It is useful to contrast the structure of a type with the acti&ity of its to#ens. The structure of a type
may be completely determined by the structure of its components% such as li!uidity is determined
by the chemical properties of water. That #ind of determination is ordinary scientific e.planation
and ta#es place at the le&el of the real. 2hat "has#ar obEects to is the assumption that such
scientific e.planations entail that the acti&ity of to#ens of a type are predetermined. 2hat happens
to this particular !uantity of water may ha&e &ery little to do with its chemical composition% for
e.ample the di&ersion of ri&ers in the 2estern F.5. to 8alifornia due to political decisions.
,reedom and agency are e.plained by unactuali9ed tendencies which are real properties of the
world but whose effects are not determined by currently actual phenomena ;see (8TF(LI5D<.
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*I(L-8TI85
"has#ar pro&ides a fornal description of dialectic as a Bprocess of conceptual or social ... conflict%
interconnection and changeB ;*+, C<. "has#ar &iews dialectics as a real process which results in
the remo&al of causally efficacious obstacles to human flourishing. 5uch obstacles are analy9ed
as BabsencesB which must be BabsentedB in a real% contingent dialectical process of emancipatory
criti!ue or Babsenting absencesB ;see ("5-08-<. 'ntological dialectics is concerned with reality%
epistemological dialectics is concerned with what is #nown about reality% and relational dialectics
metacritically situates our #nowledge in relation to what is #nown ;*+, C<.
"has#ar sees humanity as sharing a core human nature ;subEect to change< which manifests itself
differently under different conditions &ia &arious mediations. 7umanity manifests itself in different
ways under conditions of po&erty and conditions of wealth. The core humanity grounds a core
e!uality% de&iations from which must be Eustified by particular mediations in concrete indi&iduals
;+- 11C% 1?9<. Things are dialectically e!ual if there are no differences Eustified by particular
mediations that could Eustify treating them une!ually% and dialectical uni&ersali9ability re!uires
treating dialectical e!uals e!ually. "has#ar sees theory)practice inconsistencies ;see 8/ITIJF-
(0* T/(058-0*-0T(L (/AFD-0T< as arising from the lac# of dialectical uni&ersali9ability
;+- 1C=<
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*I,,-/-0TI(TI'0 (0* 5T/(TI,I8(TI'0
5tratification is the layering of ontology into the le&els of the real% the actual% and the empirical. The
real consists of real mechanisms which generate phenomena at the le&el of the actual% which may
or may not be obser&ed at the le&el of the empirical ;5/7- G7<. Dore generally% stratification
refers to the simultaneous causal efficacy of different emergent le&els ;see -D-/A-08-<.
5tratification is associated with a &ertical analogy "has#ar deploys throughout his wor#s and is
related to causal structure. 5tratification also applies in the transiti&e domain of #nowledge as well
as the intransiti&e domain% such as a piece of #nowledge &s. the cogniti&e structures which
generates #nowledges by transforming anterior #nowledges ;5/7- >@<.
*ifferentiation is the e.istence of open as well as closed systems. *ifferentiation implies that laws
and actions do not ha&e uniform effects% hence the origin of the term. The distinction between
mechanisms and the e&ents they generate ;or can generate<% which is stratification% is necessary
to account for why the world is differentiated ;/T5 19<. *ifferentiation is associated with a
hori9ontal analogy "has#ar deploys throughout his wor#% specifically in regard to the causal
efficacy of generati&e mechanisms in open and closed systems ;5/7- ?@<. 5uch causal efficacy
is termed Btransfactual.B
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-D-/A-08- ;/T5 11C<
The origin of things with a degree of causal autonomy from the e.isting causal le&el from which
they arose. 8ausal autonomy pre&ents the emergent entities from being reducible to that from
which they emerged. The properties of an emergent thing are not predictable from properties at
the lower le&el ;5/7- 1@?<. ,or e.ample% social properties in general can only be e.plained in
terms of other social properties. There may be laws about biology that are not reducible to laws of
physics. This does not re!uire some special mental or spiritual substance which has properties
o&er and abo&e physical properties. It re!uires merely that biological entities ha&e properties that
cannot be entirely reduced to mechanical properties% nor to electromagnetic properties% nor to
gra&itational properties% etc.% but are formed from comple. interactions of these. (ll these physical
phenomena can interfere with the effects of the others% as when a magnet pre&ents something
from falling. "iological entities may be able to e.ploit real possibilities in nature that are not
a&ailable to entities subEect to mechanics alone% or to electromagnetics alone% etc. The comple.
properties from all the separate physical phenomena may collude in a way that transcends the
effects of any one or se&eral of them without ha&ing to posit any other mysterious force.
