Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2005
Overview
This paper intends to examine some aspects of the moral reasoning of Immanuel
Kant and Jurgen Habermas. The main purpose of the paper is to examine the
framework of moral reasoning established by Kant and compare it with the more
the first section is to introduce my understanding of Kant and the foundations used to
ground the categorical imperative and claims of categorical validity so that in the
serves as part of the framework for modern cognitivist ethics despite what I perceive
Both Kant and Habermas attempt to identify and justify moral principles and norms
abstract universalism. Kant is very absolute in his categorical standard used to justify
moral principles, while Habermas’ criteria is more subjective and depends on the
creation of a domination free consensus and other rules inherent to moral discourse.
This paper intends to examine the framework of moral reasoning supported by these
add a historical dimension to the paper and reveal the origins of part of the
framework used today to support discourse ethics and consensus based rules of
argumentation.
The thesis begins with a description of the conceptual framework used by Kant to
describe and justify moral propositions with a particular focus on the relationship
between categorical and unconditional validity and the concept of duty and moral
obligation. The second part of the paper will attempt to outline Habermas’ theory of
communicative action and discourse ethics that serves to establish the modern
linguistic and social framework for the justification of norms within an intersubjective
context. The second section intends to work toward attributing innovations, pointing
moral reasoning of Kant and Habermas. After establishing the basic framework for
moral reasoning, the last part of the paper will attempt to compare and contrast the
justification. This section will try to canvas the terrain of moral reasoning in the
absence of categorical assertions and end with a few ideas on the topic of moral
worth that I suggest may serve as a further basis of inquiry in light of the conclusions
reached.
Introduction
Kant’s thinking established the basic framework for moral reasoning that is still used
claims of validity within a discursive context. Historically, moral norms and principles
2
3
value, or as part of an exemplary way of life leading to salvation. Immanuel Kant was
intelligible world, his rejection of religious dogma of the time, and the construction of
justify moral obligations but differs as to the means to construct it. Habermas
reflects a modern understanding that recognizes the need for participation and
from the perspective of each participant. The principle links moral validity to the
3
4
norms to the assent of informed participants and requires rules of argumentation that
discourse.
Cognitive ethics is rooted in the framework that Kant established for moral
intersubjective validity. Both Kant and Habermas rely on reasoning that makes a
categorical validity. The use of unconditional motives and categorical validity was a
necessity for Kant’s conception of moral worth because he could find no alternative
grounding for “moral” action after he refused to admit the use of conditional interests
signify something less than what Kant intended. The categorical imperative
fail to disclose any reasoned justification for their acceptance beyond their capacity
necessity. Although Kant attempted to avoid the use of conditional interests in moral
4
5
reasoning, I do not think he succeeds and the construction of moral reasoning within
not transcend conditional interests but rather merely rejects limited interests in
moral universalism attempts to prevent the use of selfish motives following from a
limited set of immediate conditional interests but it does not avoid the use of
Kant’s use of categorical validity is insufficient to explain the best way to determine
which interests are universally valid. Kant claimed that everyone already knows what
is moral and he left this determination up to individual moral agents. Once this
otherwise, whether shared by everyone or not. Even if one does not accept the idea
that the categorical imperative discloses the use of conditional interests, albeit
everyone. Moral norms accepted within an intersubjective context have little else to
Within an intersubjective procedure the process of giving reasons cannot avoid the
5
6
context.
Habermas recognizes that conditional interests are part and parcel of a transition to
intersubjective validity but he argues he can offset the problems created by such a
transition and retain claims of categorical validity for moral propositions by relying on
the constraints of a moral point of view that considers the interests and value-
orientations of everyone. Habermas proposes that an ideal role exchange that limits
very persuasive and can be contrasted with the observation that the principle of
reject norms that contain unacceptable costs to all concerned. It does not appear
conditional interests, at best it can equalize them or promote the interests of others.
moral worth to remain true to Kant’s basic insight is the idea of a person motivated to
protect the interests of others in the absence of any personal benefit. However, this
arguably, everyone has a shared interest in altruistic behaviour that protects the
incompatible with an interest based analysis or they do not exist and moral reasoning
is left with the need to redefine moral worth as something other than “unconditional”
moral action.
6
7
Both Kant and Habermas claim to rely on categorical validity in order to avoid
Habermas, like other supporters of cognitivist ethics, claims such rules are
unavoidable and necessary. I will attempt to argue that the procedural norms of
discourse ethics are the result of a dilemma of a choice rather than necessity and
norms established within such a framework are somewhat limited by the constraints
of this initial determination. In other words, the agreement to adopt procedural norms
limits the scope of acceptable substantive norms to those that fit within the
norms that fall outside this framework are not likely to be accepted. Categorical
must give way to a conception of intersubjective validity that is rooted in the prior
resolve conflict by the force of the better argument rather than with violence.
7
8
Introduction to Kant
Kant had four variations of the categorical imperative. His final formulation provides
that one should, “act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in
that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.” The principles of
Kant focused on the conditions of moral action and a few particular maxims in his
describe the theoretical limits of practical reason while recognizing the superiority of
moral principles contained in notions of mutual respect and equality. Kant argued
that the will binds itself to the dictates of reason because it recognizes the
foundations of morality in the universal form. Moral agents observe what Kant called
“laws of freedom” because practical reason guides the will to universal principles
Kant intended his critical examination of practical reason to lay the foundation for the
represented in his moral law was to be constructed solely from a priori concepts free
sense/appearance:
“…the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of man or in the
circumstances in which he is placed, but sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure
reason, and that every other precept which rests on principles of mere experience, even
1
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969 pp.3-9.
8
9
empirical grounds (perhaps only in regard to the motive involved), may be called a
practical reason that set out the limits of the “faculty of reason” and recognized a
philosophy, was the difference between being motivated by a good will or empirical
conditions. Kant claimed that the universal form was devoid of empirical interests
and could be used to construct moral duties and ground moral obligations binding on
all rational beings as dictated by the faculty of reason. According to Kant, the good
self-legislate universal laws out of respect for the worth of the unconditional moral
“ought.”
Practical Reason
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that reason operates as a function of the
mind in the construction and use of principles within the faculty of understanding.
phenomena according to rules of perception that are permanent and exhaustive and
9
10
phenomenal world. In the words of Kant, reason produces a “unity among the rules of
phenomena.
The term “principle” can be used to express at least two different meanings in the
works of Kant. Principles may be viewed as general propositions or maxims that can
establish corresponding duties and our actions may be based on, conform with, or
breach moral principles or duties. The term “principle” may also, however, indicate a
a thing’s working. When Kant explores the limits of practical reason he is attempting
to describe the principle of morality and explain how the moral law works as an
moral action. The distinction between prescriptive and descriptive moral principles is
Kant divided philosophy and the knowledge of principles into three categories: logic,
physics and ethics.4 Logic sets out formal rational knowledge concerned with the
form of understanding and the universal rules of thinking. Physics and ethics, on the
3
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. F. Max Muller (Anchor Books, NY) 1966.
pp.225.
4
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. p.3.
10
11
other hand, consist of material rational knowledge related to definite physical objects
and the laws to which they are subject, containing both empirical and rational
content. For Kant, philosophy is empirical if based on experience and pure if based on
differ from a priori judgments insofar as empirical judgments are descriptions of fact
generalized but remain limited to observations of what is, they cannot yield claims of
necessity or universality. A priori judgments, on the other hand, seek out necessary
For Kant, to say that a triangle must have its interior angles equal to two right angles
between triangles and angles, cause and effect, not given by experience. A priori
The difference between theoretical and practical reason for Kant is the difference
between cognitions that express what “is” and cognitions that express what “ought”
to be. The theoretical use of reason deals with objects of cognition in the world of
appearance, while the practical use of reason is concerned with actions and grounds
that determine the will in the intelligible world.6 It is a distinction between two
theoretical use of reason seeks to establish necessary and universal statements that
set out what “must” be the case, while the moral or practical use of reason seeks to
establish necessary and universal principles that set out what “ought” to be the case.
5
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969.see pp.3-4.
6
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New
Jersey) 1993. p.15.
11
12
The a priori element of moral judgment is the condition of moral validity according to
Kant.
critique of practical reason is concerned with “the determining ground of the will”
reason is a faculty that is used to guide people toward objects and the satisfaction of
needs through the application of principled action. Kant believed that the faculty of
reason served to satisfy our need to bring isolated judgments under general
Kant argues that, “everything in nature works according to laws.”8 He believed that
rational beings endowed with will have the capacity to act in accordance with laws
that are knowable a priori.9 Laws of nature are represented by the world of
laws of freedom are represented by the intelligible world and consist of moral
principles. The laws of nature explain physical causality while the laws of freedom
explain the moral law according to which everything should or ought to happen, even
if it does not. Kant sees the world of sense appearance as a system of necessary
7
Ibid. p.15.
8
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969.see p.33.
9
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969.see pp.33-34.
12
13
mechanical laws to which the will is subject, while the intelligible world is free of
A human agent is considered rational insofar as they are conscious of the fact that
the faculty of reason may be used to harmonize activities with the laws of nature and
the laws of freedom. The capacity of the will to conform to a conception of certain
rational.11 In other words, a rational agent is a person who recognizes the laws and
acts accordingly. Kant believes that practical reason is demonstrable to the extent
that the will is in harmony with the fulfillment of a practical purpose according to the
laws dictated by reason. For example, the practical laws of geometry and
mathematics are taken to demonstrate the necessary aspect of objective rules that
reason understands a priori as fundamental laws, such as a triangle has three angles
or two plus two is four. According to Kant, this understanding necessarily determines
the will of an agent through the recognition of the unconditional form of the law prior
through the use of reason that two plus two is four, they are bound to obey this
in moral theory, a rational agent may act on the basis of unconditional laws known a
priori through the use of pure reason not determined by an object of the senses.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes a distinction between the world of
13
14
necessary laws of physical causation, and the world of noumena, which provides a
appearance subject to the laws of pure practical reason. The clear separation of pure
practical philosophy within the intelligible world free from empirical inducements
maxims of action mixed with incentives based on feelings or inclinations. For Kant, it
is the motivation of a moral action that provides its distinctly “moral” quality.
In the world of phenomena, Kant claims that agents must recognize themselves as
subject to the mechanical laws of nature expressed by laws of physical causality. For
example, the laws of physics are said to be necessary and objective explanations of
noumena to ground an explanation of freedom of the will. The noumenal world must
be assumed, according to Kant, because we are conscious that our will is free to act
intelligible order of things. The problem that Kant articulates at the end of the
Foundations, that human beings do not have knowledge of and cannot really
gained through a positive intuition of sensual phenomena, the use of our senses. He
claims that knowledge of the noumenal world or intelligible self is not known to us
through our direct intuition in a positive fashion, but rather dialectically in a negative
fashion. He claims that knowledge of the intelligible world signifies only a something
that remains when sensual causation as the determining ground of the will is
14
15
noumenal worlds appear contradictory Kant recognizes that they must be thought of
Causality
The origins of the distinction between the world of appearance and the intelligible
world can be explained as the difference between two types of causality in Kant’s
thinking.14 The first type of causality is explained through the mechanical laws of
nature within the spatio-temporality of our experience where everything that takes
connection to the laws of nature. The second type of causality is based on reason,
The first type of causality found within the world of appearance explains the
possibility of deducing necessary causes and effects in the phenomenal world. Kant
used the notion of the world of appearance as a theoretical vehicle to overcome the
skepticism of Hume who argued that mechanical cause and effect explanations were
merely linked by custom rather than necessity. 15 Empiricism coupled with the
phenomena that did not admit of any other kind of causality, i.e. logic or laws of
13
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. see pp. 88, 86, 92, 198.
