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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 92284 July 12, 1991
TEODORO J. SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.
Leven S. Puno for petitioner.
Cesar R. Vidal for respondent GSIS.

CRUZ, J.:p
The basic issue presented in this case is the correct interpretation
of Executive Order No. 966, Section 9, providing as follows:
Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate. The
compensation of salary or pay which may be
used in computing the retirement benefits
shall be limited to the highest salary rate
actually received by an official/employee as
fixed by law and/or indicated in his duly
approved appointment. This shall include
salary adjustments duly authorized and
implemented by the presidential issuance(s)
and budget circular(s), additional basic
compensation or salary indicated in an
appointment duly approved as an exception
to the prohibition on additional or double
compensation, merit increases, and
compensation for substitutionary services or
in an acting capacity. For this purpose, all
other compensation and/or fringe benefits
such as per diems, allowances, bonuses,
overtime pay, honoraria hazard pay, flying
time fees, consultancy or contractual fees, or
fees in correcting and/or releasing
examination papers shall not be considered
in the computation of the retirement benefits
of an official/employee.
The question was raised by the petitioner in connection with the
computation of his retirement benefits which he claims was not
made in conformity to the above-quoted requirement.
The petitioner was employed in the Commission on Audit as
State Auditor IV with a monthly salary of P7,219.00. In 1988, he
was assigned to the COA Auditing Unit at the Department of
Transportation and Communications and detailed to the Manila
International Airport Authority. On July 1, 1988, the board of
directors of the MIAA passed the following resolution:
1

RESOLUTION NO. 88-70
RESOLVED, that, as recommended by
Management, the designation of Mr. Teodoro
J. Santiago, Jr., as Assistant General Manager
for Finance and Administration, effective 15
August 1988, be approved, as it is hereby
approved, subject to the following
conditions:
1. He will retain his plantilla position in COA;
2. His compensation from MIAA, shall be the
difference between the salary of AGM for
Finance and Administration (MIAA) and that
of State Auditor IV (COA); and
3. His retirement benefits shall be chargeable
against COA.
This resolution was duly communicated to the COA on July 11,
1988, with a request for the petitioner's indefinite detail to the
MIAA. In reply, Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo wrote MIAA on
July 14, 1988, as follows:
2

. . . please be informed that we are
authorizing such detail through appropriate
office order up to February 15, 1989. The
order includes authority to collect
representation and transportation
allowances (RATA) of P1,200.00 each month
and other allowances attendant to the
position chargeable against the funds of the
NAIAA.
As regards your proposal that Mr. Santiago
be allowed to collect the difference in salary
of his position in the COA as State Auditor IV
and his designated position as Assistant
General Manager thereat, likewise
chargeable against the funds of that office,
this Commission interposes no objection to
the proposal to pay him the difference
between his present monthly salary of
P7,219.00 and that of Assistant General
Manager which reportedly amounts to
P13,068.00 a month or a monthly difference
of P5,849.00, provided that he is formally
designated (not appointed) Assistant General
Manager by the Board of Directors, NAIAA,
and that payment of his salary differential is
approved by the same office.
xxx xxx xxx
On August 10, 1988, Secretary Reinerio O. Reyes, concurrently
chairman of the MIAA board of directors, issued an office order
formally designating the petitioner as Acting Assistant General

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Manager for Finance and Administration, effective August 16,
1988.
3

The petitioner served in this capacity and collected the
differential salary of P5,849.00 plus his salary of P7,219.00 for a
total compensation of P13,068.00. He received this
compensation until December 5, 1988, when he was transferred
to the Presidential Management Staff under COA Office Order
No. 8811448 dated December 6, 1988.
On March 1, 1989, the petitioner retired after working in the
government for 44 years.
In computing his retirement benefits, the Government Service
Insurance System used as basis the amount of P13,068.00,
considering this the highest basic salary rate received by the
petitioner in the course of his employment.
4
The COA disagreed,
however, and paid his retirement benefits on the basis of only his
monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State Auditor IV.
5

The petitioner requested recomputation based on what he
claimed as his highest basic salary rate of P13,068.00. This was
denied on December 8, 1989, and he was so notified on February
5, 1990. On March 7, 1990, he came to this Court to seek reversal
of the decision of the COA on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
We note at the outset that there is no dispute regarding the
legality of the petitioner's occupying the second position in the
MIAA and receiving additional compensation for his services
therein. As the Solicitor General observed. "What the petitioner
was receiving from the MIAA was the additional compensation
allowed under Section 17 of Act No. 4187 which, in turn, is
allowed under Section 8, Paragraph B, Article IX of the
Constitution."
6

In Quimzon v. Ozaeta,
7
this Court held that double appointments
are not prohibited as long as the positions involved are not
incompatible, except that the officer or employee appointed
cannot receive additional or double compensation unless
specifically authorized by law. The additional compensation
received by the petitioner is not an issue in the case at bar
because of its express approval by the COA and the admission of
the Solicitor General that it is allowed under the cited provision.
More specifically, Section 17 of Act No. 4187 provides:
Any existing act, rule or order to the contrary
notwithstanding, no full time officer or
employee of the government shall hereafter
receive directly or indirectly any kind of
additional or extra compensation or salary
including per diems and bonuses from any
fund of the government, its dependencies,
and semi-government entities or boards
created by law except:
(1) Officers serving as
chairman or members of
entities and enterprise
organized, operated,
owned or controlled by
the government, who
may be paid per them for
each meeting actually
attended or when an
official travel;
(2) Auditors and
accountants;
(3) Provincial and
municipal treasurers and
their employees;
(4) Employees serving as
observers of the Weather
Bureau; and
(5) Those authorized to
receive extra or
additional compensation
by virtue of the provision
of this Act. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Solicitor General argues, albeit not too strongly, that the
additional compensation received by the petitioner was merely
an honorarium and not a salary. As a mere honorarium, it would
not fall under the provision of Section 9 and so should not be
added to his salary in computing his retirement benefits.
We cannot accept this contention. An honorarium is defined as
something given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation
for services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of
services which admit of no compensation in money.
8
The
additional compensation given to the petitioner was in the
nature of a salary because it was receive by him as a matter of
right in recompense for services rendered by him as Acting
Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration. In
fact, even Chairman Domingo referred to it in his letter dated
July 14, 1988, as the petitioner's "salary differential."
The Solicitor General's main argument is that the petitioner
cannot invoke Section 9 because he was not appointed to the
second position in the MIAA but only designated thereto. It is
stressed that under the said provision, "the compensation of
salary or pay which may be used in computing the retirement
benefits shall be received by an official employee as fixed by law
and/or indicated in his duly approved appointment." The
petitioner's additional salary was fixed not in a duly approved
appointment but only in a designation.
Belittling this argument, the petitioner maintains that there is no
substantial distinction between appointment and designation. He
cites Mechem, who defines appointment as "the act of
designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom
that power has been delegated, of the individual, who is to
exercise the functions of a given office."
9
He also
invokes Borromeo v. Mariano,
10
where this Court said that "the

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term "appoint," whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary
acceptation, is applied to the nomination or designation of an
individual."
Strictly speaking, there is an accepted legal distinction between
appointment and designation. While appointment is the
selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office, designation, on the other
hand, connotes merely the imposition of additional duties,
usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment (or election).
11
Thus, the
appointed Secretary of Trade and Industry is, by statutory
designation, a member of the National Economic and
Development Authority.
12
A person may also be designated in an
acting capacity, as when he is called upon to fill a vacancy
pending the selection of a permanent appointee thereto or,
more usually, the return of the regular incumbent. In the absence
of the permanent Secretary for example, an undersecretary is
designated acting head of the department.
13

As the Court said in Binamira v. Garrucho:
14

Appointment may be defined as the
selection, by the authority vested with the
power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. When completed,
usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for
the person chosen unless he is replaceable at
pleasure because of the nature of his office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional
duties on an incumbent official, as where, in
the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism
is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority,
or where, under the Constitution, three
Justices of the Supreme Court are designated
by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral
Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is
essentially executive while designation is
legislative in nature.
Nevertheless, we agree with the petitioner that in the law in
question, the term "appointment" was used in a general sense to
include the term "designation." In other words, no distinction
was intended between the two terms in Section 9 of Executive
Order No. 966. We think this to be the more reasonable
interpretation, especially considering that the provision includes
in the highest salary rate "compensation for substitutionary
services or in an acting capacity." This need not always be
conferred by a permanent appointment. A contrary reading
would, in our view, militate against the letter of the law, not to
mention its spirit as we perceive it. That spirit seeks to extend
the maximum benefits to the retiree as an additional if belated
recognition of his many years of loyal and efficient service in the
government.
As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner, who
was designated Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance
and Administration in the office order issued by Secretary Reyes
on August 10, 1988. The position was then vacant and could be
filled either by permanent appointment or by temporary
designation. It cannot be said that the second position was only
an extension of the petitioner's office as State Auditor IV in the
Commission on Audit as otherwise there would have been no
need for his designation thereto. The second office was distinct
and separate from his position in the Commission on Audit. For
the additional services he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled
to additional compensation which, following the letter and spirit
of Section 9, should be included in his highest basic salary rate.
It is noteworthy that the petitioner occupied the second office
not only for a few days or weeks but for more than three
months. His designation as Acting Assistant General Manager for
Finance and Administration was not a mere accommodation by
the MIAA. On the contrary, in his letter to Chairman Domingo
requesting the petitioner's services. MIAA General Manager
Evergisto C. Macatulad said, "Considering his qualifications and
work experience, we believe that a finance man of his stature
and caliber can be of great help in the efficient and effective
performance of the Airport's functions."
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the
retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance,
and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina
to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years
of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a
grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous
retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of
his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now
that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the
weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the
lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the
thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution
is SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered DIRECTING the
computation of the petitioner's retirement benefits on the basis
of his Highest Basic Salary Rate of P13,068.00, It is so ordered.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 98395 October 28, 1994
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DR. MANUEL
BARADERO, respondents.
G.R. No. 102449

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GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and MATILDE S. BELO, respondents.
Belo, Abiera & Associates for Matilde S. Belo.