-mergent properties e.ploit possibilities in nature that were not being e.ploited at the lower le&el
from which these properties emerged. In the same way% atomic structure in&ol&es the actuali9ation
of forces of nature ;the wea# and strong forces in the nucleus< that were not in&ol&ed in the
component protons and neutrons prior to the formation of atoms. 0ew powers that emerge are
only possible in &irtue of the higher le&el of organi9ation of matter that e&ol&es ;*+, =1<.
( transcendental argument from our e.perience shows this to be correct in regard to the
irreducibility of social acti&ity. It is the condition for the e.istence of our social products that we be
causal agents whose reasons are autonomous causes. The origins of human actions can be
e.plained only by reference to social forms: the effects of human actions can be e.plained only by
reference to the causal effects of beliefs.
0ote that reductionism here is not the same as determinism3 reduction turns on which le&el of
causal mechanisms ;physical% biological% etc.< are operati&e% while determinism turns on whether
those mechanisms operate in open or closed systems ;// 11?<. -mergence is consistent with a
diachronic causal account of how the emergent entity de&elops from a pre-emergent le&el of the
world. The rise of social reality can be traced in a causal chain from the pre-e.isting non-social
reality% but once it e.ists% social reality cannot be synchronously reduced to the non-social part of
reality ;5/7- 11C<. (utonomy is e.emplified by the fact that e.planation of certain physical states
;namely% ones that are the result of intentional human acti&ity< re!uires irreducible reference to
beliefs ;5/7- 117<.
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In the epistemic fallacy% statements about being are be interpreted as statements about #nowledge
;5/7- ><. "asically% being is understood as percei&ed being% something that is unpercei&ed being
a thing-in-itself at best ;and neither real nor actual at worst<. In the ontic fallacy% #nowledge is
analy9ed as a direct% unmediated relation between a subEect and being. The ontic fallacy ignores
the cogniti&e and social mechanisms by which #nowledge is produced from antecedent
#nowledge% lea&ing an ontology of empirical #nowledge e&ents ;raw perceptions< and a de-
sociali9ed epistemology ;5/7- GC% G=C<
"has#ar sees a close relation between these two fallacies% especially in relation to classical
empiricism. The epistemic fallacy first proEects the e.ternal world onto a subEecti&e phenomenal
map% then the ontic fallacy proEects the phenomenal entities of that subEecti&e map bac# out on the
world as obEecti&e sense data% of which we ha&e direct perceptual #nowledge. 5o reality
independent of thought is first subEectified% then the subEectified elements are obEectified to e.plain
and Eustify our #nowledge.
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-pistemic relati&ism turns on the issue whether science has a uni&ersal% obEecti&e% and
unchanging set of concepts that ser&e as its absolute foundation ;5/7- ?C<. Its opposite is termed
Bmonism.B "has#ar says it does not and hence plumps for epistemic relati&ism. 7e belie&es that all
our concepts and beliefs are historically generated and conditioned and so relati&e to a
perspecti&e and subEect to change. 7e combines this &iew with Eudgmental rationality% which
asserts that science is not arbitrary and that there are rational criteria for Eudging some theories as
better and more e.planatory than others.
-pistemic relati&ism% of course% does not say that our conceptual tool#it is arbitrary% a &iew no
doubt supported by Eudgmental rationality. This concept also permits an understanding of changing
conceptual framewor# as well as the accretion of #nowledge in an unchanged conceptual
framewor# ;5/7- =G<. "has#ar often refers to changing and unchanging #nowledge% but he
appears to mean conceptual framewor#s rather than the aggregate of what is #nown.