14
Wolff, Robert Paul. The Autonomy of Reason. (Harper & Row NY) 1971. see pp.104-113.
15
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New
Jersey) 1993. p.55.
15
16
freedom. Empirical causality, for Kant, included internal sense perceptions and
The second type of causality found in the thinking of Kant gives rise to his conception
achieved through concepts and the use of reason, rather than sensibility. Kant
constructs a notion of causality that is linked to practical reason modeled on the logic
model of reasoning that consists of “two judgments that are connected with each other
as ground and consequent,”16 in the form of “if p then q.” The consequent is given as
a condition of the ground. The validity of such reasoning relies on the relation of the
premise to the conclusion independent of whether the premise is true or not. If the
premise is true then the conclusion must also be true. For example, if all bodies are
composite then they are divisible. This proposition expresses a problematic but a
priori connection between the condition of being a composite body and being
Kant also made a distinction between two different types of logical inferences,
necessary connection between a premise and a conclusion where the given subject
contains within it the predicate that is made explicit. The logical connection between
16
Kant, Immanuel. Logic. Trans. Hartmann and Schwarz. (Dover Publications Inc., New York)
1974. p.111.
16
17
two propositions was provided by a relation of identity between the subject and the
predicate implicitly contained within the original subject not requiring any further
contrasted with synthetic judgments in the Critique of Pure Reason, “Either the
concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection
with it.”17 Synthetic propositions require a “third” term to link the predicate with the
subject, a term that is not disclosed by the original subject. Synthetic judgments may
that connects the subject with the predicate. For example, the concept of body is said
connect the predicate of gravity with the concept of body in a synthetic judgment. A
priori synthetic judgments pose a particular problem for Kant because experience
may not be the third term that connects a subject with a predicate.
this problem that occupies Kant in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and
cannot be known, but can be thought, as the source of a possible necessary and a
the source of ideas in the form of noumena, such as conceptions of God, freedom,
and immortality, ideas for which no corresponding object or empirical proof can be
world although he establishes the basis of a second type of causality rooted in action
17
18
partly determined by sensuous conditions and subject to the laws of causality, while
term used to connect the subject of a will with the predicate of an action in a priori
but constructed by reason through the use of the concept of noumena. Kant uses
consciousness of freedom to explain how reason itself can be the cause of moral
actions. This type of causality is based on a notion of practical reason coupled with
the presupposition that the will is free to determine actions in conformity to principles
Kant reasons that the concept of causality itself, used to explain physical cause and
concept or mental representation to explain causation within moral action. From the
exhibited in concreto in dispositions or maxims; that is, its practical reality can be
pointed out. All this is sufficient to justify the concept even with respect to noumena.”19
Kant claims that knowledge of causality rooted in reason and freedom of the will is
way of empirical methods. Freedom is considered a mere idea, “the objective reality of
18
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New
Jersey) 1993. p.43.
19
Ibid. p.58.
18
19
material incentives an agent must assume the validity of the idea of noumena based
concepts of the intelligible world because we are conscious of more than physical
laws, but what this more is cannot be comprehended by reason because we cannot
provide any material condition as a reason for its necessity.21 Kant is very skeptical of
demonstrating the existence of objects within the intelligible world and of our
capacity to know of what they consist, maintaining that our lack of knowledge is the
supreme limit of moral inquiry. Despite Kant’s skepticism of our capacity to know
anything about the intelligible world he constructs his theory of the moral law on the
foundation of pure reason anyway. He suggests that the use of pure practical reason
laws of action that are categorically valid and binding on every rational agent.
“… nothing can secure us against the complete abandonment of our ideas of duty and
preserve in us a well-founded respect for its law except the clear conviction that, even if
there never were actions springing from such pure sources, our concern is not whether
this or that was done but that reason of itself and independently of all appearances
commands what ought to be done. Our concern is with actions of which perhaps the
world has never had an example, with actions whose feasibility might be seriously
doubted by those who base everything on experience, and yet with actions inexorably
commanded by reason.”22
20
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. see p.89.
21
Ibid. see pp. 93, 94.
22
Ibid .p.28.
19
20
determining the motivation or causes that determine the will to action. Kant’s moral
theory begins with the recognition that agents can understand the laws to which they
are subject from two different standpoints. The first standpoint is categorized under
the idea of heteronomy. Heteronomy explains the motivational force determining the
they are unfit to be apodictical practical moral commands.23 The second standpoint is
categorized under the idea of autonomy where an agent exists within an intelligible
world under laws grounded in the use of pure reason independent of sensuous
phenomena, although with the knowledge of still being subject to the laws of physical
where reason is viewed of as capable of determining the will free from foreign or
external causes,24 “The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of
the duties conforming to them; heteronomy of choice, on the other hand, not only does
not establish any obligation but is opposed to the principle of obligation and to the
incentives is therefore the basis of all moral laws and necessary duties. If the law is
rather than a will acting free from the determining causes of the world of sense.
Kant insists that the fundamental principles of morality must originate entirely a
priori from the use of reason and not spring from the inclinations of men. He suggests
that if there are commands they are based on grounds that are universal for
everyone. Objective categorical commands are universal and valid for every rational
being. Although people are bound to act only in accordance with their own will,
23
Ibid. p.72.
24
Ibid. p.73.
25
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New
Jersey) 1993. p.33.
20
21
subject to their own legislation, Kant claims that the will has been designed by nature
to use reason and legislate universal laws. If an agent acts in accordance with pure
reason they legislate in the universal form because they recognized and respect the
ultimate moral law contained in the categorical imperative. So even though the will is
self-legislated, it must recognize moral law to be moral and respect that qua law.26
For Kant the derivation of the moral law from pure reason unmixed with empirical
or personal feelings, and unconditional motives that bind abstract principles of the
will to the intent of every rational being. Toward this end, he carefully distinguishes
between a will that acts from principles of reason, and a will that acts from an
cause determining the will represented by the idea of an interest. To be morally good,
the will and its actions must be based on the renunciation of all interests. The
categorical imperative describes the principle by which the will purges itself of all
“Whatever is derived from the particular natural situation of man as such, or from
certain feelings and propensities, or even from a particular tendency of human reason
which might not hold necessarily for the will of every rational being (if such a tendency
is possible), can give a maxim valid for us but not a law; that is, it can give a subjective
principle by which we might act only if we have the propensity and inclination, but not
an objective principle by which we would be directed to act even if all our propensity,
26
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. see. pp.50, 58.
27
Ibid. p.49.
21
22
Good Will
good will. The good will is the foundation of morality for Kant because it strives to act
on the basis of maxims that accord with unconditional universal law independent of
materially conditioned maxims. A good will is considered the highest good and a
condition of every other good. The good will is be esteemed as good of itself without
because the intention of the agent is free from material interests regardless of action
outcomes that may or may not be under the control of an agent. Kant claims that
morality and the categorical imperative are synthetic judgments that follow from an
analysis of the subject of an absolutely good will and the presupposition of freedom.
“Thus if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality together with its principle follows
from [an absolutely good will] by the mere analysis of its concept.”29 According to Kant,
reason recognizes the good as practically necessary, not on subjective grounds, but
objectively on grounds valid for every rational being because a good will acts from
purely rational motives such as duty and respect for moral law. An absolutely good
will is one whose maxim can always include itself as a universal law. 30 It serves as a
model for rational agents to follow, even though one may never fully obtain the ideal
condition.
Kant is opposed to philosophers who would claim that the highest duty is self-love. He
is careful to make clear that his conception of duty is not derived from empirical
sources and rejects claims based on conditional interests because they cannot be
universalized. Kant believes that any volition dependent on the faculty of desire could
28
Ibid. p.15.
29
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. p.74.
30
Ibid. see. pp. 62-3, 74.
22
23
and therefore could not be the foundation for a necessary and universal rule. He
claims that practical rules that rest on subjective conditions are incapable of deriving
universal rules for rational beings and without exception they revolve around the
principle of one’s own happiness. For Kant, subjective ends possess only conditional
worth in relation to the desire or material incentive that grounds them. Kant argues
that rational beings want to be free of conditional and transitory ends because they
lack absolute worth, a quality possessed by objective ends. Objective ends hold
necessarily for all rational beings and they include only those ends that determine
the will of itself by the mere form of the universal rule. 31 Objective principles that
constrain the will operate as commands in the form of imperatives.32 Kant argues that
the universal form of the imperative binds the will through the use of reason insofar
as an agent is rational and submits to universal moral laws. An absolutely good will is
said to operate free from the constraints of objective laws because it is already
Realm of Ends
A rational being with good will who self-legislates duties and obeys universal laws,
subject to no will other than his own, belongs to an imaginary community of rational
beings sharing the same standard of judgment, which Kant calls a realm of ends. The
“realm of nature” as a practical idea for “bringing about that which is not actually real
but which can become real through our conduct.”33 He is careful to distinguish this
31
Ibid. p.52 and Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-
Hall Inc. New Jersey) 1993. p.19.
32
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. p.34.
33
Ibid. p.62 FN#17.
23
24
idea from a teleological position that claims reality for a theoretical proposition, i.e.
the kingdom of god. Each person who binds their will to reason is said to belong to a
potential or fictional realm of ends insofar as they have subordinated their will to a
imperative for the will it must be in the form of an objective principle that is
principle can be a universal practical law. Kant reasons that every rational agent
such a proposition may serve as the ground of a supreme objective principle capable
of deriving all other laws of the pure will. The law takes the form of the categorical
imperative : “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of
Kant proposes this principle as the supreme limiting condition on freedom of action
for each person. In other words, beings who are ends-in-themselves are to be
respected and our actions toward others are to be limited by this respect. If agents
want to consider themselves as rational they must share in the kingdom of ends and
treat each other as rational beings who recognize the existence of rational agency as
an end-in-itself.36 In this manner Kant suggests that rational beings are not to be
acted upon as if they are subjective ends of another person because they recognize
and respect actions that are objectively necessary. Therefore, all maxims of action
should consider the self and others as rational ends in themselves and should meet
the condition of being universally valid for every rational being.37 To treat rational
34
Ibid. see pp.59, 62 F.N.#17, 65-66.
35
Ibid. see pp.52-54.
36
Ibid. p.55.
37
Ibid. p.64.
24
25
viewed by others as possessing moral worth to the degree that such an idea serves
Categorical Imperative
“…if I think of a categorical imperative, I know immediately what it contains. For since
the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxim should
accord with this law, while the law contains no condition to which it is restricted, there
is nothing remaining in it except the universality of law as such to which the maxim of
the action should conform; and in effect this conformity alone is represented as
moral law valid for everyone. According to Kant the categorical imperative excludes
reference to the material of the action and its intended result in an unconditional
manner. It is a law concerned with the form of universality and the principle of
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become
guide our will in the exercise of rational autonomy. It is what every rational actor
“ought” to do. Because moral maxims are to be equally valid for everyone, moral
38
Ibid. p.65.
