From Act to Esse to Participation:

The Metaphysics of Motion in Summa Contra Gentiles 13-22

Francis Petruccelli

PHIL836 Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Nature

Msgr. John Wippel Spring Semester 2014

Catholic University of America, School of Philosophy

1
I. Introduction.
Cosmological arguments for the existence of God characteristically begin from some
observable fact in the world and reason backwards or inductively to a principle that
sufficiently explains that fact. Many scholars have argued that St. Thomas Aquinass
cosmological arguments, particularly the arguments from motion, rely too heavily on outdated
and unconvincing Aristotelian natural philosophy.
1
The idea of this line of response is that the
observable factsfor example, motionnow have sufficient principles of explanation thanks to
modern scientific theories. Therefore, the regress to some primary immobile mover proves to be
an outdated procedure. In short, cosmological arguments supposedly rely on a picture of the
cosmos that has since been proven false by a new and improved physics.
This verdict on cosmological arguments, however, would devastate Thomass project in
the Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG). Aquinas spends the majority of SCG 13 developing two
versions of the argument from motion. By comparison, he gives the final three arguments hardly
any space at all. Clearly the arguments from motion carry a lot of philosophical weight.
Furthermore, he writes explicitly that his first task is to establish by demonstration the existence
of God,
2
and in SCG 10-12 he devotes himself to refuting those who argue, for varying
reasons, that this demonstration is not possible.
3
Only after such a demonstration has been
proven possible, and then after it has been executed, can Thomas take up the via negativa.

1
For a treatment of this common modern view, see John Weisheipl, Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1985). For a discussion of these objections and
various strategies of response, see John Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC:
The Catholic University of America, 2000), 452-459.

2
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Anton Pegis (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame
Press, 1975), 9.5: For, if we do not demonstrate that God exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily
destroyed. Translation modified. My italics.

3
SCG 10-12. Thomas takes Anselms ontological argument to be a kind of rationalism, for he holds that
the proposition God exists cannot be demonstrated any more than any other a priori proposition can. On the other
2
In this essay I identify precisely what gives philosophical clout to the first argument
from motion. My thesis is that a salvageable version of the argument depends on it being
construed as a metaphysical and not as a purely physical argument. Specifically, the
philosophical clout of the argument comes from Thomass understanding of the metaphysics of
act and potency. As a corollary to my thesis, I argue further that this metaphysics retains a
central role even later on in the text, although it gets sublated into the language of esse and
participation. I proceed in the following manner. The section following this introduction
establishes the first arguments reliance on what I will call the metaphysics of motion thesis, and
considers its bearing on Thomass method in comparison to the modern versions of the argument
(section II). Next, I argue that the via negativa, both in its incipience (SCG 15-16) and in two
of its most important conclusions (SCG 21-22), involves the motion thesis in a central, albeit
hidden, role (section III). The conclusion of the essay (section IV) recapitulates the advantages of
my reading. First, it unifies Thomass methodological progression in the text. Second, it upholds
the genuinely philosophical (metaphysical) nature of that procedure.

II. The Metaphysics of Act and Potency in the First Argument from Motion
Scott MacDonald has argued quite convincingly that the first argument from motion in
SCG is parasitic on at least the third and perhaps the fourth argument for Gods existence.
4

While the current paper does not treat the order of the proofs and the relationship among them, it
does not harm them necessarily to say that they work in close connection with one another.
Furthermore, Thomas is not so much concerned with the bare logic of each proof, as he is with

hand, Anselms position finds a strange ally in those who may be called the fideists, who maintain that reason is
incapable of accessing the truth that God exists, and that instead even this must be revealed to us.

