Mansbridge 2003, Rethinking Representation

Rethinking Representation
Author(s): Jane Mansbridge

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 4 (Nov., 2003), pp. 515-528
Published by: American Political Science Association
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American Political Science Review Vol.
97,
No. 4 November 2003
Reth ink ing Representation
JANE MANSBRIDGE Harvard
University
long
with th e traditional
"promissory" form of representation, empirical political
scientists h ave
recently analyzed
several new
forms,
called h ere
"anticipatory," "g yroscopic,"
and
"surrog ate"
representation.
None
of
th ese more
recently recog nized forms
meets th e criteria
for
democratic
accountability developed for promissory representation, yet
each
g enerates
a set
of
normative criteria
by
wh ich it can be
judg ed.
Th ese criteria are
systemic,
in contrast to th e
dyadic
criteria
appropriate for
promissory representation. Th ey
are deliberative rath er th an
ag g reg ative. Th ey
are
plural
rath er th an
sing ular.
ver th e
past
two decades
empirical political
scientists h ave
developed increasing ly soph isti-
cated
descriptions
of h ow American
leg islators
relate to th eir constituents. Yet
alth oug h
th e
empirical
work h as often been motivated
by
normative convic-
tions th at one
way
of
relating
is better th an
anoth er,
th e normative
th eory
of wh at constitutes
"g ood" rep-
resentation h as not
k ept pace
with current
empirical
finding s.
Th is
paper
seek s to narrow th e
g ap.
Th e traditional model of
representation
focused on
th e idea th at
during campaig ns representatives
made
promises
to
constituents,
wh ich
th ey
th en
k ept
or failed
to
k eep.
I call th is
promissory representation.
In addi-
tion, empirical
work in th e last 20
years
h as identified
at least th ree oth er forms of
representation,
wh ich I
call
"anticipatory," "g yroscopic,"
and
"surrog ate" rep-
resentation.
Anticipatory representation
flows
directly
from th e idea of
retrospective voting : Representatives
focus on wh at
th ey
th ink th eir constituents will
approve
at th e next
election,
not on wh at
th ey promised
to do
at th e last election. In
g yroscopic representation,
th e
representative
look s
with in,
as a basis for
action,
to
conceptions
of
interest,
"common
sense,"
and
princi-
ples
derived in
part
from th e
representative's
own back -
g round. Surrog ate representation
occurs wh en
leg isla-
tors
represent
constituents outside th eir own districts.
Th ese are all
leg itimate
forms of
representation.
None, h owever,
meets th e criteria for democratic ac-
countability developed
for
I
arg ue
th at th e
appropriate
normative criteria for
judg -
ing
th ese more
recently
identified forms of
represen-
tation are
systemic,
in contrast to th e
dyadic
criteria
appropriate
for
Th e crite-
ria are almost all deliberative rath er th an
ag g reg ative.
And,
in
k eeping
with th e conclusion th at th ere is more
th an one
way
to be
represented leg itimately
in a democ-
racy,
th e criteria are
plural
rath er th an
sing ular.
Th e forms of
representation
identified h ere do not
map
well onto th e traditional
dich otomy
of "mandate"
and "trustee." Both mandate and trustee forms can
appear
as versions of
promissory representation (or,
alternatively,
th e trustee
concept
can
fig ure
as a subset
of
g yroscopic representation),
but th e new
concepts
of
representation implied by
recent
empirical
work do not
h ave an obvious relation to th e earlier
dich otomy.
In
practice, representative
beh avior will often mix
several of th ese forms. One cannot
always
tell
by
look -
ing
at a
specific
beh avior wh at
dynamics
lie beh ind it.
Yet
analyzing
each form
separately
mak es it
possible
to
identify
th e
underlying power
relation in each
form,
th e role of deliberation in
each ,
and th e normative cri-
teria
appropriate
to each . Th ese normative criteria are
g oals
toward wh ich to strive
("reg ulative ideals"),
not
standards th at can be
fully
met.
Conceiving
of demo-
cratic
leg itimacy
as a
spectrum
and not a
dich otomy,
one
mig h t say
th at th e closer a
system
of
representation
comes to
meeting
th e normative criteria for democratic
ag g reg ation
and
deliberation,
th e more th at
system
is
normatively leg itimate.
Addressing
th e norms
appropriate
to a
system
of
representation
assumes th at
representation is,
and is
normatively
intended to
be, someth ing
more th an a de-
fective substitute for direct
democracy.1
Constituents
ch oose
representatives
not
only
to th ink more care-
fully
th an
th ey
about ends and means but also to
neg o-
tiate more
perceptively
and
fig h t
more
sk illfully
th an
constituents h ave eith er th e time or th e inclination to
do. Th e difference between
representation
and direct
democracy
creates a need for norms
desig ned partic-
ularly
for democratic
representation.
Yet democratic
representation
comes in different
forms,
with norms
appropriate
to each .
Jane
Mansbridg e
is Adams
Professor,
Joh n
E Kennedy
Sch ool of
Government, Harvard
University,
79 JFK
Street, Cambridg e,
MA
02138
(jane-mansbridg e@h arvard.edu).
Th is
paper
h as evolved over time. Most
recently
I am
g rateful
for
th e
sug g estions
of
Doug las Arnold,
David
Brady,
Marth a
Minow,
Mark
Moore, Dennis
Th ompson,
and
participants
in seminars at
Center for Advanced
Study in th e Beh avioral
Sciences,
Princeton
University,
th e
University
of California Los
Ang eles,
Stanford Uni-
versity,
and th e
University
of Toronto. For excellent
sug g estions
on earlier versions I th ank William
Bianco,
Carol
Swain,
Melissa
Williams,
Iris Marion
Young ,
and
participants
in seminars at th e Insti-
tute of Governmental Studies at
Berk eley,
th e Oh io State
University,
Nuffield
Colleg e Oxford,
Indiana
University,
Princeton
University,
th e
University
of California San
Dieg o,
Harvard
University,
and
North western
University.
I
particularly
th ank
Benjamin Pag e
for h is
close
reading
and incisive comments at an
early stag e,
and th e
insig h t-
ful reviewers for th is
journal.
Th is
paper, beg un
with
support
from
th e Institute for
Policy
Research at North western
University,
was
completed
wh ile th e auth or was a Fellow at th e Center for Advanced
Study
in th e Beh avioral Sciences. I am
g rateful
for financial
support
provided by
National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9601236.
1
Alth oug h
deliberative forms of direct
democracy
can be effective
meth ods of democratic
g overnance
in
many circumstances, represen-
tative forms of
democracy
h ave th eir own
uses, functioning
not
just
as "transmission belts" for constituent
opinion (Sch wartz 1988;
see
also Ach en
1978, 476, Hibbing s
and Th eiss-Morse
2002,
Manin
1997,
and Pitk in
[1967] 1972).
515
November 2003
PROMISSORY REPRESENTATION
Promissory representation,
th e traditional
model,
fol-
lows th e classic
principal-ag ent
format. Th e
prob-
lem for th e
principal (in
Bristol or
Oh io)
is one of
k eeping
some control over th e
ag ent (in
London or
Wash ing ton).
Th e
problem
in
politics
does not differ
g reatly
from th e
problem
of
k eeping any
economic
ag ent responsive
to th e desires of th e
principal.
Eco-
nomic
h istory
and
th eory
h ave focused
recently
on
th e
problem
of
long -distance
trade wh en th ere was no
g overnmental
infrastructure to enforce contractual ar-
rang ements.
In th e Mediterranean in th e fourteenth
century,
th is situation necessitated eith er
k insh ip
ties
or above-mark et
payment
rates to ensure th at
sh ips
loaded with th e
surplus
value of th ousands of work ers
actually
returned with th e
g oods
received in trade
(see
Greif
1993).
Wh en control
(as
in a seabound
sh ip)
or
information
(as
in relations with an
expert)
is
asym-
metric,
th e
problem
for th e
principal
is to mak e sure
th at th e
ag ent (th e captain,
th e
lawyer,
th e
accountant)
acts to furth er th e interests of th e
principal (th e
mer-
ch ant,
th e
client).
So too in
political representation,
both
descriptive
and normative writers h ave
perceived
th e
problem
as one of th e voters in a district
k eeping
leg al
or moral control over th eir distant
representa-
tives. Th e normative
understanding
of
accountability
in
promissory representation
is th at th e
representative
is
"responsible to,"
"answerable
to," "bound,"
and even
"bound
by"
th ose voters.2 In th e "mandate" version
of th e
model,
th e
representative promises
to follow
th e constituents' instructions or
expressed desires;
in
th e "trustee" version th e
representative promises
to
furth er th e
constituency's long -run
interests and th e
interests of th e nation as a wh ole.
In
promissory representation,
th e
power
relation
from voter to
representative, principal
to
ag ent,
runs
forward in linear fash ion.
By exacting
a
promise,
th e
voter at Time 1
(th e election)
exercises
power,
or tries
to exercise
power,
over th e
representative
at Time 2
(th e g overning period):
VT1
--
RT2.
Promissory representation
th us uses th e standard
forward-look ing concept
of
power,
as in Robert Dah l's
(1957)
intuitive "A h as
power
over B to th e extent th at
h e can
g et
B to do
someth ing
th at B would not oth er-
wise do"
(202-203). Indeed, any
definition of
power
de-
rived, lik e Dah l's, from Weber
([1922] 1978, 53)
will im-
ply
th is k ind of
forward-look ing intentionality.
Dah l's
"g et" implies
both th at A acts with intention and th at
B's action will occur in th e future. Th e
power
relation
follows th e
simplest
version of a
principal-ag ent model,
with th e voter as
principal, statically conceived, trying
to exercise
power
over th e
representative
as
ag ent.3
work s
normatively
th ro-
ug h
th e
explicit
and
implicit promises
th at th e elected
representative
mak es to th e electorate. It work s
pru-
dentially th roug h
th e sanction th e voter exercises at
th e next election
(Time 3).
