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November 28, 2012
NYS Commission on Judicial Conduct
61 Broadway, Suite 1200
New York, New York 10006
Judges Name: Barbara Zambelli, Acting Justice
Judges Court: Westchester County Court Criminal Term
Case Name: People v. Nathan Ingram; Case No: 00499-2011
Date(s) of Incident: June 20, 2012 November 15, 2012

Dear Members of the Commission:
In August 2012, I submitted a letter to the Commission outlining a series of events that
created a reasonable inference of judicial misconduct on the part of Judge Barbara Zambelli,
Westchester County Court Criminal Term, in the case People v. Ingram, 00499-2011. To
assist the Commission in its investigation, I submit this letter along with Judge Zambellis
November 15, 2012 order, which embodies her version of the events under review.
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You will find that Judge Zambellis order confirms my original assertions that, during the
criminal trial of defendant Nathan Ingram, a witness made a knowingly false statement on the
stand, and that ADA Branca-Santos gave the witness an instruction to give false testimony.
Importantly, the order also confirms not only that Judge Zambelli was aware that the ADA gave
the perjuring witness an instruction to testify falsely, but that Judge Zambelli herself pre-
authorized the ADA to give that instruction to all the prosecution witnesses. As such, Judge
Zambellis order leaves no doubt as to the perjury of law enforcement officers, the prosecutorial
misconduct of ADA Branca, and Judge Zambellis own official misconduct.
In an effort to justify these various forms of official misconduct, Judge Zambelli states in
her November 15, 2012, order that her motivation for instructing witnesses to make false
statements was to prevent prejudice from befalling Mr. Ingram. This explanation is identical to
the justification ADA Branca invoked at trial -- just before Judge Zambelli ordered me not to
mention the perjury again or use it for any purpose on Mr. Ingrams behalf. However, the

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I have also attached a copy of the undersigneds August 21, 2012 motion to disqualify, to which Judge Zambellis
November 15 order is a response.
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explanation that Judge Zambelli and ADA Branca were actually trying to help Mr. Ingram defies
credulity. A prosecutors goal in bringing a criminal defendant before a jury is to procure a
guilty verdict against that defendant. Thus, the assertion that the prosecution was trying to shield
Mr. Ingram from prejudice while seeking a conviction is as contemptible as it is disingenuous.
As explained in detail below, Judge Zambellis proffered justification for suborning witness
perjury, although sounding in altruism, lacks the ring of truth.
It is well-established in New York that the defendants right to due process is violated if
the People knowingly use perjured testimony on any material point. People v. Washington, 51
N.Y.2d 214, 221 (N.Y. 1980); People v Waters, 35 Misc 3d 855 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (It is
fundamentally unfair and a clear violation of a defendant's right to due process for a prosecutor
to present testimony that he knew, or should have known, was perjured.). Likewise, the United
States Supreme Court has long held that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence,
known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). The same result is required when the State, although not
soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. Id. It is unquestioned in
every court organized under the U.S. Constitution that the suppression or withholding of material
evidence by the prosecution which is favorable to a person accused of a crime is a violation of
due process of law and renders a conviction void. See, e.g., United States v. Meers, 326 F.2d
135 (2d Cir. 1964); People v. Fisher, 23 Misc.2d 391 (N.Y. 1958) ([Withholding material
evidence] stands on the same footing as would the knowing use of perjured testimony to procure
the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant[.]).
Contrary to Judge Zambellis assertion that the suppression of certain facts helped Mr.
Ingram, testimony about the unmentionable facts in this case would have actually helped Mr.
Ingrams defense. Thus, Judge Zambellis joint directive to omit those same facts was actually
prejudicial to his defense. Specifically, the unmentionable facts -- revealing that uncharged
contraband was found in different locations throughout the apartment belonging to MW and Mr.
Ingram illuminate the following: (1) the police officers involved in the search planted evidence
at the scene after arresting Mr. Ingram; (2) MW did not provide consent to the search, thus the
search was in violation of her and Mr. Ingrams Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful
searches; (3) the plain view theory that the prosecution advanced both at the suppression hearing
and at trial was predicated on a completely fabricated version of events; and (4) the type,
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quantity, and location of the uncharged contraband contradicted the prosecutions evidence that
the defendant was in actual or constructive possession of any of the contraband charged and
uncharged alike.
