Epistemology (Western Michigan)

Books
Louis Pojman, The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings
Richard Fumerton, Epistemology, Laurence BonJour
Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification.
Web articles
available at homepage: http://homepages.wmich.edu/~mcgrew/episem06.htm

Epistemology (U. Penn)
Books
Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits
Referenced: Nozick, Philosophical Explanations
Articles
The Analysis of Knowledge on the SEP
E. J. Lowes review of Knowledge and its Limits
Gilbert Harmans review of Knowledge and its Limits
Putnam, Selections from The Meaning of Meaning
Optional: Putnam, Brains in a Vat
Burge, Selections from Individualism and the Mental
Greco and Feldman, Is Justication Internal? from Contemporary Debates
in Epistemology
Optional: Gettier, Is Justied True Belief Knowledge?
Cassam, Can the Concept of Knowledge be Analysed?
Fricker, Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against
Jackson, Primeness, Internalism, Explanation
Optional: Zagzebski, The Inescapability of Gettier Problems
Conee, The Comforts of Home
Quine, On a So-Called Paradox
Selections from Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Chapter 3
Optional: Foleys review of Knowledge and its Limits
Brueckner, Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson
Weiner, Must We Know What We Say?
Issues addressed
The Big Picture of Knowledge and its Limits and Semantic Externalism
Internalism vs. Externalism about Content and Justication
Can knowledge be analyzed into component concepts?
Is knowledge a relation between an agent and the world, or is it a mental state (or
both)?
Does knowledge have distinct internal and external parts? How does knowledge
connect up to action?
Can we tell when we know?
Whats going on at the margins of knowledge?
The Surprise Paradox
Must knowledge be sensitive? If so, in what sense?
Knowledge-rsting Skepticism
Is our knowledge the same as our evidence?
The Knowledge Norm for Assertion

Epistemology (Harvard, Undergraduate text list only)
Sosa et al. Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd edition. 2008.
Optional:
Audi, Robert, ed. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition.
Blackburn, Simon. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition.
Honderich, Ted, ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd edition.

Epistemic Normativity (U. Penn)
Introductory Articles
Miller, Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, Ch 1
Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, Chapter 2
Chignell, "The Ethics of Belief," (SEP) Only Sections 1 and 2
Darwall, Gibbard, Railton. "Toward Fin de siecle Ethics"
Pryor, James. "Guidelines on Reading Philosophy"
Pryor, James. "Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper"
Marui, "The Ethics of Belief"
Kelly, "The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes"
Zagzebski, "The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good"
The Value of True Belief
Sosa, "For the Love of Truth?"
Kornblith, "Epistemic Normativity"
Lynch, "The Values of Truth and the Truth of Values"
Does Belief Have an Aim?
Velleman, "On the Aim of Belief"
Owens, "Does Belief Have an Aim?"
Wedgwood, "The Aim of Belief"
Belief's Aim of Truth
Shah, "How Truth Governs Belief"
Shah and Velleman, "Doxastic Deliberation"
Gibbard, "Truth and Correct Belief"
Bykvist & Hattiangadi, "Does Thought Imply Ought?"
Steglich-Petersen, "No Norm needed: On the aim of belief"
Constructing Norms
Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action"
Enoch, "Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What is Constitutive of Agency"
Bagnoli, "Constructivism in Metaethics" (SEP)
Constructing Epistemic Norms
Singer, "How to Ignore the Schmagency Objection"
Nolfi, "Why We Ought to Care About the Epistemic Status of Our Beliefs"
Ferrero, "Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency"
Enoch, "Schmagency Revisited"
Truth as the Primary Goal (whether constructively or not)
David, "Truth as the Epistemic Goal"
Maitzen, "Our Errant Epistemic Aim"
DePaul, "Value Monism in Epistemology"
Kvanvig, "Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal"
Elgin, "True Enough"
DePaul, "Value Monism in Epistemology"
Truth and Degreed Belief
Weisberg and Easwaran on PhilosTV on Full and Partial Belief (Video)
Joyce, "A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism"
Gibbard, "Rational Credence and the Value of Truth"
Joyce, "Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief"
Joyce, "Why Evidentialists Need not Worry About the Accuracy Argument for Probabilism"
Against Epistemic Teleology
Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, Ch 5 (For an example real epistemic teleology) (Or Thagard's
Quick Review)
Kelly, "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique"
Grimm, "Epistemic Normativity"
Littlejohn, Justification and the Truth-Connection, Ch 2
Supposed Problems with Epistemic Consequentialism
Berker, "The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism"
Greaves, "Epistemic Decision Theory"
Goldman, Intro to Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology (Selection)
Berker, "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions"
Easwaran and Fitelson, "An 'Evidentialist' Worry About Joyces Argument for Probabilism"
The Normativity of Coherence Requirements
Kolodny, "Why Be Rational?"
Broome, "Is Rationality Normative?"
Sylvan, "Rationality and Justication: Reasons to Divorce?"
Sylvan, "The Objective Significance of the Subjective"
How to be an Epistemic Consequentalist
"Rule Consequentialism" (SEP) (Sections 4 - 6)
Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality"
"Moral Responsibility" (SEP) (Read intro and Section 2, Skim 1)
Singer, "How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist"
Epistemic Reasons
Schroeder, "Knowledge is Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason"
Lord, "Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters"
Additional Readings (Optional)
Epistemic Expressivism
Chrisman, "Epistemic Expressivism"
Yalcin, "Epistemic Modals"
Gibbard, "Meaning and Probability" on YouTube
Moss, "Epistemology Formalized"
Field, "Epistemology without metaphysics"