Th at sanction is a reward
or
punish ment
for
acting
or
failing
to act
according
to
th e
promise
made at th e
previous
election
(Time 1).
Both
normatively
and
prudentially,
th e electoral au-
dit at Time 3 focuses on wh eth er or not th e
promises
at Time
1
were
k ept. Georg e
Bush th us
ang ered
h is
supporters deeply by break ing
an
explicit campaig n
promise ("Read my lips:
No new
taxes").4
h as th e
advantag e th at,
at
least in its more mandated
versions,
it reflects in a rel-
atively
unmediated manner th e will
(alth oug h
not nec-
essarily
th e considered
will)
of th e
citizenry.
It comes
closer th an
any
oth er model to an ideal in wh ich th e
simple imprint
of th e voter's will is transmitted
th roug h
institutions to an
equal
exertion of
power
on th e final
policy. Alth oug h promissory representation
h as never
described actual
representation fully,
it h as been and
remains
today
one of th e most
important ways
in wh ich
citizens influence
political
outcomes
th roug h
th eir
rep-
resentatives.
th us focuses on th e nor-
mative
duty
to
k eep promises
made in th e auth oriz-
ing
election
(Time 1),
uses a
conception
of th e voter's
power
over th e
representative
th at assumes forward-
look ing intentionality,
embodies a
relatively
unmedi-
ated version of th e constituent's
will,
and results in
accountability th roug h
sanction.
How we conceive of
representation beg ins
to
ch ang e,
h owever,
wh en we consider th e
implications
of institut-
ing
a sanction at Time 3.
ANTICIPATORY REPRESENTATION
For more th an a
g eneration now, empirical political
scientists h ave
recog nized
th e
sig nificance
in th e
rep-
resentative
system
of
"retrospective voting ,"
in wh ich
th e voter look s back to th e
past
beh avior of a
repre-
sentative in
deciding
h ow to vote in th e next election.
Yet th e normative
implications
of th is
way
of
look ing
at
representation
h ave not been
fully explored.
Re-
turning
to th e model of
it
seems obvious th at th e
power
exercised
in
th at model
work s
th roug h
th e voter's
potential
sanction of
voting
a
representative
out of office at Time 3. Th is is "retro-
spective voting ."
From th e
representative's perspective,
h owever, retrospective voting
does more th an
provide
th e
potential
retribution for brok en
promises.
It also
2
See, e.g ., Pitk in
[1967] 1972,
55ff. Traditional
accountability th eory
incorporates
two
analytically separable strands, usually
intertwined.
In th e
first, accountability
means
only
th at th e
representative
h as an
oblig ation
to
explain ("g ive
an account
of")
h is or h er
past actions,
reg ardless
of th e
system
of
sanctioning (e.g .,
Beh n
2001,
220 n.
12,
and
Guttman and
Th ompson 1996).
Th e second focuses
only
on th e
capa-
city
for
imposing
sanctions for
past
beh avior
(e.g . Manin, Przeworsk i,
and Stok es
1999, 8-10).
See Fearon
1999, 55,
and Goodin 1999. Th is
analysis employs
th e second
meaning .
3
Except
wh en
discussing Nag el's (1975)
definition of
power
at its
h ig h est
level of
g enerality (see
below
p. 517), I mean
by "power"
h ere and elsewh ere "coercive
power,"
a
subtype
of
Nag el's
more
g eneral power.
Coercive
power,
in contrast to
"influence,"
involves
eith er th e th reat of sanction or th e use of force
(see
below
p.
519 and
footnote
8).
4
I
th ank
Doug las
Arnold for th is
example.
As Manin
(1997) points
out, h owever,
no
polity
h as ever
leg ally compelled
its
representatives
to abide
by
th eir electoral
promises.
516
1
97,
No. 4
g enerates
wh at I call
"anticipatory" representation,
in
wh ich th e
representative
tries to
please
future voters.
Wh ereas in
th e
representa-
tive at Time 2
(th e period
in
office) represents
th e voter
at Time
1 (th e auth orizing election),
in
anticipatory rep-
resentation th e
representative
at Time 2
represents
th e
voter at Time
3,
th e next election.
5
In
anticipatory representation,
wh at
appears
to th e
representative
to be a
"power
relation" th us work s
not
forward,
but
"back ward," th roug h anticipated
re-
actions,
from th e voter at Time 3 to th e
representative
at Time 2:
RT2
--
VT3.
Strictly speak ing ,
th e
beliefs
of th e
representative
at
Time 2 about th e future
preferences
of th e voter at
Time
3,
not th e actual
preferences
of th e voter at Time
3,
are th e cause of th e
representative's
actions at Time 2.
A later event cannot cause an earlier event.
Indeed,
th e
representative's
beliefs
may
turn out to be mistak en.
Neverth eless,
from th e
perspective
of th e
representa-
tive,
th e
entity
th at exerts th e sanction and th us th e
control
appears
to be th e voter at Time 3.
Th e model of
anticipatory representation
th us re-
quires
a
concept
of
power
different from
traditional,
forward-look ing ,
intention-based
concepts
such as
Dah l's or Weber's. It
requires
a
concept
of
power
th at
can include
"anticipated
reactions." We find
early
for-
mulations of th is idea in th e
writing s
of Carl Friedrich
(1937, 16-17, 1958, 1963,
ch .
11),
Peter Bach rach and
Morton Baratz
(1963),
and
Steph en
Luk es
(1974).
Th e
best formulation for th e
purposes
of th is
analysis
comes
from Jack
Nag el (1975, 29),
wh o defined
power,
at th e
h ig h est
level of
g enerality,
as a "causal relation between
th e
preferences
of an actor
reg arding
an outcome and
th e outcome itself." Th e
neutrality
of th is definition in
reg ard
to intention and time mak e it
compatible
with
anticipatory representation.
Unlik e Dah l's
definition,
Nag el's
definition allows th e
anticipated preferences
of
th e voter at Time 3
(th at is,
th e
representative's
beliefs
about th ose
preferences)
to cause th e actions of th e
representative
at Time 2.
directs
empirical
atten-
tion
away
from th e relation between Time 1
(th e
auth o-
rizing election)
and Time 2
(th e representative's period
of
service),
and toward th e relations th at arise between
th e
beg inning
of Time 2
(th e representative's period
of
service)
and Time 3
(th e
next
election).
Wh en
prefer-
ences are stable over time, th ere is no
important
differ-
ence between th e voter at Time 1 and Time 3
(Miller
and Stok es 1963, 50; Nag el 1975, 24ff).
But wh en
prefer-
ences are unstable or
emerg ent,
th e
representative h as
incentives to search
during
Time 2 for th e ch aracteris-
tics of th e voter at Time 3. Because th is
anticipation
usu-
ally poses
an
extremely
difficult information
problem
(Stimson, Mack uen,
and Erik son
1995, 545),
th e search
prompts
attention to
public opinion polls,
focus
g roups,
and
g ossip
about th e "mood of th e nation"
(King don
1984, 153; Stimson, Mack uen,
and Erik son
1995, 544).
It also
prompts attempts
to
ch ang e
th e voter at Time 3
so th at th e voter will be more
lik ely
to
approve
of th e
representative's
actions.
Th is
temporal
sh ift h as th ree
implications
for
empir-
ical
description
and
analysis. First,
th e model becomes
more deliberative. Th e
space
between Time 1 and Time
3 becomes filled with
reciprocal attempts
at th e exercise
of
power
and
communication,
much of it
instig ated by
th e
representative:
RT2a
++
VT2a
++
RT2b VT2b
+ etc. +
VT3.
Second, anticipatory representation prompts
atten-
tion to
underlying
interests as well as
present pref-
erences.
Benjamin Pag e (1978, 221-22),
for
example,
points
out th at a
th eory
of
democracy
based on th e
rep-
resentative's
anticipation
of reward and
punish ment
"orients
g overnment responsiveness
toward funda-
mental needs and values of th e
people
rath er th an to-
ward
eph emeral
or
weak ly
h eld
policy preferences."
Doug las
Arnold writes th at th e
representative
is better
off
th ink ing
of th e voters in th e next election as h av-
ing
"outcome"
preferences
rath er th an
"policy" prefer-
ences
(1990, 17, 1993, 409).
James Stimson
(1995, 545)
and h is
colleag ues similarly arg ue
th at th e information
problem
involved in rational
anticipation encourag es
representatives
to aim at
g eneral
rath er th an
specific
k nowledg e.
If we add to th ese formulations th e idea
th at voters can
ch ang e
th eir
preferences
after th ink -
ing
about
th em,
we can find a
place
in
empirical
th e-
ory
for th e
concept
of "interests"
(defined
as
enlig h t-
ened
preferences)
in wh at would oth erwise be a
purely
preference-oriented
model of
political
beh avior.6
Th ird, following
from th e first two
points, anticipa-
tory representation encourag es
us to th ink of voters at
Time 3 as educable
(or manipulable).
Between Time
1
and Time 3 th e voters can be "educated" not
only by
th e
representative,
wh o seek s and
prepares "explanations"
of h is votes
(Fenno 1978; King don 1981),
but also-
critical for th e
practice
of
democracy-by parties, in-
terest
g roups, media, opposition candidates,
and oth er
citizens
(Arnold 1990, 1993, 409;
Kuk linsk i and
Seg ura
1995, 15-16; Young 2001). (In
th e
following diag ram,
g roups, media, opposition
and oth er citizens are all de-
marcated as "G" for
"Groups."
Th e arrow indicates
both
power
and
communication.)
5
Th e
concept
of
is th us a
corollary
to
th e
concept
of
retrospective voting (as
in Fiorina
1981).
With
early
formulations in Downs
1957, Key 1961,
and Fiorina
1974, 32-33,1977,
1981
(see Pag e 1978, 32),
th e
concept
of
retrospective voting
h as now
become standard in American
empirical political
science. For related
views on
anticipation,
see Fiorina
1989, 5-6,
Goodin
1999, Manin,
Przework sk i,
and Stok es
1999,
and Zaller 1994.