Those four illuminations, which would have arisen naturally from truthful testimony
about the uncharged contraband, highlight Judge Zambellis true motivations for instructing
prosecution witnesses to misrepresent and omit material facts about the uncharged contraband.
Stated succinctly, if testimony at the suppression hearing would have revealed the contours of
the illegal search, New York law would have required the summary dismissal of the charges
against Mr. Ingram. So, to avoid a dismissal, Judge Zambellis instructed prosecution witnesses
to withhold information about the uncharged contraband. The same consequences explain why
Judge Zambelli and ADA Branca contrived to exclude MW from the suppression hearing,
wherein her testimony would have revealed the contours of the illegal search. And because a
judge must reopen a suppression hearing at trial upon learning that testimony admitted at trial
contradicts testimony given at the suppression hearing, those same consequences explain why
Judge Zambelli resorted to removing me from the courtroom to prevent me from divulging on
the record the means by which she and ADA Branca prevented MW from testifying at the
suppression hearing. Considering the foregoing facts, objective evaluators will easily discern
that Judge Zambellis judge-with-a-heart-of-gold explanation is entirely made up.
Turning again to the question of whether the acts described herein constitute misconduct,
it should be noted that Judge Zambellis disclosures reveal at least three subspecies of unlawful
conduct by government officials: (1) perjury by a law enforcement officer, (2) the knowing use
of false testimony by a prosecutor, and (3) pre-authorization of perjury by a judge. And it should
be made absolutely clear here that, contrary to Judge Zambellis assertions in the November 15
order, no law in any court in the entire United States permits a law enforcement officer to
provide false testimony, an attorney to suborn perjury, or a judge to authorize a witness to
provide false testimony. Indeed, if witnesses, attorneys, and judges may lawfully resort t
outright lying to mislead a jury, no witness can be taken at his or her word upon swearing to tell
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. To be sure, every witness is required to take
a solemn oath before testifying, whereby he or she is often asked to invoke the aid of deity. The
events described above constitute official and judicial misconduct of the worst kind because
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Judge Zambelli expected, indeed required, witnesses to violate that solemn oath no later than the
moment they were finished taking it.
In a transparent, unwitting attempt to cover her tracks, Judge Zambelli stated in her
November 15 order that she gave an instruction in front of all the attorneys that the prosecution
was to instruct its witnesses not to mention certain items found during a warrantless search of the
apartment. That is yet another outright lie. Notwithstanding Judge Zambellis reference to all
the attorneys, I was not among the attorneys advised that the prosecutions witnesses were
given instructions to misrepresent or omit material facts while testifying under oath. I, in fact,
learned that Judge Zambelli had pre-awareness of a plan to provide false testimony when she
blurted out: Her lawyer told her to say that to the jury in the moments after the forensic officer
was caught red-handed giving false testimony. By making that statement at trial, and by
confirming her pre-authorization of the perjury in her November 15 order, Judge Zambelli has
admitted that she and ADA Branca are co-conspirators in the unlawful suborning of perjury.
Importantly, Judge Zambellis explanation that such misconduct was undertaken to
prevent prejudice from befalling Mr. Ingram has long been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court
as well as by New Yorks highest court. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (That
the district attorney's silence was not the result of guile or a desire to prejudice matters little, for
its impact was the same, preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any real sense be termed
fair.); People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554 (N.Y. 1956) (A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject,
and if it is in any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and duty to
correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth.); People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97 (N.Y.
1984) ([A prosecutor] owes a duty of fair dealing to the accused and candor to the courts, a duty
which he violates when he obtains a conviction based upon evidence he knows to be false.).
It would seem from her November 15 order that Judge Zambelli is oblivious to these
binding cases and their unequivocal decrees. In any event, Judge Zambelli should not be sitting
on a court bench if she is unwilling or unable to uphold the guarantees, protections, and other
mandates of the U.S. Constitution. To be sure, nothing within Judge Zambellis trusted role as a
public servant permits her to authorize a prosecutor to suborn perjury from prosecution
witnesses. See, e.g., Matter of Heburn, 84 N.Y.2d 168 (N.Y. 1994) (Such deliberately
deceptive conduct is antithetical to the role of a Judge who is sworn to uphold the law and seek
the truth. A judicial officer who has so little regard for the obligations of a witness is not a
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fit person to administer oaths and cannot be trusted to faithfully uphold the laws.); Matter of
Myers, 67 N.Y.2d 550 (N.Y. 1986) (Such deception is antithetical to the role of a Judge who is
sworn to uphold the law and seek the truth.); Matter of Steinberg, 51 N.Y.2d 74, 78, n.1 (N.Y.
