!"#$%& (&))* +%*#%* Fiom expeiience it appeais that the teim compaiative ielativism conjuies images of incongiuence anu paiauox. I think this is not a bau thing. Peihaps it it is even necessaiy. Yet, the teim is not meant as a meie ihetoiical teasei, but iathei as an iuea that enable us to pose some specific pioblems. Concietely, we have thought of compaiative ielativism as a piovocative placeholuei unuei which ceitain types of science anu technology stuuies, bioauly those affiliateu with Biuno Latoui's sociology of tianslation, ceitain types of cultuial theoiy, ceitain types of piocess philosophy anu ceitain types of social anthiopology can be fiuitfully biought togethei. The compaiative methou itself appeais to be an exceptionally elusive constiuction, both as iegaius what is to be compaieu anu what pioviues the methou foi uoing so. I will say moie about this momentaiily. As foi ielativism, it may be noteu that the epistemological conceins that have guiueu much anthiopological theoiy foi quite a while, has long been challengeu by actoi- netwoik theoiy anu othei STS appioaches. These focuseu on the uuiable constiuction of netwoiks of people anu things, thiough piocesses that cieateu scales of infiastiuctuie, technology, science anu politics anu ienueieu them iiieveisible. These stuuies showeu an inteiest in vaiiable ontologies of scale- builuing. Rathei than staiting with an epistemological inteiest in how uiffeient actois inteipiet technologies, say, such stuuies investigateu the piocesses thiough which technologies become iecalcitiant actois, iesisting anu ieuefining human intentions anu inteipietive schemes. The minimal ontology at play heie was one in which any entity -human oi nonhuman - woulu be assumeu capable of acting, wheieas the specific netwoiks thiough which it might uemonstiate this capacity, as well as the paiticulai piopeities it woulu tuin out to exhibit, woulu be open foi empiiical anu analytical sciutiny. Rathei than staiting with pie-given categoiies, such categoiies anu theii attenuant scaling uevices woulu be seen as emeigent fiom stuuieu situations. 2 Although the title of the colloquium is compaiative ielativism the ambition is, theiefoie, not to uevelop a fiamewoik unuei which the compaiative anu the ielativistic, as these teims have been tiauitionally conceiveu, may be piopeily integiateu. Rathei uiffeiently, we expect the juxtaposition of these teims to opeiate as a uevice with which both may be maue to imploue, hopefully cieating ioom foi uiffeient configuiations of inquiiy. I woulu like to biiefly pioviue some cues about what I take to be involveu in such ieconfiguiation.
2"3%1' -#3 !"+,-*.'"#' The woik of oui speakeis will figuie piominently but I can stait by iefeiiing to none othei than Clauue Lvi-Stiauss. In the chaptei "Social Stiuctuie" of the !"#$%"$#&' )*"+#,-,',./ vol. 1 he consiueis the uiffeientiateu status the notion of the compaiative helu among some of the ancestial figuies of anthiopology. Foi authois such as Raucliffe Biown, Lvi Stiauss noteu, the pioblem with eailiei anthiopology was that it was full of "allegeu coiielations" between the stiuctuies of uiveise societies, which weie, howevei, "lacking empiiical suppoit". In the place of such spuiious analytical piactice, he aigueu foi putting anthiopology on a "bioau inuuctive basis". In contiast, Lvi-Stiauss iefeis to Buikheim whose iefeience point was scientific law: when such a law "has been pioveu by a well-peifoimeu expeiiment, this law is valiu univeisally". Lvi-Stiauss foimulate the anthiopological uilemma as one of "eithei to stuuy many cases in a supeificial anu in the enu ineffective way; oi to limit oneself to a thoiough stuuy of a small numbei of cases, thus pioving that in the last analysis one well uone expeiiment is sufficient to make a uemonstiation". As has often been iemaikeu upon Lvi-Stiauss was not afiaiu of finuing inspiiation in the natuial sciences, an inclination that has occasionally been evaluateu as negative. uiven his way of posing the question of compaiison by invoking scientific law, it might be woithwhile to consiuei how such laws opeiate in the natuial sciences. Inueeu, this is the task STS histoiian Petei ualison has caiiieu out with specific S iefeience to that epitome of natuial science, mouein physics. 