6
In th is analysis th e preferences and interests into wh ich delibera-
tion sh ould
provide insig h t may
be
self-reg arding , oth er-reg arding ,
or
ideal-reg arding .
I th us use th e word "interest" in its
American,
rath er th an
European,
sense to include foundational
(th at is, identity-
constituting ) ideal-reg arding
commitments as well as material needs
and wants. Because
transforming
identities transforms
interests,
interests can be seen both as
"enlig h tened preferences" (with
"en-
lig h tenment"
seen as th e
product
of
experience
and emotional
understanding
as well as of
simple cog nition)
and as
ch ang eable
and
contested.
517
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3
4
5
6
7
November 2003
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Arnold
(1993),
Stimson et al.
(1995),
and oth ers
h ave drawn th e attention of
empirical political
scien-
tists to th is form of
representation. Th ey
h ave done
so, h owever,
with out
emph asizing
its deliberative side.
Arnold's "alternative control
model,"
wh ich oth erwise
describes well th e
process
I call
"anticipatory repre-
sentation,"
does not
fully capture
th e crucial elements
of
continuing
communication and
potentially ch ang ing
voter
preferences.
Arnold
(1993, 410)
describes citizens
in th e model
statically,
as
acting
"more lik e
spectators
wh o
reg ister
th eir
approval
or
disapproval
at th e end
of a
performance."
Yet Arnold
(1993)
h imself
recog -
nizes th at
can be
intensely
interactive with citizens wh en h e notes th at
leg islators
"learn from interest
g roups,
committee
h earing s,
staff
members,
and oth er
leg islators
about th e
policy
con-
sequences
and th e
political consequences
of
specific
decisions"
(412).
Interest
g roups
and committee h ear-
ing s
are both institutions
by
wh ich citizens communi-
cate th eir
evolving
interests and
opinions (alth oug h
not
with out
intervening
biases introduced
by
th e selection
and medium of
communication).
Arnold also describes
leg islators statically,
as "con-
trolled
ag ents." Alth oug h
h e is
rig h t
in
saying
th e
leg is-
lators are not "instructed
deleg ates,"
h is
ph rase
"con-
trolled
ag ents"
does not
capture
th e
leg islators'
role
as
potential
initiators and educators. In
contrast,
th e
model of
is in most in-
stances interactive and more
continually
reflexive. An-
ticipatory representation
derives from a
mark etplace
model,
wh ich Arnold
(1993, 412)
h imself
adopts
wh en
h e writes th at "movie
mak ers,
auto
mak ers,
and real
estate
developers attempt
to
anticipate
and
satisfy
con-
sumers'
preferences."
In th e
mark etplace,
customers
are not mere
"spectators";
nor are
entrepreneurs
"con-
trolled
ag ents." Rath er,
customers
actively (if
not in-
tentionally)
exert
power
and influence on th e mark et-
place,
and
entrepreneurs
too are
active,
in
search ing
out and sometimes even
creating preferences.
Lik e th e
customer/entrepreneur
relation in th e
mark etplace,
th e
voter/representative
relation in
anticipatory represen-
tation is best conceived as one of
reciprocal power
and
continuing
mutual influence.
Th e
temporal
sh ift
produced by anticipatory repre-
sentation h as
parallel implications
for normative th e-
ory.
Most
prominently,
it undermines th e traditional
understanding
of
accountability.
It th erefore demands
new normative criteria in its
place.
Th e traditional
concept
of
accountability, focusing
on th e
relationsh ip
between Time 1 and Time 2, ask s
wh eth er th e
representative
is
doing
wh at th e
statically
conceived constituent wanted th e
representative
to do
at Time 1.
By substituting
th e voter at Time 3 for th e
voter at Time 1, anticipatory representation mak es th e
voter at Time 1 irrelevant. If we th ink of th e
repre-
sentative as an
entrepreneur, anticipating
future cus-
tomers'
preferences, th e forces th at mak e th e
repre-
sentative "accountable" are all forward
look ing .
Yet it
would seem
strang e
to
say
th at th e
representative
was
accountable to th e voter at Time 3.
Th e
arg ument
th at
un-
dermines traditional notions of
accountability
will seem
counterintuitive, because,
of all th e models I introduce
h ere, anticipatory representation
is most
intimately
re-
lated to th ose traditional notions. Th e desire for re-
election is
usually,
and
quite reasonably, interpreted
as
simply
a mech anism for
insuring
th e
fidelity
of th e
rep-
resentative to th e voter's
wish es, mak ing
no distinction
between th e voter at Time 1 and th e voter at Time 3.
Indeed,
if th e voter at Time 3 does not differ from th e
voter at Time
1,
th en we can th ink of th e voter at Time 3
as
simply doling
out th e reward or
punish ment
to en-
force th e
power
relation in
Most th eorists and most members of th e
public
still
envision
representation th roug h
th e traditional model
of
in wh ich th e voter's
power
work s forward and th e
representative's
atten-
tion look s back ward. Th e
public's advocacy
of term
limits,
for
example, adopts
th is static feature of th e tra-
ditional model. Th e voters fear th at th e farth er
away
th e
representative g ets
from
h ome, literally
and
fig u-
ratively,
th e weak er th e teth er th at h olds th at
repre-
sentative to th em. Th e voters want th eir "h ook s" in
th e
representative
to be
strong .
In th e
intensity
of th at
desire, th ey
seem
willing
to
forg o
th e reelection incen-
tive. Th eir
implicit
calculus seems not to include th e
incentives built into Time 3.
But th e sh ift in
temporal emph asis
in
anticipatory
representation bring s unexpected
normative
ch ang es
in its wak e. To th e
deg ree
th at we th ink of th e
leg is-
lator as
representing
th e voter at Time
3,
we turn th e
leg islator
into a
Sh umpeterian entrepreneur,
motivated
to
try
to attract th e votes of future customers. As we
h ave
seen,
in th is
conception, strictly speak ing ,
th e tra-
ditional
principal-ag ent
model
disappears.
We do not
th ink of an economic
entrepreneur
as an
ag ent,
with th e
future customers as
principals.
A
representative trying
to
anticipate
th e desires of voters at Time 3 h as a
pru-
dential,
not a
moral, relationsh ip
to th ose voters. To th e
deg ree
th at th e
representative
wants to be
reelected,
h e or sh e will see
pleasing
th e voters
(and funders)
at
Time 3 as th e means to th at end. Wh ereas in traditional
accountability,
we would
say
th at th e
representative
"oug h t"
to do wh at h e or sh e h ad
promised
th e voters at
Time
1,
we do not
say
th at th e
representative "oug h t"
to
try
to
please
th e voters at Time 3. In th is
respect,
purely prudential
incentives h ave
replaced
a combined
moral and
prudential imperative.
Replacing morality
with
prudence
in th e incentive
structure of
leads us to
judg e
th e
process
with new normative criteria. It mak es
us sh ift our normative focus from th e individual to
th e
system,
from
ag g reg ative democracy
to delibera-
tive
democracy,
from
preferences
to interests, from th e
way
th e
leg islator
votes to th e
way
th e
leg islator
com-
municates, and from th e
quality
of
promise-k eeping
to
th e
quality
of mutual education between
leg islator
and
constituents.
forces normative th e-
ory
to become
systemic.
In most
anticipatory
518
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
97,
No. 4
representation,
th e better th e communication between
voter and
representative
in th e interval between Time 1
and Time
3,
th e better th e
representation.
A
represen-
tative could in
th eory accurately anticipate
th e desires
of th e voter at Time 3 with out
any
mutual communi-
cation. In
practice, representatives usually
initiate and
welcome th e
opportunity
to communicate with
voters,
both to
anticipate
th eir
preferences
at Time 3 and to
influence th em. Th e
quality
of th at mutual communi-
cation th en
depends only
in small
part
on th e
dyadic
efforts of th e
representative
and th e constituent. It
depends
much more on th e
functioning
of th e entire
representative process-including political parties, po-
litical
ch alleng ers,
th e
media,
interest
g roups, h earing s,
opinion surveys,
and all oth er
processes
of communi-
cation. Each of th ese h as
important
functions in an
overall
process
of wh at
mig h t
be called
"continuing
representation."
Normative
th eory
sh ould
ask ,
and em-
pirical political
science sh ould
try
to
answer,
h ow well
th e entire
representative system
contributes to
ong oing
factually
accurate and
mutually
educative communi-
cation
(see
Williams 1998 and
Young 2000, 128,
130
on
interaction; Th ompson
1988 on
representation
over
time).
Focusing
on th e
ch ang es
in voter and
representative
between Time 1 and Time 3 also underlines th e deliber-
ative function of
representation. Recog nizing
th at th e
representative's
initiatives h ave th e
potential
to
ch ang e
as well as to
anticipate
voters at Time
3,
normative
th eorists sh ould be able to
h elp empirical political
sci-
entists ask wh eth er th ose
ch ang es
are best described as
"education" or
"manipulation.7
Manipulation may
be
disting uish ed by
th e intent to
deceive or create conditions of ch oice
leading
oth ers to
mak e a ch oice not in th eir interests
(see
Luk es
1974).
Beyond nonmanipulation,
th e
quality
of education can
be
judg ed by
th e deliberative criteria of wh eth er th e
mutual interaction between Time 1 and Time 3 mak es
th e voters at Time 3
(1)
more or less aware of th eir un-
derlying
interests and th e
policy implications
of th ose
interests and
(2)
more or less able to transform th em-
selves in
ways
th at
th ey
will later consider
g ood (in-
cluding ,
wh en
appropriate, becoming
more concerned
with th e common
interest).
Education,
in
sh ort,
is a form of wh at I will call "influ-
ence" and
manipulation
a form of wh at I will call "co-
ercive
power."