QUIASON, J.:
Before us are two petitions docketed as G.R. No. 98395 and G.R.
No. 102449. The petitions were consolidated since they
principally involved the same issue and parties.
We grant both petitions.
I
G.R. No. 98395
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court, to reverse and set aside four orders of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), namely: (1) the Resolution No. 90-642 dated
July 16, 1990, which resolved as creditable for retirement
purposes the service of private
respondent Manuel Baradero, who served as Sangguniang Bayan
member on a per diem basis from January 1, 1976 to October 20,
1978; (2) the Order dated September 20, 1990 directing the
implementation of CSC Resolution No. 90-642; (3) the Order
dated December 7, 1990 directing the President and General
Manager of petitioner Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) to show cause why they should not be held in contempt
for the delay in the implementation of Resolution No. 90-642;
and (4) the Resolution No. 91-526 dated April 23, 1991, which
dismissed petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated September 20, 1990.
Dr. Manuel Baradero was a government employee, who occupied
the position of Medical Officer IV in the Philippine Medical Care
Commission, until he reached the mandatory age of retirement
of 65 years old.
He served the Philippine Army as an enlisted man from
November 17, 1942 until June 30, 1945. He resumed his
government career on January 1, 1976, when he was elected a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of La
Castellana, Negros Occidental. As such, he received per diem for
every session attended. He resigned from the Sangguniang Bayan
on October 10, 1976. On October 20, 1978, he was appointed
Medical Officer I at the Philippine Medical Care Commission,
where he served until he reached the compulsory retirement age
of 65 years old (Rollo, p. 28).
Prior to turning 65 years old, Dr. Baradero applied for
compulsory retirement with petitioner, which credited in his
favor 13 years of government service, excluding his term as a
Sangguniang Bayan member. He requested an extension of
service from the CSC to enable him to complete 15 years of
government service. This was necessary so that he may avail of
retirement benefits.
The request was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 90-642
dated July 16, 1990. Instead, it ruled that Dr. Baradero's two-year
stint as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan be considered as
creditable service, hence completing the mandatory 15-year
service and making him eligible for retirement benefits (Rollo, p.
28).
The GSIS contested the resolution, alleging that:
(1) Per diem was expressly excluded in the
definition of compensation in RA 1573 on
June 16, 1956. Prior to this, services paid
on per diem basis were considered
creditable.
(2) Per diems were excluded from the
definition of compensation because " per
diems, by themselves are usually of minimal
amounts which cannot actually support an
insurance coverage" (Office of the General
Counsel Opinion 08-85, June 3, 1985). It had
been maintained that "salary is essential to
insurance in the System, as it serves as the
basis for the determination of the monthly
premiums or contributions" (Government
Corporate Counsel Opinion No. 198, s. 1957).
(3) In the case of the late Commissioner
Inocencio V. Ferrer of the Social Security
System, Commissioner Ferrer received per
diems not only for attending meetings of the
Commission but also for hearing cases as
hearing officer. With the almost daily
hearings of Commissioner Ferrer, he was said
to have been performing full-time service and
received substantial amount of per
diems such that "the so-called per diems that
he received were not really per diems but
compensation" (OGC Opinion 08-85). Hence,
his services as hearing Commissioner were
considered creditable, but his per diem for
attending the board meetings were excluded
in the computation of his retirement benefits
(Rollo, p. 32).
The GSIS advised that the CSC extend the services of Dr. Baradero
until he completes the required 15 years so that he may avail of
retirement benefits.
On September 20, 1990, the CSC issued an order directing the
GSIS to implement Resolution No. 90-642 (Rollo, p. 35).
The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration of the order (Rollo, p.
37), which was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 91-526
dated April 23, 1991. The resolution further directed the GSIS to
comply with the CSC resolution and order under pain of
contempt (Rollo, p. 49).

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Hence, this petition where the GSIS charges the CSC with grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that: (1) services rendered on a per
diem basis is creditable for purposes of retirement; and (2) it has
exclusive jurisdiction in the determination of services which are
creditable.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation and
Motion in Lieu of Comment," which submitted its position that
the law expressly excludes services rendered on per diem basis in
determining creditable government service for retirement
purposes.
The Solicitor General is of the opinion that the CSC's resolutions
and order crediting such services were in violation of the law,
and encroached on the power of the GSIS to administer and
implement retirement laws. He therefore recommended that the
instant petition be given due course (Rollo, p. 100).
G.R. No. 102449
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court, to reverse and set aside three orders of the CSC,
namely: (1) the Resolution dated June 7, 1989, which resolved as
creditable for retirement purposes the services rendered by
respondent Matilde S. Belo, who served as Vice-Governor of
Capiz in a hold-over capacity from December 31, 1976 to January
1, 1979; (2) the Order dated July 18, 1991 directing the President
and General Manager of petitioner to show cause why they
should not be held in contempt for the delay in the
implementation of CSC Resolution No. 89-368; and (3) the Order
dated October 3, 1991, finding the President and General
Manager of petitioner guilty of indirect contempt with penalty of
a fine of P1,000.00 per day of defiance until the implementation
of CSC Resolution
No. 89-368.
Matilde Belo retired from the government service on February 2,
1988. At the time of her retirement, Belo was the Vice-Governor
of Capiz in a
hold-over capacity. She served as Governor of Capiz from January
25, 1972 until February 1, 1988.
As an elected government official, Belo received a fixed salary of
P13,000.00 per annum from January 25, 1976 until December 31,
1976. Thereafter, she held the same position in a hold-over
capacity and was remunerated as follows: (1) from December 31,
1976 until January 1, 1979, she received per diem for every
session attended of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and (2) from
December 31, 1979 until February 1, 1988, she received a fixed
salary ranging from P23,000.00 to P45,000.00 per annum (Rollo,
p. 25).
Belo sought an opinion from the CSC to determine if the services
she rendered from December 31, 1976 until January 1, 1979, in
which period she was paid on a per diem basis, is creditable for
retirement purposes.
In response to the query, the CSC issued Resolution No. 89-368
dated June 7, 1987, which affirmed that her services for said
period was creditable (Rollo, pp. 25-26).
Belo's application for retirement was referred to the GSIS
Committee on Claims, which adopted a position contrary to that
of the CSC.
On August 6, 1991, the GSIS received the Order dated July 18,
1991, which directed its President and General Manager to show
cause why they should not be held in contempt for the delay in
the implementation of CSC Resolution No. 89-368 (Rollo, pp. 28).
The GSIS filed its "Manifestation/Explanation," alleging that it
cannot implement the resolution considering that it has a
pending petition for certiorari before this Court in the case of Dr.
Baradero (G.R. No. 98395), where the same issue was raised
(Rollo, p. 30).
On October 3, 1991, the CSC issued an order finding the
President and General Manager of GSIS guilty of indirect
contempt. Both were meted a penalty of P1,000.00 fine for each
day of defiance until the implementation of Resolution No. 89-
368. The CSC noted that the mere pendency of the case of Dr.
Baradero cannot prevent the implementation of its resolution
unless this Court issues a temporary restraining order, and that
said case had nothing to do with the case of Belo (Rollo, p. 34).
The GSIS filed the instant petition, charging the CSC with
committing the same errors in G.R. No. 98395.
The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it was
adopting its "Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment"
filed in G.R. No. 98395, holding the view that the law excluded
services rendered on a per diem basis, in crediting the length of
service for retirement purposes (Rollo, p. 62).
In her comment, Belo insisted that CSC was correct in finding that
her services rendered on a per diem basis are creditable for
retirement purposes. She claimed that the case of Commissioner
Ferrer of the Social Security Commission applied to her case by
analogy.
She likewise contended that Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987) vests in the CSC jurisdiction over
matters regarding
the accreditation of government services. She particularly cites
Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V thereof which enumerates the
powers and functions of the CSC, among which is to:
xxx xxx xxx
17. Administer the retirement program for
government employees and accredit
government servicesand evaluate
qualifications for retirement (Emphasis
supplied);
xxx xxx xxx
II
The issues to be resolved are: (1) Is government service rendered
on a per diem basis creditable for computing the length of
service for retirement purposes; and (2) Is petitioner the proper