39
Ibid. p.44.
25
26
The categorical imperative precludes any opportunity for a rational agent to make an
The resulting practical maxims of action are grounded in the use of the rule (law) and
the form of being universal.40 The test of a maxim is whether it could enter into a
acting under such a principle and determine whether they would find such a rule of
conduct acceptable and free of logical contradictions. In order to will that a maxim
should become a universal law, both the maxim and the will must remain free from
contradiction. Potential universal laws of action are to be tested by agents for any
contradictions because a universal law may not, by definition, conflict with itself. In
other words, agents test maxims relying on the universal form eliminating candidates
on the basis of contradiction in order to create a set of duties that conform to the
supreme principle.41 Practical actions are considered worthy in relation to the exercise
of autonomy that respects and submits itself to the categorical imperative. Morality is
Duty
Based on the idea that the pure practical reason of every person recognizes the
moral character of the categorical imperative, Kant constructs three propositions that
explain duty to ground his conception of morality. The first proposition is that to have
moral worth an action must be done from duty. Duty is a practical unconditional
40
Ibid. p.55.
41
Ibid. see p.48, 63.
42
Ibid. p.66.
26
27
causes.43 Duty is the condition of a pure will, good in itself acting from the necessity
of action derived from respect for the practical and universal law.44 In other words, a
good will excludes sensuous motives and recognizes a duty to act on the basis of
moral principles that are universal in form in opposition to principles that are
automatically mean that a person will act on that basis because subjective
inclinations may overpower our moral sense. For Kant, the more inclinations there are
against performing a duty and the fewer inclinations there are in favour of its
performance, the greater the opportunity to show the intrinsic worth of the
The second proposition of morality for Kant is that an action performed from duty is
and not the purpose to be achieved.45 In other words, the moral worth of an action is
not to be derived from the expected effect or any principle motivated by an expected
result; to act from duty is to be motivated by unconditional reason, not desire or self-
love. The happiness of others, for example, might be an object of the will, but if it
maxim because it would not coincide with his goal of legislating unconditional
universal law. Instead, Kant derives the acceptance of the principle to further the
happiness of others from the universalization of the maxim of self-love. Kant argues
that the universal application of the maxim of self-love requires recognition of the
43
Ibid. p.49 and Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-
Hall Inc. New Jersey) 1993. p.33.
44
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. p.23.
45
Ibid. p.19.
27
28
happiness of others. In such a case, the determining ground of the will is the
universal form of the law and not its particular content, it is therefore acceptable on
grounds that are equally valid for everyone.46 On this basis Kant claims it is not the
happiness of others, or any particular subjective condition, but the universal form of
the maxim, acceptable to each person, that is the determining ground of the will. It is
important for Kant to ground the concept of duty in maxims that reject desires such
Kant claims that the third proposition of morality follows from the first two. Duty is
the necessity of an action performed from respect for the law.47 Rather than finding
worth in the expected result, Kant ascribes worth, and therefore respect, to the
ground of the will. He claims that conformity to the universal form of law is the only
the form of law is all that remains to motivate us to conform after discarding
empirical matter as a potential object of a maxim. “If all material of a law, i.e., every
object of the will considered as a ground of its determination, is taken from it, nothing
remains except the mere form of giving universal law.”48 What remains, according to
Kant, is the command that we not act in such a way that one could not also will the
46
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New
Jersey) 1993. p.35.
47
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. p.19.
48
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New
Jersey) 1993. p.26.
49
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis
White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. p.21.
28
29
To understand how Kant conceives of the necessity of moral action and the nature of
the practical necessity of action as a means to achieve a further end, for example
objectively necessary, as good in itself, without regard to any other end or purpose.50
In both cases, reason acts as a cause to produce an action. The general idea is that a
the idea of an end with an action that is necessary to achieve that end through the
use of reason. The action is therefore a product of the recognition of its apodeictic
necessity to achieve the selected end. Because practical reason is always concerned
with the actions of a person, the subject of a proposition is always a person, or more
particularly a will, and the predicate is always an action. The difference between a
between the will and the action, between the subject and the predicate. In the
categorical practical propositions, I ought to do an action for the sake of the end itself
The first type of necessity does not indicate any kind of obligation but merely asserts
that to achieve a desired end I ought also will the means. The “ought” in this sense is
50
Ibid. p.36.
29
30
proposition I ought to repay the money I borrow if I want to retain good credit is a
hypothetical practical proposition that connects the act of repayment with the
condition of retaining good credit. The subject properly described as “the will affected
subject of a proposition is “the will affected by the desire to retain good credit” then
the act of repayment is connected to the will a priori without any other justification or
further reference to experience because repayment is the means to good credit. The
action to a conditional desire. I ought to accomplish an end for the sake of the end
judgments, the predicate and the subject, or the action and the will, are connected
directly without any reference to an existing desire or inclination. I ought to repay the
references are required for its justification. The fact that an agent believes he “ought”
proposition was acceptable from the point of view of everyone with a good will
without contradiction then that would be sufficient for meeting the test of the
motivated to provide the correct change for the customer. If the shop-keeper is
motivated by the desire to protect his reputation then the act of giving the correct
be said that his will was morally good and the act was motivated by moral
considerations rather than self-interest. Kant reasons that categorical validity and
corresponding moral obligations are the result of seeking an end for the sake of that
end. “I ought to repay the money I borrow” because I recognize the obligation or duty
as real or true without the need to motivate the action by a conditional interest such
as the desire to retain good credit. In other words, “I ought to repay the money I
30
31
borrow” because I recognize that everyone could agree and accept that everyone
should repay money they borrow. Kant argues that actions motivated by abstract
universalism possess objective moral worth because they are purged of motivations
for the universal form of law. This form of reasoning relies on a prior recognition that
repaying the money is the right thing to do and an assumption that every rational
agent must agree, hence its universal validity. Conformity to the moral law is to act
difference between right and wrong without providing a material condition to justify
opposed to our “lower” nature that seeks to act on the basis of subjective maxims
The necessity of action that Kant ascribes to moral propositions lies in the recognition
that every person would arrive at the same conclusion as concerns the necessary
action required to fulfill the duty whether motivated by a good will or not. Kant
assumes that given a true “ought” statement, anyone should be able to recognize
the necessity of the action to be done. Kant is not fundamentally concerned with the
detailed content of moral laws or the attempt to state what these objective laws are,
rather he assumes that we know what they are already or that we are capable of
recognizing them in the unconditional universal form. The a priori character of the
moral motive, that excludes experience, includes such duties as the duty not to
commit suicide, the duty not to make lying promises, the duty to develop our natural
talents, and the duty to help those in distress. Although there is no empirical
evidence available to establish the existence of the motive of duty, recognition that
31
32
Kant assures us that we know the difference between moral propositions commanded
of the categorical imperative. “To be sure, common human reason does not think of it
abstractly in such a universal form, but it always has it in view and uses it as the
standard of its judgments. It would be easy to show how common human reason, with
this compass, knows well how to distinguish what is good, what is bad, and what is
consistent or inconsistent with duty.”51 In other words, moral propositions are the
application leads to moral propositions that are categorically valid. Any attempt to
justify a moral duty beyond the categorical assertion undermines the unconditional
providing a condition for its observance we transform the categorical form of validity
into a hypothetical proposition and destroy the obligation that is at issue. This is
important because the position of this paper is to examine these ideas and assert
that actions that rely on categorical propositions within discursive forms of validation
fail to escape hypothetical forms of expression because they are tied to conditions of
forms of validity and the conditions of good will necessary for observance within a
generalized form of agreement but do not avoid the disclosure and motivation of all
51
Ibid. p.23.
32
33
is rooted in the idea that equal and reciprocal rules are intuitively used by moral
categorical imperative, as the supreme moral law, provides a reliable and consistent
assessment of the moral worth of a principle regardless of the context. Kant argued
that the faculty of reason itself was able to prescribe the content of an imaginary
kingdom of ends based on respect for universal laws upheld by a good will that hold
necessarily and always. In practice, however, this claim is subject to some legitimate
criticism.
propositions or objective laws valid in each and every case. The process of various
people applying the standard of the categorical imperative can lead to error and/or
determine “objective” moral facts and claims of this nature are open to criticisms of
toward moral philosophy, suggests a need to reform the categorical imperative and
Kant’s approach to assessing moral validity. Jurgen Habermas makes use of the basic
that recognizes the need for plurality, argumentation, and the giving of reasons as
part of any assessment of moral validity. The modern cognitive perspective attempts
to describe a more realistic understanding of the functions of the mind and processes
33
34
ideas. The modern version rejects the foundational idea that objective moral laws
equally valid for everyone can be infallibly determined through individual reflection
and adopts the position that moral norms within communities of people require
consensus of principled moral agents who discuss and debate propositions within a
more than a single declaration of what is universally valid, it entails consulting others
and listening to grounds that diverse perspectives can bring to bear on the validity of
moral principles and norms that then compete for claims of primacy through
In Kant’s historical-cultural situation, the assumption that categorical claims are valid
is based on acceptance of the idea that everyone already knows the difference
between right and wrong. This perspective denies the existence of moral dissent and
critically test existing and proposed norms through argumentation and the giving of
“true.” This insight is the starting point for Habermas who proposes a theory of
debate. Under such a revision, strong claims of objectivity attached to the categorical
imperative are replaced by weaker intersubjective claims that apply the standard of
universality within moral discursive arguments that retain Kant’s basic aim of
34
35
as the form of necessity that accompanies the prior acceptance of an end. Kant
argued that the very giving of a reason for adopting a maxim undermined the
claimed by modern moral theory, moral agents may not be able to avoid hypothetical
forms for moral statements. The additional burden of discursive forms of justification
that judge moral worth indicate that universal standards for maxims result in
persuasive forms of logic that are decided by the force of the better argument rather
process of moral reasoning in operation for participants may be, like Kant, no more
than the prior acceptance of pre-conditional ends that appear to be the subjective
choices of the philosopher for the promotion and advance of mutual respect and
standards, the resulting moral judgments are merely persuasive propositions that are
appealing to moral agents because they reject the notion of creating an advantage or
disadvantage for any particular group or person. The acceptance of the ideals of
of which are presupposed as ends that serve to limit or define the characteristics of
being advocated and helps to provide a reasoned justification for particular maxims
35
36
of action that aim to avoid contradiction within a universal process of reasoning and
To further investigate this idea, Kant held that different motivations are tied to a
distinction between the form of a proposition and its content. He argued that reason
is persuaded to adopt the categorical imperative in part because it prefers the use of
the universal form purged of empirical or sensual content and conditions. What is of
and actions. Kant’s conception of autonomy in conjunction with a good will attempts
to purge material subjective motives and interests allegedly leaving only the general
form of “the universal validity of maxims” as a cause capable of determining the will.
contain no conditions. On this basis, Kant argues that the only remaining motivation
to adopt the categorical imperative is the general form of the universal law itself
valid for every person, a command that carries an implicit demand to conform to the
If notions of mutual respect and equality that result from the application of the
dialectical form of abstract reasoning then conditional interests are tied to tangible
goals and intangible sense perceptions or desires rooted within the world of
and grounds equally valid for everyone and excluding motivations that seek
52
Ibid. p.92.
