PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs.

PRADO - A case digest

Direct Filing

Facts;

Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court, COA,
RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from them.

In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it becoming alaw.



Issues;

WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof."

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

- Violative of the Equal protection clause


Ruling:

The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the
terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to
be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.

However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is
superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege.

Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.


Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
By: Dennis D. San Diego
G.R. No. 115455
235 SCRA 630 (1994)
FACTS
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base
of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a
mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on
the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three
days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD
No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient
that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in
the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of
printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

ABAKADA Guro Party List v PurisimaG.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008FACTS:
1.

This petition for prohibition

seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335

(Attrition Actof 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and theBureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets byproviding a system of rewards and sanctions through
the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a RevenuePerformance Evaluation Board (Board). It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status2.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reformlegislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s]
the officials andemployees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their
best only in consideration of suchrewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrineof separation of powers,
for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional.In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno,
the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhanceits understanding of and
influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-
enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives,
(b) to determine whether agenciesare properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty,
(d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority,and (d) to assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to beintrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of governmentWith this backdrop, it is clear that
congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes anencroachment
on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is
integral tothe checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance
the separation of powers as itprevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
Constitution imposes two basicand related constraints on Congress
. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power.

And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures" specifiedunder the Constitution including the procedure for enactment of laws and
presentment.Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressionaloversight must be confined to the
following:(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in c
onnection withit, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on
any matterpertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and(2) investigation and monitoring
of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries inaid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in thisclass.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules andregulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed
by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprovesuch regulations before they take effect. As such,
a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of aninward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to
whichCongress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution's diagram of power asit entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its
own laws

Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
on December 30, 2011
Political Law Qualifications of a Senator or a Congress Representative
NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs DDB and PDEA ( G.R. No. 158633 ) and Pimentel vs COMELEC ( G.R. No.
161658 )
In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Sec 36 thereof requires
mandatory drugtesting of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.
On 23 Dec 2003, COMELEC issued ResolutionNo. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator
must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress
or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an amendment to the Constitution on the qualifications of Senators.
HELD: Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or
an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but
to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. The
provision *n+o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test. Is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing
and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require
a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power.
The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

Sema vs COMELEC
on June 23, 2011
Municipal Corporation Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM) Population Requirement
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not
part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two
legislative districts. The 1
st
legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces,
municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan
(Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1
st
district of Maguindanao
with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1
st
district is now only made of Cotabato
City (because ofMMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for
the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also
while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1
st
district). Later,
Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should
be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he
won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province
automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect
Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created,
the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply
with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there
must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its
plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In
fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays
within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff
Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once
created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district,
there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so
Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan
without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative
districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.


VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011
342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law Party List Representatives, 20% Allocation)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38 additional
party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of
the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the filling up of the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-list representatives
is filled up at all times.
ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.
HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a policy to promote
proportional representation in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to
obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list
seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).

Note:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of
seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical
formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will
necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there
were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats
would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is
this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances?
Our short answer is No.

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
,
which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the
issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the
case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members
of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause
of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not
being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the
Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral
grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made
misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted.

Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a violation of the non-
establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts
against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is
detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing
registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their
sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws or by any international laws by
which we adhere.

People vs. Jalosjos G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
includingattendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented.


Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives


Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting
an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI
of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for
the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.

Osmena v Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

J. Bengzon

Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K.
Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by
House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also
asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with
it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with
the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that Sergio Osmea, Jr., made a
privilege speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There, he claimed to have been hearing of ugly reports that the
government has been selling free things at premium prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale
regardless of the gravity of the case.
The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth, would
constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential office and would expose it to contempt and
disrepute.
The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of the charges against the
President of the Philippines made by Osmea, Jr. It was authorized to summon him to appear before it to
substantiate his charges, as well as to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent
papers before it, and if he fails to do so he would be required to show cause why he should not be punished by the
House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings before the adjournment of the
present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Osmea alleged that the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third,
after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the
Rules of Houseprovides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in
debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any
preliminary injunction.
The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman Osmea a chance to defend
himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and acting on such report, the House approved on the
same day House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for
fifteen months.
The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition,
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension and then invited attention to the fact
that Congress having ended its session, the Committee had thereby ceased to exist.
After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the Constitution, to suspend one of
its members.

Issue:
Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or
Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." The provision has always
been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's
power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative
of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he
should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one it
may offend."
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or
civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming a member.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been censured, committed to prison,
and even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. This was the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take
disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. For instance, the
Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the
Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against him, because after his
speech it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by
the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew
its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of actions and making them
applicable to actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action taken by a deliberative body when the required number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the power of all
deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of
business, and as security against hasty action. (Certain American cases)
In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, was censured by the House, despite the
argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for
which Osmea may be disciplined, the court believed that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter
depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black
and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to
determine whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. This
was due to the theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this. Each department, it has been said,
had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission.)
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively
legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not
review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision.
Clifford vs. French- several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a
bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a
chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to
interfere:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair
action of the legislative department, due to the Constitution. Every legislative body in which is vested the general
legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem
sufficient.
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, it was said that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to
enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state; That it is a power of self-
protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and
require its exercise. Given the exercise of the power committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this
court to direct or control the legislature, or either house, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to
exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
The Court merely refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to
maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the
position upon at least two occasions.
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924,
Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted
another member of that Body. The Senator challenged the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that
in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it
nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months
amounted to removal, and the Jones Law gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like
Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly
behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member. The Jones Law empowered
the Governor General to appoint Senators. Alejandrino was one.
The opinion in that case stated that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that
district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer
particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party.
Now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the
Constitution. In the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate
the power it then exercisedthe power of suspension for one year. Now. the Congress has the inherent legislative
prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not impair.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, limited by the Republic's Constitution. So that any
power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless
the Constitution provides otherwise.
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be weighty,
becuase deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent the Special Committee from
acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the
Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The House
had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be
dismissed for having become moot or academic.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings. But the most probable outcome of such
reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction.



POLITICAL LAW- THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF E.O. 464
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a republican state. History has been witness to the fact that
the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence the need to guard It zealously.

Senate of the Philippines vs Executive Secretary Ermita
on September 6, 2011
Question Hour EO 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the
alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads
and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of
the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP
Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they
were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464
which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials
ofexecutive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of
chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by
the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are
covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing
in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents approval. The department heads and
the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves.
Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President
Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig.
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of
Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the
SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of
inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony
to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently
true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question
Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a
supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. Theappearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not
only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody
for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was
thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of
which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of
it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-
equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to
secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its
face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question
hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department
head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless,
when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.




BELOW is a reproduction of EO 464:
E.O. 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of
the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal
branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367,
23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the
public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers
covered by this executive order, including:
Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order
(Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002);
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be
divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements
(Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998);
Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002).
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order:
Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the
executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of
the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and
Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b)
hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the
observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for
the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
**The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.**
*** On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464
and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are
invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.***