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This distinction in many ways mirrors that of Bepistemic relati&ism and Eudgmental rationality.B
"has#ar contrasts a relati&e and de&eloping ethical naturalism with a rational moral realism.
-thical naturalism is at the le&el of moral rules designed to guide actions% and these change o&er
time with changes in our ethical concepts ;for e.ample% Bsla&eB% BpersonB<. Fnderlying these is a
moral realism which grounds our ethics and which can be rationally disco&ered &ia analysis of the
changing nature of oursel&es% our needs% and our society. "has#ar spea#s of Bethical alethia%
ultimately grounded in conceptions of human natureB ;*+, G11<. It is moral realism that pre&ents
ethical naturalism from being an arbitrary matter internal to a culture.
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"has#ar distinguishes theoretical and practical e.planations ;5/7- >8% 1@7-8: *+, 1@9-11@: +-
G?-G=% G7-G8<. Theoretical e.planation in&ol&es the detection of real% underlying structures and
mechanisms which generate obser&able phenomena in a three-tiered process with a 7umean
le&el pertaining to the recognition of regularities% a Loc#ean le&el pertaining to the
conceptuali9ation of causal structure% and a Leibni9ian le&el pertaining to the empirical detection of
real structure. +ractical e.planation in&ol&es e.amining a comple. conEuncture and analy9ing it
into component structures and mechanisms ;already detected by theoretical e.planation<.
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,(8T5
"has#ar &iews facts as social constructions that are conceptuali9ations of the world and e.ist in
what he terms the transiti&e dimension of science ;/T5 =7% 19>: // 9% >@: 5/7- 9?-=% G8C<.
"has#ar concei&es the world as containing mechanisms at the ontological le&el of the real that
generate phenomena ;e&ents and situations< at the ontological le&el of the actual% and we
conceptuali9e these e&ents and situations into transiti&e facts% which are social products and
subEect to conceptual change. Thus facts% unli#e e&ents and situations% cannot e.ist in a world
without intelligent beings.
(s our conceptual tool#it changes% so does the way we conceptuali9e e&ents and situations.
8ritical realism conceptuali9es e&ents and situations in relation to the real mechanisms which
generate them% rather than concei&ing them as atoms that determine our #nowledge of them
without any #ind of mediation. ;5ee -+I5T-DI8 (0* '0TI8 ,(LL(8I-5.< ,acts are not gi&en to
us in e.perience% they are established through a social process ;5ee T/(05ITIL- (0*
I0T/(05ITIL- *ID-05I'05.< B,acts are paradigm social institutions3 they are possibilities
inherent in the cogniti&e structures that human agents reproduce and transform but do not createB
;// >@<. This &iew of facts contrasts with Bthe positi&istic concept of a fact as what is more or less
immediately apprehended in sense-perceptionB ;5/7- 9=<.
0ow if we want to claim that all facts are relati&e to a perspecti&e% then it may seem that we ha&e
to ignore the relati&ity of the perspecti&e from which the claim is ad&anced% which is termed
B0ietschean forgetting.B "has#ar resol&es this antinomy by holding that perspecti&es are real ;+-
77< and are parts of totalities in which agents are embedded. The perspecti&e from which the claim
about perspecti&es is made is part of a totality essentially relating the real perspecti&es the claim is
about. This totality is the stratified self% and its structure eliminates the need for BforgettingB the
perspecti&e from which one ma#es the claim that all perspecti&es are relati&e ;+- 8@% 198-9<
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,(8T)L(LF-
"has#ar !uestions both the scientistic assertion that factual propositions are &alue-free in content
and the positi&ist denial that &alue propositions can be deri&ed from factual propositions. The first
denies that factual discourse can be about &alues% the second denies that factual discourse can
lead to &alues ;5/7- 17?<. The scientistic assertion% conEoined with an e.tensional theory of
meaning% leads to the positi&ist denial3 &alue-free semantic atoms plus the construction of
meanings from e.tensional functions of these can only lead to &alue-free propositions ;// 99<.