Seminar in Metaphysics: Realism and Truth (NYU)
Articles
Kit Fines paper, The Question of Realism.
Realism
Michael Devitt, What is Realism?, from his Realism and Truth
Drew Khlentzos, Naturalistic Realism and Antirealism, from his Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist
Challenge
Gideon Rosen, Objectivity and Modern Idealism, in Philosophy in Mind
Mark Johnston, Objectivity Refigured, in Reality, Representation, and Projection
Michael Devitt, What has Truth to do with Realism?, from his Realism and Truth
Drew Khlentzos, Contenting Realism, from his Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge
Existence
Colin McGinn, Existence, from his Logical Properties Terence Parsons
Are There Non-existent Objects?, in the American Philosophical Quarterly
Nathan Salmon, Nonexistence, in Nos
Alexis Burgess Negative Existentials Again, in nothing at the moment
Stephen Yablo, A Paradox of Existence, on his website
Stephen Yablo, Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?, on his website
Deflationism
Paul Horwich, Reference, from his Meaning
Paul Horwich, Truth, from his Meaning
Paul Boghossian, The Status of Content, in The Philosophical Review
Hartry Field, Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse, in The Philosophical Review
Huw Price, The Place of Truth, from his Facts and the Function of Truth
Michael Smith, Minimalism, Truth-Aptitude, and Belief, in Analysis
Fictionalism
Gideon Rosen, Problems in the History of Fictionalism, in Fictionalism in Metaphysics
Michael Frede, The Sceptics Beliefs, in The Original Sceptics: A Controversy
Stephen Yablo, Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism, on his website
Hartry Field, Introduction, from his Realism, Mathematics and Modality
Paul Teller, What is a Stance?, in Philosophical Studies
Bas van Fraassen, Lecture Two, from his The Empirical Stance

