The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security

THE JOURNAL OF CULTURE,
LANGUAGE AND INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY
This Issue:
Finding a Common Thread:
Implications for the Future of Culture
and Language Programs in Support of
International Security
Making Sense of Culture: Cognitive
Obstacles to Reading Culture Road Signs
Lexical and Semantic Analysis of Defense
Culture and Foreign Language Policies
Integrating Culture General and Cross-cultural Competence &
Communication Skills: Possibilities for the Future of Military Language
and Culture Programs
Cultures of Instruction Redux: Identifying and (Hopefully)
Resolving Conflict
Strategic Enablers: How Intercultural Communication Skills
Advance Micro-Level International Security
Cultural Adaptive Performance: A Definition and Potential Solution
to the Cross-Cultural Performance Criterion Problem
Volume ! Issue ! May "#!$
http://iscl.norwich.edu/online-journal/
Dj vu All Over Again: South Sudans
Return to Conflict

The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security
Publication Information
Editor
Dr. Robert Greene Sands
Production Editor
Jessica DeVisser
Cover Art
Pieter DeVisser
Journal Point of Contact
Robert Greene Sands: rsands@norwich.edu
About JCLIS
The Journal of Culture, Language and International
Security is a publication of the Institute for the
Study of Culture and Language
(http://iscl.norwich.edu). Located at Norwich Uni-
versity, ISCL strives to promote the theory, doc-
trine, and practices foundational to mission success
in the human domain through the application of
culture and language. One of the Institutes goals is
to build and share a comprehensive body of profes-
sional knowledge on research, the development of
learning programs and application of culture and
language considered critical to the future of US military
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Editorial Board

Allison Abbe!Synergist LLC
Thomas Haines!Defense Intelligence Agency
Jackie Ellier!Middle Tennessee State University
Maj. Jonathan F. Brown!Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group
Kerry Fosher!Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, Marine Corps University
Allison Greene- Sands!Defense Language and National Security and Education Office
Catherine Ingold!National Foreign Language Center at the University of Maryland
Scott McGinnis!Defense Language Institute, Washington Office
Lauren Mackenzie!U.S. Air Force Culture and Language Center
Robert R. Greene Sands!Norwich University
Jessica Gallus!Army Research Institute
Aimee Vieira!Norwich University
Marinus van Driel
!

The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security, Vol. 1, Issue 1, May 2014

Table of Contents
Volume !, Issue !, May "#!$

1 Editors Welcome Letter
3 Robert R. Greene Sands
Finding A Common Thread:
Implications For The Future of Culture And
Language Programs In Support of International Security
22 Maj. Jonathan F. Brown
Making Sense of Culture:
Cognitive Obstacles To Reading Culture Road Signs

34 Pieter R. DeVisser
Robert R. Greene Sands
Integrating Culture General and
Cross-Cultural Competence & Communication Skills:
Possibilities For The Future of Military Language and Culture Programs

70 Gonzalo Ferro
Cultural Adaptive Performance:
A Definition and Potential Solution to
The Cross-cultural Performance Criterion Problem

85 Lauren Mackenzie
Strategic Enablers:
How Intercultural Communication Skills
Advance Micro-Level International Security

97 Scott McGinnis
Cultures of Instruction Redux:
Identifying and (Hopefully) Resolving Conflict

104 Claire Metelits
Dj vu All Over Again:
South Sudans Return to Conflict

118 Allison Abbe
Robert Morrow
Lexical and Semantic Analysis of
Defense Culture and Foreign Language Policies

1
Editors Welcome

We would like to welcome you to the inaugural issue of the Journal of Culture, Language and Inter-
national Security (JCLIS), a publication of the Institute for the Study of Culture & Language at
Norwich University (ISCL-NU). The Journal will initially be offered twice a year (May and Decem-
ber). ISCL-NU strives to support the development of theory, doctrine, and practices foundational to
mission success in the human domain through the application of knowledge of culture and language.
The Institute engages in efforts to build and share a comprehensive body of professional knowledge
through research, the development of learning programs to support the application of knowledge of
culture and language considered critical to the future of US military strategy, and missions. JCLIS
undergirds this effort by providing a venue to reach a wide audience of those who are interested in
promoting the advancement of understanding the significance of culture and language in the 21st
century security arena. This new, web-based journal provides an opportunity for a wide range of
academics, practitioners, and students to explore theories, share research, and discuss trends linking
international security to bodies of knowledge in culture and language. The intended audience in-
cludes policy and decision makers, military and non-military academics, professionals and students,
as well as others engaged in efforts to ensure a better understanding of the complex factors at play in
a dynamic and uncertain global environment.
The journal welcomes submissions at this critical intersection of field of inquiry, focus of theory and
application, and intent of practice that will facilitate the development of approaches to international
security informed by knowledge of culture and language that is valid, representative and sustainable.
JCLIS solicits work from an array of related fields such as anthropology, sociology, psychology, area
studies, criminal justice, international relations, political science, economics, linguistics, education,
second language acquisition and more, and encourages submissions with interdisciplinary perspec-
tives.
The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security was conceived to uphold certain stand-
ards of practice. The primary aims of JCLIS include a commitment to open access, while supporting
a diversity of academic scholarship and professional perspective and method of inquiry and social
responsibility.
Open access JCLIS and its content can be accessed from anywhere in the world and at no cost to
those interested in the journal. There are also no fees borne by the author for published articles.
JCLIS facilitates an equal and democratic exchange amongst scholars and practitioners.
Diversity of Perspective JCLIS actively promotes not just the multidisciplinary efforts needed to
address the advancement of culture and language for the pursuit of international security, but wel-
comes the perspectives of those directly involved in applying knowledge of culture and language to
the promotion of international security around the world. JCLIS is not about blurring the bounda-
ries of discipline, organization, or responsibility, but is intent on creating a forum that considers
Editors Welcome

2
boundaries as they exist and works to accentuate the respective strengths of each to bring about
meaningful conversations and collaboration. Further, the journal aims to internationalize, profes-
sionalize and energize scholarly exchange within the academic communities involved.
Diversity of Methodological Approaches JCLIS not only welcomes different epistemological,
methodological, and theoretical traditions, but advocates the belief that to advance the understand-
ing of culture and language to the benefit of international security, pluralism is a necessity. The
journal thereby seeks to also overcome the divide between quantitative and qualitative perspectives
to offer space for scholarship that can allow questions of how and what we know, as well as how we
can engage this epistemology to advance understanding and ultimately application.
Social responsibility and accountability JCLIS emphasizes the responsibility of the editors, its edi-
torial board, and authors to contribute mindfully to the understanding of social issues that are inher-
ent in the pursuit of global security. We believe that all parties participating in JCLIS are mindful of
the social inferences of their research, development of programs, policy making, and professional
practice as it affects the advocacy of their work.
We hope that with these aims, JCLIS can provide a space to engage contrasting perspectives through
meaningful and respectful scholarly debate, actively encouraging the questioning of assumptions,
and allowing for the germination of new ideas when possible. In addition to this first issue, special
thematic sections are also under consideration that will match the synergy of the triple pillars of the
journal and the institute: culture, language and international security. A Call for Submissions will be
put out shortly for the December 2014 issue.
We hope you will want to become a part of the mission of this journal as it relates to your field and
your interests. Please do reach out to us for any reason. We realize our success as a journal is de-
pendent upon the participation and enthusiasm shared by its supporters.
JCLIS Editor

3

Introduction
In this set of comments, I suggest that the value and importance of culture within the Department
of Defense (DoD) faces a dim future in research, learning development and application due to a lack
of resources and dwindling attention. Although not as dire, language programs face a similar future
in the DoD, and elsewhere, with resources dwindling and efforts to maintain existing capability
problematic. This essay explores the utilization and relationship of culture and language (C&L) in
the DoD and suggests that history is repeating itself with regard to scaling back on culture and lan-
guage programs after long, protracted land wars as resources and attention are programmed and pri-
oritized elsewhere. To sustain the development occurring in the last decade and to mitigate the
trend of reducing resources and focus given to C&L, common threads need to be need to be linked
and interwoven in a coherent approach across the C&L communities to promote efficiency while
creating synergy involving the development of each component so as to better facilitate success in
international security missions. This commentary acknowledges that much has been done in the
past within both culture and language, but little across C&L in drawing linkages, but at this time,
and supporting a variety of partnership-building missions, the need is to engage the opportunities
those threads provide. As an uncertain future awaits C&L programs, two examples of utilizing
common threads will be provided as potential models to consider as options to attenuate this
downward slope. This essay is by no means presented as more than just my own ruminations, alt-
hough my reflections span six years of working in and with the DoD doing research, developing
learning programs and applying C&L to DoD military and civilian personnel. As such, it is just one
perspective on the state of affairs of C&L. Within the passionate community of scholars, operators
and teachers interested in advancing C&L, there are many different perspectives that can and should
be advanced as our collective efforts see cutbacks in resources and support from leadership, advo-
cates and key stakeholders alike.

Finding a Common Thread:
Implications for the Future of Culture and Language Programs in
Support of International Security

4
The C&L Imperative
The last decade of operations in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan opened the eyes of military leaders
to the stark reality of the importance of C&L
in military operations. The concept of the
human domain has been introduced recently
to capture the physical, social and cultural en-
vironments that affect and influence human
behavior (McRaven in Ruolo 2013, Sands
2013c, Odierno, et al 2013). There are a myri-
ad of theoretical and on the ground practical
issues with parsing out human behavior with-
in any kind of construct such as a domain.
However, the veracity of the fact that the mili-
tary is now cognizant of the imperative to bet-
ter understand, interact and ultimately influ-
ence a host of cultural groups that can be
relevant to strategy and operations is absolute.
This recognition of the importance of prepar-
ing for operating effectively in the human
domain is now understood as a critical re-
quirement for future operations the DoD will
engage in around the world. Included in this
acceptance of the importance of human in
the human domain are the ability to speak and
understand the language, the awareness of a
universal set of cultural domains and systems
and how that set is expressed for specific cul-
tural groups in various locations, as well as the
motivation to engage the skills necessary to
facilitate successful cross-cultural interactions.
In a wide array of policy, strategy and learning
development documents, the DoD has intro-
duced the concept of language, regional ex-
pertise and culture (LREC).
1
In this construc-

1
See Department of Defense, Implementation Plan for
Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Capa-
bilities (January 2014), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Instruction (CJCSI), Language, Regional Expertise
and Culture (LREC) Capability Identification, Planning
and Sourcing (3126.01A), 31 January 2013, Building
Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Mili-
tion, in addition to the development of lan-
guage skills, the concept of regional expertise
and culture (REC)
2
considers knowledge of a
particular cultural group in a specific location
(region), and more broadly requires an un-
derstanding of universal concepts and pro-
cesses of culture and their application cross-
culturally. Demonstrated REC also includes
skill-based competencies that facilitate im-
proved understanding of others and ones
own behavior in cross-cultural interactions, as
well as competencies that can engage more
successful interactions with different cultural
groups. The culture component of REC for
many is described as both culture-specific -
knowledge of a specific culture or cultural
group - as well as culture-general, which in-
volves the broad and universal conceptual
knowledge about culture and cross-cultural
competence (3C). DoD policy, doctrine and
strategy documents have succeeded in advanc-
ing the importance and need for LREC.
However, the reality is that there are many
complications inherent to LREC as a policy,
but more importantly as a sustainable pro-
gram that can be successful across the DoD.
A primary complication for the REC piece
results from the necessity of bringing a num-
ber of distinct academic disciplines together -
anthropology, sociology, psychology, interna-
tional relations/studies, intercultural commu-
nications and the many interdisciplinary fields
that fall between those disciplines - to help
build, develop and deliver learning programs

tary: Bridging the Gap (2010), US House of Represent-
atives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigation, DoD Language Skills,
Regional Expertise and Cultural Capabilities Strategic
Plan, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI)
5160.70 and Department of Defense Directive
(DoDD) 5160.41E,
2
See Wisecarver et al 2012 for a more detailed explana-
tion of REC
Finding a Common Thread
5
that would advance REC. Another complica-
tion is the need to assess REC performance
so as to adequately build and capture mean-
ingful levels of proficiency.
3

Implicit in this nexus is that the DoD
has/does not view each of those components
equally in resources or in policy. Not bun-
dling them together, unless synergy is
achieved across the three elements, will con-
strain the utility and influence of at least some
but possibly all of their distinctive virtues in
the coming years. Thus the purpose of this
commentary and the genesis of this journal:
common threads already identified and ex-
plored now need to be leveraged across
LREC and those disciplines that are involved
in sustaining, and advancing research, learning
development and application to international
security efforts. This is not to say that LREC
is not important to other United States Gov-
ernment (USG) organizations, such as the
Department of State (DoS), the United States
Agency for International Development
(USAID), the Department of Homeland Se-
curity (DHS), the Peace Corps, the Intelli-
gence Community (IC), or others; it is, but it
has been developed and applied unevenly and
cyclically in some organizations and agencies
more than others. When and where possible,
these threads and efforts across the USG

3
Assessing and measuring REC has been all but un-
obtainable, although efforts to be able to assess com-
ponents, such as 3C were worked on in 2006 and 2007
at AFCLC and ARI (personal communication, K. Fo-
sher, 5/7/2014), and efforts to be able to assess com-
ponents, such as 3C are ongoing through research pro-
jects sponsored by Army Research Institute, see
McCloskey et al (2010). Jennifer Klafehn presented "In
Search of the Magic Bullet: Assessing Cross-Cultural
Competence in the U.S. Army, to the MURI virtual
brownbag on April 30, 2014. This presentation cov-
ered an ongoing ARI project to develop a 3C assess-
ment program.
should be leveraged to enhance research,
learning development and application that will
facilitate security mission effectiveness and
success across the DoD and among organiza-
tions within the Interagency.
For the remainder of this paper, LREC will be
consolidated into the two more broad catego-
ries of C&L. This by no means is in any way
designed to minimize approaches or disci-
plines included in DoDs conceptualization of
LREC from a policy and doctrinal perspec-
tive. Instead, it suggests that culture in this
sense may be a concept best able to capture
the need to explore, understand and ultimately
(if warranted) interact with and influence the
social behavior of foreign cultural groups. To
the legacy of a conventional and bipolar world
order that still dictates some aspects of US
national security policy and missions, region
(as exemplified in international studies and its
derivatives) has been a focus to specialized
DoD populations. Region, traditionally being
a product of the geo-political nation-state
construct and perspective, certainly is a vital
component of the LREC equation. This
broader categorization reflects the growing
importance of a host of actors that are not
confined or defined by nation-state borders,
and presently have a stronger impact on the
viability of national governments than in the
past. One final note, region as a perspective
has a deeper appreciation in DoD strategy and
doctrine than culture ever has. To be frank,
based on future missions that will revolve
around building partnerships and international
security, success in these missions (actions)
will depend more heavily on the capacity to
engage, understand and maintain relationships
with cultural groups within nation-states -
even those that transcend borders and bound-
aries - than with state actors and governmen-
6
tal organizations. Granted that across the
DoD, and other agencies involved in interna-
tional security efforts, the need for specific
components of LREC will vary according to
mission and organization.
The Last Decade
Past experience over the last decade in Iraq
and Afghanistan through reports from mili-
tary and civilian personnel has served to illus-
trate that missions were more successful if
there was a concerted application of culture-
general and culture-specific knowledge to
mission planning and subsequent operations.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, front lines tracked
through neighborhoods and enclaves and the
detail needed was at a level that would
help a Marine having a street-corner interac-
tion in Fallujah or a soldier negotiating with a
leader in Khost (Fosher 2014: xiv) a much
more street-level view than the resolution
provided by a regional or international studies
perspective. On the other hand, as was dis-
covered in Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),
the languages needed did not necessarily
match up with the existing capability available
when Iraq was invaded in 2003.
By 2005, the Services were starting to write
language policy, and by 2008 were initiating
policies involving culture while standing up
culture centers.
4
Attention to language ger-
mane to OEF and OIF was increased and in-
stitutions like the Defense Language Institute
Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) and oth-
ers expanded and improved language pro-
grams in Arabic dialects, as well as other Mid-

4
For a more complete history of culture in the DoD
see Abbe 2014.
5
http://www.dliflc.edu/
6
Now Defense Language and National Security Educa-
tion Office (DLNSEO)
7
http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050330roadmap.pdf
8
Recent activity in Crimea, and before that the Repub-
dle Eastern languages. To meet the rapid ac-
celeration and numbers of deployments to
first Iraq and later to Afghanistan, culture and
location-specific predeployment programs
were rushed into delivery and soon mobile
training teams were crisscrossing the country
and also provided in-country culture aware-
ness training to thousands of military service
and civilian support personnel. Concerted
efforts and dollars were spent in developing
state of the art simulations and avatar-based
training trying to appeal to a new generation
of learners while in some ways making the
soundness of culture theory and knowledge
secondary to the product. Contracted role
players populated mock Iraqi and Afghan vil-
lages and Infantry Immersion Trainers for
ground forces to practice patrolling in simu-
lated environments. Research programs de-
signed to explore capabilities such as 3C and
other interactional competencies were started
in institutions such as Army Research Insti-
tute (ARI) and Defense Equal Opportunity
Management Institute (DEOMI), among oth-
ers.
The admittedly uneven gains made in content
and application of C&L over the last decade
are threatened by the same cycle of variables -
such as reduced resources, both human and
otherwise and a return to a peacetime military
where the allure of technology development
to solve the human element trumps the de-
velopment of the softer skills, such as C&L
as enduring capabilities - that seem to repli-
cate following extended and involved conflict
in recent history, including the 1915-1934 Ba-
nana Wars in Haiti, Nicaragua, Dominican
Republic and most notably Viet Nam (see for
example Fosher 2014, Abbe 2014, McFate
2005). For those involved in this mad dash
to first make culture relevant as well as sound-
7
ly presented, and in meeting the growing need
for proficient language speakers, there has
been suspicion that this cycle up could have
been averted if lessons learned in prior con-
flicts had been heeded and carried forward
(Abbe and Gouge 2012, McFate 2005, Fosher
2014, Abbe 2014).
As resources dwindle and the last military op-
erations in Afghanistan are completed, imme-
diacy, necessity and visibility of C&L will be
reduced; this is already happening. However,
in an ironic juxtaposition the same sets of
competencies, skills and enablers that sup-
ported population-centric Counterinsurgency
(COIN) missions in Iraq and Afghanistan will
be important in an array of partnership build-
ing programs embarked on by future DoD
missions. Despite key leadership and stake-
holders acknowledging the importance of
C&L (see Odierno et al 2013, McRaven 2012,
Flynn et al, 2012 and Panetta 2012) , funding
and attention to necessary resources seems to
be moving in the opposite direction (Vergan
2013, . Keeping C&L in play and viable for
future development has not been helped by
the last decade of how culture more so than
language was inserted into programs to ad-
dress immediate need without the same atten-
tion to long term sustainment. With regard to
culture, this was characterized by a fire hose
application without much thought for con-
necting content to theory or sustainability of
effort past the immediate need posed by op-
erations. Culture as products, such as Smart
Cards and Books, Field Guides, and even live-
actor immersions and simulations, are only as
good as the depth and validity of the infor-
mation available. As soon as they are printed,
shot, or developed, their value depreciates as
they become static expressions that over time
will represent merely historical record. Iraq
and Afghanistan were minefields of cultural
complexity involving an array of ethnic and
religious groups that defied the recorded
knowledge on paper or video. Navigating
these minefields does not get any easier when
our efforts in Afghanistan cease; it is repre-
sentative of what DoD military and civilian
personnel will face and engage in in many are-
as around the world in the future.
A New World Order
In fairness to the DoD, it was only within the
last decade, and specifically after 9/11 and
following the first few years of combat in
Iraq, that culture appeared on the radar again
as critical for mission success. However, after
only ten years, the direction of C&L is once
again in danger of going in reverse. Language
programs may at least be able to tread water,
due to the fact that language has been im-
portant to certain DoD organizations and
missions and to those who support diplomatic
and country-team efforts. In other words,
language as an enabling skill had the influence
of stakeholders to institutionalize learning, a
Defense Language Institute (DLI),
5
and was
aided by the development of an Office of Sec-
retary of Defense (OSD) flagship policy
office (Defense Language Office
6
) and the
2005 Defense Language Transformation
Roadmap
7
to sustain its program.
Yet, as the Department and other USG organ-
izations struggle with the effects of war, they
are at the same time recalibrating the future of
our national security policy and the shape of
the force to meet a world that no longer fits a
conventional nation-state paradigm, but in-

5
http://www.dliflc.edu/
6
Now Defense Language and National Security Educa-
tion Office (DLNSEO)
7
http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050330roadmap.pdf
8
stead is one framed by a continued war on
terrorism and its infrastructure while book-
ended by programs to build or rebuild inter-
national security around the world. Dramatic
regime changes, insurgencies, massive civil
unrest, nation-states rupturing from within,
and pressures from ethnic, tribal and religious
perspectives are not uncommon.
8
This new
world order additionally features a transna-
tional security landscape that includes state-
actors sharing security concerns along with a
host of non-state actors and cultural groups -
some fed by extremist motivations and others
perhaps motivated by a failure to address as-
pects of human security. Also feeding into
global instability is the increase of human-
made and environmental crises that impact
emerging and developing or unstable nations
to a greater extent than the rest of developed
world. The need to more clearly understand
this new world order and then interact within
it to advance international security post-
COIN is crucial. Testament to the effective-
ness of C&L stems from experience relayed
by personnel in COINs natural laboratory
where C&L competencies and skills were
identified as effectively helping to support
asymmetrical and unconventional warfare
missions. On the flip side, however, neither
military nor civilian personnel were adequately
trained or prepared in these competencies and
skills for these missions and thus efforts met
with varying degrees of success and failure.
An Uncertain Future at Best
C&L programs now face a perfect storm fea-
turing: decreasing resources; a movement to-

8
Recent activity in Crimea, and before that the Repub-
lic of Georgia indicates that issue of newly minted gov-
ernments and issues with their nations security does
not just lie in Africa, South America and southwest
Asia, for example.
ward greater technology in the DoD; the end
of the decade-long conflict that prompted the
escalation of C&L and the immediacy of C&L
being pushed down the DoD priority list
and a Department needing to address the im-
pact of multiple deployments on the Force
and military families. DoD reports to Con-
gress have identified fewer than eight percent
of the Total Force with foreign language ca-
pability (tested and self-assessed).
9
Yet, it
could be argued that this new set of missions
brings national security priorities that are
more variable, but no less important in many
areas around the world, and an engagement of
a cross-cultural complexity far greater than
encountered in the past decade. Former Sec-
retary of Defense Gates made the following
statement regarding C&L, The nations se-
vere lack of regional expertise and linguistic
capability is an issue I have thought about and
worried about for a long time, both as the Di-
rector of the CIA and then as the president of
a large university and now as Secretary of De-
fense. This is a problem that has been a long
time developing, and it is a problem that will
take quite some time to fix.
10
Future mis-
sions outlined by the Department in speeches
and publications include activities and support
that will need the same level or advanced lan-
guage proficiency and culture capabilities, al-
beit in smaller numbers, but still spanning the
total force and across the Combatant Com-
mands.

9
DoD Report to Congress: Foreign Language Profi-
ciency (Mar 2012). Of 3,269,543 personnel in the Total
Force, DoD has identified 258,786 personnel with for-
eign language capability; 7.92% of the Total Force.
10
DoD Strategic Plan for Language skills, Regional
expertise, and Cultural capabilities: 2011-2016.
http://prhome.defense.gov/RFM/READINESS/DL
NSEO/files/STRAT%20PLAN.pdf
9
Government-funded culture programs, more
so than language programs, have waxed and
now are waning in importance. Service cul-
ture centers across the DoD are reducing in
effort and personnel, in contrast to the height
of effort and support after 2006. Their mis-
sion is changing as the demand signal need for
predeployment training to support if a large
deploying land force is diminishing and the
culture-specific products developed to meet
this mission are no longer primary concerns.
Their mission has radically curtailed as
predployment training and cultural products
are no longer primary concerns. Predeploy-
ment training is still being given, but to more
specific groups such as Special Operations
Forces (SOF), Marine Expeditionary Units
(MEU) and Female Engagement Teams
(FETs) and for mission such as Security Force
Assistance (SFA) and Foreign Internal De-
fense (FID) among others. If history is to be
our guide, without the immediacy of conflict
to drive need, culture eventually becomes a
secondary or even lower consideration. Lan-
guage training is certainly a relevant skill to
assist in mission success of those that beckon
from the near horizon, but the current cost to
train and then sustain proficiency at a level
that is relevant to missions is considerable
(although a small fraction of a DoD budget).
Research in areas to support further develop-
ment in understanding culture has also been
reduced due to funding uncertainty. It is cer-
tain that C&L programs matured across the
Total Force in a time where need drove a
much focused effort to support missions in
distinct locations with specific cultural groups.
This approach to C&L was never sustainable
for a Total Force once focus turned away
from these specific regions to meet more
global and transnational security threats.

If it isnt institutionalized by Now
"we are not going to stop screaming that
this country has to take language seriously and
we have to take language seriously because it
is a critical skill now to success on the battle-
field.
11

C&L competencies sit at a crossroads. They
are necessary enablers for current and future
missions, highlighted as critical by any number
of leadership, policy makers, educators and
operators, but far from being institutionalized
in learning programs across the DoD to en-
dure the transformation to a military having to
make critical choices where funds are placed.
Of the three perspectives that make up
LREC, culture is the only one not already sol-
idly institutionalized in policy, doctrine and
learning (professional military education
(PME) and training). There are pockets of
culture that exist as components of PME: the
Air Force Culture and Language Center
(AFCLC) features professors in anthropology,
cross-cultural psychology, cross-cultural
communications and others who are aligned
to both the Center and the PME institutions
that make up Air University at Maxwell AFB.
The Center for Advanced Operational Culture
Learning (CAOCL) and Marine Corps Uni-
versity (MCU) have developed a career long
Region/Culture/Language Familiarization

11
Michael Dominguez in Redden, E. (2014 Area Stud-
ies Mismatch, Inside Higher Ed (14 April),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/14/c
onference-focuses-state-area-and-foreign-language-
studies#sthash.uaaA4i6M.o20Iw3JU.dpbs
10
(RCLF) Distance Learning program
12
that is
just one of a several culture programs that
the Marine Corps has institutionalized, while
TRADOC Culture Center (TCC) at Ft.
Huachuca provides region, culture-specific
and cross-cultural competence training across
the US Army. The US Navy features an
LREC Navy-wide program as well as the start
of an Asia Hands program that features re-
gional familiarization.
13
Each of the Service
academies includes active language, region-
al/international studies and some elements of
culture in their curriculum; the US. Military
Academy at West Point has a Chair of Inter-
cultural Competence.
Traditionally language and region-strong pop-
ulations in the Force, such as Special Opera-
tions Forces (SOF), Foreign Area Officers
(FAOs) and Defense attachs who have al-
ways been well-prepared in region and lan-
guage, have also started to seed some culture
into their professional development. The
Office of Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) and the individual agencies across
the Intelligence Community (IC) also have
language and region programs in varying
strengths but are just now beginning to see
the benefit of culture as a means to advance
their missions. In brief, each of the culture
centers, along with other service elements, do

12
See RCLF site,
https://www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl/SitePages/RCLF.
aspx
13
See Navy LREC program
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupersnpc/career/language_culture/Pa
ges/default2.aspx. , The Asia Pacific (APAC) Hand pro-
gram is an officer-centric extended learning program
to build and identify officers with regional under-
standing and confidence to inform decision makers.
The programs varying levels are marked by incremen-
tal increases in graduate education and experience
gained in select regionally focused billets (APAC,
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/career/language_culture/Pages/APACHands.aspx).
manage to work across the policy, doctrine,
and learning areas, but the ability to continue
further development of C&L programs, even
just sustaining the current level of commit-
ment is deeply problematic.
Research
Research and technical development in C&L
has not been without programs or funding in
the last decade.
14
Region from an internation-
al relations/political science perspective has a
deeper history within the DoD and has
worked well with a conventional state actor
paradigm. With regard to culture, however,
there is over-reliance on technology to pro-
duce efforts that can double for theoretically
solid approaches and ethnographically-
validated data, while efforts to introduce cul-
ture lack a contemporary reality of what cul-
ture is and how it can be useful to programs
serviced by technology. In addition, there
seems to be a programmatic imperative to
develop a product (call it a success and
move on) as well as a budgetary process and
timeline that works against real and useful ap-
plication to planning strategy, operations and
missions.
The science and technology approach
tends to become attractive to organi-