4
Scott MacDonald, Aquinass Parasitic Cosmological Argument, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1
(1991): 119-155.
3
the implications of what can be demonstrated within his operative metaphysical framework.
Accordingly, in this essay I consider the first argument from motion from a slightly different
vantage point: not insofar as it is parasitic on the contingency argument, but insofar as it is
translucent to Thomass underlying metaphysics of actuality and potentiality.
Actuality and potentiality are the principles of motion in Aristotle and Thomas. For the
Philosopher, motion is the fulfillment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists
potentially.
5
Thomas picks up this definition, calling motion the reduction of something from
potentiality to actuality, and saying that to move something is to bring something from
potentiality to actuality.
6
We can formulate a thesis, which will hold true throughout the
sections of SCG treated in this essay:
Metaphysics of Motion Thesis: The principles of act and potency explain motion.
Motion can refer either to something moving something else, or to something being moved by
something else. In fact, act and potency contribute to the flexibility of the term motion, and
account for certain confusions that arise in readings of the proof. As Scott MacDonald observes,
We would ordinarily say that anything that moves is in motion, but it is crucial to the validity of
the proof that there are moving (active) things that are not moved (passive) things; that is, cases
of moving that are not also cases of motus.
7
It is important to keep the moving of movers and
the motion of things moving distinct. Having this distinction in mind, here is the first argument
from motion in the SCG, as I reconstruct it:
1.1 Everything that is moved is moved by another.
1.2 Any instance of a mover is either (a) moved or (b) not moved.
1.3 Assume that 1.2a is always the case.

5
Aristotle, Physics, 201a10-11. Trans. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye. From The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed.
Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

6
SCG16.6.

7
MacDonald, Aquinass Parasitic Cosmological Argument, 122.
4
1.4 One must proceed to infinity in an ordered series of moved and movers.
1.5 One cannot proceed to infinity in such a way. ( ~ 1.4)
1.6 Therefore, 1.2a is not always the case ( ~ 1.3)
1.7 Therefore, 1.2b, there is some mover is unmoved.
8


Premises 1.1 and 1.5 need to be defended. Both are justified ultimately by the principles of
potentiality and actuality, that is, by the metaphysics of motion thesis.
St. Thomas offers three defenses regarding the first premise in SCG, but here I only focus
on the last one:
9

2.1 Everything that is moved is in potency with respect to its motion.
2.2 Everything that is a mover is in actuality with respect to its motion.
2.3 The same thing cannot be wholly in potency and in act with respect to some motion.
2.4 Therefore, nothing is both moved and mover with respect to some motion.
10


The crux of the defense in this argument is the way that potentiality and actuality intertwine to
explain motion. The first two premises are corollaries of the definition of motion, regarding first
the nature of any mover as such, and second, the nature of any moved thing as such. It is
important to notice the phrasing of the 2.2 as well, since St. Thomas does not hold, as someone
might mistakenly think, that every mover is necessarily moved. That would undermine the whole
proof. He only maintains that any mover moves the moved insofar as the mover is in act with
respect to the motion. Furthermore, the principles of potentiality and actuality do not admit of a
case in which the mover and the moved with respect to some motion turn out to be identical
(2.3). Later on, this principle affords Thomas a seamless transition from the existence arguments,
where he talks about God as the absolutely unmoved mover, to the via negativa, where he speaks

8
SCG, 13.3. Aquinas structures the proof a bit differently than I do, but we both end up holding that the
same two premises need to be defended.

9
This is the defense that Thomas retains for the First Way in his Summa Theologiae. Cf. ST I, q. 2, a. 3. For
a discussion of this point, see John Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 444-46.

10
SCG 13.9. I will not directly treat the denial of self-motion. Thomas admits that something composed
can in a certain manner move itself, as an animal soul does. The moving principle in the composed thing is as close
as we can get to an instance of self-motion. But in cases where composition must be denied, so-called self-motion
must be strictly denied as well.
5
of God as pure act (devoid of all passive potency). The conclusion in 2.4 secures premise 1.1:
every thing that is moved is moved by another.
Premise 1.5the denial of the possibility of a per se ordered infinite regressalso leans
heavily on the metaphysics of motion thesis, as Thomas makes evident in the argument taken
from SCG below:
3.1 If there is a per se ordered causal series, then either (a) there is first unmoved mover
causing all motions in the series, or (b) there is an infinite regress of moved movers in the
series.
3.2 If (b), then (c) every mover in the series is an instrumental or intermediate mover.
3.3 If (c), then (d) there is no motion.
3.4 ~ (d) ~ (c) ~(b).
3.5 Therefore, there is a first unmoved mover causing motion in a per se ordered causal
series.
11