With in
Nag el's
broad
understanding
of
power
as
preferences causing outcomes, we
may
distin-
g uish analytically
between th ese two forms. Influence,
mark ed
by (relatively)
common interests on th e issue
between influencer and influenced, is exercised
th roug h
arg uments
on th e merits. Coercive
power,
mark ed
(ex-
cept in
paternalism) by
a conflict of interest between
power exerciser and
recipient,
h as two
subtypes:
"Th e
th reat of sanction," wh ich involves th e will of th e actor
subject
to
power,
and "force," wh ich includes not
only
ph ysical
force but
any structuring
of alternatives th at
constrains th e ch oices of th e actor
subject
to
power
reg ardless
of th at actor's will. "Education"
may
be
conceived as a form of
influence,
as it work s
th roug h
arg uments
on th e merits and is
by
definition in th e
recipients'
interests.
"Manipulation" may
be conceived
as a form of
force,
as it
occurs, by definition, ag ainst
th e
recipients'
interests with out th eir
recog nizing
ch arac-
teristics of th e situation th at
mig h t
h ave led th em to
tak e anoth er action.8 None of th ese forms of
power
is
easy
to
operationalize,
because th eir definitions involve
contests over wh at is and wh at is not in an individual's
interests.
Normative th eorists are
currently work ing
to de-
fine th e
appropriate
standards for th e use of coercive
power
and influence.
Reg arding
coercive
power,
th e
normative
th eory appropriate
for
ag g reg ative
mod-
els of
democracy
mandates th at each voter's
prefer-
ences sh ould h ave
roug h ly equal
coercive
power
over
th e outcome. In
deliberation,
in
contrast,
th e ideal is
th e absence of coercive
power.9
In
deliberation,
influ-
ence can
leg itimately
be
h ig h ly unequal (at
least un-
der conditions in wh ich th e
unequal
exercise of influ-
ence does not undermine a
roug h equality
of
respect
among participants,
foreclose furth er
opportunities
to
exercise
equal power,
or
deny any
of th e
participants
th e
opportunity
to
g row th roug h participation). Knig h t
and Joh nson
(1998) arg ue convincing ly
for an ideal of
"equal opportunity
of access to
political
influence" in
democratic deliberation. But even th at ideal is a default
position, h olding
unless
g ood
reasons can be
g iven
for
unequal
access to influence. In formal
representation,
for
example,
citizens for
g ood
reasons
place
th e
rep-
resentative in a
position
of
g reater potential
influence
and coercive
power
th an most constituents. Wh en a
representative
uses th at
g reater
coercive
power
in a
deliberation, e.g .,
to set th e
ag enda,
th at act is not au-
tomatically normatively wrong (as sug g ested by
both
ideals of
equal
access to influence and absence of co-
ercive
power)
but sh ould be
judg ed by
th e th ree cri-
teria, appropriate
to
deliberation,
of
nonmanipulation,
illuminating interests,
and
facilitating retrospectively
approvable
transformation.
Unfortunately
for
analyses
th at
try
to be
purely
"ob-
jective," questions reg arding
voters'
interests,
in con-
trast to th eir
preferences,
are not
susceptible
to certain
7
Cf. Jacobs and
Sh apiro
2000. "Education" in th is context intrinsi-
cally requires disting uish ing
wh at
people actually
want from wh at
th ey oug h t
to want
(and
th erefore sh ould be "educated" to
want)
with
reg ard
to both means and ends.
8
See Bach rach and Baratz 1963 and Luk es 1974. Th ese
stipulative
definitions,
useful
analytically,
do not
encompass
all of th e
ordinary
meaning s
of th ese terms. In th is
section,
in order to avoid confusion
with Nag el's broad definition of power, I h ave labeled "coercive
power"
wh at elsewh ere in th e paper (along with many oth ers) I
simply
call
"power."
Th is
analysis
omits
any
discussion of
positive
incentives,
wh ich
pose
a
th orny problem
of
categ orization
in th ese
terms
(see, e.g ., Barry [1975]
1991 and Nozick
1972).
For oth er inter-
pretations
of
power, see, e.g ., Wartenberg
1990.
9
For th e
ag g reg ative ideal of equal coercive power (a reg ulatory
ideal th at cannot be reach ed in practice), see, e.g ., Lively 1975 and
Mansbridg e [1980]
1983
(but
cf. Beitz
1989).
For th e deliberative ideal
of absence of
(coercive) power, see, e.g .,
Habermas
[1984] 1990,
235.
(Th is reg ulatory
ideal also cannot be reach ed in
practice,
because
no exercise of influence can be
separated fully
from th e exercise of
coercive
power,
wh ich will
always
affect th e
back g round
conditions
of th e
discussion,
th e
capacities
of th ose in th e
discussion,
and th e
implementation
of th e
decision.)
519
17
18
19
20
21
November 2003
resolution.
Th ey
are
"essentially
contested"
(Gallie
1962). Th ey
are neverth eless th e
rig h t questions
to
ask . Th ese
questions
force th e observer to consider
wh eth er th e
process
of mutual communication with th e
representative deepens
th e base on wh ich th e voters'
preferences rest,
or instead introduces
misleading
con-
siderations or
emph ases th at, g iven adequate
informa-
tion and th e time for
adequate reflection,
th e voters
would
reject.
At th e
moment,
th e
existing representative appara-
tus in th e United States does not facilitate well th e
processes
of mutual
education, communication,
and in-
fluence. For
example,
wh en William Bianco
(1994, 51)
ask ed members of
Cong ress
wh eth er
th ey th oug h t th ey
could
explain
to th eir constituents a vote
(ag ainst
th e
repeal
of
Catastroph ic Coverag e
for h ealth
insurance)
th at
th ey
considered a vote for
g ood public policy, many
found th at th eir
attempts
at education
only
made th eir
constituents
ang ry.10
In th is
case,
some constituents
(wh ose private policies
covered much of wh at th e bill
would
provide)
h ad far
g reater
access to influence th an
oth ers. Some
political entrepreneurs
deceived th e
pub-
lic, probably intentionally (King
and Scott
1995).
Crit-
ically, representatives
h ad neith er th e
political space
nor th e time to
explain
th eir
reasoning
to th eir con-
stituents and be educated in turn. Th e citizens did not
h ave forums in wh ich
th ey
could discuss
tog eth er
all
aspects
of th e matter. Th e deliberative
process
th us fell
far sh ort of
meeting
not
only
th e criteria of
equal op-
portunity
for access to
influence
and
nonmanipulation
but also th e criteria of interest clarification and
(less
relevantly h ere) retrospectively approvable
transfor-
mation,
wh ich
mig h t
h ave
justified unequal
access.
In th e case of
Catastroph ic, political parties,
th e me-
dia,
and th e relevant interest
g roups played only
minor
roles in
rectifying
distortions in th e
process
of
represen-
tation. Yet in a
polity
th e size of th e United
States,
th ese
intermediaries
play
a crucial role in th e
larg er system
of
representation. By emph asizing
th e distance between
th e
representative
and th e
voter,
th e traditional model
of
promissory representation puts
little
weig h t
on th e
quality
of communication between th e two. In
contrast,
th e incentive structure beh ind
anticipatory representa-
tion h as created an entire
apparatus
of
opinion polling ,
focus
g roup,
and interest
g roup activity
th at deserves
closer normative
scrutiny.
Rath er th an
treating opinion
polls
and focus
g roups
as tools of
manipulation
and in-
terest
g roups
as no more th an th e
tool
of
"special
inter-
ests," an
empirical analysis
driven
by appropriate
nor-
mative concerns sh ould ask h ow well th ese institutions,
along
with
opposition candidates, political parties,
and
th e media, avoid th e biases of
unequally
funded or-
g anizational forms and h ow well
th ey
serve th e nor-
matively worth y purposes
of mutual communication
and
education.1
Such a focus would
inevitably
draw
one
away
from th e
dyadic representative-constituent
relation and toward th e
larg er system
of multi-actor,
continuing representation.
In sh ort, if in
th e
rep-
resentative
simply anticipated
th e
preferences
of th e
voter at Time 3 and made no move to
ch ang e
th ose
preferences,
th e
ag g reg ative
norms of
equal power per
voter th at underlie th e
promissory
model would need
no
supplementation.
But
if,
as seems to be th e case
in almost all actual
instances, representatives
use th eir
power
and influence to affect th e
preferences
of voters
at Time
3,
th e norms of
g ood
deliberation must come
into
play,
and we must ask wh eth er th e criteria of non-
manipulation,
interest clarification and
retrospectively
approvable
transformation th at
justify unequal
access
to influence are
being
met or at least
approach ed.
th us focuses on th e
pru-
dential incentive to
please
th e voter in th e next election
(Time 3),
uses a
conception
of th e voter's
power
over
th e
representative
th at allows
anticipated reactions, re-
places
th e constituent's transmission of will with th e
representative's
desire to
please,
and sh ifts normative
scrutiny
from th e
process
of
accountability
to th e
qual-
ity
of deliberation
th roug h out
th e
representative's
term
in office.
GYROSCOPIC REPRESENTATION
I h ave
g iven
th e label
"g yroscopic representation"
to a
conception
of
representation
th at not
only
differs
from,
but is to some
deg ree incompatible with , anticipatory
representation.
Oth ers h ave called th is
representation
by
"recruitment"
(King don 1981, 45), by
"initial selec-
tion"
(Bernstein 1989),
or
by
"electoral
replacement"
(Stimson
et al.
1995).12
In th is model of
representation,
voters select
representatives
wh o can be
expected
to
act in
ways
th e voter
approves
with out external incen-
tives. Th e
representatives
act lik e
g yroscopes, rotating
on th eir own
axes, maintaining
a certain
direction, pur-
suing
certain built-in
(alth oug h
not
fully immutable)
g oals.