14
DoD and USG research organizations have included
research agendas that include LREC components. See
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), http://www.darpa.mil/default.aspx, Intelli-
gence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA),
http://www.iarpa.gov, Office of Naval Research
(ONR), http://www.onr.navy.mil/, Center for the Ad-
vanced Study of Language (CASL),
http://www.casl.umd.edu/, DoDs Minvera Initiative,
http://minerva.dtic.mil/ and Office of Secretary of
Defenses Human Sociocultural Board (HCSB)
http://www.dtic.mil/biosys/hscb-mp.html, and Air
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). Army Research
Institute (ARI) and Defense Equal Opportunity Man-
agement Institute (DEOMI) have also engaged in be-
havioral research in 3C programs.
11
zations when they realize that the ex-
perts are not necessarily going to show
up when needed and that building in-
ternal capacity is going to take a long
time. Understandably then, organiza-
tions look for ways to analyze culture
or interact cross-culturally that do not
require a great deal of expertise, inter-
nal or external. It is easy for DOD or-
ganizations to swing back to one of
their old standbys, If we give it to the
engineers theyll fix it for us, because
the engineers can solve anything (Fo-
sher, in press).
There does not seem to be a scarcity of re-
search opportunities to engage culture to in-
form missions. Several research institutions
have engaged resources to further investigate
culture and its application to aid future need,
yet their conceptual apparatus will always
push them to conceive of problems in par-
ticular ways that are not relevant to most so-
cial scientists and their perspective, or, more
importantly, to human behavior. For example,
the Minerva Program, a sociocultural partner-
ship between academia and the DoD, tends to
focus on topical areas and a penchant to em-
phasize perspectives that involve neurobiolog-
ical and cognitive science as well as interna-
tional relations and political sciences
perspectives.
Technology and Learning Programs
The science and technology approach also
seems germane to the development of tech-
nology to promote training and education in
culture. In the last decade, with time short,
needs high and a budget that would make
most social science educators think they had
died and gone to research heaven, trying to
build in knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs)
through simulation and gaming was much
more palatable to a Department not com-
posed of social scientists. More attention was
spent on trying to make the simulation or
other experience real than undergirding the
technology with the theoretical notions of cul-
ture not in line with existing theory or the cul-
tural reality of the locations or peoples ad-
vanced in the simulation. Moving forward,
effort might be better spent in developing ca-
pacity to promote trained role players, expert
instructors, and professionally developed mili-
tary personnel. It is easier to build technology
that can be pushed into service to fill a need,
than to bow to the reality of time, effort, lim-
its of its predictive ability and methods uti-
lized in good social science research, not to
mention the science itself. At present we do
not have the basic science that would allow us
to render complex cross-cultural processes
into computer algorithms, nor does the nature
of knowledge about culture allow it to be
parsed for storage in databases (Fosher, in
press).
Perhaps, advances can be made in marrying
technology to the social sciences, but progress
will not be made unless there is an active col-
laboration of intent and understanding of
theory and what can be provided by all in-
volved. In many ways, if this collaboration
can help promote a more solid understanding
of the questions that need to be asked, bend-
ing technology to help in the endeavor of an-
swering those questions might be more bene-
ficial (see McNamara et al, 2011 and Turnley
and Perls, 2008).
Collateral Uncertainty
A reduction in C&L resources is not just a
DoD or interagency danger, as US universities
and colleges face a similar future in promoting
active programs in C&L. A recent conference
highlighted a dismal future and motivation of
12
C&L in the DoD and United States Govern-
ment (USG) organizations. The conference,
Internationalization of U.S. Education in the
21st Century: The Future of International and
Foreign Language Studies. A Research Con-
ference on National Needs and Policy Impli-
cation,
15
revealed a paradox of rising interest
in language and declining resources to support
that interest, .concerned about the decline
in federal and university support for their
programs (Redden 2014). The DoD, and the
Interagency like those in academic programs
across US universities and colleges know that
expanding language (and culture) programs is
critical to keep pace with international busi-
ness and our national security. There are two
concerns about the near and mid-term future.
The first concern is that the deep Federal
budget cuts of 2011 affected the ability to just
meet sustainability let alone an increase in lan-
guage programs and studies in secondary and
higher education. Second, although as indi-
cated earlier in this article, DoD and the In-
teragency leadership and policymakers have
strongly endorsed the criticality of C&L, pro-
gress to translate that importance into contin-
ued funding has been minimal at best in cul-
ture as well as program maintenance for
language.
In summary, these are just some examples of
a contemporary and uneven application of
C&L across the DoD. Culture is in danger of
being relegated to an afterthought in existing
learning programs save for some of the ex-
amples above, and even those instances if not
funded for sustainment will see an eventual

15
Internationalization of U.S. Education in the 21st
Century The Future of International and Foreign Lan-
guage Studies A Research Conference on National
Needs and Policy Implications,
http://www.wm.edu/offices/revescenter/international
ization/description%20/index.php
demise in keeping culture relevant. We
are entering a time when standalone programs
are being dismantled or left to wither without
resources.Programs developed purely for
the conflicts of the last ten years are finding it
hard to justify continued existence (Fosher
2014: xvi). I do not think there is any doubt
throughout leadership and stakeholders that
C&L are key enablers. Moving beyond the
concept of enabler to making aspects of cul-
ture core competencies is a critical step (Ab-
be 2014). The military develops programs
based on requirements. The more C&L can
be turned into requirements across the DoD,
the better it will be for institutionalization.
Common Threads
Wir hren von einer besondern Einrichtung
bei der englischen Marine. Smtliche Tau-
werke der kniglichen Flotte, vom strksten
bis zum schwchsten, sind der gestalt gespon-
nen, dass ein roter Faden durch das Ganze
durchgeht, den man nicht herauswinden kann,
ohne alles aufzulsen, und woran auch die
kleinsten Stcke kenntlich sind, dass sie der
Krone gehren. (Goethe, 1962)
(Translation) We heard of a special provision
of the English Navy. All plaited ropes in the
Royal Fleet, from the strongest up to the
weakest, are spun such that red thread is run-
ning through the whole rope which cannot be
removed without disintegrating everything. So
even for the smallest pieces, it is recognizable
that they belong to the crown.
This imagery from Goethes Elective Affini-
ties provides us with a way of thinking about
common threads, red threads, as integral to
the continuity of C&L, the removal of which
likely to unravel future DoD efforts. Thus far,
the thoughts and reflections shared in this
13
commentary reveal an uncertain future, at
most, a calamitous prediction of culture and
possibly to some extent language as mission
enablers being placed back on the shelf of
been there, done that. As scholars, re-
searchers, teachers, operators and program
managers, all invested in supporting a more
stable international security, we must realize
there are several common threads that con-
nect our efforts together, but that unless
threads are established, efforts to sustain, or
even advance C&L as critical to international
security will be problematic. There are two
types of threads that offer to bind C&L ef-
forts together. First is the existential red
thread of policy, approach, research, dogma,
and doctrine that is essential to further devel-
opment and articulation within the communi-
ty and will allow all interested stakeholders
visibility into ongoing research, learning de-
velopment and application of C&L and pro-
vide some continuity across these efforts.
The second binding is more of a carbon-fiber
thread
16
that strengthens the fabric, the fiber
and the tensile strength of rope. This thread is
the creation and adoption of theoretical and
sound pedagogy and useful and meaningful
assessment measures that that bind C&L
KSAAs across learning events. The identifica-
tion of red threads will allow all interested
stakeholders visibility into ongoing research,
learning development and application of C&L
and provide some continuity across these ef-
forts.
Malcom Gladwell, in his book, Tipping Point:
How Little Things Can Make a Big Differ-
ence, reflects on those variables that are criti-
cal to inform and engage that moment where
change, a tipping point, can generate, acceler-

16
Thanks to Thomas Haines for this analogy
ate or promote the success of a social move-
ment. To Gladwell, there exists in the lifetime
of social movements where a certain course of
action or direction of path reaches a point
where small changes or movements coalesce
to prompt a cascade of change that will see
new trends, or to Malcom Gladwell, a tipping
point, the moment of critical mass, the
threshold, the boiling point (Gladwell
2005:12). One of his observations about the
success of these points is the environment
and the individual and groups invested in
achieving change. If you want to bring a
fundamental change in people's belief and be-
havior...you need to create a community
around them, where those new beliefs can be
practiced and expressed and nurtured. Since
publication, there have been counter studies
done on the validity of Gladwells assertions
about the connectors and the other socially
and behaviorally privileged few (that form
hubs) that are critical to germinate those
changes.
17
However, there does seem to be
some agreement that context (existing envi-
ronment) and to me the profound strength of
the common threads can promulgate effective
change.
Examples of Red Threads
Two examples of efforts within the DoD that
featured and continue to feature common
threads and community-wide approaches can
provide possible models for future work.
The first example considers the development
of cross-cultural competence (3C) as a critical
set of knowledge, skills, abilities (and atti-
tudes) as part of a culture-general approach to
provide cultural capabilities that were and are
critical to US and coalition efforts in Iraq and

17
August 12, 2003 NY Times Article
14
Afghanistan.
18
Identified initially by social and
behavioral scientists (Selmeski 2007, Abbe et
al, 2007) as a multiplier to population-centric
missions, a confederated body of multidisci-
plinary social and behavioral scientists and
educators, Service-wide military personnel,
and OSD policy strategists came together in
working groups and smaller meetings to con-
ceptualize 3C. An Office of Secretary De-
fense (OSD) conference on 3C was held in
2009, sponsored by then Defense Language
Office (now Defense Language and National
Security Education Office, DLNSEO) and a
variety of meetings and exchanges between
social and behavioral scientists and OSD were
held on continuing research and learning suc-
cesses. Several DoD research institutions en-
gaged in research on defining, assessing and
applying 3C to develop a greater understand-
ing.
19
A 3C web portal was developed to act
to consolidate 3C learning and feature ongo-
ing research
20
and DLNSEO managed the
development of several training simulations
called Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainers
(VCATs) that were specific to Combatant
Commands (COCOMs), such as AFRICOM
and SOUTHCOM. Developmental models
of 3C have been proposed (McCloskey, et al,
2010, Reid, et al, 2012 and Reid et al, 2014)
and ongoing research by ARI seeks to further

18
This section on 3C is not meant to be an inclusive
and indepth account of its development and expression
in the DoD. Resources highlighted are meant to be
examples of work done and published. (Gallus, et al
(2014) provides the most complete and systematic re-
view of current and ongoing efforts in 3C and features
an extensive annotated bibliography. See also Fosher
2014, Abbe 2014, and Sands and Greene-Sands 2014
for a more in-depth perspective of the development of
3C in DoD
19
see Gallus et al (2014) and Sands and Greene-Sands
(2014) for a DoD-wide survey of efforts to include
conceptualization, assessment, and development of 3C
20
See www.cultureready.org
explore this model. Currently, 3C has been
folded into additional learning programs
across the DoD and can be found in the De-
fense Intelligence Agency (Sands and Haines
2013, Sands 2013a & b) and in other Intelli-
gence Community (IC) agencies,
21
Joint For-
eign Area Officer (FAO) training, among oth-
ers; while 3C is now written into Services lan-
language and culture strategies.
22

The last eight years of 3C research and learn-
ing development has seen a remarkable effort
of scholarship and collaboration across a mul-
titude of disciplines, involving a dedicated
community now facing the eventual reduction
in focus and funding that will come once
forces are drawn down. It has been a period
not without debate and passionate discussion
by those in the community concerning theory
and bridging discipline divide, yet the com-
munity overcame the effects of a period of
time where funding was plentiful, but direc-
tion and sensibility in short supply. Out of
the large room of opportunity, there was col-
lection of people from divergent perspectives,
operators, policy writers, and different aca-
demic walks of life, willing to give up per-
sonal opportunities and do the long hard, and
often unrewarded work of forging the con-
cept of 3C into something we could all, more
or less, agree on and use....Rarely has academ-
ia or the government seen so many different

21
Between 2004 and the present, the IC has had nu-
merous working groups and community-wide or agen-
cy-specific efforts to identify and develop the
knowledge and skills needed by different kinds of intel-
ligence personnel. The IC just recently launched a
community-wide Culture and Regional Knowledge
Expert Group (CRKEG) to explore identifying region
and cultural knowledge and skills.
22
Draft DoD policy on LREC included 3C training
and development (publication of each is expected
shortly, Greene-Sands 2014).
15
perspectives converge on one approach (Fo-
sher 2014: xv-xvi).
The second example of collaboration within
the C&L community concerns intersection of
C&L in learning development and proficiency.
Working intimately with a host of cultural
groups demands effectiveness in intercultural
communication; ensuring the effectiveness
of intercultural communication has become
increasingly critical as US government, mili-
tary, and NGO personnel work closely in
joint efforts, and not only at senior levels (In-
gold 2014:304). Two events will be high-
lighted here that explore this intersection.
The first event is the identification of behav-
ioral elements that can facilitate more success-
ful intercultural communication events. The
second event considers re-envisioning the
knowledge, skills and abilities necessary to
support future emphasis on partnership build-
ing as a synergistic combination of language,
region and culture. This re-envisioning oper-
ates on the premise that capabilities to pro-
mote successful facilitation of missions in-
volved in this partnership building will
improve when brought together in a sound
and sequenced learning event.
To the first event, the Interagency Language
Roundtable (ILR)
23
, a volunteer group of affil-
iated government linguists and academic and
professional linguists (see Ingold 2014) con-
vened an effort to develop Intercultural Com-
petence (ICC) skill descriptors that would
highlight skills appropriate to the non-
linguistic aspects of intercultural communica-
tion into consideration and loosely align with
proficiency levels for existing language skills
(several members of this journals editorial

23
ILR webpage: http://www.govtilr.org/
board were part of that two-year effort). This
development was seen as a response for the
need to communicate and interact effec-
tively with members of communities whose
cultural frame of reference is markedly differ-
ent from their own (Ingold 2014: 304). Alt-
hough the ICC skill descriptor development
committee was primarily composed of lan-
guage professionals, the members sought to
bring in aspects of intercultural communica-
tions theory, pedagogy and application to help
guide their efforts. The skill descriptors have
since been published and in response to this
effort
24
, the ILR in May of 2012 added a Cul-
ture Committee (co-chaired by Allison
Greene-Sands and Ewa Zeoli) to explore the
intersection of C&L to better facilitate what
has been seen in the language community as
the need to marry culture into existing re-
search and learning programs.
Potential next steps for the community with
regard to intercultural communications could
be to further explore the development of
can-do statements for intercultural commu-
nication that can be general enough (culture-
general) to apply to a majority of cultural
groups within specified languages and to take
on the development of a competency or per-
formance scale (similar to the existing scale
seen in the American Council of Teachers of
Foreign Language (ACTFL) or perhaps like
the Defense Language Proficiency Test
(DLPT), which is intended to identify lan-
guage proficiency against the ILR skill level
descriptors.
25
Although these efforts seem to

24
See ICC skill descriptors:
http://www.govtilr.org/Skills/Competence.htm
25
See Defense Language Proficiency Test:
http://www.dliflc.edu/dlptguides.html and American
Council of Foreign Language Standards;
http://www.actfl.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/public/
StandardsforFLLexecsumm_rev.pdf
16
be logical next steps, success will depend on
both the C&L communities willingness to
acquire intercultural KSAAs which can be re-
liably assessed. Efforts exist in the DoD to
promote research and learning development
in intercultural communication which can ad-
vance language acquisition as well as devel-
opment of pedagogy to successfully manage a
security environment that no longer contains
distinct front lines within the newly human
domain. Work by intercultural communica-
tion scholars in the DoD such as Mackenzie
(Mackenzie 2014, this issue, and Mackenzie
and Wallace,) and Greene-Sands (2014a) can
provide the language community ongoing re-
search and learning development to ensure
that Intercultural Communication contribu-
tions (such as the ICC skill descriptors) are
both institutionalized and utilized effectively.
This important work is put into practice by
such scholars as Vieira (2014) who examines
interpretation in non-permissive environ-
ments. While language proficiency can be the
critical piece of C&L to advance in-depth un-
derstanding, some elements of future missions
will most undoubtedly involve the continued
or more advanced use of interpreters to
communicate with local populations.
The second avenue for consideration as a
model to highlight common threads is to ex-
plore alternatives to existing learning tradi-
tions in language and culture in the
DoD. One possible model is currently being
piloted at Joint Base Lewis/McChord (Sands
2013a, kand Sands, 2014, this issue). Results
and future implications will be presented at
the 2014 June ILR session. Language famili-
arity courses at JBLM aim for proficiency of 1
on a scale of 0+ to 5 on the DLPT. With this
new approach, the language courses combine
traditional language instruction with 3C, cul-
ture-general and culture-specific knowledge,
and intercultural communication in a blended
10-week format. A preliminary note to this
effort and other models intending to marry
C&L together, language instruction offers an
extended and intensive period of several
weeks to months and in that period is a longer
forum in which to include culture/3C ele-
ments. For example in a 10-week language
familiarization course, there are over 300
hours of instruction. Pilot efforts have indi-
cated that folding non-linguistic KSAAs into
the curriculum can better enhance overall
learning and proficiency in competencies nec-
essary for the intimacy of missions that will be
featured in national security efforts.
This is not a small shift in approach or per-
spective; it is the acknowledgement that learn-
ing a language does not necessarily make you
adept at culture-general or 3C, or even pro-
vide a solid culture-specific knowledge base
unless you purposely set out to build and staff
an integrated curriculum and overall learning
event. Sands (2013) offers reasons why a
C&L course makes sense, to include budget-
ary, resourcing, and the intuitive fit of lin-
guistic, intercultural communication and
cross-cultural competence with the culture-
general and culture-specific knowledge neces-
sary for language and communicative profi-
ciency. There are ample DoD and Interagen-
cy organizations and programs that feature
extended learning opportunities where this or
similar approaches can be adopted.
Over the last decade, developing language
proficiency has been identified and developed
for populations beyond those such as intelli-
gence analysts/collectors and professional
linguists considered necessary in a post-Cold-
War security environment. Language, just as
17
much as culture, was found to enhance effec-
tiveness across operations in OEF and OIF,
and language programs will continue at places
such as DLI and for organizations such as
SOCOM and the IC. Granted, not everyone
in the DoD goes through extended language
training, or even sustainment training, but
those who do should be exposed to culture
(culture-general, culture-specific, and 3C),
with the accompanying KSAAs as part of the
overall learning experience. It just makes
sense. There are a number of different learn-
ing approaches that feature a variety of learn-
ing models - residential, distance learning or
blended (the JBLM pilot featured all three
models). Perhaps by shifting perspective, stu-
dents gain a minimum of language skills in
this program to effectively operate in a for-
eign environment, but may equipped with the
requisite cultural capability (and cultural con-
text) to understand what is or could be mis-
understood culturally.
Summary
This essay is by no means a comprehensive
survey of ongoing work in C&L across the
DoD and Interagency and academia, nor is it
intended to be anywhere near a definitive
statement of what needs to happen in the fu-
ture. As hopefully this commentary has ex-
posed, there is real need to align perspectives
from those within and across the C&L com-
munity. It is also an invitation to join an ex-
panding community of interested groups to
continue and advance efforts to better facili-
tate international security. This brief survey
did not include efforts occurring elsewhere
outside of the US in C&L; it is certain that
visibility into research and development in
organizations and agencies internationally can
better inform efforts by all. What it does rep-
resent is a frank admission to the reduction in
resources from existing funding organizations,
and a recognition that although region and
language programs may maintain at existing
levels, or reduce slightly, funding and re-
sources for cultural programs will see dra-
matic cutbacks. This sets the future of C&L
in a precarious tipping point. It takes a vil-
lage certainly applies to the efforts needed to
advance C&L to benefit international security.
Culture, Language and International Security
is offered up as one of the vehicles devoted to
promote and sustain research, learning devel-
opment, and application of C&L in the DoD
and the Interagency, to promulgate partner-
ships across the USG and institutions of high-
er learning, and to foster multidisciplinary ap-
proaches and perspectives to a continued
dialogue that will be open and invaluable to
all.
18
References

Abbe, A., & Gouge, M. (2012). Cultural training for military personnel: Revisiting the Vietnam era.
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21

Robert R. Greene Sands, Ph.D is an anthropologist and
Director & Senior Research Fellow for the Institute for the
Study of Culture and Language (ISCL) at Norwich Universi-
ty. Sands is an adjunct professor in the Norwich University
College of Graduate and Continuing Studies and is also a Sen-
ior Research Consortium Fellow for the Consortium Re-
search Fellows Program supporting US Army Research Insti-
tute. He is Editor of the ISCLs online journal Culture,
Language and International Security (CLIS). From 2008 to
2011, Dr. Sands was Culture Chair of the Cross-Cultural
Competence Department, and Assistant Professor of An-
thropology at the Air Force Culture and Language Center
(AFCLC) and Air University at Maxwell AFB, AL. He was al-
so Director of the Minerva Initiative for Energy and Envi-
ronmental Security during his tenure at Air University. Dr.
Sands also is a consultant supporting the development of cul-
ture and cross-cultural competence programs across the De-
partment of Defense. He has presented to organizations such
as AFRICOM, 17th Air Force, the US Air Force Expeditionary Center, the Joint Chaplains Col-
lege, Special Operations Command, the JAG School, Advanced Air Mobility Operations, Joint
Military Attach School, Joint Foreign Area Officer Phase One course, Defense and National
Intelligence professionals, among others. Dr. Sands has authored seven books and numerous
chapters and articles on topics such as cross-cultural competence, environmental security, build-
ing partnerships and sustainability, sport and culture, ethnographic theory, and the cognitive ori-
gins of religion. His seventh book (co-authored with Allison Greene-Sands) is Cross-Cultural
Competence for a 21st Century Military Culture: the Flipside of COIN (2013, Lexington Books).
Dr. Sands holds a BA from Illinois State University, an MA from Iowa State University and a
PhD from University of Illinois, all in anthropology.

The author would like to acknowledge the efforts of the following in providing review of this ar-
ticle: Maj Jonathan Brown, Mark Dye, Lauren MacKenzie, Aimee Vieira, Thomas Haines, Kerry
Fosher, Aillison Greene-Sands, and Pieter DeVisser. Often, it indeed takes a village.
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22

ABSTRACT
Reading cultural road signs effectively requires insights into common cognitive errors, or bias, that
shape attitudes and thinking patterns. Effects of bias are powerful and more common than most
Marines acknowledge. This article discusses four biases relevant to cultural sense-making: hindsight
and confirmation bias, framing effect and loss aversion. This article complements discussion of
operational culture, the Marine Corps approach to developing cross-cultural knowledge and skills
needed for Marines to operate effectively in any clime and place.
The lessons of the last decade have taught us that trust and cooperation cannot be surged, and nei-
ther can culture skills. The quality of relationships that Marines build with people is critical to mis-
sion success. Marines need to be able to work effectively with people from cultures that may be sig-
nificantly different from their own. The goal is for Marines to develop the concepts and skills with
which to read any culture.

The views expressed in this work are the authors alone and do not represent the position of the
United States Marine Corps.

Making Sense of Culture:
Cognitive Obstacles to Reading Culture Road Signs

Maj. Jonathan F. Brown
Making Sense of Culture: Cognitive Obstacles to Reading Culture Road Signs
23
Culture means many things to a wide audi-
ence of people. Young Marines commonly
associate cultural proficiency with etiquette.
Marines senior enough to receive professional
military education are taught five dimensions
of operational culture to improve planning
and tactical performance overseas. Lieutenant
General George Flynn set the standard of cul-
tural awareness for Strategic Corporals.

Marines must be trained to read cultural road
signs to distinguish threat from customary
behavior in people whose customs may seem
strange. Marines must communicate and
understand the context of the environments
in which they operate.
1

Familiarity with cultural road signs can be un-
derstood in many ways. Developing cultural
literacy, in the sense of reading cultural road
signs, involves steps that do not come natural-
ly to most Marines.

In this article, I use Daniel Kahnemans analy-
sis of bias from his book, Thinking, Fast and
Slow, and perspectives from my own 17-year
career in the Marine Corps to examine chal-
lenges in developing cross-cultural compe-
tence among Marines. In particular, I exam-
ine how four common biases prevent us from
reading cultural road signs well. Similar in-
formation processing errors work in reverse,
complicating foreign efforts to make sense of
American actions and intentions. In this arti-
cle, I outline a variety of common thinking
habits that get in the way of cross cultural un-
derstanding, highlighting concepts being dis-
cussed in the field of psychology. Our atti-
tudes often feel like they emerge from within
ourselves, but they are soaked in the cultural

1
LtGen George Flynn, The Strategic Corporal (1 Sep
2008), p. 8.
broth of our environment, taking on flavors
and absorbing its context through shared per-
spectives. Scientific developments in psy-
chology indicate people are extraordinarily
sensitive and plugged-into cultural signals that
suggest how we should make sense of the
world around us. Much of this sensitivity
happens below our radar. An introspective
approach can improve our cultural literacy
and performance abroad.

Yellow footprints at Marine Corps Recruiting
Depots, where prospective Marines enter
boot camp, represent a culture shock to
young Americans. The meaning of normal
is dramatically flipped on its head. The im-
mersion is often so disorienting, recruits
struggle to remember their own name, and
left from right. The first days are the most
overwhelming. Morning routines, practiced
against a school bus schedule and a pleading
parent are instantly replaced by terrifying drill
instructors and earlier hours. Clothes, once
selected by proximity and probability of clean-
liness, become uniform and subject to drive-
by inspection all day. Meals are now shoveled
down in record speed. Privacy and recreation
no longer exist, and movement is always done
with a sense of urgency. The possessive pro-
noun I must be erased from a recruits vo-
cabulary. Boot camp challenges every detail
of life once effortlessly considered normal. In
the early weeks, a recruits mind is constantly
racing, working to overcome habits estab-
lished by a lifetime of practice. Over time,
drill instructor behavior becomes normal in
the context of boot camp, and foreign cultural
road signs become clear. This represents the
exhausting struggle to master a new culture.
At the end of thirteen weeks, the movements,
details, and pace of life of freshly minted Ma-
24
rines become routine. A new cultural identity
forms.

In foreign cultural contexts, challenges emerge
to every perspective reinforced over our life-
times. Language differences are an obvious
starting point. Communication styles vary. In
America, speakers are expected to communi-
cate clearly. We believe we say what we mean
and mean what we say. In Korea, listeners are
expected to make sense of what is said. A
graceful response to a difficult question may
come in the form of a parable. If the parable,
such as an impending storm, is ambivalent,
the listener must decipher the most appropri-
ate meaning. Perhaps lingering presence, or
controversial decision will cause a storm with
unfavorable consequences. Speech in Asia is
commonly tailored to the audience, mitigating
and hinting at meanings in conscious
measures of respect. Misunderstandings are
alternately the fault of speakers or listeners,
depending on the cultural bias. Greetings al-
ternate between nods, handshakes, kisses and
bows. Food changes, as do customs of eating
with fingers verses forks; clothing style chang-
es, as do customs of leaving shoes at the door.
Sitting for meals may involve floors as often
as chairs. Punctuality, emphasis on relation-
ships, and men holding hands carry different
meanings in various countries. Showing re-
spect and recognizing the intentions of others
involves layers of complexity that can be very
taxing. These also contribute to culture
shock, like yellow footprints, but few more
than the effort of deciphering attitudes. As
overwhelming as boot camp is for young Ma-
rines, the recruit depot does not challenge
deeply held beliefs of our historical narrative.
Drill instructors do not reframe American
history or challenge attitudes of our role in the
world. Foreigners do. Attitudes reflect co-
herent stories. Those stories spring from dif-
ferent sources. Foreign audiences are as likely
to have different understandings of American
narratives and agendas as we have of theirs.
Marines typically encounter this for the first
time when they travel abroad, where both
sides of cultural engagements are quick to
embrace a common group insider bias that
we are good and they (foreigners) misun-
derstand us.

What if difficulty in reading cultural road signs
is directly related to our brain? Not in biolo-
gy, but the thinking patterns that spring so
automatically from it. Daniel Kahneman out-
lines a concept of our mental hardware and
common cognitive errors. Bias, here, refers to
information processing shortcuts (heuristics)
and judgment errors, as opposed to prejudice
or preference. Effects of bias are powerful
and more common than most Marines
acknowledge. In this article, I highlight four:
hindsight and confirmation bias, framing ef-
fects and loss aversion, and why these are
formidable obstacles to cultural literacy. Fa-
miliarity with bias does not make us immune
from them. Familiarity, however, can help us
recognize and anticipate them more quickly in
ourselves and others. Introspection may give
us the insight to distinguish threat from cus-
tomary behavior, communicate effectively,
and understand the environments where we
operate.

Hindsight bias
Hindsight bias is a tendency to revise the his-
tory of ones beliefs in light of what actually
happened.
2
Risk looms large in the future, but
disappears in memory. Abraham Lincolns

2
D. Kahneman. Thinking, Fast and Slow. (2011), p. 202.
25
nomination as Republican candidate for Pres-
ident was a much longer long shot in 1860
than is remembered today. Suggestion that
American settlers would ever fail to unify our
nation from sea to shining sea also seems ab-
surd today. Both events happened, so, were
they ever in doubt? Hindsight bias makes it
easy to forget how steep the road Lincoln
climbed to become Americas 16
th
President
was. It also blurs our recollection that Mani-
fest Destiny was not an assured outcome of
the 19
th
century. Amphibious landings at In-
chon, Korea in September 1950 were laden
with risk. Success depended on deception,
timing the tides to prevent landing craft stuck
in the mud, skill, luck and a long list of other
risk factors. Successful outcomes make plan-
ning decisions seem bolder, and assessments
of the process appear more assured in retro-
spect than they were. History is not a recipe
that can be followed and repeated to predict-
ably reliable outcomes. Lincoln, Manifest
Destiny, and amphibious landings in Korea
would be remembered much differently today,
if at all, had the outcomes been different.

To put hindsight bias in a more modern con-
text, with a lighter touch, sports analogies
work well. Football teams meet on the gridi-
ron each week in the fall. Despite win-loss
standings and batteries of pundits anticipating
point spreads, there is no way to accurately
predict the outcome of games. Plans con-
stantly shift with conditions on the ground,
player injuries, and a constant stream of split
second decisions. After each game, however,
doubts are quickly forgotten. Coherent sto-
ries of great plays and brilliant coaching spring
up to explain the inevitable results.

An industrial example is also useful in describ-
ing how judgment errors arise from hindsight
bias. Recent shifts in domestic and Canadian
oil production are dramatically increasing
freight rail activity across the American Mid-
west. Railroad traffic seemed benign and safe
enough for train and oil companies to resist
environmental impact studies and expensive
improvements to their existing fleet of DOT-
111A freight cars
3
for years, despite shifts in
flammable cargo and the rapid increase from
10,000 to over 400,000 tank loads per year
from 2009 to 2012.
4
Ten recent train acci-
dents involving explosive oil spills in North
Dakota, Quebec, Illinois and Alabama have
caused alarm, sudden interest in environmen-
tal studies, and in some cases, resistance to
freight travel through local communities.
5
In
hindsight, freight safety is less benign, despite
a 99.9 percent safety record.

