Hegemony File

HEGEMONY FILE - 4 WEEK
Hegemony File - 4 Week.........................................................................................................................................1

***Leadership .........................................................................................................................................................2
Doesnt War.............................................................................................................................................................3
No ransition War...................................................................................................................................................!
Heg De"line No#.....................................................................................................................................................$
Heg High No#.......................................................................................................................................................1%
Heg Dead No#.......................................................................................................................................................12
&hina 'ise .............................................................................................................................................................1$
(2) &hinas 'ise....................................................................................................................................................1*
***Heg +ad ..........................................................................................................................................................22
Heg +ad , (sian War ...........................................................................................................................................23
Heg +ad , &hina War............................................................................................................................................24
Heg +ad , &hina 'elations....................................................................................................................................2!
Heg +ad , -"onomi" &ollapse..............................................................................................................................2$
Heg +ad , -.rope 'elations..................................................................................................................................2*
Heg +ad , /orean War .........................................................................................................................................20
Heg +ad , 1roli2eration ........................................................................................................................................31
Heg +ad , '.ssia3&hina (llian"e..........................................................................................................................32
Heg +ad , 4pa"e Weaponi5ation...........................................................................................................................33
Heg +ad , ai#an ................................................................................................................................................34
Heg +ad , errorism.............................................................................................................................................3$
Heg +ad , War.......................................................................................................................................................3*
***Heg 6ood ........................................................................................................................................................41
Heg 6ood , (sian War..........................................................................................................................................42
Heg 6ood , (sian 1roli2eration............................................................................................................................43
Heg 6ood , &entral (sia.......................................................................................................................................44
Heg 6ood , &hina War..........................................................................................................................................4!
Heg 6ood , -ast (sia............................................................................................................................................4$
Heg 6ood , -"onomy ...........................................................................................................................................47
Heg 6ood , Free rade..........................................................................................................................................4*
Heg 6ood , 8apanese 1roli2eration........................................................................................................................40
Heg 6ood , /orean War.......................................................................................................................................!%
Heg 6ood , 1roli2eration.......................................................................................................................................!1
Heg 6ood , '.ssia................................................................................................................................................!2
Heg 6ood , errorism ..........................................................................................................................................!3
Heg 6ood , War....................................................................................................................................................!4

***LEADERSHIP
DOESNT WAR
US cant sol! t"! #o$l%s &$o'l!(s ) %o(!st*c *ss+!s an% $*s*n, &o#!$s
S#*t-!$ .. 9om: resear"h asso"iate at the ;nited 4tates 4t.dies &enter at the ;ni<ersity o2 4ydney: (.stralia: =he World oday: Foretold >y Ni?on:@ 7-!:
http)33###.nytimes."om32%113%73%$3opinion3%$iht-eds#it5er%$.htmlA
B2 "o.rse: Ni?ons predi"tion a>o.t the end o2 ;.4. glo>al predominan"e #as premat.re. (nd his assessment o2 4o<iet military po#er #as e?aggerated. +.t he did
re"ogni5e the limits to the ;.4. role as #orld poli"eman in a m.ltipolar system that is starting to >e"ome more
e<ident. +loodied >y C.agmires in DraC and (2ghanistan: "rippled >y a E14 trillion de>t and near-do.>le-digit
.nemployment: shattered >y s#elling home 2ore"los.res: the ;nited 4tates is str.ggling to impose its #ill and
leadership a"ross the glo>e. Fean#hile: the rise o2 &hina: Dndia and +ra5il: taken together #ith the 2ormida>le
presen"e o2 8apan and the -.ropean ;nion: s.ggests that po#er is >e"oming more di22.se.Dn the past t#o de"ades: the
a""epted #isdom in Washington has em>ra"ed se<eral e?pressions a>o.t the ;.4. pla"e in the post-&old War #orld: 2rom =indispensa>le nation@ and =sole remaining
s.perpo#er@ to =>enign hegemony@ and =( Ne# (meri"an &ent.ry.@
US H!,!(on/ not 0!/ to ,lo'al sta'*l*t/--T"!$! a$! ot"!$ alt!$nat*! co+nt$*!s ca&a'l! o1 %o*n, t"! sa(!
t"*n,.
P$!'l! .2- Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Taught history at St. Cloud State University and Temple University, was a
commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, h.D. in history from Temple University !Christopher re"le, #U.S. $ilitary ower% reeminence for what
urpose&', http%((www.cato-at-li"erty.org(u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose() N

he ;.4. military is already .na22orda>le G and yet it needs to >e larger to s.stain (meri"as glo>al leadership:
espe"ially in the 2a"e o2 a rising &hina. hats the >ottom line 2rom a "ongressionally "hartered >ipartisan panel: "o-"haired >y 4tephen Hadley:
6eorge W. +.shs national se".rity ad<iser: and William 1erry: +ill &lintons De2ense se"retary. he report: released 8.ly 20: is the independent panels assessment o2
and "ommentary on the 1entagons o#n H.adrennial De2ense 'e<ie#: released earlier this year.IFreC.ent e?pert >log "ontri>.tor 6ordon (dams: among others: has
already >lasted the Hadley-1erry report 2or making the .nderlying ass.mption that the ;.4. "an and sho.ld "ontin.e to in<est hea<ily in >eing a =glo>al poli"eman.@ Ds
(dams right that the Hadley-1erry report "alls 2or an .na22orda>le ans#er to the #rong C.estionJ Br are the reports a.thors "orre"t #hen they arg.e that the ;.4. m.st
>e the leading g.arantor o2 glo>al se".rityJ (nd i2 the ;.4. m.st lead: has the Hadley-1erry panel laid o.t the right path to doing soJ Fy response)Dan 6o.re says that
;.4. military preeminen"e is not .na22orda>le. hat is pro>a>ly "orre"t. -<en tho.gh #e spend in e?"ess o2 E*%% >illion ann.ally on
national se".rity Kin"l.ding the "ost o2 the #ars in DraC and (2ghanistan: and the Departments o2 Homeland
4e".rity and Leterans (22airsM #e "o.ld choose to spend as m."h: or more: 2or a #hile longer. We "o.ld "hoose to shi2t money o.t o2 other go<ernment
programsN #e "o.ld raise ta?esN or #e "o.ld "ontin.e to 2inan"e the #hole thing on de>t: and sti"k o.r "hildren and grand"hildren #ith the >ill. +.t #hat is the
pointJ Why do (meri"ans spend so m."h more on o.r military than does any other "o.ntry: or any other "om>ination o2 "o.ntriesJ 6o.re and the Hadley-1erry
"ommissioners #ho prod."ed the alternate HD' arg.e that the p.rpose o2 (meri"an military po#er is to pro<ide glo>al p.>li" goods: to de2end other "o.ntries so that
they dont ha<e to de2end themsel<es: and other#ise shape the international order to s.it o.r ends. Dn other #ords: the same O.sti2i"ations o22ered 2or (meri"an military
dominan"e sin"e the end o2 the &old War. Fost in Washington still em>ra"es the notion that (meri"a is: and 2ore<er #ill >e: the #orlds indispensa>le nation. 4ome
s"holars: ho#e<er:C.estioned the logi" o2 hegemoni" sta>ility theory 2rom the <ery >eginning. ( n.m>er "ontin.e to do so today. hey ad<an"e
arg.ments diametri"ally at odds #ith the prima"ist "onsens.s. rade ro.tes need not >e poli"ed >y a single dominant po#erN the
international e"onomy is "omple? and resilient. 4.pply disr.ptions are likely to >e temporary: and the "osts o2 mitigating their e22e"ts sho.ld >e
>orne >y those #ho stand to lose G or gain G the most. Dslami" e?tremists are s"ary: >.t hardly "ompara>le to the threat posed >y
a glo>e-straddling 4o<iet ;nion armed #ith tho.sands o2 n."lear #eapons. Dt is 2rankly a>s.rd that #e spend
more today to 2ight Bsama >in Laden and his tiny >and o2 m.rdero.s th.gs than #e spent to 2a"e do#n 8oseph
4talin and &hairman Fao. Fany 2a"tors ha<e "ontri>.ted to the dramati" de"line in the n.m>er o2 #ars
>et#een nation-statesN it is .nrealisti" to e?pe"t that a ne# spasm o2 glo>al "on2li"t #o.ld er.pt i2 the ;nited
4tates #ere to modestly re2o".s its e22orts: dra# do#n its military po#er: and "all on other "o.ntries to play a
larger role in their o#n de2ense: and in the se".rity o2 their respe"ti<e regions. +.t #hile there are "redi>le
alternati<es to the ;nited 4tates ser<ing in its ".rrent d.al role as #orld poli"eman 3 armed so"ial #orker: the 2oreign
poli"y esta>lishment in Washington has no interest in e?ploring them. he people here ha<e gro#n a"".stomed to li<ing at the "enter o2 the
earth: and indeed: o2 the .ni<erse. he tangi>le >ene2its o2 all this military spending 2lo# disproportionately to this tiny
"orner o2 the ;nited 4tates #hile the s"hl.>s in 2ly-o<er "o.ntry pi"k .p the ta>. Dn short: #e sho.ldnt ha<e e?pe"ted that a gro.p o2 Washington insiders
#o.ld seek to o<ert.rn the O.dgments o2 another gro.p o2 Washington insiders. ( gen.inely independent assessment o2 ;.4. military spending: and o2 the strategy the
military is designed to implement: m.st "ome 2rom other C.arters.
H!,!(on/ *s +s!l!ss ) A(!$*ca can3t t$anslat! (at!$*al &o#!$ *nto *n1l+!nc!
4a$$an-a .2 9Fario -.: (sso"iate 1ro2essor o2 1oliti"al 4"ien"e at e?as ( P F: Q'eality &he"k) (meri"aRs
&ontin.ing 1.rs.it o2 'egional Hegemony:Q &ontemporary 4e".rity 1oli"y: 31) 3: 4%$-44%A
Dnternational hegemony is >oth a str."t.ral matter and a matter o2 "hoi"e. (2ter the end o2 the &old War in 100%-1001: #ith an enormo.s amo.nt o2 str."t.ral po#er:
the ;nited 4tates #as the .ndisp.ta>le only s.perpo#erN >.t it "o.ld still ha<e "hosen not to p.rs.e a strategy o2 glo>al hegemony. Set it de"ided to implement a
military strategy o2 pre<enting the emergen"e o2 any potential 2.t.re glo>al "ompetitor.13 here2ore: it is important to disting.ish >et#een the str."t.ral dimensions o2
;4 hegemony and its RagentialR dimensions.14 Fost s"holars agree that the ;nited 4tates possesses an enormo.s amo.nt o2 po#er
reso.r"es) str."t.ral po#er in the glo>al politi"al e"onomy and an .npre"edented amo.nt o2 military po#er #hi"h
makes some analysts "ompare "ontemporary ;4 dominan"e o2 the international system to the 'oman empire. Set the ;nited 4tates has >e"ome
in"reasingly .na>le to translate its str."t.ral e"onomi" and military po#er into desired and d.ra>le o.t"omes:
>oth glo>ally and regionally. Bn the one hand: as Ni"ola 1hillips notes: Rthe str."t.rally hegemoni" po#er o2 the ;nited 4tates mo.lds the parameters o2
the regional politi"al e"onomy and de2ines to a <ery signi2i"ant e?tent: the "onto.rs o2 the regional agendaR.1! Bn the other hand: ho#e<er: the resistan"e to
the ;4 <ision o2 hemispheri" integration Kthe proposal 2or a Free rade (rea o2 the (meri"as: F((: and its
"ollapse in 2%%3-2%%!M sho#s the limits to ;4 hegemony in the (meri"as and the #eaknesses and limitations o2
;4 Ragential po#erR in the regional politi"al e"onomy.1$ 4imilarly: the ;nited 4tates has >een .na>le to translate
its str."t.ral and military po#er into desired and d.ra>le o.t"omes in 4o.th (sia: despite its military allian"e
#ith 1akistan and its strategi" partnership #ith Dndia that ".lminated in the ;4-Dndia n."lear deal o2 2%%*. his arti"le e?amines the
disO.n"t.re >et#een the str."t.ral dimensions o2 ;4 po#er and its RagentialR dimensions .sing ;4 poli"ies to#ard Latin (meri"a and 4o.th (sia as "ase st.dies. he
2o".s on these t#o regions pro<ides a Rreality "he"kR to the de>ates >et#een o22ensi<e3de2ensi<e realists and neo"lassi"al realists and >et#een .nipolar optimists and
agnosti"s. (s D #ill sho#: ;4 relations #ith >oth regions present p.55les that ha<e >een ignored >y the s"holarly de>ates on .nipolarity and (meri"an prima"y a2ter 11
4eptem>er.
NO TRANSITION WAR
No t$ans*t*on #a$ ) *nt!$nat*onal o$%!$ c"!c0s
I0!n'!$$/ 5 K8ohn is a pro2essor o2 1oliti"s and Dnternational (22airs at 1rin"eton ;ni<ersity. he 'ise o2 &hina and the F.t.re o2 the West &an the Li>eral
4ystem 4.r<i<eJ: Foreign (22airs: 8an3Fe>M
4ome o>ser<ers >elie<e that the (meri"an era is "oming to an end: as the Western-oriented #orld order is repla"ed >y one in"reasingly dominated >y the -ast. he
historian Niall Ferg.son has #ritten that the >loody t#entieth "ent.ry #itnessed Qthe des"ent o2 the WestQ and Qa reorientation o2 the #orldQ to#ard the -ast.
'ealists go on to note that as &hina gets more po#er2.l and the ;nited 4tatesR position erodes: t#o things are
likely to happen) &hina #ill try to .se its gro#ing in2l.en"e to reshape the r.les and instit.tions o2 the
international system to >etter ser<e its interests: and other states in the system -- espe"ially the de"lining
hegemon -- #ill start to see &hina as a gro#ing se".rity threat. he res.lt o2 these de<elopments: they predi"t:
#ill >e tension: distr.st: and "on2li"t: the typi"al 2eat.res o2 a po#er transition. Dn this <ie#: the drama o2 &hinaRs
rise #ill 2eat.re an in"reasingly po#er2.l &hina and a de"lining ;nited 4tates lo"ked in an epi" >attle o<er the
r.les and leadership o2 the international system. (nd as the #orldRs largest "o.ntry emerges not 2rom #ithin >.t o.tside the esta>lished post-
World War DD international order: it is a drama that #ill end #ith the grand as"endan"e o2 &hina and the onset o2 an (sian-"entered #orld order. hat "o.rse:
ho#e<er: is not ine<ita>le. he rise o2 &hina does not ha<e to trigger a #ren"hing hegemoni" transition. he ;.4.-
&hinese po#er transition "an >e <ery di22erent 2rom those o2 the past >e"a.se &hina 2a"es an international order
that is 2.ndamentally di22erent 2rom those that past rising states "on2ronted. &hina does not O.st 2a"e the ;nited
4tatesN it 2a"es a Western-"entered system that is open: integrated: and r.le->ased: #ith #ide and deep politi"al
2o.ndations. he n."lear re<ol.tion: mean#hile: has made #ar among great po#ers .nlikely -- eliminating the
maOor tool that rising po#ers ha<e .sed to o<ert.rn international systems de2ended >y de"lining hegemoni"
states. odayRs Western order: in short: is hard to o<ert.rn and easy to Ooin.
HEG DE4LINE NOW
US l!a%!$s"*& %!cl*n! s*(*la$ to So*!ts ) A1,"an*stan &$o!s
4$o#l!/ 6788 senior "orrespondent and dep.ty Washington >.rea. "hie2 2or Time maga5ineN grad.ate o2 Sale ;ni<ersity KFi"hael &ro#ley: =B>amas
(2ghanistan 4pee"h) (dmitting the Limit o2 (meri"an po#er@ 8.ne 22: 2%11: http)33s#ampland.time."om32%113%$3223o>amas-a2ghanistan-spee"h-admitting-the-limits-
o2-ameri"an-po#er3M mihe
Dn Noer o2 10*$: 4o<iet president Fikhail 6or>a"he< addressed the 1olit>.ro a>o.t his "o.ntrys 2.tile #ar in (2ghanistan. he "on2li"t had already
dragged on 2or si? years: 6or>a"he< told his "omrades: >.t no end #as in sight. =Dn general: #e ha<ent 2o.nd the key to resol<ing this pro>lem:@ the "omm.nist leader
e?plained: a""ording to 6regory Fei2ers >ook: The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. =We need to 2inish this pro"ess as soon as
possi>le.@ hat #as espe"ially tr.e in a nation #hose e"onomy #as groaning 2rom the e?pense o2 the #ar. 4oon a2ter: 6or>a"he< in2ormed (meri"an o22i"ials
that the 4o<iets #o.ld >egin their e?it 2rom (2ghanistan. 6or>a"he<s retreat 2rom &entral (sia #as an admission o2
de2eat and a sign that the 4o<iet era #as "oming to a "lose. For +ara"k B>ama and the ;nited 4tates: the pi"t.re is not so dire. Not C.ite.
+.t the presidents anno.n"ement last night that he #ill #ithdra# 33:%%% (meri"an troops 2rom (2ghanistan >y ne?t s.mmer: and that the ;.4. "om>at mission there
#ill end >y 2%14: #as also an admission a>o.t #aning po#er. B>ama .nderstands that: a2ter 1% years o2 #ar and an e"onomi" "atastrophe: (meri"a
has neither the #ill nor the reso.r"es to "ontin.e an all-o.t 2ight in (2ghanistan. When 6eorge W. +.sh 2o.ght on st.>>ornly to
res".e DraC: he had the l.?.ry o2 a relati<ely healthy e"onomy and a national de>t that B>ama #o.ld en<y. +.t (meri"a "an no longer #in at all "osts. he >ills are
sta"king .p: the patien"e is r.nning o.t. B>ama sent a message #hen he promised steady dra# do#n #itho.t any re2eren"e to ="onditions on
the gro.nd@) Fay>e this time 2ail.re is an option. &ommentators #ill 2i?ate on the military dimensions o2 B>amas ne# poli"y. Dn tr.th the test 2or him no#
is the 2ar more "ompli"ated politi"al settlement o2 #hi"h he spoke. hat is a h.ge diplomati" "hallenge: an ela>orate dan"e >et#een the /ar5ai go<ernment: the ali>an:
and o.r 2renemies in Dslama>ad. ( real long term sol.tion #ill likely in<ol<e Delhi as #ell: and e<en ehran. Dn the "oming days B>amas "onser<ati<e "riti"s #ill talk
at length a>o.t Da<id 1etrae.ss 2r.strations. +.t #hat matters more is this game o2 three-dimensional diplomati" "hess. he 4o<iets: too: tho.ght they
"o.ld arrange a 2a"e-sa<ing politi"al sol.tion: one that also in<ol<ed 1akistans deep in<ol<ement. hey #ere pro<en #rong #hen
the "o.ntry soon de<ol<ed to a horrendo.s "i<il #ar that #iped o.t their politi"al allies. B>amas "hallenge no# is to a<oid a repeat o2 that
history. (nd to a"hie<e diplomati"ally #hat seems 2.tile militarily) an o.t"ome that #ill pre<ent (meri"as ad<ent.re in (2ghanistan 2rom
>eing re"orded as another re<elation o2 a great po#ers de"line.