As in th e oth er new models of
representation
introduced
h ere,
th ese
representatives
are not account-
able to th eir electors in th e traditional sense. In th is
case,
th e
representatives
act
only
for "internal" rea-
sons. Th eir
accountability
is
only
to th eir own beliefs
and
principles.
Th is model can tak e several forms. In all forms
th e
representative
look s with in, for
g uidance
in tak -
ing action, to a
contextually
derived
understanding
of interests, interpretive
sch emes
("common sense"),
10
See also oth er
examples
in Bianco
1994, 50, and
King don 1981,
48
(e.g .: "Very frank ly,
if I h ad a ch ance to sit down with all of
my
constituents for 15 minutes and talk to
th em,
I'd h ave voted
ag ainst
th e wh ole
th ing .
But I didn't h ave th at ch ance.
Th ey
wanted
[x].
If
I voted
ag ainst it,
it would
appear
to th em th at I was
ag ainst [x],
and I wouldn't h ave h ad a ch ance to
explain myself.)
Rich ard Fenno
concurs: "... If education is a h ome
activity
th at
by
definition h as to
h urt a little
[in ask ing people
to
ch ang e
th eir
minds],
th en I did not
see a
g reat
deal of it"
(1978, 162;
Bianco
1994, 51).
11 Tak ing
th ese
intermediary
institutions
seriously
as veh icles of mu-
tual
learning sug g ests expanding
and
enh ancing
th e interest
g roup
universe in
ways
th at increase
political equality (see, e.g .,
Coh en and
Rog ers 1995, Crosby 1995,
Dah l
1997,
Fish k in
1991,1995,1996, Nag el
1992,
and Sch mitter
1995).
12 Miller and Stok es 1963
(50)
also described th eir "first" means of
constituency
control as "for th e district to ch oose a
Representative
wh o so sh ares its views th at in
following
h is own convictions h e does
h is constituents' will." Th eir second means was a form of
anticipatory
representation.
520
22
23
24
25
2
1
97,
No. 4
conscience,
and
principles.
In th e United
States,
a voter
may
select th e narrowest version of th e
type,
dedicated
to a
sing le
issue such as th e
leg alization
of abortion.
Or a voter
may
select th e broadest
version,
a
person
of
integ rity
with a commitment to th e
public g ood.
In
g en-
eral, people
often
try
to select wh at Fearon
(1999, 68)
calls a
"g ood type,"
with th e ch aracteristics of
(1) h aving
similar
policy preferences
to th e
voter, (2) being
h onest
and
principled,
and
(3) being sufficiently
sk illed.
Th ey
explain
th eir
ch oices,
for
example,
with th e
ph rase,
"He's a
g ood
man" or "Sh e's a
g ood
woman"
(Fenno
1978, 55;
Miller and Stok es
1963, 54).
Ch aracter, including
adh erence to
principle,
is an im-
portant
feature on wh ich voters select. But it is not th e
only
feature. In th e United
States,
voters also use de-
scriptive ch aracteristics, along
with
party
identification
and indicators of
ch aracter,
as cues
by
wh ich to
pre-
dict th e
representative's
future beh avior
(Popk in 1994).
Leg islators
th emselves often
adopt
th is
understanding
of
representation, seeing
th emselves as
h aving
an at-
titudinal
identity
with a
majority
of th eir constituents
(Bianco 1994, 39;
Fenno
1978, 115; King don 1981,
45-
47).
Th us th e two
principal
features th at Fearon
(1999)
enunciates,
of
h aving policy preferences
similar to th e
constituent's and
being
h onest and
principled,
are an-
alytically separable
but entwined in
practice,
because
similar
policy preferences
will not suffice if th e
repre-
sentative can be bribed.13
In th e
"party discipline"
models ch aracteristic of
much of
Europe, representatives
look with in to a set
of
principles
and commitments th at derive
partly
from
th eir own ideals and
partly
from th eir commitment to
th e collective decisions of th e
party.
Th e
representative
is also
subject
to
party
sanctions for not
obeying
th e
party,
and th e
party
in turn is
subject
to sanctions from
th e voters. I focus h ere
only
on th e model of
g yroscopic
representation
th at
prevails
in th e United States.
In all versions of
th e vot-
ers affect
political
outcomes not
by affecting
th e be-
h avior of th e
representative ("inducing preferences,"
as in
promissory
or
anticipatory representation),
but
by
selecting
and
placing
in th e
political system represen-
tatives wh ose beh avior is to some
deg ree predictable
in advance based on th eir observable ch aracteristics.
Wh ereas in
promissory
and
th e
representative's preferences
are
induced,
in th is
model th e
representative's preferences
are
internally
determined. Wh ereas in
promissory
and
anticipatory
representation th e voters
(at
Time 1 or Time
3)
cause
ch ang es
in th e
representative's beh avior, in
g yroscopic
representation
th e voters cause outcome
ch ang es
first
in th e
leg islature
and more
distantly
in th e
larg er polity
not
by ch ang ing
th e direction of th e
representative's
be-
h avior but
by placing
in th e
leg islature
and
larg er polity
(th e "system")
th e
active, powerful
element constituted
by
th is
representative.
Th e voters th us h ave
power
not
over th e
representative,
but over th e
system:
VT1
--
SYSTEMT2.
In th is form of
representation,
th e
representative
does not h ave to conceive of h im or
h erself,
in Pitk in's
([1967] 1972) terms,
as
"acting
for" th e
constituent,
at
eith er Time 1 or Time 3. Th e motivations of th e
rep-
resentative can remain a black box. Th e voter selects
th e
representative
based on
predictions
of th e
repre-
sentative's future beh avior derived from
past
beh av-
ior and oth er cues. We
may
envision th e candidates
vying
for election as a set of
self-propelled
and self-
directed
th ink ing , feeling
and
acting mach ines,
from
wh ich th e voter selects one to
place
in th e
system.
Af-
ter th e
selection,
th e
self-propelled
mach ine need h ave
no
subsequent
relation to th e voter. Th e
k ey
to th e
voter-representative relationsh ip
in th is model is th us
not traditional
accountability
but
deep predictability,
in
th e sense of
predicting
an inner constellation of values
th at
is,
in
important respects,
lik e th e constituent's own.
In some electoral
systems,
th e
political party
is often
far more
predictable
and easier for voters to relate to
th eir own interests th an are individual
politicians.
In
th e United
States,
a
politician's personal reputation,
descriptive ch aracteristics,
and ch aracter
(as
th e voters
judg e it) provide deep predictability
above and
beyond
th e
predictor
of
party
identification.
In th e United
States, g yroscopic representation
forms a
relatively larg e part
of th e
representative pro-
cess. As Joh n
King don (1981, 45) writes,
"Th e
simplest
mech anism
th roug h
wh ich constituents can influence a
cong ressman
is to select a
person initially
for th e of-
fice wh o
ag rees
with th eir attitudes."
Approximately
th ree-quarters
of th e time
King don (1981, 45)
found
no conflict between wh at a
majority
of th e
constituency
wanted and th e
personal
attitudes of th eir member of
Cong ress. Gyroscopic representation (or representa-
tion
by recruitment)
could th erefore
comprise
as much
as
th ree-quarters
of th e
dynamic
of
representation
in
th e United States
Cong ress.
Robert Bernstein
(1989)
ag rees
with th is
assessment, dubbing
th e
prevailing
fixation on wh at I call
and
"th e
myth
of
constituency
control." In th e most
eleg ant analysis
to
date,
Stimson
et al.
(1995) provide
data
sug g esting
th at in th e United
States Senate and
presidency, g yroscopic representa-
tion
(th eir
"electoral
replacement")
is th e most
impor-
tant mech anism
by
wh ich th e
representatives respond
to
public opinion ch ang es.
In th e House of
Representa-
tives, th eir data
sug g est,
th e most
important
mech anism
is
anticipatory representation (th eir
"rational
anticipa-
tion").
Lik e
anticipatory representation, g yroscopic repre-
sentation h as some ties to th e traditional form of ac-
countability postulated
in
but th ere are also crucial differences. In
g yroscopic
representation,
th e
representatives
do h ave a norma-
tive
responsibility
to th eir constituents not to lie about
th e ch aracteristics on wh ich
th ey
are
being
selected at
13
Fearon's "g ood type" th us differs
subtly
from th e virtuous and wise
representative
wh om James Madison
(along
with James Wilson and
many
oth er
Federalists)
wanted selected
(Manin 1997, 116-19),
in
being
based more on
similarity
in
preferences
th an on a universalistic
understanding
of and commitment to th e
public g ood.
In
emph asizing
voters
selecting
on virtuous
ch aracter,
Brennan and Hamlin
(1999,
2000)
also omit
similarity
in
preferences
or interests. See also Lott
1987,
183.
521
3
4
5
November 2003
election time. But in th e
g yroscopic
model th e
deeper
accountability
of th e
representatives
is to th emselves
or
(particularly
in electoral
systems
outside th e United
States)
to th e
political party
with wh ich
th ey identify.
Th ey
are not
expected
to relate to th eir constituents as
ag ents
to
principals.
As
King don (1981, 46) puts it,
in
th is model th e member of
cong ress
"never even tak es
[th e constituency]
into account."
Or,
as Fearon
(1999,
56) writes,
"electoral
accountability
is not
necessary."
Th e
fiduciary component
to th e relation is weak . Th e
teth er to th e voter at Time 1 is almost nonexistent.
Gyroscopic representation
also differs from Burk e's
"trustee" form of
representation.
Burk e
([1774] 1889)
envisioned th e
representative
as a
statesman,
con-
cerned with interests rath er th an mere
preferences
and
with th e interests of th e entire nation rath er th an th e
district.14 Yet in
th e voter
may
select a
representative only
because both voter and
representative
sh are some
overriding
self-interested
g oal,
such as
lowering
taxes. Or th e voter
may
select
a
representative
with
many
of th e voter's own back -
g round ch aracteristics,
on th e
g rounds
th at such a
rep-
resentative will act much th e
way
th e voter would if
placed
in th e
leg islature.