Philosophy of Mind (NYU)
Books
David Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1996
Articles
Substance Dualism
Ren Descartes, Meditations II and VI (NM 1)
Property Dualism and Materialism
Daniel Dennett, 'True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works' (NM 36)
Hilary Putnam, 'Brains and Behavior' (NM 16)
Optional: Alex Byrne, 'Behaviourism' (in Guttenplan).
The 'Identity Theory'
J.J.C. Smart, 'Sensations and Brain Processes' (NM 17)
David Lewis, 'Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications' (NM 22)
Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, excerpts (NM 25)
Optional: David Armstrong, 'The Causal Theory of Mind' (NM 19)
Functionalism
Hilary Putnam, 'The Nature of Mental States' (NM 21)
David Lewis, 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain' (NM 24)
Ned Block, 'Troubles with Functionalism' (NM 23)
John R. Searle, 'Minds, Brains and Programs' (NM 55)
Optional: Ned Block, 'The Mind as Software of the Brain' (online only); 'Functionalism' (in Guttenplan); the
debate between Searle and Fodor (NM 55); Sydney Shoemaker, 'Functionalism and Qualia' (NM 43)
Eliminativism
Paul Churchland, 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes' (NM 61)
Optional: Stephen P. Stich, 'Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis' (NM 60)
Content and Consciousness
Bertrand Russell, Principles of Philosophy, excerpts
Tyler Burge, 'Individualism and the Mental' (NM 57)
Optional: W.V. Quine, 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes' (NM 33); Brian Loar, 'Social Content and
Psychological Content' (NM 58); Robert Stalnaker, 'On What's in the Head' (NM 59)
Content: What determines it?
Jerry Fodor, 'Why There Still Has to Be a Language Of Thought' (in his Psychosemantics (MIT Press,
1987) and in Lycan)
Daniel Dennett, 'Brain Writing and Mind Reading' (NM 54)
Optional: Fred Dretske, 'The Intentionality of Cognitive States' (NM 37); Tim Van Gelder, 'What Might
Cognition Be, If Not Computation?' (Journal of Philosophy 112, 1995; in Lycan)
Consciousness: the Knowledge Argument
Frank Jackson, 'What Mary Didn't Know' (NM 42)
Brian Loar, 'Phenomenal States' (Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990)
David Lewis, 'What Experience Teaches' (in Lewis, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology,
Cambridge, 1999; in Lycan)
Optional: Thomas Nagel, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?' (NM 46)
Consciousness: Zombies
David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (excerpts)
Daniel Dennett, 'Quining Qualia'
Consciousness and Content: Representationalism
Gilbert Harman, 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience' (Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990; in Lycan)
Ned Block, 'Inverted Earth' (Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990; in Lycan)
Resources
Optional texts
Jim Pryor's Philosophical Terms and Methods.
A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, by Samuel Guttenplan (Blackwell, 1994).
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Edward Craig)
Oxford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Ted Honderich)
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (ed. Robert Audi)
Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Westview Press, 1998)
David Armstrong, The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction (Westview Press, 1999).
William Lycan's Mind and Cognition (2nd edition, Blackwell, 1999)

Disagreement and Testimony (Tufts)
Articles
Disagreement
Adam Elga, Reflection and Disagreement
Optional: David Christensen, Disagreement as Evidence
David Christensen, Epistemology and Disagreement: The Good News
Thomas Kelly, Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment
Optional: Thomas Kelly, The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
The etiology of belief
Roger White, You Just Believe that Because
Ekaterina Vavova, Irrelevant Influences
Background reading: David Papineau, The Evolution of Knowledge"
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/davidpapineau/Staff/Papineau/OnlinePapers/evoknow.html
Epistemic akrasia and disgreement
Michael Titelbaum, Rationalitys Fixed Point
Daniel Greco, A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia
Sophie Horowitz, Epistemic Akrasia
Aesthetic testimony
Robert Hopkins, Beauty and Testimony
Optional: Tyler Burge, Content Preservation
Aaron Meskin, Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn from Others about Beauty and Art?
Aaron Meskin, Solving the Puzzle of Aesthetic Testimony
Moral testimony
Sarah McGrath, Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism
Paulina Sliwa, In Defense of Moral Testimony
David Enoch, A Defense of Moral Deference
Epistemic permissiveness
Roger White, Epistemic Permissiveness
Optional: Thomas Kelly, How to be an Epistemic Permissivist

The Self (Tufts)
Articles
De se thought, Fregean aspects:
Perry, Frege on Demonstratives
Frege, The Thought: A Logical Inquiry (pp.296-298)
Optional: Perry, The Problem of the Essential Indexical
Evans vs. Perry on Frege on demonstratives
Evans, Understanding Demonstratives
Perry, Postscript to Frege on Demonstratives
Kripke on Frege on demonstratives
Kripke, Freges Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes
Optional: Burge, Sinning against Frege; Kripke, The First Person
Self-knowledge
Pryor, Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
Optional: Shoemaker, Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, Evans, The Varieties of Reference,
Sections: 6.6, 7.2, 7.3, 7.5
Shoemaker, Introspection and the Self
Personal identity
Sider, selections from Four-Dimensionalism
Parfit, Personal Identity
Lewis, Survival and Identity
Parfit, Lewis, Perry, and What Matters
The problem of too many thinkers
Noonan: Animalism vs. Lockeanism: A Current Controversy
Olson: Thinking Animals and the Reference of I
De se thought, formal aspects:
Lewis, Attitudes, De Dicto and De Se
Optional: Lewis, Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation
Stalnaker on de se thought
Stalnaker, Our Knowledge of the Internal World, Ch. 3
Optional: Stalnaker, Indexical Thought; Stalnaker, pp. 1-21 of the Introduction to Context and Content