Likewise, influenza virus spreads in seasonal
epidemics that result in severe illness and
death. Flu shots have a record of reducing
the number and severity of cases, and are rec-
ommended by the Center for Disease Con-
trol. Several unexpected deaths in 2012 were
attributed to flu shots; hindsight bias caused
many parents to believe the shots were more
risky than advertised and doctors should have
known better. Media reports exploded with
conspiracy theories of unsafe medicine and
pharmaceutical profiteering at the expense of
public health. Hindsight bias makes it hard to
evaluate decisions properly, in terms of beliefs

3
B. Mann. Lac-Megantic Blast Leaves Impact on
Town, Rail Industry. (2013). National Public Radio
4
D. Schaper. String of Oil Train Crashes Prompts Push
for Safety Rules. (2014). National Public Radio
5
C. Krauss, J. Mouawad. Accidents Surge as Oil In-
dustry Takes the Train. (2014). New York Times
26
that were reasonable when decisions were
made.
6

The Iraqi Army was roundly defeated and ex-
pelled from Kuwait within two months in
1991 (Operation Desert Storm), following
Manuel Noriegas successful capture in Pana-
ma the year before (Operation Just Cause).
Why should Pentagon planners expect a dif-
ferent result in 2003? We did not believe the
capability of the Iraqi Army had changed sig-
nificantly, nor did we anticipate the reaction
of the population because neither was a signif-
icant factor before. Similar calculations were
applied in Afghanistan. Troop levels were
kept low and assessments consistently antici-
pated quick redeployment timelines after the
Taliban government was unseated in early
2002. There are a lot of lessons to learn from
each political and military conflict. Most of
the time, wisdom gained from experience
serves us well. Hindsight bias both informs
and undercuts sound decision making. Like
our memory of Lincolns election and suc-
cessful landings at Inchon, Korea, hindsight
leads us to believe that consistent recipes pro-
duce the same results, by underestimating risk
and overlooking the context of new situations.
Bias led military commanders to believe that
both Iraq and Afghanistan could be wrapped
up in a few months, as it was in 1990-91.
Sometimes, bias creates a slippery cognitive
slope, resulting in too little credit for decisions
that turn out well, and too much blame for
decisions made with sound processes but
poor outcomes.

Hindsight bias and selective memory influ-
ences cultural interaction as well. Russian dis-
trust of America traces to conflicting ideology,

6
dysfunctional leader relationships, delayed
engagement against the German Army on the
Western front in World War II, arms races
and proxy engagements in Cuba, Berlin, Ger-
many and Vietnam, among other things. The
Kremlin has the Cold War to compare Ameri-
can intentions against. It is easy for both
sides to assess future motives against previous
ones, ignoring changes in context in the pro-
cess. Confrontation is not a fixed paradigm to
define how nations see each other. Germany
and Japan are now allies, despite radically dif-
ferent relationships in 1941. Hindsight bias
contributes to regular setbacks in security rela-
tions between China, Korea and Japan. Hav-
ing suffered through Japanese occupation,
China and Korea perceive yesterdays aggres-
sion in todays assertiveness. Japanese visits
to war shrines to honor World War II ances-
tors punctuate the meaning that Chinese and
Koreans attribute to Japanese attitudes about
the past. Trust is hard to reestablish when
selective hindsight is employed to maintain
fixed beliefs about the character and inten-
tions of others. Cultural road signs and cus-
tomary behavior are often influenced by the
past, but not defined or determined by it.
Marines are well served with familiarity of his-
tory and an open mind to allow alternative
future outcomes as circumstances change.

Confirmation bias
Confirmation bias is a tendency to magnify
details that support previously held beliefs
while ignoring conflicting observations. In
the first weeks of boot camp, drill instructors
expect to break recruits of a lifetime of bad
habits, which are all they see. When Corporal
Brown is introduced as a Marine to keep an
eye on, future mistakes will stick out and stack
up in our memory more easily than his suc-
27
cesses. First impressions have an outsized
impact on follow-on perceptions because we
tend to see what we are looking for. Marines
patrolling combat zones sometimes see evi-
dence of hostile intent in every foreign face.
Afghans who were warned that Americans
were occupier forces bent on social and reli-
gious changes with little regard for Afghan
lives found outsized evidence of this in air-
strikes and night raids. Messages that seem
intuitive are magnified with each example we
can point to, and are often very difficult to
adjust or correct.

Daniel Kahneman suggests the way our brain
associates suggestion to memory makes us
susceptible to confirmation bias.
7
When Ser-
geant Smith is introduced as intelligent and
friendly, we are more likely to notice evidence
that matches the description. If China is de-
scribed as shifty and menacing in the South
China Sea, our brain fixes on confirming evi-
dence, such as near collisions with USS
Cowpens (December, 2013)
8
, unilateral estab-
lishment of air defense identification zone
(November, 2013),
9
cable-cutting of Vietnam-
ese survey cables,
10
rhetoric of south china sea
as a core interest,
11
etc. Under these circum-
stances our brain minimizes examples of re-
strained or supportive behavior, to the point
we feel they dont exist. When Al Qaeda tells
fellow Muslims that Americas secret agenda
is a crusade against Islam, the suggestion,
supported by night raids, civilian casualties,

7
8
C. Thayer. USS Cowpens Incident Reveals Strategic
Mistrust Between U.S. and China (2013), The Diplomat
9
C. Clover. John Kerry Warns China Against Declaring
Second Air Defense Zone (2014), Financial Times
10
J. Page. Vietnam Accuses Chinese Ships (2012), Wall
Street Journal
11
T. Yoshihara and J. Holmes, (2011) Can China De-
fend a Core Interest in the South China Sea? CSIS
and any insensitivity by NATO forces, can
seem compelling. Kahneman outlines a
common cognitive tendency to see the world
as more tidy, simple, predictable and coherent
than it really is.
12
Stereotypes are frequently
reinforced by confirmation and selective hind-
sight bias, and both shape foreign attitudes
towards America. Marines are well served to
be watchful for confirmation bias, recognize it
in themselves and others.

Framing effect
The presentation or framing of information
impacts reactions, preferences and beliefs. A
glass half full is also a glass half empty. An
employment rate of 93.3 percent elicits a
more positive response than a 6.7 percent un-
employment rate. Both present the same in-
formation, framed differently to evoke a re-
sponse. Marketing firms pay close attention
to this in order to trigger predictable feelings
or action. Freight train safety records listed at
99.9 percent elicit confidence. We assume the
.1 percent is a realistic rounding error to ac-
count for occasional accidents. When de-
scription of .1 percent of freight train acci-
dents shifts to 1.5 million gallons of oil spilled
and 175 lives lost in ten explosive derailments
over five states in a single year (2013), the
meaning of the same information changes.
Political pundits obsessively frame their issues
in terms of left or right, liberal or conserva-
tive, red or blue. These associations make it
easier for people to quickly interpret how to
feel about the ideas that follow, without need-
ing to understand the details of each issue.

Infantry Marines are the main effort of most
Marine warfighting engagements, by design.

12
D. Kahneman. Thinking, Fast and Slow. (2011), p.
204.
28
Infantry is, by far, the largest of 42 occupa-
tional fields among Marines, enlisted (18%)
and officer (12%).
13
31 of 35 Marine Com-
mandants were infantry officers. Framing
effect impacts how Marines see themselves,
and contributes to perceived dichotomy be-
tween infantry (grunts) and everyone else. As
young infantrymen enjoy attesting, youre
either a grunt or a pogue. For optimum ca-
reer management, department head tours as
Operations Officers and Chiefs are highly
valued. Marines prioritize and compete for
these limited assignments. Promotion boards
tend to look for this in performance records
and draw conclusions when critical billets are
missing. Framing communicates relative im-
portance.

America is a predominantly Christian nation,
familiar with a wide spectrum of Christian
denominations. When Timothy McVeigh
detonated his truck bomb in Oklahoma City
in April 1995, few Americans felt the nation
was under attack by organized, zealot religion-
ists. Before 2001, most Marines were com-
fortably unfamiliar with Islam, Afghanistan, or
Osama bin Laden. After September 11, fram-
ing effect associated all three with attacks on
Americas homeland and values. The mean-
ing of a religion, a country and a leader blend-
ed so tightly in that context, many Americans
could not distinguish any difference. Bin
Laden came to represent Islam, and both be-
came tied, via the attack, to Afghanistan.
Since then, political leaders have attempted to
clarify that the U.S. is not at war with Islam.
America learned about Islam through the con-
text of terror, and has had a difficult time sep-
arating them since. Framing effect can be
powerful enough to trigger hindsight and con-

13
Marine Corps Almanac (2013)
firmation bias. Because we were attacked, the
Muslim community has been closely correlat-
ed to threats. A key difference between 9/11
and Oklahoma City is relative familiarity be-
fore traumatic events, and the way infor-
mation was presented to the public. In con-
trast, many Afghans have come to learn of
Christianity through the context of armed pa-
trols in their villages and a decade of war and
foreign interference in their affairs.

Framing effects are important in reading cul-
tural road signs. Chess players can see their
opponents pieces, but they cannot see the
intent. Information can be deliberately pack-
aged to create positive or negative reactions.
Cultures suspicious of American intentions
can draw radically different conclusions from
the same information. For example, China
and Russia view U.S. posturing in their re-
spective backyards as containment. The U.S.
advertises our presence as enforcement of
international order and balance of power.
Iran claims nuclear ambitions for peaceful
energy; western nations believe Iran seeks nu-
clear weapons. Insider bias helps people
frame information about themselves in the
most positive and benevolent light possible.
When controversy occurs, explanations or
exceptions quickly surface. The Oklahoma
City bombing was the act of an individual, not
a religious group, for example. When for-
eigners apply insider bias, they see themselves
selectively, in the most favorable light, much
as we do when the roles are reversed. The
key is familiarity. Outsider bias is the perspec-
tive that comes intuitively when people have
superficial insights and familiarity with anoth-
er group. After 9/11, Muslims were scary to
many Americans. Framing effects are more
likely to influence attitudes towards the glass
29
half empty, where less benefit of the doubt is
considered.

Battalion and Company intelligence sections
are typically charged with informing Marines
about foreign populations. Marines responsi-
ble for threat assessments and force protec-
tion are more likely to be affected by hind-
sight and confirmation bias, using intelligence-
based information sources, and season their
briefs with hints of suspicion. The same bias
can work in reverse, in foreign interpretations
of America. Washington D.C. is a beautiful
city, rich with history, museums and American
culture. It also had the fifth highest crime
rate
14
in the most (handgun) armed nation in
the world,
15
with a revolving door of political
scandal and corruption. Americans are simul-
taneously charitable, industrious, individualis-
tic, politically polarized, opinionated, creative,
wealthy, and prone to spying. Depending on
the information source, stereotypes foreigners
use to characterize Americans are often
framed with the same bias that Americans use
to understand foreign audiences.

Loss aversion
Loss aversion, put simply, is a powerful ten-
dency to fight harder to prevent losses than to
achieve gains. In a foot race, for example, a
Marine will run harder to beat another runner
(avoid losing) than she would to set a personal
record on her own. This bias applies in sever-
al contexts. Armies tend to fight harder in an
existential fight to defend their families and
homeland than to expand an empire far from
home. Vietnam, for example, lost an estimat-
ed 1.6 million soldiers and 2 million civilians

14
FBI Uniform Crime Report (2013)
15
M. Morgenstern. (2013) How Many People Own
Guns in America? The Blaze.
fighting the French (1945-54), Americans
(1965-1972), and Chinese (1979).
16
Russia left
Afghanistan in 1989 after nine years of
fighting and 14,500 killed in action, compared
to 90,000 Afghans killed.

Defense is a more desperate position to be in.
In April, 1863 at the battle of Chancellorsville,
General Robert E. Lees force of 60,000 pre-
vailed against a Union attack by 133,000 men
under General Joseph Hooker. With the
Rappahannock River at their back, fighting on
Virginia soil, Lee and Stonewall Jackson sur-
prised the Union force, stood their ground,
and won. Because defeat is so difficult to
accept, the losing side in wars often fight long
past the point at which victory of the other
side is certain, and only a matter of time.
17

Many parts of the American South continue
to disavow the results of the Civil War. Un-
conventional warfare and insurgency spring
from this refusal to accept loss. As of this
writing, Syrian rebels, pummeled by the Assad
regime, Hezbollah and Iran, continue fighting
against great odds and heavy attrition, three
years after the Arab spring revolution began.
To avoid loss of face, honor, or sovereignty,
Marines should be prepared for people to
make irrational decisions when opponents
perceive themselves backed into a corner.

A second context of loss aversion emerges
from fear of change and the unknown. The
disadvantages of change loom larger than its
advantages, inducing a bias that favors the
status quo.
18
Many Pashtun and Baluch Af-
ghans have clannish societies, long accus-
tomed to independence from any central gov-

16
VietnamGear.com (2012)
17
18
Ibid. p. 292.
30
ernment. The imposition of an effective cen-
tral government potentially threatens tradi-
tional tribal structures and Pashtunwali, the
way of Pashtun life. Modernity itself, often
depicted by Marines with advanced technolo-
gy hanging from every limb, represents chal-
lenge to tradition. It makes Pashtun children
aware of technological differences between
them and an outside world.

Over the course of many conversations with
Arab families across Egypt, Oman and Saudi
Arabia, a consistent pattern of fear has
emerged that western influence will erode the
ethical behavior of young generations. Mus-
lim parents worry their children will be se-
duced by temptations represented by Holly-
wood: pornography, drugs, marriage outside
of local custom, obsessions with wealth, tech-
nology, and a replacement of community-
oriented Arab culture with western individual-
ism. Marines should not be surprised if eve-
ryone does not aspire to become American.
Yet this perspective does surprise many Ma-
rines. It seems intuitive for Marines to as-
sume opportunities represented by the Ameri-
can dream are universal values. They are not.
The aversion to lose identity and tradition is
powerful, and the American dream is often
framed as a challenge to a cultural status quo.

A third perspective of loss aversion involves a
surprising connection between context and
attitudes towards risk. Kahneman outlines
four decision-making patterns that Marines
should be aware of; two result in risk seeking
behavior and two result in risk aversion. The
first pattern is long odds for high payoff, such
as winning the lottery, which results in risk-
seeking behavior. Scott Moore, the Sergeant
from 3
rd
battalion, 2
nd
Marines who asked ac-
tress Mila Kunis to the 2011 Marine Corps
Ball
19
via a YouTube video from Afghanistan
had nothing to lose, with a potential big pay-
off. The second risk-seeking pattern is near
certain odds for a big loss, such as Aids vic-
tims willing to try experimental drugs.
Corpsmen who rush through open fire to
treat and recover wounded Marines, and secu-
rity guards who stand their ground against
approaching suicide bombers to save their
fellow Marines exhibit this kind of risk-
acceptance, particularly when they know oth-
ers will be harmed if they fail to act. Suicide
bombers have a similar incentive to seek risk,
for a disproportionate impact against a
stronger enemy. Sports provide a less contro-
versial example. Facing near certain loss in
the final seconds of a football game, a quar-
terback will throw a Hail Mary pass (risk seek-
ing) for the chance of avoiding defeat. Af-
ghans on horseback fought Russian tanks in
the 1980s against similar odds.

The converse are conditions that encourage
risk averse behavior. The first risk averse pat-
tern is near certain odds for high reward. A
sniper with a 90 percent chance of hitting a
moving target, or a 100 percent chance of hit-
ting a stationary target, is more likely to
choose the stationary shot to avoid the chance
of missing (risk averse). The second risk aver-
sion pattern is small odds of catastrophic loss.
Insurance companies count on people paying
money to cover the minor chance of fire,
flood or accident.
20
The American defense
budget is larger than comparable defense
budgets of the next 13 countries combined!
We pay huge sums to guarantee the greatest

19
G. Harkins, My Date with Mila Kunis: Marines Un-
told Story, (2012), Marine Corps Times
20
Ibid. p. 317.
31
advantage and minimize risk, despite high
probability of similar results at much less cost.
These four tendencies are important for Ma-
rines to pay attention to. They do not dictate
human behavior, but tilt the mental playing
field in predictable ways. Foreign populations
and opposing forces will be more likely to
seek or avoid risk if Marines recognize and set
the right conditions.

Conclusion
I began with a brief description of boot camp
because all Marines have experienced basic
training. As recruits or officer candidates, we
were overwhelmed with new circumstances,
attitudes and expectations. After training,
hindsight bias made it difficult to remember
what it was like to not know the basic expec-
tations of being a Marine. Confirmation bias
constantly reinforces and reaffirms our new
standards. Framing effects help us present
information in ways to affirm our beliefs, and
loss aversion keeps us holding tight to existing
reputations, attitudes and norms. Foreign au-
diences tick through similar sequences when
they come in contact with Marines. An effec-
tive way for Marines to improve relationships
and performance is to become familiar with
our own psychology and employ cross-
cultural competence. As Marines prepare to
read cultural road signs and perform as Stra-
tegic Corporals, they should consider the four
biases discussed above and incorporate an
introspective approach. Lessons about cross-
cultural situations are subtle, sometimes hard
to notice and difficult to pass from generation
to generation. Our thinking habits incorpo-
rate hidden obstacles that modern psychology
is only beginning to understand and articulate.
Hindsight and confirmation bias, framing ef-
fects and loss aversion are not the only rele-
vant biases that affect human thinking and
attitudes. Attitudes and cultures are influ-
enced by our biology, learned habits of think-
ing and the context of our environment. Op-
erational culture training focuses on physical
environment, economic, social, political struc-
tures and belief systems.
21
Applied with an
introspective awareness that attitudes are of-
ten developed beneath rational, conscious
thought, Marine performance abroad will im-
prove.

21
Salmoni, B.A. & Holmes-Eber, P (2008) Operational
Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications.
P. 1.

References

Lieutenant General George Flynn, USMC, (2008). The Strategic Corporal. P. 8.
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=strategic%20corporal&source=web&cd=12&v
ed=0CDQQFjABOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.quantico.usmc.mil%2Fdownload.aspx
%3FPath%3D.%2FUploads%2FFiles%2FCDI_strat%2Bcpl%2Bfinal.pdf&ei=vZZWUZCd
Ooi29QTGiYCIBQ&usg=AFQjCNERgpCwqGweovolFzF50rGdqz-VjQ .
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
B. Mann. Lac-Megantic Blast Leaves Impact on Town, Rail Industry. National Public Radio, All
Things Considered, 14 Oct, 2013. http://www.npr.org/2013/10/14/227840021/lac-m-
gantic-blast-leaves-impact-on-town-rail-industry
D. Schaper. String of Oil Train Crashes Prompts Push for Safety Rules. National Public Radio,
Around the Nation, 24 Jan, 2014. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/24/265762435/string-of-
oil-train-crashes-prompts-push-for-safety-rules
C. Krauss, J. Mouawad. Accidents Surge as Oil Industry Takes the Train. New York Times, 25 Jan,
2014.http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/business/energy-environment/accidents-
surge-as-oil-industry-takes-the-train.html?_r=0
C. Thayer. USS Cowpens Incident Reveals Strategic Mistrust Between U.S. and China. The Diplomat,
17 Dec, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/uss-cowpens-incident-reveals-strategic-
mistrust-between-u-s-and-china
C. Clover. John Kerry Warns China Against Declaring Second Air Defense Zone. Financial Times, 14 Feb,
2014. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cc37afda-9574-11e3-8371-00144feab7de.html
J. Page. Vietnam Accuses Chinese Ships. Wall Street Journal, 3 Dec, 2012.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323717004578157033857113510
T. Yoshihara and J. Holmes, (2011) Can China Defend a Core Interest in the South China Sea?
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), The Washington Quarterly.
https://csis.org/files/publication/twq11springyoshiharaholmes.pdf
Marine Corps Almanac (2013), Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2013, Headquarters, United
States Marine Corps.
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/136/Docs/Concepts%20and%20Programs/2013/CP13%2
0CH4-BkCvr_WEBFA_5FEB13.pdf
FBI Uniform Crime Report (2013), Congressional Quarterly Press
http://os.cqpress.com/citycrime/2012/CityCrime2013_CityCrimeRankingsFactSheet.pdf
M. Morgenstern. (2013) How Many People Own Guns in America? And is Gun Ownership Actually
Declining? The Blaze, 19 Mar 2013. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/03/19/how-
many-people-own-guns-in-america-and-is-gun-ownership-actually-declining/
Vietnam War Casualties (2012) http://www.vietnamgear.com/casualties.aspx
G. Harkins, My Date with Mila Kunis: Marines Untold Story, 10 Nov, 2012, Marine Corps Times
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20121110/NEWS/211100316/My-date-Mila-
Kunis-Marine-s-untold-story
Salmoni, B.A. & Holmes-Eber, P. (2008) Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles
and Applications. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/mcu_op_culture_for_warfighter.pdf

33

Major Jonathan Brown is a Marine helicopter pilot
and Foreign Area Officer (FAO). Jonathans global per-
spective on security cooperation and military program
management comes from his work in Indonesia, multiple
deployments, previous assignment at Headquarters U.S.
Marine Corps, and current assignment at Marine Corps Se-
curity Cooperation Group (MCSCG). In his previous as-
signment as USMC FAO Program Manager, he promoted
language, regional expertise and culture (LREC) skills de-
velopment and employment in the Marine Corps. He has
led efforts to double accession into the USMC LREC
community for officer and enlisted personnel, managed in-
ternational exchange programs, and currently prepares Ma-
rines for advising and Security Cooperation missions abroad. He has been based in Indonesia,
Okinawa, Washington DC, and deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and across the Asia Pacific. He is
currently assigned to Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group in Virginia Beach, working to
advance the Marine Corps approach to security cooperation, security force assistance and advis-
ing.

Jonathan has a masters degree in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School.
He is tri-lingual, speaking Indonesian and French.

You can contact Maj. Brown at Jonathan.f.brown@usmc.mil. Additionally, you can read his
blog at http://jonb-one.blogspot.com/ and follow the Marine Corps International Affairs Pro-
gram (IAP) on Facebook (www.facebook.com/pages/Marine-Corps-International-Affairs-
Program-IAP/231182070225906)

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34

Disclaimer
The views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements,
including the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center. The content does not necessari-
ly reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in official
US Army publications.

Abstract
This article presents arguments in support of the inclusion of culture-general and cross-cultural
competence learning points, as well as cross-cultural communication competence skill development,
in language and culture education and training throughout the Department of Defense. It describes
a curriculum and assessment model already developed and piloted at the Joint Base Lewis-McChord
Language & Culture Center and explores the applicability of Morans Cultural Knowings framework as
a potential starting point for programmatic curriculum development. Sample lesson plans using Mo-
rans framework are provided for demonstration purposes. Finally, this article calls for greater col-
laborative effort and discourse both within and without the Department of Defense for exploring
such models and sharing best practices.

Integrating Culture General and Cross-cultural Competence &
Communication Skills:
Possibilities for the Future of Military Language and Culture Programs

Pieter R. DeVisser
Robert Greene Sands
Integrating Culture General and Cross-cultural Competence & Communication Skills

35
Introduction
Two stark realities exist in todays military in
regards to providing our troops with language
and culture education and training. First, lack
of sufficient cross-cultural competence (3C)
and intercultural communication competence
not only severely limits operational success
but also jeopardizes it, as well as our troops
safety. In a very real sense, lack of 3C is killing
us in the field (Bordin, 2011). For our purpos-
es, 3C is defined as the ability to navigate in
complex interpersonal situations, express or
interpret ideas/concepts across cultures, and
make sense of foreign social and cultural be-
havior (following Sands 2013b and c, Sands
and Haines 2013 and modified from Reid et
al., 2012 and 2014). Four baseline compe-
tencies make up 3C: cultural learning, cultural
self-awareness, perspective-taking, and cultur-
al sensemaking. A series of additional skill-
based competencies and enablers have also
been identified as being important for increas-
ing 3C. These include cognitive flexibility,
emotional self-regulation, openness to new
experience, and tolerance for ambiguity and
others (Reid et al., 2012, and Reid et al., 2013).
A complementary but distinct concept of
cross-cultural communication competence
defined here as the knowledge, motivation
and skills to interact effectively and appropri-
ately with members of other cultures (Mac-
kenzie & Wallace 2014:241) has also been
identified as critical to successful cross-
cultural interactions. This concept considers
additional skills and enablers such as im-
pression management, active listening, com-
munication adaptability, paralinguistic skills
and self-monitoring, and others (Mackenzie &
Wallace2014: 235) as well as utilizing base-
line 3C skill-based competencies in its expres-
sion.

After over a decade of Counterinsurgency
(COIN) efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
Department of Defense (DoD) has acknowl-
edged that interactions within complex cultur-
al environments require exploration of an ad-
ditional domain, the Human Domain, to
those the military has traditionally considered
(strategy, preparation and operations, and
land, sea, air/space and cyber mission spaces).

This nation takes action in the international arena
aimed at influencing human activity and the envi-
ronments in which that activity occurs. It could
not be otherwise, as all institutions states, corpo-
rations, NGOs, etc. are populated, controlled,
and directed by people. Influencing these people
be they heads of state, tribal elders, militaries and
their leaders or even an entire population re-
mains essential to securing U.S. interests Time
and again, the U.S. has undertaken to engage in
conflict without fully considering the physical, cul-
tural, and social environments that comprise what
some have called the human domain, but it is
within these fundamentally human endeav-
or[s] that we operate as a military (Odierno,
Amos, and McRaven, 2013).

It is central to the success of those future op-
erations to recognize the existence of a mis-
sion space that features not only the various
populations in and around military Areas of
Operation but also the diversity of US, Coali-
tion, ally/partner nation agencies, as well as
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Failure to recognize and learn to work within
the context of cultural difference and unfamil-
iarity can, at best, lead only to short-term suc-
cesses, and will more likely and more often
end in failure and loss of lives, American and
foreign.

The second harsh reality we must
acknowledge is that the current fiscal envi-
Pieter R. DeVisser and Robert R. Greene Sands

36
ronment will simply not allow for significant
budgetary increases aimed at addressing this
readiness deficiency through sufficient fund-
ing of the necessary additional research, edu-
cation, or training. On the contrary, training
and education budgets and associated person-
nel are being reduced across the DoD in the
wake of budget sequestration and the current
military draw down. In March of 2014, Secre-
tary of Defense Hagel announced the plan to
continue to downsize human and other re-
sources dramatically in all four services, in-
cluding budgets for education, training, and
force preparation (Simeone, 2014). This se-
cond truth, however, cannot be allowed to
result in simply ignoring the first.

It is with both these truths in mind that the
endeavor outlined below is contemplated, not
merely as an academic or hypothetical pursuit
but rather as a viable response to supporting
military readiness and addressing identified
deficiencies. Significant effort has been devot-
ed to re-envisioning one particular DoD lan-
guage program to integrate 3C information
(and the underlying culture-general (CG)
knowledge that informs it) and 3C competen-
cy skills into its foreign language curricula. At
the same time, course length is not increased,
nor are language portions diminished in any
way by the additions. These efficiencies result
in a significant net gain to the military units
and students supported. Students are exposed
to the additional CG/3C information and
skills they will need to execute their missions
successfully. These are not culture or region
specific and are therefore transferable across
the various mission contexts of service mem-
bers entire careers. At the same time, unit
commanders can enjoy better-trained troops
who have acquired meaningful, transferable
skills without losing their personnel to addi-
tional training events at additional cost. Espe-
cially in a resource-constrained environment,
the resulting benefits cannot be overstated.

Academically, of course, there are sound rea-
sons and support for combining 3C and CG,
with language learning and the culture specific
(CS) information that has traditionally accom-
panied it. In the early 1970s, Hymes used the
term communicative competence (CC) to describe a
language learners ability to use not only
grammatically correct utterances in the target
language, but to use them appropriately when
to speak and when not to, to whom, in what
manner, etc. (Corbett, 2003). It is partly from
this concept that Communicative Language
Teaching (CLT) approaches evolved in the
decade that followed, and it is CLT (along
with approaches that developed alongside and
from it) that has dominated the major lan-
guage programs throughout the DoD, most
notably at the Defense Language Institute
Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC).

Since the turn of this last century, a greater
emphasis on cultural understanding is being
added to Hymes concept. Byram and Guil-
herme coined the term intercultural communica-
tive competence (ICC), which Corbett defines as
a learners ability to understand the behaviors of
the target community, as well as the ability to
explain them to the learners home com-
munity as a kind of language/culture diplo-
mat (Corbett, 2003). In line with this concept
of cultural mediator, Kramsch has expounded
upon the concept of third culture, the mental
space foreign language (FL) teaching should
afford FL learners from which to explore
both their own and target cultures, as a means
through which to better understand and ex-

37
plain both (Kramsch, 2009). These concepts
represent a departure from the long-standing
aim of producing native-like proficiency and
the de facto adoption of target culture norms by
FL learners. Instead, they focus FL learning
on the more realistic and infinitely more use-
ful production of FL users with the ability to
facilitate reflection and intercultural collaboration
and not simply hasty, target-language transac-
tions or snap judgments. It is in this same vein
of departure that the strategy explored below
aims to move our military language and cul-
ture program from CC to ICC and beyond, as
cultural mediation is precisely what has been
missing from DoD efforts overseas (Odierno,
et al. 2013).

Research in this area, though as yet insuffi-
cient for the purposes of inferring universally
applicable correlations, also indicates support
for the integration of ICC into language class-
rooms. Genc and Bada argue that:

Ethnocentricity limits the self, hence individuals
have to look at themselves from a different per-
spective to surmount such limitation; thus, culture
classes are vital in enabling individuals to see
themselves from a different point of view Cul-
ture classes have a humanizing and a motivating
effect on the language learner and the learning
process. They help learners observe similarities and
differences among various cultural groups (2005).

In their 2005 study of students attitudes to-
wards the culture class they attended in the
fall semester of 2003-2004, they found that a
culture class is significantly beneficial in terms
of language skills, raising cultural awareness,
[and] changing attitudes towards native
and target societies with implications for a
culture class in the curriculum of language
teaching departments (Genc and Bada,
2005). The participants in their study empha-
sized some form of transformation in their
thinking and attributed significant proficiency
gains in speaking, listening, and reading (and
moderate gains in writing) to the culture class
they attended.

In late 2012, the Joint-Base Lewis-McChord
Language & Culture Center (JBLM LCC) pi-
loted a ten-week Korean course that added
CG and 3C components to the language cur-
riculum. Though this integration was far from
seamless and there was no identified control
group against which to measure outcomes, the
JBLM LCC was able to conclude that signifi-
cant knowledge gain in CG and 3C had taken
place, with no detriment to the language
component of the course (the ILR goal of 0+
in speaking having been achieved by the
overwhelming majority of students). It was
not possible to determine whether or not the
integration of CG/3C resulted in higher lan-
guage proficiency than might have been
achieved without it, but the JBLM LCC was
encouraged enough to continue developing
the course model (Sands, 2013a).