36
37
material bias, personal feelings, and desires on the one hand, and impartial reflection
grounded in respect for self-legislated universal laws equally valid for everyone on
the other. However, if one accepts that the categorical imperative is merely a
abstract universal principles it can be argued that Kant does not establish the use of
conditions insofar as they recommend mutual respect and equality as the product of
moral reasoning. This conclusion is foreshadowed by Kant’s own speculation that our
a claim that moral agents could purge their will of conditional preferences. The only
The ground used to support the idea that practical reason and the will of a person
could be motivated by something other than a conditional interest was really nothing
more than Kant’s fondness for dialectal reasoning through exclusion. Kant uses a
the idea that self-determining causes operate beyond determinism, however the
To counter the idea of a pure unconditional motive all one has to do is suggest that
interests of others. From Kant’s own perspective, the desire to discover the content of
pure practical reason and the prescription to use the universal form itself can be
53
Ibid. p.93.
37
38
viewed as the satisfaction of a desire to use a general and abstract law. The will to
apply a universal law serves to satisfy the desire to use the universal form.
A stronger claim would be to assert that all determining grounds of the will are
attached to conditional interests and that claims of universal form are merely a
special set of universal content. Given this argument all action and the will is viewed
is inconceivable is that action and the will should be considered free from conditional
interests. For Kant, to act from duty is to be motivated by an interest, even if that
interest is in being impartial. In such a case, the exercise of practical reason, always
aiming at moral action through the application of principled maxims, discloses and
guide action. If this argument is accepted then the categorical imperative is just one
purge itself of conditions (unsuccessfully) and the use of the idea of a universal law.
At best, the use of the term “unconditional” in Kant can be used to describe a
preference for abstract principles of mutual respect and equality. Kant believed that
that because practical reason is aimed at action, decisions to act will always lead to
providing an outcome that is advantageous for some and a barrier to others. In other
words, all reasoning that is used to support an action discloses some kind of
decision without using some kind of standard or result that aligns with conditional
38
39
Kant would argue that such a position would destroy the possibility of moral
propositions, however, the better view is that it discourages the idea that universal
laws or principles are the result of a separation of form and content between
unconditional and conditional interests in favour of the idea that a conditional desire
exists to consider the general interests of all parties without the influence of self-
acceptance. The question for moral theory is not to ask whether unconditional
principles are possible, but what desires or interests are being satisfied by the
dichotomy proposed between form and content collapses into a unity of desires or a
of universal moral acceptance. Rather than distinguishing between the form and
content of practical reasoning, Kant perhaps might have been satisfied with a less
would have preserved the attempt to prevent selfish empirical conditional interests
influencing the will in moral propositions without having to postulate the fiction of a
pure practical reason and an absolute moral standard. If one accepts the argument
that unconditional principles are impossible then the search for grounds equally valid
It is the intention of this paper to follow the reasoning of Habermas with a view
toward understanding his conception of validity for moral principles and claims of
39
40
search for grounds equally valid for everyone becomes a search for shared interests
or a “common will” and the application of procedural discourse rules. Habermas, like
Kant, argues that it is possible for moral reasoning to transcend the influence of
conditional interests and establish a categorical form of moral obligation, a claim that
is at odds with the thesis of this paper. He argues that an unlimited communication
community that requires an ideal role taking exchange can preserve Kant’s purpose
author will argue that Habermas fails to escape from conditional and hypothetical
reasons for ethical behaviour are better than others based on an appeal to common
dialogue. The thesis of this paper is to argue that the goal of establishing moral
undertaking morally binding only on those of good will who accept the moral
command.
Introduction to Habermas
Cognitive Perspective
investigate in what sense and in what way moral commands and moral norms are
40
41
and selectively building on works that collectively exhaust the entire field of cognitive
The interesting thing about the framework he establishes for the validity of moral
communicative action and practical discourse are used as standards to measure the
democratic nature of the modern legal system viewed as justified to the extent that
rules and procedures are in congruence with communicative principles. For the
of moral theory and the manner in which substantive norms are justified through the
41
42
religion and metaphysics, can ground the justification of a morality of equal respect
and solidarisitic responsibility for everyone. “If the good is no longer laid down in a
transcendent manner, the only principle of the good seems to be consideration for
members of the community, whose membership in turn can no longer be limited, and
hence consideration for all others – which means consideration for their wishes and
moral truth derived from the faculty of reason. In its place is an examination of the
a shared social context, and the recognition that normative claims may be fallible.
The objective “fact of pure reason” established by Kant to justify universal ought
need for consensus on the validity of norms and principles within a public discourse.
that provides participants with an actual, open, public forum for moral
55
Habermas, Jurgen. The Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.23.
42
43
theory of communicative action that sets out the manner in which expectations and
norms between people are established. Habermas believes, however, that moral
norms, it should attempt to set out the conditions of validity for an “impartial point of
known as the principle of universalization and includes other rules necessary for a
cooperative discourse in the search for the better argument. The principle of
Kant’s moral theory. However the transition to intersubjective validity involves more
than one individual ruling out maxims of action based on perceived contradictions
with the categorical imperative, it requires that actions and norms be capable of
practical discourse. For Habermas, the justification of action in terms of valid norms
of clarification and communication that binds the will through the construction of
43
44
edifice, Habermas claims to be able to construct a moral point of view that operates
Skepticism
Modern value skepticism rejects the idea that moral issues can be settled on the
cannot be justified like descriptive statements as true or false. On this basis, skeptics
claim that there is no moral order, moral objects or moral facts. By limiting reason to
arguments that suggest morals and norms are based on nothing more than purely
alternative basis for the validity of moral norms to overcome skeptical claims that
obligatory character of moral duties motivated by rational force alone. He claims that
classical empiricism cannot explain the obligatory force of moral norms in terms of
self-interested preferences just as they cannot explain the fact that actors motivated
by moral feelings argue about moral judgments with reasons. In other words,
recognition that moral feelings express attitudes that imply moral judgments
56
Habermas, Jurgen. The Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.16.
44
45
the potential for reasoning to be grounded in something other than rational self-
interest, I suggest that his approach does not avoid the operation of a presupposed
value choice in the act of adopting discourse ethics and the search for the better
argument. I am not persuaded that the rules of moral reasoning are entirely free of
hypothetical necessity or the prior acceptance of a moral end. I intend to argue that
despite this limitation, cognitive philosophy is able to discredit the position that no
Habermas asserts that to limit ethical reasoning to the preference based motives of a
theory because it is not able to disclose any kind of morally privileged position. “An
externally imposed social regulation of conduct, but not to a binding, let alone
person could choose to exit from existing agreements whenever they might benefit
that approach the ideal of universal acceptance and obligation while remaining aware
that such agreements may be subject to change over time. His approach
and maintaining moral norms in comparison with strategic action. In the final
57
Ibid. p.23.
45
46
ethics, I suggest his theory is subject to some internal limitations that require
Communicative Action
Habermas begins his search for universal moral principles to ground the substance of
reason. Habermas claims that the study of a moral vocabulary and the need for
Habermas proposes that moral phenomena are grasped in the first person
everyday speech aims to coordinate future plans of action for participants by way of
sharing moral action and norms. It is based on the observation that participants in
promised reward.
46
47
rationally motivate others through an offer to redeem a validity claim in the future.
back up a claim so long as the agreed actions do not contradict other propositions
the actors accept as true at any given point.58 A speaker incurs an obligation to back
up a claim made during discourse based on acceptance by the hearer insofar as they
both intend to orient future action around the acceptance and non-contradiction of
the claim. When accepted, the offer of normative validity is the source of a bonding
take the form of “moral norms” or customary practices, a unit of analysis that
displaces the focus that Kant placed on moral principles or laws. Moral norms or
Habermas links the normative validity of moral commands and norms of action to a
shared social world that forms a “universe of norms,” similar to Kant’s idea of a
kingdom of ends. He suggests that moral consciousness is grounded in the fact that
moral feelings are apparent in everyday life and accessible to us as first person
social group. The moral validity of a norm is reflected in the feeling of being obligated
58
Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983.
see. pp. 58, 59.
59
47
48
They are, however, produced and maintained in society through individual conviction
existing convention to observe a norm but this fact does not indicate whether the
depends on more than mass acceptance, its redemption and validity is said to be a
product of the logic of practical discourse.60 Similar to Kant, Habermas suggests that
Intersubjective Validity
moral feelings and reasons manifest themselves in everyday activity. For Habermas,
action. The rules of discourse ethics and the introduction of intersubjective validity
within modern frameworks of moral reasoning represent key features in the transition
Habermas outlines three types of intersubjective claims to validity that can be made
about the world in the form of descriptive, normative, and personal statements.
60
Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983.
p.62.
48
49
Descriptive claims of truth refer to facts about the objective world, normative claims
Claims of descriptive facts or shared social norms give rise to obligations that take
the form of an expectation to redeem a claim in the future through the provision of
moral issues that claim normative rightness and operate by condoning specific
The use of intersubjective validity claims within moral theory are to be distinguished
rather than claims of discovering immutable and timeless laws of freedom. Toward
this end, Habermas envisions a process of public argumentation where people debate
their own needs and wants in the course of determining social norms, but because
traditions, he argues, they must not be justified monologically. The shift from
61
Ibid. p.58.
49
50
or recognizing a new claim in substitution for an old one. 62 These agreements can
overcome the position of value skeptics who claim that normative statements fail to
claims that, “feelings seem to have a similar function for the moral justification of
action as sense perceptions have for the theoretical justification of facts.”63 Feelings
acceptance of the claim, the expectation to be able to provide good reasons for
accepting the claim, and an intention to not contradict the claim in the future.
Habermas puts the matter into the following notational form: “When we assert “p” and
thereby claim truth for “p” we accept the obligation to defend “p” in argumentation – in
full awareness of its fallibility – against all future objections.”64 The binding nature of
not address the issue of the worth of any accepted norm. It is the persuasive nature
62
Ibid. p.67.
63
Ibid. p.50.
64
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.37.
50
51
of the reasons provided that serve to ground claims of worth and normative
rightness. For Kant, the categorical form of validity as represented by the assertion
that I ought to do this or that moral action because I recognize it as a universal moral
duty or end in itself (the categorical imperative) was sufficient to bind the will to
practical reason and accomplish this act of persuasion. For Habermas, a different
belonging to collective and individual modes of life. Principled morality emerges from
this established lifeworld as a form of abstract reflexivity that includes the demand to
justify itself in public argumentation. For Habermas, the moral point of view develops
when an agent in the social world adopts the hypothetical attitude of a participant in
a dialogue who seeks to justify value choices beyond the context of an already
and moral questions in argumentation relating to moral theory. The main advantage
of these distinctions is the separation between pragmatic, ethical and moral reasons,
each of which derive their meaning from a context-dependent, or in the case of moral
contains a different type of validity claim that sets out different criteria for what
51
52
evaluations of the good or not misspent life determined in relation to identities and
primary grounds of “epistemic” truth, while moral questions are said to focus on the
normative justification.