Th e
point
for th e voter is
only
to
place
in th e
system
a
representative
wh ose
self-propelled
actions th e voter can
expect
to furth er
th e voter's own interests. Burk e's "trustee"
conception
th us
comprises
one subset with in th e
larg er concept
of
g yroscopic representation.
Th e
g yroscopic
model does resemble Burk e's trustee
conception
in one
important respect. Having
decided
th at th e
representative already wants,
for internal rea-
sons,
to
pursue
much th e same course as th e one
th e voter
wants,
th e voter often
expects
th e
represen-
tative
(or
th e
party)
to act with considerable discretion
in th e
leg islature.
Th is
expectation opens
th e door to
creative deliberation and
neg otiation
at th e
leg islative
level.
Compromises, ch ang es
of
h eart,
and even th e
recasting
of fundamental interests are all
normatively
permitted.
As we h ave
seen,
traditional
accountability
is irrel-
evant in th e
g yroscopic
model. In th e
pure
form of
th e
model,
as
King don points out,
th e
representative
never tak es th e
constituency
into account and is not
expected
to do so. Th e
quality
of
ong oing
communi-
cation between
representative
and constituent is also
irrelevant. In th e
pure
form of th e
model,
as
King don
also
points out,
th e
ong oing
communication between
th e
representative
and th e constituent can, even
ideally,
be nil. Th e normative
process
of
judg ing
th is form of
representation th us
requires
criteria th at differ from
th ose of traditional
accountability.
One critical criterion, deliberation at auth orization,
requires normatively estimating
th e
quality
of deliber-
ation
among
constituents and
representatives
before
and at Time 1, th e
auth orizing
election. Good deliber-
ation at th is moment would result in voters
ach ieving
both
developed understanding s
of th eir own interests
and accurate
predictions
of th eir ch osen
representa-
tives' future beh aviors. Good deliberation
requires
th at
representatives
not
intentionally
deceive th e
public
as
to th eir future beh avior. Th e voter's aim is to discern
and select on th e criterion of
commonality
of interests
between th e
representative
and th e constituent
(see
Bianco
1996).
A second
criterion,
ease of maintenance and re-
moval, requires
th at th e voters be able at
periodic
in-
tervals to reenter th e
system,
eith er
perpetuating
its
current direction
by maintaining
th eir
self-propelled
representatives
in office or
ch ang ing
th at direction
by
removing
one
representative
and
inserting
anoth er.
Term
limits,
wh ich mak e sense in a model of
promissory
representation,
mak e little sense eith er for
anticipatory
representation
or for
Term
limits mak e it
impossible
to maintain one's ch osen
rep-
resentative in th e
system.
In
sh ort,
th e normative criteria
appropriate
for
g y-
roscopic representation
are
g ood systemwide
deliber-
ation at th e time of selection
(th e auth orizing election)
and relative ease in
maintaining
one's selected
rep-
resentative in office or
removing
th at
representative
and
placing
anoth er in th e
system. Gyroscopic repre-
sentation stresses th e
representative's
own
principles
and
beliefs,
sees th e voter as
h aving power
not over
th e
representative
but over th e
system (by inserting
th e
representative
in th at
system),
and sh ifts normative
scrutiny
from traditional
accountability
to th e
quality
of deliberation in th e
auth orizing
election.
SURROGATE REPRESENTATION
Surrog ate representation
is
representation by
a
representative
with wh om one h as no electoral
relationsh ip-th at is,
a
representative
in anoth er dis-
trict. As with th e oth er forms of
representation,
I am not
th e first to notice th e
importance
of th is k ind of
repre-
sentation in th e United States
today.
Robert
Weissberg
described it in 1978 as "collective
representation,"
and
Joh n Jack son and David
King
in 1989 called
someth ing
similar "institutional"
representation.
Edmund Burk e
h ad a version h e called "virtual"
representation,
but
Burk e's
concept
focused on
morally rig h t answers,
wis-
dom rath er th an
will, relatively
fixed and
objective
in-
terests,
and th e
g ood
of th e
wh ole,
wh ich is
only
one of
many possible g oals
for
surrog ate representation.15
In th e United States
today,
individuals and interest
g roups representing
individuals often turn to
surrog ate
representatives
to
h elp
advance th eir substantive inter-
ests, including
th eir
ideal-reg arding
interests. A mem-
ber of
Cong ress
from Minnesota, for
example, may
lead
th e
Cong ressional opposition
to a war
opposed by sig -
nificant numbers of voters in Missouri and Oh io wh ose
own
representatives support
th e war. Th e situation h as
ch ang ed
from th e time wh en territorial
representation
14
For a standard
interpretation, see Miller and Stok es
1963,
45:
"Burk e wanted th e
representative
to serve th e
constituency's
interest
but not its will"
(emph asis
in
orig inal).
More
fully,
see Pitk in
[1967]
1972.
15
Burk e [1792] 1871. Pitk in
([1967] 1972, 174ff)
discusses th ese and
oth er
ways
in wh ich Burk e's
concept
of virtual
representation
dif-
fers from modern
concepts.
For a related
concept,
see Gutmann and
Th ompson 1996,
144ff. on 'moral constituents.'
522
97,
No. 4
captured many
of a voter's most
sig nificant interests,
but in th e United States th e
representational system
h as not
ch ang ed
with it. In th e United
States,
surro-
g ate representation-a noninstitutional, informal,
and
ch ance
arrang ement-is
th e
preeminent
form of non-
territorial
representation.
For th e affluent
(or
th e
org anized, e.g ., th roug h
labor
unions), surrog ate representation
is
g reatly
enh anced
by
th e
possibility
of
contributing
to th e
campaig ns
of
representatives
from oth er districts. Individual candi-
dates, political parties,
and
many
oth er
political org a-
nizations as a matter of course solicit funds from out-
side th eir districts. Citizens with
ample discretionary
income find
many
of th eir most
meaning ful
instances
of
leg islative representation th roug h
wh at one
mig h t
call
"monetary surrog acy."
Surrog ate representation,
both state- and nation-
wide, plays
th e
normatively
critical role of
providing
representation
to voters wh o lose in th eir own dis-
trict. Because both federal and state electoral
systems
use
sing le
member
districts,
with
first-past-th e-post,
winner-tak e-all
majority elections,
citizens wh ose
pre-
ferred
policies
attract a
minority
of voters in th eir own
districts could
th eoretically
end
up
with no
represen-
tation at all in th e
leg islature.
Yet with sufficient
g eo-
g raph ic clustering ,
th e interests and
perspectives
th at
lose in one district will win in
anoth er,
so th at voters
in th e
minority
in District A will h ave
surrog ate rep-
resentation
th roug h
th e
representative
of District B.
In electoral
systems
structured th is
way,
th e accidental
supplement
to
existing
institutions
provided by
surro-
g ate representation
is crucial to democratic
leg itimacy.
As we sh all
see,
if
serendipity
did not
produce enoug h
surrog ate representation
to meet
systemic
criteria for
leg itimacy,
th e electoral
system
as a wh ole would not
with stand normative
scrutiny.
In th e k ind of
th at is not
anch ored in
money
or oth er contributions
("pure"
sur-
rog ate representation),
th ere is no relation of account-
ability
between th e
representative
and th e
surrog ate
constituent. Nor is th ere a
power
relation between sur-
rog ate
constituent and
representative:
VT1
-
0.
Th e
only power
relation
(in
th e sense of th e th reat of
sanction
or
th e use of
force)
arises between th ose wh o
contribute
money
or oth er
g oods
and th e
representa-
tives to wh ose
campaig ns th ey
contribute. In a relation
of
monetary
or
contributing surrog acy,
th e contribu-
tor exerts
power th roug h exacting promises
as in tra-
ditional
representation, th roug h anticipated
reactions
as in
and
th roug h placing
in th e
system
a
leg islator
wh o will
predictably
act in
certain
ways
as in
Because
all th e
power
th at is exercised in
any surrog ate
re-
presentation
work s
th roug h monetary
or oth er contri-
butions and
th roug h
contributors rath er th an voters,
surrog ate representation in
th e United States
today
embodies far more
political inequality
th an does even
th e traditional
leg islator-constituent relation.
Yet even with out th e fear of
losing monetary
or oth er
contributions,
and with out
any
formal
accountability,
surrog ate representatives
sometimes
feel responsible
to th eir
surrog ate
constituents in oth er districts.
Leg -
islators
deeply
allied with a
particular ideolog ical per-
spective
often feel a
responsibility
to nondistrict con-
stituents from th at
perspective
or
g roup.
Th at sense of
surrog ate responsibility
becomes
strong er
wh en th e
surrog ate representative
sh ares ex-
periences
with
surrog ate
constituents in a
way
th at a
majority
of th e
leg islature
does not.
Representatives
wh o are
female,
African
American,
or of Polish an-
cestry,
wh o h ave a ch ild with a
disability,
or wh o h ave
g rown up
on a
farm,
in a
mining community,
or in a
work ing -class neig h borh ood,
often feel not
only
a
par-
ticular
sensitivity
to issues
relating
to th ese
experiences
but also a
particular responsibility
for
representing
th e
interests and
perspectives
of th ese
g roups,
even wh en
members of th ese
g roups
do not constitute a
larg e
frac-
tion of th eir constituents.
Feeling s
of
responsibility
for
constituents outside one's district
g row
even
strong er
wh en th e
leg islature
includes
few,
or
disproportionately
few, representatives
of th e
g roup
in
question.16
Representative Barney Frank ,
a Democrat from
Massach usetts, consciously
sees h imself as a
surrog ate
representative
for
g ay
and lesbian citizens
th roug h out
th e nation.
Frank ,
wh o is h imself
openly g ay,
h as a
sympath etic
district
constituency: "My
constituents at
h ome understand
my position.