US "!, %!cl*n*n, no# ) t"$!! 0!/ $!asons
Walt 67.2 ) pro2essor o2 international a22airs at Har<ard ;ni<ersityRs 8ohn F. /ennedy 4"hool o2 6o<ernment K4tephen F. Walt: = What D old he Na<y his
Sear:@ 8.ne 1%: 2%11: http)33#alt.2oreignpoli"y."om3posts32%113%$31%3#hatTiTtoldTtheTna<yTthisTyearM mihe
he title o2 my talk #as Qhe #ilight o2 the (meri"an -ra:Q and my "entral point #as that #e are nearing the end o2 the .n.s.al position o2 prima"y that the ;nited
4tates has enOoyed sin"e the end o2 World War DD. Dn 104!: the ;nited 4tates prod."ed a>o.t hal2 o2 gross #orld prod."t: #e #ere a
"reditor nation #ith a trade s.rpl.s: and #e had the #orldRs largest armed 2or"es and sole possession o2 atomi"
#eapons. he 4o<iet ;nion had a large land army >.t not m."h else: and its e"onomy #as al#ays de"idedly in2erior to o.rs. his position o2 prima"y allo#ed the
;nited 4tates to "reate: maintain: and lead a politi"al-e"onomi"-se".rity order in <irt.ally e<ery part o2 the #orld: e?"ept 2or the 4o<iet ;nion and Warsa# 1a"t itsel2.
Not only did the ;nited 4tates play the leading role in instit.tions like the ;N: DFF: World +ank: and 6(: >.t #e also esta>lished a dominant se".rity role in
-.rope thro.gh N(B and in (sia thro.gh >ilateral treaties #ith 8apan: (.stralia: 4o.th /orea: Ne# Uealand and others. Dn the Fiddle -ast: the ;nited 4tates helped
"reate and s.pport Dsrael and also 2orged se".rity partnerships #ith <ario.s (ra> monar"hies: there>y o>taining a predominant role there as #ell. ;.4.
hegemony #as already #ell-esta>lished in the Western hemisphere: and tho.gh the ;.4. didnRt pay m."h attention to (2ri"a: it did eno.gh to
preser<e its modest interests there too. B<er the ne?t 2orty years: this position o2 prima"y #as "hallenged on se<eral o""asions >.t
ne<er serio.sly threatened. he ;nited 4tates lost the Lietnam War >.t its (sian allian"es held 2irm: and &hina e<ent.ally mo<ed "loser to .s in the 107%s.
he 4hah o2 Dran 2ell: >.t the ;nited 4tates simply "reated the 'apid Deployment For"e and maintained a >alan"e o2 po#er in the 6.l2. Dsrael gre# e<er-stronger and
more se".re: and -gypt e<ent.ally realigned to#ards .s too. (nd then the 4o<iet ;nion "ollapsed: #hi"h allo#ed the ;nited 4tates to >ring the Warsa# 1a"t into
N(B and spread market->ased systems thro.gho.t the 2ormer "omm.nist #orld. his sit.ation #as highly .n.s.al: to say the least. Dt is rare that any single po#er-let
alone one #ith only ! per"ent o2 the #orldRs pop.lation -- is a>le to "reate and maintain a parti".lar politi"al and se".rity order in almost e<ery "orner o2 the #orld. Dt
#as ne<er going to last 2ore<er: o2 "o.rse: and three key trends are no# "om>ining to >ring that era o2 dominan"e to an end.
he 2irst trend is the rise o2 &hina: #hi"h dis"arded the "omm.nist system that had "onstrained its "onsidera>le potential and has no# e?perien"ed
three de"ades o2 e?plosi<e gro#th. &hinaRs military po#er is gro#ing steadily: and as D and other realists ha<e noted: this trend #ill almost "ertainly lead to
serio.s se".rity "ompetition in (sia: as &hina seeks to limit the ;.4. role and as Washington stri<es to maintain it. he se"ond trend is the
sel2-in2li"ted damage to the ;.4. e"onomy: a "onseC.en"e o2 the +.sh administrationRs pro2liga"y and the 2inan"ial "risis o2 2%%7. he ;nited
4tates 2a"es a mo.ntain o2 de>t: the near-"ertainty o2 persistent 2ederal de2i"its: and a dys2.n"tional politi"al system that "annot seem to make hard "hoi"es.
his sit.ation does not mean the ;nited 4tates is a>o.t to 2all 2rom the ranks o2 the great po#ers: >.t the "ontrast #ith earlier periods -- and espe"ially the immediate
a2termath o2 World War DD -- is st.nning. 8.st look at o.r tepid response to the (ra> spring and "ompare that #ith the Farshall 1lan: and yo. get some idea o2 o.r
diminished "lo.t. he third trend is the emergen"e o2 se<eral in2l.ential regional po#ers: #ho ha<e managed to re2orm their o#n
e"onomies: gain greater "on2iden"e and independen"e: and Kin some "asesM thro# o22 their pre<io.s de2eren"e to Washington. 4tates s."h as .rkey: Dndia: and
+ra5il are not a>o.t to >e"ome tr.e glo>al po#ers: >.t ea"h has >e"ome more in2l.ential in its o#n neigh>orhood: is a>le to "hart its o#n 2oreign poli"y
"o.rse: and #onRt >e in"lined to de2er to WashingtonRs #ishes. his is espe"ially tr.e 2or those states -- most nota>ly .rkey -- #here the ;.4. image is no# de"idely
negati<e. &hinaRs rise may e<ent.ally gi<e many states diplomati" options: 2.rther "ompli"ating (meri"aRs a>ility to r.n a Washington-
"entered #orld order. What is ending: ho#e<er: is the Q(meri"an -raQ) that .n.s.al period o2 prima"y #here the ;nited 4tates "o.ld
or"hestrate lead a politi"al3e"onomi"3se".rity order almost e<ery#here. We didnRt "ontrol the #orld: >.t #e "ast a long shado# <irt.ally e<ery#here and #e "o.ld
.s.ally make most things go o.r #ay.
US L!a%!$s"*& D!cl*n*n, no# ) O'a(a 4on1*$(s
Was"*n,ton T*(!s 6789 ) KFi"hael 1rell: =B>ama and the end o2 (meri"an 1o#er:@ 8.ne 20: 2%11:
http)33###.#ashingtontimes."om3ne#s32%113O.n3203o>ama-and-the-end-o2-ameri"an-po#er3M mihe
B.tgoing De2ense 4e"retary 'o>ert F. 6ates said something that is tr.e 2or almost e<ery (meri"an reading these #ords) =D spent my entire ad.lt li2e #ith the ;nited
4tates as a s.perpo#er: and one that had no "omp.n"tion a>o.t spending #hat it took to s.stain that position.@ Fost (meri"ans >orn sin"e 104! ha<e spent e<ery
moment o2 their li<es in the #orlds most e?"l.si<e "l.>) the s.perpo#er "l.>. 4in"e the 2all o2 the +erlin Wall in 10*0: (meri"ans ha<e >een the only
mem>ers o2 the s.perpo#er "l.>. Fany (meri"ans: like Fr. 6ates and the troops #ho ser<e .nder him: #holeheartedly em>ra"e (meri"an po#er and .nderstand
the importan"e o2 (meri"an po#erN not O.st to (meri"a: >.t to the #orld. Bthers: like the president o2 the ;nited 4tates: ha<e a more "on2li"ted <ie# o2 (meri"an
po#er. (s Ne#s#eek editor 8on Fea"ham o>ser<ed:+ara"k B>amas 2ormati<e years in the small: 2oreign "o.ntry o2Dndonesia made him =more "ons"io.s o2 #hat
(meri"an po#er 2eels like on the re"ei<ing end than on the gi<ing end.@ 1erhaps that is #hy: on (pril 3: 2%%0: in 4tras>o.rg: Fran"e: Fr. B>ama de"ried
(meri"an po#er and =arrogan"e:@ saying: =Dn (meri"a: theres a 2ail.re to appre"iate -.ropes leading role in the
#orld.@ hen: later that month: in rinidad and o>ago: Fr. B>ama told the assem>led leaders o2 Lene5.ela: Haiti: 6renada: -".ador:
&olom>ia: &hile: 4.riname and others) =D pledge to yo. that #e seek an eC.al partnership. here is no senior partner
and O.nior partner in o.r relations.@ hen: d.ring his 2irst address to the ;nited Nations: Fr. B>ama s"orned (meri"an po#er and
e?"eptionalism: saying: =No #orld order that ele<ates one nation or gro.p o2 people o<er another #ill s.""eed. No
>alan"e o2 po#er among nations #ill hold.@ D.ring his <isit to &hina in Noer 2%%0: Fr. B>ama spoke o2 the need 2or (meri"a to sho#
=modesty@ and =h.mility@ on the #orld stage. +.t it #as the presidents spee"h to the nation last #eek that "on2irmed his .n-(meri"an <ie# o2
(meri"an po#er: leading e<en the traditionally 2riendly Washington1ost to #rite: =1resident B>amas (2ghanistan spee"h "on2irms
(meri"as de"line:@ heralding that =the (meri"an &ent.ry O.st ended 9andA 1resident B>ama said that 9(meri"anA
po#er had rea"hed its limit.@ Ds it any #onder #hy some people: like Fr. 6ates and a gro#ing n.m>er o2 (meri"an "iti5ens: think that Fr. B>ama is
either standing idly >y #hile (meri"an po#er #anes - or #orse - that his administration is a"t.ally speeding the demise o2 the on"e-great
s.perpo#er: (meri"aJ
US "!,!(on/ %!cl*n*n, no#
Pape 09- rofessor of olitical Science at the University of Chicago !*o"ert +. ape, #,mpire -alls', http%((nationalinterest.org(article(empire-falls-
./0.&page12) N
+$,*IC+ IS in unprecedented decline. The self-inflicted wounds of the Ira3 4ar, growing government de"t,
increasingly negative current-account "alances and other internal economic wea5nesses have cost the United
States real power in today6s world of rapidly spreading 5nowledge and technology. If present trends continue, we will loo5 "ac5
at the 7ush administration years as the death 5nell for +merican hegemony. Since the cold war, the United States has
maintained a vast array of overseas commitments, see5ing to ensure peace and sta"ility not 8ust in its own neigh"orhood-the +mericas-"ut also in
,urope and +sia, along with the oil-rich ersian 9ulf !as well as other parts of the world). Simply maintaining these commitments re3uires enormous
resources, "ut in recent years +merican leaders have pursued far more am"itious goals than merely maintaining the status 3uo. The 7ush administration
has not 8ust continued +merica6s traditional grand strategy, "ut pursued am"itious o"8ectives in all three ma8or regions at the same time-waging wars in
Ira3 and +fghanistan, see5ing to denucleari:e North ;orea and e<panding +merica6s military allies in ,urope up to the "orders of *ussia itself.
Ot"!$ &o#!$s #*ll !n% US H!,!(on/ soon -- 4o+nt!$ 'alanc*n,: o!$ !;t!ns*on: an% !cono(*c
const$a*nts<
&hristopher Layne 26 K(sso"iate 1ro2essor at the +.sh 4"hool o2 6o<ernment and 1.>li" 4er<i"e: e?as (PF ;ni<ersityK&hristopher: =he 1ea"e o2 Dll.sions@ 14%-
142M V1hillipsW
Dn retrospe"t: it is not surprising that the second-tier major powers chose to avoid confronting the United States head
on while it was at the zenith of its power, but this doesnt mean that great power politics has been banished
permanently from the international system. -<en the most ro>.st .nipolar optimists admit that e<ent.ally peer
"ompetitors #ill emerge and that their "o.nter>alan"ing strategies #ill s.""eed in o22setting ;.4. hegemony.
Similarly, it is not surprising that, in the short term, the se"ond-tier maOor po#ers have chosen to pursue
mixed strategies of cooperation with and competition against the United States. This does not imply that they are
reconciled to continuing U.S. hegemony, however. ather, they have chosen to lie low and reap the >ene2its o2
2ree-riding on Americas military and economic coattails #hile sim.ltaneo.sly engaging in other !nonhard and semi-hard"
2orms o2 >alan"ing .ntil the time is ripe to "hallenge ;.4. hegemony more dire"tly. Viewed properly, the real
debate about the future of #merican hegemony has been miscast. The issue is not whether other states can, or
will, balance against U.S. hegemony. They are, and have been since the cold wars end. Similarly, the issue is not
whether #merican "!,!(on/ #*ll !n% < Even unipolar optimists and agnostics admit that someday it will end. he !ey
"uestion is when it will end. #n this point, the unipolar pessimism of the balance$of$power theorists is not misplaced. here
are good reasons to >elie<e that the .nipolar era #ill end #ithin the ne?t de"ade or t#o. Dndeed: the 2o.ndation o2 ;.4. hegemony already are
eroding d.e to the intera"tion o2 e?ternal and internal 2a"tors . First: .nipolar optimism not#ithstanding: the
distri>.tion o2 po#er in the international system #ill shi2t as ne# great po#ers Kor =peer "ompetitors@M emerge
to "hallenge the ;nited 4tates . Second, >y s."".m>ing to the =hegemons temptation:@ the ;nited 4tates #ill
>e"ome in"reasingly o<ere?tended a>road. hird: 2is"al and e"onomi" "onstraints in"reasingly #ill impinge on
Washingtons a>ility to maintain edge de"lines: other maOor states #ill >e em>oldened to engage in hard
>alan"ing against the ;nited 4tates
Other countries are competing for Global Hegemony. China and Japan are interested in
dominating East sia!"outh #orea could get caught in the middle.
Ka,an 2=- 4enior (sso"iate at the &arnegie -ndo#ment 2or Dnternational 1ea"e and the a.thor o2 he 'et.rn
o2 History and the -nd o2 Dreams. K'o>ert /agan: =-nd o2 Dreams: 'et.rn o2 History@:
http%((www.realclearpolitics.com(articles(.==>(=>(end?of?dreams?return?of?histor.htmlM N1
If the world is mar5ed "y the persistence of unipolarity, it is nevertheless also "eing shaped "y the reemergence
of competitive national am"itions of the 5ind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold 4ar, this historical
tendency of great powers to 8ostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed "y the two
superpowers and their rigid "ipolar order. Since the end of the Cold 4ar, the United States has not "een powerful enough,
and pro"a"ly could never "e powerful enough, to suppress "y itself the normal am"itions of nations. This does
not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with
the superpower for glo"al influence. Nevertheless, several large powers are now competing for regional
predominance, "oth with the United States and with each other. National am"ition drives China6s foreign
policy today, and although it is tempered "y prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as possi"le to the
rest of the world, the Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its traditional position
as the preeminent power in ,ast +sia. They do not share a ,uropean, postmodern view that power is pass@A hence their now two-decades-long military
"uildup and moderni:ation. Bi5e the +mericans, they "elieve power, including military power, is a good thing to have
and that it is "etter to have more of it than less. erhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared "y
+mericans, that status and honor, and not 8ust wealth and security, are important for a nation. Capan, meanwhile, which in the past
could have "een counted as an aspiring postmodern power -- with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending -- now appears em"ar5ed
on a more traditional national course. artly this is in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns a"out
North ;orea 6s nuclear weapons. 7ut it is also driven "y Capan6s own national am"ition to "e a leader in ,ast
+sia or at least not to play second fiddle or Dlittle "rotherD to China. China and Capan are now in a competitive
3uest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other 6s rise to predominance,
and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their
competition is such that a nation li5e South ;orea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn "etween the two
powers, is once again worrying "oth a"out a Dgreater ChinaD and a"out the return of Capanese nationalism. +s
+aron -ried"erg commented, the ,ast +sian future loo5s more li5e ,urope6s past than its present. 7ut it also loo5s li5e +sia6s past.
US #*ll %!cl*n! soon ) "a! to act to (a*nta*n "!,!(on/
$$C %e&s 0'- 7ritish 7roadcasting Corporation News !77C News, #US 9lo"al Dominance Eset to waneF, http%((news.""c.co.u5(.(hi(>>G2=G/.stm)
N
The National Intelligence Council !NIC) predicts China, India and *ussia will increasingly challenge US influence. It also says
the dollar may no longer "e the world6s ma8or currency, and food and water shortages will fuel conflict.
However, the report concedes that these outcomes are not inevita"le and will depend on the actions of world leaders. It will
ma5e som"re reading for resident-elect 7arac5 I"ama, the 77C6s Conathan 7eale in 4ashington says, as it paints a "lea5 picture of the future of US
influence and power. DThe ne<t .= years of transition to a new system are fraught with ris5s,D says 9lo"al Trends .=.0, the
latest of the reports that the NIC prepares every four years in time for the ne<t presidential term. 4ashington will retain its considera"le military
advantages, "ut scientific and technological advancesA the use of Dirregular warfare tacticsDA the proliferation of long-range precision weaponsA and the
growing use of cy"er warfare Dincreasingly will constrict US freedom of actionD, it adds. Nevertheless, the report concludes% DThe US will remain
the single most important actor "ut will "e less dominant. DNuclear weapons use' The NIC6s .==G study painted a rosier picture of
+merica6s glo"al position, with US dominance e<pected to continue. 7ut the latest 9lo"al Trends report says that rising economies such as
China, India, *ussia and 7ra:il will offer the US more competition at the top of a multi-polar international The ,U is meanwhile
predicted to "ecome a Dho""led giantD, una"le to turn its economic power into diplomatic or military muscle. + world with more power
centres will "e less sta"le than one with one or two superpowers, it says, offering more potential for conflict.