"has#ar$s &iew is that facts are social constructs in the transiti&e dimension and so are bound to
incorporate &alues implicit in social relations ;5/7- 17?<.
(gainst 7ume$s law that fact)&alue deri&ations are impossible% "has#ar notes that the e.posure of
a source of untruth leads to a negati&e e&aluation of it and a commitment to eliminate it. It might be
obEected that "has#ar is himself illicitly importing the &alue of commitment to truth% but 7ume$s law
really says that following a commitment to truth can ne&er legitimately lead to a &alue commitment
;other than to truth< ;// 1@=% 5/7- 18?ff<. ( commitment to truth thus leads to prescriptions for
action% what "has#ar calls the a.iological commitments of truth. The transition from fact to &alue
does not reduce &alues to facts% because the transition is possible only if &alues ha&e a real
e.istence.
The brea#down between facts and &alues leads to a theory of emancipation. The domain of a
social science includes both a social obEect ;say% a social structure< and a belief about that obEect
;our understanding of the social structure in !uestion<% and one of the !uestions for social science
is the match between the two. The answer will be found in internal relations between them ;5/7-
1=C% 17><. 7ow much does our understanding ;or misunderstanding< of a social structure reinforce
its e.istence% and &ice &ersaM The answer can lead to negati&e e&aluations of the social structure
;5/7- 1=C% *+, G=9% +- 1@9<. "has#ar claims that a structure of emancipation is implicit in all
our discourse and practice.
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8ausal laws are distinguished from patterns of e&ents. This position relies on the distinction
between open and closed systems. The position is established by transcendental argument based
on the e.istence of e.perimental acti&ity% in which a scientist is a causal agent who interferes with
the course of natureB ;/T5 =?<. The empiricist conception &iews laws as always actuali9ed in
empirical regularities. The 8/ &iew is that causal laws are real tendencies which may not be
manifested ;made actual< and typically manifest themsel&es as empirical regularities only &ia
e.perimental acti&ity in closed systems artificially created ;// 1>-17<. ,rom the point of &iew of
causal patterns of e&ents% then% "has#ar belie&es that all laws are most honored in the breach.
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"has#ar understands this term in two Iantian strands3 an immanent metaphysics primarily
concerned with what our #nowledge presupposes about reality% and a descripti&e metaphysics
concerned with the conceptual framewor#s in terms of which reality is thought ;5/7- 1@-11% G1<. It
is important to #eep in mind that "has#ar &iews #nowledge in a &ery practical manner% so an
immanent metaphysics analy9es what our e.isting conceptual practices presuppose about the
world ;see 8/ITIJF- (0* T/(058-0*-0T(L (/AFD-0T<% while a descripti&e metaphysics
analy9es the categories deployed in those conceptual practices.
Fnli#e Iant% who thought geometry% for e.ample% was an immanent feature of our conceptual
structure% "has#ar holds that a descripti&e metaphysics cannot be deri&ed from an immanent
metaphysics. "has#ar sees immanent metaphysics as an BunderlaborerB for social practices
ranging from scientific acti&ity to emancipatory practices. *escripti&e metaphysics can Bdecode
and decipher the conceptual schemes informing those practices.B ;5/7- GG<
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'0T'L'AI8(L -OT-05I'0(LI5D
Traditional e.tensionalism can be &iewed as ta#ing a fi.ed set of atoms of some sort that are part
of a closed system yielding actualist generalities. In a logically e.tensional language the atoms are
atomic sentences which enter into truth-functional relations. ,or e.ample% $pP!$ is true if and only if
p is true and ! is true. Truth as a whole can be gi&en a purely e.tensional definition along these
lines. ( maEor problem is that language tends to be highly recalcitrant when you try to interpret it in
e.clusi&ely e.tensional terms.
This e.ample is at the le&el of epistemology% but "has#ar sees the same sort of thing occurring at
the le&el of ontology and hence his phrase. The world is reduced to atomistic states% and laws are
sustained as &alid by the tacit assumption of closure. In opposing such an atomistice &iew% /" of
course wants to &iew totalities as other than atoms bound together by e.ternal relations. The
concept of absence as essential to this picture.