In late 2013, the JBLM LCC piloted two itera-
tions of a revised course, this time in Indone-
sian and Tagalog. In this revised pilot, the in-
tegration of CG/3C was more explicitly stated
and more directly related and relatable to the
CS components of the curriculum, and the
instructors themselves completed the CG/3C
learning modules prior to the course. Again,
significant gains in CG and 3C knowledge
were achieved. The first round of Indonesian
and Tagalog was ten weeks long. Across both
languages, the stated ILR outcome goal of 0+
(in speaking) was exceeded, with twelve of the
thirteen students achieving ILR level 1. The
second round of these classes was nine weeks,

38
but all 14 of the students (eight Tagalog and
six Indonesian) achieved ILR speaking level 1.
While these outcomes are far from scientifi-
cally conclusive, they cannot be discarded as
purely anecdotal or coincidental either.

The JBLM LCC pilots referenced above have
been focused on the training of what the Ar-
my calls General Purpose Forces (GPF), re-
ferring to any service member not specifically
trained in an occupational specialty that re-
quires a foreign language skill. Given the im-
portance of 3C integration and the apparent
JBLM LCC successes, the intention now is to
make similar curricular changes to the JBLM
LCC continuing education courses offered to
the Armys language-trained personnel. As the
linguistic skills of this population are signifi-
cantly higher in regard to, at least, reading and
listening in their respective target languages
(typically between 2 on 4 on the ILR scale),
the amount of culture integration possible (to
include 3C, CG, and additional CS compo-
nents) is presumably also higher. As such, the
JBLM LCC is exploring curricular models that
lend themselves to more in-depth exploration
of these components, as well as to easier fus-
ing of the CG and 3C components to the tar-
get language and CS ones. Considering the
development of 3C is essential for construct-
ing a viable learning model that will help in-
form curriculum and instructional develop-
ment.

There are several models that consider the
development of 3C and ICC and could be
applied to promote the development of a
learning program like that featured at JBLM.
Reid et al 2012, 2014 represent the most re-
cent attempts at a developmental model of 3C
for military use, although others have been
proffered, as well. To provide a sound theo-
retical foundation upon which to build a suc-
cessful program, many such existing devel-
opmental models for developing ICC should
also be explored. Morans Cultural Knowings
framework, for instance, appears to incorpo-
rate the competencies that make up 3C (cul-
tural learning, cultural self-awareness, perspec-
tive-taking and sensemaking) and thus offers
the potential to apply them to learning events,
such as the experimental JBLM LCC curricu-
lum now under development for the revised
continuing education courses mentioned
above (See example lesson plan drafts in Ap-
pendix A). What follows is an assessment of
how well Morans model fits into the CG and
3C learning concepts already in use at JBLM
and how the model may and may not be ap-
plicable to its language and culture program
and potentially others throughout the DoD.

Morans Cul t ural Knowi ngs
To understand the way these lessons are de-
signed, it is important to have a basic grasp of
Morans model, how it is structured, and how
it might be adapted for the JBLM LCC. First,
his model is broken into for parts: Knowing
About, Knowing How, Knowing Why, and Knowing
Oneself (Moran, 2001). Moran adapts the four
stages of Kolbs Experiential Learning Cycle
to apply more aptly to the culture-learning
context, changing concrete experience to participa-
tion, reflective observation to description, abstract con-
ceptualization to interpretation, and active experi-
mentation to response. With the learner placed in
the center, he then overlays Knowing How,
Knowing About, Knowing Why, and Knowing One-
self over each new term, respectively, to create
his Cultural Knowings framework for culture
learning and language instruction (Moran,
2001). See Figure 1.

39

Knowing About includes all activities that con-
sist of gathering and demonstrating acquisi-
tion of cultural information about the
specific culture and language, as well as about
the nature of culture and the process of learn-
ing and entering other cultures in general, or
information about students own culture(s)
(Moran, 2001). This definition expands cul-
tural exploration to include CG, 3C, and
home culture, where traditional language
classes have limited themselves to target-
culture specific information only (primarily
data based), devoid of meaningful explanation.
Though labeled slightly differently, Knowing
About echoes Sands concept of cultural learning
already employed at JBLM LCC, lending itself
to easy adoption as a potential part of the
learning model.

Knowing How is focused on the doings in-
volved in target culture interaction and partic-
ipation and also falls under Sands cultural
learning, generally. For Moran, this calls for
direct or simulated participation in the every-
day life of the people of the target culture,
according to their customs and traditions, us-
ing their tools or technology and their
language to establish bona fide relationships
with them (Moran, 2001). JBLM LCC de-
parts from this approach slightly, as it may
imply a level of desired acculturation that
would be inappropriate in the context of mili-
tary operations. It also implies that it is possi-
ble, as a non-native, to somehow divest one-
self of her/his home culture and internalize
the customs and traditions of a target culture.
Certainly is it important to know how people
of the target culture do things and equally im-
portant to simulate walking in their shoes for
the purposes of achieving deeper understand-
ing of that culture. However, outside of
playacting, it is not possible to abstract oneself
from her/his culture, anymore than it is pos-
sible to be a foreigner and a native simultane-
ously. This would require the absence of
home culture socialization and the insertion
of target culture socialization in its stead, both
of which can only ever exist as hypothetical
constructs. As myriad acculturation difficulties
exemplify, one cannot simply swap one cul-
ture for another, regardless of how much one
may want to or tries, especially in a classroom

40
or simulated environment. Setting this portion
of Morans approach aside, we rely on the
ideas of Kramsch and Corbett (mentioned
above) to focus not only on how things are
done within the target culture, but also on
how things can be done by foreigners (Ameri-
cans) operating within that culture in ways
that do not deny ones own culture (some-
thing our military has an obvious interest in
avoiding) while not offending the target cul-
ture. It is our belief, supported by the intercul-
tural operational successes our military has
had (not to be overlooked or discounted), that
it is still quite possible to establish bona fide
relationships cross-culturally, without having
to adopt and/or accept (or feign acceptance)
of target-culture norms.

Knowing Why deals with developing an under-
standing of fundamental cultural perspec-
tives the perceptions, beliefs, values, and
attitudes that underlie or permeate all aspects
of the [target] culture (Moran, 2001). This
step falls under Sands sensemaking and perspec-
tive taking concepts, and it is here that the
JBLM LCC focuses on CG learning as an ini-
tial enabler, followed by 3C and 3C compe-
tence. In order to understand why any culture
does things one way versus another, it is im-
perative one understand the universal motiva-
tions that inform all cultures to one degree or
another. While any two cultures may be very
similar or vastly different from each other (or
anywhere along that continuum), all human
cultures reside within the Human Domain,
and all cultures concern themselves with ad-
dressing the human condition. In the ongoing
GPF pilots at JBLM LCC, courses begin with
a weeklong, intensive introduction to CG that
explores concepts like defining culture, sports &
recreation, worldview, ideology, alliances & networks,
social institutions, and identity. This intensive in-
troduction to anthropology and other social
sciences, 3C, and CG concepts is front-loaded
to provide the cultural framework for the rest
of the course, in order to properly contextual-
ize it as being more about interaction within
the human domain than solely a language
course, abstracted from operational context.
JBLM LCC now intends to do likewise with
the more advanced courses it offers. These
are concepts that are continually readdressed
throughout the Knowing Oneself lessons, as well.

Knowing Oneself is primarily about self-
reflection, conceptualized by Sands as cultural
self-awareness. Individual learners need to un-
derstand themselves and their own culture as
a means to comprehending, adapting to, or
integrating into the [target] culture (Moran,
Table 1: Morans Cultural Knowings: Content, Activities, Outcomes
Content Activities Outcomes
Knowing
About
cultural information gathering information cultural knowledge
Knowing
How
cultural practices developing skills cultural behaviors
Knowing
Why
cultural perspectives discovering explanations cultural understanding
Knowing
Oneself
Self reflection self-awareness


41
2001). As part of understating themselves,
JBLM LCC focuses on students discomfort
zones, encouraging them to identify and artic-
ulate their own underlying biases that tend to
lead to culture clash or misunderstanding.
Again, Morans notion of integrating into the
culture is dropped, as that is rarely desired to
a significant degree in the context of military
operations.

Together, this cycle of Knowings establishes
clear pedagogical foci for use in lesson plan
design, as depicted in Table 1.

Course Description
The lesson plans provided in Appendix A
were designed with a specific class in mind.
Though the class is hypothetical, it is based on
a composite of actual, specific requests the
JBLM LCC has received in the recent past
and therefore indicative of courses we will be
expected to design and teach in the future.
The lesson plans provided are general sketch-
es more than step-by-step instructions. In-
structors are expected to personalize their les-
sons and add relevant materials and insight.

This group of imagined students consists of
six junior officers who will be traveling to
Germany to work with German military and
civilian counterparts to coordinate an upcom-
ing joint-military exercise. As part of the rap-
port-building part of the trip, this de facto atta-
ch team will meet with their German
counterparts at restaurants and cafes in civil-
ian attire and will be expected to conduct
themselves appropriately. The lesson plans
and their objectives concern themselves spe-
cifically with this aspect of the trip. Each of
these officers already speaks German at a
basic conversational level (ILR 2 to 2+), and
each has spent at least 6 months in Germany
at some point during his undergraduate stud-
ies. None of them, however, has been in
Germany or spoken German on a regular ba-
sis in over 5 years. Given the time constraints
of their duty schedules, this course is designed
as a four-week refresher that will meet from
9:00am to 11:00am, Monday through Friday.
The JBLM LCC concept of 3C lends itself to
flexibly combining steps of Morans model
into shorter or longer lesson plans, as time
allows, so this hypothetical demographic is
provided as only one possibility, with each
Knowing as a separate lesson for demonstration
purposes.

In addition to in-class instruction, students are
required to complete homework assignments
and take quizzes using the JBLM LCC online
Learning Management System (LMS). The
LMS assignments are designed to take be-
tween one and two hours to complete. Since
contract instructors will be used for this
course, as a cost-saving measure to limit the
expense of billable contractor hours, auto-
grading rubrics have been designed within the
LMS and are used to the greatest extent pos-
sible. Certain components of quizzes and as-
signments (recorded speech, for instance)
would need to be assessed by the instructors,
however.

Assessment Mechanisms
There are several assessment tools that have
been developed for use in areas such as inter-
national business and marketing to identify
intercultural competencies and skills within
individuals (van Driel & Gabrenya 2014). Un-
fortunately, these kinds of assessments have
not yet been adapted for the various popula-
tions within the DoD. Though organizations,

42
such as the Interagency Language Roundtable
(ILR) and the Kentucky Department of Edu-
cation, have established cultural skill de-
scriptors with associated proficiency levels
that may serve as useful starting points, little
progress has been made in establishing testing
mechanisms that can be used to assign scores
to individuals proficiency (ILR and Kentucky
DoE). Standardization and alignment of such
mechanisms to multiple organizations with
multiple operational goals within the DoD
will require a concerted effort and the requi-
site funding, neither of which has been clearly
established to date. While those efforts to de-
velop such an assessment program are con-
templated, JBLM LCC has established the ru-
dimentary program outlined below for its
courses.

First, it is important to decide what will be
assessed before, during, and/or after the
course to determine the course's effective-
ness/success. Proficiency-based assessments
are preferred, since they help determine what
a student can do, as opposed to what a student
knows. Especially in the context of military
operations, being able to do things is ultimate-
ly the desired end-state. In some cases, how-
ever, proficiency-base assessments are not
possible (either because they have not yet
been officially developed or because resource
constraints prevent their development or the
testing itself). Also, where quantifying essen-
tially subjective concepts (such as what consti-
tutes good or bad intercultural interac-
tion) is concerned, assessments are
exceedingly tricky. The JBLM LCC employs a
mixture of both knowledge-based and skills-
based types of assessment, usually weighting
skills-based performance higher when calcu-
lating a students cumulative course grade.
Assessments and feedback occur regularly in
different formats, formal and informal,
throughout the course. The formal rubrics
designed for the JBLM LCC pilot courses are
provided in Appendix B. Similar rubrics
would be used in the hypothetic class.

In addition to quizzes, homework, and in-
class activities, Language in Action (LIA) sce-
narios are typically used as capstone assess-
ment events at the end of each week. These
role-play events take place in modified class-
rooms or common areas transformed to re-
semble, as closely as possible, a real-world en-
vironment the students are likely to encounter
when interacting in the target culture while
performing their military functions (aide sta-
tion, cafe, home, checkpoint, etc.). Students
are given a general task to perform with a na-
tive-speaker role-player, usually the class in-
structor. Students are assessed individually not
only on their linguistic performance (pronun-
ciation, vocabulary, grammar, use of honor-
ifics, etc.), but also on the cultural appropri-
ateness of their actions (gestures, body-
language, etc.) and the thoroughness with
which they complete the primary task and its
associated, unstated sub-tasks. Linguistic per-
formance is scored with points or letter
grades. The separate components of the cul-
tural interaction (as defined in the scoring ru-
brics) are awarded pass/fail grades, since it is
not really possible to quantify something so
subjective. "Failure" for any graded action in-
dicates the behavior would likely be deemed
offensive by a typical native of the target-
culture and would likely be detrimental to the
conversational goals and/or a significant im-
pediment to completion of the assigned task
under real-world conditions.

43
Implications for Military Intelligence
Professions
The JBLM LCC decision to include CG, 3C,
and 3C Competence in its language curricula
for GPF courses was fairly simple, as there is
an obvious and direct link between these sub-
ject areas and the kinds of communicative in-
teraction envisioned for the myriad non-
combative missions GPF conduct from se-
curity and stability operations, to disaster re-
lief and humanitarian assistance, to joint-
military exercises and maneuvers. These mis-
sions require primarily a speaking and listening
capability along linguistic lines, which are bet-
ter informed by CG and 3C knowledge and
3C skill-based competencies. Sufficient anec-
dotal and academic support can be found
throughout data and narratives collected by
the Armys Center for Lessons Learned
(CALL, 2014), as well as the recently pub-
lished Cross-Cultural Competence for a 21st Century
Military Culture, the Flipside of COIN (Greene
Sands and Greene-Sands 2014; Sands, 2013b
and c; Sands & Haines 2013, to rationalize the
JBLM LCC approach for its GPF curricula.
Similar justification can be used to integrate
these components into the training for official
military interpreters, Special Operations Forc-
es (SOF), and Civil Affairs (CA) personnel, as
their missions are nearly always intercultural,
generally, and also largely speaking and listening
centric, linguistically.

But what about more traditional Military In-
telligence (MI) professions that rely in whole
or in part on linguistic and/or (inter)cultural
capabilities? While much of the Human Intel-
ligence (HUMINT) side is cultural and/or
intercultural also with a linguistic focus on
speaking and listening, the bulk of Signals Intel-
ligence (SIGINT) has traditionally concerned
itself with culture-specific reading and listening,
with a very limited focus on intercultural inter-
action and speaking. Is there room in SIGINT
education and training for these additional
components? Would they be beneficial
and/or necessary in similar ways to the GPF,
CA, and SOF demographics? The JBLM LCC
and the authors of this article assert that the
answer to both questions is a resounding
yes.

There are many possible missions for Military
Intelligence (MI) personnel that have some
need for linguistic and/or (inter)cultural skills
on both the HUMINT and SIGINT sides. At
a minimum, these can include transcription,
translation, and linguistic analysis for SIGINT
personnel and interpretation, interrogation,
and negotiation for HUMINT operators.
(This is only where clearly discernible lines
can be drawn. More often than not, these two
disciplines overlap, and the line between them
is blurred, at best.) For HUMINT missions,
the need for 3C Competence, derived from
CG and 3C education and field experience, is
obvious and both directly and positively im-
pacts mission success, as those missions are
interactive in nature and clearly fall within the
Human Domain (Sands 2013b). It need not
be discussed in detail here. For SIGINT oper-
ations, however, other arguments must be
made to account for the difference in opera-
tional focus and end products.

SIGINT professionals typically produce a va-
riety of reports, as opposed to conversing
with foreigners in a foreign language. The vast
majority of these documents are in English
and not the target language. These facts not-
withstanding, this group and the duties they
perform can benefit greatly from CG, 3C, and

44
3C Competency education, especially when
integrated with the language classes they al-
ready attend as a part of their normal duties.

First, just as with the training for the previ-
ously mentioned groups, these additional
components provide a context in which to
place culture-specific and target language in-
formation. In addition to the importance of
this context in its own right, we hypothesize
that its inclusion drives linguistic proficiency
higher than in similar courses without it. If
JBLM LCCs results from its GPF pilots can
be seen to substantiate this claim, this has im-
port implications and direct applicability to
DoD language programs, especially as the
Services begin to require them to establish
means for MI linguists to achieve ILR level 3
(instead of the previous requirement of 2) in
both reading and listening (AFISRA Instruction
14-131; INSCOM Regulation 11-6).

Second, Kramsch third culture can be used as
the vantage point from which to perform ana-
lytical tasks. Sands perspective-taking, sensemak-
ing, and cultural self-awareness are skills with im-
portant implications for how well those tasks
are done and the relative accuracy of the
products produced from translations of idi-
oms and colloquialisms to course-of-action
(COA) development and assessment. [T]he
human domain is a critical space to master
and manage intent, purpose and interaction of
the different actors involved (Sands, 2013c),
so it follows that development of the
knowledge and skills necessary for operating
with that domain are integrated into education
and training programs for this discipline.

Third, more and more, the Intelligence Com-
munity (IC) is a multinational, multicultural
one. Intelligence products, be they oral brief-
ings or written reports, are often shared and
even created with the help of our foreign al-
lies. While the form of this collaboration may
not be conversational in the more tradition-
al sense, it is certainly interactional and inter-
cultural. Our partners are also actors in the
Human Domain in which we operate, not
simply the target culture actors of a particular
Area of Operation. For that collaboration to
be truly effective, the interactions must
acknowledge and account for cultural, com-
municative differences.

Finally, when not engaged in specifically MI
missions, commanders often leverage the ca-
pabilities of the MI professionals with GPF,
SOF, and/or CA type missions when the or-
ganically assigned or attached personnel from
those specialties are not available or sufficient
for successful mission execution. This is an
operational reality that will increase in fre-
quency as DoD continues to downsize and
the remaining personnel are required to pick
up the additional duties resulting from elimi-
nated positions. Thus, the same arguments
that apply to those demographics, apply here
to SIGNIT professionals, as well.

Conclusion
Given the JBLM LCC concept of 3C and its
overall pedagogical goals in support of the
military, much of Morans model could be
used in effective lesson plan and curriculum
development, potentially in many other DoD
language and culture programs, as well. Our
aim with this application of Morans Cultural
Knowings framework was to provide one pos-
sible approach to future military language and
culture education and training. We have also
attempted to show the implications for the

45
integration of CG, 3C, and Cross-cultural
Communication Competencies across the en-
tire spectrum of potential student populations
throughout DoD. Given resource constraints,
it is clear that all organizations within DoD
must be innovative enough to explore effi-
ciencies wherever they can be found, while
still ensuring the accomplishment of their
primary missions and still making improve-
ments to their various programs wherever
possible. The JBLM LCC initiative described
above is submitted as just such an innovation.
Our approach attempts to specifically address
identified deficiencies within DoD, one of our
core responsibilities. The existing infrastruc-
ture (course length, number of instructors,
facilities, etc.) is being utilized, while addition-
al subject matter is added to course curricula
essentially providing more bang for the
buck to students and the military units they
belong to. In addition, we have kept abreast
of contemporary approaches to culture learn-
ing and teaching and have updated our meth-
odologies accordingly to stay at the cutting
edge of culture-based FL instruction.

This is by no means the only way to approach
culture and language education, though the
JBLM LCC approach has enjoyed substantial
successes. What is required now is greater col-
laboration and experimentation across all
DoD language and culture programs to identi-
fy and begin using approaches that work best
at other locations, tailored specifically for the
missions they support and the students they
teach. This too is a utilization of existing re-
sources: something that costs nothing extra
but might bear significant fruit. As much as
possible and practical, this collaboration
should then be extended to reach outside of
DoD to the civilian sector, as most of the
challenges in FL and culture teaching and
learning are shared ones. Even those that are
not shared can provide insight to each respec-
tive community and potentially spur new ideas
and approaches. As best practices are identi-
fied, they should be shared across the wider
teaching communities. This collaboration
cannot be aimed at finding a single, standard-
ized solution to FL and culture teaching,
however. The varied teaching and learning
contexts and their respective objectives pre-
vent this from being a tenable and realistic
pursuit. Instead, collaboration should be
geared towards finding better ways to tailor
curricula to those specific contexts and out-
comes, while keeping an eye on integrating
new ideas, lest our programs stagnate to the
point of irrelevance and continue to fail to
address known and enduring deficiencies.


46
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48
Integrating Culture General and Cross-cultural Competence & Communication Skills:
Appendix A

Cross-cultural Communication (3C) & Language Refresher (LR)
Week 2: Restaurant Etiquette
Lesson 1: Knowing About Lesson Overview
49
Lesson 1: Knowing About Time/Activity Tables
50-51
Lesson 2: Knowing How Lesson Overview
52
Lesson 3: Knowing How Time/Activity Tables
53-54
Lesson 3: Knowing Why Lesson Overview
55
Lesson 3: Knowing Why Time/Activity Tables
56-58
Lesson 4: Knowing Oneself Lesson Overview
59-60
Lesson 4: Knowing Why Time/Activity Tables
61-63

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64
Integrating Culture General and Cross-cultural Competence & Communication Skills:
Appendix B

Class Participation Rubric 65
Homework Oral/Speaking Rubric 66
Essay Rubric 67
Language in Action Rubric (Partial) 68

65

66

67

68

69

Pieter R. DeVisser is currently the De-
fense Language Institute Foreign Language
Centers Liaison to Joint Base Lewis
McChord, Washington where he works to-
gether with Yvonne Pawelek, Director of
the JBLM Language & Culture Center. Since
taking the position in early 2012, his primary
focus has been on non-traditional language
and culture training of the Armys General
Purposes Forces (troops not in a foreign
language dependent operational specialty).
While this training was first focused on
troops deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan,
Mr. DeVisser has helped make the JBLM
LCC the first site to fully pivot the training focus to the Armys ongoing regional alignment,
generally, and I Corps alignment to Pacific Command, specifically. Additionally, Mr. DeVisser
advises and collaborates with the JBLM area language managers and unit commanders at all
echelons.

Prior to his position at JBLM, Mr. DeVisser was the Command Language Program Manager for
66th Military Intelligence Brigade (MIB) in Wiesbaden, Germany. During his three and a half
years there, he was responsible for the language training of hundreds of military linguists. He
was instrumental in correcting the pay procedures for service members foreign language skills
throughout Germany, assisting other language program managers throughout Europe, and help-
ing the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center to establish its first Language
Training Detachment (LTD) in Europe. The technology integration he achieved at the 66th MIB
Language Learning Center was used as a model for that and later LTDs established throughout
Europe. Upon his departure from that position, Mr. DeVisser was presented the Commander's
Award for Civilian Service.

From early 2000 to early 2004, Mr. DeVisser served honorably in the US Army as an Intelligence
Analyst and Noncommissioned Officer, deploying for eight months in support of what eventu-
ally became Operation Iraqi Freedom. After his discharge from the Army, Mr. DeVisser contin-
ued to directly support the military by managing operations responsible for providing contract
linguists to Intelligence operations throughout Europe.

Mr. DeVisser graduated magna cum laude from Christ College, Valparaiso University in 1998
with a B.A. in German & English Literature. He is currently pursuing a Masters of Applied Lin-
guistics through University of Massachusetts Boston and is expect to graduate later this year.
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70

Abstract
Finding, assessing, training, and evaluating individuals who are able to perform in different cultures
is extremely important for any multinational organization. A number of different terms have been
used to describe this type of performance, with an equal number of different definitions proposed
that focus on different aspects of performing across cultures. However, researchers in the area of
cross-cultural performance acknowledge that the lack of a sound, theory-based definition for cross-
cultural performance is inhibiting and sewing confusion in the advancement of this field. For exam-
ple, some of the definitions currently being used lack a solid theoretical framework and confound
performance with its predictors. The current work focuses on clarifying and delineating the cross-
cultural performance domain, based on the adaptive performance literature. The term cultural adap-
tive performance (CAP) is proposed as a term for cross-cultural performance, and defined using
evaluable behaviors (Viswesvaran & Ones, 2000). This approach is consistent with other approaches
to defining performance in the industrial-organizational psychology field (e.g., Borman & Motowid-
lo, 1993)

.
Cultural Adaptive Performance:
A Definition and Potential Solution to the
Cross-cultural Performance Criterion Problem

Gonzalo Ferro
Cultural Adaptive Performance
71
Defining the Criterion Domain of Cultural
Adaptive Performance
The term globalization is often used to refer
to increasing interconnectedness of global
economic activity. The author Thomas
Friedman described globalization as a flat-
tening of the world (Friedman, 2005). Ac-
cording to Friedman, this flattening is charac-
terized by the ability of individuals to compete
in a global economy due to advances in trans-
portation and the ability of individuals to
communicate with each other anywhere in the
world. One consequence of the globalization
of the worlds economies is a need for organi-
zations to find and develop individuals capa-
ble of successfully adapting to and meeting
the needs of global customers, employees, and
business partners (House, 2004). Organiza-
tions increasingly recognize the importance of
employing individuals who perform effective-
ly in different cultures and environments
(Ilgen & Pulakos, 1999).

The topic of individual performance in differ-
ent cultures has been examined from a variety
of perspectives. Some of this work emphasiz-
es individual difference variables such as cul-
tural intelligence (Ang et al., 2007; Earley &
Ang, 2003; Earley & Peterson, 2004), or inter-
cultural sensitivity (Hammer, Bennett, &
Wiseman, 2003); other work focuses on the
processes of cross-cultural adjustment (Arthur
& Bennett, 1995; Black, Mendenhall, &
Oddou, 1991; Harrison & Shaffer, 2005;
Tucker, Bonial, & Lahti, 2004), intercultural
communication (Gudykunst, 1997; Ting-
Toomey, 2010), sociocultural adaptation
(Ward & Kennedy, 1999), or acculturation
(Berry, 2003); some characterize such perfor-
mance as a competence, which mixes predic-
tor and criterion variables, as is done with the
term cross-cultural competence (3C) (Abbe,
Gulick, & Herman, 2008; McCloskey, Behym-
er, Papautsky, Ross, & Abbe, 2010); and oth-
ers characterize performing in different cul-
tures as a dimension of performance referred
to as cultural adaptability (Pulakos, Arad, Do-
novan, & Plamondon, 2000).

This multitude of perspectives and theoretical
approaches has created a number of obstacles
in the advancement of this important field.
One issue is the lack of a consistent definition
of what constitutes effective cross-cultural
performance (for discussions see Arthur &
Bennett, 1995; Burke, Watkins, & Guzman,
2009; Deshpande & Viswesvaran, 1992; Har-
rison, Shaffer, & Bhaskar-Shrinivas, 2004;
Kealey & Protheroe, 1996; Mol, Born, Wil-
lemsen, & Van Der Molen, 2005; Mol, Born,
& van der Molen, 2005; Ones & Viswesvaran,
1997; Sinangil & Ones, 2001). In addition to
the lack of consensus on the definition of
what constitutes effective performance,
Yamazaki and Kayes (2004) argue that much
of the research in this area lacks a solid theo-
retical framework and is comprised mostly of
lists of predictors (such as skills or personality
variables). In order to address these issues,
researchers have called for individual-level
theories that specify the process by which in-
dividuals adapt to the global work environ-
ment (Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007, p.
497).

The purpose of this article is to clarify and
delineate the cross-cultural performance do-
main. This involves clearly defining what does
and does not constitute cross-cultural perfor-
mance. In this article, cross-cultural perfor-
mance is defined in terms of evaluable behav-
iors (Viswesvaran & Ones, 2000), which is
consistent with other approaches to defining
Gonzalo Ferro

72
performance in the industrial-organizational
psychology field (e.g., Borman & Motowidlo,
1993). Relying on existing organizational theo-
ries, I will define and explicate what is cross-
cultural performance from a behavioral
standpoint.

Defining Cross-Cultural Performance as a
Dimension of Adaptive Performance
In order to identify valid predictors of cross-
cultural performance, an initial step must be
to define cross-cultural performance. As pre-
viously stated, the lack of a consistent defini-
tion of cross-cultural performance has been a
consistent problem in this literature. As dis-
cussed later in this section, existing definitions
of cross-cultural performance tend to com-
bine predictors of performance with perfor-
mance itself (e.g., the ability to perform in
different countries). In order to avoid repeat-
ing the intermixing of criterion and predictor
variables in defining a performance domain, I
rely on existing theories of performance
(Viswesvaran & Ones, 2000), focusing on be-
haviors that are relevant to the performance
domain and that can be measured in terms of
each individuals proficiency (Campbell, Gas-
ser, & Oswald, 1996).

Cross-cultural performance can be defined
based on the adaptive performance literature
(Pulakos et al., 2000). Schmitt and colleagues
(2003) and Cortina and Luchman (2013) argue
that performance is a behavior that is a direct
function of declarative and procedural
knowledge and motivation (2003, p. 78).
They categorize performance into three types:
task proficiency, contextual behavior, and
adaptive performance. The adaptive perfor-
mance category is particularly relevant to per-
forming in a different culture. The term adap-
tive performance is used to describe perfor-
mance that takes place in a dynamic environ-
ment, in which individuals must effectively
adjust their thinking and actions in order to
achieve their goals (Cracraft, 2011).

The key concept that differentiates adaptive
performance from task or contextual perfor-
mance is that an individual changes his or her
thinking and behavior to meet the challenge
of a dynamic work environment. Task per-
formance is usually described in terms of core
tasks (Campbell, 1990) or task-related behav-
iors that contribute to the attainment of an
organizations goals (Borman & Motowidlo,
1993). Contextual performance is defined as
behaviors that facilitate an environment con-
ducive to the execution of the technical core
(e.g., task performance). Unlike the behaviors
that define task performance, which differ
from one job to the next, contextual behav-
iors are stable across jobs and not role-
prescribed. The behaviors that define contex-
tual performance do not address the changing
nature of the work environment.