Issues
concerning g ay
and lesbian discrimination are
important
to me." He
points
out th at h e is able to
play
th is role because it
does not tak e a
g reat
deal of time and th erefore does not
detract much from wh at h e does for h is district. Frank
tak es h is
surrog ate responsibilities seriously.
He be-
lieves th at h is
surrog ate
constituents nationwide "k now
I understand th eir concerns. ... I h ave a staff with th ree
openly g ay,
talented
lawyers
wh o feel committed to
h elping
th is
problem
at
larg e.""17
He receives mail from
g ay
and lesbian citizens across th e nation
"reg arding
th eir concerns about
g ay rig h ts
and
discrimination,"
and h e feels a
special responsibility
to th at
g roup,
be-
cause h e is one of th e few
openly g ay
members of
Cong ress.
In h is
case,
th is sense of
responsibility
is in-
creased because th e constituents wh o write h im from
around th e nation are often not in a
position,
due to
prejudice ag ainst
th em,
to become
politically
active on
th eir
own.18
Th e relation of a
surrog ate representative
with sur-
rog ate
constituents can also be somewh at deliberative.
16
For African American members of
Cong ress see, e.g .,
Swain
1993,
218;
for women
see, e.g .,
Carroll
2002; Cong ressional Quarterly 1983,
76;
Dodson et al.
1995,
15 21;
Th omas
1994, 74;
and Williams
1998,
141. For th e
political psych olog ical
effects of
belong ing
to a
g roup,
see
Conover 1988. For increased feeling s
of
responsibility in th e absence
of oth er potentially responsible actors, see Latane and Darley 1970.
For more on norms of
"descriptive" representation,
see
Mansbridg e
1999, Ph illips 1995,
and Williams 1998. Th e
feeling s
of
responsibility
g row particularly strong
wh en th e
disproportionately
small number
of
descriptive representatives
can be traced to
past
or
present
acts of
injustice ag ainst
th e
g roup.
17 Interview with
Representative Barney Frank , April 14, 1997,
in
DiMarzio 1997.
18
Personal communication from
Barney Frank , May 15,
1998.
523
November 2003
In addition to th eir contributions of
money,
in-k ind ser-
vices,
and volunteer
time,
wh ich foster a form of
power
relation, g roups represented
in
surrog ate
fash ion
may
provide
information and
expertise. (Th e
moral
appro-
bation or
disapproval
th at
th ey
also
provide may
be
conceived in
part
as information and in
part
as an exer-
cise of
power.) Surrog ate representatives may
consult
with
g roup members, particularly
th ose wh o h ave some
formal or informal claim to
represent
oth ers of th e
g roup,
so th at information and
insig h ts
flow both
ways.
Alth oug h dyadic, district-based, representative-
constituent
accountability
is
completely
absent in
pure
surrog ate representation,
we can neverth eless
develop
normative criteria to
judg e
th e
deg ree
to
wh ich ,
on
a
systemic basis,
th at
meets
democratic standards. Th e most obvious criterion is
th at th e
leg islature
as a wh ole sh ould
represent
th e
interests and
perspectives
of th e
citizenry roug h ly
in
proportion
to th eir numbers in th e
population.
But to
th is
larg er
criterion we must enter certain caveats.
First,
th e
ag g reg ative
aims of
democracy require
th at
th e most conflictual interests be th ose on wh ich most
effort is made to ach ieve
proportionality
in
representa-
tion. Wh en interests conflict in
ways
th at cannot be rec-
onciled
by deliberation,
th e
Ang lo-American th eory
of
democracy
th at h as evolved since th e seventeenth
century
rests th e fairness of th e
conflict-resolving pro-
cedure on some
approximation
to
equal
coercive
power
among
th e
parties.
Th e norm of "one
person/one
vote"
implies
th e
equal
individual
power
of a vote in a direct
democracy
and
equal proportional power
in a
repre-
sentative
democracy.
Th e more
important
th e
conflict,
th e more vital becomes a
proportional representation
of th e relevant interests.
Second,
th e deliberative aims of
democracy require
th at th e
perspectives
most relevant to a decision be
represented
in
k ey
decisions. Such
perspectives
do not
necessarily
need to be
presented by
a number of
leg is-
lators
proportional
to th e number of citizens wh o h old
th ose
perspectives.19
Th e
g oal
is to
produce
th e best in-
sig h ts
and th e most relevant
information, th roug h
mu-
tual
influence,
wh ich in deliberation
may leg itimately
be
unequal,
not
th roug h
coercive
power,
wh ich
ideally
sh ould be absent.
Deliberative
g oals may
also
justify
some of th e in-
equality currently
ch aracteristic of
surrog ate
and oth er
forms of
representation.
Wh en th e deliberative mech -
anisms built into an electoral
system
work
well, th ey
sh ould select, th roug h
"th e force of th e better
arg u-
ment," ag ainst,
at th e
very least, th e least informed
political positions
in th e
polity. According ly,
th e
rep-
resentatives in th e
leg islature
wh o advocate th ese
posi-
tions sh ould be fewer
proportionately
th an th e number
of citizens wh o h old th at
position.
Good deliberation
sh ould work
th roug h
th e electoral
process
as well as
th roug h
oth er
processes
of mutual education to winnow
out th e least informed ideas, leaving
th e best in active
contest.20
Th e current
surrog ate
selection
process
in th e United
States
departs sig nificantly
from th e democratic stan-
dard.
Alth oug h existing
electoral
systems
do to some
deg ree
select th e best
ideas, surrog ate systems,
even
more th an direct
elections,
select
primarily
for th e best
financed ideas and interests. In th e United States in-
equalities
of th is sort are often
justified
on th e
g rounds
th at
th ey
reflect freedom of
"speech ,"
as
conveyed
th roug h monetary
contribution. But
unequal
contribu-
tions to
surrog ate representatives are, I would
arg ue,
not
justified
on th e
g rounds
of eith er
adversary
fairness
(providing proportional representation
to
conflicting
interests)
or deliberative
efficacy (providing
some
rep-
resentation for relevant
perspectives
on a
decision).
Th e normative
questions
to be ask ed with
reg ard
to
differ from th e
questions
posed by
traditional
accountability.
In
surrog ate repre-
sentation, leg islators represent
constituencies th at did
not elect th em.
Th ey
cannot th erefore be accountable in
traditional
ways.
As in
th e
leg islators
act to
promote
th eir
surrog ate
constituen-
cies'
perspectives
and interests for various reasons in-
ternal to th eir own
convictions, consciences,
and iden-
tities. Or
th ey
act to assure th e continuous flow of
dollars into th eir
campaig ns.
Th e normative
question
for
is
not, th erefore,
wh eth er
representatives accurately
reflect th e current
opinions
or even th e
underlying
interests of th e members of
th eir constituencies.
Rath er,
it is
wh eth er,
in th e
ag -
g reg ate,
each
conflicting
interest h as
proportional
ad-
versary representation
in a
leg islative body (Weissberg
1978, esp. 542)
and each
important perspective
h as ad-
equate
deliberative
representation.
Such a normative
analysis
must involve a contest
reg arding
wh at interests
most conflict
(and
th erefore most deserve
proportional
representation)
in
ag g reg ation
and wh at
perspectives
count as
important
in deliberation.22
In
sh ort, surrog ate representation
must meet th e cri-
teria for
proportional representation
of interests on
relatively
conflictual issues
(an ag g reg ative criterion)
and
adequate representation
of
perspectives
on mat-
ters of both conflict and more common interest
(a
de-
liberative
criterion). Surrog ate representation
th us fo-
cuses not on th e
dyadic relation between
representative
and constituent but on th e
systemwide composition
of
19
Kymlick a 1993, 77-78, 1995, 146-47, Ph illips 1995, 47, 67ff, and
Pitk in
[1967] 1972, 84, point
out th at deliberation
g enerally requires
only
a "th resh old"
presence
of each
perspective
to contribute to th e
larg er understanding . Important exceptions
to th is
g eneral
rule come
wh en
g reater
numbers
g uarantee
a
h earing , produce
deliberative
syn-
erg y,
or facilitate
diverg ences, interpretations,
and sh ades of
meaning
with in a
perspective (Mansbridg e 1999).
Th e
underlying
criterion
remains, h owever,
th e contribution a
perspective
can mak e to th e
decision rath er th an strict
proportionality.
20
For "th e force of th e better
arg ument,"
see Habermas
[1977] 1984,
22ff, summarized in Habermas
[1984] 1990,
235. One would
expect
g ood
deliberation also to reduce or even eliminate th e least moral
positions
in th e
polity.
Th e normative issues raised
by
wh at one
mig h t
call "deliberative
winnowing ,"
with its tension between
respecting
"remainders"
(Honig 1993)
and
provisionally recog nizing
some ar-
g uments
as better th an
oth ers, require
fuller discussion elsewh ere.
21
For a
supporting arg ument, see Sunstein 1990.
22
A deliberation among all
potentially
affected
participants,
mark ed
by
a minimal intrusion of
power
and
by
better rath er th an worse
arg uments,
sh ould
ideally
decide wh ich interests most conflict and
wh ich
perspectives
are most crucial.
524
97,
No. 4
TABLE 1. Forms of
Representation
Promissory Anticipatory Gyroscopic Surrog ate
Focus
Auth orizing
election Reelection and
Auth orizing
election
Composition
of
preceding
term
leg islature
Direction of Over th e
representative
Over th e
represen-
Over th e
system
None for
voters;
voter
power (forward look ing )
tative
("back ward" only
for contributors
look ing )
Normative
Keeping promises Quality
of
rep/ Quality
of deliberation 1.
Representation
criteria constituent
during auth orizing
of
conflicting
interests
deliberation
during
election in
proportion
to
term numbers in
population
Ease of
selection,
2.
Sig nificant
maintenance, representation
and removal of
important
perspectives
Traditional Yes No No No
accountability
th e
leg islature,
sees th e
represented
as
exercising
no
power
over eith er th e
representative
or th e
system
ex-
cept
wh en th e
represented
mak es a
(usually monetary)
contribution to th e
representative,
and sh ifts norma-
tive
scrutiny
from constituent-oriented
accountability
to
systemic inequities
in
representation.