Act and potency once again are crucial to this argument. Thomas entertains the possibility of a
per se ordered causal series that regresses to infinity, but denies it because it entails a
contradiction (3.3) of the fact of motion, from which the cosmological argument begins. The
setup for the reductio (3.4) is grounded in premises 2.1 and 2.2: nothing is a mover except
insofar as it is in act, and nothing is moved except insofar as it is in potency. With respect to
some motion, something cannot be both moved and mover at the same time and in the same
respect; the logic of act and potency precludes such a possibility. The strategy of positing a
further mover to explain the moved does not stop until there is a mover that is wholly in act with
respect to that motion, and hence, with respect to that motion, unmoved. If instead there were an
infinite regress,
12
every mover would be a moved one, and thus motion would not be explained.
But it is not just that now there would be unexplained motion. To frame the argument in slightly
different terms: everything being moved is in potency with respect to that towards which it is

11
SCG 13.9

12
By infinite regress here I mean the per se ordered causal series infinite regress entertained by Thomas,
but ultimately rejected by reductio, in argument 3. I am not including the per accidens variety.
6
being moved; but, in an infinite causal series, there are only intermediate movers and thus no
mover is in full actuality with respect to the initial motion.
13
Therefore, no motion in the series
has been accounted for, which means: there is no motion. In order to explain the initial motion,
the reduction of potency to act, there must be some first mover, which is wholly in act with
respect to that motion. The explanation regards the conditions of the possibility of the motion,
not one interpretation of the motions factuality. Therefore, for any motion, the conclusion in 3.5
(and therefore 1.5) must obtain.
It is worth noting that both modern proponents and opponents of the cosmological
argument often misunderstand the strategy of blocking an infinite regress. Paying attention to
why it is misunderstood further illuminates Thomass methodology. William Rowe construes
cosmological arguments as variations on the argument from contingency and dependence.
14

Rowe understands the cosmological argument in its barest form to say:
4.1 Every being [ . . . ] is either a dependent being or a self-existent being.
4.2 Not every being can be a dependent being.
4.3 Therefore, there is a self-existent being.
15


The middle premise, 4.2, needs the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) as its justification; and
Rowe holds that the PSR requires first an explanation of any beings existence, along with an
explanation of any positive fact whatsoever.
16
He is correct in saying that the initial motion in
the first argument, lacking a first mover, is left wanting an explanation (according to its

13
Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 424. A beginningless series of instrumental causes (i.e., of moved
movers) is nothing but that, a beginningless series of moved movers. Since no one of these is capable of accounting
for the motion it produces, by multiplying them to infinity one does no advance the level of explanation.

14
William Rowe, An Examination of the Cosmological Argument, in Philosophy of Religion: An
Anthology, ed. Louis Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994), 16-24.

15
William Rowe, An Examination of the Cosmological Argument, 16.

16
Ibid., 18.
7
proponents). However, to leave this motion unaccounted for in the argument does not mean that
the series goes on without a cause; it entails that it does not go on in the first place.
Modern variations of the cosmological argument have been neither construed nor
understood in this way. Rowe makes an interesting observation concerning the presentation of
the cosmological argument among early modern philosophers:
The eighteenth-century proponents of the Cosmological Argument recognized that the
causal series of dependent beings could be infinite, without a first member to start the
series. They rejected the idea that every being that is or ever was is dependent not
because there would then be no first member to the series of dependent beings but
because there would then be no explanation for the fact that there are and have always
been dependent beings. [ . . . ] It is the series itself that lacks an explanation.
17


If Rowes account is correct, then even those who endorsed the cosmological argument in the
eighteenth century misunderstood the need to stop an infinite regress. They were not following
the logic of St. Thomas. For it is not that the series itself lacks an explanation, but rather that,
based on the metaphysics of motion thesis, the real motion in question does not happen without a
first unmoved mover. Rowes explication and critique of this strategic blocking of an infinite
regress, while perhaps pertinent to modern variants of the argument, differs from Joseph
Owenss own account: anything that is being moved does not have of itself the act towards
which it is being moved. So in an indefinite series of moved movents, none would have the act of
itself. Accordingly, such a series would never be able to account for the motion.
18
Owens
rightly appeals to the nature of act and potency here to explain Thomass argument against
infinite regress. Thomas is looking for the act required to explain the initial motion, and he only
finds it in a first unmoved mover with respect to that motion. Along the same lines, Scott

17
Ibid., 19.

18
Joseph Owens, The Conclusion of the Prima Via, St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God:
Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, ed. John R. Catan (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1980), 144.
8
MacDonald says that Aquinass first mover is secured neither to keep explaining further
phenomenon introduced in the series, nor to explain the series as a whole:
[Aquinas] thinks that citing a secondary mover is not an adequate explanation of some
things being moved. It is not that an explanation of this sort explains, but at the cost of
introducing something further to be explained; it is that it does not explain. One must find
a primary mover in order to explain somethings being moved.
19