The behaviors that define adaptive perfor-
mance, which is sometimes referred to as
adaptability, describe reactive or proactive
change to meet changing environmental con-
ditions. For example, Banks and colleagues
(2001) defined adaptability as a functional
change (cognitive, behavioral, and/or affec-
tive) in response to altered environmental cir-
cumstances (p.4). Research in the area of
adaptive performance provides a theoretical
framework necessary to clarify and delineate
how performance in cross-cultural environ-
ments can be defined and described in behav-
ioral terms.
73
Using Campbell et al.s (1993) model of per-
formance as a starting point, Pulakos and col-
leagues developed (2000) and validated (2002)
a taxonomy of adaptive job performance.
They define adaptive performance as a multi-
dimensional construct consisting of eight di-
mensions: 1) handling emergencies, 2) han-
dling work stress, 3) solving problems
creatively, 4) dealing with uncertain situations,
5) learning, 6) interpersonal adaptability, 7)
cultural adaptability, and 8) physically-oriented
adaptability. These eight dimensions were de-
fined in terms of behaviors that exemplify the
change required to be effective in different
adaptive situations.

Effective performance in cross-cultural set-
tings requires one to change the way that he
or she behaves in order to fit into a different
culture. Culture has been defined in a variety
of ways, with Brown (1991) defining it as
patterns of doing and thinking that are
passed on within and between generations by
learning (p.130). Culture, or more specifical-
ly, cultural differences represent situational
variables that force people to adapt in order
to be effective. These differences are usually
described in terms of values, beliefs, percep-
tions, and norms (for a summary see Hof-
stede, 2011). Pulakos et al. (2000) define cul-
tural adaptability as:

Taking action to learn about and understand the
climate, orientation, needs, and values of other
groups, organizations, or cultures; integrating well
into and being comfortable with different values,
customs, and cultures; willingly adjusting behavior
or appearance as necessary to comply with or
show respect for others values and customs; un-
derstanding the implications of ones actions and
adjusting approach to maintain positive relation-
ships with other groups, or cultures (2000, p.
617).
As Ployhart and Bliese (2006) point out, adap-
tive performance is not inherent in the crite-
rion construct but driven by the demands of
the environment. Thus, adaptive performance
requirements are really consequences of a
changing environment (p. 25).

In summary, because cultural differences dic-
tate changes in individual behavior, the adap-
tive performance literature provides a theoret-
ical framework for defining performance in
cross-cultural settings. The following section
defines the criterion space for performance in
cross-cultural settings based on the Pulakos et
al. (2000) definition of cultural adaptability.

Cultural Adaptive Performance (CAP)
The Pulakos et al. (2000) definition of cultural
adaptability describes the behaviors and ac-
tions that are thought to make up effective
performance in cross-cultural settings. As Pu-
lakos et al. (2000) state, the key aspect of this
type of adaptive performance involves suc-
cessfully integrating into a new culture or en-
vironment by fully understanding and willing-
ly behaving in accordance with the accepted
customs, values, rules, and structures operat-
ing within it (p. 614). In their view, cultural
adaptability results from an individuals pur-
poseful change in behavior, in order to suc-
cessfully perform in an environment that is
culturally different from the individuals.

Although Pulakos et al. (2000) use the term
cultural adaptability, the term Cultural
Adaptive Performance (CAP) provides a more
straightforward emphasis on performance,
which is needed to distinguish this work from
other related work on individual differences.
Other researchers use the term adaptability
to denote an individual difference construct
Gonzalo Ferro

74
(e.g., Ployhart & Bliese, 2006), or focus on the
process of adapting (e.g., Chan, 2000). The
term cultural adaptability has been used by
other researchers, but not always as Pulakos
intended a dimension of adaptive perfor-
mance. For example, Kelley and Meyers
(1995) developed the Cross-Cultural Adapta-
bility Inventory (CCAI) and defined cross-
cultural adaptability as ones readiness to in-
teract with people who are different from
oneself or adapt to living in another culture
(Nguyen, Biderman, & McNary, 2010; p. 113).
This definition of cultural adaptability refers
to an individual attribute (e.g., ones readi-
ness), not a dimension of performance. Simi-
larly, Sutton and colleagues (2006) referred to
cultural adaptability as the ability to un-
derstand ones own and others cognitive bi-
ases and to adapt, as necessary, to ensure suc-
cessful team performance (p.144). In this
context, the researchers were focusing on cul-
tural adaptability within a cross-cultural team
performance domain. By using the term abil-
ity in their definition, the authors imply that
this is an individual difference variable, not a
dimension of performance.

In their theory of performance, Campbell and
colleagues (1993) argue that if we want to
accumulate knowledge about how to measure,
predict, explain, and change performance but
have no common understanding of what it is,
then building a cumulative research record is
difficult to impossible (p.35). Therefore, it is
Table 1: Components of CP Based on Pulakos et al.s (2000) Definition
Cultural Adaptability Di-
mension
Exemplary Behaviors/Activities Revised Definition of CAP
1) Taking action to learn about
and understand the climate, orien-
tation, needs, and values of other
groups, organizations, or cultures.
Learning Behaviors:
Behaviors/activities associated with
learning about the culture of the indi-
vidual or society (e.g., studies about the
cultural norms of a particular region;
interviews others about cultural orienta-
tion of business partners).
1) Takes action to learn about and
understand the climate, orientation,
needs, and values of other groups,
organizations, or cultures and how
these differ from ones own.
2) Integrating well into and be-
ing comfortable with different
values, customs, and cultures.
Willingly adjusting behavior or
appearance as necessary to comply
with or show respect for others
values and customs. Understand-
ing the implications of ones ac-
tions and adjusting approach to
maintain positive relationships
with other groups, or cultures.
Integrating Behaviors: Behav-
iors/activities demonstrating capacity for
effective integration into a different cul-
ture (e.g., conducts and/or participates
in meetings in cross-cultural settings;
builds rapport with foreign partners).
Behaviors/activities demonstrating pur-
poseful changes in behavior (e.g., fol-
lows the appropriate cultural protocols
for the region; adjusts lan-
guage/terminology to meet the level of
the audience). Behaviors/activities
demonstrating actions taken to correct
past mistakes (e.g., changes topic of
conversation away from taboo topics
when interacting with foreign personnel;
recognizes own actions that are deemed
offensive and quickly corrects behavior).
2) Adjusts behaviors in order to
integrate well into and to be com-
fortable with different values, cus-
toms, and cultures. Monitors and
evaluates the implications of ones
actions and adjusts behaviors in
order to correct inappropriate be-
haviors, maintain existing positive
relationships, and build upon exist-
ing relationships with other groups,
or cultures.

75
important to make a distinction between re-
search on the adaptive performance domain
and other conceptualizations of adaptability.

The term cultural adaptive performance
(CAP) will be used in this article to highlight
the performance aspect of a cultural dimen-
sion and avoid focusing on individual differ-
ence variables. In the conceptualization of
CAP proposed here, CAP is composed of two
components: learning behaviors and integrat-
ing behaviors. Learning behaviors are those
that facilitate the effective adjustment of per-
forming tasks/behaviors in a new cultural en-
vironment. Integrating behaviors reflect ac-
tions that indicate one is modifying his or her
behavior based on what was observed and
learned through past learning behaviors, and
correcting for past mistakes or replacing inef-
fective behaviors with behaviors that are more
likely to be effective in a different culture.

To define the two hypothesized components
of CAP, the behaviors identified in Pulakos et
al.s definition of cultural adaptability are used.
The Pulakos et al. (2000) definition focuses
first on behaviors that reflect efforts to learn
about the culture in which performance will
occur. It then identifies behaviors that high-
light effective integration into that culture,
which includes demonstrating adherence to
the performance requirements of the cross-
cultural environment and behaviors that indi-
cate recognition of the impact of the individu-
als behavior. Table 1 presents the definition
of each component of CAP and a comparison
to the Pulakos et al. definition.

The subdivision of CAP into two dimensions
is similar to other performance dimensions
such as contextual performance (Borman &
Motowidlo, 1993), which has been subdivided
into different categories (e.g., Borman & Pen-
ner, 2001). One advantage of narrowing the
focus to specific culture-related behaviors in
each CAP dimension is that the knowledge
and skills that are likely to predict these be-
haviors can be identified.

Components of CAP
Implicit in the Pulakos et al. (2000) definition
of cultural adaptability is the process by which
individuals are able to change their actions in
order to effectively perform in a different cul-
ture. This process entails engaging in behav-
iors (e.g., learning behaviors) that result in
learning about either a particular culture or
about culture and cultural differences in gen-
eral. These behaviors result in gaining culture-
specific knowledge that allow an individual to
then engage in behaviors (e.g., integrating be-
haviors) that facilitate effective integration
into a culture and that allows them to sustain
or improve/fix performance in this cross-
cultural environment.

In the following sections, the two compo-
nents of CAP are further defined by describ-
ing the behaviors that help define each partic-
ular piece of the performance domain (Austin
& Villanova, 1992). This approach is different
from others who have tried to define perfor-
mance in cross-cultural settings. For example,
Caligiuri (2006) notes that the most common
measures of successful cross-cultural perfor-
mance focus on assignee adjustment (Harri-
son & Shaffer, 2005), completion of assign-
ment, and performance on the assignment
(e.g., task and/or contextual performance).
These are not true conceptualizations of per-
formance per se, or at least not of cross-
Gonzalo Ferro

76
cultural performance as a dimension of adap-
tive performance.

Component 1: Learning Behaviors.
The first component of CAP is learning be-
havior. This dimension captures those behav-
iors or activities associated with learning
about the culture or society in which an indi-
vidual is going to be operating. In order to
effectively adapt to a new culture, an individu-
al needs to know the parameters of acceptable
behavior (e.g., social norms, values, beliefs)
for a specific culture. As such, this dimension
includes culture-general (etic) type behaviors
and/or actions an individual engages in that
facilitate gaining general knowledge and un-
derstanding of the key aspects of culture, and
how these aspects vary across cultures.

Learning behaviors are the first step in an im-
portant aspect of adaptive performance the
temporal/dynamic component. Chan (2000)
argued that adaptive performance is a dynam-
ic phenomenon that occurs over time. In their
research that addresses the temporal nature of
adaptive performance, Lang and Bliese (2009)
proposed two types of adaptation, transition
adaptation and reacquisition adaptation, with-
in a task-change paradigm. The authors de-
fined reacquisition adaptation as the process
of recovering after a change that is a system-
atic and analytical learning behavior needed in
order to understand and learn the new chal-
lenges of the task (p. 415). Similar to reacqui-
sition adaptation, learning behaviors lead to
identification of how tasks have changed in
the new, cross-cultural environment, and what
entails effective behaviors in this new envi-
ronment. The learning behaviors themselves
are etic in nature in that the same types of be-
haviors may be used to gain general
knowledge of a culture and may be applied
across cultures, but the knowledge and under-
standing gained as a result of these behaviors
can be emic (e.g., culture-specific). The
knowledge and understanding gained from
learning behaviors then informs integration
behaviors.

Results from other studies of cross-cultural
performance provide support for the learning
behavior component of CAP. For example, in
the adjustment literature, Tucker et al. (2004)
examined the relationship between intercul-
tural adjustment and job performance of cor-
porate expatriates. The authors argue that in-
tercultural adaptation (the process of adjusting
to a new country) cannot occur unless indi-
viduals learn about the foreign country. This
knowledge dimension includes historical and
contemporary information about the country
that an individual gains through learning or
interacting with the local population. Similar
to this dimension, CAPs learning behaviors
are behaviors that result in the acquisition of
culture-related facts and concepts that will
facilitate an understanding of the operational
environment in which an individual is going
to have to perform. Specific knowledge (e.g.,
facts and figures about a country) is a conse-
quence of these behaviors and, as such, does
not constitute part of the definition of this
dimension.

All jobs require the performance of tasks (e.g.,
driving a bus, advising students) that are job-
specific and non-job-specific (Campbell et al.,
1993). In a cross-cultural setting, effective per-
formance of these tasks requires understand-
ing how a task may be different because of the
new cultural context (e.g., driving in Rome,
or advising students in China). Learning
behaviors are those that are needed to under-
77
stand and learn how the task has changed, and
how to effectively adjust ones task perfor-
mance in a new cultural setting.

An important addition to Pulakos definition
captured in the learning behavior dimension is
the concept of differentiating how the com-
ponents of a culture differ from ones own.
Learning behaviors not only help an individu-
al to learn and understand a different culture,
but also how the differences between ones
culture and another culture impact job-
specific and non-specific proficiency. Follow-
ing the previous example, learning behaviors
help one understand not only about driving
in Rome or advising students in China, but
also how that is different from driving in Mi-
ami or advising students in the U.S. This is
beneficial because drawing specific distinc-
tions may help build a more accurate under-
standing of appropriate behaviors and miti-
gate the chances that an individual will
inadvertently fall back on his or her own cul-
ture-specific approach.

Learning behaviors are those that result in an
understanding of what effective performance
in a new environment needs to look like,
which facilitates the adaptation of existing be-
haviors to meet the requirements of the new
environment. Learning behaviors differ from
the other component of CAP in that they fo-
cus on what Lang and Bliese (2009) describe
as behaviors needed to understand and learn
the performance requirements of this differ-
ent environment. The other dimension of
CAP builds on this understanding in order to
implement change for effective performance
in this environment. Table 2 provides exam-
ple behaviors of the learning component of
CAP, which are drawn from critical incidents
Pulakos and colleagues (2000) collected and
used to define the eight dimensions of adap-
tive performance.

Component 2: Integrating Behaviors.
The second component of CAP focuses on
behaviors that demonstrate an individuals
capacity for integration into a cross-cultural
environment, which involves taking initial
steps to fit in and taking action to correct mis-
takes or maintain relationships that are built.
Integrating behaviors are related to social in-
teractions, such as building interpersonal rela-
tionships, and are geared towards monitoring
the environment to ensure behaviors fit with-
in that cultures norms of acceptable behav-
iors in order to maintain relationships. In ad-
dition, this dimension includes corrective
behaviors (e.g., evaluating the effects of past
behaviors and modifying a behavior that was
offensive), which are necessary to amend for
Table 2: Examples of Learning Behaviors
Ask others about cultural differences before I enter a new culture.
Learn rules for appropriate social interaction in a different culture.
Read books to learn about a new culture before I enter it.
Learn about the customs and language of another culture.
Talk to individuals from different cultures to understand their values and customs.

Gonzalo Ferro

78
past mistakes and maintain existing relation-
ships.

These types of behaviors lead to effective so-
cial interactions or acceptance by individuals
in the culture and reflect an individuals capac-
ity to adjust his/her behavior in order to suc-
cessfully perform in a new culture. While
learning behaviors assist in learning and un-
derstanding how the environment is different,
and as such, how behavior should differ to be
effective (e.g., knowing that in this culture it
is inappropriate to contradict a leader in front
of others); integrating behaviors are the im-
plementation of behaviors that exemplify ef-
fective change (e.g., refraining from voicing an
opposing opinion from that held by a leader
in front of his subordinates).
Integrating behaviors are the second step in
the CAP process in that they build upon what
is observed and learned from the learning be-
haviors. Similar to the concept of reacquisi-
tion adaptation identified in Lang and Bliese
(2009), having to adapt to a new culture is a
change that requires learning and building
skills to overcome the change. Models of skill
acquisition suggest that there are three phases
to skill acquisition: 1) cognitive phase (in-
volves developing an understanding of the
task and what will lead to success), 2) associa-
tive phase (involves formulation of strategies
and increasingly accurate execution), and 3)
autonomous phase (execution of behaviors
are fast and highly accurate) (Ackerman,
1988). Integrating behaviors involve an indi-
vidual applying his or her knowledge gained
from learning behaviors and beginning to ex-
ecute new strategies, and in this sense reflect
the associative phase of skill acquisition. The-
se behaviors represent an individuals effort to
implement effective changes in behavior to fit
a different culture, resulting in effective inter-
actions with individuals in the new cultural
context.

The proposed definition for integrating be-
haviors differs from Pulakos and colleagues
(2000) definition in two key aspects. The first
is the focus on monitoring and evaluating
ones actions, which are both behaviors, in-
stead of the focus on understanding the im-
plications of ones actions which can be
viewed more as an outcome. This is in line
with the view of performance as a behavior
and not as an outcome (Motowidlo, 2003).
The second is the addition of the concept of
adjusting behaviors not only to maintain pos-
itive relationships with other groups, as Pu-
lakos et al. state, but also to correct for inap-
propriate behaviors, an important component
of adaptive performance.

The concepts of social interactions, and en-
gaging in behaviors to build relationships or
to correct for behavioral mistakes (e.g., offen-
sive behaviors), as a core component of per-
formance is not new. For example, models of
task performance contain such dimensions as
facilitating peer and team performance, super-
vision/leadership, and management/ admin-
istration (Campbell et al., 1993), all of which
have social interaction as a core component.
Contextual job performance dimensions in-
clude the notion that individuals willfully en-
gage in activities and behaviors that although
are not necessarily role prescribed or formally
rewarded, are nonetheless important for or-
ganizational functioning (Schmitt et al., 2003);
and they include components such as helping
and cooperating with others, and interperson-
al facilitation (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993).

79
In the cross-cultural performance literature,
various models have posited dimensions relat-
ed to social interaction. For example, in their
effort to map out the criterion space for ex-
patriate success, Harrison and Shaffer (2005)
listed relationship building (defined as devel-
oping and maintaining interpersonal ties with
members of the host country, p. 1458) as
one of the dimensions of the performance
domain (in addition to task completion and
turnover/early return).

In another example, Sinangil and Ones (2002)
hypothesized model of expatriate job perfor-
mance included dimensions such as: com-
municating and persuading, working with oth-
ers, interpersonal relations, and personal
discipline (which is defined as the avoidance
of counterproductive behaviors). Ones and
Viswesvarans (1997) model included the di-
mensions of communication competence, in-
terpersonal relations, leadership, effort and
initiative, and compliance with/ acceptance of
authority.
In summary, integrating behaviors are those
that exemplify how an individual fits into a
foreign culture, focusing specifically on be-
haviors related to social interactions, and en-
gaging in behaviors to build relationships or
to correct for behavioral mistakes. Table 3
provides examples of integrating behaviors
taken from the critical incidents Pulakos and
colleagues (2000) collected and used to define
the eight dimensions of adaptive performance.

Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to provide a
sound, theory-based definition for cross-
cultural performance. The proposed definition
of CAP, and its two components: learning and
integrating behaviors, address two issues
commonly found in other definitions of
cross-cultural performance. Many definitions
lack a theoretical framework or the definitions
confound the criterion space (performance)
with its predictors. By basing the definition of
CAP on the adaptive performance literature, I
provide a theoretical rationale for how cross-
cultural performance is different from other
types of performance (e.g., task and contextu-
al performance). Furthermore, by defining
CAP and its components in behavioral terms,
Table 3: Examples of Integrating Behaviors
Modify my style of dress to fit in with local customs.
Change my behavior to fit in with individuals from different cultures.
Communicate with individuals who are from unfamiliar cultural backgrounds.
Find creative ways to communicate with individuals that speak another language.
Follow the customs and practices in another culture even when uncomfortable with the custom/practice.
Adapt by leadership style to match the needs and values of individuals from other cultures.
Change my behavior to help people from different backgrounds feel comfortable.
Adapt work practices to fit in with the customs of a different culture.
Maintain working relationships with individuals from different cultures.

Gonzalo Ferro

80
this definition can be used in future research
in the areas of assessment, selection, and
training.

For example, the behaviors used in the defini-
tions of learning and integrating behaviors can
be used to develop behavioral anchored rating
scales (Smith & Kendall, 1963) to measure
cross-cultural performance. Once these types
of measures have been developed, perfor-
mance data can be used to conduct criterion-
related validity studies to evaluate the predic-
tive validity of variables (e.g., knowledge,
skills, abilities, or other characteristics) that
have been posited as being important predic-
tors of cross-cultural performance.

In addition, both learning behaviors and inte-
grating behaviors can be used in a school-
house context. These can be used to assess
students progress or engagement with learn-
ing materials. They can also be used to con-
duct a training gap analysis, by mapping how
the extent to which the training requires stu-
dents to engage in learning behaviors. To the
extent that students engage in learning behav-
iors, these behaviors should be predictive of
gaining required knowledge and skills neces-
sary for cross-cultural performance.

81
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84

Gonzalo Ferro, Ph.D., is a Research Scientist at PDRI a
CEB Co. Gonzalo has over twelve years of research and ap-
plied experience in the field of Industrial Organizational (I/O)
Psychology. Over the last ten years he has primarily worked on
U.S. Army related projects, focusing on the assessment, selec-
tion, and training of Soldiers. Gonzalo has worked on a number
of projects involving cross-cultural performance, including the
development of a competency model for Regional Expertise
and Culture (REC), and web-based cultural awareness training.
Gonzalo has conducted basic and applied research projects in
the areas of training needs analyses, competency modeling, de-
veloping classroom-based and web-based training courses,
identification of predictors of Soldiers field performance, lead-
ership, and performance in extreme environments. Currently,
he is working on finishing his doctoral degree at George Mason
University. His dissertation research is focused on defining
cross-cultural performance in a way that disentangles the mix of
predictors and performance descriptors that is commonly used
to define cross-cultural performance, as well as identifying knowledge and skills that predict cul-
tural adaptive performance across different cultures. He is currently serving as the President-Elect
of the Personnel Testing Council of Metropolitan Washington (www.ptcmw.org), the local I/O
psychology group. Gonzalo has presented his work at national conferences and published his
work in technical reports and peer-reviewed journals.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Gonzalo Ferro. E-mail: gonza-
lo.ferro@pdri.com. Address: PDRI, 1777 North Kent St, Suite 401, Arlington, VA 22209. This
article is based on the theory component of my doctoral dissertation. Thank you to my disserta-
tion advisors, Drs. Jose Cortina, Stephen Zaccaro, and David Kravitz for their feedback, and the
two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.
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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the authors and do not re-
flect the official policy or position of the United States government, the Department of De-
fense, or Air University.

Abstract

A fundamental assumption of this essay is that effective intercultural communication is a
strategic enabler of micro-level international security. It will be argued in three parts that the
knowledge and skills at the heart of the field of intercultural communication are a natural
platform for advancing international security. First, an explanation is offered for why current
PME course offerings do not sufficiently address the pressing need our military has for im-
proving the quality of intercultural communication. Next, an overview is provided of the
specific communication skills that are research-proven predictors of cross-cultural compe-
tence. Finally, a framework is offered for institutionalizing intercultural communication into
Professional Military Education
Strategic Enablers:
How Intercultural Communication Skills Advance
Micro-Level International Security

Lauren Mackenzie
Lauren Mackenzie
86
Introduction
The military's "Culture Rush" (Wynn, 2008)
has created a consensus among military pro-
fessionals and scholars in regard to culture's
significant implications for security and stabil-
ity operations. In today's culturally diverse
operational environment, individuals ranging
from commanding officers to strategic ser-
geants often rely on the warfighting capabili-
ties of negotiating and relationship-building to
accomplish their mission. However, if negoti-
ation and cross-cultural relations represent the
entryway to success in this environment,
communication skills are the keys needed to
open the door. A commonly cited example
illustrating this point is Triandis (1994, p. 29)
claim that the first Gulf War could have been
avoided had the parties involved been better
educated about nonverbal communication
patterns:

On January 9, 1991, the foreign minister of
Iraq, Tariq Aziz, and the United States Secre-
tary of State, James Baker, met in Geneva to
attempt a last-minute compromise that would
avoid a war. Seated next to Aziz was the half-
brother of Iraqs President, Saddam Hussein.
The half-brother kept calling Baghdad to pro-
vide Hussein with his evaluation of what was
going on. Baker used the verbal channel of
communication almost exclusively and said
very clearly that the U.S. would attack if Iraq
did not move out of Kuwait. The Iraqis, how-
ever, paid less attention to what Baker said and
most attention to how he said it. Hussein's
half-brother reported to Baghdad that "the
Americans will not attack. They are weak.
They are calm. They are not angry. They are
only talking." Six days later, the United States
unleashed Operation Desert Storm and
Iraq lost close to 175,000 citizens.

Triandis further suggests that if Baker had
pounded the table, yelled, and shown outward
signs of anger to communicate intent nonver-
bally, the Iraqis may have decoded Baker's
message the way he intended and the outcome
may have been entirely different. Situations
such as these are the focus of intercultural
communication research which examines pat-
terns of interaction in order to predict misun-
derstanding.
This example can certainly be extended to
current international security operations,
whose success depends on micro-relations
whether they occur at the negotiation table or
on the battlefield. Such high-impact interper-
sonal interactions determine whether or not
the practices of partnership-building or nego-
tiating can even begin. Whereas macro-level
international security often focuses on long-
term strategic goals between nations, micro-
level international security entails the interper-
sonal interactions necessary to put such goals
into action. Decorated Navy SEAL J. Robert
DuBois captures the essence of this relation-
ship in his recent book, Powerful Peace, where
he calls for the relentless pursuit of interper-
sonal and international peacekeeping as an
imperative to global security (2012). Although
DuBois falls short of offering "pragmatic
methods for implementing the thesis in policy
and operations" (Sine, 2012, p.122), this essay
fills that void, offering a prescription for how
to infuse interpersonal and intercultural com-
munication skills into Professional Military
Education (PME).
A fundamental assumption of this essay is
that effective intercultural communication is a
strategic enabler of micro-level international
security. The communication of respect and
intercultural rapport-building must be incor-
porated into all levels of PME in order for
these skills to evolve from a "nice to have"
lecture or elective to a strategically necessary
Strategic Enablers: How Intercultural Communication Skills Advance Micro-Level International Security
87
professional competency. It will be argued
that the knowledge and skills at the heart of
the field of intercultural communication are a
natural platform for advancing international
security. To develop necessary cross-cultural
competence, leadership must "ensure proper
application and institutionalization of these
[knowledge and skill] competencies within
education, training, assessment and daily ap-
plication" (McDonald, et al., 2008, p. 2).
To support this claim, this essay is divided
into three sections. First, an explanation is
offered for why current PME course offerings
do not sufficiently address the pressing need
our military has for improving the quality of
intercultural communication. Next, an over-
view is provided of the specific communica-
tion skills that are research-proven predictors
of cross-cultural competence. Finally, a
framework is offered for institutionalizing in-
tercultural communication into PME.

Communication is the Intersection of
Language and Culture
Many military members serving overseas have
found themselves halfway through a mission
with a partner military only to realize they are
not succeeding because of an early, unintend-
ed act of disrespect (McConnell, Matson &
Clemmer, 2007). As most are now painfully
aware, a lack of understanding of the role cul-
ture plays in communication has serious con-
sequences: lost time, lost resources, and lost
lives. Members of the military are literally at
the front lines of international security opera-
tions, yet even as late as 2011, U.S. military
personnel struggle to communicate with allies and
adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan (How-
ard, 2011, p. 26). As unsettling as this truth
might be, the interaction of two individuals can
have a profound effect on the relationship
between two nation-states. It is here, at the
micro-level of international security that the
make-or-break policy moments occur. Like
any other human relationship, cooperative
alliances are formed or dissolved one conver-
sation at a time.
Improving the quality and outcomes of such
conversations is a main focus of intercultural
communication research which makes it
distinct from the study of language alone.
Whereas linguistic competence is concerned
with the ability to speak a language, commu-
nication competence is concerned with the
ability to use a language effectively and appro-
priately in context. An example that illustrates
this distinction is the creation of the ABCA
alliance - which was formed to create a means
to continue close cooperation between the
militaries of the United States, Britain, Cana-
da, Australia and New Zealand. To ensure
interoperability, the Alliance cites communica-
tion as one of the key cultural factors that af-
fects 'the thinking and motivation of individu-
als and groups' (see website: www.abca-
armies.org). It is of interest that an organiza-
tion was formed by several English speaking
nations to attempt to facilitate intercultural
communication and cooperation between mil-
itary forces. Examples such as these highlight
the distinction between culture and language
and reinforce that the bridge between the two
is intercultural communication. This skillset is
recognized in recent DoD-related publications
(Sands, R., 2013; Ingold, 2014) and has been
discussed by members of the Interagency
Language Roundtable.
Intercultural communication competence has
been defined and distinguished from other
fields of study in recent works (see Mackenzie
Lauren Mackenzie
88
& Wallace, 2014, p. 241), but these assump-
tions bear repeating:
Due to the fact that the field of communication
came in to existence well after many of the
more traditional social sciences, it is often con-
fused with the fields of language, cross-cultural
psychology (CCP), and international relations
(IR). To be clear, the field of communication
makes unique contributions to 3C that are not
typically within the theoretical scope of these
fields of study. For example, whereas linguistic
competence is concerned with the ability to
speak a language, communication competence
is concerned with the ability to use a language
effectively and appropriately in context. Addi-
tionally, while IR is primarily concerned with
institutional-level analysis of political and eco-
nomic systems and CCP is primarily concerned
with individual-level analysis of the personal
characteristics that predict competence, CCC is
concerned with analyzing the normative inter-
action behavior of small groups that can help
us identify difference and predict misunder-
standing (Bennett, 2011).
Defined as the knowledge, motivation, and
skills to interact effectively and appropriately
with members of different cultures (Wise-
man, 2002, p. 208), intercultural communica-
tion competence must have a permanent place
in PME if our military is to succeed in the di-
verse operational environment of the 21
st
cen-
tury.

A variety of professional fields with increasing
percentages of practitioners engaging in inter-
cultural interaction have looked to the field of
intercultural communication to inform and
enhance their practices and applied research.
The successful theory-based, discipline-
specific, cross-cultural competence training
available in the professional development lit-
erature particular to the fields of education

(i.e.; Barrera & Corso, 2000), social work

(i.e.;
Mason, 1995), medicine (i.e.; Jeffreys, 2006;
Crosson et al., 2004; Crandall et al., 2003) and
law (i.e.; Bryant, 2001) illustrate this prece-
dent. However, in the military, consular af-
fairs, and government, the stakes are as high
or higher than in the fields just cited, and one
single mismanaged interaction has the poten-
tial to derail decades of diplomatic work.