9lo"al warming, along with rising populations and economic growth will put additional strains on natural
resources, it warns, fuelling conflict around the glo"e as countries compete for them.DStrategic rivalries are
most li5ely to revolve around trade, investments and technological innovation and ac3uisition, "ut we cannot rule out
a 2/th Century-li5e scenario of arms races, territorial e<pansion and military rivalries,D the report says. DTypes of conflict we have not seen for a while -
such as over resources - could re-emerge.D Such conflicts and resource shortages could lead to the collapse of governments in +frica and South +sia, and
the rise of organised crime in ,astern and Central ,urope, it adds. +nd the use of nuclear weapons will grow increasingly li5ely, the report says, as Drogue
statesD and militant groups gain greater access to them. 7ut al-Jaeda could decay Dsooner than people thin5D, it adds, citing the group6s growing
unpopularity in the $uslim world. DThe prospect that al-Jaeda will "e among the small num"er of groups a"le to transcend the generational timeline is
not high, given its harsh ideology, unachieva"le strategic o"8ectives and ina"ility to "ecome a mass movement,D it says. The NIC does, however, give
some scope for leaders to ta5e action to prevent the emergence of new conflicts. DIt is not "eyond the mind of human "eings, or political systems, KorL in
some cases KtheL wor5ing of mar5et mechanisms to address and alleviate if not solve these pro"lems,D said Thomas -ingar, chairman of the NIC. +nd,
our correspondent adds, it is worth noting that US intelligence has "een wrong "efore.
HEG HIGH NOW
US *s '!st s+*t!% to (!!t n!# c"all!n,!s
M!a% .. 9Walter '.ssell: 1ro2essor o2 Foreign (22airs and H.manities at +ard &ollege and -ditor-at-Large
o2 The American Interest maga5ine: 2ormer 4enior Fello# 2or ;4 2oreign poli"y at the &o.n"il on Foreign
'elations: =he F.t.re 4till +elongs to (meri"a:@ 7-2:
http)33online.#sO."om3arti"le34+1%%%1424%!27%23%44!%$%4!7$4107%%2%311%1*%.htmlJ
modXgooglene#sT#sOA
Dt is: the p.ndits keep telling .s: a time o2 (meri"an de"line: o2 a post-(meri"an #orld. he 21st "ent.ry #ill >elong to someone else.
&rippled >y de>t at home: hammered >y the a2termath o2 a 2inan"ial "risis: >loodied >y long #ars in the Fiddle -ast: the (meri"an (tlas "an no longer hold .p the sky.
Like +ritain >e2ore .s: (meri"a is headed into an assisted-li<ing 2a"ility 2or retired glo>al po#ers. his 2ashiona>le "hatter "o.ld not >e more #rong. 4.re:
(meri"a has >ig pro>lems. rillions o2 dollars in national de>t and .n"o.nted trillions more in o22-the->ooks lia>ilities #ill gi<e anyone pa.se. 'ising
po#ers are also "hallenging the international order e<en as o.r key &old War allies sink deeper into de"line. +.t #hat is .niC.e a>o.t the ;nited
4tates is not o.r pro>lems. -<ery maOor "o.ntry in the #orld today 2a"es e?traordinary "hallengesGand the 21st
"ent.ry #ill thro# more at .s. Set looking to#ard the t.m.lt.o.s "ent.ry ahead: no "o.ntry is >etter positioned to take
ad<antage o2 the opport.nities or manage the dangers than the ;nited 4tates. 6eopoliti"ally: the doomsayers tell .s: &hina #ill soon
"hallenge (meri"an leadership thro.gho.t the #orld. 1erhaps. +.t to 2o".s e?"l.si<ely on &hina is to miss ho# ;.4. interests
interse"t #ith (sian realities in #ays that "ement rather than "hallenge the ;.4. position in #orld a22airs. &hina
is not 6ermany: the ;.4. is not 6reat +ritain: and 2%11 is not 101%. Dn 101% 6ermany #as a rising po#er s.rro.nded >y de"line)
Fran"e: '.ssia: the Bttoman -mpire and (.stria-H.ngary #ere all gro#ing #eaker e<ery year e<en as 6ermany #ent 2rom strength to strength. he -.ropean po#er
system gre# less sta>le e<ery year. Dn (sia today &hina is risingG>.t so is Dndia: another emerging n."lear s.perpo#er
#ith a pop.lation on "o.rse to pass &hinas. Lietnam: 4o.th /orea: ai#an: Dndonesia and (.stralia are all
rant: gro#ing po#ers that ha<e no intention o2 2alling .nder &hinas s#ay. 8apan remains a 2ormida>le
presen"e. ;nlike -.rope in 101%: (sia today looks like an emerging m.ltipolar region that no single "o.ntry: ho#e<er large and
dynami": "an hope to "ontrol. his 2its (meri"an interests pre"isely. he ;.4. has no interest in "ontrolling (sia or in >lo"king
e"onomi" prosperity that #ill >ene2it the entire 1a"i2i" >asin: in"l.ding o.r part o2 it. ;.4. poli"y in (sia is not 2ighting the tide o2 &hinas ine?ora>le rise. 'ather: o.r
interests harmoni5e #ith the nat.ral "o.rse o2 e<ents. Li2e rarely mo<es smoothly and it is likely that (sia #ill see great politi"al dist.r>an"es. +.t thro.gh it all: it
appears that the ;.4. #ill >e s#imming #ith: rather than against: the tides o2 history. (ro.nd the #orld #e ha<e
no other real ri<als. -<en the -.ropeans ha<e stopped talking a>o.t a rising -; s.perpo#er. he spe"ter o2 a
"lash o2 "i<ili5ations >et#een the West and an Dslami" #orld .nited >ehind 2anati"s like the .nlamented Bsama >in Laden is less
likely than e<er. '.ssias demographi" de"line and poor e"onomi" prospe"ts Knot to mention its "on"erns a>o.t Dslami" radi"alism
and a rising &hinaM make it a poor prospe"t as a ri<al s.perpo#er. When it "omes to the #orld o2 ideas: the (meri"an
agenda #ill also >e the glo>al agenda in the 21st "ent.ry. Ninety years a2ter the 2ormation o2 the &omm.nist 1arty o2 &hina: !% years a2ter
the death o2 the philosopher o2 modern militant Dslam 4ayyid H.t>: li>eral "apitalist demo"ra"y remains the #a<e o2 the 2.t.re. Fas"ism: like Fran"o: is still dead.
&omm.nism lingers on li2e s.pport in 1yongyang and a hand2.l o2 other redo.>ts >.t sho#s no signs o2 regaining the po#er it has
lost sin"e 10*0 and the 4o<iet "ollapse. =Dslami"@ 2anati"ism 2ailed in DraC: "an only "ling to po#er >y tort.re and repression
in Dran: and has >een marginali5ed Kso 2arM in the (ra> 4pring. No#here ha<e the 2anati"s >een a>le to demonstrate that their approa"h
"an prote"t the dignity and enhan"e the prosperity o2 people >etter than li>eral "apitalism. he heirs o2 H.t> are 2.rther 2rom po#er than they #ere d.ring the 2irst
-gyptian 'e<ol.tion in 10!3. &loser to home: H.go &ha<e5 and his (?is o2 (nkle>iters are des"ending to#ards 2ar"e. he
e"onomi" s.""ess o2 &hile and +ra5il ".ts the gro.nd o.t 2rom .nder the =+oli<arean@ caudillos. hey may str.t and pran"e on the stage: appear #ith Fidel on L
and dra# a "ro#d >y atta"king the SanC.is: >.t the dream o2 .niting 4o.th (meri"a into a great anti"apitalist: anti-;.4. >lo" is
as dead as &he 6.e<ara. 4o the geopoliti"s are 2a<ora>le and the ideologi"al "limate is #arming. +.t on a still-
deeper le<el this is shaping .p to >e an e<en more (meri"an "ent.ry than the last. he glo>al game is mo<ing
to#ards (meri"as home "o.rt.
US *s st*ll t"! l!a%!$ ) "as a%anta,!s *n all %o(a*ns
Rac"(an .. (Gideon is chief foreign-affairs commentator for the Financial Times and author of Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an
Age of Anxiety. He joined the FT after a 15-year career at The Economist, which included spells as a forein correspondent in !russels, "ashinton
and !an#o#. He also edited The Economist$s %usiness and &sia sections. His particular interests include &merican forein policy, the European 'nion
and lo%ali(ation. http)33###.2oreignpoli"y."om3arti"les32%113%13%23thinkTagainTameri"anTde"lineJpageX%:2M
Q(meri"a 4till Leads ("ross the +oard.Q For no#. (s things stand: (meri"a has the #orldRs largest e"onomy: the #orldRs
leading .ni<ersities: and many o2 its >iggest "ompanies. he ;.4. military is also in"ompara>ly more po#er2.l
than any ri<al. he ;nited 4tates spends almost as m."h on its military as the rest o2 the #orld p.t together. (nd
letRs also add in (meri"aRs intangi>le assets. he "o.ntryRs "om>ination o2 entreprene.rial 2lair and te"hnologi"al pro#ess has
allo#ed it to lead the te"hnologi"al re<ol.tion. alented immigrants still 2lo"k to ;.4. shores. (nd no# that
+ara"k B>ama is in the White Ho.se: the "o.ntryRs so2t po#er has re"ei<ed a >ig >oost. For all his tro.>les:
polls sho# B>ama is still the most "harismati" leader in the #orldN H. 8intao doesnRt e<en "ome "lose. (meri"a
also >oasts the glo>al all.re o2 its "reati<e ind.stries KHolly#ood and all thatM: its <al.es: the in"reasing
.ni<ersality o2 the -nglish lang.age: and the attra"ti<eness o2 the (meri"an Dream.
All*anc!s a,a*nst U<S< H!, a$! +nl*0!l/
Y! 29 - Dire"tor o2 the -ast (sian 4t.dies 1rogram P (ssistant 1ro2essor o2 Dnternational 'elations at +oston ;ni<ersity 9Fin Se: =he ;.4. Hegemony and
Dmpli"ation 2or &hina@ pages 23-31: http)33"hinaipa.org3"paC3<1i131aperTSe.pd2 33alisa yangA
-irst, from the aggregate power perspective, the U.S is simply too powerful for the other nations to catch up.
4illiam 4ohlforth has done a comprehensive empirical study of U.S power, and concluded that U.S has
enormous supremacy in all aspects of military power and almost all aspects of economic power as well, not to
mention its normative and cultural powers. He also pointed out the U.S is a #"enign hegemon' and it is in the
worldFs "enefit for its presence. Similarly, Coanne 9owa o"served that allies of the U.S "enefited from trading with the U.S, hence it is in the
nationsF interest to have an enduring U.S hegemony.
Second, alliance against the U.S is unli5ely and ineffective. Stephen 4alt has listed the causes for alliance formation. +lliances
form not to "alance the "iggest power "ut to "alance against the "iggest threat. Threat, in turn, is determined "y !2)
aggregate power, !.) geographic pro<imity, !M) offensive power, and !G) aggressive intention. The U.S is distant from all ma8or powers
geographically, although the most powerful nation in the world. Clearly the U.S does not demonstrate
aggressive intentions against other ma8or powers. Hence their "alancing against the U.S is unli5ely.
HEG DEAD NOW
H!,!(on/ *s t!$(*nall/ +ns+sta*na'l! ) (+lt*&l! &$o'l!(s
G+!ss 29- La# st.dent at ;& Hastings. Holds degrees in e"onomi"s and an"ient #orld history degrees 2rom
;& +erkeley K4te<en 6.ess: =he -nd o2 -mpire@: http)**www.uardian.co.u#*commentisfree*cifamerica*+,,-*jan*1-*%arac#-o%ama-
rome-empireM N1
+y <irt.e o2 its e"onomi" and military po#er: as #ell as a politi"al system e?tolled 2or its s.periority to all other systems: (meri"a has >een the leader o2 the 2ree #orld
2or the last $% years. +.t 2rom &hinaRs rapidly rising stat.s as a glo>al player: to '.ssiaRs sho# o2 2or"e in 6eorgia: to
rising tensions in 4o.th (sia and the Fiddle -ast: (meri"a is 2a"ing a #ide array o2 in"reasingly tro.>ling
threats: #hile str.ggling internally to re"o<er 2rom an e"onomi" "ollapse not seen sin"e the 6reat Depression.
(meri"an s.prema"y in a post-"old #ar en<ironment seems o.tmat"hed >y a progressi<ely more .nsta>le
#orld. Like 'ome: (meri"a has spread itsel2 too thin and is .na>le to respond to ne# threats as they emerge
#ith either a "on<in"ing sho# o2 military 2or"e or a skilled .se o2 so2t po#er to le<erage its "redi>ility in the
#orld. While the dangers #e 2a"e #ere on"e di<erse and s"attered: the DraC #ar p.shed many o2 o.r enemies to
see .s as a "ommon threat #here religio.s di22eren"es #o.ld ha<e other#ise made "ooperation impossi>le.
Foreo<er: in "ollapsing the +aRathist regime o2 4addam H.ssein: (meri"a has pa<ed the #ay 2or an e<en less
palata>le Dranian dominan"e in the region. While the "omparison to an"ient 'ome is imper2e"t: there are nonetheless parallels #orth "onsidering.
(meri"a today 2a"es the same dilemma o2 the eastern 'oman empire) sho.ld it attempt to regain its lost glo>al s.prema"y or 2orti2y and adapt to the ne# #orldJ Will
#e 2ollo# LirgilRs 2amo.s line 2rom the (eneid: Q'ome: Rt is thine alone: #ith a#2.l s#ay: o r.le mankind: and make the #orld o>ey:Q or preser<e o.r strength and
"reate a 2rame#ork 2or glo>al "ooperation in #hi"h (meri"a a"ts as a mediator and responsi>le a"tor rather than instigator.
Un*&ola$*t/ *s +ns+sta*na'l! an% not !11!ct*!<
Haass (0- -ormer Director of policy planning at the US State Department. 1resident o2 the &o.n"il on Foreign 'elations K'i"hard N. Haass: =(n
B<ere?tended ;nited 4tates ;rgently Needs 1artners@:http%((www.dailystar.com.l"(Ipinion(Commentary($ay(.>(+n-over-e<tended-United-States-
urgently-needs-partners.ash<Na<::2*vOPUow3M N1

4e are in a protracted period of international transition, one that "egan more than two decades ago with the end of the Cold 4ar.
That era of strategic rivalry "etween the United States and the Soviet Union gave way to one in which 4ashington possessed far greater power than any
other country in the world and en8oyed an unprecedented degree of influence.That +merican unipolar moment has given way to a
world that can "e "etter descri"ed as non-polar, in which power is widely distri"uted among nearly .== states
and tens of thousands of non-state actors ranging from +l-Jaeda to +l-Ca:eera, and from 9oldman Sachs to the United Nations. 7ut what
distinguishes historical eras from one another is less the distri"ution of power than the degree of order "etween states and within states. Irder never
8ust emergesA it is the result of conscious efforts "y the most powerful entities in the world. 4hile the United
States remains the worldFs most powerful single country, it cannot maintain, much less e<pand, international
peace and prosperity on its own. It is over-e<tended, dependent upon massive daily imports of dollars and oil,
and its armed forces are engaged in demanding conflicts in "oth +fghanistan and Ira3. The US also lac5s the
means and the political consensus to ta5e on much more in the way of glo"al responsi"ility. It also lac5s the
means to compel other countries to follow its lead. $oreover, contemporary pro"lems Q for e<ample, thwarting the
spread of materials and weapons of mass destruction, maintaining an open world economy, slowing climate
change, and com"ating terrorism Q cannot "e managed, much less solved, "y any single country. Inly
collective efforts can meet common challengesA the more glo"al the response, the more li5ely that it will succeed. In short, the
UnitedStates re3uires partners if the .2st century is to "e an era in which the ma8ority of people around the world
en8oy relative peace and satisfactory standards of living. 7ut the partnerships that prevailed during the Cold
4ar Q "etween the US, 4estern ,urope, and several +sian countries, including Capan, South ;orea, and +ustralia Q are no longer ade3uate.
These countries lac5 the resources and often the will to manage most of the worldFs pro"lems. So the old
partners need new ones. ,merging powers have the potential to fill this need. The 3uestion is what such
powers, for e<ample China, India, 7ra:il, and others, are prepared to do with their growing strength.
M+lt*&ola$*t/ *n!*ta'l! - #*ll 0*c0 *n '/ 8282<
Layne 26 (sso"iate 1ro2essor at the +.sh 4"hool o2 6o<ernment and 1.>li" 4er<i"e: e?as (PF ;ni<ersity
K&hristopher: =he 1ea"e o2 Dll.sions@ 140-1!%M
(ltho.gh >alan"e-o2-po#er theorists #ere o22 #ith respe"t to the timing: no#: e<en i2 some#hat >elatedly: ne# great po#ers indeed are emerging:
and the .nipolar eras days are n.m>ered. Dn its s.r<ey o2 likely international de<elopments .p .ntil 2%2%: the
National Dntelligen"e &o.n"ils report: Fapping the 6lo>al F.t.re: notes) he likely emergen"y o2 &hina and
Dndia as ne# maOor glo>al players , similar to the rise o2 6ermany in the 10th "ent.ry and the ;nited 4tates in the early 2%th "ent.ry , #ill
trans2orm the geopoliti"al lands"ape: #ith impa"ts potentially as dramati" as those o2 pre<io.s t#o "ent.ries. Dn
the same #ay that "ommentators re2er to the 10%%s as the (meri"an &ent.ry: the early 21st "ent.ry may >e seen as the time #hen some in the de<eloping #orld led >y
&hina and Dndia "ame into their o#n. Dn a similar <ein: a st.dy >y the 4trategi" (ssessment 6ro.p "on"l.des that already >oth &hina K#hi"h: a""ording to Fapping the
6lo>al F.t.re: >y aro.nd 2%2%: #ill >e =>y any meas.re a 2irst rate military po#er@M and the -.ropean ;nion Kea"h #ith a 14 per"ent shareM are approa"hing the ;nited
4tates K2% per"entM in their respe"ti<e shares o2 #orld po#er. (ltho.gh the same st.dy predi"ts the -;s shares o2 #orld po#er #ill de"rease some#hat >et#een no#
and 2%2%: &hina and Dndia are proOe"ted to post signi2i"ant gains. Dn other #ords: the international system today already is on the ".sp o2
m.ltipolarity and is likely to >e"ome 2.lly m.ltipolar >et#een no# and 2%2%. Dt is .ns.rprising that: as >alan"e-o2-po#er theory
predi"ts: ne# great po#ers are rising. he potential 2or s.""ess2.l "o.nterhegemoni" >alan"ing al#ays e?ists in a .nipolar
system: >e"a.se hegemony is not the eC.i<alent o2 #hat .sed to >e "alled =.ni<ersal empire.@ ( .nipolar system still is
made .p o2 so<ereign states: and e<en i2 none o2 them ha<e the short-term "apa"ity to "o.nter>alan"e the hegemon: in<aria>ly some o2 these states , #hi"h D term
=eligi>le states , ha<e the potential to do so. Di22erential e"onomi" gro#th rates determine #hi"h a"tors in the international system are eligi>le states. he distri>.tion
o2 po#er in the international system is ne<er stati": >e"a.se some states are gaining relati<e po#er #hile others are losing it. ( hegemons grip on preponderan"e >egins
to loosen #hen the relati<e po#er gap >et#een itsel2 and some o2 the other starts narro#ing appre"ia>ly. When that gap "loses eno.gh: an in2le"tion point is rea"hed
#here the hegemons hard-po#er "apa>ilities no longer are an e22e"ti<e entry >arrier to others emergen"e as peer "ompetitors. (s 6ilpin p.ts it: =he "riti"al
signi2i"an"e o2 the di22erential gro#th o2 po#er among states is that it alters the "ost o2 "hanging the international system and there2ore the in"enti<es 2or "hanging the
international system.@ he redistri>.tion o2 po#er in the international system "a.sed >y di22erential gro#th rates
in<aria>ly has important geopoliti"al "onseC.en"es) time and again relati<e =e"onomi" shi2ts heralded the rise
o2 ne# 6reat 1o#ers #hi"h one day #o.ld ha<e a de"isi<e impa"t on the military3territorial order.@ Dn a
.nipolar #orld: eligi>le states ha<e real in"enti<es to trans2orm their latent "apa>ilities into a"t.al hard po#er.