Pace Rowe, MacDonald confirms that the series itself is not the target of explanation; rather,
the reality of any motion at all requires a first mover, with the requisite actuality. Both Owens
and MacDonald confirm my thesis by locating the real clout of the first argument from motion in
its underlying metaphysics of motion.
There is consequently a two-fold disparity between Thomass cosmological argument and
its modern versions. First, there is a great methodological disparity. Second, there is an
underlying metaphysical disparity. We could put the second point this way: the modern variants
understand motion opaquely. We can translate the movers and moved in question in their proofs
into variables: . . . z y x, etc. The question of the argument then becomes: how far back
could the variables go? And of course, the answer is: indefinitely. By contrast, Thomas relies the
metaphysics of motion thesis to get inside the variables, to make them translucent, so to speak.
Movers and moved in the Thomistic framework turn out to be translucent to the principles of act
and potency at work in motion. Thomas argues that those very principles ground the
demonstration of what makes the motion of z possible in the first place. This illuminates the
first, methodological, disparity: Aquinas does not take the movers and moved in his proof as
mere variables, for doing so would drain the cosmological argument of its underpinnings in the
metaphysics of motion thesis, and thereby desiccate its cogency.


19
Scott MacDonald, Aquinass Parasitic Argument, 146.
9
III. Expanding the Metaphysics of Motion in the Via Negativa
After establishing the existence of God, Thomass express goal in the via negativa is to
arrive at God as distinct from all things, in order to properly consider Gods substance, by way
of analogical predication.
20
To that end, Thomas must derive the distinction of God from other
beings by means of negative differences.
21
In this section, I treat the beginnings of the via (15-
16) as well as one of its vistas (21-22). In doing so, I highlight the sub-arguments that rely
exclusively on the principles of act and potency. I want to bring out how Thomas develops the
Aristotelianism behind the metaphysics of motion thesis while incorporating it into a much
different philosophical framework than the one in which Aristotle operated.
In the last section I argued that the two premises Thomas defends in the first argument
from motion (1.1 and 1.5) are both justified on the basis of his metaphysics of motion thesis.
This thesis is still at work in the via negativa, but Thomas places it within his own broader
philosophical framework, which we can capture with the metaphysics of esse thesis:
Metaphysics of Esse Thesis: Existingto be (esse)is an act.
The metaphysics of esse thesis sublates the metaphysics of motion thesis. I use sublate here
following its Latin roots to indicate that this new thesis integrates and transforms, without
destroying, the metaphysics of motion thesis.
22
This sublation allows St. Thomas to operate in a
metaphysical framework broader than Aristotles. The broader framework, in turn, supports

20
SCG14.3.

21
SCG14.3.

22
Although this is a separate topic, I think my reading preserves Twettens argument that the proof from
motion does not begin on the existential plane, but also allows that there is something like this existential plane
that Thomas operates within as the text progresses (on the grounds that the metaphysics of esse thesis does not
reduce to the metaphysics of motion thesis). For the argument that the first proof from motion is neither physical nor
existential, see David Twetten, Clearing a Way for Aquinas: How the Proof from Motion Concludes to God,
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Assocation 70 (1996): 270.

10
Thomass conclusions in the via negativa, particularly in the somewhat climactic chapters where
he concludes that God is His essence and that Gods essence is His esse.
In SCG 15, St. Thomas concludes that God is eternal, that is, without beginning or end.
This chapter is important because Aquinas introduces the language of esse, in reference to the act
of existing, as a component of his demonstrations. There is a peculiar argument in chapter 15 that
seems to be another demonstration of Gods existence. It relies on a distinction between possible
esse, necessary esse, and per se necessary esse:
5.1 That which has possible esse is in potency to non-esse.
5.2 If something is in potency to non-esse, then it has a necessary esse as its cause.
5.3 If some necessary esse is a cause, it has its esse either through another or per se.
5.4 We cannot proceed to infinity in the order of causes. (3.5, 1.5)
5.5 Therefore, there is some being, which we call God, who exists per se necessarily.
5.6 Therefore, Gods esse is without beginning or end. (He is eternal)
23


