Anthropological Theory

Copyright © 2006 SAGE Publications

(London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
http://ant.sagepub.com
Vol 6(1): 122–125
10.1177/1463499606065002

Lukes and ‘substantive

social scientific work’
John R. Searle
University of California, Berkeley, USA

I found little to disagree with in Steven Lukes’ judicious and perceptive commentary on
this issue. In this reply I will not repeat all of the points I agree with but will concen-
trate on some possible points of misunderstanding and disagreement.

I. INTENTIONALITY DEPENDENCE
He is right to say that it can be misleading to use the word ‘observer’ in ‘observer depen-
dence’ because it might imply a contrast between observer and participant. I did not
intend any such contrast. As I wrote in my response to Friedman, ‘For me, the notion
of “observer” is short for all of the forms of intentionality that human beings have in
dealing with their environment. So, when I say that the existence of money is observer
relative, by “observer” I mean observer, user, possessor, buyer, seller, borrower and so on’
(p. 82). A more accurate term would have been ‘intentionality dependence’, but that can
also lead to confusion, because original, intrinsic intentionality itself is not intentional-
ity dependent. ‘Participant’ can also be misleading because one can be part of the collec-
tive acceptance without any active participation. The point is that we need a contrast
between those features of the world whose existence does not depend on our intention-
ality – hydrogen atoms and techtonic plates, for example – and those which do – money,
governments and esthetic excellence, for example. I think once the point is understood
that observer dependence includes participant dependence and so on, any confusion
should evaporate.

II. INSTITUTIONAL OPACITY

This is a more important point. There are unexpected macro-phenomena, unexpected
consequences that grow out of the micro-processes of institutional behavior. For
example, out of the totality of micro-economic processes grow unforeseen phenomena
in the form of inflations, depressions, and trade cycles generally. This objection, stated
by Friedman in this collection, has previously been made by Amie Thomasson (2003)
and answered by Åsa Andersson (n.d.). I called these ‘systematic fallouts’, and Andersson
calls the level of the fallouts the ‘macro’ level, in contrast to the ‘micro’ level of
intentional behavior.
I regard this as an important extension of my original theory because, on the original
statement, the ontology of institutional reality is in part constituted by people’s attitudes.

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No collective intentionality, no institutional facts. But often there are features of

institutional phenomena that are quite surprising and unexpected. Does this refute the
original ontological theory? I do not think so. Notice two important features of these
opaque phenomena. First, in all these cases the ontology of the macro-processes is still
constituted by the collective intentionality of the institutional phenomena at the micro-
level as I have described it. The institutional ontology constituted by the collective
intentionality of the people involved will have unexpected higher level consequences.
For example, an inflation can be surprising and unexpected but the inflation is consti-
tuted by a whole lot of consumers’ behavior such as exchanging money for goods and
services. Logically speaking, the situation is formally the same as the right-hand, left-
hand batter phenomenon that I cite (p. 84), though of course the sports example is trivial
relative to such important phenomena as trade cycles. Second, notice that, logically
speaking, once the participants in the institution have accepted the constitutive rules of
the institution, then that acceptance commits them to the recognition of the apparently
opaque phenomena. Institutional commitments turn opacity into transparency. For
example, once you are a player in the game of money, exchange, buying, selling and so
on, you are committed to recognizing that under the such and such conditions there is
an inflation.

III. COLLECTIVE ACCEPTANCE

As Lukes points out, it is possible to misunderstand my notion of collective acceptance
if it is taken to imply collective approval. There are lots of institutional facts that I accept
without approving of them, for example, the current distribution of Congressional
districts in the state of California. If enough people go along with the institution, if they
enable it to function, that is all the collective acceptance I need for my analysis. As I
have pointed out elsewhere, collective acceptance is a continuum that goes all the way
from enthusiastic support to grudging submission. Perhaps a less misleading term would
have been ‘recognition’.

IV. DURKHEIM
I am reluctant to enter into any debate about the interpretation of Durkheim because I
do not have a deep enough acquaintance with his work, and frankly I did not find it
very clearly written. The only book of his I know well is The Rules of Sociological Method
and I think that the criticisms I make apply to that text and to the others that I quote.
Lukes points out that Durkheim’s practice is better than his theory, but I am interested
in getting an adequate theory. Lukes also points out that some of the apparent in-
consistencies in Durkheim that I cite might be reconciled. ‘The point is that Durkheim
was, in making these apparently contradictory statements, expressing the very paradox
noted by D’Andrade’ (p. 9), that is to say that institutional facts are real but they only
exist because people think they exist. Perhaps that is the best interpretation of the texts,
but I do not see that Durkheim resolved the paradox or even showed an awareness that
it was a paradox that he had made apparently inconsistent remarks. Overall, I do not
doubt that Lukes may be right in thinking that Durkheim can be given a more favor-
able reading than I gave him, and Lukes is the ideal person to do it. All the same, my
main worry remains: even with the most sympathetic interpretation that you could
possibly give, one that removes some, or perhaps even all, of the obvious glaring