The ethical point of view sets the frame for value judgments and evaluative self-
community. First person singular perspectives and first person plural perspectives
how we should orient our lives, or what is best for me (or us) in the long run all things
social life generally accept a shared ethos that has been “proved” in practice.65
Similar to the Piaget tradition of moral development, the first person perspective
that attempts at norm justification within a shared ethos inevitably lead to abstract
and general principles that require more than a first person perspective of an
claims that in the later stages of moral development, the introduction of a reflective
65
Ibid. p.26.
66
Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983.
p.127.
52
53
life, related to the identity of groups and individuals, and moral questions relating to
justice which can be decided rationally on the basis of generalized and universal
interests. Questions of the good life involve rational evaluative self-clarification while
questions of justice incorporate the moral point of view and attempt to consider the
equal interests of everyone. Questions of the good life have the advantage of being
contextual and concrete, posed within the horizon of a particular social group that
exists within an accepted cultural identity. Questions of justice, on the other hand,
are said to be abstract and divorced of the context of a lifeworld relying on the
persuasive nature of better reasons for their existence. According to Habermas, the
statements. This procedure sorts through practical issues and selects only those that
are capable of generalization and rational debate.68 In this manner, moral questions
are dissociated from particular contexts and solutions are dissociated from subjective
motives, despite the recognition that moral solutions require contextual sensitivity in
67
Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983.
p.165.
68
Ibid. p.204.
53
54
Justification
typically involve grounds of validity that provide reasons, which if accepted, are the
basis of justification. According to Habermas, moral norms are valid if they “could win
the agreement of all concerned, on the condition that they jointly examine in practical
discourse, whether a corresponding practice is in the equal interest of all.”69 The claim
of a moral norm to represent a practice in the equal interests of everyone is not really
capable of being proved in an empirical sense and should not be confused with the
statement and an object in the world. The validity of descriptive statements signifies
tested for factual congruence but rather makes a weaker claim of reliability based on
the potential for a speaker to redeem the claim in discourse, or in the case of moral
norms through a consensus formed within a discursive context that does not exclude
69
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. pp.35-6.
54
55
conditions that provide the opportunity for affected parties to contribute. Validity in
testing of empirical evidence, the other based on accepting good reasons within
context. In the case of normative claims, assertions of a final justification are unlikely
and philosophers who endorse communicative ethics, such as Seyla Benhabib, prefer
procedure for attaining agreement and the conditions required to sustain an ongoing
practice of moral discourse. The aim is to promote the better argument rather than
arriving at a final determination of “truth” because normative claims are fallible and
the future.
themselves of the worth of a moral proposition, then one of the primary issues for
moral reasoning is the context within which that decision takes place. Kant’s system
universalization without the need for consultation or discussion with others, that
every person can recognize moral duty. Modern moral philosophers support ideas of
They prefer to test the moral worth of a norm within an ideal communicative
community. If moral norms result in equal and exceptionless obligations for everyone,
as Habermas claims, then moral norm justification should be tested by more than one
55
56
moral norm from their own perspective. This decreases the potential for fallible
person determine the existence of a moral norm by using the categorical imperative,
about the acceptability of a moral proposition given conditions that reject strategic
forms of motivation and action. What is of worth in the determination of a moral norm
communicative actions.
First, practical deliberation is regarded as the only resource for the establishment of
impartial judgment for moral questions captured by the formulation of the discourse
principle: “Only those norms can claim validity that could meet with the acceptance of
a rule of argumentation that sets out how norms can be justified: “A norm is valid
when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the
concerned without coersion.” And third, the selection of norms within a practice of
agreement because they are common to everyone. Through this process, normatively
binding obligations that are generalizable to the point of being common to everyone
analysis of the consequences for all concerned. The inclusion of all concerned
promotes a dialogue that forces participants to consider the interests of all concerned
70
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. see pp.41-3.
56
57
within the context of a reciprocal ideal role exchange. A detailed analysis of this
Habermas conceives of the construction and use of an impartial “moral point of view”
as a product of an ideal role taking exercise that attempts to enlarge the interpretive
may test in common a controversial norm. The moral point of view intends to compel
the universal exchange of roles based on the requirement that all affected parties
consider the position of all others and in particular the consequences of adopting the
impartial discourse rules and the practice of joint deliberations may help to persuade
participants that moral norms are justified because they were determined within
Habermas claims that the procedure of ideal role taking is linked with emotional
dispositions and attitudes like empathy and care for ones neighbour which are seen
and emotional dispositions and attitudes in the process of justifying and applying
interests of all concerned. Within such a view there is a connection between maturity
and the recognition that everyone has the right to participate in moral discourse and
71
Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983.
p.182.
72
Ibid. p.182.
57
58
perspective bolsters the credibility of obligations and norms established within such a
requires more than equal treatment, it requires discursive agreements that depend
Kant used practical reason to ground an impartial perspective to judge moral actions
and principles through the use of the categorical imperative, what Habermas calls the
“moral point of view.” A principle or norm of action was considered free from
subjective interests due to the generality and universality of the prescribed law that
regulated matters valid for each individual. Habermas makes a similar distinction. He
uses the abstract moral question of “what is in the equal interest of all” to overcome
best for me or us in the long run all things considered. The ethical perspective that
views norms as “justified in our context” becomes a claim from the moral point of
that issues of justice can be given priority over evaluative questions relating to the
good life because they embody shared interests. The good that is relevant from the
assumes that the initial impulse to engage in deliberation and work out a shared
73
Ibid. p.37.
74
Ibid. p.30.
58
59
not wish to resolve their conflicts through violence, or even compromise, but through
does not disclose the prior acceptance of an ethical value-choice. In the absence of a
participant may choose to rely on common interests found within the act of
generalizability of the interests involved. “It stands to reason that people with
competing value orientations who take part in a process of argumentation will more
easily reach agreement on a common course of action if they can have recourse to more
abstract points of view that are neutral with respect to the content at issue.”76 The
necessary for rational argumentation. The rules reflect the common interests of
justified but rather they are the product of identifying unavoidable presuppositions of
rational argumentation that all competent agents must use to participate in discourse
that aims at persuasion through the force of the better argument. According to
Habermas, agreements based on the rules of discourse ethics are the best method
75
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. see p.39.
76
Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983.
italics mine. p.75.
59
60
“…we engage in argumentation with the intention of convincing one another of the
validity claims that proponents raise for their statements and are ready to defend
competition for the better argument where the orientation to the goal of a
deliberative action, total vision, or unified system. The cooperative principles are
seen as procedural preconditions for the legitimization of moral norms that may
additionally be applied in legal and political contexts. Procedural norms claim validity
dialogue. They are modeled on a pattern inherent in the use of language oriented
norms are constructed and justified on the basis of being accepted within this
reflective process. The rules are considered regulative ideas that discourse can strive
to approximate. They provide a structure for argumentation that takes the shape of
an idealized form of uncoerced reciprocity in the cooperative search for the better
governed interaction designed to ensure that all concerned take part freely and
equally. Normative validity, and in a sense moral worth, is viewed as a product of the
60
61
It requires a reflective form of communication that seeks to establish moral norms for
communication rules out all external or internal coercion other than the force of the
better argument and thereby also neutralizes all motives other than that of the
cooperative search for truth.”79 Although the rules can be ignored, Habermas argues
that the act of entering into a good faith search for the truth presupposes the
the procedural level of his moral theory. The most important procedural standards
being,80
• and the communication is free from internal and external coercion in order
the right to participate and the right of reciprocal assertion, but also, good faith
79
Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983.
pp.88-9.
80
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.44.
61
62
universalization. Within this set of rules for argumentation only the principle of
they operate as metanorms in a discursive procedure that gives equal weight to the
rational discourse that presupposes the use of such rules.82 “If there is no authority for
relations of moral recognition higher than the good will and insight of those who come
to a shared agreement concerning the rules that are to govern their living together, then
the standard for judging these rules must be derived exclusively from the situation in
which participants seek to convince one another of their beliefs and proposals. By
entering into a cooperative communicative practice, they already tacitly accept the
is, of course, what to do with those who choose not to cooperate but prefer to use a
The rule of unlimited participation raises the issue of what to do with people who
refuse to adopt cooperative discourse rules and in particular those who refuse to be
source of Kant’s explanation of good will and moral worth. Habermas claims
categorical validity for norms established within the confines of discourse ethics,
62
63
egocentric positions that advocate one’s own interests in favour of considering the
epistemic kind.”84 Within the logic of this form of argumentation, moral validity rests
speculative use of the imagination that considers the potential for a universal
mind without constraints or they are not. Strict adherence to the rule of unlimited
some people would refuse to operate from any other perspective and consider the
claims that normative justification can both respect individual opinions and require
somewhat mutually exclusive. For this idea to succeed, the choice would have to be
exclude real life participants who refuse to genuinely consider the interests of
everyone.
84
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.35.
63
64
with factual real-life forums. Habermas sets out the ideal conditions of legitimacy for
decision-making procedures and concrete forms of social organization. The rules are
of communication and social interaction. This position can be contrasted with real
protect the right to participate and provide symmetrical rights of assertion in order to
limit the application of strategic rationality. Ideally, they act as a warrant of rightness
or fairness for further normative agreements. In the real world, the validity of a
Habermas assumes that in the absence of coercion and deception nothing could
convince participants to accept a controversial norm except reasons that each person
failed to achieve these basic cooperative agreements for all concerned. Given this
situation, it is possible to anticipate “yes” or “no” answers for people subject to the
application of a moral norm whether they participate or not, despite the need for
reject the “yes” or “no” contributions of those who refuse to act on the basis of
of the interests of others in the context of claiming moral obligations for other people.
Transcendental-Pragmatics
85
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. see pp.44-5.
64
65
discourse principles are not moral duties and rights but rather argumentative duties
and rights. Within this context, argumentation is conceived as a special form of rule-
discourse principles are not the result of social conventions or personal choice, nor
are they conclusions drawn from a deductive proof, rather they are unavoidable
According to Habermas, “if one is to argue at all, there are no substitutes. The fact that
there are no alternatives to these rules of argumentation is what is being proved; the
rules themselves are not being justified.”86 The general idea is that public
identifies an inconsistency between the act of assertion and the asserted proposition.
argument.” The inconsistency between the act of assertion about the use of the rule
at the same time as the pragmatic observance of the rule undermines the claim
made in the assertion. The rules of discourse ethics are not justified in an ultimate
sense but merely shown to be unavoidable on the basis that any attempt to deny or
86
Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983.
p.95. italics original.
65
66
alternatives are available.87 Habermas argues that there are no alternatives to the
rules because of their general nature, “Strictly speaking, arguments cannot be called
one may conclude that the presuppositions of cooperative discourse are necessary
moral reasoning.