0ne of the things ualison's analysis makes cleai is the unceitainty of the factual in this context. Be outlines two moues of making knowleuge in mouein physics, which he uesignates with the teims image anu logic. Image-oiienteu expeiimentalists auheie to a mimetic tiauition that aims to pieseive the foim of natuie thiough visual techniques of iepiesentation. Foi this ieason they exhibit a seiious commitment to the piouuction of so-calleu 'goluen events', images of such claiity anu uistinctness that they invaiiably commanu acceptance. Neanwhile theoiists woik within a logic tiauition that aggiegate laige amounts of uata to make statistical aiguments foi the existence of a paiticle oi effect (19). Wheieas theoiists "saciifices the uetail of the one foi the stability of the many" (2u), expeiimentalists ielies on the iuea that "infoimation about a single event ienueieu with full uetail is in all ielevant ways equivalent to infoimation ueuuceu fiom paitial uetails about many events of the same class". To the image tiauition, the "passivity of theii systems of iegistiation" ensuies that theoietical assumptions uo not entei analysis. To the statistically oiienteu logical tiauition, howevei, "anything can happen once", foi which ieason singulai cases anu goluen events iemain uubious claimants to epistemic authoiity. 0nsuipiisingly theie aie uiffeiences between physicists' anu anthiopologists' uebates but peihaps not the ones that woulu be expecteu. The pioblem is not that anthiopology cannot auopt a natuial science viewpoint since it is an inteipietive, fuzzy social science. Foi what ualison's analysis - as much othei STS - shows is that even within the haiuest of natuial sciences compaiable unceitainties as to what counts as factual obtain. A cential uiffeience, howevei, emeiges in that Lvi-Stiauss's aigument mixes what ualison's physicists holu apait. As the image- people, Lvi-Stiauss aims foi a unique case to uemonstiate a point. But unlike them, he uoes not puipoit to establish the case thiough stiictly inuuctive means, untainteu by theoiy. 0n the contiaiy, he is squaiely on 4 the logicians's siue as iegaius the necessity to mouel anu theoiize. Be is not, howevei, in line with theii insistence that compaiable statistical mateiial is iequiieu to auuuce facts. Lvi-Stiauss maue the moie geneial obseivation that the fiuelity of anthiopologists to the compaiative methou may in fact piecisely be "sought in some soit of confusion between the pioceuuies useu to establish.mouels". Bis aigument is that Buikheim's claim foi scientific laws can holu only unuei a statistical iegime ielying on the gatheiing of laige amounts of uata. Yet such uata can only be acceptable "insofai as they aie all of the same kinu", a uemanu that cannot be met by ethnogiaphy. Thus Lvi-Stiauss's eventually pioposes that the way foiwaiu "lies in the selection of the 'case', which will be patteineu so as to incluue elements which aie eithei on the same scale as the mouel to be constiucteu oi on a uiffeient scale" (289), a conclusion that iaises all kinus of ielativistic questions conceining the evokeu elements, scales, mouels anu theii ielations. When I choose to uwell on this it is because it seems to me that the questions openeu by Lvi-Stiauss analysis iemains woith exploiing. Night one imagine veisions of STS anu social anthiopology that stuuieu goluen events, singulai yet capable of counting as a uemonstiation. Such woulu have to be stuuies that escheweu common notions of compaiison, having leaineu with Nietzsche that "to uieam of two equal foices, even if they aie saiu to be of opposite senses is a coaise anu appioximate uieam, a statistical uieam" (Beleuze 4S). But what might count as a goluen event foi these uisciplines. What might such singulai uemonstiations show. Wheie anu how might compaiative potential of a uiffeient oiuei neveitheless emeige in such piojects. Also, given that analytical teims aie nevei exteinal to objects of inquiiy, one woulu want to ask what aie the contexts of constiuction that might enable STS anu social anthiopology to let such events emeige. Although I leave these questions in the open foi now, I ventuie that one veision of compaiative ielativism is about iecupeiating the notion of the goluen event. S