As I have construed the argument, Thomas employs the metaphysics of act and potency,
although he is certainly extending it beyond Aristotle. In fact, he has connected our first and
second metaphysical theses. The logic of the connection is that existence, considered as an act, is
related to essence as act is related to potency. Things that have esse only possibly, that can be or
not be, also have the possibility to not be. They are in potency to non-esse (5.1). The structure of
existing as an act leads us to the conclusion that all essences, except one, are in potency to the act
of existing. If we dont make the exception, then nothing with possible esse would now have
esse. The argument proceeds to the conclusion that God is eternal, without beginning or end,
since His esse is per se necessary.
The structure of the argument parallels the argument from motion: one needs to locate the
requisite actuality to account for the present motion of the thing being brought from potency to
act. Considering its place in the text, however, and its intended goal of proving the eternity of

23
I have reconstructed this argument from what Thomas says in 15.3 and 15.5.

11
God, I propose that we take it not as another existence argument that happens to be misplaced,
but instead as the introduction of a new metaphysical thesis, which I have identified above.
In SCG 16, there is a simple argument that manifests an expansion beyond both the
metaphysics of motion and the metaphysics of esse theses. Here Thomas establishes that God is
pure act. In doing so, he introduces the language of participation. The two-fold achievement is in
the argument below:
6.1 Each things acts insofar as it is in act.
6.2 If something is not total act, it acts by participation in something else.
6.3 If it acts by participation, it is not a first mover.
6.4 Therefore, God as first mover does not act by participation.
6.5 Therefore, God is total act (He exists without any admixture of potency).
24


This argument first of all sheds light on the importance of the metaphysics of motion thesis.
Thomas had needed to establish the necessary existence of a first unmoved mover to explain the
act of motion. This first unmoved mover is wholly in act with respect to the motion. Thomas
relies on the idea of total act to introduce to idea of partial or participated act. Thus, in this
proof Thomas introduces his participation metaphysics. This allows us to formulate a further
concentric circle in the metaphysics in SCG:
Metaphysics of Participation Thesis: Existing essences (except one) participate in esse.
The principle that something cannot reduce or bring itself from potency to act grounds the
crucial move in 6.2, where Thomas introduces the notion of participation: to act through
something distinct from ones essence is to participate in that act, to have a share in it. The
participation is not just postulated but is necessary to explain the fact of anythings esse in the
first placeexcepting one, again, on pain of infinite regressjust as that which is in potency to

24
SCG, 16.3 Here is the original Latin, since I have somewhat modified the terms of the Pegis translation:
Unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu. Quod igitur no est totus actus, non toto se agit, sed aliquo sui. Quod
autem non toto se agit, non est primum agens: agit enim alicuius participatione, non per essentiam suam. Primum
igitur agens, quod Deus est, nullam habet potentiam admixtam, sed est actus purus.
12
act needs actuality from some other thing in order to be brought forth from potency to act.
Aquinas concludes that God is devoid of all passive potency. This conclusion remains a
negatively established one, even though we can now help ourselves to the expression God is
pure act.
SCG 16 is a philosophical tour de force. Thomas has brought about a rapid and succinct
expansion of his operative metaphysics: from act to esse to participation.
25
He builds upon the
foundation of the metaphysics of motion. It helps him explain both the composition of essence
and esse, as well as the reason this composition can be understood in terms of esses
communication to essences, which receive, and thus participate, the actus essendi.
Now we jump ahead to the demonstrations in 21-22, which represent a kind of peak
within the via negativa, a vista that affords the intellect a faint yet provoking intimation of the
divine nature. In 21, Thomas offers an argument that God is His essence. An obvious
objection is: how is that conclusion drawn by the eliminative method? It seems prima facie that
Thomas is inappropriately predicating something positively of God. The fact that the conclusion
he demonstrates is a negative one becomes manifest in one of his arguments that relies on the
metaphysics of motion thesis, that is, on the principles of act and potency:
7.1 Whatever is not its essence relates to its essence as potency relates to act.
7.2 In God, there is no passive potency. (6.5)
7.3 Therefore, God is His essence.