Although open and fair procedural rules are an important part of a decision-making
disposition of participants in a real discourse. The exercise of ideal role taking may
adoption of a norm, but people often listen to and ignore submissions of dissenting
voices on a regular basis within democratic forums. They simply do not share the
same interests and do not agree. Habermas’ conception is open to the objection that
procedure could lead to arbitrary outcomes and terror. Although it may represent the
best method available for the determination of moral norms, it cannot prevent the
consensus. Can the consensus stand the test of ideal speech conditions? In the words
of Albrecht Wellmer, “to claim that a consensus is rational indeed means to assume
87
Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983.
p.83 and 95.
88
Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983.
p.83.
66
67
that it rests upon insight (upon the force of arguments) and not upon deception, self-
more than a factual consensus.”89 In other words, the rules of discourse ethics
represent necessary conditions for the validity of moral norms, are hypothetical in
nature, and are not sufficient to guarantee that individuals involved will refrain from
strategic action or that biased individuals or groups will not affect the outcome.
be questioned. Habermas claims that the rules are necessary and unavoidable
aspects of communicative practices however, they all share one thing in common.
They are the product of an agreement to search for mutual understandings within a
a cooperative competition for the better argument where the orientation to the goal of a
communicatively reached agreement unites the participants from the outset.”90 This
prior agreement does not share the condition of being unavoidable in the context of a
through the direct application of force or through other strategic means. If successful,
of the better argument. Although obvious, this demonstrates that the rules are only
the presuppositions of communicative action are the result of the prior acceptance of
an agreement to resolve differences through the force of the better argument rather
than through the direct application of force or other strategic means. This prior
agreement to resolve conflict through argumentation and the force of the better
89
Benhabib, Seyla & Dallmayr Fred. The Communicative Ethics Controversy. (M.I.T. Press, 3rd.
1995) 1990 p.293.
90
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. (italics original) pp.43-44.
67
68
means unavoidable within the larger context of action in general. When a person
adopts this general end the rules of discourse become necessary and are
that requires the rules under the hypothetical condition of necessity only adds
normative rightness to the force of arguments that voluntarily use the rules of
disputes manifests itself in the criteria set out in the principle of universalization, the
action, between cooperation and manipulation. Habermas asserts that his arguments
agreement to settle conflicts by the force of the better argument and to not opt out
or sanctions. It should be apparent that if a participant opts for strategic action they
are in fact rejecting the rational end of argumentation, in effect suspending the rules
until such time as they agree to join the discourse in good faith. The fact that the
rules are contingent on the prior acceptance of an end suggests that moral reasoning
and claims of obligations as set out by modern discourse theories are subservient to
68
69
hypothetical propositions such as: “If I agree to cooperate and resolve arguments
through the force of the better argument then I ought to obey the rules of discourse
that necessity is the result of the prior acceptance of the end of argumentation, i.e.,
the rules are unavoidable only if one has already decided to use them. Prior to that
decision they are not unavoidable, but merely a potential choice between strategic
actions and cooperative actions, between actions directed for success and actions
directed toward mutual understanding. The role of good will in making this decision
should not be overlooked and it is a bit of a puzzle how one should attempt to claim
categorical or moral validity for norms that are the result of hypothetical rules
The prior decision to use the rules introduces a value choice that is not justifiable in
cooperative manner arbitrary. The “force of the better argument” is a better method
something with some certainty while strategic action merely attempts to talk
someone into believing something is true and is not very reliable. He also suggests
that in the long run strategic action discredits participants and results in alienation
distinction demonstrates that discourse rules are not neutral or value-free but are
of variation for moral norms and limits dispute resolution to communicative practices.
This value-choice is perhaps the primary distinction to be made. Whether you believe
69
70
cooperation or not, the conclusion of this argument contradicts the position that the
rules of discourse are neutral insofar as they limit forms of dispute resolution within a
norm setting discourse. The fact that these procedural standards are logical
seek to convince participants that communicative forms of action are better than
that the general agreement to cooperate has a special place in moral reasoning
other norms.
The shift to an intersubjective context and the rules of argumentation result in the
substantive norms that are linked to the rationality of the procedure and the capacity
act as rational criteria to establish ideal discourse conditions that rely on the “force of
consideration of the consequences of adopting a norm for all affected parties. The
hypothetical reasoning.
70
71
evidence.”91 He points out that studies on the logic of moral argumentation end up
valid view of the world that considers the implications of adopting a norm from the
and convince each other that adoption of a proposed norm is in the equal interest of
the conditions of communication in order to ensure that all interested parties test the
persuasion that relies on the weight of the better argument. In the words of Richard
Posner, “when the stakes are high, emotion engaged, information sparse, criteria
71
72
process – people do not simply yield to the weight of the argument, especially argument
derived from the abstractions of moral or political theory.” 93 One reason for divergent
views over moral norms and their application is that they conflict in the same manner
truth. The only difference is that rather than contesting divergent views of particular
divergent views are contested over the generalized interests of all concerned. Of
the “equal interests of all,” can contain a contestable value claim leading to problems
interests. If this were not the case, Kant’s method of moral justification would
like Habermas are forced to admit that any maxim of moral action is potentially
fallible. A consensus grounded in an ideal role exchange is the best method devised
to overcome this problem but it cannot achieve Kant’s claim to construct an objective
“fact of reason” and settle, once and for all, questions of normative rightness. The
are a notable exception to the problems of dissensus because they are based on
Within the moral sphere of deliberation, the principle of universalization provides the
conditions for the worth of a moral norm. The issue is whether everyone could will
93
Posner, R.A..The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. (Harvard University Press, 1999)
paperback ed. 2002. p.104.
72
73
that a contested norm should gain binding force under given conditions.94 The
principle of universalization excludes contested norms that could not meet with the
qualified assent of all who are or might be affected by it. The principle is considered a
the moral point of view and consider whether a controversial norm is acceptable from
the point of view of each participant, “a law is valid in the moral sense when it could
agreement. Instead of binding others to maxims that each can will monologically
suggestion for a universal maxim to the scrutiny of others to see if everyone can
agree that such a maxim can be a universal norm. The difference for Habermas
can defend their view and judge for themselves what is in his or her best interest,
while remaining open to criticism from others. On this basis Habermas reformulates
when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the
94
Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983.
p.204.
95
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.31.
96
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. italics original p.42.
73
74
The principle of universalization equates the validity of a moral norm with the
potential of a norm to be jointly accepted by all concerned. The use of “could be”
potential for universal acceptability rather than on the basis of actual acceptance.
Toward an analysis of acceptability, the first step is to select norms and principles of
to achieve a consensus. Habermas argues that “true impartiality pertains only to that
standpoint from which one can generalize precisely those norms that can count on
universal assent because they perceptibly embody an interest common to all affected. It
important because the selection of norms based on their generalizability narrows the
scope of moral reasoning into a search for interests that we all share in common
rather than establishing, as Kant attempted, a conceptual standard from which one
interests and value orientations of all concerned. What should be evident is that such
introduces the consideration of interests that may motivate the will and form the
and unconditional motives. The modern approach is necessary if one rejects the
74
75
highlights the potential for limited interests to result in costs to third parties. The
participants in the observation of a norm, a process that Kant would consider not part
and material incentives. One advantage of this formulation is that it does not equate
equal treatment with equal outcomes and makes the search for consequences, which
may be different for particular groups, a priority. The disadvantage is that moral
rejected by at least some of the participants because of its impact on their self-
defined interests, unless the difference was acceptable, for example, on grounds of
some conceptual overlap between the idea of acceptable differences and the idea
that a norm should not result in harm, but the main insight is that the condition
reject a proposed norm on the basis of undue hardship in relation to their personal
75
76
Although Habermas indicates that issues of application are separate from issues of
result in identical consequences may be acceptable, however most norms will have
this type of agreement cannot be avoided because, “moral universalism must not
take into account the aspect of equality – the fact that persons as such are equal to all
other persons – at the expense of the aspect of individuality – the fact that as individuals
they are at the same time absolutely different from all others. The equal respect for
everyone else demanded by a moral universalism sensitive to difference thus takes the
must be achieved between protecting the interests of particular groups that result in
Considerations of this nature are tied into Habermas’ conception of normative validity
to the extent that they provide content to the search for what is in the “equal”
interests of everyone.
98
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.40. italics original.
76
77
Moral norms and principles tested by the principle of universalization are transformed
into a binding normativity through the agreement of all concerned. The agreement of
convince one another of the worth of a moral norm and the freedom of self-legislating
subjects who agree to adopt the norm.99 The position is in contrast to any conception
that appeals to ultimate justifications that claim unerring knowledge not subject to
judgments. He argues that the weak motivating force of moral reasons is a product of
good life, and should be supplemented by coercive positive law. Like Kant, Habermas
recognizes that we may agree on actions that are morally right but be inclined to act
otherwise anyway.
Shared Interests
There are at least two different kinds of universal agreements contained within the
idea of “common” interests that form the domain of moral norms concerned with
“common will.” These two conceptually distinct ideas involve the identification of
99
Ibid. p.36.
77
78
practical reason. In the first case, consideration of what is equally good for all limits
norms to those that agree with specific identical conditional interests of everyone the
needs and interests of all people that are not the same. Moral reasoning in the
second case involves consideration of multiple interests held by some but not all
reciprocity and equality. In both cases, positive or negative conditional interests may
align with self-interest for at least some of the participants if not for all of them.
because they involve the identification of the same interest for everyone. This
because it is aligned in every case with the self-interest of every person. Each person
has an interest in the observation of a norm that protects the interest in question,
whether the norm takes the form of a positive personal entitlement or a negative
greater moral worth of a duty. It is much more difficult to know when an action may
be motivated by duty or motivated by self-interest when both the duty and the
to the decision maker, it is easy to suspect the influence of self-interest on the will.
However, the moral aspect of deliberation as outlined by Habermas does not avoid
interest in a proposition does not transcend its original context on the basis of an
78
79
agreement that we all share the same conditional interest in common. It is more
likely that unconditional motives remain unknowable in any particular manner and in
The second type of interest involved by definition includes a motivation to protect the
interest of some participants that is not equally shared by all concerned. In this
situation, a “common will” forms despite the lack of identical interests. The abstract
for acceptance under particular discourse conditions. The act of comparison, and the
nature and content of each individual contribution. Such a consensus may be based
on a combination of diverse general interests that do not share the same condition
under consideration because the interests at stake are not identical. The consensus
that can result is represented by an interest that intends to assist others, often
viewed as the protection of a minority interests not shared by everyone in the form of
equally shared by everyone make it more difficult to reach a universal consensus. His
the norms are not general enough to pass conditions that support universal
demonstrate other than self-directed selfish decision-making and actions that meet
indirect interest when the interest at stake does not disclose a benefit for the
79
80
and is designed to help others or at least not harm others in a norm setting
discourse.
participants who do not share the interest at stake. Moral reasoning that attempts to
avoid harming the interests of others involves the recognition of contingent interests
and motivations that are either aligned with self-interest or a mature consideration of
the interests of others. Neither approach is free from motivations of subjective self-
interest for at least some of the participants. For example, in a large norm setting
help those in need of assistance. Those who do not have an interest in assistance
may agree to adopt the norm because they believe it is the right thing to do, or
because they are dedicated to conditions of equality and reciprocity. The participants
in this situation collectively agree on a common will despite not sharing the same
govern diverse conditions. Although Kant would restrict moral worth to actions
beyond a categorical assertion that this action is acceptable to those who possess a
good will, i.e. it does not harm the interests of other people.