6i<en the anar"hi" nat.re o2 the international politi"al system: eligi>le states "an gain se".rity only >y >.ilding
themsel<es into "o.nter#eights to the hegemons po#er. Dn this sense: .nipolar systems "ontain the seeds o2
their o#n demise: >e"a.se the hegemons .n"he"ked po#er: in itsel2: stim.lates eligi>le states: in sel2-de2ense:
to emerge as great po#ers. he emergen"e o2 ne# great po#ers erodes the hegemons relati<e po#er: .ltimately ending its dominan"e. h.s: 2rom the
standpoint o2 >alan"e-o2-po#er theory: =.nipolarity appears as the least sta>le o2 international organi5ations.@ he t#o prior .nipolar moments in international history ,
Fran"e .nder Lo.is YDL and mid-Li"torian +ritain- s.ggest that hegemony prompts the near-sim.ltaneo.s emergen"e o2 se<eral ne# great po#ers and the "onseC.ent
trans2ormation o2 the international system 2rom .nipolarity to m.ltipolarity.
So1t 'alanc*n, %!st$o/s US "!,: an% o11s!ts +n*lat!$al*s( ) "!, %!cl*n! *n!*ta'l!
&hristopher Layne 26 K(sso"iate 1ro2essor at the +.sh 4"hool o2 6o<ernment and 1.>li" 4er<i"e: e?as (PF ;ni<ersityK&hristopher: =he 1ea"e o2 Dll.sions@ 144-
14!MV1hillipsW
4o2t >alan"ing is a "on"ession to the disparity in military po#er >et#een the ;nited 4tates and other maOor
states in todayRs international system .4* 4o2t >alan"ing relies on diploma"yG"ond."ted thro.gh ad ho"
"oalitions or thro.gh international instit.tionsGand: rather than "hallenging ;.4. hegemony dire"tly: it seeks to
"onstrain the ;nited 4tates and limit WashingtonRs a>ility to impose its poli"y pre2eren"es on others . he key
idea .nderlying so2t >alan"ing is that >y "oordinating their diploma"y and lending one another m.t.al s.pport:
so2t >alan"ers "an gain o.t"omes <is-a-<is the ;nited 4tates that they "o.ld not o>tain >y a"ting separately. o
date: so2t >alan"ing has taken t#o 2orms. First: the se"ond-tier maOor po#ers ha<e "ooperatedGeither thro.gh in2ormal ententes
or >y "reating organi5ational str."t.resGto rein in (meri"aRs e?er"ise o2 hegemoni" po#er. -?amples in"l.de periodi"
s.mmit meetings K4ino-'.ssian: Fran"o-'.ssian: 4ine-Dndian-'.ssianM that pledge "ooperation to restore m.ltipolarity: and the 4hanghai
&ooperation &o.n"il: "reated >y Fos"o# and +eiOing to "oordinate e22orts to resist the intr.sion o2 ;.4. po#er into &entral
(sia.40 he se"ond-tier maOor po#ers also engage in Q>indingQ strategies that seek to enmesh the ;nited 4tates in international
instit.tions: to ens.re that it is restrained >y international la# and norms o2 permissi>le great po#er >eha<ior.
Ho#e<er: as the "om>ined e22orts o2 Fran"e: 6ermany: and '.ssia to .se the ;nited Nations to pre<ent the Far"h 2%%3 ;.4. in<asion o2 DraC demonstrate: >inding is an
ine22e"ti<e means o2 "onstraining ;.4. hegemony Kaltho.gh perhaps marginally more s.""ess2.l as a means o2 delegitimi5ing ;.4. .nilateral
a"tionsM. his does not mean: ho#e<er: that so2t >alan"ing is .nimportant. (2ter all: grand strategy is a>o.t .tili5ing the key instr.ments o2 a
stateRs po#erGmilitary: e"onomi" : and diplomati"Gto ad<an"e its interests and to gain se".rity . Diploma"y in<aria>ly
is an integral "omponent o2 "o.nter>alan"ing strategies. h.s: so2t >alan"ingRs real signi2i"an"e is that: i2 states
learn that they "an #ork together diplomati"ally in standing .p to the ;nited 4tates: the gro.nd#ork may >elaid
2or 2.t.re "oalitions that #ill he a>le to engage e22e"ti<ely in hard >alan"ing: or semi-hard >alan"ing: against the
;nited 4tates.
H!, *s +ns+sta*na'l! ) t"! %olla$ *s %!cl*n*n, an% co((*t(!nts !ns+$! 1*scal o!$st$!tc"
&hristopher Layne 26 K(sso"iate 1ro2essor at the +.sh 4"hool o2 6o<ernment and 1.>li" 4er<i"e: e?as (PF ;ni<ersityK&hristopher: =he 1ea"e o2 Dll.sions@ 1!4-
1!!MV1hillipsW
he e"onomi" <.lnera>ilities that /ennedy pinpointed did not disappear: ho#e<er. Bn"e again: the ;nited 4tates is r.nning endless 2ederal >.dget de2i"its and the trade
de2i"it has gro#n #orse and #orse. Dn "ontrast to the late 10*%s K#hen 8apan #as the pro>lemM: today (meri"as >iggest >ilateral trade de2i"it is #ith &hina KE1$2
>illion in 2%%4 a""ording to ;.4. go<ernment 2ig.res , more than t#i"e as m."h as the se"ond >iggest >ilateral trade de2i"it: E7! >illion #ith 8apanM. Foreo<er:
&hina also has emerged as a maOor ;.4. "reditor. (""ording to the reas.ry Department: it no# is the n.m>er-t#o in<estor in ;.4. reas.ry
>ills KE242 >illion: "ompared #ith 8apans E$*3 >illionM. he ;nited 4tates still depends on "apital in2lo#s 2rom a>road , to
2inan"e its de2i"it spending: to 2inan"e pri<ate "ons.mption: and to maintain the dollars position as the
international e"onomi" systems reser<e ".rren"y. +e"a.se o2 the t#in de2i"its: the .nderlying 2.ndamentals o2
the ;.4. e"onomy are o.t o2 alignment. he ;nited 4tates "annot li<e >eyond its means inde2initely. 4ooner or
later: the >ill #ill "ome d.e in the 2orm o2 higher ta?es and higher interest rates. (nd: as the ;nited 4tates
>orro#s more and more to 2inan"e its >.dget and trade de2i"its: pri<ate in<estment is likely to >e "ro#ded o.t o2
the marketpla"e: #ith predi"ta>le e22e"ts on the e"onomys long-term health. Dn a #ord Kor t#oM: the ;nited
4tates is s.22ering 2rom =2is"al o<erstret"h@M. -"onomi"ally: the ;nited 4tates is looking at the same pro>lems in the early t#enty-2irst "ent.ry that
it 2a"ed in the 10*%s Kand #hi"h had >een >.ilding sin"e the early 10$%sM. -?"ept this time the long-term prognosis is >leaker: >e"a.se there are t#o >ig di22eren"es
>et#een no# and then. First: d.ring the "old #ar: 8apan Kand: d.ring the 107%s: West 6ermanyM s.>sidi5ed ;.4. >.dget and trade de2i"its as a C.id pro C.o 2or ;.4.
se".rity g.arantees. Dt #ill >e interesting to see #hether an emerging geopoliti"al ri<al like &hina , or: 2or that matter:
the -.ropean ;nion , #ill >e as #illing to .nder#rite ;.4. hegemony in the "oming de"ades. 4e"ond: >ig "hanges on the
e"onomi" side o2 the ledger make (meri"as long-term e"onomi" prospe"ts pro>lemati". he #illingness o2 other states to "o<er (meri"as de>ts no longer "an >e
taken 2or granted. (lready: key "entral >anks are signaling their la"k o2 "on2iden"e in the dollar >y di<ersi2ying their ".rren"y holdings. here are r.m>lings: too: that
the Brgani5ation o2 1etrole.m -?porting &o.ntries KB1-&M may start pri"ing oil in e.ros: and that the dollar "o.ld >e s.pplanted >y the e.ro as the international
e"onomys reser<e ".rren"y. 4ho.ld this happen: the a>ility o2 the ;nited 4tates to s.stain its hegemony #o.ld >e Oeopardi5ed.
he domesti" e"onomi" pi"t.re is not so promising: either. he ann.al 2ederal >.dget de2i"its are O.st the tip o2
the i"e>erg. he deeper pro>lem is the 2ederal go<ernmentNs h.ge .n2.nded lia>ilities 2or entitlement programs
that #ill >egin to "ome d.e a>o.t a de"ade hen"e. Dn"reasingly: de2ense spending and entitlement e?pendit.res
are sC.ee5ing o.t dis"retionary spending on domesti" programs. 8.st do#n the road: the ;nited 4tates is 2a"ing
stark =#ar2are@ or =#el2are@ "hoi"es >et#een maintaining the o<er#helming military "apa>ilities on #hi"h its
hegemony rests or 2.nding dis"retionary spending on domesti" needs and 2.nding Fedi"are: Fedi"aid: and
4o"ial 4e".rity. D.ring the past 2i2teen years or so sin"e the 4o<iet ;nions "ollapse: the ;nited 4tates #as a>le to postpone the need to grapple #ith the pain2.l
iss.es 1a.l /ennedy raised in 10*7. Ho#e<er: the "hi"kens are "oming home to roost: and those C.estions soon #ill ha<e to >e 2a"ed. 6ilpins 10*7 des"ription o2
(meri"as grand strategi" and e"onomi" dilemmas is: i2 anything e<en more timely today) With a de"reased rate o2 e"onomi" gro#th and a lo# rate o2 national sa<ings:
the ;nited 4tates #as li<ing and de2ending "ommitments 2ar >eyond its means. Dn order to >ring is "ommitments and po#er >a"k into >alan"e on"e again: the ;nited
4tates #o.ld one day ha<e to ".t >a"k 2.rther on its o<erseas "ommitments: red."e the (meri"an standard o2 li<ing: or de"rease domesti" prod."ti<e in<estment e<en
more than it already had. Dn the meantime: (meri"an hegemony #as threatened >y a potentially de<astating 2is"al "risis. (t some point: the relati<e de"line o2 ;.4.
e"onomi" po#er hat is in the o22ing #ill >ring (meri"an hegemony to an end. Dn the shorter term: ho#e<er: the ;nited 4tates "an prolong its hegemony i2 (meri"ans
are #illing to pay the pri"e in terms o2 higher ta?es: red."ed "ons.mption: and the ".rtailing o2 domesti" programs. +.t there is a treadmill-like aspe"t
to preser<ing ;.4. hegemony: >e"a.se perpet.ating (meri"an dominan"e #ill hasten the #eakening o2 the
e"onomi" >ase on #hi"h it rests.
Non&ola$*t/ no#
Haass 25 K'i"hard is a 1resident o2 the &o.n"il on Foreign 'elations. +ottom o2 Form he (ge o2 Nonpolarity What Will Follo# ;.4. Dominan"e: Foreign
(22airs Fay38.neM
(t 2irst glan"e: the #orld today may appear to >e m.ltipolar. he maOor po#ers -- &hina: the -.ropean ;nion K-;M: Dndia: 8apan: '.ssia: and the ;nited 4tates --
"ontain O.st o<er hal2 the #orldRs people and a""o.nt 2or 7! per"ent o2 glo>al 6D1 and *% per"ent o2 glo>al de2ense spending. (ppearan"es: ho#e<er: "an >e de"ei<ing.
odayRs #orld di22ers in a 2.ndamental #ay 2rom one o2 "lassi" m.ltipolarity) there are many more po#er
"enters: and C.ite a 2e# o2 these poles are not nation-states. Dndeed: one o2 the "ardinal 2eat.res o2 the
"ontemporary international system is that nation-states ha<e lost their monopoly on po#er and in some domains
their preeminen"e as #ell. 4tates are >eing "hallenged 2rom a>o<e: >y regional and glo>al organi5ationsN 2rom
>elo#: >y militiasN and 2rom the side: >y a <ariety o2 nongo<ernmental organi5ations KN6BsM and "orporations.
1o#er is no# 2o.nd in many hands and in many pla"es. Dn addition to the si? maOor #orld po#ers: there are
n.mero.s regional po#ers) +ra5il and: arg.a>ly: (rgentina: &hile: Fe?i"o: and Lene5.ela in Latin (meri"aN
Nigeria and 4o.th (2ri"a in (2ri"aN -gypt: Dran: Dsrael: and 4a.di (ra>ia in the Fiddle -astN 1akistan in 4o.th
(siaN (.stralia: Dndonesia: and 4o.th /orea in -ast (sia and B"eania. ( good many organi5ations #o.ld >e on the list o2 po#er
"enters: in"l.ding those that are glo>al Kthe Dnternational Fonetary F.nd: the ;nited Nations: the World +ankM: those that are regional Kthe (2ri"an ;nion: the (ra>
Leag.e: the (sso"iation o2 4o.theast (sian Nations: the -;: the Brgani5ation o2 (meri"an 4tates: the 4o.th (sian (sso"iation 2or 'egional &ooperationM: and those
that are 2.n"tional Kthe Dnternational -nergy (gen"y: B1-&: the 4hanghai &ooperation Brgani5ation: the World Health Brgani5ationM. 4o: too: #o.ld states
#ithin nation-states: s."h as &ali2ornia and DndiaRs ;ttar 1radesh: and "ities: s."h as Ne# Sork: 4ao 1a.lo: and
4hanghai. hen there are the large glo>al "ompanies: in"l.ding those that dominate the #orlds o2 energy: 2inan"e: and man.2a"t.ring. Bther entities deser<ing
in"l.sion #o.ld >e glo>al media o.tlets Kal 8a5eera: the ++&: &NNM: militias KHamas: He5>ollah: the Fahdi (rmy: the ali>anM: politi"al parties: religio.s instit.tions
and mo<ements: terrorist organi5ations Kal HaedaM: dr.g "artels: and N6Bs o2 a more >enign sort Kthe +ill and Felinda 6ates Fo.ndation: Do"tors Witho.t +orders:
6reenpea"eM. odayRs #orld is in"reasingly one o2 distri>.ted: rather than "on"entrated: po#er
H!,!(on/ *s %!a%
Choms)y 0'- +merican linguist, philosopher,K.LKML cognitive scientist, and activist. He is an Institute rofessor and professor emeritus of linguistics
at $IT !Noam Choms5y, #US Hegemony will continue to Decline', ST4*, http%((www.stwr.org(united-states-of-america(us-hegemony-will-continue-
to-decline-says-choms5y.html) N
I thin5 that US hegemony will continue to decline as the world "ecomes more diverse. That process has "een
underway for a long time. US power pea5ed at the end of 4orld 4ar II, when it had literally half the world6s
wealth and incompara"le military power and security. 7y 2/>=, its share of glo"al wealth had declined "y a"out
half, and it has remained fairly sta"le since then. In some important respects, US domination has wea5ened. Ine
important illustration is Batin +merica, 4ashington6s traditional D"ac5yard.D -or the first time since ,uropean coloni:ation 0== years ago,
South +merica is ma5ing significant progress towards integration and independence, and is also esta"lishing South-South relations
independent of the US, specifically with China, "ut elsewhere as well. That is a serious matter for US planners. +s it was
discussing the transcendent importance of destroying Chilean democracy in 2/>2, Ni<on6s National Security Council warned that if the US cannot
control Batin +merica, it cannot e<pect Dto achieve a successful order elsewhere in the worldD -- that is, to control the
rest of the world. Controlling Batin +merica has "ecome far more difficult in recent years. It is important to recogni:e that these goals were e<plicitly and
clearly articulated during 4orld 4ar II. Studies of the State Department and Council on -oreign *elations developed plans, later
implemented, to esta"lish a D9rand +rea,D in which the US would Dhold un3uestioned power,D displacing 7ritain and
-rance and ensuring the Dlimitation of any e<ercise of sovereigntyD "y states that might interfere with its glo"al designs. lanners called for Dan
integrated policy to achieve military and economic supremacy for the United StatesD in the 9rand +rea, which was to include at least the 4estern
hemisphere, the former 7ritish ,mpire, and the -ar ,ast. +s the war progressed, and it "ecame clear that Soviet military power was crushing the Na:i
war machine, 9rand +rea planning was e<tended to include as much of ,urasia as possi"le. Since that time fundamental policies have changed more in
tactics than in su"stance. +nd there is little reason to e<pect any change of goals with a new US administration, though the possi"ilities of
reali:ing them are declining in a more comple< and diverse glo"al system. 4ith regard to the $iddle ,ast, policy has "een
3uite sta"le since 4orld 4ar II, when 4ashington recogni:ed that $iddle ,ast oil supplies are Da stupendous source of strategic
powerD and Done of the greatest material pri:es in world history.D That remains true. It is interesting that as the prete<ts for
invading Ira3 "ecome more difficult to sustain, mainstream commentary is "eginning to concede the o"vious reasons for the invasion, and the need for
the US to maintain control of Ira3, to the e<tent that it can. Thus when I"ama called for shifting the focus of US military
operations from Ira3 to +fghanistan, the 4ashington ost editors instructed him that he was ma5ing a serious mista5e,
since +fghanistan6s Dstrategic importance pales "eside that of Ira3, which lies at the geopolitical center of the
$iddle ,ast and contains some of the world6s largest oil reserves.D ropaganda a"out 4$D and democracy is fine to 5eep the
domestic pu"lic 3uiet, "ut realities must "e recogni:ed when serious planning is at sta5e. 7oth Democrats and *epu"licans accept the principle that the
US is an outlaw state, entitled to violate the UN Charter at will, whether "y threatening force against Iran !an e<plicit violation of the Charter) or "y
carrying out aggression !the Dsupreme international crime,D in the words of the Nurem"erg Tri"unal). They also accept the principle that the US not only
has the right to invade other countries if it chooses, "ut also to attac5 any country that it alleges is supporting resistance to its aggression. Here the guise
is Dthe war on terror.D $urderous attac5s "y US drones in a5istan are one illustration. The recent US cross-"order raid from Ira3, on Icto"er .O, on the
town of 7u5amal in Syria is another. The editors of the Be"anese Daily Star are 3uite right in warning that the attac5 on Syria is another contri"ution to
the Dloathsome legacyD of the 7ush II administration. 7ut it is not 8ust 7ush II, and there is, currently, no su"stantial "asis for e<pecting any significant
change under a new administration with regard to Ira3, Iran, +fghanistan, Israel-alestine, or any other crucial issue involving the $iddle ,ast.