In a military context, a good amount of re-
search has been devoted to nonverbal skills
(i.e, Samman et al., 2009, Kramer, 2009, Yager
et al., 2009) to assist military personnel in ne-
gotiating the variety of meanings in cross-
cultural contexts. The Special Forces com-
munity has also reported specific communica-
tion performance categories that have been
deemed essential to cross-cultural interactions
such as building partner capacity and co-
ordinating relationships (Alrich, 2014), to
include incidents reported by Special Forces
members themselves (Russell, Crafts &
Brooks, 1995). The importance of communi-
cation skills is mentioned in several books as
well as training and technical reports (e.g.;
Bauer, 2007; McCloskey, M.J., Behymer, K.J.,
& Ross, K., 2010; National Research Council,
2008; Rasmussen et al., 2011; & Russell,
Crafts & Brooks, 1995;) however it is unclear
how much of this research is being dissemi-
nated amongst military members themselves.
Fully understanding and mastering these per-
formance categories, including using non-
verbal communication and negotiating, is im-
possible without a discussion of intercultural
communication (Reid et al., 2012). Intercul-
tural communication skills are the essential
foundation on which international security-
enabling practices such as conflict resolution
and negotiation are built.
Despite its necessity for a 21
st
century military,
the field of intercultural communication is
89
conspicuously absent from PME. Communi-
cation is often a taken-for-granted process that
is neglected in the outcome-focused leadership
and negotiation PME courses. Courses related
to international security in PME lack a so-
cial/relational perspective due to the fact that
the curriculum - written by faculty with ad-
vanced degrees in International Relations, Po-
litical Science, History, etc., is likely to focus
on learning objectives common to such tradi-
tional disciplines. Their impact on partici-
pants intercultural effectiveness could certain-
ly be enhanced and optimized by a
foundational intercultural communication
course devoted to the crucial process of rap-
port-building.
Intercultural Communication Skills as
Strategic Enablers
There is no question that learning a language
is a critical skill for military personnel. How-
ever, there are limitations involved in relying
on language skills alone to build partnerships.
Not only is the spoken word a small portion
of the communication process, but it would
take a lifetime to learn every language spoken
in each operational theater, partner military
base, or location of a potential future conflict.
The unique contribution made by intercultural
communication skills is their applicability re-
gardless of the language spoken or the loca-
tion of the interaction. These foundational
skills enable military communicators to inter-
act more effectively in both a newly acquired
language and their own native tongue.
Communication must be a part of DoD
cross-cultural competence training and educa-
tion (Reid et al., 2012) as such research exam-
ines the ways in which language use varies sig-
nificantly across cultures. A recent review of
state-of-the-art themes in cross-cultural
communication research (Merkin, Taras, &
Steel, 2013) reveals that the most common
hypotheses related to the link between cultural
values and communication behavior are de-
voted to: indirectness, self-promotion, face-
saving concerns, attitudes towards silence,
openness, interruption, personal space, high-
context communication, deception, drama-
tism and ritualism. An understanding of these
communication patterns is integral to begin-
ning the process of building relationships
across cultures, and military students must be
aware of their significance.
Intercultural communication skills are actions
and behaviors that are intentionally repeatable
and goal-oriented during interaction (Spitz-
berg, 2000). Such skills use appropriate and
effective processes to successfully navigate an
intercultural encounter in order to achieve the
desired outcome. These culture-general com-
petencies can be effectively taught and devel-
oped
47
. Those that are most relevant to mili-
tary students have been condensed into the
following eight foundational skills of intercul-
tural communication:
1. Interaction management
2. Impression management
3. Self-monitoring
4. Perceptual acuity
5. Paralanguage use and perception
6. Nonverbal communication
7. Active listening techniques
8. Communication styles

47
For example, the Introduction to Cross-Cultural Commu-
nication course offered by the Community College of
the Air Force has used this model with success for
three years, graduating close to 1500 Airmen. See
http://culture.af.mil/enrollmentwindow.aspx for more
information.
Lauren Mackenzie
90
To summarize, interaction management is the ef-
fective and appropriate use of conversational
turn-taking, information-gaining strategies,
and topic choice based on a reasonably accu-
rate assessment of the needs and desires of
others (Ruben, 1976, p. 341). Interaction
skills are goal-oriented behaviors enacted
while communicating with an individual or
group (Spitzberg, 2003) and are strongly af-
fected by cultural preferences for direct or
indirect messages as well as an orientation to-
ward task or relational outcomes. Impression
management is defined as deliberate and moti-
vated self-presentation and assumes that a
basic motivation of individuals is to be viewed
favorably by others (Goffman, 1959). Effec-
tive impression management across cultures
requires self-monitoring, which is the ability to
detect appropriateness of social behaviors and
self-presentation in response to situational
constraints and to adjust our behaviors to fit
the situation (Chen & Starosta, 1997). Percep-
tual acuity is the flip side to self-monitoring.
Defined as attention to and accurate detec-
tion of various aspects of the environment
(Montagliani & Giacalone, 1998, p.601), per-
ceptual acuity is necessary for a communicator
to accurately recognize how s/he is perceived
by others in an interaction. Accuracy will of-
ten hinge on a conversational partner's verbal,
nonverbal and paralinguistic cues.
Communication style is defined as: The way in
which we communicate, a pattern of verbal
and nonverbal behaviors that comprises our
preferred ways of giving and receiving infor-
mation in a specific situation. If the message
content is the what, and the communicators are
the who, then communication style is the how
(Saphiere, Mikk, & DeVries, 2005, p. 5). Differ-
ence is communication style preferences are
often conveyed via paralanguage (how a message
is delivered through rate of speech, volume,
word emphasis, intonation, and silence), via
nonverbal communication (conveying messages
through the use of touch, space, time, and body
movement) and via active listening practices (cultur-
ally variable feedback preferences used to
communicate understanding to a speaker).
Although a compelling case for intercultural
communication skills as strategic enablers of
international security has been made, a home
for it in PME has yet to be created. It is the
aim of this essay not only to initiate this dis-
cussion but also to lay the groundwork for its
foundation.
Incorporating Intercultural Communica-
tion into PME
In order to help military members avoid as
many mismanaged interactions or unforeseen
difficulties as possible, intercultural interac-
tions must be framed and examined as accu-
rately as possible with the most precise tools.
In matters of international security, it would
be an unfortunate oversight not to "take ad-
vantage of the diversity of knowledge and
epistemologies" offered by the discipline of
communication, which is both problem-
focused and task-oriented (Capella, 2011,
p.1476). Insights from the field of communi-
cation (to include the subfields of interper-
sonal, intercultural and organizational) must
inform how military personnel are taught to
communicate effectively within a multitude of
contexts and circumstances of cultural com-
plexity.

Currently, communication is found only as a
component of other courses or in bits and
pieces throughout PME. It typically falls un-
der training; and often, if it is getting done, it
91

Table 1: Intercultural Communication PME Framework
What is Intercultural Communication?
Intercultural communication is a field of study that enables us to interact effectively and ap-
propriately across cultures. The field of intercultural communication (also called cross-cultural
communication) is based on the insight that communication everywhere contains traces of cul-
ture (s) and that cultural values are displayed in communication behavior. The field is often
aligned with socio-linguistics, cultural anthropology, and cross-cultural psychology however,
practitioners in the field of intercultural communication focus on communication in context as
their primary theoretical concern.
Why is Intercultural Communication important?
Intercultural communication education can improve the quality of intercultural interactions -
thereby minimizing misunderstanding and conflict. Cross-cultural relations and negotiations
are dependent on communication skills, which make them foundational to cross-cultural com-
petence. The knowledge, motivation, and skills to interact effectively and appropriately with
members of different cultures (also known as intercultural communication competence) is a
most necessary competence for military personnel in the diverse operational environment of
the 21st century.
What are the goals of Intercultural Communication?
To encourage communicators to notice cultural distinctions in others behavior and inter-
pret these distinctions appropriately
To describe, interpret, and evaluate the communicative patterns and practices of particular
people in a particular place and compare them across cultures
To provide communicators with resources to create a variety of explanations for confusing
cross-cultural interaction
What is covered in a Intercultural Communication course?
Impression Management: Defined as deliberate and motivated self-presentation, this skill
is crucial to intercultural interaction since our projected message is often not interpreted the
way we intend it to be. This lesson also focuses on self-monitoring and perceptual acuity.
Paralanguage: What we say and how we say it influences the way we perceive and are per-
ceived by others. Factors such as volume, tone of voice, rate of speech, word emphasis and
interpretations of silence impact the meaning of a message.
Nonverbal Communication: Haptics (how we use touch to communicate), proxemics (how
we use space to communicate), chronemics (how we use time to communicate), and kine-
sics (how we use our bodies to communicate) are important aspects of communication that
military personnel in culturally diverse circumstances can leverage for mission success.
Communication Styles: The ways in which our cultural values are displayed in our behavior
reflects our communication style. These styles are often characterized by high and low
context communication patterns and connect to collective and individual cultural values, re-
spectively.
Situational Judgment Tests: Concepts are applied in culturally complex, military-relevant
scenarios.

Lauren Mackenzie
92
is not being done in an accountable, traceable
way. Moreover, intercultural training must
develop intercultural communication compe-
tence based on research-proven predictors, as
opposed to a taken-for-granted or assumed
skill that all military personnel possess. What
follows is a one-page synopsis of how Inter-
cultural Communication should be intro-
duced, defined and defended. It is intended to
be an action-item that can serve as a roadmap
for the programmatic inclusion of intercultur-
al communication into all levels of PME.

This framework has been taught in-residence
and on-line throughout the Air Force, to in-
clude students at: the Senior NCO Academy,
Squadron Officer College, Air Command &
Staff College, International Officer School,
Air War College Distance Education, among
others. It is a starting point for the inclusion
of a field of study that suggests concepts, the-
ories and skills to improve the quality of per-
sonal and professional relationships across
cultures.
Conclusion
Former Harvard Business School Dean, Nitin
Nohria, once said that communication is the
real work of leadership (1992). If this is the
case, and if we want our military students to
realize their potential as leaders, communica-
tion courses must be infused into PME in a
serious, specific and systematic way. The skills
and educational framework suggested here
move us closer toward helping military mem-
bers increase attributional confidence in their in-
tercultural interactions. Defined as the per-
ceived adequacy of information with which to
explain behavior occurring and to predict ap-
propriate future behaviors (Sanders &
Wiseman, 1993, p. 3), attributional confidence
is essential for reducing the kind of uncertain-
ty that impedes micro-level international secu-
rity operations. Arming our military with the
tools to explain behavior in culturally complex
interactions is essential to building trust, rap-
port and partnerships. This essay has made
the case for creating a permanent place for
this essential process in military education
anything less is a security risk that PME deci-
sion-makers should not be willing to take.


93
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96

Lauren Mackenzie is Associate Professor of Cross-Cultural Com-
munication at the U. S. Air Force Culture and Language Center. She re-
ceived her M.A. and Ph.D. in Communication from the University of
Massachusetts and has taught intercultural competence courses
throughout the Department of Defense over the past five years. Previ-
ously, she taught a variety of intercultural and interpersonal communica-
tion courses at the University of Massachusetts, the State University of
New York, and Columbus State University, among others. Dr. Macken-
zie's research centers around the verbal, paralinguistic and nonverbal
components that comprise the communication of respect across cultures. She has recently pub-
lished in the journals EDUCAUSE and Cross-Cultural Communication as well as in the book Cross-
Cultural Competence for a 21
st
Century Military.

Contact Information: Lauren Mackenzie, Air Force Culture and Language Center, 600 Chen-
nault Circle, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112, or by email at Lauren.Mackenzie@us.af.mil.

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97

Abstract
Returning to an empirical study first conducted by the author in 1992, and more recently referenced
in the work of Hall and Ferro (2011), this essay considers the perceptions of teachers and students
of less commonly taught languages (LCTLs) or critical need languages (CNLs) in the United States,
specifically Chinese. As first reported by McGinnis (1994), sixteen items in three categories of cur-
ricular and extra-curricular elements classroom-internal and classroom-external procedures, and
instructional materials were rated according to their perceived importance in the teaching or learn-
ing of Chinese in a university program in the United States. Results of that survey revealed both
some significant conflicts as well as points of agreement between the native Chinese teachers and
the Chinese as a foreign (CFL) language learners, serving at the least as a basis for consciousness
raising, toward the end of building transcultural competence for both students and teachers.

Cultures of Instruction Redux:
Identifying and (Hopefully) Resolving Conflicts

Scott McGinnis
Scott McGinnis
98
Pedagogical and scholarly trends seem to
quite frequently be like clothing fashions; if
one hangs on to them long enough, they will
come back in style again (and sometimes again
and again and again). Thus I was only mild-
ly surprised to receive an e-mail at the begin-
ning of 2011 from a good friend and some-
time collaborator on various projects over the
years, Professor Marjorie Hall Haley of
George Mason University.

We just had an article accepted by FL An-
nalsWeve cited your work from the 90s. You
and Schrier were going gang busters (sic) there
with looking at teachers transitioning into US
schools and then it stopped.we hope to resur-
rect this work and shed light on teacher training
for these teachers (personal communication, Janu-
ary 19, 2011).

This work that Dr. Haley refers to was a
research study that appeared in the journal
Theory Into Practice in the winter of 1994, as
well as another article in the same issue by
Professor Leslie Schrier of the University of
Iowa, both having to do with the perceptions
of teachers of less commonly taught languages
(LCTLs) or critical need languages (CNLs) in
the United States. Dr. Schrier was focusing on
teachers entering a precollegiate school set-
ting, as did Haley and Ferro (2011) for the
Foreign Language Annals article mentioned in
the e-mail. For my research, the target popula-
tion was students and teachers in the Chinese
language program at the University of Ore-
gon, for which I served as the program direc-
tor in the early 1990s.

However, as luck would have it, Marjorie did
not have to do all the resurrecting herself. Be-
ginning in the summer of 2010, and again dur-
ing the spring of 2013, I have in essence taken
my research tool on the road to workshops
for East Asian language teachers (Chinese and
Japanese) at Cornell University and Yale Uni-
versity. I present it here in the hopes that
some of the readers who have responsibility
for a language program of their own may
choose to administer it to both their teachers
and students, either in full, in part, or revised
to meet your local conditions. I do so in the
spirit of the Chinese chengyu (idiomatic expres-
sion) of paozhuan-yinyu casting a brick to
attract jade.

The original inspiration for my research came
primarily from the writings of Hammerly
(1985) and Bernhardt (1987), as well as some
complementary work by Nieto (1992) and my
own collaborations with Walker (1995). To
my knowledge, Hammerly was one of the first
to frame linguistic and communicative com-
petence within the larger realm of cultural
competence. In our collaboration, Walker and
McGinnis (1995) cited culture-based learning
and teaching (p.2) as one of the five princi-
pal considerations (p. 1) in both the teaching
and learning of language in general, and
LCTLs in particular.

The problem that can arise is most frankly
and bluntly brought forth in Bernhardts ob-
servations. Many foreign students take on
god-like attitudes toward their own teaching
and are appalled at being asked questions, for
in some cultures students do not ask ques-
tions or even address the teacher. In like
manner, foreign-born teaching assistants enter
the classroom expecting U.S. students to be-
have in particular ways; i.e., to attend to the
teacher in a quiet respectful manner, to
never challenge the teachers decisions on
grading or the truth value of the teachers
statements (1987, p. 68).

Cultures of Instruction Redux: Identifying and (Hopefully) Resolving Conflicts
99
It was within this context that I put together a
survey that I distributed to 12 of our teachers
(staff instructors and graduate teaching fel-
lows (GTFs)) and all of our students in the
Chinese language program at Oregon. All 12
teachers and 84 of the students completed the
survey. The survey questions are presented
below in a topically organized manner; the
original survey presented them in a random
manner. The only difference between the sur-
vey questions on the two forms is that stu-
dents were asked about the importance of
each in the learning of Chinese, while teachers
were asked their importance for the teaching of
Chinese. The ranking of each item was to be
made according to the following scale.
+ I think this is very important
! I think this is important
I think this is not very important
0 I do not think this is important
Table 1: Survey Items
Classroom-internal procedures
1. Daily performance for grade
2. Drill work emphasizing creative (minimal rote
repetition) use of the language
3. Drill work emphasizing rote repeti-
tion/mechanical drill
4. Formal classroom instruction of grammar
5. Use of audiotapes and videotapes during class
6. Use of language laboratory during class
Classroom-external procedures
1. Frequent written homework
2. Preparation outside of class for in-class perfor-
mance
3. Students meeting individually with an instructor
4. Students meeting with native speakers other
than teachers
5. Students working with other classmates outside
of class
6. Student memorization of sentences and dia-
logues
7. Student memorization of vocabulary
8. Use of audiotapes in preparation for class
Instructional materials
1. Authentic materials (oral and written)
2. Computer-based materials

Obviously, two decades have rendered some
of these categories more than a little anachro-
nistic, literally reflecting pedagogy from a pre-
vious century! For both the Cornell and Yale
workshops, the lists were updated to a more
21
st
century look (in particular the items that
referenced audiotapes).

What potentially has stood the test of time are
the rank orders for what teachers and students
saw as most and least important both where
they coincide, and where they collide.

Table 2: Most Important Features
Teachers Students
1. Preparation outside of
class for in-class perfor-
mance
1. Exposure to authentic
materials
2. Formal classroom instruc-
tion of grammar
3. Memorization of vocabu-
lary
4. Drill work emphasizing
rote repeti-
tion/mechanical drill
1. Preparation outside
of class for in-class
performance
2. Memorization of
vocabulary
3. Meeting with native
speakers other than
teachers
4. Drill work empha-
sizing creative use
of language
5. Formal classroom
instruction of
grammar
Teachers Students
1. Use of computer-based
materials
2. Use of language laborato-
ry during class
3. Students working with
other classmates outside
of class
4. Use of audiotapes in
preparation for class
1. Use of computer-
based materials
2. Use of audiotapes
and videotapes dur-
ing class
3. Students working
with other class-
mates outside of
class
4. Memorization of
sentences and dia-
logues

Scott McGinnis
100
Table 3: Least Important Features

At least three areas of confluence or conflict
may be seen.

Accuracy versus creativity. While teachers
ranked rote repetition and mechanical drill
as one of the most important elements in
teaching Chinese, students ranked a com-
plementary category (memorization of sen-
tences and dialogues) to be of relatively little
use. In addition, students who had grown
up in an American precollegiate setting
ranked creative drill as one of the most im-
portant factors in the language learning pro-
cess a ranking not seen among the teach-
ers. Identification of this particular cultural
conflict will require teachers to examine the
heart of their instructional approach.
Interaction with native speakers. While
the United States students ranked interac-
tion with native speakers other than teach-
ers highly, teachers failed to rate such a pro-
cedure as relatively high in importance. This
may reflect an attitude among some teachers
that native speakers other than themselves
represent a challenge to the teachers au-
thority, or at the least a form of potentially
conflicting input. But indeed, from the per-
spective of someone who has learned Chi-
nese as a foreign language, interaction with
other native speakers is essential at the
least, for more purely linguistic, aural com-
prehension skill development purposes. Ac-
cordingly, the resolution of this conflict
might well be to actively integrate native
speakers other than the teacher(s) into the
regular course curricula, such as in the form
of guest speakers.

The role of authentic materials. The high
value placed on exposure to authentic mate-
rials by teachers was not shared by the stu-
dents as a whole, save those at the most up-
per end of the language curriculum. This,
too, may be an artifact of a time when we as
a profession were only beginning to inte-
grate realia for pedagogically effective pur-
poses, as was the case for computer-assisted
instruction during the 1990s.

The good news is that there was seen some
core of agreement among our teaching staff
and students in Eugene in the fall of 1992.
Both groups rated formal preparation outside
of class, vocabulary memorization, and formal
classroom instruction of grammar highly. At
the same time, both the Chinese teachers and
students felt that many technologically-based
components were of the least use in the teach-
ing and learning of the language. Two decades
later, in the midst of a generation of digitally
native Generation X-ers, it might well do us
good to ask this question again. Similarly, in a
generation wherein not just students in the
pre-K through 16-plus pipeline are virtually
connected with quite literally the world via
mobile devices and Facebook, the concept of
working with other classmates outside of
class takes on a whole new meaning, seeing
Teachers Students
1 Use of computer-
based materials
2 Use of language
laboratory during
class
3 Students working
with other class-
mates outside of
class
4 Use of audiotapes in
preparation for class
1. Use of computer-based
materials
2. Use of audiotapes and
videotapes during class
3. Students working with
other classmates outside
of class
4. Memorization of sen-
tences and dialogues

Cultures of Instruction Redux: Identifying and (Hopefully) Resolving Conflicts
101
as how convenient and constant it has be-
come not just for our children, but for many
of we baby boomers.

When I first took this survey on the road to
Ithaca in June of 2010, I thought having a au-
dience of only language teachers and no au-
thentic students would be a limitation. In
point of fact, I discovered both there and in
New Haven last spring that in fact it served to
be an advantage. During the course of the
workshop, in the discussions that followed the
participants completing the survey, I noted
that teachers were frequently reflecting on
their own experience in learning English as a
foreign or second language, and how that dif-
fered from their experience learning Chinese
or Japanese as a first language. Such con-
sciousness raising that it, to get teachers to
think like the language learners they had been,
and in a sense always would be if they contin-
ued to work here in the United States can
serve as a means to achieving transcultural
competence of a very unique and important
kind.


102
References

Bernhardt, E. (1987). Teaching foreign teaching assistants: Cultural differences. College Teaching 35(2),
67-69.
Hall, M.H. and Ferro, M. (2011). Understanding the perceptions of Arabic and Chinese teachers to-
ward transitioning into U.S. schools. Foreign Language Annals 44(2), 289-307.
Hammerly, H. (1985). An integrated theory of language teaching and its practical consequences. Blaine, WA:
Second Language Publications.
McGinnis, S. (1994). Cultures of instruction: Identifying and resolving conflicts. Theory Into Practice
33(1), 16-22.
Nieto, S. (1992). Affirming diversity: The sociopolitical context of multicultural education. White Plains, NY:
Longman.
Schrier, L. (1994). Preparing teachers of critical languages for the precollegiate environment. Theory
Into Practice 33(1), 53-59.
Walker, G. and McGinnis, S. (1995). Learning less commonly taught languages: An agreement on the bases for
the training of teachers. Columbus: The Ohio State University Foreign Language Publications.

103

Scott McGinnis (Ph.D. Ohio State University,
1990) is the Academic Advisor for the Washington
Office of the Defense Language Institute (DLI).
He also holds the academic rank of professor at
DLI. Between 1999 and 2003, he served as Execu-
tive Director of the National Council of Organiza-
tions of Less Commonly Taught Languages at the
National Foreign Language Center (NFLC) in Col-
lege Park, Maryland. In nearly three decades in the
language teaching profession, he has held positions
at institutions including the University of Pennsylvania and Middlebury College, and has a dec-
ade of experience as supervisor of the Chinese language programs at the University of Oregon
and University of Maryland. Dr. McGinnis has authored or edited five books and over 50 book
chapters, journal articles and reviews on language pedagogy and linguistics for the less common-
ly taught languages in general, and Chinese and Japanese in particular.

Within the Chinese language teaching profession, Dr. McGinnis has worked to bring about
greater interaction and cooperation among the various settings within which Chinese language
teaching is carried out K-12, college and universities, and heritage schools. He has twice
served as President of the Chinese Language Teachers Association and has regularly been an in-
vited participant for major projects on standards, articulation, teacher training and materials de-
velopment sponsored or funded by the Modern Language Association, the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities, and the United States Department of Education. Dr. McGinnis is the
former chair of The College Board Chinese Language Test Development Committee for the
Educational Testing Service. His current professional responsibilities include serving as Coordi-
nator for the Interagency Language Roundtable for the United States Government.
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104

Abstract

In December 2013, violence broke out in the newly independent South Sudan. President Salva Kiirs
Dinka-dominated national military, and former Vice President Riek Machar and his Nuer fighters
took up arms against one another. To many in the policy world, this was somewhat of a surprise;
South Sudan has drawn international developmental and security assistance since the end of the war
with Sudan in 2005. Yet to those who have studied South Sudan, this turn of events was not unex-
pected. This article assesses the elements that have contributed to recent violence. I argue that by
ignoring historical legacies of divisive politics among southerners, focusing on external security is-
sues, and continuing to fund a corrupt government, Western nations bear as much responsibility for
the violence as do South Sudanese leaders.

*Thank you, Yogi Berra
Dj vu All Over Again*:
South Sudans Return to Conflict

Claire Metelits
Dj vu All Over Again: South Sudans Return to Conflict
105
It is devastating for the people of South Su-
dan, and for those of us in the US govern-
ment and broader international community,
who have made enormous investments in this
country in the hope of seeing it escape the ter-
rible cycles of violence that marked its past
and that now threaten to destroy its future.
- Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, Ambas-
sador Donald Booth

In December 2013, conflict broke out in
South Sudan between forces loyal to President
Salva Kiir and those allied with the former
vice president, Riek Machar. President Kiir
had dismissed former Vice President Machar
from his post in July, along with the rest of
the cabinet. The violence between forces
aligned with former Vice President Machar
(who is a member of the Nuer) and President
Kiir (a member of the Dinka) quickly evolved
into violence among military and rebel forces
in Jonglei, Unity, Warrap and Upper Nile
States (South Sudan Human Rights Commis-
sion, 2014). A recent report published by the
South Sudan Human Rights Commission re-
ports that government forces loyal to the
president initiated the massacre of several
hundred members of the Nuer ethnic group
in Juba, while rebel forces have been accused
of revenge killings against the Dinka. Since
this time, thousands of people have been
killed and approximately 800,000 displaced.
An estimated 70,000 people have sought pro-
tection at UN compounds throughout the
country (Fabricius, 2014). While the main par-
ties to the conflict signed a ceasefire in Janu-
ary, there is no peace between them nor
among the disparate groups who take ad-
vantage of the fighting to express their griev-
ances (Aleu, 2014; BBC, 2014; International
Crisis Group, 2014; Kushkush & Kulish,
2014).
For those who have studied Sudan and South
Sudan, the recent crisis comes as no surprise.
This article details why the return to violence
in South Sudan was not unexpected and, quite
arguably, inevitable. Based on fieldwork con-
ducted in South Sudan both during the war
and shortly after independence, as well an
analysis of historical and contemporary works,
this article assesses elements that have con-
tributed to the recent crisis. In addition to the
part that individual leaders of South Sudan
play in the conflict, the international commu-
nity with the US at the helm is also com-
plicit. By ignoring the historical legacies of
divisive politics among southerners, focusing
largely on external security issues, and contin-
uing to fund a corrupt, weak government,
western nations bear as much responsibility
for the violence as do southern leaders. To
put the circumstances in architectural terms,
state building in South Sudan has been con-
structed on an unstable foundation, constitut-
ed by debilitated materials, and propped up by
the international community in a reckless
manner.

The Foundation: A Legacy of Divisions in
South Sudan
Sudan was home to over 500 tribes. In the
south this included the Dinka and the Nuer
tribes (the first and second dominant tribes in
the south), and numerous smaller tribes such
as the Shilluk, Bari, Madi, Kakwa, Azende,
Bagara, Toposa, and the Didinga. An under-
standing of the current crisis in South Sudan
requires knowledge of historical tensions be-
tween individuals, ethnic groups, and political
factions in Sudan, of which the south was a
part until independence in July 2011. Faction-
alism is not necessarily (but at times can be)
driven by ethnic enmities and can adversely
Claire Metelits
106
affect stability. Events during the first and
second civil wars in Sudan demonstrate this
legacy of divisiveness between southerners
and reinforce the ethnic and ideological nature
of todays crisis.

The First North-South War
The first civil war in Sudan lasted from 1955
to 1972. The protracted nature of the struggle
was the result of several factors, many of
which were the result of divisive politics
among the southern Sudanese leaders. Long-
standing disagreement and the lack of unity
among southerners kept any one group from
achieving a majority platform that would serve
as the basis for action. Until nearly the end of
the conflict and coincident with the rise of the
South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM)
led by Joseph Lagu, southern politicians were
at constant odds over both the desired end-
state of the struggle (unification with the
north, a federal system, regional autonomy or
separation) and the means to achieve that
end-state (diplomacy, violence or international
intervention). For example, two factions of
the Sudan African National Union (SANU),
one inside Sudan (SANU-inside) and one in
exile (SANU-outside), represented the souths
position at the March 1965 Round Table Con-
ference in Khartoum, which was held to re-
solve the Southern Problem. Delegates rep-
resenting SANU-outside came from several
groups including the Azania Liberation Front
(ALF) and the Sudan African Liberation
Front (SALF). The Khartoum-based Southern
Front and the Other Shades of Opinion,
also were in attendance. Many southerners
living in Khartoum continued to work inside
the political process (e.g. the Southern Front).
However, because those who were physically
located in the south felt that those living in
the north were far removed from the reality
on the ground, they formed separate parties.
Others simply left the country for safety else-
where and formed parties in exile (Collins,
2008).

Factionalism among southerners was exacer-
bated in 1967 when politicians began forming
actual governments in the south. The first of
these, the Southern Sudan Provisional Gov-
ernment (SSPG) was made obsolete almost
immediately by internal squabbling, as repre-
sentatives of small ethnic groups reacted to
the perceived domination of the Dinka. The
political environment was further complicated
by the formation of several ethnically-based
pseudo-governments to include the Anyidi
Revolutionary Government, the Sue River
Revolutionary Government and the Sudan-
Azania Government. By the end of 1969,
there were three governments in the south
with one in exile, as well as three political par-
ties in the north purportedly representing the
southern Sudanese. All of them claimed to be
the unique and sole representatives of the
south (O'Ballance, 1977).