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government agency in determining what service is creditable for
retirement purposes?
Section 35 of P.D. No. 1146 (Government Service Insurance Act
of 1987) vests in petitioner the power to implement the
provisions of said law, which includes the guaranty of retirement
benefits.
Under the epigraph "Benefits," Section 10 thereof provides for
the computation of service, and reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Computation of Service.
For the purpose of this section, the term
service shall include full time service with
compensation:Provided, That part-time and
other services with compensation may be
included under such rules and regulations
prescribed by the System (Emphasis
supplied).
It is therefore material in the claim of retirement benefits that
the employee should have rendered service with compensation.
"Compensation" is defined by Section 1(c) of R.A. No. 1573,
which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government Service
Insurance Act), thus:
(c) "Salary, pay, or compensation" shall be
construed as to exclude all bonuses, per
diems, allowances and overtime pay, or
salary, pay or compensation given in addition
to the base pay of the position or rank as
fixed by law or regulations (Emphasis
supplied).
A similar definition is provided in Section 2(i) of P.D. No. 1146:
(i) Compensation the basic pay or salary
received by an employee, pursuant to his
employment/appointments, excluding per
diems, bonuses, overtime pay, and
allowances (Emphasis supplied).
The law is very clear in its intent to exclude per diem in the
definition of "compensation." Originally, per diem was not
among those excluded in the definition of compensation
(See Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186), not until the passage of the
amending laws which redefined it to exclude per diem.
The law not only defines the word "compensation," but it also
distinguishes it from other forms of remunerations. Such
distinction is significant not only for purposes of computing the
contribution of the employers and employees to the GSIS but
also for computing the employees' service record and benefits.
The Secretary of Justice, in his Opinion No. 196, s. 1976, opined:
. . . That such receipt of salary is an
indispensable requirement for membership,
especially in the Retirement Insurance Fund,
is logically inferred from these provisions of
the GSIS Act: Section 5 which requires that to
receive the benefits provided for and
described in the GSIS Act, each official or
employee who is a member of the System
and his employer shall pay the prescribed
monthly rates of contributions or premiums
based on a percentage of the
"monthly salary" of the employee or official;
Sections 11 and 12, providing that the
amount of retirement annuity or gratuity, or
death or disability benefits granted
thereunder, shall be based on the monthly
"salary"; and Section 13, providing that the
term "service" for purposes of computing the
aggregate period of service which forms the
basis for retirement, shall include only service
with "compensation" (Emphasis supplied;
G.R. No. 98395,Rollo, p. 67).
In essence, the grant of retirement benefits necessitates an
obligation on the part of the employee to contribute to the
insurance fund of petitioner. Such obligation only arises where
the employee is receiving "salary, pay or compensation" and
not per diem, which is not capable of paying off the premium
contributions to petitioner.
Also enlightening is the "Joint Civil Service Commission,
Department of Budget and Management and Government
Service Insurance System Circular No. 1-89" dated July 13, 1989.
It prescribes the guidelines on the filing and processing of
retirement applications, and we quote:
IV. Certification of Services Rendered.
xxx xxx xxx
C. In certifying to services rendered, Heads
and Personnel Officers/Administrative
Officers of agencies shall be guided by the
existing laws, rules and regulations followed
by GSIS in determiningcreditable services for
retirement purposes which are as follows:
1. All previous services rendered by an
official/employee pursuant to a duly
approved appointment, including those of
Presidential appointees, to a position in the
Civil Service with compensation or salary or
pay whether on permanent, provisional,
temporary, emergency, substitute, or casual
status, and whether paid monthly, daily, or
hourly, subject to these conditions:
xxx xxx xxx

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2. Services of government employees paid on
per diem basis up to June 15, 1956 only.
D. All cases not covered by the
procedures/guidelines above shall be
referred to GSIS for final determination (G.R.
No. 98395, Rollo, pp. 75 and 77; Emphasis
supplied).
The circular is clear that services rendered on a per diem bases
are not creditable for retirement purposes. It likewise confirms
that it is the GSIS, and not the CSC which is the proper agency in
determining services which are creditable for retirement
purposes.
In Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 (1992), we ruled that the GSIS
has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a
member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit
under P.D. No. 1146, based on its computation of a member's
years of government service. By analogy, we reiterate our ruling
in the cases at bench.
The case of Commissioner Inocencio V. Ferrer of the Social
Security System is unapplicable. While it is true that
Commissioner Ferrer was granted retirement benefits
notwithstanding being paid on a per diem basis, we find merit in
the GSIS explanation that the grant was consistent with its policy,
since the service which was creditable in Commissioner Ferrer's
favor was his full time service as Hearing Officer, and not his
attendance at board meetings, which was not credited.
Anent the CSC's power to "administer the retirement program . .
. and accredit government services . . . for retirement"
(Administrative Code of 1987, Book V, Chapter 3, Section 12), we
rule that CSC role is ministerial. "Accredit" merely means
acknowledge. It must not be confused with the power to
determine what service is creditable for retirement purposes. It
has been established that such power belongs to the GSIS (cf.
Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 [1992]).
The aforementioned provision relied upon by public respondent
is derived from the Administrative Code of 1987, which is a
general law. It cannot prevail over the Revised Government
Insurance Act of 1977, which is a special law (cf. Cena v. Civil
Service Commission, 211 SCRA 179 [1992]).
With the passage of the Administrative Code of 1987, members
of the Sangguniang Bayan are no longer paid per diem, but are
now receiving compensation. Thus, services rendered after the
effectivity of the law may therefore be considered creditable for
retirement purposes.
Private respondents both claim that retirement laws must be
liberally interpreted in favor of the retirees. However, the
doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in the instant
petitions, where the law invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves
no room for interpretation or construction. Moreover, to
accommodate private respondents' plea will contravene the
purpose for which the law was enacted, and will defeat the ends
which it sought to attain (cf. Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes, 216 SCRA
720 [1992])
WHEREFORE, the petitions are both GRANTED. The CSC
resolutions and orders in question are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 98395-102449 June 19, 1995
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DR. MANUEL
BARADERO, respondents.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and MATILDE S. BELO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
In our decision dated October 28, 1994 we held that government
service rendered on a per diem basis is not creditable in
computing the length of service for retirement purposes. Thus,
we reversed the questioned resolutions and orders of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) requiring the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) to consider creditable the services of
private respondents on a per diem basis.
However, private respondent Matilde S. Belo in G.R. No 102449
filed a motion for reconsideration dated 17 November 1994, of
this Court 's decision of October 28, 1994. She insists that the
services rendered by her as Vice Governor of Capiz, between
December 31, 1975 to January 1, 1979, be considered as
creditable for purposes of retirement. The Government Service
Insurance System likewise filed a motion for reconsideration on
November 22, 1984 in behalf of both private respondents Belo
and Dr. Manuel Baradero on essentially the same grounds. We
shall deal with both motions together.
Central to the averments on the aforestated motions for
reconsideration is the question of whether or not regular service
in government on a per diem basis, without any other form of
compensation or emolument, is compensation within the
contemplation of the term "service with compensation" under
the Government Service Insurance Act of 1987.
After a careful consideration of the arguments in both motions,
we are compelled to reconsider our decision.

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While what respondents Belo and Baradero received were
denominated as "per diem," the amounts received were actually
in the nature of a compensation or pay. What should therefore
be considered as controlling in both cases would be the nature of
remuneration, not the label attached to it.
Respondent Belo held the position of Vice-Governor of Capiz
continuously between January 5, 1972 up to February 1, 1988.
From January 25, 1972 up to December 31, 1979, she held office
by virtue of an election and was paid a fixed salary.
1
From
December 31, 1979 up to February 1, 1988, she held the position
of Vice Governor of Capiz in a holdover capacity, broken down
into two periods:
2

1. A period in which she was paid on a per
diem basis from December 31, 1976 to
December 31, 1979; and
2. A period in which she was paid a fixed
salary from January 1, 1980 to February
1,1988.
In its June 7, 1989 Resolution
3
on the matter, CSC held that the
services rendered for the first holdover period between January
31, 1976 to January 1, 1979 was creditable for purposes of
retirement. CSC noted that during the entire holdover period,
respondent Belo actually served on a full time basis as Vice
Governor and was on call 24 hours a day. Disagreeing with the
CSC's insistence that the period in which respondent Belo was
paid on a per diem basis should be credited in computing the
number of years of creditable service to the government, GSIS
subsequently filed a petition for certiorari before this court,
questioning the orders of the CSC. Agreeing that per diems were
not compensation within the meaning of Section 1(c) of R.A.
1573 which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government
Service Insurance Act), we granted the petitions in G.R. Nos.
98395 and 102449,
4
and reversed the CSC Orders and
Resolutions in question.
A review of the circumstances surrounding payment to
respondent Belo of the per diems in question convinces us that
her motion is meritorious. We are convinced that the "per diem"
she received was actually paid for in the performance of her
duties as Vice-Governor of Capiz in a holdover capacity not as
the per diem referred to by section 1(c) of R.A. No 1573 which
amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government Insurance
Service Act). A closer look at the aforecited provision, moreover,
reveals a legislative intent to make a clear distinction between
salary, pay or compensation, on one hand, and other incidental
allowances, including per diems on the other. Section 1(c)
provides:
(c) Salary, pay or compensation shall be
construed as to exclude all bonuses, per
diems, allowances and overtime pay, or
salary, pay or compensation given to the base
pay of the position or rank as fixed by law or
regulations.
5

Since it is generally held that an allowance for
expenses incident to the discharge of an office is not a salary of
office,
6
it follows that if the remuneration received by a public
official in the performance of his duties does not constitute a
mere "allowance for expenses" but appears to be his actual base
pay, then no amount of categorizing the salary as base pay, a
"per diem" would take the allowances received by petitioner
from the term service with compensation for the purpose of
computing the number of years of service in government.
Furthermore, it would grossly violate the law's intent to reward
the public servant's years of dedicated service to government for
us to gloss over the circumstances surrounding the payment of
the said remunerations to the petitioner in taking a purely
mechanical approach to the problem by accepting an attached
label at face value.
In G.R. No. 98395, the period disputed was served by respondent
Baradero as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of La Castellana, Negros Occidental between
January 1, 1976 to October 10, 1978 where he was likewise paid
on a per diem basis. It is not disputed that during this period,
respondent Baradero rendered full services to the government as
a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. In fact, on the basis of its
earlier resolution on the case of respondent Belo, the Civil
Service Commission recognized the period in which respondent
Baradero served as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan as
creditable for retirement purposes instead of allowing his
petition for extension of service in order to complete the 15 year
period of service required for the purpose of qualifying for
retirement benefits.
7

In the sense in which the phrase "per diem" is used under the
Government Service Insurance Law, a per diem is a daily
allowance given for each day an officer or employee of
government is away from his home base.
8
This is its traditional
meaning: its usual signification is as a reimbursement for extra
expenses incurred by the public official in the performance of his
duties.
9
Under this definition the per diem intended to cover the
cost of lodging and subsistence of officers and employees when
the latter are on duty outside of their permanent station.
10

On the other hand, a per diem could rightfully be considered a
compensation or remuneration attached to an office.
11
Under
the circumstances obtaining in the case of respondent Belo
the per diems received by her during the period that she acted in
holdover capacity obviously were in the nature of compensation
or remuneration for her services as Vice Governor of the
Province of Capiz, rather than as a reimbursement for incidental
expenses incurred while away from her home base. In
connection with this, it is important to lay stress to the following
facts:
1. Petitioner rendered service to the
government continuously from January 25,
1972 to February 1, 1988 as Vice Governor of
the Province of Capiz. During a portion of the
holdover-period, i.e., from December 31,
1976 to January 11 1979, payment for her
services to the government was through per
diems for every regular or special session of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan attended.
12