Motivations
Moral reasoning that attempts to avoid harming the interests of others is likely to
80
81
could be the case if the condition was motivated by the perception of prestige or
other material rewards. If a person is motivated to not accept norms that harm other-
that support others because the person does not perceive self-interest to be at stake.
motivational category insofar as the participant does not put forward any effort to
support or deny a norm when the interests at stake are not vested against personal
self-interest. The motivation in this category can be criticized as not being intuitively
moral even though it would pass the standard of the principle of universalization
insofar as a person refuses to harm the interests of other people. Identical common
interests that represent motivations that are the same for everyone can also result in
and conditions.
Moral action best demonstrated against personal self-interest, as Kant would have it,
may not meet the conditions of the principle of universalization. This motivation
results in the sacrifice of self-interest for the benefit of others. Such an interest is
properly described as altruistic. It fails to act on the basis of self-interest and prefers
to act on the basis of promoting the interests of others. It is not the case that there
exists no interest in the motivation affecting the will, rather the person making the
case of moral deliberation that results in the sacrifice of personal benefit to protect
81
82
the interests of others. The specific interest being protected belongs to a second
party. It can be noted that the interest represented by the desire to assist others has
the full potential of incorporating many if not all interests attached to other people if
one permitted moral norms that include the voluntarily sacrifice of self-benefit for
other people from the first person perspective. Such an interest willed without
calculation to balance the interests of some with the interest of many and limit itself
to results that do not harm third parties, or in the formulation of Habermas, only
Conditional Interests
above present problems for moral reasoning associated with motivations. Both Kant
and Habermas claim that moral obligations are the product of emancipating the will
discursive forms of validation then claims of moral obligations are suspect and
legitimate norm use and claims of “moral” universal validity. As set out by the
justification insofar as they are part of a motivation to reject norms or interests they
represent. From this perspective, the entire moral project can be viewed as the
application of a few moral standards that test and reject incompatible conditional
interests and a description of what remains. When conditional interests are tested
and rejected there are no claims of normative rightness to contest on the basis of
unconditional motivations because the process does not result in a positive norm or
82
83
the acceptance of a positive norm, its acceptance does not necessarily rely on a
interests of other people. According to modern moral theory, when shared interests
are aligned with self-interest, the process of considering the interests and value-
nullifies, if you will, either at the individual level or at the level of a collective
decision, the self-interested motivation. The search for shared interests, however, is
open to the critique that self-interest remains the actual motivation because it is still
aligned with the resulting consensus. At issue in this process is whether a process of
to the point of being common is sufficient to achieve categorical validity on the basis
interest.
produce outcomes based on shared interests can actually exclude self-interest and
sufficient to maintain claims of universal validity and moral worth given claims that
such norms exist and are shared universally in common. A plausible alternative
explanation of what operates within discursive forms of justification that claim moral
status beyond the assertion that it is possible to nullify the self-interested motivation
norms on the basis of a universal common interest. But not even this solution
escapes the use of conditional interests, it merely generalizes the conditional interest
or advantage. The individual interest may avoid being disclosed through the process
83
84
best, the demand to include conditions of impartial reflection on what is in the equal
or costs on different groups. The net effect is to maintain Kant’s basic intuition to
individual self-interest is entirely avoided when one additionally considers that any
increases the likelihood of conditional interests being what motivates the acceptance
This is not to claim however, that intersubjective forms of deliberation that rely on
viewed as a product of ideal discourse conditions and the potential for a universal
consensus then the search for shared interests within an intersubjective process may
unacceptable costs for particular groups. In the case of denying acceptance, respect
for the conditional interests of those who are burdened by resulting costs creates
84
85
difficult to deny the role of conditional interests in the application of the principle of
acceptable conditions.
collective decision does not have the same properties as an individual decision, at
best one could describe the various individual reasons or motivations of all individual
particular cost not shared by everyone are discounted and what remains attempts to
theoretical universal collective rather than a limited interest group. This analysis only
unconditional nature because all members of the group are capable of achieving
consensus based on conditions that may or may not actually represent the factual
impartial perspective and adhere to principles of acceptance that level out harms to
other people. If Habermas did not argue in favour of subsequent claims of moral
85
86
advocates while failing, and properly so, the conditions necessary to ascribe moral
obligation mirror Kant’s objective analysis of universal validity and the potential for
theoretical and practical claims of validity. For Kant, theoretical cognitions express
actually real and are different from practical judgments that correspond to moral
perception of participants. The main transition from Kant’s explanation that includes
objective moral commands and the more modern approach of defining the criteria of
assumptions that moral propositions are found by the mind rather than made in the
mind of all rational agents. This distinction is sufficient to map the transition from
something less than objective recognition. Claims of categorical validity and moral
theoretical claims within intersubjective forms of justification. The rest of this paper
will consider the possibility of such a position based on what I perceive to be the
86
87
conditional interests within abstract reasoning processes that claim validity based on
objectivity may entail a transition that requires a theoretical shift from categorical
forms of reasoning to hypothetical forms of reasoning in every case, and that such an
observation may pre-exist within Kant’s own conception. In other words, discursive
forms of justification that use universal standards as criteria for acceptability may not
motivates the will, but rather they may incorporate conditional motivations at a
higher, more general level of abstraction and fail to meet categorical definitions of
validity.
moral worth for every person. In this manner, Kant appears to construct the idea of a
more than the identification of pre-existing fixed abstract logical relationships of non-
empirical phenomena, such as a triangle must have its interior angles equal to two
right angles. The distinction between theoretical and practical operations of reason
allows Kant to express language that constructs the idea of a moral domain by
theoretical rules of geometry and mathematics within the faculty of practical reason.
Kant argued that pure reason could identify objective rules that would clarify the
motivational force of reason by rejecting motives grounded in the world of sense, and
accepting motives grounded on pure intellection, and that these rules were pre-
87
88
observation. In other words, the mind itself was able to construct relational
what was common to all persons the same and accepted given the presence of good
attached to motivational frames of mind may leave one wondering about the abstract
processes that include the simplification of the workings of motivation forces may
Categorical propositions were only concerned with the inclusion of the universal form,
will in the form of a universal law that was impartial. If however, the focus of moral
others and form the basis of a universal consensus. The mix of heteronomous and
rejected by Habermas, who argues that the inclusion of self-interest would fail to
achieve moral obligation and remain within the domain of argumentation that
88
89
process in the context of a competition to reduce norm conflict and achieve moral
validity. The rules used to achieve validity are themselves the product of hypothetical
forms of necessity that claim moral obligation as the result of achieving universal
premise and conclusion to test for a universal truth condition without contradiction or
condition that disclose specific examples are not objective and cannot form the basis
of a universal rule acceptable to everyone. The hypothetical form ruins the idea of an
To critique Kant based on his own reasoning, the difference between hypothetical and
categorical forms of logic within inert theoretical expressions are not the same if the
context is changed and they are viewed within a practical sphere of motivational
action. The difference between the heteronomous and autonomous will in Kant was
two right angles must equal the interior degrees of a triangle, while hypothetical
part of a logical expression in the form of the end of an action or purpose. Forms of
89
90
purpose or reference to an end other than the performance of the action directly and
does not contain intermediate conditions. Kant argued that this avoids the logical
action, that such conditions exist anyway, and are unavoidable, even if not disclosed,
given the possibility of the full expression of the categorical proposition and
reciprocity and equality. Within the context of discursive forms of validation, moral
given the need to perform an impartial consequential analysis as set out by the
Moral Reasoning
Although there are many aspects of Kant’s reasoning that Habermas does not
references to the material conditions of an action and its intended result defines an
autonomous will in an unconditional manner and binds the will to practical reason so
that it may adopt maxims of action on the basis of insight. The exercise of rational
unconditional demands that are categorically valid. Habermas claims that the
90
91
hypothetical relation that manifests itself in the conditions of acceptance for all
practical reason that avoid such a conclusion are necessary to maintain claims of
subjective conditions and discourse rules, moral reasoning needs to distinguish itself
from non-moral contextual situations that result in agreement but not moral
Subjective Contexts
91
92
The moral point of view claims to avoid specific or particular values attached to pre-
origins. Ethical contexts involve evaluations of the good life in relation to identities
approach that operates within ethical contexts. The difference between claiming
propositions that remain within ethical first person considerations of moral worth
linked to the presence of good will and the denial of subjective conditions within
that consider the interests of all people. The differences, however, do not necessarily
validity, they merely act as a warrant of rightness for claims of a subjective nature.
The motivation may remain under the influence of acceptable subjective motivations
unless the standard operates as a motivation on the will. The inclusion of dialogical
intersubjective claims in order to replace the idea of objective laws that are suspect
in ethical first person contextual situations. The standards actually displace reliance
92
93
ethical context, even if the value has multiple sources of origin and is generalizable
to the point of being a shared common interest in each specific case. The prior
and a review of the consequences of adopting a norm may limit moral reasoning to a
which ground contingent interests, “there seems to be no way around the explanation
not avoid subjective evaluations that lead to hypothetical conditions despite the
introduction of the moral point of view. The moral context in this situation is viewed
toward but it does not change the motivational contextual situation of maxims of
action and other propositions that cannot escape being viewed in the “concrete.” A
affective-emotional constitution.101
100
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.99.
101
Benhabib, Seyla. The Generalized and the Concrete Other : The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy
and Moral Theory in Kittay, E. and Meyers, D. (eds.), Women and Moral Theory. New Jersey :
Rowan and Littlefield, 1987.p.164.
93
94
validity that reference ethical contexts and contingent motivations. The decision to
avoid strategic actions and motivations may not avoid subjective contexts and claim
participants (and all those affected) can accept with good reasons as appropriate for
regulating the subject matter at hand, and which can thereby acquire binding
Thus an interest only deserves consideration from the moral point of view once it is
stripped of its intrinsic relation to a first person perspective. Once it is translated into
desire or preference survives the generalization test only under the description of a
value that appears to be generally acceptable to all participants as a basis for regulating
102
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. pp.81-82. italics original.