1980) (Needless to say, such conduct is totally unacceptable, for a Judge is, of course, sworn to
uphold the truth-seeking process.).
Sadly, Judge Zambelli resorts to further deception in her November 15 order, in which
she falsely asserts that she advised me in advance of ADA Brancas and her intention to suborn
perjury. There can be no doubt that this is an unwitting fabrication because, due to ADA
Brancas deception resulting in MWs exclusion from the suppression hearing, the prosecution
witnesses gave the false testimony before I first laid eyes on either Judge Zambelli, ADA
Branca, or any prosecution witness in the case. In fact, I met ADA Branca a couple of hours
after the suppression hearing ended (June 22); and I met Judge Zambelli three days after the
suppression hearing ended (June 25). Once the trial began on June 27, a full five days after the
suppression hearing, I entered my appearance and immediately set about cross-examining the
prosecution witnesses. The perjury plot only came to light during the second day of the trial,
when one of the witnesses admitted during cross-examination that she had knowingly given false
testimony. As explained above, Judge Zambelli then immediately blurted out that ADA Branca
had directed the witness to give the false testimony. I was surprised and disappointed at that
time to learn that Judge Zambelli was tolerant of ADA Brancas unlawful suborning of perjury.
So, one might imagine how utterly appalled I was to learn -- from Judge Zambellis November
15 order -- that Her Honor had orchestrated the perjury scheme from the bench.
If my reputation for integrity precedes me, it goes without saying that I would never
consent to an agreement permitting witnesses to give false testimony. Agreeing to that type of
arrangement is just as impractical as it is unethical. More specifically, because an agreement to
use perjury is unenforceable, a breach of such an agreement could land a criminal defendant in
jail with no legal recourse for redressing the breach itself. And if the attorney disciplinary
committee later learns of such an agreement, it would be justified in deeming the defense
attorney unfit to continue in a profession that the general public already views with fair
indications as highly steeped in deceptive practices. Likewise, in terms of practicality
(common sense is just as suited a term), whenever a prosecutor offers to suppress information,
a keen criminal defense attorney will instinctively know that the information is likely
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exculpatory, and that the gesture is not altruistic. And even the least-experienced criminal
defense attorney would intuit that a prosecutors goal of procuring a criminal conviction does not
readily cohere with an effort to protect the defendants rights and stave off any prejudice to
him as Judge Zambelli proclaimed with a mawkish air and a slipshod pen in her November 15
order. Quite the contrary, incarcerated citizens in the United States are deprived of all but the
most fundamental human rights. And little short of the imposition of death is as prejudicial to a
persons interests as the compound deprivations of liberty, livelihood, and human relationships
that are incidental to a prolonged prison sentence. To be sure, anyone who would seek to bring
about such deprivations by way of contrivances and deceit, subverting the U.S. and N.Y.
Constitutions in the process, is more perverse and sociopathic than all but the most heinous of
criminal convicts.
In closing, it should be reflected upon that Mr. Ingram has abided a jail cell since June
29, 2012, when Judge Zambelli revoked his bail and remanded him to custody upon the close of
what she had orchestrated to be a sham trial. Reflecting on Judge Zambellis instrumental role in
procuring the conviction against Mr. Ingram, along with her proffered explanation for doing so, I
can only wonder how many times in the past she has staved off prejudice on behalf of other
defendants via the same methods. And I am mortified by the thought of the many defendants
who may have suffered the dire consequences of her purported altruism. As the aphorism goes,
with friends like that
I hope that this update and the attachments are helpful in resolving whether the conduct
described herein and in my original complaint meet the high standards to which New York
judges are to be held by the Commission and, more importantly, by the public.
Please feel free to contact me if you require additional information or have questions.

Sincerely and Dutifully,
/s/Brian King
Brian King, Esq.