2. The CSC noted that: "[F]ormer Vice
Governor Belo was on a full time basis when

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she served . . . on a hold-over capacity. . . As
such provincial official she is (sic) legally and
factually on call by the provincial people and
the province more than eight hours a day, or
at any time of the day beyond the prescribed
working hours.
3. She received no other forms of
remuneration during the disputed period.
13

The same could be said of the services rendered by respondent
Baradero, who, before and after the period in question had an
unblemished record of service to the government as a member
of the army and as a medical officer of the Philippine Medicare
Commission. The disputed period was served on a full-time basis
regardless of the denomination given to the compensation
received by him.
What ought to be controlling in the cases at bench therefore,
should be the nature of the remuneration rather than the label
attached to it. While there is no dispute that the law
excepting per diems from the definition of compensation is clear
and requires no interpretation, however, since the term per
diem may be construed either as compensation or as allowance,
it would be necessary for us to inquire whether the term per
diem in the GSIS Law refers to one or the other signification. As
explained above, it is plainly obvious that per diem as
compensation, is not what the law contemplates. The clear intent
of the Government Insurance Law was to exclude those extra
incidental expenses or incurred on a daily basis covered by the
traditional definition of the term per diem. An important fact
missed from our earlier decision was that, while respondent Belo
was paid on a per diembasis during her first holdover period as
Vice Governor she was subsequently paid a fixed salary, which
apparently rectified an otherwise anomalous situation. The
services rendered by respondent Belo having been continuous,
the disputed period should be credited for purposes of
retirement.
On the other hand, respondent Baradero was willing to serve two
additional years of service to government in order to complete
the 15 year period required by our retirement laws. The Civil
Service Commission felt this was unnecessary and denied the
same on the ground that the period served on a per diem basis,
was, like the disputed period in the Belo case, creditable.
14

The distinctions between salary and per diem made hereinabove
were in fact adverted to in our original decision dated October
28, 1994. In explaining the allowance of service rendered on
a per diem basis in the case ofInocencio vs. Ferrer of the Social
Security System, we noted with approval the Government Service
Insurance System's explanation that the per diem service which
was credited for purposes of retirement was Commissioner
Ferrer's full time service as Hearing Officer not his per
diem service for attendance at Board Meetings. Even then, we
indirectly noted the difference between per diem paid as
compensation for services rendered on a full time basis and per
diem as allowance for incidental expenses. Respondent Belo
asserts, with reason, that the per diems paid to her, while
reckoned on the basis of attendance in Board Meetings, were for
her full time services as Vice Governor of the Province of Capiz. In
fact, the same service, albeit still on a holdover basis, was
eventually paid with a fixed salary.
Retirement benefits given to government employees in effect
reward them for giving the best years of their lives to the service
of their country. This is especially true with those in government
service occupying positions of leadership or positions requiring
management skills because the years they devote to government
service could be spent more profitably in lucrative appointments
in the private sector. In exchange for their selfless dedication to
government service, they enjoy security of tenure and are
ensured of a reasonable amount of support after they leave the
government. The basis for the provision of retirement benefits is,
therefore, service to government. While a government insurance
system rationalizes the management of funds necessary to keep
this system of retirement support afloat and is partly dependent
on contributions made by the thousands of members of the
system, the fact that these contributions are minimal when
compared to the amount of retirement benefits actually received
shows that such contributions, while necessary, are not
absolutely determinative in drawing up criteria for those who
would qualify as recipients of the retirement benefit system.
It cannot be convincingly asserted that petitioners could not avail
themselves of the benefits of the policy because no deductions
were made from their salaries during the disputed periods when
they were paid on a per diembasis. In respondent Belo's
case, before and after that short interregnum, she was paid a
fixed salary. She was not duly informed that short period was not
to be credited in computing the length of her service for
retirement purposes. She assumed in all good faith that she
continued to be covered by the GSIS insurance benefits
considering that in fact and in practice the deductions are
virtually mandatorily made from all government employees on
an essentially involuntary basis. Similarly, had respondent
Baradero been informed of the need to pay the required
deductions for the purpose of qualifying for retirement benefits,
he would have willingly paid the required sums. In a sense, the
contract made between the GSIS and the government employee
is done on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, that is, it is a virtual contract
of adhesion which gives the employee no choice but to
involuntarily accede to the deductions made from their
oftentimes meager salaries. If the GSIS did not deduct, it was by
its own choice: contributions were exacted from
petitioner before and after the disputed period. To assert that
petitioners would have been entitled to benefits had they opted
for optional deductions at that point misses the principal fact in
issue here, which is the question as to whether or not the
disputed periods should be credited as service with
compensation for the purposes of retirement.
Moreover, the source of GSIS benefits is not in essence merely
contractual; rather, it is a social legislation as clearly indicated in
the "whereas" of Presidential Decree No. 1146, to wit:
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that
have prejudiced, rather than benefited, the
government employee; restricted, rather
than broadened, his benefits, prolonged,
rather than facilitated the payment of
benefits, must now yield to his paramount
welfare;

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WHEREAS, the social security and insurance
benefits of government employees must be
continuously re-examined and improved to
assure comprehensive and integrated social
security and insurance programs that will
provide benefits responsive to their needs
and those of their dependents in the event of
sickness, disability, death, retirement, and
other contingencies; and to serve as a fitting
reward for dedicated public service;
WHEREAS, in the light existing economic
conditions affecting the welfare of
government employees there is a need to
expand and improve the social security and
insurance programs administered by the
Government Service Insurance Systems,
specifically, among others, by increasing
pension benefits, expanding disability
benefits, introducing survivorship benefits,
introducing sickness income benefits, and
eventually extending the compulsory
coverage of these programs to all
government employees regardless of
employment status.
The situation as far as private respondents and the GSIS are
concerned could be rectified by deducting a reasonable amount
corresponding to the contributions which should have been
deducted during the period from the amount of retirement
benefits accruing to them. It would be grossly inequitable as it
would violate the spirit of the government retirement and
insurance laws to permanently penalize both respondents
Belo and Baradero by ignoring the fact of actual period of service
to government with compensation, and deny them the
retirement privileges that they, for their unselfish service to the
government justly deserve. Under the peculiar circumstances of
the case at bench, the demand for equity prompts us to regard
spirit not letter, and intent, not form, in according substantial
justice to both respondents, where the law, through its inflexible
rules might prove inadequate.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby GRANTED, our
decision dated October 28, 1994 RECONSIDERED and the
questioned resolutions and orders of the CSC requiring GSIS to
consider creditable the services of private respondents on a per
diem basis AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 97419 July 3, 1992
GAUDENCIO T. CENA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE HON. PATRICIA A. STO.
TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
May a government employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9
months and 6 days of government service, be allowed to
continue in the service to complete the
15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the
benefits of an
old-age pension under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977? This is the issue
raised before this Court by petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, a
Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.
The facts are not disputed.
Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on
November 16, 1978 as Legal Officer II of the Law Department of
Caloocan City where he stayed for seven (7) years until his
transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office of the Congressman
of the First District of Caloocan City where he worked for only
three (3) months, or until February 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff
Officer.
On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of
Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, the position he held at the
time he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years on
January 22, 1991. By then, he would have rendered a total
government service of 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before
reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice,
through Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), that he be allowed to extend his
service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable
him to retire with full benefits of old-age pension under Section
11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146.
The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the Civil
Service Commission whether or not to allow the extension of
service of petitioner Cena as he is covered by Civil Service
Memorandum No. 27, series 1990. In his 2nd Indorsement dated
August 6, 1990, the LRA Administrator observed that if
petitioner's service as of January 22, 1991 of 10 years, 6 months
and 6 days (should be 11 years, 9 months and 6 days) would be
extended to 15 years, he would have to retire on April 15, 1994
at the age of 68 years.
On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petitioner
Cena's request for extension of service in its CSC Resolution No.
90-681, declaring therein, that Mr. Cena shall be considered
retired from the service on January 22, 1991, the date when he
shall reach the compulsory retirement age of
sixty-five (65) years, unless his retention for another year is
sought by the head of office under Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, s. 1990.

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Petitioner Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. On October
17, 1990, the Civil Service Commission set aside its CSC
Resolution No. 90-681 and allowed Gaudencio Cena a one-year
extension of his service from January 22, 1991 to January 22,
1992, citing CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, series of 1990,
the pertinent of which reads:
1. Any request for the extension of service of
compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen
(15) years service requirement for retirement
shall be allowed only to permanent
appointees in the career service who are
regular members of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted
for a period not exceeding one (1) year.
On January 22, 1991, petitioner's second motion for
reconsideration was denied in its CSC Resolution No. 91-101.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging that
the Civil Service Commission committed a grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the extension of petitioner's service as
Registrar of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, for a period of
only one (1) year pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27,
Series of 1990, instead of three (3) years and three (3) months to
complete the 15-year service requirement for his retirement with
full benefits as provided under Section 11, par. (b) of Presidential
Degree No. 1146, otherwise known as the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977.
Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1)
of Memorandum Circular No. 27 allowing an extension of service
of a compulsory retiree for a period not exceeding one (1) year is
both erroneous and contrary to the "benevolent and munificent
intentions" of Section 11 of P.D. 1146. Petitioner points out that
par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. No. 1146 does not limit nor specify the
maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to complete
the 15 years of service.
The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that
the questioned provision being generally worded, Section 11 par.
(b), P.D. 1146 has general application, thus respondent CSC has
no authority to limit through CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27
the privilege under said section to government employees who
lack just one year to complete the 15-year service requirement.
The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since
public respondent CSC is the central personnel agency of the
government, it is vested with the power and authority, among
others, to grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement
age pursuant to Section 14 par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987). In interpreting Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146, public
respondent CSC contends that the phrase "Provided, That if he
has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to
continue in the service to complete the fifteen years", is qualified
by the clause: "Unless the service is extended by appropriate
authorities," which means that the extension of service must be
first authorized by the Commission, as the appropriate authority
referred to in Section 11, par. (b), P.D. 1146, before the service of
a compulsory retiree (one who has already reached age of 65
years with at least 15 years of service) can be extended.
We grant the petition.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be
interpreted to authorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to
only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who
has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 without having
completed 15 years of service, when said limitation his no
relation to or connection with the provision of the law supposed
to be carried into effect.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides thus:
Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. The
Commission shall have the following powers
and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all
appointments and other personnel matters in
the Civil Service including extension of service
beyond retirement age;
As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot authorize the modification of an express provision of a
special law (Revised Government Service Insurance of 1977).
Otherwise, the intent and purpose of the provisions on
retirement and pension of the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977 (P.D. 1146) would be rendered nugatory
and meaningless.
Section 11 paragraph (b) of the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977 expressly provides, thus:
Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.
(a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a
member who:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Unless the service is extended by
appropriate authorities, retirement shall be
compulsory for an employee of sixty-five
years of age with at least fifteen years of
service: Provided, That if he has less than
fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to
continue in the service to complete the
fifteen years. (Emphasis supplied)
Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or
establishing retirement plan should be liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited
thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian
purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and
well-being of government employees may be enhanced (Bautista