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The thesis that there is only one type of e.istence% namely presence% comprising phenomena
which essentially are e.perienced% or at least e.periencable. 2ith no concept of absence% there
can be no concept of a stratified world in&ol&ing generati&e mechanisms whose effects may not be
present. Fnder that constraint the only realism which can be affirmed is a form of actualism.
(ctualists or empiricists do not deny the reality of% say% atomic structure: howe&er% they analy9e
that structure in terms of actual or possible e.perience of the effects of atomic structure% so they
recogni9e no transfactual acti&ity that occurs independently of intellection. (t a higher le&el% Iant
understood space and time as presuppositions for the &ery possibility of e.perience% but he placed
them in the structure of mind as organi9ing principles for managing the actualist stream of e&ents.
"y mono&alence there is no absenting and hence no change: there is merely a set of eternali9ed
facts--past% present% future--which e.ist once and for all in a closed set ;bloc#ism<. (lternati&ely%
there is merely a set of features of an unchanging +armenidean one ;punctualism% inde.icalism--
see 87(0A-<. "has#ar sees ontological mono&alence as bloc#ing the raising of what he terms
Be.istential !uestionsB3 if tautologically e&erything e.ists% there is no way to say something does
not e.ist% much less to claim that its absence is causally efficacious ;*+, GC?< ,or e.ample% the
absence of resources for self-de&elopment is a constraint on freedom ;*+, G8@<. 'ntological
mono&alence pre&ents the recognition of the e.istence of such a constraint% which cannot be
produced. +olitically% legally% and morally a mono&alent society sees nothing that pre&ents a
person li&ing in po&erty from becoming a millionaire% and freedom is understood as the absence of
a legalist prohibition% which is the narrower concept of liberty or negati&e freedom.
(lthough "has#ar &iews absences as real and apparently subscribes to the &iew that e&erything is
real% the !uantifier Be&erythingB has to be understood as ranging o&er whate&er is real% not simply
o&er whate&er e.ists% at least if Be.istsB refers to presences and not absences. 2ith e.istence%
reality% and !uantifiers understood this way% the answer to the !uestion of what e.ists is narrower
than the answer to the !uestion of what is real.
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/-(5'05 (5 8(F5-5 ;5/7- 17<
If the mental could be reduced to the physical% then reasons would be irrele&ant to causal
e.planations% because the reduced le&el would e.plain e&erything without the need to refer to
reasons. Therefore% if reasons are causes% the mental cannot be reduced to the physical ;// 1>?-
=<. The legitimacy of the scientific enterprise re!uires the causal efficacy of reasons% because Bin
an e.periment scientists co-determine an empirical result which% but for their intentional causal
agency% would not ha&e occurredB ;*+, =G<. This constitutes an immanent criti!ue of reducti&e
materialism.
0ow it may be obEected that if the mental could be reduced to the physical% reasons could still be
real and causally efficacious% because one part of physical reality would be causally efficacious on
other parts. "has#ar$s &iew does re!uire an additional component3 it is not Eust the reality and
causal efficacy of reasons that pre&ent their reduction to the physical% they must be in some sense
partly autonomous of the physical% which is to say that they are emergent ;see -D-/A-08-<.
It is possible to e.plain physical phenomena prior to the emergence of mental phenomena without
reference to beliefs and intentional acti&ity% but once mental acti&ity has emerged and causally
interacted with the physical world% e.planation of physical phenomena re!uires ineliminable
reference to intentional acti&ity. It is this difference in e.plaining pre- and post-emergent physical
phenomena that establishes the causal efficacy of reasons in a non-reducti&e sense. 2hat is said
here about mental phenomena carries o&er to the wider social bases of actions.
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5T/'0A (0* 2-(I (8TF(LI5D
There are two strategies to which empiricist accounts of causal laws are forced to resort in the
face of open systems. 5trong actualism is the &iew that complete state descriptions supporting
causal laws e.ist% and are uni&ersal% but are not #nown. The empiricist analysis of laws thus
becomes a regulati&e ideal% an unachie&ed empiricism ;5/7- G9<. 2ea# actualism is the &iew that
causal laws only apply in closed systems% so laws are #nown but not uni&ersal ;5/7- G8-9<. 2ea#
actualism is an empiricism that can be achie&ed in practice% but it lea&es phenomena in open
systems une.plained.