4HINA RISE
4"*na *s c"all!n,*n, t"! US a$o+n% t"! #o$l%
Rac"(an .. KGideon is "hie2 2oreign-a22airs "ommentator 2or the Finan"ial imes and a.thor o2 Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age
of Anxiety. He Ooined the F a2ter a 1!-year "areer at he -"onomist: #hi"h in"l.ded spells as a 2oreign "orrespondent in +r.ssels: Washington and +angkok. He
also edited he -"onomists >.siness and (sia se"tions. His parti".lar interests in"l.de (meri"an 2oreign poli"y: the -.ropean ;nion and glo>ali5ation.
http)33###.2oreignpoli"y."om3arti"les32%113%13%23thinkTagainTameri"anTde"lineJpageX%:%M
&hinaRs e"onomi" pro#ess is already allo#ing +eiOing to "hallenge (meri"an in2l.en"e all o<er the #orld. he
&hinese are the pre2erred partners o2 many (2ri"an go<ernments and the >iggest trading partner o2 other
emerging po#ers: s."h as +ra5il and 4o.th (2ri"a. &hina is also stepping in to >.y the >onds o2 2inan"ially
strapped mem>ers o2 the e.ro5one: s."h as 6ree"e and 1ort.gal. (nd &hina is only the largest part o2 a >igger
story a>o.t the rise o2 ne# e"onomi" and politi"al players. (meri"aRs traditional allies in -.rope -- +ritain:
Fran"e: Dtaly: e<en 6ermany -- are slipping do#n the e"onomi" ranks. Ne# po#ers are on the rise) Dndia: +ra5il:
.rkey. hey ea"h ha<e their o#n 2oreign-poli"y pre2eren"es: #hi"h "olle"ti<ely "onstrain (meri"aRs a>ility to shape the #orld. hink o2 ho# Dndia and
+ra5il sided #ith &hina at the glo>al "limate-"hange talks. Br the <otes >y .rkey and +ra5il against (meri"a
at the ;nited Nations on san"tions against Dran. hat is O.st a taste o2 things to "ome.
Domesti" pro>lems are irrele<ant , &hina #ill "ontin.e to "hallenge the ;4
Set e<en i2 yo. 2a"tor in "onsidera>le 2.t.re e"onomi" and politi"al t.r>.len"e: it #o.ld >e a >ig mistake to ass.me that the &hinese
"hallenge to ;.4. po#er #ill simply disappear. Bn"e "o.ntries get the hang o2 e"onomi" gro#th: it takes a great
deal to thro# them o22 "o.rse. he analogy to the rise o2 6ermany 2rom the mid-10th "ent.ry on#ard is
instr."ti<e. 6ermany #ent thro.gh t#o "atastrophi" military de2eats: hyperin2lation: the 6reat Depression: the
"ollapse o2 demo"ra"y: and the destr."tion o2 its maOor "ities and in2rastr."t.re >y (llied >om>s. (nd yet >y the
end o2 the 10!%s: West 6ermany #as on"e again one o2 the #orldRs leading e"onomies: al>eit shorn o2 its
imperial am>itions. Dn a n."lear age: &hina is .nlikely to get s."ked into a #orld #ar: so it #ill not 2a"e
t.r>.len"e and disorder on remotely the s"ale 6ermany did in the 2%th "ent.ry. (nd #hate<er e"onomi" and
politi"al di22i".lties it does e?perien"e #ill not >e eno.gh to stop the "o.ntryRs rise to great-po#er stat.s. 4heer
si5e and e"onomi" moment.m mean that the &hinese O.ggerna.t #ill keep rolling 2or#ard: no matter #hat
o>sta"les lie in its path.
Po#!$ t$ans*t*on no#: 4"*nas $*s!
4oo0 !t al .2 9.alcolm, former /roram 0irector for East &sia at the 1owy 2nstitute, 0ean of the 3chool of 2nternational 3tudies at Flinders
'ni4ersity,5/ower and 6hoice) &sian 3ecurity Futures,5
7une,http)**asiasecurity.macfound.or*imaes*uploads*%lo8attachments*&sian8security8futures8-8final84ersion.pdf9
What is "lear is that the ".rrent trends o2 shi2ting po#er to and in (sia pose a "hallenge to the e"onomi" and strategi" 2o.ndations o2 (meri"an prima"y in the region.
While the ;nited 4tates is likely to remain the most po#er2.l regional a"tor 2or many years to "ome: >oth e"onomi"ally and militarily: (sias po#er
transition portends a ne# se".rity order , one potentially shaped to a 2ar greater e?tent >y the "o.ntries o2 (sia
itsel2 , in #hi"h (meri"an dominan"e "o.ld >e less prono.n"ed and more "ontested. Dn the a>sen"e o2 #ar or
a".te se".rity "ompetition: it has >e"ome tempting to "on"ei<e o2 pea"e and e"onomi" dynamism as imm.ta>le
2eat.res o2 (sias strategi" en<ironment. Set these e?ist largely as a >y-prod."t o2 ;4 prima"y: and the strategi"ally predi"ta>le en<ironment that
(meri"as preponderant po#er has .nderpinned. (lternati<e se".rity orders are possi>le: and in none o2 them "an pea"e and
sta>ility >e taken 2or granted: sin"e the regions po#er transitions "ontin.e to .n2old against the >a"kdrop o2
di<ergent national interests: histori"al mistr.st: signs o2 in"reasingly strident nationalism: .nresol<ed territorial
disp.tes: the proli2eration o2 game"hanging military te"hnologies: and gro#ing "ompetition 2or energy and
reso.r"es. &hina is a de"isi<e parti"ipant in most o2 these .n"ertainties: 2rom the 4o.th &hina 4ea to maritime
disp.tes #ith 8apan and 2rom >order di22eren"es and potential maritime "ompetition #ith Dndia to the
.nresol<ed pro>lems o<er the ai#an 4trait and on the /orean 1enins.la. (t the same time: there is a need to
take into a""o.nt "o.nter<ailing 2a"tors: nota>ly the impa"t o2 glo>alisation and regional e"onomi" integration:
a "ommitment among many a"tors to demo"rati" <al.es: e22orts to >.ild regional se".rity ar"hite"t.re: and the
potentially .ni2ying impa"t o2 "ommon dangers , s."h as terrorism: "limate "hange and reso.r"e sho"ks. (s the
s"enarios and dis"ontin.ities e?plored in this p.>li"ation ill.strate: the regions se".rity 2.t.re is >y no means predetermined solely >y
po#er relations: e<en tho.gh the distri>.tion o2 po#er #ill largely shape the limits o2 possi>le "ooperation.
U<S< H!, $a&*%l/ %!c$!as*n, '!ca+s! o1 4"*nas $*s!
La/n! 25 - 'o>ert F. 6ates &hair in Dntelligen"e and National 4e".rity at the 6eorge +.sh 4"hool o2 6o<ernment and 1.>li" 4er<i"e at e?as (PF
;ni<ersity: international relations theorist 9&hristopher Layne: =&hinas &hallenge to ;.4. Hegemony@ &.rrent History: 8an.ary 2%%*: pages 14-1*:
http)33a"me.highpoint.ed.3Zmset5ler3D'3D'readings>ank3"hina.s"ontain."h%*.$.pd2 3 (lisa SangA
here is mo.nting e<iden"e: ho#e<er: that this <ie# is mistaken: and that: in 2a"t : the era o2 (meri"an
hegemony is dra#ing to a "lose right >e2ore o.r eyes. he rise o2 &hina is the >iggest reason 2or this.
Not#ithstanding Washingtons ".rrent preo"".pation #ith the Fiddle -ast: in the "oming de"ades &hinas
great po#er emergen"e #ill >e the paramo.nt iss.e o2 grand strategy 2a"ing the ;nited 4tates. Whether &hina
#ill .ndergo a =pea"e2.l rise@Gas +eiOing "laimsGis do.>t2.l. Histori"ally: the emergen"e o2 ne# poles o2 po#er in
the international system has >een geopoliti"ally desta>ili5ing. For e?ample: the rise o2 6ermany: the ;nited
4tates: and 8apan at the end o2 the nineteenth "ent.ry "ontri>.ted to the international politi"al 2ri"tions that
".lminated in t#o #orld #ars. here is no reason to >elie<e that &hinas rise #ill >e an e?"eption.
A8> 4HINAS RISE
4"*na cant c"all!n,! t"! US
N/! .2 K8oseph has a 1hD in politi"al s"ien"e 2rom Har<ard. He has ser<ed as (ssistant 4e"retary o2 De2ense 2or Dnternational 4e".rity (22airs: &hair o2 the
National Dntelligen"e &o.n"il: and Dep.ty ;nder 4e"retary o2 4tate 2or 4e".rity (ssistan"e: 4"ien"e and e"hnology.Dn 2%%4: he p.>lished Soft Power: The Means to
Success in World PoliticsNUnderstanding International onflict K!th editionMN and The Power Game: A Washington !ovel" Dn 2%%* he p.>lished The Powers to
#ead and his latest >ook p.>lished in 2%11 is The $uture of Power"
http)331431731ontario.net3&.rrent3(rti"les3heF.t.reB2(meri"an1o#erTDominan"e(ndDe"lineDn1erspe"ti<e.pd2M
Set &hina has a long #ay to go to eC.al the po#er reso.r"es o2 the ;nited 4tates: and it still 2a"es many o>sta"les to its
de<elopment. -<en i2 o<erall &hinese 6D1 passed that o2 the ;nited 4tates aro.nd 2%3%: the t#o e"onomies: altho.gh ro.ghly eC.i<alent in
si5e: #o.ld not >e eC.i<alent in "omposition. &hina #o.ld still ha<e a <ast .nderde<eloped "o.ntryside: and it
#o.ld ha<e >eg.n to 2a"e demographi" pro>lems 2rom the delayed e22e"ts o2 its one-"hild poli"y. 1er "apita
in"ome pro<ides a meas.re o2 the sophisti"ation o2 an e"onomy. (ss.ming a si? per"ent &hinese 6D1 gro#th
rate and only t#o per"ent (meri"an 6D1 gro#th rate a2ter 2%3%: &hina #o.ld pro>a>ly not eC.al the ;nited
4tates in per "apita in"ome .ntil sometime aro.nd the middle o2 the "ent.ry. Dn other #ords: &hinas impressi<e
e"onomi" gro#th rate and in"reasing pop.lation #ill likely lead the &hinese e"onomy to pass the ;.4. e"onomy
in total si5e in a 2e# de"ades: >.t that is not the same as eC.ality.
No 4"*n!s! c"all!n,!
N/! .2 K8oseph has a 1hD in politi"al s"ien"e 2rom Har<ard. He has ser<ed as (ssistant 4e"retary o2 De2ense 2or Dnternational 4e".rity (22airs: &hair o2 the
National Dntelligen"e &o.n"il: and Dep.ty ;nder 4e"retary o2 4tate 2or 4e".rity (ssistan"e: 4"ien"e and e"hnology.Dn 2%%4: he p.>lished Soft Power: The Means to
Success in World PoliticsNUnderstanding International onflict K!th editionMN and The Power Game: A Washington !ovel" Dn 2%%* he p.>lished The Powers to
#ead and his latest >ook p.>lished in 2%11 is The $uture of Power"
http)331431731ontario.net3&.rrent3(rti"les3heF.t.reB2(meri"an1o#erTDominan"e(ndDe"lineDn1erspe"ti<e.pd2M
Foreo<er: linear proOe"tions "an >e misleading: and gro#th rates generally slo# as e"onomies rea"h higher le<els o2 de<elopment. &hinas a.thoritarian politi"al
system has sho#n an impressi<e "apa>ility to harness the "o.ntrys po#er: >.t #hether the go<ernment "an maintain that "apa>ility o<er the longer term is a mystery
>oth to o.tsiders and to &hinese leaders. ;nlike Dndia: #hi"h #as >orn #ith a demo"rati" "onstit.tion: &hina has not yet
2o.nd a #ay to sol<e the pro>lem o2 demands 2or politi"al parti"ipation Ki2 not demo"ra"yM that tend to
a""ompany rising per "apita in"ome. Whether &hina "an de<elop a 2orm.la that manages an e?panding .r>an
middle "lass: regional ineC.ality: r.ral po<erty: and resentment among ethni" minorities remains to >e seen.
4ome ha<e arg.ed that &hina aims to "hallenge the ;nited 4tates position in -ast (sia and: e<ent.ally: the
#orld. -<en i2 this #ere an a"".rate assessment o2 &hinas ".rrent intentions Kand e<en the &hinese themsel<es "annot kno# the <ie#s o2 2.t.re generationsM: it is
do.>t2.l that &hina #ill ha<e the military "apa>ility to make this possi>le anytime soon. Foreo<er: &hinese
leaders #ill ha<e to "ontend #ith the rea"tions o2 other "o.ntries and the "onstraints "reated >y &hinas need 2or
e?ternal markets and reso.r"es. oo aggressi<e a &hinese military post.re "o.ld prod."e a "o.nter<ailing
"oalition among &hinas neigh>ors that #o.ld #eaken >oth its hard and its so2t po#er. he rise o2 &hinese
po#er in (sia is "ontested >y >oth Dndia and 8apan Kas #ell as other statesM: and that pro<ides a maOor po#er
ad<antage to the ;nited 4tates. he ;.4.-8apanese allian"e and the impro<ement in ;.4.-Dndian relations mean
that &hina "annot easily e?pel the (meri"ans 2rom (sia. From that position o2 strength: the ;nited 4tates: 8apan: Dndia: (.stralia: and
others "an engage &hina and pro<ide in"enti<es 2or it to play a responsi>le role: #hile hedging against the possi>ility o2 aggressi<e >eha<ior as &hinas po#er gro#s.
4"*na 1ac!s "+,! &$o'l!(s> &o#!$ t$ans*t*on +nl*0!l/
B2 "o.rse: it #o.ld >e a>s.rd to pretend that &hina does not 2a"e maOor "hallenges . Dn the short term: there is plenty
o2 e<iden"e that a property >.>>le is >.ilding in >ig "ities like 4hanghai: and in2lation is on the rise. B<er the
long term: &hina has alarming politi"al and e"onomi" transitions to na<igate. he &omm.nist 1arty is .nlikely
to >e a>le to maintain its monopoly on politi"al po#er 2ore<er. (nd the "o.ntryRs traditional dependen"e on e?ports
and an .nder<al.ed ".rren"y are "oming .nder in"reasing "riti"ism 2rom the ;nited 4tates and other
international a"tors demanding a Qre>alan"ingQ o2 &hinaRs e?port-dri<en e"onomy. he "o.ntry also 2a"es maOor demographi"
and en<ironmental "hallenges) he pop.lation is aging rapidly as a res.lt o2 the one-"hild poli"y: and &hina is threatened
>y #ater shortages and poll.tion.
4"*n!s! (o%!$n*-at*on #ont ca+s! #a$ ) t"! US co+l% %!c*(at! t"!(
?an%o# 9 KDo.g is a senior 2ello# at the &ato Dnstit.te: spe"iali5ing in 2oreign poli"y and "i<il li>erties. He #orked as spe"ial assistant to 1resident 'eagan and
editor o2 the politi"al maga5ine In%uiry. &hinaRs Filitary 'ise Feans -nd o2 ;4 HegemonyJ http)33###."ato.org3p.>Tdisplay.phpJp.>TidX1%17!M
Bne s.spe"ts it means a""epting (meri"an military hegemony in -ast (sia G something #ith #hi"h +eiOing isnRt likely to agree. he &hinese military >.ild.p
so 2ar has >een signi2i"ant >.t meas.red. Qhe 1eopleRs Li>eration (rmy K1L(M is p.rs.ing "omprehensi<e trans2ormation 2rom a mass army designed 2or
protra"ted #ars o2 attrition on its periphery against high-te"h ad<ersaries:Q e?plains the 1entagon. Foreo<er: &hinaRs Qarmed 2or"es "ontin.e to de<elop and 2ield
disr.pti<e military te"hnologies: in"l.ding those 2or anti-a""ess3area-denial: as #ell as 2or n."lear: spa"e: and "y>er #ar2are: that are "hanging regional military
>alan"es and that ha<e impli"ations >eyond the (sia-1a"i2i" region.Q Set this "on"erted e?pansion little threatens ;.4. se".rity. Bnly the
&hinese n."lear 2or"e is theoreti"ally a>le to strike (meri"a today. +eiOing possesses a>o.t $% missiles: some o2 limited range. Dn
"ontrast: the ;.4. n."lear arsenal in"l.des tho.sands o2 sophisti"ated #arheads on h.ndreds o2 missiles. +eiOing is going to
ha<e to spend years to >.ild a modest 2or"e simply "apa>le o2 deterring (meri"a. B2 "o.rse: &hina intends to mo<e >eyond its o#n shores.