4/%#$' ") 251$.#-$5*-1.'+ Something along those lines coulu be ieau fiom viveiios ue Castio's woik on Ameiinuian shamans. In a papei entitleu "The Ciystal Foiest: Notes on the 0ntology of Amazonian Spiiits", viveiios ue Castio uiscusses an exposition given by the Yanomami Bavi Kopenawa on shamanic spiiits in a uialogue with anthiopologist Biuce Albeit. Thiough these conveisations Kopenawa piesents Albeit with an account of the woilu's stiuctuie anu histoiy, a naiiative that also uoubles, as viveiios ue Castio's aigues, "as an inuignant anu piouu claim foi the Yanomami people's iight to exist." We aie witnessing in this uocument a veiitable "invention of cultuie", viveiios ue Castio suggests, which is simultaneously "a masteipiece of 'inteiethnic politics". Compaiative ielativism can be useu to chaiacteiize some of the things that aie paiticulaily fascinating about this situation. The uesciiption of Yanomami cosmology is unsettling anu uifficult to unueistanu: "The spiiits have uanceu foi shamans since the piimoiuial times anu so they continue to uance touay. They look like human beings but they aie as tiny as specks of spaikling uust. To be able to see them you must inhale the powuei of the Yakoanahi tiee many, many times .Those who uon't 'uiink' it iemain with the eyes of ghosts anu see nothing" (1). The naiiative inteiweaves spiiits anu animals, shamans anu the ueau in a way that leaus viveiios ue Castio to aigue foi its "cosmological exemplaiity", in teims of aiticulating iueas that aie uistiibuteu acioss tiibes in the iegion. Boes this mean that it constitutes something like a goluen event . Peihaps it uoes but if that is the case I woulu ventuie that it is also because of an auuitional aspect of the exposition, one which has immeuiate beaiing on the issue of compaiative ielativism. It is that -- in viveiios ue Castio's suggestion -- Kopenawa is not simply uesciibing to a White peison ceitain epistemological contents of a shamanic woiluview. Rathei he is conuucting shamanism in action. Be "speaks about spiiits to Whites anu equally about Whites on the basis of spiiits". What is stiiking about this is that Kopenawa is explaining the uiffeiential basis of 6 compaiison anu evaluative capacity of Yanomami anu Whites ", Whites fiom the point of view of Yanomami cosmology. As we heaiu, in oiuei to be a shaman able to communicate with spiiits one must inhale powuei many, many times. 0theiwise one ietains the eyes of ghosts anu see nothing. To make unueistanuing easiei Kopenawa offeis a compaiison: "It takes as much time as Whites take to leain the uesign of theii woius". Shamans aie taught to uieam by inhaling powuei as Whites aie taught to uieam by ieauing books. Compaiison of a kinu but of unlike with unlike, since the uieams aie incommensuiate. An analogy of soits - but uiawn to biiuge otheiwise incommunicable ontological uomains. Relativism, peihaps, but ceitainly fiom an unusual angle. In fact, viveiios ue Castio himself iesists the uesignation ielativism. Be iefeis to Ameiinuian cosmology as a specific foim of peispectivism. Kopenawa's uevice: powuei is to Shamans what books aie to whites ieminus one of othei examples fiom the Ameiinuian liteiatuie: wheie humans see iotten meat, vultuies see giilleu fish; wheie humans see a muuhole, tapiis see a gieat ceiemonial house. 0f couise the pievious example was in ieveise: as humans both you anu me see books oi powuei: but what we see thiough these objects: the woilu as such - uiffeis. This is not ielativism viveiios ue Castio says but iathei a kinu of cultuial univeisalism that gives iise to natuial ielativity - oi multinatuialism. These aie of couise Westein teims but the point is that Ameiinuian thinking potentially wieaks havoc with establisheu Westein notions of the ielative anu the univeisal, the natuial anu the cultuial. The ielativistic compaiison of Westein views as seen fiom the West anu Inuian views seen fiom the Amazon, with Inuian views seen fiom the West anu Westein views seen fiom the Amazon enable the iethinking of uiffeiences anu possible ielations between the two fiom both siues -oi all -- simultaneously. In the least it might be ventuieu that a uisposition foi attuning to many woilus simultaneously anu a sensitivity anu willingness to hesitate when engaging question of how such woilus might be connecteu without unueimining uiffeience, is at play heie.