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vs. Auditor General, 104 Phil 428; Ortiz vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).
The Court stated in Abad Santos vs. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176,
that a pension partakes of the nature of "retained wages" of the
retiree for a double purpose: (1) to entice competent men and
women to enter the government service, and (2) permit them to
retire from the service with relative security, not only for those
who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have
been incapacitated by illness or accident.
We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes
creating pension or establishing retirement plans in cases
involving officials of the Judiciary who lacked the age and service
requirement for retirement. We see no cogent reason to rule
otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of the Executive
Branch, as in the case of petitioner Cena, who has reached 65 but
opted to avail of the statutory privilege under Section 11 par. (b)
of P.D. 1146 to continue in the service to complete the 15-year
service requirement in order to avail of old-age pension.
In Re: Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren
I. Plana, Adm. Matter No. 5460, En Banc Resolution, March 24,
1988, the Court, applying the liberal approach, ruled that Justice
Plana, who at the time of his courtesy resignation on March 25,
1986 lacked a few months to meet the age requirement for
retirement under the law, is entitled to full retirement benefits
under R.A. 910 because his accrued leave credits would have
entitled him to go on leave until beyond the age requirement for
retirement.
The above ruling of the Court was reiterated in Re: Application
for Retirement under Rep. Act No. 910 of Associate Justice
Ramon B. Britanico of the Intermediate Appellate Court, Adm.
Matter No. 6484 Ret., May 15, 1989. By liberally interpreting
Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended, in favor of the persons
intended to be benefited by them, the Court also allowed the
conversion of the application for disability retirement of Justice
Ruperto Martin under said Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended
(10-year lump sum without the lifetime annuity) into an
application for voluntary retirement under Section 1
(5-year lump sum with lifetime annuity) eleven years after his
disability retirement was approved on January 10, 1978 (In Re:
Application for Life Pension under Rep. Act 910. Ruperto G.
Martin, applicant, 187 SCRA 477). The ten-year lump sum which
he had received was considered by the Court as payment under
Section 1 of the five-year lump sum, to which he was entitled,
and of his monthly pensions for the next five years.
However, the Court pointed out in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, Adm.
Matter No. 2076-RET., July 13, 1990, and its six (6) companion
cases, 187 SCRA 469, that when the Court allows seeming
exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or Justices,
there are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The
crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required
age or length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always
on case to case basis.
There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary
employees in the Executive Branch on a case to case basis, to
continue in the service to complete the 15-year service
requirement to avail of the old-age pension under Section 11 of
P.D. 1146. By limiting the extension of service to only one (1)
year would defeat the beneficial intendment of the retirement
provisions of P.D. 1146.
In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory
retiree to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service,
there must be present an essential factor before an application
under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the
employer or government office concerned. In the case of officials
of the Judiciary, the Court allows a making up or compensating
for lack of required age or service only if satisfied that the career
of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and
dedication to the public service (Re: Gregorio Pineda, supra). It
must be so in the instant case.
It is interesting to note that the phrase "he shall be allowed to
continue in the service to complete the fifteen years" found in
Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146 is a reproduction of the phrase in the
original text found in Section 12 (e) of Commonwealth Act 186,
as amended, otherwise known as the "Government Service
Insurance Act" approved on November 14, 1936. There is nothing
in the original text as well as in the revised version which would
serve as the basis for providing the allowable extension period to
only one (1) year. There is likewise no indication that Section 11
par. (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a
compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more
than 14, but less than 15 years of government service., i.e. only a
few months short of the 15-year requirement which would
enable him to collect an old-age pension.
While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given
the Civil Service Commission the authority "to take appropriate
action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the
Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement
age", the said provision cannot be extended to embrace matters
not covered by the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977 (Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382,
"citing 12 C.J. 845-46). The authority referred to therein is limited
only to carrying into effect what the special law, Revised
Government Insurance Act of 1977, or any other retirement law
being invoked provides. It cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law.
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being
in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed
by the principle that administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People
vs. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450;
Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619,
June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-
28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-
21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusta Toledo
vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 92646-47, October 4,
1991, squarely applies in the instant case. We declared in the
case of Toledo that the rule prohibiting 57-year old persons from
employment, reinstatement, or
re-employment in the government service provided under

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Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions
and Policies (CSRPAP) cannot be accorded validity, because it is
entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no
basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement and it
cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of
the law which it is meant to carry into effect. The Court, speaking
thru Justice Edgardo L. Paras, stated, thus:
The power vested in the Civil Service
Commission was to implement the law or put
it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law
into effect or execution, not to supply
perceived omissions in it. "By its
administrative regulations, of course, the law
itself can not be extended; said regulations
cannot amend an act of Congress." (Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators,
Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA
585, 589 [1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109
Phil. 419 [1960]; see also, Animos v.
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA
214, 223-224 [1989] in turn citing Teoxon).
The considerations just expounded also
conduce to the conclusion of the invalidity of
Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The
enactment of said section, relative to 57-year
old persons, was also an act of
supererogation on the part of the Civil
Service Commission since the rule has no
relation to or connection with any provision
of the law supposed to be carried into effect.
The section was an addition to or extension
of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it
into effect. (Emphasis supplied)
The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146
otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance
Act of 1977." The rule on limiting to only one (1) year the
extension of service of an employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15
years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27
s. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no
relation to or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146
supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or
extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect.
The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived
omissions in P.D. 1146.
As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par. (b)
of P.D. 1146 in two (2) recent cases where We allowed two
employees in the Judiciary who have reached the age of 65 to
continue in the government service to complete the 15-year
service requirement to be entitled to the benefits under P.D.
1146.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1990 in A.M. No. 87-7-1329-
MTC, We allowed Mrs. Florentina J. Bocade, Clerk of Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Dagami, Leyte, who at the time she
reached the age of 65 years on October 16, 1987 had only 10
years of government service, to continue her services until
October 10, 1992. Thus, she was given a period of 5 years, to
complete the
15-year service requirement to be entitled to the retirement
benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The Court
observed that Mrs. Bocade is still performing her duties without
any adverse complaints from her superior and that she is
physically fit for work per report of the Medical Clinic.
The Court, in a resolution dated April 18, 1991, in A.M. No. 91-3-
003-SC.-Re: Request for the extension of service of Mrs. Crisanta
T. Tiangco, allowed Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, Budget Officer V,
Budget Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the
Supreme Court to continue her services until February 10, 1995.
She was granted a period of 3 years, 10 months and 13 days
because she has to her credit only 11 years, 1 month and 17 days
of government service at the time she reached the age of 65
years on March 29, 1991 in order that she be entitled to the
retirement benefits under P.D. No. 1146.
It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11
years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, Section 12,
par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has
rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service
at the time of separation shall, . . . upon separation after age
sixty, receive a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly
compensation for every year of service."
The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146
which allows him to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days to
complete the 15-year of service consistent with the beneficial
intendment of P.D. 1146 and which right is subject to the
discretion of the government office concerned.
Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of
herein Cena, because he opted to continue in the service to
complete the 15-year service requirement pursuant to Section 11
par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The completion of the 15-year service
requirement under Section 11 par. (b) partakes the nature of a
privilege given to an employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of service.
If said employee opted to avail of said privilege, he is entitled to
the benefits of the old-age pension. On the other hand, if the
said employee opted to retire upon reaching the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years although he has less than 15 years of
service, he is entitled to the benefits provided for under Section
12 of P.D. 1146 i.e. a cash equivalent to 100% of his average
monthly compensation for every year of service.
The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees
similarly situated, so it does not offend the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the law. There is nothing absurd
or inequitable in rewarding an employee for completion of the
15-year service beyond the retirement age. If he would be better
off than the one who has served for 14 years but who is
separated from the service at the age of 64, it would be only just
and proper as he would have worked for the whole period of 15
years as required by law for entitlement of the old-age pension.
Indeed, a longer service should merit a greater reward. Besides,
his entitlement to the old-age pension is conditioned upon such
completion. Thus, if the service is not completed due to death or
incapacity, he would be entitled to the benefit under Section 12,