Thereafter, southern political leaders recog-
nized the impact that divisive politics were
having on their fight against the north. In one
instance, the first president of the SSPG, Ag-
grey Jaden, attempted to end the decentralized
and ethnically based organization of the
southern opposition. To provide a more na-
tional character to the insurgency, he renamed
the guerilla forces the Anya-Nya National
Armed Forces (ANAF) and created a General
Staff to coordinate operations in the three
southern provinces. To stem infighting
among soldiers, he required them to operate
outside of their tribal areas. Khartoum took
107
advantage of divisions among southerners,
seeking to weaken the Anya-Nya by leverag-
ing long-standing ethnic tensions and recruit-
ing soldiers to challenge the group. This was
one of Government of Sudans (GoS) more
effective tactics, one it used repeatedly in the
second civil war (O'Ballance, 1977).

Southerners achieved a limited unification
during the first civil war. Lagu melded an ef-
fective political machine in the SSLM by ap-
pealing to members of other parties to defect
to his cause. He also engineered coups in op-
position parties when necessary. Such political
machinations removed factionalism from the
southern opposition. Furthermore, Lagu
achieved unified command of the ANAF by
placing officers personally loyal to him in
charge of the various independent guerilla
groups, dispensing arms and ammunition as
rewards for fealty, and dismissing those indi-
viduals whom he found untrustworthy (O'Bal-
lance, 1977). Lagu thus established the south
as a force with which all other parties had to
reckon.

The souths unification hastened the end of
the war and in 1972 the rebels and the GoS
signed the Addis Ababa Agreement. Some
southern leaders took issue with portions of
the peace agreement to include an article that
directed how southern insurgents would be
integrated into the police, the prison system
and the army. While integration of the police
and prison system went fairly smoothly, the
sense that the army was the only existing na-
tional institution raised concerns on both
sides. First, although the army was a national
one, the individuals manning it did not come
from throughout Sudan. Thus, integration
threatened the vested interests of officers and
enlistees of the Sudanese armed forces who
were not from the south and depicted south-
erners as receiving special treatment by politi-
cal fiat. Conversely, members of the Anya-
Nya feared they would be outnumbered and
viewed as disposable in an integrated national
military (Collins, 2008).

The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rein-
tegration (DDR) process was completed three
years after the signing of the Agreement when
some 6,200 Anya-Nya were consolidated into
the Sudanese army and trained in modern
warfare weapons, logistics and tactics. An-
other 7,600 Anya-Nya were placed in other
government departments (Collins, 2008).
While this transition was not without its chal-
lenges, the overall success of this DDR pro-
cess stands in stark contrast to the still extant
problem of demilitarizing the tens of thou-
sands of SPLA soldiers and other southern
militias following the end of the second civil
war.

The Era of the Sudan Peoples Liberation
Army (SPLA)
Divisions within the south were not unique to
Sudans early history, nor were they only eth-
nically based. Equal levels of divisiveness also
existed during the second civil war (1983-
2005), many of them characterized by ideolog-
ical differences among the leadership. The
second civil war began with the compounding
of various events including the discovery of
oil in the central and southern regions of the
country. The governments abrogation of the
Addis Ababa Agreement also intensified
southern grievances. In January 1983, south-
ern troops belonging to the 105th battalion
refused orders to abandon their weapons and
transfer to the north. These soldiers feared
Claire Metelits
108
they would be sent to Iraq to join with anoth-
er Sudanese contingent fighting that countrys
war against Iran, a condition that would leave
the south open to an all-northern unit and
increase its vulnerability. Following failed ne-
gotiations with this southern unit, President
Nimeiri ordered aggressive action against the
soldiers, which in turn inspired a succession
of mutinies throughout the south (Metelits,
2009).

The mutineers found refuge in Ethiopia,
where they came together to form the SPLA
(Johnson and Prunier 1993). The southern
Sudanese rallied around a group calling itself
the SPLA. The were various reasons for the
SPLAs popularity among southerners. First, it
provided an outlet for the expression of pro-
test over the dissolution of the Addis Ababa
Agreement. The insurgent group also attract-
ed individuals who rejected the inequalities
implemented by the north on the south. John
Garang de Mabior, a Twic Dinka, emerged as
the groups leader. Garang was a former of-
ficer in the Sudanese Army and a US-educated
agricultural economist. Under him, the SPLA
defined its objectives in broad terms: to help
establish a democratic Sudan that was multi-
racial, multi-religious and multi-ethnic (Inter-
national Crisis Group 2002). Garangs new
goal for the SPLA was a marked difference
from many of the previous southern insur-
gents objectives, which included advocating
for southern autonomy. Not all southerners
accepted this goal of unification. Thus, from
its inception, the SPLA was plagued with in-
fighting. This culminated in a split in the
movement in 1991, when several southerners,
including Nuer leader Riek Machar, formed
their own factions, protesting what they called
Garangs dictatorial style (Metelits, 2009).
While intra-group fighting in South Sudan
could in part be characterized as an extension
of ethnic enmities, a more accurate explana-
tion for tensions within the SPLA should in-
clude ideological and personal differences
among the leadership (Metelits, 2009). One
historian has characterized these individuals as
men of limited abilities, conceited personali-
ties, and narrow vision unable to define, let
alone articulate, a future that would unify the
[s]outh [they] were bewitched by a kaleido-
scope of internal rifts, ethnic loyalties, and
ideological confusion (Collins, 2008, p. 87).
The discord in part stemmed from Garangs
life experience. Many southern officers were
dissatisfied with Garangs qualifications to
lead an insurgency. He was a former officer in
the Sudanese Army and with a western de-
gree, and his time in the field was limited to a
few months serving in the original Anya-Nya.
In military matters, this forced him to rely
heavily on insurgent veterans from the first
war. This was a source of tension in his rela-
tions with field commanders, many of whom,
though lacking in formal education, had spent
several years in combat with the Anya-Nya
and had advanced to high levels (Johnson,
2003). A veteran field commander argued that
A sign posted on a local leader's desk, outside of
Bentiu - left over from the lead up to the referen-
dum vote (Photo Credit: Claire Metelits, 2011.

109
during this period the SPLA became a group
that served a few high-level southern elites
(Confidential Source, 2003).

The Norths tactic of coopting militias also
was reinstituted during this period. The threat
of insurgents from the south and the desire to
clear the Upper Nile regions for oil explora-
tion by interested foreign corporations
spurred Khartoum to raise a Nuer army
(Johnson, 2003). Khartoum even went so far
as to legalize militias under the Popular De-
fense Act in 1989 (Salih & Harir, 1994). Thus
began what one SPLA commander referred to
as the balkanization of tribes (Lino, 2005).
Many of these divisions dating back to the
era of the first war continued to affect poli-
tics in the Sudan following the end of the se-
cond civil war. The national election during
April 2010, for example, exposed counterpro-
ductive divisions in the Sudan Peoples Liber-
ation Movement (SPLM), the SPLAs political
arm. It highlighted continuing factionalism
regarding the goal of unity versus secession,
and exposed the power struggle between indi-
vidual members who ran for office without
the approval of the SPLM political bureau
(Centre for International Governance Innova-
tion, 2011). These individual and group-level
tensions remained unaddressed in the years
immediately prior to southern independence.

Poor Building Materials: Insecurity With-
in South Sudan
Along with the fragile foundation upon which
South Sudan was built, insecurity within the
region has contributed to the nascent states
current crisis. When the second civil war end-
ed in 2005 with the signing of the Compre-
hensive Peace Agreement (CPA), several un-
derlying challenges re-emerged. During the
war, people put many of their differences
aside to attain the greater objective of defeat-
ing the north. Thus, after 2005, and particular-
ly after the 2011 referendum (which would
determine if South Sudan should declare in-
dependence from Sudan) internal challenges
once again materialized. During the conflict,
foreign humanitarian assistance mitigated ten-
sions between groups. Lower levels of hu-
manitarian assistance (and more development
and security sector assistance) meant fewer
immediate resources. This exacerbated extant
divisions among groups. To worsen the issue,
during the period between the end of the war
and the referendum, the international com-
munity focused on ushering the Sudanese to-
ward the vote for independence and paid little
attention to new and not-so-new security con-
cerns in the south. These particular security
issues included the prevalence of small arms
coupled with the lack of security guarantees
from the Government of South Sudan
(GoSS), and land insecurity.

Unfettered arms flows
In the years leading up to the referendum,
Sudan was a powder keg[an area of] unfet-
tered arms flows (McEvoy, 2009, p. 1). The
Geneva-based Small Arms Survey estimated
in 2007 that between 1.9 and 3.2 million fire-
arms were in circulation in the country, two-
thirds of which were in civilian hands (Small
Arms Survey, 2013).

One of the major concerns among southern-
ers was the uneven process of disarmament
being carried out by the SPLA (Small Arms
Survey, 2013; O'Brien, 2009). Locals inter-
viewed in Unity and Upper Nile States in late
2011 complained that some communities
were being targeted for disarmament while
Claire Metelits
110
others were not. This left specific regions of
South Sudan vulnerable to attacks (Members
of Shilluk village, 2011). Individuals did not
want to give up their arms because they need-
ed them for self-defense, at times from the
government soldiers, and at others from raid-
ers (Local Administrator and Chief, 2011).
These statements highlight important prob-
lems that have gone unaddressed by the US
and other western donor nations during the
interim period. The GoSS had not achieved
buy-in from local communities nor did it
provide security guarantees (O'Brien, 2009).
Since the GoSS lacks effective security institu-
tions, it is understandable that some local citi-
zens have been reticent to disarm. The tenu-
ous-at-best social contract between the South
Sudan government and its populace leads to
questions on the appropriate use of time lead-
ing up to independence. Why was there inad-
equate focus on state building during this pe-
riod? Why was there such emphasis on
developing South Sudans military capabilities
to counter external threats (Khartoum) if so
many important internal issues existed? If the
military was viewed as an internal peacekeep-
er, what accounted for the absence of atten-
tion to drivers of internal instability?

Land Insecurity
Land insecurity is the result of the interlacing
of land and politics in portions of the country.
Pastureland is prized, and violence involving
cattle raiding has long been a feature of migra-
tory movement of pastoralist tribes. In late
2011 and early 2012, approximately 3,000
people were killed in Pibor County, Jonglei
State when 6,000 armed Lou Nuer youth
marched on the area, targeting people of the
Murle in reprisal for raids that had occurred in
early 2011 (Gettleman, 2012). Historically,
legal and uniform land tenure rules across Su-
dan simply did not exist. The norths land leg-
islation was founded on colonial land laws
while customary practice regulated access to
southern land. Local chiefs were entrusted
with the management of land ownership and
use (Pantuliano, 2007). During the early years
of the second civil war, the SPLA focused on
negotiating disputes and administering law at
the local level through these indigenous
mechanisms. However, the civil war dis-
placed communities and their leaders, which
reduced contact between chiefs and their fol-
lowers, and ultimately led to the end of their
influence and popularity. A report by the Up-
per Nile State Government in South Sudan
claims that chiefs were punished often in
public for crimes committed by their sub-
jects. Such public humiliation reduced their
status in the community. Thus, many chiefs
found themselves subordinated to the SPLA.
With the weakening of traditional authorities
power, customary law no longer functioned as
it once did. Additionally, in the wake of war
and the subsequent proliferation of weapons,
smaller groups who in the past were power-
less now found themselves possessing power-
ful instruments of coercion (Upper Nile State
Government, 2011).

While the land tenure issue was one focus of
the CPA-mandated Southern Sudan Land
Commission, which drafted a five-year strate-
gic plan to govern land allocation as well as
leasing and acquisition issues, this body was
unable to fix the countrys continuing land
challenges. South Sudan forces exacerbated
these problems, as returning soldiers have
been accused of occupying abandoned plots
in key towns without the consent of the owners.
Additionally, the military has been accused of
111
building on and selling non-owned plots. Ac-
cording to one report, some military members
boasted that they took precedence in owner-
ship of land over those who fled during the
war because they were the ones who fought to
get it back (Pantuliano, 2007).
The Shilluk are the most vocal about land
conflict, claiming that other ethnic groups,
specifically the Dinka, seize territory as a con-
sequence of their military and political domi-
nance in South Sudan. For example, some
Shilluk reported that the Nuer and Dinka had
disproportionate influence in the city of Mala-
kal (traditionally a Shilluk town) and denied
land to returnees (Upper Nile State Govern-
ment, 2011; USAID, 2011). Furthermore, the
redrawing of county borders heightened eth-
nic tensions in several states. The newly creat-
ed Akoka County (carved out of Manyo and
Baliet Counties in Upper Nile State) became
the site of increased hostility between the
Shilluk and the Dinka. The Shilluk claimed
this area is their ancestral land, but Dinka
were relocated there. Meanwhile, members of
the Shilluk maintained that giving Akoka
County to the Dinka was a part of the political
machinations of the central government in
Juba (Upper Nile State Government, 2011;
Members of Shilluk village, 2011). In South
Sudans rural areas (which is the majority of
the country) land is essential to survival,
whether for subsistence farming or pastoralist
activities. Because of weak state institutions,
land insecurity has led to increasing instability.

The Framework: Foreign Support for a
Weak State
While much of the blame for the recent crisis
rests in the hands of the GoSS, the interna-
tional community is also culpable. The main
international actors involved in South Sudans
transition included the Intergovernmental Au-
thority on Development (IGAD) as well as
the IGAD-Partners, a largely western consor-
tium of donor countries and organizations
that brokered the agreement that ended the
war. Additionally, an Assessment and Evalua-
tion Committee (AEC) composed of repre-
sentatives from Norway, the UK, the US,
Kenya, Ethiopia, and several international or-
ganizations such as the African Union (AU),
the European Union (EU) and the Arab
League monitored and supported the imple-
mentation of the CPA. Yet the provision of
foreign assistance to a new country such as
South Sudan, cobbled together during a six-
year period, did little to enhance future stabil-
ity. The US and other international entities are
at the very least complicit in the current vio-
lence, if only as facilitators providing the
means with which to carry it out.

During the interim period, the foreign diplo-
matic and military corps focused largely on
getting the north and the south to the January
2011 referendum without a return to war; the
focus was not on internal southern security
concerns such as growing factionalism, inse-
curity in rural areas, and corruption among
southern government and military officials
(who were usually one in the same). In the
years leading up to independence, and the
months afterward, aid increased. Donors
spent billions building roads and digging
wells, ferreting out landmines laid during the
war, printing textbooks, training women to
farm, and helping the government write laws
(Robinson, 2012). Global assistance to South
Sudan increased from $1.2 billion in 2004 (the
year prior to the CPA) to $2.1 billion in 2005.
By 2009, the amount had increased to $2.4
Claire Metelits
112
billion (Poole, 2010). The notion that greater
development by way of improved services and
institution building would lead to stability was
the rubric under which much of the interna-
tional community worked. South Sudan ana-
lyst Alex de Waal argues that because of the
justice of the US and international communi-
tys cause, many of them held South Sudan to
a lower standard than other countries
(DeWaal[a], 2014).

Internal opposition in post-conflict societies
not only can make for tenuous stability, it can
lead to increased government corruption. Ac-
ademic studies have suggested that polarized
societies are prone to competitive rent seeking
by different groups struggling over public
goods (Alesina & Tabellini, 1989; Alesina &
Drazen, 1991; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Alesi-
na & Rodrik, 1994; Alesina & Spolaore, 1997).
Such polarization naturally impedes consensus
on the distribution of resources and creates
rents for groups in power at the expense of
the larger populace (Easterly & Levine, 1997).
According to several studies, the competing
ethnic groups interests in South Sudan are
kept in check around President Kiir, making
the regime susceptible to the demands of
competing groups and therefore open to cor-
ruption (Lacher, 2012; Mores, 2013). A Free-
dom House report claims that officials take
advantage of inadequate budget monitoring to
divert public funds (Freedom House, 2013).
For example, while health, education, and so-
cial service monies allocated to states within
South Sudan have been consistently under-
budget, security and the public sector payroll
have been vastly over-spent (DeWaal[a],
2014). Citizens have reported facing demands
for bribes in their dealings with South Sudans
government institutions, even to access basic
public services. The 2011 Transparency Inter-
national Global Corruption Barometer found
that of the respondents who had contact with
nine public institutions (police, education, ju-
diciary, medical services, land services, tax
revenue, customs, registry/permit), 66 percent
reported paying bribes during a 12-month pe-
riod (Transparency International, 2011).

The lack of infrastructure and capacity in the
south was the premise upon which donors
started large-scale state-building programs af-
ter the signing of the CPA. However, it was
the security sector that received the bulk of
the assistance. Security Sector Reform (SSR)
focuses on developing institutions that protect
the state. These institutions include border
and customs bureaus, the armed forces, jus-
tice institutions and actors that play a role in
implementing security such as the parliament
and ministries. There have been reports of
corruption of SSR assistance as well. As one
donor representative complained, The tech-
nical advisers help[ed] prepare budget alloca-
tions but then army generals wheel[ed] into
the ministers office and [made] the real allo-
cations (DeWaal[b], 2014).

By 2011, the US had spent $300 million on
SSR activities as compared to the British 5.5
million (Security Sector Reform Resource
Center, 2014). Much of this money goes to
the salaries of individuals in the security sec-
tor. According to one report, salaries account
for 40 percent of the SSR budget, which are
among the highest in the region (Bonn Center
for International Conversion, 2013). Likewise,
between 2009 and 2013, a program run by
Great Britains Department for International
Development (DFID) to assist in the devel-
opment of South Sudans security sector and
113
defense had a budget of 16,778,245
($27,385,365). As of 2012, 14,296,761
($23,335,401.73) had been spent. The goal of
the project was to transform the SPLA into a
professional, disciplined army accountable to
democratic, civil control (Department for In-
ternational Development, 2014). By March
2012, the World BankMulti-Donor Trust
Fund for South Sudan, a project of 13 donor
states and the World Bank, had dispensed
over 90 percent of the total $541 million in
financing. While the Trust Fund was spent on
a variety of activities, the security sector re-
ceived a disproportionate $37 million while
state and peace-building activities garnered
$12 million (World Bank, 2012). In 2012, the
US justified selling weapons to South Sudan
by framing it in counter-terrorism rhetoric.
When President Obama approved the sale of
defense services and weapons, he stated that
the furnishing of defense articles and defense
services to the Republic of South Sudan
[would] strengthen the security of the United
States and promote world peace (Brannen,
2012). There is no evidence available to the
public, however, that claims the US carried
out such sales to South Sudan. Furthermore,
in response to the increased violence in South
Sudan, the US, much to its credit, announced
it is considering withholding further military
aid to the country. In his testimony before the
House of Representatives, Special Envoy to
South Sudan, Ambassador Donald P. Booth,
said he did not know how much money
would be withheld from South Sudans army
and police (Sudan Tribune, 2014).
In the end, the trainings, workshops, reforms,
and a battalion of foreign technical assistants
embedded within state ministries appear to
have made little real change in South Sudan.
As one report claims, the GoSS now looks
like a state but performs as anything but
(Larson, Ajak & Pritchett, 2013). The transi-
tion from war to peace is not merely a tech-
nical exercise. It is a highly political process
that necessitates an understanding and appre-
ciation for issues that fuel instability. In other
words, it is not simply the provision of basic
services that is of great import; rather, it is
how these services are distributed and to
whom they are allocated that is critical (Gida
& Lucey, 2014). The challenge, though, lies
not merely in the amounts of money being
spent by western governments and agencies.
The problem is the seemingly blind donations
without oversight in the face of a system
known to be corrupt. Despite the immense
amount of funding that continues to flow into
South Sudan, there is frustratingly slow pro-
gress in developing a legitimate, functioning
government. The rationale for further training
a military known to have a history of violence
against civilians in the face of few if any gov-
ernment institutions to manage such forces is
certainly questionable.

The speed at which todays crisis in South Su-
dan has metastasized exposes the short-
sightedness of the self-appointed cheerleaders
of southern independence abroad who have
maintained, if not in word, certainly in deed,
that all other issues have been secondary to
sovereignty (Wallis, 2014). Since independ-
ence was a foregone conclusion, it is puzzling
why the international community did not pay
more attention and urge southern leaders to
focus on internal security issues. Furthermore,
sufficient historical analysis demonstrates that
the south as a body unified in vision and
purpose was a moderately correct concept
only in the face of a common enemy. Once
the common enemy the north no longer
Claire Metelits
114
posed a threat, the internal challenges facing
the south once again ignited.

What is to be done?
I am hesitant to provide policy solutions. I
do not have my feet firmly planted in the pol-
icy sector, though I have worked with those
who are. However, scholars are often criti-
cized from shying away from policy recom-
mendations. Therefore, I will provide some
thoughts that policymakers can consider in
this regard.

First, it has been acknowledged that commu-
nity-based programs and local leadership did
not have much voice in institution building
during the interim period. National level pro-
grams furthermore did not address systems
that would regulate or enable violence, such as
the presidents monopoly on power, the
dearth of party structures within the SPLM,
ethnic-based recruitment and corruption. As
this paper has highlighted, the international
communitys focus during the six years prior
to the referendum focused on keeping peace
between the north and the south. By placing
the perceived north-south conflict threat at
the center of all things, the international
community overlooked the historical divisions
within South Sudan. Consequently, the en-
trenched discord continued to shape relation-
ships after independence. The role of ethnicity
and power relations should be acknowledged
and addressed as a major force of future in-
stability. Without the involvement of local
actors, any sort of peace agreement will not
take hold (ISS, 2014).

While today the international aid community
scrambles to address the humanitarian chal-
lenges that trouble the country since the re-
cent outbreak of violence, since the CPA initi-
ative have focused on development. The as-
sumption embedded in this assistance is that
development will lead to stability. The Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) challenges these assump-
tions. It found there is no causal link between
the provision of basic services and a decrease
in conflict (Bennett, et al, 2010). This, per-
haps, is part of the impetus behind the enor-
mous amounts of money allocated to the se-
curity sector. However, if the former issues
(excessive executive control, ethnic divisive-
ness, and corruption, to name a few) are not
subsequently addressed, security reform and
development assistance will continue to have
little impact on the populations that need the-
se most.

Conclusion
While the western media appears to have
largely forgotten about the current crisis in
South Sudan, violence continues. As this pa-
per argues, the conflict and the ensuing vio-
lence that broke out late in 2013 is not a sur-
prise. The historical legacy of divisive politics
is alone an issue that, unaddressed, fuels in-
stability. The focus for the GoSS and the in-
ternational community during the interim pe-
riod following the end of the second civil war
was on reaching the referendum and inde-
pendence. Following these benchmarks, atten-
tion continued to focus on relations between
the GoS and the GoSS, and as such the lat-
ters defense capacity was given priority.
While some of this focus is justifiable, as the
two countries shared border has been witness
to troop standoffs and sporadic violence, it
does not justify the backseat position South
Sudans own internal security issues have tak-
en. Additionally, the ongoing efforts of the
115
international aid community, which has given
South Sudan over $1 billion in aid annually
since 2010, allow the GoSS to divest itself of a
significant portion of responsibility to form
effective institutions in support of the popula-
tion writ large.

Disappointingly, the level of corruption with-
in South Sudans government and military has
not stymied the flow of donor monies without
conditions. Looking at the international
communitys role specifically the US in
the recent violence poses several questions:
With the knowledge of corruption, why do
such large sums continue to flow to the
GoSS? Why do officials travel long distances
to broker ceasefires between warring parties,
only to put into place agreements that do not
address the root causes of the violence? Cer-
tainly, progress in any area cannot be made
until violence is brought to a halt. Yet one
must not confuse business with progress. In
the case of South Sudan, as has been the case
in past development models, such assistance
and intervention often protects and sustains
weak governments while doing little for the
people of the country.

There are multiple dimensions to the current
crisis in South Sudan. This paper has attempt-
ed to narrow these down to a set of three un-
derstandable variables: the history of division,
unaddressed internal insecurity, and interna-
tional assistance that proliferates corruption
and prolongs the resolution of the causes of
conflict. The goal here has been to provide a
rough picture of the South Sudanese envi-
ronment, not merely to think about the causes
of the current crisis, but to identify the under-
lying issues that fuel insecurity and violence in
the new nation.

Nuer men holding court in a Kakuma Refugee camp (northern Kenya).
Photo Credit: Claire Metelits, 2001.

116

Addendum:

The top UN humanitarian official in South Sudan reported that on April 20, 2014
the killing of hundreds of civilians was carried out in Bentiu in Unity State (where
the author conducted research in 2012). According to the official, "piles and piles"
of bodies were left behind in a mosque, a hospital, and along roads. He said the
killings were a response to a local radio broadcast urging people to engage in
atrocities.

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Claire Metelits is a Visiting Professor of Political
Science at Davidson College and a Research Fellow at
the Institute for the Study of Culture and Language at
Norwich University. She has been studying and travel-
ing in South Sud an since 2001. Her most recent re-
search in the region was in late 2011 when she trav-
eled through the northern states of the new country.

Special Thanks from the Author:
I would like to thank CAPT Owen M. Travis, USN, for providing invaluable insight on the historical
divisions in Sudan during the first civil war. I also want to thank Marie Besanon for her willingness
to provide assistance on this article while she traveled through Sudan.
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118

Abstract

In recent years, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and its Service components have adopted
various policies for culture and foreign language training of military personnel. Though the ap-
proaches and priorities differ, each strategy includes three common elements: foreign language,
knowledge of or expertise in specific regions, and general cultural understanding or skills. Qualitative
reviews by observers within and outside DoD have concluded that the strategies place less emphasis
on foreign language relative to the other elements. To test this conclusion using alternate methods,
this paper applies quantitative methods to the strategy documents, using word frequencies and com-
putational analysis to identify themes and elements in each of the major culture and language strate-
gies, including documents from the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense. Results showed that foreign language receives as much or more attention than
culture and region in DoD policies. Semantic analyses indicated that language and culture have relat-
ed, but distinct and separable meanings in popular understanding.

Lexical and Semantic Analysis of Defense Culture and
Foreign Language Policies

Allison Abbe
Robert Morrow
Lexical and Semantic Analysis of Defense Culture and Foreign Language Policies
119
Lexical and Semantic Analysis of Defense
Culture and Foreign Language Policies
When the United States intervened in Afghan-
istan and Iraq in the early 2000s, training of
military personnel in culture, regions, and for-
eign language was primarily limited to small
numbers of individuals in specialist communi-
ties, such as linguists, foreign area officers,
regional area strategists, or analysts. As condi-
tions in Iraq shifted toward stability and re-
construction, and later to counter-insurgency
operations, the U.S. defense community rec-
ognized the need for greater attention to the
socio-cultural aspects of the conflict. As a re-
sult, the Department of Defense (DoD) be-
gan extending cultural, regional, and language
training to a much broader portion of the
workforce.
DoD Language, Regional, and Culture
Policies
Initially, the Defense Language Transfor-
mation Roadmap (Undersecretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness, 2005) focused
primarily on language capabilities. Many of
the recommended actions applied to linguists
and translators, but other actions aimed to
expand regional studies and increase language
capability in general-purpose forces (GPF).
Each of the Service components (Army, Air
Force, Marine Corps, and Navy) and the Of-
fice of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) subse-
quently adopted strategies encompassing both
foreign language and cultural training. The
Navy strategy was the first to be published
(2008), followed by the Air Force and Army
(2009), the Marine Corps (2010), and OSD
(2011).
Though they differ in implementation details,
these strategies show consensus on some cen-
tral principles. Each includes the same basic
elements of foreign language, regional studies,
and culture (LRC). This consensus suggests
that some LRC capabilities are needed not just
in specialist roles and missions, but more
broadly in the General Purpose Force (GPF).
They project that such capabilities will be
needed for the foreseeable future, not only in
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan that
prompted the policies.
Beyond the basic areas of consensus, the poli-
cies and their implementation differ across
Services. Some initiatives for culture and for-
eign language in GPF reflect an adjustment
from the educational model used for special-
ists in terms of regional focus. For example,
the Marine Corps Regional, Culture, and Lan-
guage Familiarization program (U.S. Marine
Corps, 2012) assigns individuals a region and
language to study throughout their career. The
Army has elected to implement some regional
specialization at the brigade level and began
aligning brigades to regions in 2012
(McIlvaine, 2012). These policies primarily
address training and education, and do not
explicitly outline the implications of these pol-
icies for personnel management.
Like the Army and Marine Corps, the Air
Force provides culture-general education for
everyone and regional training in pre-
deployment (Department of the Air Force,
2009). But the Air Force also selects some
personnel (both enlisted and officers) for
more specialized training in its Language En-
abled Airmen Program (LEAP). The Air
Force is also considering a foreign language
requirement for all Airmen (Hardison et al.,
2012).
Observer Responses
A number of academics and military person-
nel have responded to these initiatives, con-
Allison Abbe and Robert Morrow
120
tinuing the dialogue about how much, when,
and who should receive training and educa-
tion in LRC capabilities. Commentators seem
to disagree about the appropriate level of em-
phasis for particular elements of the strategies
and programs. For example, according to
Watson (2010), the Army, Air Force, and Ma-
rine Corps have separated language from cul-
ture in their training and education efforts and
thereby marginalized it. Watson concluded
that the Armys weighting of culture and re-
gion over language for GPF is a mistake
shared by the other Services (with the excep-
tion of the Navy):
In most branches of the military, the philosophy
behind culture training programs is based on the
idea of big C Culture; little l language.