Philosophy of Language (Tufts)
Books
The Philosophy of Language (edited by A. P. Martinich)
Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction (William G. Lycan)
suggested: Philosophy of Language, Scott Soames, Princeton University Press, 2012
Articles/readings-in-text
Lycan, pp. 108-119 of Ch. 9: Truth-Condition Theories: Davidsons program, Ch. 2, pp. 31-44 of Ch. 3:
Proper names: the Description Theory, Ch. 4: Proper names: Direct Reference and the Causal-
Historical Theory, Lycan, Ch. 13: Implicative relations, Optional: Ch. 1; Lycan, Ch. 10.
Portner, pp. 12-22 of What is Meaning?
Russell, On Denoting (in Martinich)
Strawson, On Referring (in Martinich)
Frege, On Sense and Nominatum (in Martinich)
Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Lectures 1-3
Lycan, Evans, The Causal Theory of Names (in Martinich)
Kripke, A Puzzle About Belief (in Martinich)
Frege, pp. 366-367-41 of The Thought: A Logical Inquiry (in Martinich)
Perry, Frege on Demonstratives
Perry, The Problem of the Essential Indexical (in Martinich)
Kaplan, Demonstratives
Semantic pragmatics
DeRose, Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions
Putnam, Meaning and Reference (in Martinich)
Grice, pp. 1-13 and all of Ch. 2 of Studies in the Way of Words
Grice, Ch. 4 of Studies in the Way of Words
Bennett, Ch. 2 of A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals
Kripke on Wittgenstein on rule-following
Kripke, On Rules and Private Language (in Martinich)
Optional: Boghossian, The Rule-Following Considerations

Ethical Theory (Tufts)
Books
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals, Hackett.
Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Hackett.
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Hackett.
Articles:
Peter Singer, Affluence, Famine, and Morality.
Michael Stocker, The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.
Susan Wolf, Moral Saints.
Catherine Wilson, On Some Alleged Limitations to Moral Endeavor.
John McDowell, Virtue and Reason.

Logic (Tufts)
Books
Jeffrey, Richard. Formal Logic: Its Scope and Limits. 4th edition. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006). Quine,
Willard. Philosophy of Logic. 2nd edition. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). suggested:
Quine, Willard. Elementary Logic. Revised edition. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

Semantics and Cognition (Tufts)
Books:
Jackendoff, Semantics and Cognition
Jackendoff, A Users Guide to Thought and Meaning
Misc:
Various readings by Lakoff, Talmy, and Fillmore

Computation Theory (Tufts) [notes used in course, but unavailable]
Books:
Boolos, Burgess, Jeffrey, Computability and Logic
Marvin Minsky, Computation: Finite and Infinite Machines (Automatic Computation)

Philosophy of Law (Tufts)
Books:
Ronald Dworkin, Laws Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1986).
H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law Third Ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012).
Articles:
Philosophy of Criminal Justice:
Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Chs. 1, 4, 13, 17 (1))
Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution
Murphy, Marxism and Retribution
Furman v. Georgia
Alexander. The Color of Justice
McClesky v. Kemp
Farrell, The Justification of General Deterrence
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment
Tadros, Punishment and Duty
Tadros, Protection Against Punishment
Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law
Tison v. Arizona
Pinkerton v. U.S.
Private Law - Corrective Justice:
Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry
Whitman v. American Trucking Association
Coleman, A Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice
Goldberg and Zipursky, Tort Law and Responsibility
Goldberg and Zipursky, In Defense of Civil Recourse Theory of Tort Law
Lauer v. City of New York
Natural Law Theory and Benthams Challenge:
Aquinas, Summa Thoelogiae, selections
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, selections
Bentham, A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights, selections
Legal Positivism - Austin and Hart:
Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the
Study of Jurisprudence, (pp. 1-33, 191-200, 228-233, 253-264)
Hart, The Concept of Law, Ch. I (pp.1-13), Ch. II (pp.18-25), Ch. III
(pp.38-44), Ch. IV (pp. 50-61, 66-78), Ch. V (pp. 79-99), VI (100-117), Ch. VII (124-147)
Coleman, Inclusive Legal Positivism
Griswold v. Connecticut
Dworkin and Law as Integrity
Dworkin, Laws Empire, Ch. 1 (pp. 15-30), Ch. 4 (pp. 114-124, 130-150), Ch. 4 (130-150), Ch. 5 (pp. 151-
168), Ch. 6 (pp. 176-216)
Plessy v. Ferguson
Brown v. Board of Education
Rawls A Theory of Justice (pp. 93-101, 293-308)