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par. (b), i.e. cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly
compensation for every year of service.
Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section 11,
par. (b) of P.D. 1146, petitioner Cena should not be covered by
Memorandum Circular No. 65 issued by then Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig on June 14, 1988. Memorandum Circular No.
65 allowing retention of service for only six (6) months for
"extremely meritorious reasons" should apply only to employees
or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of
65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year
service requirement for retirement purposes. It should not apply
to employees or officials who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, but who opted to avail of the old-age
pension under par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. 1146, in which case,
they are allowed, at the discretion of the agency concerned, to
complete the 15-year service requirement.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The Land Registration
Authority (LRA) of the Department of Justice has the discretion to
allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9
months and 6 days of government service to complete the 15-
year service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section
11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 104139 December 22, 1992
LYDIA M. PROFETA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, Office of the President of the Philippines, respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing a portion of the
decision of the Office of the President, dated 23 October 1991,
declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October
1991 and the resolution dated 31 January 1992 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said decision.
The antecedents are the following:
Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta, served as Executive Dean of the
Rizal Technological Colleges from 24 October 1974 to 15 October
1978. From 16 October 1978 to 30 April 1979, petitioner was the
appointed Acting President of said College until her promotion to
President of the same college on 1 May 1979.
After the 1986 EDSA revolution or on 5 March 1986, petitioner
filed her courtesy resignation as President of the Rizal
Technological Colleges and the same was accepted on 21 March
1986. A day before the acceptance of her courtesy resignation,
petitioner applied for sick leave.
On 4 November 1988, petitioner was appointed Acting President
of Eulogio "Amang" Rodriguez Institute of Science and
Technology (hereinafter referred to as EARIST) and was
thereafter appointed its President on 29 March 1989.
After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) years on 16 June 1989,
petitioner inquired from the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) as to whether she may be allowed to extend her
services with the government as President of EARIST beyond the
age of sixty-five (65) years, to enable her to avail of the old-age
pension retirement benefits under PD 1146 (Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977). In answer to her
query, petitioner was advised by the GSIS to return to the service
until she shall have fulfilled the fifteen (15) years service
requirement pursuant of Section 11 of PD 1146, to qualify for the
old-age pension retirement plan. The GSIS declared that
petitioner was not yet eligible to retire under PD 1146, as she
had not rendered the sufficient number of years of service on the
date of her supposed retirement on 16 June 1989 and that her
creditable service was only twelve (12) years and two (2) months.
As things stood, she could only claim one hundred percent
(100%) of her average monthly compensation for every year of
creditable service or to a refund of her premium contributions
with the GSIS.
1

On 6 October 1989, as recommended by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Secretary and the Board of
Trustees of EARIST, President Aquino, through Deputy Executive
Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, extended the term of petitioner as
President of EARIST until she shall have completed the required
fifteen (15) years of service after reaching the age of sixty five
(65) years on the date of her normal retirement on 16 June 1989
or for an additional period of two (2) years, seven (7) months and
twelve (12) days.
2

In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an
administrative complaint against petitioner before the Office of
the President, for her alleged irregular appointment and for graft
and corrupt practices. In a memorandum, dated 16 August 1990,
the Office of the President furnished petitioner a copy of the
complaint with a directive to file an answer thereto with the
DECS Secretary, who was duly authorized to conduct a formal
investigation of the charges against petitioner. Pending
investigation of the complaint, petitioner was placed under
preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days.
3
After
serving the period of suspension, petitioner re-assumed her
duties and functions as President of EARIST.
In a letter dated 20 July 1990, DECS Secretary Cario
recommended the compulsory retirement of petitioner.
4

For the purpose of investigating the administrative charges
against petitioner,
5
an Ad-Hoc Committee was created by
President Aquino on 12 February 1991. The parties filed their
respective pleadings and hearings in the case were conducted by
the committee.

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Pending resolution of the administrative charges against her,
petitioner was detailed with the DECS Central Office pursuant to
a memorandum dated 13 February 1991 signed by Deputy
Executive Secretary Sarmiento III. Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, seeking her reinstatement as
EARIST President. After trial, said petition was dismissed. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari on
2 April 1991.
6

Petitioner likewise assailed her reassignment with the DECS
Central Office, before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On 30
July 1991, the CSC denied petitioner's complaint. She moved for
reconsideration of said resolution but the same was denied on 3
December 1991, which prompted petitioner to file a petition
for certiorari before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 103271. On 3
March 1992, this Court dismissed said petition.
After evaluating the evidence presented before the Ad-Hoc
Committee, in a decision
7
dated 23 October 1991, the Office of
the President dismissed the administrative complaint against
petitioner for lack of substantial evidence. In the same decision,
the Office of the President also declared petitioner as
compulsory retired from government service as of 15 October
1991, holding that:
... (I)f the aforesaid sick leave of 62 working
days (approximately 3 months) were to be
added to the respondent's creditable service,
together with the period of two (2) weeks
which the respondent's counsel admits in his
Memorandum the respondent had served as
Professorial Lecturer, the respondent should
be considered as compulsorily retired as of
Oct. 15, 1991, having completed the required
15 years in the service on or about the said
date after reaching the age of 65.
Accordingly, the administrative charges
against Dr. Lydia M. Profeta for her alleged
"irregular appointment and graft and corrupt
practices" are hereby dismissed. However,
Dr. Profeta is hereby considered as now
compulsorily retired from the service as of
October 15, 1991, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 11 (b) of Presidential
Decree No. 1146, having completed fifteen
(15) years in the government service on or
about he said date after reaching the age of
sixty-five (65) on June 16, 1989. 8
In a letter dated 23 October 1991, petitioner requested the GSIS
to determine the exact date of her retirement. On 5 November
1991, petitioner was advised by the GSIS that the exact date of
her retirement falls on 14 August 1992.
9

A motion for reconsideration was then filed by petitioner with
the Office of the President, assailing the portion of its decision
declaring her as compulsorily retired from the service as of 15
October 1991, alleging that the said office has no jurisdiction
over the issue of her compulsory retirement from the
government service.
In a resolution
10
dated 31 January 1992, petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Office of the President. In the
same resolution, the Office of the President clarified that there
was an over extension of petitioner's period of service with the
government by failure to reckon with the sixty-two (62) working
days during which petitioner went on sick leave (from 20 March
to 17 June 1986) and the period of two (2) weeks during which
petitioner served as Professorial Lecturer. In considering
petitioner as compulsory retired as of 15 October 1991, the
Office of the President held that it merely resolved motu
proprio to shorten by three-and-a-half (3-1/2) months the
extension granted to petitioner to complete the required fifteen
(15) years of service for purposes of retirement. It further
declared that it is for the President to determine whether or not
petitioner could still continue as EARIST President despite her
exoneration from the administrative charges filed against her.
Under Presidential Decree No. 1146 (Revised Government
Insurance Act of 1977), one of the benefits provided for qualified
members of the GSIS is the old-age pension benefit. A member
who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service and is at
least sixty (60) years old when separated from the service, is
entitled to a basic monthly pension for life but for not less than
five (5) years. On the other hand, a member who has rendered
less than fifteen (15) years of service but with at least three (3)
years of service and is sixty (60) years of age when separated
from the service is entitled to a cash payment equivalent to one
hundred percent (100%) of the average monthly compensation
for every year of service.
However, retirement is compulsory for a member who has
reached the age of sixty-five (65) years with at least fifteen (15)
years of service. If he has less than fifteen (15) years of service,
he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
fifteen (15) years,
11
to avail of the old-age pension benefit.
To a public servant, a pension is not a gratuity but rather a form
of deferred compensation for services performed and his right to
it commences to vest upon his entry into the retirement system
and becomes an enforceable obligation in court upon fulfillment
of all conditions under which it is to be paid. Similarly, retirement
benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the
consideration for entrance into and continuation in public office
or employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary
objective in establishing them is to induce competent persons to
enter and remain in public employment and render faithful and
efficient service while so employed.
12
Retirement laws are
liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because their
intention is to provide for his sustenance and hopefully even
comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning
his livelihood.
13
The liberal approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency,
security and well-being of government employees maybe
enhanced.
14

In the case at bar, at the time petitioner reached the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, she had rendered less
than the required fifteen (15) years of service under Section 11 of
P.D. 1146. Thus, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension
benefit, she was allowed to continue in the service and her term

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as President of EARIST was extended until she shall have
completed the fifteen (15) years service requirement, or for an
additional two (2) years, seven (7) months, and twelve (12) days,
as determined by the Office of the President.
This period of extended service granted to petitioner was
amended by the Office of the President. In resolving the
administrative complaint against petitioner, the Office of the
President, ruled not only on the issues of alleged irregular
appointment of petitioner and of graft and corrupt practices, but
went further by, in effect, reducing the period of extension of
service granted to petitioner on the ground that the latter had
already completed the fifteen (15) years service requirement
under P.D. 1146, and declared petitioner as compulsorily retired
as of 15 October 1991.
In other words, the extension of service of petitioner was until
January 1992. However, the Office of the President made a new
computation of petitioner's period of service with the
government, the Office of the President included as part of her
service the sixty-two (62) days sick leave applied for by petitioner
covering the period between 20 March to 17 June 1988 and her
service as a lecturer of approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of
three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months. As a result of this new
computation, petitioner's extension of service which was
supposed to end in January 1992 was reduced by the Office of
the President by three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months or until 15
October 1991.
On the other hand, the computation made by the GSIS as to the
exact date of retirement of petitioner fell on 14 August
1992.
15
Thus, the extension of service granted to petitioner by
the Office of the President for two (2) years, seven (7) months
and twelve (12) days which brought her services only up to
January 1992, would not enable herein petitioner to complete
the fifteen (15) years service requirement for purposes of
retirement. To allow the Office of the President to shorten the
extension of service of petitioner by three-and-a-half (3 1/2)
months which consist of petitioner's sick leave and service as
lecturer, would further reduce petitioner's service with the
government. Such reduction from petitioner's service would
deprive her of the opportunity of availing of the old-age pension
plan, based on the computation of the GSIS.
We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified or not to
avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. 1146, based on its
computation of a member's years of service with the
government.
16
The computation of a member's service includes
not only full time but also part time and other services with
compensation as may be included under the rules and
regulations prescribed by the System.
17