&hina is Qde<eloping longer-range "apa>ilities that ha<e impli"ations >eyond ai#an:Q #hi"h Q"o.ld allo# &hina to proOe"t po#er to ens.re a""ess to reso.r"es or
en2or"e "laims to disp.ted territories:Q #arns the 1entagon. Ho#e<er: notes the Department o2 De2ense KDBDM: &hinaRs military Q"ontin.es to 2a"e
de2i"ien"ies in inter-ser<i"e "ooperation and a"t.al e?perien"e in Ooint e?er"ises and "om>at operations.Q Foreo<er:
+eiOing is not yet "apa>le o2 Qde2eating a moderate-si5e ad<ersary.Q he 1entagon adds: Q&hina #ill not >e a>le to proOe"t and
s.stain small military .nits 2ar >eyond &hina >e2ore 2%1!: and #ill not >e a>le to proOe"t and s.stain large 2or"es in "om>at operations 2ar 2rom
&hina .ntil #ell into the 2ollo#ing de"ade.Q Dn any "ase: &hina has minimal strategi" "on<entional rea"h. he ;nited 4tates
possesses 11 "arrier gro.ps to &hinaRs none. +eiOing also la"ks a signi2i"ant strategi" air "apa>ility. -ast (sian "o.ntries may >e at
greater risk: >.t de2ending these nations G #hi"h are largely "apa>le o2 prote"ting themsel<es G is not the same as de2ending the ;nited 4tates. &hinaRs most o><io.s
o>Oe"ti<e is to "reate a military "apa>le o2 en2or"ing its #ill on ai#an. Ho#e<er: tensions in the ai#an 4trait ha<e eased and the DBD admits that Qan
attempt to in<ade ai#an #o.ld strain &hinaRs .ntested armed 2or"es and in<ite international inter<ention.Q aipei also "o.ld do
signi2i"antly more to prote"t itsel2. Dn 2a"t: +eiOingRs military >.ild.p is 2o".sed on pre<enting the ;nited 4tates 2rom atta"king &hina.
he 1entagon admits as m."h #itho.t e?pli"itly saying that +eiOing is 2o".sed on deterring Washington.
T"! US *s *n no %an,!$ o1 '!*n, "!,!(on*call/ o!$ta0!n '/ 4"*na ) not !no+," !cono(*c o$ "a$%
&o#!$<
4te<e 4"an 5 K=&hina: the ;4 and the po#er transition theory@ Department &hair and pro2essor o2 politi"al s"ien"e at the ;ni<ersity o2 &oloradoM V1hillipsW
4.>stanti<ely: my arg.ment in this >ook takes iss.e #ith the po#er-transition theory as it has o2ten >een applied to &hinas rise. +rie2ly: D arg.e that despite the
gro#th o2 &hinas e"onomy in re"ent de"ades: the a<aila>le e<iden"e does not s.pport any "laim that &hina is
o<ertaking or e<en approa"hing the ;4 as a "ontender 2or international prima"y. his remark s.ggests that one
o2 the s"ope "onditions o2 the po#er-transition theory: #hi"h is "on"erned #ith the str.ggle 2or #orld
domination >y the hegemon and "hallenger K#hi"h is s.pposed to >e at least *% per"ent as strong as the
hegemonM: is not met. -<en in a regional "ompetition in the (sia 1a"i2i": &hina is <astly o.tmat"hed >y the ;4
in e"onomi" and espe"ially military "apa>ilities. Foreo<er: e<en its stat.s as a regional hegemon in the Western
Hemisphere and the #orlds largest and most dynami" e"onomy did not C.ali2y the ;4 as a "ontender 2or glo>al
leadership in the years prior to 104!.
T"!$! a$! (an/ o'stacl!s *n 4"*nas $*s! 1o$ &$*(ac/
4oo0 !t al .2 :.alcolm, former /roram 0irector for East &sia at the 1owy 2nstitute, 0ean of the 3chool of 2nternational 3tudies at Flinders
'ni4ersity,5/ower and 6hoice) &sian 3ecurity Futures,5
7une,http)**asiasecurity.macfound.or*imaes*uploads*%lo8attachments*&sian8security8futures8-8final84ersion.pdf9
Like e<ery great po#er: &hina has good reasons to #ant prima"y in its region. 4."h a position #o.ld allo# it to
esta>lish an other#ise .nattaina>le le<el o2 se".rity: prosperity and prestige , salient "on"erns 2or a "o.ntry
#ith &hinas pain2.l memories. While many people <ie# &hina today as an essentially satis2ied great po#er:
one thri<ing in the shado#s o2 ;4 prima"y: there is nothing in"onsistent a>o.t a long-term aspiration to
prima"y and &hinas present "a.tio.s 2oreign and strategi" poli"ies , #hi"h allo# it C.ietly to ma?imise its
po#er #itho.t "on2rontation. he C.estion o2 #hether &hina "o.ld realisti"ally e?pe"t to attain prima"y is another matter. ( &hina that
remains enmeshed #ith the glo>al e"onomy has the potential to generate more e"onomi" and military po#er
than any great po#er in history. +.t +eiOing is also "oming o2 age in hea<y strategi" tra22i". he ;nited 4tates
has a long re"ord o2 th#arting hegemoni" "hallengers: on o""asion a""epting massi<e "osts and risks to do so.
Nor #o.ld 8apan: '.ssia or Dndia >e likely to greet a &hinese >id 2or prima"y #ith eC.animity. Finally: &hina
2a"es a range o2 serio.s domesti" "hallenges #hi"h "o.ld "ompli"ate its "ontin.ed rise. Fe# C.estions are as
"riti"al to (sias 2.t.re as the #ay in #hi"h &hina manages the tension >et#een its desire 2or prima"y on the
one hand: and the potentially ins.rmo.nta>le o>sta"les it 2a"es on the other. his is the most spe".lati<e 2.t.re "onsidered.
Dndeed: it is hard to see ho# &hinese prima"y "o.ld arise #itho.t >eing pre"eded >y either a long era o2 m.ltipolarity , 2or e?ample: thro.gh a >alan"e or "on"ert o2
po#ers: in #hi"h &hina "o.ld grad.ally amass its "apa>ilities , or a s.dden and rapid disintegration o2 the pre<ailing order: >ro.ght on >y a sho"k: or sho"ks: to the
region and its strategi" order
***HEG ?AD
HEG ?AD ) ASIAN WAR
H!, #*ll %$a# t"! US *nto con1l*ct *n As*a
La/n! 96: <isiting 2ello# in 2oreign poli"y st.dies at the &ato Dnstit.te
K&hristopher: =Less is more - realisti" 2oreign poli"ies 2or -ast (sia@: he National Dnterest: 4pring M
he "onditions that "ontri>.ted to s.""ess2.l e?tended n."lear deterren"e in &old War -.rope do not e?ist in post-&old War -ast (sia. ;nlike the sit.ation that
pre<ailed in -.rope >et#een 104* and 100% -- #hi"h #as 2.ndamentally sta>le and stati" -- -ast (sia is a <olatile region in #hi"h all the
maOor players -- 8apan: &hina: /orea: '.ssia: Lietnam -- are "andidates to >e"ome in<ol<ed in large-s"ale #ar.
here is no "lear and in<iola>le stat.s C.o. he lines o2 demar"ation >et#een spheres o2 in2l.en"e are already
>l.rred and may #ell >e"ome more so as &hinese and 8apanese in2l.en"e e?pand sim.ltaneo.sly: in"reasing the
n.m>er and .npredi"ta>ility o2 regional ri<alries. he stat.s o2 ai#an: tension along the 3*th 1arallel in
/orea: "on2li"ting "laims to o#nership o2 the 4pratly Dslands: and the 4ino-8apanese territorial disp.te o<er the
4enkak. Dslands are only a 2e# o2 the 2lash-points that "o.ld ignite a great po#er #ar in -ast (sia. Washington #ill
"learly e?er"ise 2ar less "ontrol o<er the poli"ies o2 -ast (sian po#ers than it e?er"ised o<er (meri"aRs -.ropean allies d.ring the &old War. Hen"e: the risk o2
>eing "hain-ganged into a n."lear "on2li"t are m."h higher 2or the ;nited 4tates in post-&old War -ast (sia i2
it maintains or e?tends n."lear g.arantees to any o2 the regionRs maOor states. -<en more important: post-&old War -ast (sia
simply does not ha<e the same degree o2 strategi" importan"e to the ;nited 4tates as did -.rope d.ring the &old War. Wo.ld the ;nited 4tates risk a
n."lear "on2rontation to de2end ai#an: the 4pratlys: or 4enkak.J /no#ing that they #o.ld not "onstit.te the
same kind o2 threat to ;.4. interests that the 4o<iet ;nion did: 2.t.re re<isionist -ast (sian po#ers #o.ld
pro>a>ly >e more #illing to dis"o.nt (meri"aRs "redi>ility and test its resol<e. he presen"e o2 (meri"an 2or"es
in the region may indeed ha<e the per<erse e22e"t o2 2ailing to preser<e pea"e #hile sim.ltaneo.sly ens.ring the
;nited 4tates #o.ld >e dra#n a.tomati"ally into a 2.t.re -ast (sian #ar. hey "o.ld "onstit.te the #rong sort
o2 trip#ire: tripping .s rather than deterring them. Not#ithstanding ".rrent "on<entional #isdom: the ;nited 4tates sho.ld en"o.rage -ast
(sian states -- in"l.ding 8apan -- to resol<e their o#n se".rity dilemmas: e<en i2 it means a"C.iring great po#er: in"l.ding n."lear: military "apa>ilities.
As*an con1l*ct !scalat!s to n+cl!a$ #a$
Lan%/ 22: National 4e".rity and Dnternational &orrespondent K8onathon: /night 'idder: Far"h 1%M
Fe# i2 any e?perts think &hina and ai#an: North /orea and 4o.th /orea: or Dndia and 1akistan are spoiling to 2ight. +.t e<en
a minor mis"al".lation >y any o2 them "o.ld desta>ili5e (sia: Oolt the glo>al e"onomy: and e<en start a n."lear
#ar. Dndia: 1akistan: and &hina all ha<e n."lear #eapons: and North /orea may ha<e a 2e#: too. (sia la"ks
the kinds o2 organi5ations: negotiations: and diplomati" relationships that helped keep an .neasy pea"e 2or 2i<e
de"ades in &old War -.rope. =No#here else on -arth are the stakes as high and relationships so 2ragile:@ said +ates
6ill: dire"tor o2 northeast (sian poli"y st.dies at the +rookings Dnstit.tion: a Washington think tank. =We see the "on<ergen"e o2 great po#er interest o<erlaid #ith
lingering "on2rontations #ith no instit.tionali5ed se".rity me"hanism in pla"e. here are elements 2or potential disaster. Dn an e22ort to "ool the
regions tempers: 1resident &linton: De2ense 4e"retary William 4. &ohen and National 4e".rity (d<iser 4am.el '. +erger all #ill hops"ot"h (sias "apitals this month.
For (meri"a: the stakes "o.ld hardly >e higher.here are 1%%:%%% ;.4. troops in (sia "ommitted to de2ending ai#an: 8apan
and 4o.th /orea: and the ;nited 4tates #o.ld instantly >e"ome em>roiled i2 +eiOing mo<ed against ai#an or
North /orea atta"ked 4o.th /orea. While Washington has no de2ense "ommitments to either Dndia or 1akistan: a "on2li"t >et#een
the t#o "o.ld end the glo>al ta>oo against .sing n."lear #eapons and demolish the already shaky international
nonproli2eration regime.
HEG ?AD ) 4HINA WAR
Ma*nta*n*n, "!,!(on/ ca+s!s t$ans*t*on con1l*cts ) t"! US #*ll att!(&t to "ol% on
&hinas rise a22e"ts the ;nited 4tates >e"a.se o2 #hat international relations s"holars "all the =po#er transition@ e22e"t)
hro.gho.t the history o2 the modern international state system : as"ending po#ers ha<e al#ays "hallenged the
position o2 the dominant Khegemoni"M po#er in the international =pea"e2.l rise:@ an as"ending &hina ine<ita>ly
#ill "hallenge the geopoliti"al eC.ili>ri.m in -ast (sia. he do"trine o2 pea"e2.l rise th.s is a reass.ran"e
strategy employed >y +eiOing in an attempt to allay others 2ears o2 gro#ing &hinese po#er and to 2orestall the
;nited 4tates 2rom a"ting pre<enti<ely d.ring the dangero.s transition period #hen &hina is "at"hing .p to the
;nited 4tates . Does this mean that the ;nited 4tates and &hina are on a "ollision "o.rse that #ill lead to a #ar
in the ne?t de"ade or t#oJ Not ne"essarily. What happens in 4ino-(meri"an relations largely depends on #hat
strategy Washington "hooses to adopt to#ard &hina. D2 the ;nited 4tates tries to maintain its ".rrent dominan"e
in -ast (sia: 4ino-(meri"an "on2li"t is <irt.ally "ertain: >e"a.se . s grand strategy has in"orporated the logi" o2
anti"ipatory <iolen"e as an instr.ment 2or maintaining (meri"an prima"y. For a de"lining hegemon: =strangling
the >a>y in the "ri>@ >y atta"king a rising "hallenger pre<enti<elyGthat is: #hile the hegemon still holds the
.pper hand militarilyGhas al#ays >een a tempting strategi" option.
$ando& 09 - senior fellow at the Cato InstituteA former special assistant to resident *onald *eagan, author of Foreign Follies: America's New
Global Empire KDoug 7andow, #ChinaFs $ilitary *ise means end of U.S. hegemony&' Korea Times 0(0(=/, http%((www.cato.org(pu"?display.php&
pu"?id12=2>0L
Ine suspects it means accepting +merican military hegemony in ,ast +sia R something with which 7ei8ing isn6t li5ely
to agree.The Chinese military "uildup so far has "een significant "ut measured. DThe eople6s Bi"eration +rmy !B+) is
pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its
periphery against high-tech adversaries,D e<plains the entagon. $oreover, China6s Darmed forces continue to develop
and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access(area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and
cy"er warfare, that are changing regional military "alances and that have implications "eyond the +sia-acific
region.D
US &$*(ac/ !ns+$!s con1l*ct #*t" 4"*na
La/n! 2= Lisiting Fello# in Foreign 1oli"y 4t.dies at the &ato Dnstit.te
9&hristopher =(meri"an -mpire) ( De>ate@ Kp 7!MA
4o #hat sho.ld the ;nited 4tates do a>o.t &hinaJ D2 the ;nited 4tates per sists #ith its strategy o2 prima"y: the
odds o2 a 4ino-(meri"an "on2li"t are high. &.rrent (meri"an strategy "ommits the ;nited 4tates to maintaining
the geopoliti"al stat.s C.o in -ast (sia: a stat.s C.o that re2le"ts (meri"an prima"y. he ;nited 4tatesR desire to
preser<e the stat.s C.o: ho#e<er: "lashes #ith the am>itions o2 a rising &hina. (s a rising great po#er: &hina
has its o#n ideas a>o.t ho# -ast (siaRs politi"al and se".rity order sho.ld >e orga ni5ed. ;nless ;.4. and
&hinese interests "an >e a""ommodated: the potential 2or 2.t.re tensionGor #orseGe?ists. Foreo<er: as D
already ha<e demonstrated: the <ery 2a"t o2 (meri"an prima"y is >o.nd to prod."e a geopoliti"al >a"klashG
#ith &hina in the <ang.ardGin the 2orm o2 "o.nter-hegemoni" >alan"ing. Ne<ertheless: the ;nited 4tates
"annot >e "ompletely indi22erent to &hinaRs rise.
HEG ?AD ) 4HINA RELATIONS
A %*$!ct $!s+lt o1 "*," US H!,!(on/ *s (*l*ta$/ %!&lo/(!nts t"at %!st$o/ US ) S*no $!lat*ons an%
(*l*ta$/ &$oocat*ons
6lo>al imes 8.ne 0
th
2%1% Khttp)33opinion.glo>altimes."n3editorial32%1%-%$3!4%%%*.html Sello# 4ea no pla"e 2or ;4 "arrier M
( sym>ol o2 its past hegemony: the ;4 still likes to deploy air"ra2t "arriers aro.nd the #orld #hen it #ishes to dist.r>
others. 4o 2ar: no de2initi<e ans#er has >een gi<en to spe".lation o<er #hether the ;4 #ill send a "arrier to parti"ipate in
Ooint military drills #ith 4o.th /orea in the Sello# 4ea. +.t the possi>ility remains in2.riating to many &hinese. 4tationed in
the 8apanese port o2 Sokohama sin"e 2%%*: the ;4 "arrier 6eorge Washington has >een deployed to #at"h &hinaRs na<al a"ti<ity and 2le? its m.s"le in the
West 1a"i2i". Dt "ertainly intends to make its presen"e 2elt in the Sello# 4ea and the -ast &hina 4ea. +.t the ;4 sho.ld
re"onsider its military mo<ements in the West 1a"i2i". Disg.ised as a mo<e aimed at maintaining regional sta>ility: the
deployment o2 a "arrier o22 o2 &hinaRs "oast is a pro<o"ation that #ill generate hostility among the &hinese p.>li" to#ard
the ;4. Who #o.ld not >e >othered >y an opponent hanging aro.nd at the door #ith a g.n all day longJ Fany &hinese are tired
o2 the a>r.pt "hanges in ;4 post.re. he ;4 O.st stressed the importan"e o2 partnership >et#een the t#o "o.ntries at the se"ond 4trategi" and -"onomi" Dialog.e at the
end o2 last month. No#: it looks as i2 the ;4 "o.ld try to in"ite &hina #ith military aggression. 4."h a mo<e #o.ld erode the
hard-earned tr.st e?isting >et#een the t#o "o.ntries. -a"h time the ;4 has tried to pro<oke &hina militarily: it has
>ro.ght >ilateral relations to a nadir and damaged p.>li" tr.st: #hi"h takes time to re>.ild. &hina does not oppose the military
presen"e o2 the ;4 in the West 1a"i2i". ;nderstanda>ly: a 2e# "o.ntries in the region still need the se".rity .m>rella pro<ided >y the ;4. +.t it "annot irritate &hina
#hen making sensiti<e military mo<ements.
HEG ?AD ) E4ONOMI4 4OLLAPSE
Eland 09- 4enior Fello# and Dire"tor o2 the &enter on pea"e and Li>erty at the Dndependent Dnstit.te: Dire"tor o2 De2ense 1oli"y 4t.dies at the &ato Dnstit.te: +.(.