For Thomas, potency must be brought into act, or, alternatively, act reduces potency from
potency to act. Spelling out the first premise, then, we can say that everything that is not its
essence is brought from potency to act by its essence. Thomas likes to use the example of

25
As Wippel notes, Cornelio Fabro sees the priority instead going from participation to esse. I am not
qualified to speak on that issue. It still seems to me in Summa Contra Gentiles that Thomas moves from esse to
participation. Of course, he certainly may have had participation in mind from the start. See Wippel, Metaphysical
Thought, 161-169.
13
Socrates and humanity: Socrates is not identical to humanity; humanity is the essence of
Socrates, which actualizes (brings to act) Socrates qua human.
26
Socrates is a particular instance
of a universal.
It also becomes clear in premise 7.1 how Thomass argumentative framework is quite
naturally disposed to the language of participation. Socrates participates in humanity. For
Thomas, to participate is to have a partial share in something total: when something receives in
particular fashion that which belongs to another in universal (or total) fashion, the former is said
to participate in the latter.
27
Therefore, by the very definition of participation, Socrates is
necessarily other than humanity. By the same token, God is necessarily not other than His
essence. Keeping in mind the underlying metaphysics, it is obvious that Thomas draws a
negative conclusion: just as God is pure act because there is no passive potency in Him (16), we
can say that God is His very essence, because there is nothing of Him that is not His essence;
whatever that might be would have to be related to (participate) His essence as potency is related
to (participates) act.
Thomas employs a similar strategy in demonstrating that in God esse and Essence are
the same, at least in the act/potency strand of the demonstrations: Esse, furthermore, is the
name of an act, for a thing is not said to be because it is in potency but because it is in act.
28

This is a crucial premisethe metaphysics of esse thesisin Thomass philosophy. Existing
denotes an act, for Thomas. Consequently, if Gods essence (to which He is identical) were not
also identical to His esse, Gods essence would be related to His esse in the same way that

26
SCG 21.4.

27
Thomas Aquinas, In De Hebdomadibus, lect. 2, Leon. 50.271:71-73. Cited from Wippel, Metaphysical
Thought, 96. Unfortunately, there is no space in the paper to take up the issue of the different orders of participation.
Here I merely want to point out how the language of participation has surfaced in the Summa Contra Gentiles.

28
SCG 22.7.

14
potency is related to act. We do not need to formalize the argument, since it has the same
structure as argument 7 above. Nonetheless, it is striking that Thomas sees the need for chapter
22 after chapter 21. For him, form/essence is not the whole story. Thomas infuses into that
metaphysics of motion paradigm he inherited from Aristotle with his own unique understanding
of esse as a higher (the highest) act, and thus a higher (the highest) perfection.
29
Thomass
understanding of existing things simultaneously incorporates and transcends the Aristotelian
principles of actuality and potentiality.

IV. Conclusion
I have argued that the metaphysics of motion thesis forms a strand of argumentation,
which takes Thomas from the cosmological demonstration of a first unmoved mover, all the way
to the establishment of identity between Gods essence and His esse. Along the way, I suggested
that he was building on that metaphysics as he progressed, first by introducing the metaphysics
of esse, and second by introducing the metaphysics of participation. Joseph Owens, commenting
on the first argument from motion, notes how it takes its beginnings in Aristotle but quickly
becomes something unique to Thomas:
The nerve of the argument [from motion] for both thinkers is that potentiality is
actualized only by something already in actuality. For Aristotle, to be actualized meant to
acquire form. For Aquinas, it meant to be brought into existence, since for him existence
is the actuality of every form of nature. For Aquinas, consequently, the conclusion
reached by the argument can be located only in the unique subsistent existence that is
recognized at once as the God seen in the patristic interpretation of I am who I am
(Exodus, 3:14).
30


As Owens observes, Aquinas takes some metaphysical principles found in Aristotle, namely act
and potency, and uses them as a vehicle for working out his original metaphysics. Specifically,

29
Cf. the famous formulation of this thesis in De Potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad. 9.

30
Owens, Aquinas and the Five Ways, 134.
15
he incorporates act/potency into his understanding of the relationship between essences and the
actus essendi, and from there derives the pure act we call God. He is not only distinct from
every other thing and identical to His essence; He is ipsum esse, I am who am.
Furthermore, Thomass methodology is everywhere guided by his metaphysics. This fact,
as we have seen, both unifies the progression of the Summa Contra Gentiles, and provides a
strong rejoinder to the scientistic objections to his cosmological proofs. These objectors, if they
wish to discredit Thomass cosmological argument, must deal with the metaphysical views
which make them cogent in the first place, and should examine in turn the metaphysical
implications of their own objections.
















16
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