The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between
20 March to 17 June 1986 and her part-time service as a lecturer
f approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3
1/2) months is not reflected in her service record. Said period
should be considered as part of her service with the government
and it is only but proper that her service record be amended to
reflect said period of service.
We have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of
petitioner's date of retirement failed to take into account the
three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner which was
not reflected in her service record. If we deduct this unrecorded
three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner from 14
August 1992, petitioner is to be considered retired on 30 April
1992.
The order of the Office of the President declaring petitioner as
compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991 defeats the purpose
for allowing petitioner to remain in the service until she has
completed the fifteen (15) years service requirement. Between
the period of 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992, petitioner should
have been allowed to continue in the service to be able to
complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement; she was
prepared to render services for said period but was not allowed
to do so; she should, therefore, the entitled to all her salaries,
benefits and other emoluments during said period (16 October
1991 - 30 April 1992). However, petitioner's claim for
reinstatement to her former position to enable her to complete
the fifteen (15) year service requirement for retirement purposes
is no longer possible, considering that she is deemed to have
completed the said service requirement as of 30 April 1992.
WHEREFORE, the portion of the decision of the Office of the
President dated 23 October 1991 declaring petitioner as
compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991 is SET ASIDE.
Petitioner is hereby declared to have been in the service as
President of EARIST from 16 October 1991 until 30 April 1992 and
therefore entitled to all salaries, benefits and other emoluments
of said office from 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992. In addition,
she is declared as entitled to her old-age pension benefits for
having reached age 65 years while in the service with 15 years of
service to her credit, subject to her compliance with all applicable
regulations and requirements of the GSIS.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 111812 May 31, 1995
DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.


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FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of
the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a
Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years.
Sometime in May 1991,
1
Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the
Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to
apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached
the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with
thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government service.
Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of
Membership"
2
issued by the Government Service Insurance
System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this
"Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the
following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service
reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the
following date "2/28/91."
Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms.
Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service
Commission, Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-XI"), informing the
latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action
[should] be taken on this matter."
In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of
CSRO-XI advised Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:
Please be informed that the extension of
services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No.
65 of the Office of the President, the relevant
portion of which is hereunder quoted:
Officials and employees
who have reached the
compulsory retirement
age of 65 years shall not
be retained the service,
except for extremely
meritorious reasons in
which case the retention
shall not exceed six (6)
months.
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that
the services of Mr. Dominador [M.] Rabor as
Utility Worker in that office, is already non-
extend[i]ble.
3

Accordingly, on 8 August l991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of
the 26 July 1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised
him "to stop reporting for work effective August 16, 1991."
4

Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a
letter dated 14 August 1991, asking for extension of his services
in the City Government until he "shall have completed the fifteen
(15) years service [requirement] in the Government so that [he]
could also avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given to
employees of the Government." The extension he was asking for
was about two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good
health and very able to perform the duties and functions of [his]
position as Utility Worker," Rabor sought "extension of [his]
service as an exception to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the
Office of the President."
5
This request was denied by Director
Cawad on 15 August 1991.
Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29
January 1992 seeking reconsideration of the decision of Director
Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the President referred Mr. Rabor's
letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission on 5
March 1992.
In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service
Commission dismissed the appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the
action of Director Cawad embodied in the latter's letter of 26 July
1991. This Resolution stated in part:
In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be
allowed to continue rendering services as
Utility Worker in order to complete the
fifteen (15) year service requirement under
P.D. 1146.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990
provides, in part:
1. Any request for
extension of service of
compulsory retirees to
complete the fifteen
years service requirement
for retirement shall be
allowed only to
permanent appointees in
the career service who
are regular members of
the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS)
and shall be granted for a
period of not exceeding
one (1) year.
Considering that as early as October 18,
1988, Rabor was already due for retirement,
his request for further extension of service
cannot be given due course.
6
(Emphasis in
the original)
On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of
Resolution No. 92-594 of the Civil Service Commission this time
invoking the Decision of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service
Commission.
7
Petitioner also asked for reinstatement with back
salaries and benefits, having been separated from the
government service effective 16 August 1991. Rabor's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Commission.
Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the
Office of the Mayor, Davao City, again requesting that he be
allowed to continue rendering service to the Davao City
Government as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen
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was once more denied by Mayor Duterte in a letter to petitioner
dated 19 May 1993. In this letter, Mayor Duterte pointed out
that, underCena grant of the extension of service was
discretionary on the part of the City Mayor, but that he could not
grant the extension requested. Mayor Duterte's letter, in
relevant part, read:
The matter was referred to the City Legal
Office and the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, in the advent of the decision of
the Supreme Court in the Cena vs. CSC, et al.
(G.R. No. 97419 dated July 3, 1992), for legal
opinion. Both the City Legal Officer and the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission are
one in these opinion that extending you an
appointment in order that you may be able to
complete the fifteen-year service
requirement is discretionary [on the part of]
the City Mayor.
Much as we desire to extend you an
appointment but circumstances are that we
can no longer do so.As you are already
nearing your 70th birthday may no longer be
able to perform the duties attached to your
position. Moreover, the position you had
vacated was already filled up.
We therefore regret to inform you that we
cannot act favorably on your
request.
8
(Emphases supplied)
At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a
Letter/Petition dated 6 July 1993 appealing from Civil Service
Resolution No. 92-594 and from Mayor Duterte's letter of 10
May 1993.
The Court required petitioner Rabor to comply with the formal
requirements for instituting a special civil action ofcertiorari to
review the assailed Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In
turn, the Commission was required to comment on petitioner's
Letter/Petition.
9
The Court subsequently noted petitioner's
Letter of 13 September 1993 relating to compliance with the
mentioned formal requirements and directed the Clerk of Court
to advise petitioner to engage the services of counsel or to ask
for legal assistance from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
10

The Civil Service Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed its comment on 16 November 1993. The Court
then resolved to give due course to the Petition and required the
parties to file memoranda. Both the Commission and Mr. Rabor
(the latter through PAO counsel) did so.
In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls
squarely within the ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service
Commission.
11

Upon the other hand, the Commission seeks to distinguish this
case from Cena. The Commission, through the Solicitor General,
stressed that in Cena, this Court had ruled that the employer
agency, the Land Registration Authority of the Department of
Justice, was vested with discretion to grant to Cena the extension
requested by him. The Land Registration Authority had chosen
not to exercise its discretion to grant or deny such extension. In
contrast, in the instant case, the Davao City Government did
exercise its discretion on the matter and decided to deny the
extension sought by petitioner Rabor for legitimate reasons.
While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old, the Court
considers that it must reexamine the doctrine ofCena and the
theoretical and policy underpinnings thereof.
12

We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena.
Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of
Deeds of Malabon, Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July 1987. He
reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on
22 January 1991. By the latter date, his government service
would have reached a total of eleven (11) years, nine (9) months
and six (6) days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena
requested the Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to
extend his service to complete the fifteen-year service
requirement to enable him to retire with the full benefit of an
Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. If Cena's
request were granted, he would complete fifteen (15) years of
government service on 15 April 1994, at the age of sixty-eight
(68) years.
The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil Service
Commission on whether or not Cena's request could be granted
considering that Cena was covered by Civil Service Memorandum
No. 27, Series of 1990. On 17 October 1990, the Commission
allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his service from 22
January 1991 to 22 January 1992 under its Memorandum Circular
No. 27. Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without
success. He then came to this Court, claiming that he was
entitled to an extension of three (3) years, three (3) months and
twenty-four (24) days to complete the fifteen-year service
requirement for retirement with full benefits under Section 11
(b) of P.D. No. 1146.
This Court granted Cena' s petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court held that a
government employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same time has
not yet completed fifteen (15) years of government service
required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the
Old-Age Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his
government service for such period of time as may be necessary
to "fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service
requirement. The Court also held that the authority to grant the
extension was a discretionary one vested in the head of the
agency concerned. Thus the Court concluded:
Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Land Registration Authority (LRA) and
Department of Justice has the discretion to
allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend
his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of
governmentto complete the fifteen-year
service so that he may retire with full benefits

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under Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D.
1146.
13
(Emphases supplied)
The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of
the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No.
1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety:
Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a)
Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member
who
(1) has at least fifteen
(15) years of service;
(2) is at least sixty (60)
years of age; and
(3) is separated from the
service.
(b) unless the service is extended by
appropriate authorities, retirement shall be
compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-(65)
years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of
service; Provided, that if he has less than
fifteen (15) years of service, he shall he
allowed to continue in the service to
completed the fifteen (15) years. (Emphases
supplied)
The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction
which has often been invoked in respect of retirement statutes:
Being remedial in character, a statute
granting a pension or establishing [a]
retirement plan should be liberally construed
and administered in favor of persons
intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal
approach aims to achieve the humanitarian
purposes of the law in order that efficiency,
security and well-being of government
employees may be enhanced.
14
(Citations
omitted)
While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms,
there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which
prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be
granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of
age.
The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, which should be quoted in its
entirety:
TO : ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS
AND AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL/LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-
OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS.
SUBJECT : Extension of Service of Compulsory
Retiree to Complete the Fifteen Years Service
Requirement for Retirement Purposes.
Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 90-454 dated
May 21, 1990, the Civil Service Commission
hereby adopts and promulgates the following
policies and guidelines in the extension of
services of compulsory retirees to complete
the fifteen years service requirement for
retirement purposes:
1. Any request for the
extension of service of
compulsory retirees to
complete the fifteen (15)
years service
requirement for
retirement shall be
allowed only to
permanent appointees in
the career service who
are regular members of
the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS),
and shall be granted for a
period not exceeding one
(1) year.
2. Any request for the
extension of service of
compulsory retiree to
complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement
for retirement who
entered the government
service at 57 years of age
or over upon prior grant
of authority to appoint
him or her, shall no
longer be granted.
3. Any request for the
extension of service to
complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement
of retirement shall be
filled not later than three
(3) years prior to the date
of compulsory
retirement.
4. Any request for the
extension of service of a
compulsory retiree who
meets the minimum
number of years of
service for retirement
purposes may be granted
for six (6) months only
with no further extension.