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The inference from obser&ed to unobser&ed things. Transdiction has the following forms. Induction
is the inference from past to future% transduction is the inference from closed to open systems%
retroduction is the inference from actual phenomena to structural causes% and retrodiction is the
inference from e&ents to antecedent causes ;*+, GCG<. /etrodiction is the transition in practical
e.planation from resol&ed components of a comple. to antecedent causes ;5/7- 1@8<. The
ability to retrodict causes presupposes theoretical e.planation and retroduction. /etroduction is
the transition in theoretical e.planation from manifest phenomena to their generating mechanisms
;5/7- 1@8<. Transduction pertains to the applicability of laws disco&ered in closed systems to
open systems ;5/7- C@<.
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T/(05ITIL- (0* I0T/(05ITIL- *ID-05I'05
The intransiti&e dimension in the philosophy of science corresponds roughly to ontology and the
transiti&e dimension roughly to epistemology ;5/7- G?-=<. This tells us little% since e&ery
philosophy has an ontology and an epistemology. It is the reEection of subEect)obEect identity which
re!uires a special understanding of their relation for critical realism. Inowledge e.ists as a real
social obEect in the transiti&e dimension and is about real obEects in the intransiti&e dimension%
which e.ists independently of mental acti&ity. Intransiti&e obEects e.ist and act independently of
our #nowledge of them ;e.cept when we use our #nowledge to inter&ene<% so #nowledge is
irreducible to what it is about and constitutes an obEect with its own le&el of social causality ;5/7-
=1-G<.
0ote that #nowledge has both intransiti&e obEects% namely what #nowledge is about% and transiti&e
obEects% namely the antecedently e.isting #nowledge from which new #nowledge is formed ;5/7-
=?<. Transiti&ity represents the social character of science and thus is in opposition to solipsism%
while intransiti&ity is tied to the e.istence of causal structures and is in opposition to
phenomenalism ;/T5 G?% G><.
It should be #ept in mind that the transiti&e)intransiti&e distinction applies both to reality and to our
#nowledge of reality. 2ithin reality there is a distinction between intransiti&e features of reality and
the transiti&e production of #nowledge% which is a component of reality. 2ithin that part of reality
comprising the transiti&e production of #nowledge% one can find the philosophy of science with a
distinction between the intransiti&e dimension ;ontology< and the transiti&e dimension
;epistemology<. 'ne can also find a metacritical dimension which scrutini9es the philosophy of
science containing those dimensions. 5o the intransiti&e% transiti&e% and metacritical dimensions
are all found within the transiti&e process of #nowledge construction% which is itself a part of a
broader intransiti&e reality ;5/7- G?-G=<
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( correspondence theory of truth ;a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts< is
substanti&e only if propositions and facts are independently identifiable. If they are not% then the
assertion of correspondence becomes a tri&ial platitude% a guiding form for a genuine theory of
truth ;5/7- 1@@<. 5ince facts are social constructs ;see ,(8T5<% a correspondence theory would
be subEecti&e and tri&ial as an e.planation of truth% since we will always ensure that our transiti&e
propositions and facts are correlated ;see T/(05ITIL- (0* I0T/(05ITIL- *ID-05I'05<.
( correspondence theory could be framed differently% though3 a proposition is true if and only if it
corresponds to the intransiti&e e&ents and situations it describes. 5ince e&ents and situations e.ist
at the le&el of the actual and are generated by a deeper le&el of real structures and mechanisms
;see (8TF(LI5D<% an ade!uate theory of truth is surely tied to the le&el of the real% unli#e the
reformulated correspondence theory which is actualist in nature.
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,ile courtesy of Louis Irwin and the 2eb 5ite for 8ritical /ealism
http3))www.raggedclaws.com)criticalrealism)inde..phpMsitesig6258/