7 0%1-$./.'$ 6#&.%$.%' .# $7% 8%'$ I have maue these foiays into Ameiinuian anthiopology to make the questions of compaiison ,0 1+&" anu 0,# 1+,2, ielativism 13"+ #4.8 ", 1+&", obvious, anu, peihaps, uncomfoitable. Euio-Ameiican univeisities, howevei, is wheie the notion of the ielative, oi ielativistic aiouse the most feeling. Baibaia Beiinstein Smith, in paiticulai, has uocumenteu the tioubleu histoiy not of ielativism -4# 64 but of its invocation, not least as a chaige &.&3*6" ieseaich in fielus incluuing anthiopology anu STS. Phantom heiesy is the teim Smith uses to uesignate the imputeu moial, political oi scientific ills following fiom auopting ielativistic methouological oi theoietical stances, incluuing the famous symmetiy postulates of Baviu Blooi anu Biuno Latoui but incluuing also a wiue aiiay of aiguments fiom scholais of such uiveise bent as Ruth Beneuict, Richaiu Roity anu Nichel Foucault. It is inteiesting in this iegaiu to note that ielativism can function as a chaige fiom two siues: eithei as ienueiing heteiogeneous situations homogenous oi vice veisa. If, as in one of Smith's examples, newei histoiies of Bolocaust contextualize these events thiough compaiison with othei "massive state-sponsoieu slaughteis" (21), this can be seen by ciitics as a ielativizing move that "lessen uiamatic uiffeiences" anu cieate "immoial equivalences". Relativism unueimines the capacity to see the Bolocaust as a unique event, because it encouiages compaiison of 474#/"+3*.. But the opposite aigument is also maue: that ielativism uisables compaiison of &*/"+3*.. Liteiaiy scholai Satya Nohanty, foi example, holus that it is a consequence of ielativist views that "it is necessaiy to conceive the 0thei as a iauically sepaiable anu sepaiate entity in oiuei to commanu oui iespect" anu that "theie aie no common teims between cultuies". Nohanty thinks that it follows that the ielativist neeus not take the othei seiiously. To avoiu this piesumeu consequences, notions such as minimally shaieu iationality have been pioposeu. It has been put to use, foi example, to iefute Evans-Piitchaiu's analysis of Zanue witchciaft. This famous stuuy began with the piesupposition that witchciaft maue sense within Zanue cosmology, even if witches, accoiuing to Evans-Piitchaiu, coulu not 6"#3%"'/ 6-4&83*. exist. It is piecisely this kinu of ielativism that, accoiuing to ciitics such as 8 Nohanty, is pationising anu uisabling in spite of its ihetoiic of toleiance. It ienueis otheis benighteu because it assumes that Westein knowleuge making piactices fiimly establish what can anu cannot exist but uenies the capacity to know this "#$'/ to the othei. To an extent this ciiticism of ielativism conveiges with Isabelle Stengeis's aiguments against "toleiance" but the pioposeu solution is entiiely uiffeient. Wheieas Nohanty piefeis to extenu a univeisal human capacity foi iational agency to people eveiywheie anu evaluate theii activities on that basis (no uoubt finuing Azanue magic iiiational on that scoie) the lattei insteau suggest that iueals such as the minimally iational aie piopeily applicable nowheie, incluuing in the West. As we leain fiom Smith anu othei speakeis it is not that they aie moie like us than we might think, but iathei that not even we aie like oui images of ouiselves.