DELIBERATIVE, SYSTEMIC,
AND PLURAL
NORMATIVE CRITERIA
Table 1 summarizes some of th e ch aracteristics of
th ese different forms of
representation.23
Wh en em-
pirical political
scientists want to answer th e
ques-
tion of h ow well a
political system
meets democratic
norms, th ey
need a democratic
th eory
th at will clar-
ify
th ose norms in
ways
th at mak e it easier to tell
wh en real-world situations conform to or violate th em.
In th e field of United States
leg islative studies,
th e
democratic norms
reg arding representation
h ave of-
ten been reduced to one criterion: Does th e elected
leg islator pursue policies
th at conform to th e
prefer-
ences of voters in th e
leg islator's
district? Th is crite-
rion is
sing ular, ag g reg atively oriented,
and district-
based. In
contrast,
th is
analysis
advocates
plural
criteria
(cf.
Ach en
1978;
Beitz
1989).
It furth er
sug g ests
th at
some of th ese criteria sh ould be
deliberatively-oriented
and
systemic.
From a deliberative
perspective,
even
promissory
representation requires g ood
deliberation to ascer-
tain wh eth er or not
representatives
h ave fulfilled th eir
promises
or h ave
persuasive
reasons for not
doing
so.
Anticipatory representation requires g ood
delibera-
tion between citizens and
representatives
in th e
pe-
riod of communication between elections
wh enever--
as is almost
always
th e case-a
representative
tries to
influence th e voter's
preferences by
th e time of th e
next election.
Gyroscopic representation requires g ood
deliberation
among
citizens and between citizens and
th eir
representatives
at th e time th e
representative
is
selected.
Surrog ate representation requires
not
only
equal g ladiatorial representation
of th e most
important
conflicting
interests in
proportion
to th eir numbers in
th e
population
but also
g ood
deliberative
representa-
tion of
important perspectives.
Each form of
representation
sh ould also be
judg ed
by
its contribution to th e
quality
of deliberation in th e
leg islature.
In
a
g ood qual-
ity
of communication
among citizens, g roups,
and
rep-
resentatives between elections
probably improves
th e
quality
of deliberation with in th e
leg islature.
In con-
trast,
one form of
g yroscopic representation-based
on
voters'
ch oosing
a
representative
wh om
th ey expect
to
pursue
a vision of th e
public
interest-facilitates
g ood
leg islative
deliberation not
by
mutual
continuing
con-
tact and education but
by selecting
individuals
lik ely
to deliberate well and
leaving
th em free to
pursue
th at
g oal
as
th ey
th ink fit.
Surrog ate representation
con-
tributes to
g ood leg islative
deliberation
by mak ing
it
more
lik ely
th at varied and
important perspectives
will
be included.
Alth oug h
a normative
judg ment
on each of th ese
forms of
representation
involves
judg ing
th e
quality
of th e deliberation th at
th ey produce
or th at
produces
th em, political
th eorists are
currently only g radually
work ing
out wh at th e criteria for
g ood
deliberation
sh ould be. Th e standard account is th at democratic de-
liberation sh ould be
free, equal,
and rational or reason-
able. As we h ave seen in th e case of
equality, h owever,
each of th ese ch aracteristics needs
g reater specifica-
tion,
because not all of th e
ordinary lang uag e meaning s
of th ese words
oug h t
to
apply
to th e deliberative case.
Democratic deliberation sh ould be free in th e sense of
open
to all relevant
participants (much h ang s h ere,
as
elsewh ere,
on th e
definition
of
"relevant").
It sh ould
ideally
come as close as
possible (in
a world created
by
and suffused
by power)
to a situation in wh ich coercive
23
Table 1 presents in a crude form some of th e
major points
in th is
analysis.
It does not
pretend
to
incorporate
all of th e normative cri-
teria relevant to
judg ing
th e
quality
of
representation (e.g .,
"clean"
elections, equal votes).
Nor does it
incorporate
all of th e considera-
tions
presented
in th e text.
525
November 2003
power
h as no role and th e
only
"force" is th at of th e
better
arg ument.
It sh ould
ideally
allow
equal oppor-
tunity
of access to influence for all
constituents, except
wh ere
g ood
reasons can be
g iven
for
unequal opportu-
nity.
It sh ould facilitate th e
expression
and
processing
of relevant emotions as well as
cog nitions.
It sh ould be
nonmanipulative.
And it sh ould both
clarify
and
appro-
priately
transform individual and collective interests in
th e directions of both
cong ruence
and
conflict.24
None of th ese criteria
replace
th e criterion of
constituent-representative cong ruence. Th ey
add to it.
Indeed, cong ruence
of a sort is a factor in each of th e
forms of
representation.
It is most obvious in
promis-
sory representation,
wh ere one would
expect explicit
promises
to reflect
points
of
cong ruence
between con-
stituent
preferences
and a
representative's
future ac-
tions. It
applies
in
to th e re-
election,
wh ere one would
expect
constituents to h ave
moved both toward and with th e
representative's po-
sitions and th e
representative
to h ave moved
similarly
both toward and with th e constituents. In
g yroscopic
representation
one would
expect g reater cong ruence
to th e extent th at th e
representative
was elected de-
scriptively
to
duplicate
th e median voter but less to th e
extent th at th e
representative
was elected to beh ave
as a
principled
notable. In
surrog ate representation,
norms of
cong ruence,
wh en
applicable, apply
to th e
polity
as a wh ole.
None of th e
recently
identified forms of
represen-
tation, h owever,
involves
accountability
in its clas-
sic form. In
anticipatory representation, strictly
inter-
preted,
th e
representative
acts
only
as
entrepreneur,
preparing
to offer and
offering
a
product
to a fu-
ture
buyer.
In
g yroscopic representation, strictly
in-
terpreted,
th e voter selects a
representative
wh o th en
acts
purely autonomously.
In
pure surrog ate represen-
tation,
th ere need be no relation at all between th e
representative
and th e individual constituent. Th ese
th ree forms of
representation supplement
th e tradi-
tional model of
wh ich does
involve
accountability
in its classic form.
Th ey
do not
replace
th e traditional
model;
nor do
th ey replace
th e
concept
of
accountability.
As
leg itimate
and useful
sup-
plementary
forms of
representation, h owever, th ey
re-
quire separate
normative
scrutiny.
In most
respects,
th ese models of
representation
are
compatible
with one anoth er and with
promissory rep-
resentation.
Th ey
h ave
complementary
functions for
different contexts and can, th us, be viewed as cumula-
tive, not
oppositional. Compatibly, th ey
direct attention
to deliberation at different
points
in th e
representative
system:
to th e moment of election, between elections,
and in th e
leg islature. Compatibly, th ey
all
require
each
voter's interests to h ave
equal weig h t
in contexts of
conflicting interests, alth oug h promissory representa-
tion comes closest to th e normative standard of di-
rect
democracy,
in wh ich th e
people
th emselves rule.
Compatibly, surrog ate representation provides
at th e
national level elements
required
for
systemic
demo-
cratic
leg itimacy
th at th e oth er th ree forms do not
provide. Gyroscopic representation
is most
appropri-
ate for
uncrystalized
interests and
ch ang ing
situations
but
requires
considerable constituent trust, wh ich
many
situations
may
not warrant.
requires
little
open-ended
trust but work s
badly
in sit-
uations of
rapid ch ang e. Anticipatory representation
requires
little trust and
easily
accomodates
ch ang e,
but
produces
incentives for sh ort-term
th ink ing
and
manip-
ulation focused on th e next election.
In a few
respects,
th e models come in conflict.
Most
importantly, promissory representation
restricts
th e
representative's
action after election, wh ile
g yro-
scopic representation
frees it.
Anticipatory represen-
tation attracts
entrepreneurs; g yroscopic representa-
tion, public-spirited
notables. Certain functions th at
mig h t
be
th oug h t compatible
in a division of labor
(e.g .,
g yroscopic representation requiring
considerable con-
stituent trust and
anticipatory representation relatively
little
trust) mig h t,
from anoth er
point
of
view,
be con-
sidered conflicts
(institutions
th at assume little trust
sometimes drive out institutions th at assume
g reater
trust).
Oth er conflicts
may
become visible over time.
Th ese forms of
representation
are not
mutually
ex-
clusive.
Moreover, th ey may
interact over time with one
anoth er. An
anticipatory representative may
become a
promissory representative
at th e next election. A
leg -
islator
may
start as a
g yroscopic representative and,
wing s clipped
and some trust
lost,
become a
promis-
sory representative.
Th e
preferences
th at constituents
express
at Time 1 in
promissory representation may
be th e
product
of earlier
anticipatory, g yroscopic,
or
surrog ate processes.25
Alth oug h
in some
respects
th e normative criteria
for
judg ing
th ese forms of
representation
are
additive,
th e
plural
criteria of th is
analysis
do not
require
th e
models to be
fully cong ruent
with one
anoth er, any
more th an th e
separate
normative mandates of free-
dom and
equality
need to be
cong ruent.
As a conse-
quence,
wh at
representatives oug h t
to do wh en faced
with constituent
preferences
th at are not in th e con-
stituents'
long -term
interests or not
compatible
with th e
g ood
of th e wh ole is, from th e
perspective
of
represen-
tational
th eory,
indeterminate.
Representatives may
le-
g itimately
act in several
ways,
as
long
as
th ey respect
moral norms and th e norms
appropriate
for th e model,
or combination of models, th ey
are
following .
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24
Th e criteria listed are not intended to exh aust th e criteria for
g ood
deliberation. For th e
early
'standard account' of criteria for demo-
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th eory
of democratic
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Coh en 1989. For
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see, e.g .,
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Th ompson 1996, Th ompson 1988,
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Entman
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I th ank Dennis
Th ompson
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