94
95
interests that may motivate acceptance and observance of a norm and subsequently
fail to achieve categorical validity given that acceptability may, in every condition
contexts to avoid strategic action. Whether the moral point of view is actually part of
incorporating generalized subjective conditions that are the same for everyone is to
motivations linked to conditional being. It can be argued that such an illusion does
necessity of the moral point of view operates to contradict the idea of a context-
independent process. The decision to accept the presupposed end to resolve conflict
through the force of the better argument rather than strategic forms of motivation is
governed behaviour that require accounting for the interests of others, avoiding
The selection process of generalization operates in the same manner as a good will to
select norms that are capable of achieving universal approval. The selection process
the process of weighing the probability of universal consensus and the formal
95
96
will of every individual as defined by Kant and supported by Habermas. The inclusion
It can be argued that the condition of a morally good will produced by the
universal duty shared and acceptable to all people is not the same proposition as the
acceptability may not reference claims of unconditional validity, being limited by the
judgment with a consequential analysis may be the only theoretical means to avoid
would appear to be suitable candidates for Kantian categorical validity but not qualify
96
97
The secondary derivation of cooperative forms of behaviour that follow from the force
confused with the idea of a primary decision to resolve conflict or the means by
which to do so. The decision to avoid logical performative contradictions is the result
of pragmatic logic and a desire for performative competency or a desire to obey rules
of agreement, while the decision to resolve conflict within a process of norm selection
the expression of a primary ethical preference to avoid strategic action if one accepts
The operation of forming a consensus based on generalizable interests may not avoid
being generalized to the point of being less objectionable. This would involve
accepting that subjective common interests of others are conditional in form and
rejection of selfish motivations. Just because the generalizable test claims to avoid a
subjective motivation through the operation and denial of self-interest of the person
making the determination does not necessarily entail avoiding the insight that all
that hearing the interests and value-orientations of all concerned results in a context-
independent motivation that is not a preference but the result of reasoned conviction
97
98
categorical validity. To achieve this claim, contingent values are either not involved in
the motivation of an agreement or they do not retain their conditional status when
considered from an abstract perspective that considers the interests of all concerned
in a context-independent manner.
ethical contexts and the determination of norms within a moral context and claim
that the construction of values and norms are distinct processes. It can be argued,
however, that the incorporation of discourse ethics within a norm setting discourse
relies on the inclusion of at least one ethical value choice insofar as cooperation is a
determination of acceptable norms serves to limit the scope of moral reasoning. Such
a limit can be viewed as the inclusion of an ethical value within a framework that
claims value neutrality. The second observation of such a claim, as noted earlier, is
that despite the transition to a search for shared norms, the consideration of the
generalizes subjective values in an attempt to compare them with the general values
of justice over questions of the good, however it does not support the claim to
generalizable and particular interests of others to the point of recognizing and acting
98
99
considered in the context of all rational agents. It is still based on conditional reasons
despite the idea that they apply to everyone. Hypothetical propositions take the
following form: I ought to do “x” if I want to achieve “y”. In the abstract context of
moral reasoning and normative justification the hypothetical proposition is: I ought to
accept norm “x” if I want achieve common interest “y” and everyone agrees that “y”
is equally good for everyone. “Y” within my argument is a common interest accepted
as a conditional reason for acting within the universal sphere of moral deliberation,
its standards as such, but without claims of unconditional validity or moral obligation.
interests does not transcend the conditional nature of particular subjective interests,
it merely introduces the requirement that interests relied on must be disclosed and
that everyone agrees the interest could be common to everyone. The deliberative
conflicting interests that result in unacceptable inequality. At best, the moral point of
Absence of Self-Interest
what is equally in the interests of everyone may avoid self-interest if it were based
99
100
approach avoids self-interest but it does not avoid the use of conditional interests
perspective. The desire to protect the common interests of others would have to
exclude the interests of the person making the determination and accept the
obligations and benefits that were identical for each person without attachment to
conditional motivations or interests. Given the modern treatment of his claims, this
form of deliberative practice relies on the consideration of the equal interests of all
concerned and limits interests to those we all share, either equally, or collectively but
it does escape from the presence and use of conditional and contingent interests
The claim for the existence of unconditional motivations, not tied to any interests at
reason will always be linked to the interests of someone and be in the hypothetical
form. In all cases, the will is determined either by an interest attached to the
going beyond this limit as a factual explanation of the potential for universal
agreements, these two sets of interests exhaust the potential grounds for motivation
100
101
constructing the norm, although I suppose a norm could be constructed in the total
absence of interests, only that no one would likely support it. In every case of
interests of others, or a mix of both, but not the total absence of conditional interests
agreeing to support the interests of other people, however, because such a task still
categorical validity.
In summary, Kant and Habermas conceive of two different standards for moral action
summarized as a test that rules out maxims of action based on contradiction with the
everyone did that? You should not do this or that action because if everyone did it
would result in a performative contradiction. You should not give lying promises
because if everyone gave lying promises then contract law would break down, or you
should not give incorrect change because if everyone gave incorrect change then
commerce would break down. This standard makes an assumption that we already
know what is good, it is what everyone could will without contradiction. You should
respect your parents because if everyone respected their parents it would be good
and not result in unequal advantages. It creates a set of moral propositions that
provide equal obligations for everyone. Habermas on the other hand, uses a different
principle. You should not give incorrect change because it would harm the interest of
others. You should not give lying promises because it would induce contracts, which
examination of the potential harms and a test of consent based on the assumption
that no one would agree to something that would harm their interests.
101
102
The main difference between the two standards is what I will call the high and low
watermark of morality, a positive versus a negative test. Kant established the highest
standard, it reaches for the best in people. We should support all actions that are
good. The only problem is that different people in different cultures hold different
opinions on what is good, on what everyone ought to do. Habermas’ standard tries to
deal with this objection, but as a result he has to water down the standard somewhat,
or use a negative test. It is not the case that we should support what is good because
our conception of what is good may be fallible, so instead we should at least not
harm others. This test creates a set of norms and corresponding obligations that are
do not harm the interests or value-orientations of others. The only problem is that
such a standard introduces a value choice insofar as it justifies the prior acceptance
through argumentation and norms of equal application. These rules are a necessary
modification on moral reasoning because when one accepts a standard that rejects
harmful outcomes one must first be able to listen to others in order to determine
motivations linked to the subjective interests of the self or others, then claims of
presupposes the prior recognition of what is good which modern moral reasoning
Kant posits that we already know what is moral and what is not and merely have to
102
103
cast it in a universal form to avoid conditional interests, test our beliefs, and establish
a universal obligation. He advocates that we ought to perform an action for the sake
of an action and not for a mediating inclination or desire, the action is motivated by
inclination or desire that may void categorical forms of validity. The invention of
contexts that consider the consequences of adopting norms and may fail achieve the
preferences that set out conditions of acceptability despite aiming for the potential of
same time. If such were the case, categorical validity claims would be the result of
that operate on the basis of reciprocity and equality are not sufficient to ground
reasoning determine the result. Even if one accepts reciprocity and equality as the
justification for intersubjective validity then the reasons for adopting a norm will still
conditional interests, disclosed or not, within the decision to first operate on the basis
103
104
If one agrees that moral reasoning cannot escape from motivations based on
subjective contingent interests, whether they are attached to the person making the
obligations. Habermas refers to this objection, “…insofar as an actor only has rational
nature of the moral expectations whose categorical validity he should recognize under
validity and claims of moral obligation because they are linked to hypothetical forms
of agreement despite that the moral point of view claims to escape subjective self-
Moral Worth
Kant and Habermas place a great deal of emphasis on the motivation for adopting a
norm or principle because they link unconditional motivations with moral obligations.
103
Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.22.
104
105
Such a task is beyond the scope of the present inquiry that restricted itself to an
Moral worth, in the Kantian sense, cannot really be attached to norms on the basis of
their potential for universal agreement because such an analysis cannot avoid
interests are aligned with self-interest for at least some of the participants. What
remains of Kant’s assessment of moral worth is the idea that it applies to motivations
exclusively for the protection of the interests of others. Norms that are motivated to
protect the interests of a particular group that involve a cost to other groups provide
selflessness but are the least likely to be accepted for that very reason. On this basis
personal benefit. This proposition relies on an ethical rather than moral context for
justification. The claim of moral worth is merely an intuition that describes a standard
outcomes are better than competitive ones. When confronted with the choice to
normalize a generalizable interest that results in costs to some groups when given
and obtain the same benefits and obligations or we can promote the interests of
105
106
others over our own interests. The only caveat to this simple description is that
promoting the interests of others still requires an analysis of the potential costs to
third parties in order to avoid establishing unacceptable advantages for others. This
approach suggests that the equalization of interests is not the sine qua non of
morality, it is the minimum standard. The highest moral standard is that of altruism.
Moral obligations can likely be attached to acts of altruism on the basis of duty and
consistent with that position. Once moral theory rejects the idea of objectively
necessary moral obligations, and accepts the idea that obligations exist only when
we agree to undertake them, what we are left with is the determination of value in
abstract and general contexts. The domain of morality loses some of its special
extension of ethical value determinations that contain integrity. What remains are
three distinct standards of judgment that may be applied in any particular case. The
claiming a value or interest for a particular group to which one belongs, claiming a
value or interest for all people, and claiming a value or interest for a particular group
to which one does not belong. These standards reflect different motivations that
determine the will to action and correspond roughly with stages of moral
development. The first category includes those who help themselves regardless of
the cost to others, the second category includes those who balance their personal
interests with what all may agree to be the identical interests of everyone and the
third category includes those who help others at a cost to themselves. The first
an advantage they do not want to share with others. The second standard is based
benefits that do not result in the advantage of one group over another. The third
106
107
protect the interests of others, such as in war-time. The idea of moral worth is linked
to a rejection of the first standard in favour of the other two, however protecting the
interests of others without the expectation of personal benefit is the only clear
example of an action containing moral worth on the basis of being totally purged of
self-interest.
The use of these three standards in moral deliberation and recognition of the need to
those who would want to justify some sense of necessary obligation rooted in
something more than a free choice or arbitrary preference. I do not think, however,
that because obligations rest on choices, these choices do not disclose the existence
statements. The initial choice can be grounded in pragmatic insights that suggest
better outcomes for all participants. The initial choice may be based on a decision or
the collective.
In its most general form, moral worth is the acceptance of caring, which if applied in
a moral context means caring for everyone. However, the acceptance of the
proposition does not result in binding moral obligations for everyone, it is an option.
The task of moral philosophy should be to persuade people to agree to adopt a moral
order that prefers to care, either because it can be justified on the basis of forming
better outcomes or because one already believes that caring is to be preferred. The
107
108
moral imperative is to communicate with others in order to promote good will and
contexts and to reject selfish motives that lead to exclusive personal advantage.
Bibliography
Benhabib, Seyla. The Generalized and the Concrete Other. Kittay, E.F. and Meyers,
D.T. (eds.), Women and Moral Theory. (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield) 1987.
Benhabib, Seyla. On Reconciliation and Respect, Justice and the Good life. Philosophy
& Social Criticism. Vol.23 no. 5 pp. 97-114 (Sage Publications, London) 1997.
Benhabib, Seyla & Dallmayr Fred. The Communicative Ethics Controversy. (M.I.T.
Press, 3rd. 1995) 1990.
Duncan, A.R.C. Practical Reason and Morality. (Thomas Nelson Ltd. London) 1957.
Habermas, Jurgen. The Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T. Press, 1998) 1996.
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff.
Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. F. Max Muller (Anchor Books, NY)
1966.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall
Inc. New Jersey) 1993.
Kant, Immanuel. Logic. Trans. Robert Hartman & Wolfgang Schwarz (Dover NY 1988)
1974.
Paton, H.J.. The Categorical Imperative. (Hutchinson & Co. London, U.K.) 1947.
Posner, Richard, A. The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. (Harvard University
Press) 1999.
Rawls, John. Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Ed. Barbara Herman.
(Harvard University Press) 2000.
108
109
Wolff, Robert Paul. The Autonomy of Reason. (Harper & Row NY) 1971.
109