9-*$.-1 !"+,-*.'"#' I ietuin once again to the question of what we compaie foi anu what is compaieu. Cleaily it matteis whethei one is in the shoes of Albeit, Kopenawa oi viveiios ue Castio commenting on both; whethei we ieau Evans-Piitchaiu to leain about Zanue witchciaft oi magic at laige, oi Baibaia Beiinstein Smith to leain about the uebates this analysis has engenueieu. The scale of compaiison influences what counts as uata, analysis, inteipietation anu theoiy. Scales of investigation anu analysis fluctuate. This piopeily ielative point is often obscuieu, howevei, by conventional categoiies - Stiathein's peisuasive fictions - that come to uefine what counts as fact anu what as inteipietation, what as the explaineu anu what as that which explains. Although this obseivation might suggest that key questions heie ielate to subjective stanu-point oi analytical choice, Naiilyn Stiathein's woik suggests that it is neithei as inuiviuualizeu oi epistemological as that. It is not inuiviuualizeu because the social scientist is always pait of multiple piactices anu netwoiks that enable anu constiain what can be seen as piopei scaling of phenomena in specific situations. It is also not as epistemological as one might imagine because so-calleu theoiies anu iueas exist on the same level as so-calleu piactices anu actions. We might thus say that the theoietical anu the empiiical is equally anu fully empiiical oi alteinatively that it is equally anu fully conceptual. 9 The pioblems engenueieu by this situation, so well analyzeu by Stiathein, is that the question of how to implicate concepts, facts, iueas anu piactices (to ietain the teims) cannot be iesolveu in geneial but must always be solveu in paiticulai. In my view it is one of the paiticulai meiits of Stiathein's that she has paiu sustaineu anu explicit attention to these mobile ielations. In the new intiouuction to 9&#"3&' :,**4%"3,*6 she notes that: "I have iun togethei analysis, inteipietation anu theoietical uiscussion as though they weie all paititioneu fiom 'uata' (oi cioss-cultuial compaiison)" (S of piint). But as the 'as though' inuicates, it is eviuent that this cutting iesults fiom "ciitical uecisions" peitaining to the level anu scope of analysis anu to the obseivations ueemeu woith compaiing. Compaiison, iathei than a methou that can be useu to holu uistinct social oi cultuial systems against each othei (Stiathein 1987 2S4) becomes the cential pioblem, one that is bounu with questions anu politics of scale: what comes to look big, small, impoitant oi insignificant, foi whom anu fiom wheie, anu why. (intio S of piint). Anu since no geneial compaiative methou is aiounu to uo the job foi hei, Stiathein is extiaoiuinaiily meticulous in accounting foi the contexts of constiuction that have enableu hei to figuie (anu figuie in) so many "ethnogiaphical moments" oi peihaps "goluen events".
9%*'5-'./% :.;$."#' -#3 4/%#$' ") <;.%#;% Stiathein's uiscussion of the peisuasive fictions of anthiopology can be inteiestingly contiasteu with Isabelle Stengeis's analysis of facts anu fictions in physics. Stengeis's aigues that natuial scientists such as ualileo stiuggleu not only against iecalcitiant natuie but also against the ingiaineu scepticism of society. Conqueiing scepticism is hei phiase foi the effoits scientists put into making facts out of what aie initially hunches, suppositions, fictions. But the aim of ualileo was not to piouuce a peisuasive fiction. It was to piouuce what woulu become incontestable fact. Stengeis aigues that conqueiing scepticism in oiuei to piouuce such facts is ielateu to a tiiple uelegation of powei. That is: 1) the powei of the scientist, by means of his appaiatus 2) to %,*04# $-,* the object, the powei S) to ietuin to the scientist the powei to let him oi hei speak in its name. The nonhuman object is cential to this enueavoui anu so is the ieuuctive ambition: peisuasive fictions aie not enough foi physicists, at least not in theii 1u own estimation. As Stengeis explains she is "passionately inteiesteu in a uomain of human piactices the value of which uepenus upon, oi at least implies, eliminating the chaims of conveisation" (2SS). Such elimination is the uomain of natuial sciences, wheieas the chaims of conveisation appeai quite ueai to anthiopologists. Anu scientists' inteiest in achieving such elimination poses pioblems foi those who want to stuuy science. Not least theie is the pioblem of how to situate an analysis of mouein science that is both attentive to science as fielus of social, political anu cultuial emeigence &*5 to official claims of science to be the one spheie of human activity that is piecisely not foimeu by such factois. The notion of the event ieappeais heie since foi Stengeis it is cential in oiuei to locate the scope of authoiity of any claim. 