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falsehoods and inconsistencies, one that gets rid of the waves of thought, and the sui
generis ontology, and the failed analogies with chemical compounds, the resulting theory
is still inadequate for reasons that I try to spell out in detail in my response to Gross:
the conceptual apparatus that Durkheim employs is inadequate to make the distinctions
and characterizations that are essential to understanding social ontology. Worse yet, I
believe the whole approach is misguided. He wants to make sociology seem like a natural
science. I want to insist on how different it is from the natural sciences. Sociology and
other social sciences are largely concerned with human behavior. The behavior in
question consists in large part of actions done for reasons, and often the actions occur
within humanly created institutions. But these facts, that actions are often done for
reasons, and thus subject to constraints of rationality, and that sometimes the actions
are done within human institutions, together imply that the behavior in question is
performed under the presupposition of free will, and empowered by systems of humanly
created deontologies. Durkheim, as far as I can tell, never got anywhere near this concep-
tion, at least not in his theoretical statements. I gather that Lukes agrees with me about
this, but thinks that Durkheim’s social science practice exhibited the traits left out of his
social science theory.

V. SOCIAL THEORY AND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE

This leads to Lukes’ final question: ‘What bearing does this discussion of social
ontology have on substantive social scientific work?’ (p. 10). I am not at all sure that
there is a general answer to that. Sometimes foundational questions are important to
research and sometimes not. It seems to me that a sociologist might study, for example,
fluctuations in trade union membership without worrying too much about social
ontology, in the same way a geologist might study the Loma Prieta earthquake without
worrying about atomic physics. In this very connection, when I gave a lecture on this
topic at the Bourdieu Memorial Conference at the College de France, an American
sociologist who was present told me that his work on trade unions begins where mine
ends. The need for a good theoretical apparatus is greatest when one attempts to do
general social theorizing. The three contemporary social theorists of whose work I have
some knowledge are Bourdieu, Foucault and Habermas. Though I think all three have
great merits, I think their work in every case suffers from weaknesses in the analytic
apparatus that they employ.

VI. ANALYTIC IDIOM

Lukes, echoing Gross, says I use an ‘analytic idiom’. I am not sure what an analytic
idiom is. If it is supposed to be the jargon used by analytic philosophers, then I have
to point out that most analytic philosophers have no interest in social ontology, and
the technical terms I use – ‘institutional facts’, ‘status functions’, ‘deontic powers’ and
so on – were all invented by me and are not to my knowledge part of any general
‘analytic idiom’. The one exception is ‘intentionality’ and we owe that one, in its
technical sense, to a nonanalytic Austro-German, Brentano. If he means ‘analytic’ as
opposed to ‘synthetic’, then I have to say my aim in these discussions is precisely
synthesis as much as analysis. As well as trying to take things apart, I am trying to put
things together.

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SEARLE Reply to Lukes

VII. LIMITS OF THE THEORY

I quite agree with Lukes that my account of institutional facts does not cover the whole
domain of the social sciences, nor was it intended to. Facts about famines, earthquakes,
climate changes and diseases, though crucial for understanding society, are all brute facts,
and thus not subject to the logical analysis I propose for institutional facts. There is for
me an essential question: How does human institutional reality relate to such brute reali-
ties? And this leads to my last point.

VIII. BRUTE FACTS AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTS

Lukes points out correctly that a wide open field for investigation concerns the relation
between brute facts and institutional facts. I claim that, typically, human institutions are
enabling. They give us enormous powers that we would not otherwise have. But often,
the whole point of getting these powers is to get control of brute facts. For example, I
buy a ticket from an airline (institutional fact) in order to move myself from one place
to another (brute fact).
Another example: Hitler became chancellor of Germany (institutional fact) but he
did not just get institutional control of the apparatus of the German government (more
institutional facts); he then used his institutional powers for mass destruction and
genocide (brute facts). A pressing intellectual need in this area is to get an adequate
taxonomy of the various ways in which the brute and institutional relate. I see this as a
proposal for fruitful research and it is certainly a proposal that I welcome.

References
Andersson, Åsa (n.d.) ‘Extending the Scope of Searle’s Theory of Social Reality’,
unpublished paper.
Thomasson, Amie L. (2003) ‘Foundations for a Social Ontology’, ProtoSociology
18–19: 269–90.

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