In
other words, we give culture more importance in
our training programs and make language a
supporting effort. (Watson, 2010, p. 95)
Similarly, Outzen (2012) has critiqued the
Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy
as artificially separating culture from language
and inappropriately prioritizing culture. In this
view, the increase in attention to culture has
come at the expense of foreign language.
As representatives of the language (Watson)
and specialist (Outzen) communities, these
authors argue for an expansion of the training
and education paths traditionally used for spe-
cialists. Homan (2010) has proposed this ap-
proach explicitly, contending that the Army
would benefit from a light version of For-
eign Area Officer (FAO) a skill identifier for
all officers in the GPF, modeled after the
FAO training and education cycle. This ap-
proach seems generally consistent with the
regional familiarization being implemented in
the Marine Corps. Another perspective shares
the call for specialization (Buswell, 2011; Sis-
ka, n.d.), but has proposed regional proficien-
cy rather than foreign language as the center-
piece for understanding human dynamics, ar-
guing that regional expertise is the key for
attaining proficiency in language and culture
(Siska).
In a RAND review, assessing the DoD cul-
ture, language, and regional strategies with a
focus on application to GPF (DeCamp et al.,
2012), the authors asserted:
Our review of LREC policy and direc-
tives leads to three important conclusions.
First, there is a clear belief that LREC skills
are important for military effectiveness, espe-
cially for COIN. Second, although DoD places
equal emphasis on LREC skills, the services empha-
size cultural skills over language and regional exper-
tise for GPF. Third, existing LREC guidance
appears to be based on anecdotes from the
field that have not been collected in any sys-
tematic manner. (p. 12; emphasis added)
The second conclusion above identifies a dis-
tinction between the treatment of LRC capa-
bilities in the DoD strategy and in the Services
strategy, unambiguously asserting that culture
and region have either been prioritized over
language, or treated equally with language. In
addition, in this view, the emphasis on culture
will be short-lived, as the authors predicted
that regional alignment in GPF personnel or
units will result in a shift from cultural to-
ward language emphasis during FY 2013 and
beyond (DeCamp et al., 2012, p. 9).
Other perspectives on the relative emphasis
of LRC capabilities have also been proposed.
Some have called for increased emphasis on
intercultural competence (Collins, 2011;
McFarland, 2005; Selmeski, 2007). Pete (2011)
has argued that DoD policies have achieved
greater success with foreign language than
with other capabilities and more remains to be
accomplished in other areas. Still others call
for more integration of the capabilities, advo-
121
cating for programs that combine LRC
(Chandler, 2005; Greene Sands, 2013; Wolfel,
2008).

In contrast, Kinner (2012) cautions against
placing too much emphasis on language and
culture overall. For some operations, language
and culture may not be critical enablers. As
one example, Kinner cited the tsunami relief
efforts in Japan as an operation in which cul-
tural awareness and language were minimally
relevant. Thus, expanding culture, language,
and regional training to all GPF may not al-
ways have a meaningful impact on operational
effectiveness. From this perspective, the dis-
putes over how much of each capability area
to include are secondary to determining in
which operations they are most relevant.
Present Research
The aim of the present study was to test some
of the assertions made in previous analyses of
the LRC strategies and policies in DoD. Alt-
hough qualitative assessments have indicated
that the Services have prioritized culture over
foreign language and region (DeCamp et al.,
2012; Watson, 2010), the basis for those as-
sessments is not entirely clear. Thus, text
analyses were conducted to complement the
qualitative assessments of various commenta-
tors with quantitative analysis of the docu-
ments themselves.
Study 1: Lexical Analysis
This research aimed to test the notion that the
Services policies emphasize culture over for-
eign language, as commentators have suggest-
ed. Based on previous qualitative analysis, we
should expect greater emphasis on culture in
Service policies (DeCamp et al., 2012; Wat-
son, 2010) and relatively equal emphasis on
language, region, and culture in OSD policies
(DeCamp et al., 2012). Other analyses were
used for exploratory purposes, described in
further detail below.
Method
Sample. Documents in the analysis included
policy documents from the U.S. Department
of Defense and its component Services, as
well as internal government assessments of
these policies (sample documents appear in
the References marked with an *). The docu-
ments included in the present study were pub-
lished between 2005 and 2012. This period of
time started with the publication of the De-
fense Language Transformation Roadmap and
ends with the publication of implementation
orders for the LRC policies within the Army
and Marine Corps in 2012. Reports by non-
government organizations were not included
in this analysis. For the Army Culture and
Foreign Language Strategy, analyses included
only the main text of the policy. The appen-
dices were excluded because none of the oth-
er Services documents included a comparable
level of detail.
To be included, each document had to apply
to general-purpose forces, not only to special-
ist personnel. In addition, to enable direct
comparison, documents had to include more
than one of the three topics of interest (cul-
ture, region, or foreign language). Thus, doc-
uments that focused on only one capability
area, such as foreign language proficiency pay
policies, were excluded. The analyses included
22 documents: policy documents from the
Services (7), policy documents, plans, and tes-
timony from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (9), and reports from the Govern-
ment Accountability Office and the House
Armed Services Committee (6).
122
Procedure. Word frequencies for each doc-
ument were obtained from WriteWords Word
Frequency Counter. Frequency counts for a
subset of the documents were also obtained in
a text editor to provide a reliability check.
Both tools yielded the same frequencies, with
occasional discrepancies of plus or minus two.
Discrepancies sometimes occurred when one
tool counted a word that appeared on the title
page or in a header, but the other did not. The
counts reported here are the WriteWords fre-
quencies.
Analyses were also conducted to explore
structural aspects of the documents rather
than the substantive topics, using Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker
et al., 2007). LIWC analyzes the use of func-
tion words. Though commonly used to assess
the psychological states and characteristics of
individual authors (Pennebaker & King,
1999), LIWC has also been used to analyze
the products of collective efforts, such as Su-
preme Court opinions (Cross & Pennebaker,
2012). LIWC produces relative frequencies of
specific categories of terms.
Results and Discussion
To test the hypothesis that the Services would
emphasize culture over language, the propor-
tion of LRC words that reflected each element
(language, region, culture) was calculated for
each document (see Table 1). An independ-
ent-samples t-test showed that the OSD doc-
uments made fewer references to culture than
did the Services documents (p = .02; Ms =
.20 and .36, respectively). References to lan-
guage were not significantly different (p = .27,
Ms = .58 and .48, OSD and Services, respec-
tively).
Of the three sets of documents, the Services
policies come closest to treating the three
LRC elements equally (see Table 1). In the
OSD documents, references to language dom-
inate (58.5%), followed by region (21.2%),
closely followed by culture (20.3%) (in paired-
samples t-tests, p = .01). In the Services poli-
cies, language references are also predominant
(48.0%), but are followed more closely by cul-
ture (36.5%) and then region (15.5%). The
differences among elements in the Services
documents were not statistically significant.
The GAO and HASC assessments mirror the
patterns of the OSD documents with heavy
emphasis on language. Moreover, the GAO
and HASC reports consistently refer more to
language than to both culture and region com-
bined (in a paired-samples t-test, p = .01; Ms =
.59 and .41, respectively).
Thus, the hypothesis was partially supported.
The Services policies do refer to culture rela-
tively more than OSD documents do, but do
not refer more to culture than to language.
OSD documents refer to language more fre-
quently than to either culture or region.
Because some of the strategies used abbrevia-
tions or definitions that combined LRC ele-
ments, frequencies were also obtained for
those abbreviations. Variations included
LREC or LRC (language, regional expertise,
and culture; Navy and Marine Corps) and
CRL (culture, region, and language; Air
Force). Each of the documents used language
alone more than they used the inclusive ab-
breviation, ranging from a low of a 1.08:1 ra-
tio (Navy) to a high of a 5:1 ratio
(MARADMIN 619-12). Relative to culture
and region, the inclusive abbreviation ap-
peared more frequently in two of the strate-
gies (Navy and Air Force).
123
Analysis of linguistic styles using LIWC
showed few differences between OSD docu-
ments and the Services policies. The lack of
differences may reflect similarities in writing
style among these collectively-produced, offi-
cial documents. However, some differences
did emerge. Discrepancies and past tense
verbs were lower in the Services documents
than in OSD (for discrepancies: t (10) = 2.21,
p = .05, 95% confidence interval -1.09 to -
0.001; Ms = .50 and 1.94, respectively; for
past tense verbs: (t (10) = 3.10, p = .01, 95%
confidence interval -0.56 to -0.09; Ms = .30
and .62, respectively). These differences sug-
gest greater immediacy in the Services docu-
ments than in OSDs (Pennebaker & King,
1999). Words referring to emotion and affect
were more common in the OSD documents
than in the Services documents (t (10) = 2.85,
p = .017; 95% confidence interval -3.23 to -
.40, Ms = 4.11 and 2.38, respectively). There
were no significant differences in categories of
words associated with greater complexity,
such as cognitive mechanisms and words
longer than six letters (Tausczik & Penne-
baker, 2010).
Table 1: Relative Frequencies of Terms
Proportion of Each Capability
Policy or Report Language Culture Region
1. Navy LREC Strategy .59 .23 .18
2. Air Force CRL Flight Plan .51 .30 .19
3. Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS) .40 .50 .10
3a. ACFLS with appendices included .33 .51 .16
4. Marine Corps Language, Regional and Culture Strategy 2011-2015 .44 .36 .20
5. Army HQDA EXORD 070-11 .54 .46 0
6. Army Posture Statement 2012 ACFLS .61 .37 .02
7. MARADMIN 619-12 .28 .32 .40
8. Defense Language Transformation Roadmap .86 .02 .12
9. DoD Instruction 5160.70 .56 .06 .38
10. DLO Regional and Cultural Capabilities White Paper .19 .43 .38
11. DoD Language, Regional, and Cultural Capabilities Strategic Plan .39 .32 .29
12. DoD Summit on Language and Culture: Changing Perspective .43 .33 .24
13. Glenn Nordin, testimony to Senate Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs Committee
.76 .14 .10
14. Laura Junor, testimony to Senate Homeland Security and Governmen-
tal Affairs Committee
.79 .13 .08
15. Gail McGinn, testimony to House Armed Services Committee .68 .21 .11
16. Nancy Weaver, testimony to House Armed Services Committee .61 .19 .20
17. GAO 09-568: DoD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory .56 .04 .40
18. GAO 10-879: Continued Actions Needed .54 .07 .39
19. GAO 11-456: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Coordination .52 .40 .08
20. GAO 12-50: Language and Culture Training: Opportunities Exist to
Improve Visibility and Sustainment
.63 .28 .09
21. HASC Report: Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies .61 .25 .14
22. HASC Report: Bridging the Gap .67 .24 .09

124
Study 2: Semantic Analysis
The quantitative analyses of DoD policies and
government reports showed that the OSD
documents emphasized foreign language ca-
pabilities over culture and region. Contrary to
the conclusion of previous qualitative assess-
ments, the Services policies did not empha-
size culture over language. OSD documents
vary on the degree to which language domi-
nates, but there was convergence on language
as the primary element. However, analyses in
Study 1 did not address the semantic relation-
ship among language, culture, and region.
Understanding these relationships is im-
portant to anticipating how the policies may
be interpreted and implemented by members
of the stakeholder organizations, who may or
may not have similar backgrounds as the au-
thors of the documents.
Although language and culture are certainly
linked, the nature of the relationship is less
evident. Is culture primarily a component of
language? Or is language primarily a compo-
nent of culture? Or are the two partially over-
lapping and partially distinct? Seelye argued,
it is becoming increasingly apparent that the
study of language cannot be divorced from
the study of culture, and vice versa (Seelye,
1993, p. 22). This view is echoed by Watson
(2010), who noted that, . . . language is vitally
and inextricably linked to every aspect of cul-
ture. . . . Language and culture are inherently
interrelated and interdependent (p. 95). This
perspective suggests that the overlap between
language and culture is so great that they are
essentially indistinguishable for education
purposes.
Though a comprehensive review of all poten-
tial interpretations of the relationship between
language and culture is beyond the scope of
the present research, it is possible to test
whether a broader audience shares the notion
that language and culture are inseparable con-
cepts, as proposed by some members of the
language education community. Experts in
these content areas may have a different un-
derstanding of the terms than the readers and
users of the policy documents. In a second set
of analyses, we aimed to determine whether
the inseparability of language and culture is
shared in general knowledge using a computa-
tional model of semantic memory. Readers of
the documents bring background knowledge
to their understanding of the policies, which
includes their experiences with the LRC ele-
ments in other contexts. Thus, Study 2 anal-
yses examined how language and culture may be
understood by readers of the policy docu-
ments.
Method
For this analysis, we used the High-
Dimensional Explorer (HiDEx) (Shaoul &
Westbury, 2010a) implementation of the HAL
(Hyperspace Analogue to Language) mathe-
matical model of semantic memory (Lund &
Burgess, 1996). In this model, a corpus is
processed for frequency of co-occurrence in-
side a weighted moving window. This process
creates a feature vector (which is the size of
the entire retained vocabulary) for each word
in the corpus as well as its relative proximity
in high-dimensional space. Word meaning,
therefore, is instantiated as mathematical pro-
jections in a high-dimensional space. Bottom-
up word feature vectors, which include each
words relative mathematical loading on any
other given word, are based on words co-
occurrence in natural language use. A words
definition is its relative mathematical distance
from every other word.
An extension to the original HAL model pro-
vided by HiDEx allows for higher levels of
mathematical precision when estimating mod-
125
el build quality, including: controlling for the
weighted width of the moving window for
distance of co-occurrences, global ortho-
graphic frequency in the corpus, and the glob-
al radius of co-occurrence. Mathematically
expressed, co-occurrence is calculated by iter-
ating over a given corpus and increasing the
weighted load of a given words increasing
semantic load on the vector by relative
proximity as it naturally occurs in the corpus.
Tersely expressed, the following formula de-
scribes the calculation of each words
weighted distance vector:
!!!!
!
!!
!
!!
!
!

The mathematical effect of such a calculation,
is equivalent to incrementing the weights in
the feature vector for cat in below sentence
in the following way:
!!!
!
!!"#$
!
! !"#
!
! !"#
!
!"# !"#$%
!
!"#$
!
!!!
!
!"#$
!

Words immediately adjacent in the corpus
receive a higher weighted value for that co-
occurrence. Though you must imagine billions
of iterations of this calculation occurring in
the vector creation processing of a given mul-
ti-million word corpus, the above sentence (if
it occurred in the corpus) would be included
in the features vector in precisely the above
way.
Sample. The text used in the current study
was the Westbury Lab English-language Wik-
ipedia corpus from at the University of Alber-
ta (Shaoul & Westbury, 2010b). HiDEx and
related models require a corpus large enough
to sample different contexts in which the tar-
get words occur, in order to construct the fea-
ture vectors. The Westbury Lab Wikipedia
corpus includes over 990 million words from
over 2 million documents. The Wikipedia
corpus closely resembles a collectively-edited,
natural language representation of shared
popular knowledge, much like the policy doc-
uments in Study 1. Using this corpus allows us
to determine the likely understanding of vari-
ous terms by a mixed audience, which in-
cludes but is not limited to subject matter ex-
perts. Feature vectors were established for the
57,377 most commonly occurring terms in the
corpus.
Procedure. The 50 nearest neighbors to the
target words (culture, language) were obtained
from the Westbury Wikipedia global co-
occurrence model for HiDEx. Words with an
orthographic frequency higher than 9,000 per
million words were excluded from analyses.
This threshold was selected to ensure inclu-
sion of all content words, while excluding
words like the and of because those words
make no semantic contribution.
A matrix was formulated for each of the
neighbor words, which included the cosine
(distance) from that words vector to every
other of the nearest neighbors to the target
word. As an example, once the word historical
was identified as falling inside the nearest
neighbor perimeter to culture, the distance
from historical to every other word in the culture
neighborhood was inserted into the matrix.
The result is a 50x50 matrix for each term (cul-
ture, language) which is a 2,500-cosine, reduced,
higher-level set of feature vectors of the much
larger global co-occurrence matrix, which is a
57,377x57,377 matrix with 3.3 billion cosines.
This reduction was needed in order to allow
for human-readable visualization of the fea-
ture vector.
126
Once each of the 50x50 matrices of nearest
neighbors for both terms was created, a num-
ber of matrix analyses were produced. The
first is a simple scree plot and goodness of
fit analysis to determine, once the dimen-
sionality was reduced, what amount of further
pressure would be placed on the model by
reducing the dimensionality of each vector.
Next, the vector for each term was placed in a
multidimensional scaling solution that con-
verted the cosines to distances. Cosines, al-
ready a measure of similarity, would have to
be converted to distances otherwise the
product would be a measure of dissimilarity,
instead of the desired similarity. Using dis-
tances, a multidimensional scaling solution
plotted each term vector in a two-dimensional
space. This allowed for viewing the proximity
of each term placement relative to the target
term as well as a further visual depiction of
relative vector density. Results from these
analyses are presented below.

Table 2: Nearest Neighbors for Culture and Language
Culture Language
Neighbor Cos Neighbor Cos Neighbor Cos Neighbor Cos
cultural .910 language .879 languages .890 people .853
modern .898 great .878 culture .879 subject .852
people .896 like .878 modern .872 knowledge .852
especially .892 since .878 particular .869 information .852
history .892 early .878 social .866 human .851
social .890 much .877 example .865 religious .851
work .890 human .877 work .861 more .851
among .890 even .877 word .860 most .850
particularly .889 period .876 different .860 its .850
traditional .887 often .876 these .859 such .850
life .886 both .876 English .859 means .850
society .886 very .875 traditional .859 fact .850
well .886 community .875 some .859 writing .850
today .886 present .875 this .858 not .850
historical .886 influence .875 cultural .857 common .850
various .884 nature .875 those .857 which .849
particular .884 throughout .875 form .855 historical .849
art .883 although .874 or .855 groups .849
important .882 own .874 many .854 especially .849
those .882 itself .874 that .854 rather .848
recent .882 example .874 words .854 various .848
these .881 though .873 other .854 itself .848
others .881 several .873 literature .853 have .848
popular .880 see .871 term .853 certain .848
works .879 being .871 related .853 even .847

127
Results
Table 2 presents the fifty nearest neighbors
for the words culture and language, as well as
their cosine values, which reflect the degree of
semantic similarity between the target word
and each of its neighbors. Semantic analyses
showed an asymmetrical relationship between
language and culture. Although culture appeared
as a near neighbor of language, language was not
a particularly near neighbor of culture. In other
words, the term culture helps to convey the
meaning of language, whereas language is more
peripheral to the meaning of culture in general
usage.
Scree plots (Figure 1) and goodness of fit
(Table 3) were calculated to determine the
amount of stress introduced by reducing the
dimensionality (in order to create a human-
readable representation of the 50x50 matrix).
Though the plots indicate a modest amount
of relative stress on the model when utilizing
Figure 1: Scree Plot Depicting Stress Score for Dimensionality Reduction for Cul-
ture (top panel) and Language (bottom panel)

Table 3: Goodness-of-Fit Analysis for Multidimensional Scaling So-
lutions
Stress and Fit Measures Culture Language
Dimensionality: 2
Normalized raw stress .054 .063
Stress-I .234

.261
Stress-II .462

.483
S-Stress .133

.180
Dispersion accounted for .945 .937
Tuckers coefficient of congruence .972 .968

128
two dimensions instead of six dimensions,
the absolute stress (.05 for both terms) is quite
low on both multidimensional scaling (MDS)
solutions, and the dispersion accounted for is
quite high (>.94 for both terms.) Since six
dimensions are not easily human-readable and
the results do not systematically vary when
using six dimensions, only two dimensions
were needed.
Analyses showed that semantic representa-
tions for the terms culture and language differ in
three important ways: content, density, and
uniformity.
Content. First, the neighborhood for culture is
quite semantically rich, but language is some-
what more procedural in nature (see Table 2).
Simply put after controlling for derivatives
of language (languages, etc.) culture and its de-
rivatives (cultural, etc.) contribute substantially
to the semantic representation of language, but
the inverse is not true. The neighborhood for
culture is asymmetrically richer and includes
more conceptual content words (historical, mod-
ern, social) of equivalent or greater proximity,
whereas the neighborhood for language con-
tains more function words (e.g., pronouns).
The contribution of language to the vector for
culture is low, relatively speaking. Language is
the fortieth neighbor to culture, but culture is
the first [non-derivative] nearest neighbor to
language. Although culture and language share
some neighbors, such as references to time
(e.g., modern, traditional, and historical) and peo-
ple (e.g., social, human, people), culture has a clos-
er relationship with those neighbors.
Density. Vector density refers to the distance
of a word to its nearest neighbors: words
whose nearest neighbors are more similar to
the target word have denser semantic neigh-
Figure 2: Nearest-50 Semantic Neigh-
bor Dimensionality Reduction (Eu-
clidean Distance-Based Multidimen-
sional Scaling) for Culture (top panel)
and Language (bottom panel)
129
borhoods than words whose nearest neigh-
bors are less similar or naturally occur in a
more distal way in the corpus in terms of lo-
calized sentence structure. In the Wikipedia
corpus, neighborhood density is higher for
culture than for language (see Figure 2). In order
to get to the same level of resolution on the
culture vector that is required to simply include
the 50 nearest terms from the language vector,
one would have to scale out to include 209
terms from culture. Thus, culture has four times
the semantic density/richness of language and
is a great deal more complex, having more
complex terms as nearest neighbors and fewer
function words.
As shown in Table 2 and in Figure 2, the
nearest neighbors of culture have higher co-
sines (Table 2) and are closer in space (Figure
2) than those of language, indicating a richer
semantic representation for culture. Although
the nearest neighbors of language are close to
other neighbors of language, they are relatively
distant from language itself. Though both lan-
guage and culture load on each others meaning
in the form of the feature vector, language
loads lowest in both vectors. Language actually
loads lowest in its own feature vector to its
nearest neighbors. Note the centrality of cul-
ture in its multidimensional scaling solution for
an equal, but opposite spatial relationship.
Culture has many very-near terms contributing
to its definition.
Uniformity. Another observation involves
the distribution of points in space for each of
the target terms. The points projected into
space for the culture term are more uniformly
distributed, which means they tend to occur at
roughly similar proximal distance both from
each other and from the target term. In con-
trast, language has a much higher degree of var-
iance in the distances each term held from
each other in the global co-occurrence matrix.
Language itself is distal from every other point
in the language vector when each terms inter-
term distance is accounted for.
A more global grayscale view of the feature
vectors reveals that the entire matrix for culture
can be visually depicted as more dense simply
by converting the cosines to a color value (see
Figure 3 on page 130) in the Nearest-50 Se-
mantic Neighbor Density Visual Projection
for each term. The purpose of this analysis is
to determine the gap in spatial constraints of
each terms vector. Differences in density are
apparent from a simple visual inspection of
that projection. Ignoring the diagonal, any cell
that showed as a darker shade of gray was
closer to the target term. In Figure 3, other
than the diagonal (which is each terms weight
relative to itself, always 1.0), the nearer a
neighbor is to the target word, the darker the
color.
The darker overall image vector, along with
the mathematical values in the distance table,
establishes that the 50 nearest neighbors for
culture are nearer to the target term than are
the 50 nearest neighbors for language. Thus,
the Density Visual Projection establishes that,
in the Wikipedia natural language corpus, cul-
ture has a much denser neighborhood than
does language.
130

Discussion
Word frequency analyses indicate that despite
DoDs increased attention to culture in the
post-9/11 era, there was no evidence from the
lexical analyses that policies emphasized cul-
ture over language. Study 1 addressed the lan-
guage of the policies and government anal-
yses, examining leaders, decision makers, and
government observers emphasis on different
elements of the LRC strategies. The hypothe-
sis that the Services policies prioritized cul-
ture to a greater degree than did OSD policies
was only partially supported. Although the
Services policies contain more references to
culture than do OSD documents, references
to culture were matched or exceeded by refer-
ences to language. Within OSD, foreign lan-
guage still tends to dominate many of the pol-
icies and discussions in this domain.
Study 2 addressed the meaning of LRC ele-
ments as they may be interpreted by readers
and stakeholders of the LRC policies. Rather
than looking at the intent of the authors of
the documents, these analyses examined the
relationship between language and culture in
general understanding, using the language of
shared popular knowledge as reflected in the
collectively-edited documents of Wikipedia.
These analyses showed that although culture
contributes to the meaning of language, the
relationship is asymmetrical and these terms
have distinct meanings.
One limitation of these analyses is that there
is no perfect conceptual correspondence for
the terms used. Alrich and colleagues (2011)
have noted that terminology for LRC capabili-
ties differs across DoD components and insti-
tutions. Similarly, it is possible that the same
terms may be used in different ways across
components. The terms for capability areas
used in the present analyses were not an ex-
haustive list of all possible terms, but focused
instead on the terms most often used in de-
fense discussions of these issues. For example,
area is sometimes used interchangeably with
region, but was not included in the analyses due
to other common meanings that do not refer
to geographic regions (e.g., a topic area).
The present research suggests that the percep-
tion of culture as the Services priority is a
myth. Overall, there was no difference in ref-
erences to culture and references to language
in the Services policies. The Army Culture
Figure 3: Nearest-50 Semantic Neigh-
bor Density Visual Projection for Cul-
ture (top panel) and Language (bot-
tom panel)
131
and Foreign Language Strategy is the only
Service LRC strategy to attempt explicitly to
prioritize culture over language for general-
purpose forces (2009, p. 6). However, the im-
plementation of the policy does not reflect
that emphasis. Both the Executive Order and
Army Posture Statement implicitly reverse the
prioritization, making more references to lan-
guage than to culture.
Findings are therefore inconsistent with the
conclusions of the RAND review (DeCamp et
al., 2012) and with other commentary (Wat-
son, 2010). We found no support for the no-
tion that OSD treats language, culture, and
region equally and that the Services prioritize
culture. Instead, OSD seems to have incorpo-
rated culture and region as subordinate ele-
ments of foreign language training and educa-
tion. The present text analysis suggests that,
although attention to culture and region has
certainly increased in the last decade, attention
to foreign language has similarly increased.
Given the overlap in documents analyzed in
the present study and in the RAND review, it
is unclear why the qualitative and quantitative
reviews produced such different conclusions
about the weighting of LRC capabilities.
Exploratory analyses in Study 2 showed that
language and culture are not only quite distin-
guishable from each other, they have very dif-
ferent associations with other, related con-
cepts. Results from density analyses showed
that although culture is a central feature of
language, language is far more peripheral to
culture. Furthermore, relative to culture, lan-
guage is peripheral even to the words that re-
late to it most closely. This finding suggests
that the relationship between language and
culture is an asymmetric one, and these con-
cepts are neither interchangeable nor insepa-
rable.
DoD Emphasis on Language
The continuing emphasis on language in OSD
policies has several potential explanations,
which the current research cannot directly
disentangle. One explanation is that decision
makers and observers believe, either implicitly
or explicitly, that language is more important
for military personnel than culture and region.
Foreign language capability may be perceived
as more useful, or perhaps simply more diffi-
cult to achieve than cultural and regional ca-
pabilities, therefore requiring more attention
and more resources. The challenge of reach-
ing fluency in a foreign language is widely rec-
ognized, particularly for adult learners. Be-
cause learners cannot fully assimilate into a
culture or achieve deep expertise without flu-
ency in the language, a large investment in
foreign language may be seen as a necessity.
However, deep expertise and potential assimi-
lation are not the goals for general-purpose
forces.
A second possibility is that leaders and deci-
sion makers within the defense LRC commu-
nity have a different understanding of the
LRC concepts and capabilities. Decision mak-
ers may believe language is, or should be, the
primary route to cultural understanding and
regional knowledge. Some may view language
as a super-ordinate category that encompasses
culture, and is therefore the best route to
learning culture.
The language-route to-culture view has pro-
ponents in theory (e.g., language as an enabler
of cultural understanding or regional exper-
tise, Outzen, 2012; Stratton, 2006), but evi-
dence for practical support is scarce. Where
language is genuinely viewed as a means to
132
other outcomes, one would expect to see as-
sessments of those outcomes included in
training, education, and personnel manage-
ment. Not only are research findings to ad-
dress such outcomes sparse (Abbe, 2008),
there are few instruments available even to
assess those relationships. Examples of such
efforts exist, such as the development of a
regional proficiency assessment (Center for
Advanced Study of Language, 2012), but they
have not yet received even a fraction of the
investment and attention that language apti-
tude and proficiency testing have received.
Furthermore, the language-route-to-culture
view is not consistent with popular under-
standing of the terms as revealed in the
HiDEx semantic analysis. Not surprisingly,
experts may diverge from a more general au-
dience in understanding their subject matter.
However, examining how a policy or directive
may be understood by their audience can help
experts and decision makers better convey
their intent. Perhaps OSD intended to place
equal emphasis on all three LRC elements, as
the RAND review suggested (DeCamp et al.,
2012), but their more frequent references to
language convey that the priority is language.
The realities of deploying personnel to specif-
ic geographic locations further highlight the
lack of a one-to-one, symmetric relationship
among LRC capabilities. Regions and national
borders often do not conveniently divide
along cultural and linguistic lines. Diverse cul-
tures and regions sometimes use the same
language, and different languages are some-
times spoken in culturally similar populations.
The appropriate emphasis on each likely de-
pends on what personnel will be doing and
where they are going, as well as on time and
resource constraints. Service members with
recent deployment experience have provided
some useful feedback on these issues (Abbe &
Gallus, 2012; Chambers & Maki, 2012; Hardi-
son et al., 2009), which can help inform future
policy and programs. In addition, good prac-
tices from the science of training (Salas, Tan-
nenbaum, Kraiger, & Smith-Jentsch, 2012)
can further inform policy. For example, as-
sessing performance and mission outcomes
and incorporating training evaluation would
be particularly helpful in determining what
aspects of LRC training are most critical.
As scholars across disciplines have observed,
gaining consensus on a definition of culture is
a controversial undertaking. However, a better
understanding and consensus on the relation-
ships among culture, language, and related
concepts is critical to training and educating a
globally-responsive force. The nature of these
relationships should be a topic of continued
discussion and research to inform the devel-
opment of policies and programs that best
prepare service members for their roles and
missions.


133
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References marked with * are included in the text analysis for Study 1.

136

Allison Abbe is Principal Scientist with Synergist Research and Consulting. She previously
held positions in the federal government with the inter-agency High-Value Detainee Interroga-
tion Group and the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Dr.
Abbe holds a PhD in Personality and Social Psychology and BAs in Psychology and Political
Science. She is a recipient of the Army Research and Development Achievement Award and a
member of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, the Association for Psy-
chological Science, and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology.

Robert Morrow is a Senior Engineer with Cloudera where he specializes in data science and
in high-dimensional models of semantic memory. He previously held a position as the Chief Ar-
chitect of Oracle Corporations National Security Group where he supported U.S. Government
engineering efforts for high- performance distributed systems. Mr. Morrow previously worked
with Dr. Curt Burgess on research on the Hyperspace Analogue to Language and on Latent Se-
mantic Analysis
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