Do#a 4tate ;ni<ersity: F.+.(. in -"onomi"s and 1h.D. in 1.>li" 1oli"y 2rom 6eorge Washington ;ni<ersity KD<an -land: =Ho# the ;4 -mpire &ontri>.ted to the
-"onomi" &risis@: http)33###.independent.org3ne#sroom3arti"le.aspJidX240*M N1
+ fewRand only a fewRprescient commentators have 3uestioned whether the U.S. can sustain its informal glo"al
empire in the wa5e of the most severe economic crisis since 4orld 4ar II . +nd the simultaneous 3uagmires in Ira3 and
+fghanistan are leading more and more opinion leaders and ta<payers to this 3uestion. 7ut the U.S. ,mpire helped cause the meltdown
in the first place. 4ar has a history of causing financial and economic calamities. It does so directly "y almost
always causing inflationRthat is, too much money chasing too few goods. During wartime, governments usually commandeer
resources from the private sector into the government realm to fund the fighting. This action leaves shortages
of resources to ma5e consumer goods and their components, therefore pushing prices up. $a5ing things worse,
governments often times print money to fund the war, thus adding to the amount of money chasing the smaller
num"er of consumer goods. Such #ma5e-"elieve' wealth has funded many U.S. wars . -or e<ample, the 4ar of 2S2. had
two negative effects on the U.S. financial system. -irst, in 2S2G, the federal government allowed state-chartered "an5s to suspend payment in gold and
silver to their depositors. In other words, according Tom C. DiBoren:o in Hamiltons Curse, the "an5s did not have to hold sufficient gold and silver
reserves to cover their loans. This policy allowed the "an5s to loan the federal government more money to fight the war. The result was an annual
inflation rate of 00 percent in some U.S. cities. The government too5 this route of e<panding credit during wartime "ecause no U.S. central "an5 e<isted
at the time. Congress, correctly 3uestioning The 7an5 of the United StatesF constitutionality, had not renewed its charter upon e<piration in 2S22. 7ut the
financial turmoil caused "y the war led to a second pernicious effect on the financial systemRthe resurrection of the "an5 in 2S2> in the form of the
Second 7an5 of the United States. Bi5e the first "an5 and all other government central "an5s in the future, the second "an5 flooded the mar5et with new
credit. In 2S2S, this led to e<cessive real estate speculation and a conse3uent "u""le. The "u""le "urst during the anic of 2S2/, which was the first
recession in the nationFs history. Sound familiar& +lthough resident +ndrew Cac5son got rid of the second "an5 in the 2SM=s and the U.S. economy
generally flourished with a freer "an5ing system until 2/2M, at that time yet another central "an5Rthis time the -ederal *eserve SystemRrose from the
ashes. 4e have seen that war ultimately causes the creation of "oth economic pro"lems and nefarious
government financial institutions that cause those difficulties. +nd of course, the modern day U.S. ,mpire also
creates such economic maladies and wars that allow those institutions to wrea5 havoc on the economy. The -ed
caused the current collapse in the real estate credit mar5et, which has led to a more general glo"al financial and
economic meltdown, "y earlier flooding the mar5et with e<cess credit. That money went into real estate, thus creating an artificial
"u""le that eventually came crashing down in .==S. 7ut what caused the -ed to vastly e<pand credit& To prevent a potential
economic calamity after /(22 and soothe 8itters surrounding the ris5y and unneeded U.S. invasion of Ira3, -ed
Chairman +lan 9reenspan "egan a series of interest rate cuts that vastly increased the money supply . +ccording to
Thomas ,. 4oods, Cr. in Meltown, the interest rate cuts culminated in the e<traordinary policy of lowering the federal
funds rate !the rate at which "an5s lend to one another overnight, which usually determines other interest rates) to only one percent for an entire
year !from Cune .==M to Cune .==G). 4oods notes that more money was created "etween .=== and .==> than in the rest of U.S. history. $uch of
this e<cess money ended up creating the real estate "u""le that eventually caused the meltdown . 7en 7ernan5e, then
a -ed governor, was an ardent advocate of this easy money policy, which as -ed Chairman he has continued as his solution to an economic crisis he
helped create using the same measures. If course, according to Isama "in Baden, the primary reasons for the /(22 attac5s were U.S. occupation of
$uslim lands and U.S. propping up of corrupt dictators there. +nd the invasion of Ira3 was totally unnecessary "ecause there was never any connection
"etween al Jaeda or the /(22 attac5s and Saddam Hussein, and even if Saddam had had "iological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons, the massive U.S.
nuclear arsenal would have li5ely deterred him from using them on the United States. So the causal arrow goes from these imperial
"ehaviorsRand "low"ac5 there fromRto increases in the money supply to prevent related economic slowdown,
which in turn caused even worse eventual financial and economic calamities. These may "e indirect effects of
empire, "ut they cannot "e ignored. 9et rid of the overseas empire "ecause we can no longer afford it,
especially when it is partly responsi"le for the economic distress that is ma5ing us poorer.
US H!, &$!!nts !cono(*c ,$o#t": a s"*1t to (+lt*&ola$*t/ 'oosts t"! ,lo'al: an% US: !cono(*!s<
&hristopher Layne 26 K(sso"iate 1ro2essor at the +.sh 4"hool o2 6o<ernment and 1.>li" 4er<i"e: e?as (PF ;ni<ersityK&hristopher: =he 1ea"e o2 Dll.sions@ 177-
17*MV1hillipsW
(d<o"ates o2 hegemony Kand sele"ti<e engagementM also seem to ha<e a pe".liar .nderstanding o2 international e"onomi"s
and "on<ey the impression that international trade and in<estment #ill "ome to a grinding halt i2 the ;nited
4tates a>andons its ".rrent grand strategyGor i2 a -.rasian great po#er #ar o"".rs . his is not tr.e: ho#e<er . D2
the ;nited 4tates a>andons its ".rrent grand strategi" role as the prote"tor o2 international e"onomi" openness:
international e"onomi" inter"o.rse #ill not stop: e<en in time o2 great po#er #ar.11% D2 the ;nited 4tates #ere to
adopt an o22shore >alan"ing grand strategy: its o#n and glo>al markets #o.ld adapt to the ne# politi"al and
strategi" en<ironment . Finns and in<estors #o.ld reassess the risks o2 o<erseas trade and in<estment: and o<er
time in<estment and trade 2lo#s #o.ld shi2t in response to these "al".lations. Dnstead o2 >eing diminished: international
trade and in<estment #o.ld >e di<erted to more geopoliti"ally se".re regions: and these Qsa2e ha<ensQG
espe"ially the ;nited 4tatesG#o.ld >e the >ene2i"iaries . Finally: the ass.mption that a -.rasia dominated >y a hegemon #o.ld >e "losed
e"onomi"ally to the ;nited 4tates is d.>io.s. (-.rasian hegemon #o.ld ha<e a stake in its o#n e"onomi" #ell->eing K>oth2or strategi" and domesti" politi"al reasonsM:
and it #o.ld >e most .nlikely to hi<e itsel2 o22 "ompletely 2rom international trade
HEG ?AD ) EUROPE RELATIONS
(meri"an Hegemony h.rts ;4--.rope 'elations.
*ayne 0+- +sso"iate 1ro2essor in the +.sh 4"hool o2 6o<ernment and 1.>li" 4er<i"e at e?as (PF ;ni<ersity and 'esear"h Fello# #ith the &enter on 1ea"e and
Li>erty at he Dndependent Dnstit.te K&hristopher Layne: =4.prema"y is (meri"as Weakness@: http)33###."ato.org3p.>Tdisplay.phpJp.>TidX$%%1M N1
$a8or com"at operations in Ira3 ended in +pril "ut the transatlantic rupture "etween the US and DoldD ,urope
triggered "y the war has not healed. This is "ecause +merican hegemony remains the cause of the rift. The struggle
for supremacy has "een a feature of US-,uropean relations since +merica emerged as a great power in the late 2/th century.
During the .=th century, the US fought two large wars in ,urope to stop a hegemonic 9ermany from threatening +merica6s "ac5yard. +fter the second
world war, +merica6s strategic am"itions - "ased primarily on economic self-interest, not cold-war ideology - led it to
esta"lish its own hegemony over western ,urope. There is a well-5nown 3uip that Nato was created to 5eep the *ussians out, the
9ermans down and the +mericans in. It is more accurate to say that +merica6s commitment to the +tlantic alliance is a"out staying on top - and 5eeping
the ,uropeans apart.
HEG ?AD ) KOREAN WAR
H!,!(on/ s&+$s Ko$!an (*s+n%!$stan%*n, an% #a$
La/n! 26 Lisiting Fello# in Foreign 1oli"y 4t.dies at the &ato Dnstit.te
Khe 1ea"e o2 Dll.sions) (meri"an 6rand 4trategy 2rom 104% to the 1resent: p. 1$4-!M
(meri"as hegemoni" strategy holds that in -ast (sia Kand in -.ropeM the ;nited 4tates m.st K1M prote"t ;.4. allies
2rom =rog.e states@ armed #ith n."lear #eapons or other #eapons o2 mass destr."tionN K2M remain in -.rasia to
pre<ent great po#er ri<alries 2rom er.pting into #ar >y pro<iding regional deterren"e and reass.ran"eN and K3M
.nders"ore the "redi>ility o2 its "ommitments >y 2ighting in de2ense o2 its allies i2 deterren"e 2ails. his is
potentially a high-risk strategy. Dts <ia>ility hinges on a key C.estion) Ho# "redi>le are (meri"an se".rity g.arantees in -ast (siaJ (meri"as
-ast (sian strategy is most immediately "hallenged >y North /orea. (ltho.gh 1yongyang "laims it has n."lear
#eapons: it is .n"ertain #hether it a"t.ally does. D2 it does not presently ha<e them: ho#e<er: it "ertainly is
"lose to ha<ing some #eapons in hand: and , .nless something happens either diplomati"ally or militarily to interr.pt its #eapons de<elopment
program , its arsenal "o.ld gro# "onsidera>ly d.ring the ne?t 2e# years. Foreo<er: 1yongyang ".rrently has >allisti" missiles "apa>le o2
deli<ering n."lear #arheads against targets in 4o.th /orea and 8apan: and it "o.ld ha<e some inter"ontinental missile "apa>ility in a de"ade or so. he North
/orean regimes .npredi"ta>ility: its n."lear am>itions: and the military stando22 along the 3*th parallel
>et#een North /orean 2or"es and ;.4. and 4o.th /orean troops make the penins.la a <olatile pla"e. &on2li"t is not
ine<ita>le: >.t neither is it .nimagina>le. D2 diploma"y 2ails to >ring a>o.t a North /orean agreement to dismantle its n."lear
#eapons: the ;nited 4tates may de"ide to strike preempti<ely in an attempt to destroy 1yongyangs n."lear
2a"ilities. Dt is impossi>le to kno# #hether this #o.ld spark an all-o.t #ar on the penins.la. Bn the other hand:
2earing it might >e the target o2 s."h strikes or a ;.4. "ampaign to >ring a>o.t regime "hange: North /orea
might lash o.t irrationally in #ays that "on2o.nd the predi"tions o2 deterren"e theory. 6i<en that the (meri"an homeland
".rrently is not <.lnera>le to North /orean retaliation: the ;.4. deterrent .m>rella sho.ld diss.ade 1yongyang 2rom .sing n."lear #eapons to atta"k "i<ilian or military
targets in 4o.th /orea or 8apan. Whether North /orea actually #o.ld >e deterred: tho.gh: is a h.ge .nkno#n. hree things are
kno#n: ho#e<er. First: i2 North /orea has n."lear #eapons: ;.4. troops in 4o.th /orea: and possi>ly in 8apan: are
hostages. 4e"ond: e<en a nonn."lear "on2li"t on the penins.la #o.ld >e "ostly to the ;nited 4tates Knot#ithstanding the 2a"t that the
;nited 4tates .ltimately #o.ld pre<ail on the >attle2ieldM. hird: ;.4. troops in 4o.th /orea a"t as a trip #ire: #hi"h ens.res that: i2
#ar does o"".r: the ;nited 4tates a.tomati"ally #ill >e in<ol<ed.
Ko$!an con1l*ct ca+s!s !;t*nct*on
F+n,a(#an,o 99 K1at: (2ri"a Ne#s: hird #orld #ar) Wat"h the /oreas: 1%32!: le?isM
D2 there is one pla"e today #here the m."h-dreaded hird World War "o.ld easily er.pt and pro>a>ly red."e
earth to a h.ge smo.ldering "inder it is the /orean 1enins.la in Far -ast (sia. -<er sin"e the end o2 the sa<age three-year /orean #ar in
the early 10!%s: military tension >et#een the hardline "omm.nist north and the (meri"an >a"ked 4o.th /orea has
remained dangero.sly high. Dn 2a"t the /oreas are te"hni"ally still at #ar. ( 2oreign <isitor to either 1yongyong in the North or 4eo.l in 4o.th /orea #ill
C.i"kly noti"e that the di<ided "o.ntry is al#ays on ma?im.m alert 2or any e<ent.ality. North /orea or the Demo"rati" 1eopleRs 'ep.>li" o2 /orea KD1'/M has ne<er
2orgi<en the ;4 2or "oming to the aid o2 4o.th /orea d.ring the /orean #ar. 4he still regards the ;4 as an o"".pation 2or"e in 4o.th /orea and #holly to >lame 2or the
non-re.ni2i"ation o2 the "o.ntry. North /orean media "onstantly "h.rns o.t a tirade o2 atta"ks on QimperialistQ (meri"a and its Qr.nning dogQ 4o.th /orea. he D1'/
is one o2 the most se"reti<e "o.ntries in the #orld #here a <isitor is gi<en the impression that the peopleRs hatred 2or the ;4 is a>sol.te #hile the lo<e 2or their
go<ernment is total. Whether this is really so: it is e?tremely di22i".lt to "on"l.de. Dn the D1'/: a <isitor is ne<er gi<en a "han"e to speak to ordinary /oreans a>o.t the
politi"s o2 their "o.ntry. No <isitor mo<es aro.nd alone #itho.t go<ernment es"ort. he (meri"an go<ernment arg.es that its presen"e in 4o.th /orea #as >e"a.se o2
the "onstant danger o2 an in<asion 2rom the north. (meri"a has <ast e"onomi" interests in 4o.th /orea. 4he points o.t that the north has d.g n.mero.s t.nnels along
the demilitarised 5one as part o2 the in<asion plans. 4he also a"".ses the north o2 <iolating 4o.th /orean territorial #aters. -arly this year: a small North /orean
s.>marine #as "a.ght in 4o.th /orean #aters a2ter getting entangled in 2ishing nets. +oth the (meri"ans and 4o.th /oreans "laim the s.>marine #as on a military
spying mission. Ho#e<er: the intension o2 the alleged intr.sion #ill pro>a>ly ne<er >e kno#n >e"a.se the "ra2tRs "re# #ere all 2o.nd #ith 2atal g.nshot #o.nds to their
heads in #hat has >een des"ri>ed as s.i"ide pa"t to hide the tr.th o2 the mission. he ;4 mistr.st o2 the northRs intentions is so deep that it is no se"ret that today
Washington has the largest "on"entration o2 soldiers and #eaponry o2 all des"riptions in so.th /orea than any#here else in the World: apart 2rom (meri"a itsel2. 4ome
o2 the armada that #as deployed in the re"ent >om>ing o2 DraC and in Bperation Desert 4torm against the same "o.ntry 2ollo#ing its in<asion o2 /.#ait #as 2rom the
2leet permanently stationed on the /orean 1enins.la. Dt is tr.e too that at the moment the North34o.th /orean >order is the most 2orti2ied in the #orld. he >order line
is littered #ith anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines: s.r2a"e-to-s.r2a"e and s.r2a"eto- air missiles and is "onstantly patrolled >y #arplanes 2rom >oth sides. Dt is
"ommon kno#ledge that (meri"a also keeps an eye on any military mo<ement or >.ild-.p in the north thro.gh spy satellites. he D1'/ is said to ha<e
an estimated one million soldiers and a h.ge arsenal o2 <ario.s #eapons. (ltho.gh the D1'/ regards hersel2 as
a de<eloping "o.ntry: she "an ho#e<er >e "lassi2ied as a s.per-po#er in terms o2 military might. he D1'/ is
"apa>le o2 prod."ing medi.m and long-range missiles. Last year: 2or e?ample: she test-2ired a medi.m range missile o<er 8apan: an a"tion
that greatly shook and alarmed the ;4: 8apan and 4o.th /orea. he D1'/ says the proOe"tile #as a satellite. here ha<e also >een 2ears that she
#as planning to test another >allisti" missile "apa>le o2 rea"hing North (meri"a. Nat.rally: the #orld is an?io.s
that military tension on the /orean 1enins.la m.st >e de2.sed to a<oid an apo"alypse on earth. Dt is there2ore signi2i"ant
that the (meri"an go<ernment anno.n"ed a 2e# days ago that it #as mo<ing to#ards normalising relations #ith North /orea.