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This Memorandum Circular shall take effect
immediately. (Emphases supplied)
The second administrative issuance Memorandum Circular No.
65 of the Office of the President, dated 14 June 1988 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, this Office has been. receiving
requests for reinstatement and/or retention
in the service of employees who have
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years, despite the strict conditions provided
for in Memorandum Circular No. 163, dated
March 5, 1968, as amended.
WHEREAS, the President has recently
adopted a policy to adhere more strictly to
the law providing for compulsory retirement
age of 65 years and, in extremely meritorious
cases, to limit the service beyond the age of
65 years to six (6) months only.
WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of
Memorandum Circular No. 163 or on the
retention in the service of officials or
employees who have reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Officials or employees
who have reached the
compulsory retirement
age of 65
yearsshall not be retained
in the service, except for
extremely meritorious
reasons in which case
the retention shall not
exceed six (6) months.
All heads of departments, bureaus, offices
and instrumentalities of the government
including government-owned or controlled
corporations, are hereby enjoined to require
their respective offices to strictly comply with
this circular.
This Circular shall take effect immediately.
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15
(Emphasis supplied)
Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2)
administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil
Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the
Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65
as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.
We turn first to the Civil Service Commission's Memorandum
Circular No. 27. Medialdea, J. wrote:
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an
administrative regulation, must be governed
by the principle that administrative
regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions
(People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166,
October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, L-
25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel
v. General Auditing Office, L-28952,
December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v.
Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA
350). . . . . The rule on limiting to one the year
the extension of service of an employee who
has reached the compulsory retirement age
of sixty-five (65) years, but has less than
fifteen (15) years of service under Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S.
1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity
because it has no relationship or connection
with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to
be carried into effect. The rule was an
addition to or extension of the law, not
merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The
Civil Service Commission has no power to
supply perceived omissions in P.D.
1146.
16
(Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service
Commission Memorandum No. 27, took a very narrow view on
the question of what subordinate rule-making by an
administrative agency is permissible and valid. That restrictive
view must be contrasted with this Court's earlier ruling in People
v. Exconde,
17
where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:
It is well established in this jurisdiction that,
while the making of laws is a non-delegable
activity that corresponds exclusively to
Congress, nevertheless, the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority and
promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate
its policies, for the reason thatthe legislature
often finds it impracticable (if not impossible)
to anticipate and provide for the multifarious
and complex situations that may be met in
carrying the law into effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to
standards that the law
prescribes.
18
(Emphasis supplied)
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez,
19
the Court, in sustaining the validity of a
MECS Order which established passing a uniform admission test
called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a
prerequisite for eligibility for admission into medical schools in
the Philippines, said:
The standards set for subordinate legislation
in the exercise of rule making authority by an
administrative agency like the Board of
Medical Education are necessarily broad and
highly abstract. As explained by then Mr.
Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta (35 SCRA
481 [1970])
The standards may be
either
expressed or implied. If
the former, the non-
delegation objection is
easily met. The Standard
though does not have to
be spelled out specifically.
It could be implied from
the policy and purpose of
the act considered as a
whole. In the Reflector
Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety.
What is sought to be
attained in Calalang v.
William is "safe transit
upon the roads."
We believe and so hold that the necessary
standards are set forth in Section 1 of the
1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and
regulation of medical education" and in
Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body
of the statute itself, and that these
considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the
non-delegation principle.
20
(Citations
omitted; emphasis partly in the original and
partly supplied)
In Edu v. Ericta,
21
then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the
abstract and very general nature of the standards which our

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Court has in prior case law upheld as sufficient for purposes of
compliance with the requirements for validity of subordinate or
administrative rule-making:
This Court has considered as sufficient
standards, "public welfare," (Municipality of
Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36
Phil. 547 [1917]); "necessary in the interest of
law and order," (Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39
Phil. 660 [1919]); "public interest," (People v.
Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]); and "justice
and equity and substantial merits of the
case," (International Hardwood v. Pangil
Federation of Labor, 17 Phil. 602
[1940]).
22
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher
degree of detail in the statute to be implemented, went against
prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or
enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there
would be very little need (or occasion) for implementing
administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability
of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed
situations in respect of any relatively complex subject matter,
that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative
agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be
reasonably; demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation
consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the
general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute.
This is the test that is appropriately applied in respect of Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this
test we now turn.
We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately
be examined is the present Civil Service law found in Book V,
Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 and not
alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of
extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65)
years of age is an area that is covered by both statutes and not
alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146. This is crystal clear from
examination of many provisions of the present civil service law.
Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987
Administrative Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Sec. 12 Powers and Functions. The [Civil
Service] Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and
regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and other
pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies,
standards and guidelines for the Civil
Service and adopt plans and programsto
promote economical, efficient and effective
personnel administration in the government;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate
programs relative to the development and
retention of aqualified and competent work
force in the public service;
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all
appointments and other personnel matters in
the Civil Serviceincluding extension of service
beyond retirement age;
xxx xxx xxx
(17) Administer the retirement program for
government officials and employees, and
accredit government services and evaluate
qualifications for retirement;
xxx xxx xxx
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging
to a central personnel agency and such other
functions as may be provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987
Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission
promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the
Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the
government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and
guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel
administration in the government."
23
It was also discharging its
function of "administering the retirement program for
government officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing]
qualifications for retirement."
In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987
Administrative Code with providing leadership and assistance "in
the development and retention of qualified and efficient work
force in the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the
"enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions,
relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective
implementation of the retirement of government officials and
employees" (Section 16 [14]).
We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of
permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached
sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is
not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil
Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes
associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the
efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from
individual persons. The policy considerations which guided the
Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of

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service allowable for compulsory retirees, were summarized by
Grio-Aquino, J. in her dissenting opinion in Cena:
Worth pondering also are the points raised
by the Civil Service Commission that
extending the service of compulsory retirees
for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give
a premium to late-comers in the government
service and in effect discriminate against
those who enter the service at a younger age;
(2) delay the promotion of the latter and of
next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the
chances for employment of qualified young
civil service applicants who have already
passed the various government examination
but must wait for jobs to be vacated by
"extendees" who have long passed the
mandatory retirement age but are enjoying
extension of their government service to
complete 15 years so they may qualify for
old-age pension.
24
(Emphasis supplied).
Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be
retirees, something that is, in itself, quite appropriate. At the
same time, however, we are bound to note that there should be
countervailing stress on the interests of the employer agency and
of other government employees as a whole. The results flowing
from the striking down of the limitation established in Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and
inequitable," as suggested by Mme. Justice Grio-Aquino in her
dissenting opinion. An employee who has rendered only three (3)
years of government service at age sixty-five (65) can have his
service extended for twelve (12) years and finally retire at the
age of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the significance of the
general principle of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65)
very close to the vanishing point.
The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational
personnel administration and management in the Civil Service,
are aggravated when Cena is considered together with the case
of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission.
25
Toledo involved the
provisions of Rule III, Section 22, of the Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which prohibited the
appointment of persons fifty-seven (57) years old or above in
government service without prior approval of the Civil Service
Commission. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of
1983 provided that a person fifty-seven (57) years of age may be
appointed to the Civil Service provided that the exigencies of the
government service so required and provided that the appointee
possesses special qualifications not possessed by other officers or
employees in the Civil Service and that the vacancy cannot be
filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees of the Civil
Service. Petitioner Toledo was appointed Manager of the
Education and Information Division of the Commission on
Elections when he was almost fifty-nine (59) years old. No
authority for such appointment had been obtained either from
the President of the Philippines or from the Civil Service
Commission and the Commission found that the other conditions
laid down in Section 22 of Rule III, CSRPAP, did not exist. The
Court nevertheless struck down Section 22, Rule III on the same
exceedingly restrictive view of permissible administrative
legislation that Cena relied on.
26

When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling
in Cena, very strange results follow. Under these combined
doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age may be appointed
to the government service and one (1) year later may demand
extension of his service for the next fourteen (14) years; he
would retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that
the general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-
five (65) years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes
unenforceable. That general statutory policy may be seen to
embody the notion that there should be a certain minimum turn-
over in the government service and that opportunities for
government service should be distributed as broadly as possible,
specially to younger people, considering that the bulk of our
population is below thirty (30) years of age. That same general
policy also reflects the life expectancy of our people which is still
significantly lower than the life expectancy of, e.g., people in
Northern and Western Europe, North America and Japan.
Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is
hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1)
thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of
P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together with
Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the
holding in Cena that the head of the government agency
concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or
disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who
has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing
fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is,
nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions of
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with
Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President
dated 14 June 1988. It will be noted from the text
quoted supra (pp. 11-12) that the text itself of Memorandum
Circular No. 65 (and for that matter, that of Memorandum
Circular No. 163, also of the Office of the President, dated 5
March 1968)
27
does not purport to apply only to officers or
employees who have reached the age of sixty-five (65) years and
who have at least fifteen (l5) years of government service. We
noted earlier that Cenainterpreted Memorandum Circular No. 65
as referring only to officers and employees who have both
reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) and
completed the fifteen (15) years of government service. Cena so
interpreted this Memorandum Circular precisely
because Cena had reached the conclusion that employees who
have reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but who have less than
fifteen (15) years of government service, may be allowed such
extension of service as may be needed to complete fifteen (15)
years of service. In other words,Cena read Memorandum Circular
No. 65 in such a way as to comfort with Cena's own conclusion
reached without regard to that Memorandum Circular. In view of
the conclusion that we today reached in the instant case, this last
ruling of Cena is properly regarded as merely orbiter.
We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 is fully compatible with
Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65; this
question must be reserved for detailed analysis in some future
justiciable case.

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Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the
instant case, we believe and so hold that Civil Service Resolution
No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of
petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director
Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed.
ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Quiason, J., is on leave.