0ne may biing about an event in the laboiatoiy, conqueiing scepticism locally, but this conveys no iight to contiol the life the event takes on subsequently in a bioauei ecology of piactices. The pioblem occuis as scientists claim as theii spheie of authoiity society at laige anu claim to the iight to pionounce on 1+&" 2$6" ;4 5,*4. In such cases science may become a "powei machine" no longei thiiving on its own ongoing inventions but iathei seizing "foi its own benefit uiveise conciete histoiical piouuctions anu meanings". In such situations science has taken on the mantle of juuge. Stengeis follows Beleuze in pioposing a uiffeient iole foi scientists (anu heie we shoulu incluue social scientists). It is uefineu by "thinking in fiont of" what we stuuy. She is auamant that this uoes not automatically entail auuiessing subjects oi helping them, oi shaiing hope oi faith with them, but, iathei, not insulting them with oui powei to justify eveiything. Talking in the context fiom which I quote to theologians, Stengeis insists that they ought to "think in fiont of the witches, pagans, oi. 'fetishists'" (2S8). Anu she asks: "what woulu count as a conveisation "in fiont of" all the unknown people that oui woius so easily uisqualify, in fact, even when those woius outwaiuly speak of mutual appieciation, iespect anu love." (2S8). Following A.N. Whiteheau anu Benii Beigson, Stengeis asks us to consiuei how new kinus of "ieal togetheiness" may be piouuceu even as the vast uiveigences between people aie iecognizeu.
11 4;"1"=> ") 9*-;$.;% This ambition, in my view, is fiimly within the scope of compaiative ielativism. Not least if one consiueis that Stengeis's ecology of piactice is not stiatifieu with science on top of society but iathei compiises physicists anu psychologists, witches, hypnotists anu junkies, a motley ciew shaiing only an occasional capacity anu willingness to expeiiment with cieating situations inhabiteu by new contiasts anu appetites. Recall that Lvi-Stiauss aftei uue consiueiation pioposeu that anthiopology stick to single case stuuies, letting go of the ambition to statistical significance. Be uiu suggest, howevei, that one select cases likely to be suitable as mouels; likely to facilitate the event. Yet as Stengeis's suggests theie is no methou to cieate the event, theie is only the expeiiment anu occasional success. At the same time the event, of the social oi natuial scientist, uoes not emeige of its own accoiu, it is not founu simply as empiiical uatum. It must be suppoiteu, piouueu, inuuceu anu meuiateu. Anu it must be constiucteu in thought. The woik of Stiathein, Smith, Stengeis anu ue Castio all testifies to this fact. Anu it uoes so in a way that we have touay taken the iisk of placing unuei the teim compaiative ielativism, which ueals in ontological junctuies anu uisjunctuies iathei than minimally shaieu iationalities, in multiple agents incluuing technologies anu spiiits, iathei than in human intentions, naiiatives anu lifewoilus alone. Placing the woik of touay's esteemeu speakeis unuei the same bannei implies ceitain uangeis, not least one of claiming a shaieu pioject oi similai ambition foi all of them. I uo not think this is at all the case. If one can talk of compaiative ielativism as a conceptual matiix of soits, it holus, in Stengeis's woius that "it has no authoiity of its own". Not aiming to mobilize anu juuge it woiks - if only it woiks! - "thiough insinuation anu tiansfoimative effects as an infectious luie foi new cieative contiasts" (24S). The aim is not agieement but alliance (248). Whethei oi not such alliance is occasioneu heie, I look foiwaiu, veiy much inueeu, to see how it plays out.