HEG ?AD ) PROLIFERATION
H!,!(on/ ,!n!$at!s s!c+$*t/ 1!a$s ) ca+s!s &$ol*1!$at*on< I$a@ &$o!s
Noam 4"o(s0/ 432432%24K(meri"an ling.ist: philosopher: "ogniti<e s"ientist: and a"ti<ist. He is an Dnstit.te 1ro2essor and pro2essor emerit.s o2 ling.isti"s at
the Fassa"h.setts Dnstit.te o2 e"hnology.=an inter<ie# #ith Noam &homsky:@http)33###.dissident<oi"e.org3(pril2%%43Fars%424.htmM V1hillipsW

4imon Fars) Dd like to >egin >y asking ho# m."h damage has >een done to the ;4 administration >y >oth its 2ail.re to 2ind any
#eapons o2 mass destr."tion in DraC and its ina>ility to pa"i2y the "o.ntry and #hether yo. think these 2ail.res
#ill >e a set >a"k to some o2 the more am>itio.s: hegemoni": plans o2 the neo "onser<ati<esJ Noam &homsky) Within the ;nited
4tates the 2ail.re to 2ind any #eapons o2 mass destr."tion has not had m."h o2 an e22e"t: O.dging >y the pollsN part o2 the reason is that people are so skepti"al o2
go<ernment and media that i2 it t.rns o.t some>ody is lying they dont pay that m."h attention. he other is >e"a.se the prete?ts keep shi2ting and as the prete?ts shi2t
the propaganda shi2ts. here #ere: ho#e<er: se<eral important "onseC.en"es to the 2ail.re to 2ind #eapons o2 mass destr."tion. he most important
"onseC.en"e: and the least noted: is that it lo#ered the >ar 2or aggression. he original do"trine: propagated >y
+.sh: 1o#ell and the rest: #as that the ;nited 4tates has the right to resort to 2or"e in sel2 de2ense against a
"o.ntry that it regards as threateningN that has: and is de<eloping: #eapons o2 mass destr."tion and has ties to
terror. Well: the ties to terror #ere C.ietly dropped #hen it >e"ame "lear that the in<asion: as predi"ted: has t.rned DraC into a "enter o2
terror 2or the 2irst time and has in"reased glo>al terror e?a"tly as #as e?pe"ted. 4o thats dropped: >.t #hat a>o.t the #eapons o2
mass destr."tionJ Well the do"trines >een "hanged: so the ".rrent do"trine: o22i"ially: is that it is eno.gh 2or a "o.ntry to ha<e the intent and
the a>ility to de<elop #eapons o2 mass destr."tion. 4imon Fars) Whi"h is any "o.ntry in the #orld... Noam &homsky) (ny
"o.ntry in the #orld. (ny "o.ntry that has a high s"hool la>oratory has the a>ility. (nd intent is in the eye o2 the >eholder. hats an important "hange. (nother
"hange is that the prete?t shi2ted. Dt t.rns o.t that the "on"ern #asnt #eapons o2 mass destr."tion: it #as the no>le <ision o2 >ringing
demo"ra"y to DraC and the greater Fiddle -ast. (s soon as that #as de"lared to >e the 1residents <ision the gears immediately shi2ted and all the
"ommentary starts talking a>o.t the no>ility o2 the <ision. &riti"s say it may >e o<er rea"hing: may>e #e "ant do it. No>ody >others to point o.t that in order to >elie<e
this #e ha<e to ass.me that +.sh and +lair are some o2 the history s most 2a>.lo.s liars sin"e that #asn t #hat they had said and i2 they #ere lying >e2ore #hy sho.ld
#e >elie<e them no#J +.t any#ay thats no# the do"trine: so it doesnt matter i2 yo. dont 2ind any #eapons o2 mass
destr."tion.

HEG ?AD ) RUSSIA74HINA ALLIAN4E
H!,!(on/ *nc*t!s a R+ss*an-4"*na all*anc! ) ca+s!s n+cl!a$ #a$
Ro'!$ts 2= 4enior 'esear"h Fello# [ the Hoo<er Dnstit.tion: 4tan2ord ;ni<ersity: William -. 4imon &hairin 1oliti"al -"onomy: &enter 2or 4trategi" and
Dnternational 4t.dies K1a.l &raig=;4 Hegemony 4pa#ns '.ssian-&hinese Filitary (llian"e:@http)33###.le#ro"k#ell."om3ro>erts3ro>erts21*.htmlM
his #eek the '.ssian and &hinese militaries are "ond."ting a Ooint military e?er"ise in<ol<ing large n.m>ers o2
troops and "om>at <ehi"les. he 2ormer 4o<iet 'ep.>li"s o2 aOikistan: /yrgky5stan: and /a5akstan are parti"ipating. Bther "o.ntries appear
ready to Ooin the military allian"e.his ne# potent military allian"e is a real #orld response to neo"onser<ati<e del.sions
a>o.t ;4 hegemony. Neo"ons >elie<e that the ;4 is s.preme in the #orld and "an di"tate its "o.rse. he
neo"onser<ati<e idiots ha<e a"t.ally #ritten papers: read >y '.ssians and &hinese: a>o.t #hy the ;4 m.st .se its military s.periority to
assert hegemony o<er '.ssia and &hina. &yni"s >elie<e that the neo"ons are O.st shills: like +.sh and &heney: 2or the military-se".rity "omple? and
are paid to restart the "old #ar 2or the sake o2 the pro2its o2 the armaments ind.stry. +.t the 2a"t is that the neo"ons a"t.ally >elie<e their
del.sions a>o.t (meri"an hegemony. '.ssia and &hina ha<e no# #itnessed eno.gh o2 the +.sh
administrationRs .npro<oked aggression in the #orld to take neo"on intentions serio.sly. (s the ;4 has pro<en
that it "annot o"".py the DraCi "ity o2 +aghdad despite ! years o2 e22orts: it most "ertainly "annot o"".py '.ssia
or &hina. hat means the "on2li"t to#ard #hi"h the neo"ons are dri<ing #ill >e a n."lear "on2li"t.
HEG ?AD ) SPA4E WEAPONIAATION

H!,!(on/ ca+s!s &$!!(&t*! s&ac! #!a&on*-at*on t"at c$!at!s a s&*$al o1 &$ol*1!$at*on< L!a%s to
(*scalc+lat*on: acc*%!ntal la+nc": an% GLO?AL NU4LEAR WAR
Noam 4"o(s0/ 432432%24K(meri"an ling.ist: philosopher: "ogniti<e s"ientist: and a"ti<ist. He is an Dnstit.te 1ro2essor and pro2essor emerit.s o2 ling.isti"s at
the Fassa"h.setts Dnstit.te o2 e"hnology.=an inter<ie# #ith Noam &homsky:@http)33###.dissident<oi"e.org3(pril2%%43Fars%424.htmMV1hillipsW

Noam &homsky) hats #hy #e are ali<e. He <etoed or "o.ntermanded an order to 2ire n."lear tipped torpedoes at the peak o2 the &.>an missile "risis #hen '.ssian
s.>marines tho.ght they #ere .nder atta"k. D2 he hadnt: it pro>a>ly #o.ld ha<e lead to a n."lear #ar: #hi"h i2 that happens: #ere 2inished. Whats happening no#J
When the National 4e".rity 4trategy #as anno.n"ed 2or it to >e taken serio.sly it had to >e implemented. Fa2ia Dons .nderstand that too: yo. ha<e to do something or
people #ont take yo. serio.sly. Well the most <isi>le and p.>li"i5ed implementation #as the in<asion o2 DraC: >.t there #as another one #hi"h #as important and hasnt
>een m."h dis".ssed. he +.sh administration immediately mo<ed to e?pand o22ensi<e military "apa"ity. hey
immediately mo<ed to .ndermine international treaties. Dt terminated negotiations on an en2or"ea>le >io
#eapons treaty: .ndermined rati2i"ation o2 old >io-#eapons treaties. he air 2or"e spa"e "ommand immediately
anno.n"ed plans to mo<e 2rom it "alled "ontrol o2 spa"e to o#nership o2 spa"e: #hi"h is e?a"tly "onsistent #ith
the se".rity strategy: that no one "an "hallenge o.r total domination. What does o#nership o2 spa"e meanJWell
thats presented in leaked plans: yo. "an 2ind them. Dt means p.tting spa"e plat2orms in or>it 2rom #hi"h yo. "an la.n"h
o22ensi<e #eapons: highly destr."ti<e #eapons: #itho.t #arning and instantaneo.sly #ith 2irst strike a.thority.
Dt #as also O.st reported that the 1entagon is de<eloping hypersoni" planes #hi"h #ill or>it in spa"e: enter the
atmosphere at the last min.te so they "ant >e dete"ted and instantaneo.sly drop highly destr."ti<e pre"ision
#eaponry. he #orld is .nder <ery tight s.r<eillan"e so yo. "an dete"t i2 some>ody is #alking a"ross the street in (nkara. No# others rea"t to that
threat: so '.ssian de2ense spending has predi"ta>ly sharply in"reased sin"e +.sh "ame in: >y (meri"an "al".lation it might ha<e tripled.
8.st a "o.ple o2 #eeks ago the '.ssian had their 2irst maOor military mane.<ers in the last t#o de"ades. hey <ery
pointedly said this is in response to ;4 es"alation. he ;4 is de<eloping lo# yield n."lear #eapons #hi"h is in
<iolation o2 international treaties and the '.ssians .nderstand: as do strategi" analysts: that their p.rpose is to
atta"k the "ommand >.nkers that "ontrol their retaliatory n."lear systems: so theyre going to rea"t to
it. he+.sh administration O.st anno.n"ed that it is going to employ a missile de2ense system. -<ery>ody kno#s
that a missile de2ense system is an o22ensi<e #eapon: its a 2irst strike #eapon. heres .ni<ersal agreement on this >y >oth sides.
We kno# ho# the ;4 rea"ted to this #hen the '.ssians made a slight mo<e in that dire"tion >y pla"ing: in 10$*: a small (+F system aro.nd Fos"o#. he ;4 rea"ted
at on"e >y targeting it #ith o22ensi<e n."lear #eapons: targeting the rear o.tposts #ith n."lear #eapons so they #o.ld o<er#helm any possi>le de2ense. Do yo. think
the'.ssians #ill rea"t di22erentlyJ No theyre saying straight o.t that they<e adopted +.shs 2irst strike do"trineN that theyre
deploying their o22ensi<e missiles: #hi"h they "laim are m."h more sophisti"ated and are on "omp.ter
"ontrolled a.tomated la.n"h. (meri"an strategi" analysts "all that an a""ident #aiting to happen. T"!s! t"*n,s
a$! ,o*n, to (*s1*$!< he (meri"an systems #hi"h are m."h more sophisti"ated ha<e a three min.te period
d.ring #hi"h h.man inter<ention "an pre<ent a.tomated response: the '.ssian systems are #orse. 4o(&+t!$
!$$o$s a$! %a*l/ occ+$$!nc!s *n t"! US co(&+t!$ s/st!(. hink #hat theyre going to >e like in the '.ssian systems. So. are asking 2or
a disaster. he &hinese are s.rely going to respond to a so "alled missile de2ense system sin"e it eliminates their
strategi" n."lear "apa"ity: so instead o2 ha<ing t#enty missiles targeting the ;nited 4tates theyll >.ild it .p and
pro>a>ly ha<e a s.>marine la.n"hed "apa"ity. hat sets o22 a ne# "y"le. &hina in"reases its missile "apa"ity: Dndia
responds. Dndia in"reases it and 1akistan responds. So. get a ripple e22e"t. his is e?traordinarily dangero.s. Do
#e #ant 1akistan to in"rease its o22ensi<e n."lear "apa"ityJ Ha<e a look at ho# their missiles are
"ontrolled. hese mo<es are deli>erately: "ons"io.sly: raising the threat to s.r<i<al. (nd its not that Wol2o#it5 and '.ms2eld and so on #ant the #orld destroyed:
it O.st doesnt matter m."h to them: those risks arent important as "ompared to #hat its important: dominating the #orld >y 2or"e and dismantling the hated #el2are state
meas.res at home: thats important. Dn "omparison i2 yo. threaten to >lo# .p the #orld: i2 yo. in"rease the threat o2 terror: #ell thats B/: thatRs the #ay the
"ookie "r.m>les.
HEG ?AD ) TAIWAN
US-4"*na #a$ *s +nao*%a'l! as lon, as t"! US (a*nta*ns *ts s!c+$*t/ co((*t(!nts to Ta*#an< Onl/
%!c$!as*n, "!,!(on/ sol!s
Ta*#an - 4"*na T*(!s B7897.. K?/ Gao 4"on,l+n :Translated By Lisa Ferguson 89 Ma$c" 82.. Will the ;nited 4tates 6i<e ;p on Dts
&ommitment to ai#an 4e".rityJ -dited >y Fark DeL."as http)33#at"hingameri"a."om3Ne#s30$2123spe"ial-"ol.mn->y-g.o-"hongl.n-#ill-the-.nited-states-gi<e-.p-
on-its-"ommitment-to-tai#an-se".rityM
Dn the tide o2 the 8asmine 'e<ol.tion: it appeared that the ;nited 4tates "o.ldnt de"ide initially #hi"h path to takeN #hen it 2irst
started: the ;nited 4tates appeared to #el"ome it #armly: >.t >y the time it had spread to +ahrain: Semen and 4a.di (ra>ia: the ;nited 4tates had >eg.n to hesitate.
(ltho.gh it #as at the reC.est o2 many -.ropean "o.ntries: the ;nited 4tates rel."tantly agreed to .se military 2or"e in Li>ya: >.t re2.sed to send in gro.nd troops.
Foreo<er: the ;nited 4tates is in a h.rry to trans2er "ommand o2 the allied armies to N(B. Fany are "alling this inter<ention in Li>ya =h.manitarian inter<ention:@
>.t the attit.de o2 the (meri"an go<ernment is 2ar 2rom >eing a model e?ample o2 this. Dnstead: it is making other "o.ntries in the #orld >egin to s.spe"t #hether G
>e"a.se o2 DraC and (2ghanistan G ;.4. hegemony has >eg.n to deteriorate. Ds ;.4. 2oreign poli"y shrinking
>a"k into isolationismJ (ll along: the ;.4. "ommitment to ai#ans se".rity #as not only rea22irmed >y the ai#an 'elations ("t and all pre<io.s
presidents: >.t it #as also the ;nited 4tates making an asso"iated pledge) a "ommitment to the se".rity o2 the (sia-1a"i2i" region. No#: ho#e<er: there is a
so.nd emerging that perhaps the ;nited 4tates #ill eliminate ai#an 2rom its se".rity "ommitments. 2%1% #as a
pi<otal year in &hina-;.4. relations: 2irst #ith Ooint ;.4.-/orea e?er"ises in the Sello# 4ea: #hi"h triggered
&hinas protest. hen "ame the &hina-8apan so<ereignty disp.te o<er the Diaoy. K4enkak.M DslandsN the ;nited
4tates: in the spirit o2 se".rity "ooperation: took the position o2 s.pporting 8apan. (2ter#ard: in the disp.te in
the 4o.th &hina 4ea: the ;.4.: on >ehal2 o2 4o.theast (sian nations: told &hina it #o.ld inter<ene. (ll o2 these
"ontro<ersies related to territorial #aters ne<er happened in the past >e"a.se &hina had yet to >.ild .p strength.
+.t no#: 2ollo#ing &hinas rise: its military might and e"onomi" strength ha<e already "reated 2ri"tion >et#een
it and other po#ers. B<er the "o.rse o2 &hinas rise: many ha<e >een looking 2or#ard to it >e"oming more do"ile: little >y little: #ithin the ;.4.-led
international orderN they a#ait the day #hen +eiOing >e"omes a =responsi>le shareholder.@ Set 2%1% pro<ed that &hina #ill not 2ollo# in a""ordan"e #ith the r.les set
>y the West: not only >e"a.se it 2inds the r.les to >e .n2air: >.t also >e"a.se the legitima"y o2 ;.4. leadership has no gro.nd le2t to stand
on a2ter the 2inan"ial e"onomi" "risis. For the sake o2 its o#n interests: the ;.4. #ill o2ten shi2t its tro.>les onto
its neigh>ors G the C.antitati<e easing KmonetaryM poli"y is O.st one e?ample o2 this. &onseC.ently: the se"ond pessimisti"
<ie# emerged: maintaining that "on2li"t >et#een &hina and the ;.4. is .na<oida>le. hey look do#n .pon the resear"h o2 past sinologists and think that &hina or the
&hinese &omm.nist 1artys so-"alled =spe"ial "hara"teristi"s@ are simply se"ondaryN #hat really has an e22e"t is international po#er str."t.re: #hi"h does not shi2t #ith
indi<id.al #illpo#er. D2 &hina really #ants to rise and "hallenge the (meri"an hegemony: then there is >o.nd to >e "on2li"t. Lately: ho#e<er: a third #ay o2 thinking
has arisen. 1ro2essor &harles 6laser o2 (meri"as 6eorge Washington ;ni<ersity #rote an arti"le in the most re"ent edition o2 the periodi"al Foreign (22airs:
ad<o"ating that the se".rity dilemma >et#een &hina and the ;.4. is not at all a>sol.te. D2 a 2e# se"ondary tensions are a>le to >e
dealt #ith properly: then its not ne"essarily the "ase that a.tomati" m.t.al "on2rontation #ill ariseN a military
"on2li"t is a<oida>le. He thinks that O.st >e"a.se there are o"eans o2 di22eren"e >et#een the t#o "o.ntries as #ell as m.t.al n."lear deterren"e: this does not
mean that they are ea"h others enemy. &hinas rise #ill not go so 2ar as to threaten the ;nited 4tates: >.t it "o.ld threaten the se".rity o2 its
(sia-1a"i2i" allies and the ;.4. military garrison there. 6laser thinks that &hina #ill not p.sh the ;nited 4tates o.t o2 the (sia-1a"i2i" in
p.rs.it o2 greater se".rity. Dn reality: #hat he didnt say is that the ;.4. military po#er deployed in the (sia-1a"i2i" "an inhi>it the e?pansion o2 the 8apanese and
/orean militaries. Dn other #ords: &hina doesnt need to #orry a>o.t 8apanese: or e<en 4o.th and North /orean: military "on2li"t: >e"a.se (meri"as se".rity "oalition
in the (sia-1a"i2i" "an a"t.ally promote se".rity in the region. +.t there is one e?"eption to this G the ;.4. se".rity "ommitment to ai#an. He
>elie<es that ai#an is not in the same "ategory as 8apan and 4o.th /orea. ;ntil no#: &hina still has not gi<en .p on .sing military 2or"e
against ai#an: 2o".sing all its reso.r"es on inter<ening in ai#anese and ;.4. military a22airs and in"reasing its threats. (s the pa"e o2 the 1eoples
Li>eration (rmys moderni5ation a""elerates: the danger o2 >ilateral "on2li"t also rises. (""ording to the "al".lations o2 a
realist like 6laser: sin"e &hina #ill not "hange its intentions and the risk o2 "on2li"t is so great: the ;.4. sho.ld
"onsider #ithdra#ing its se".rity "ommitment to ai#an. his drasti" meas.re "o.ld mo<e .s a#ay 2rom the
"on2li"ts detonator: #hile also laying a smooth path 2or relations >et#een the t#o nations 2or 2.t.re de"ades. B2
"o.rse there #ill >e "riti"s #ho say this #o.ld mean the ;.4. had yielded to &hinas military might. Bther than "osting the ;nited 4tates its "redi>ility in the (sia-
1a"i2i": it "o.ld also #het &hinas appetite. +.t =not all ad<ersaries are Hitler:@ as 6laser points o.t. Looking thro.gh the lens o2 negotiation and
"ompromise: this "o.ld help rea"h a ne# eC.ili>ri.m: and tensions #o.ld th.s re"ede. Foreo<er: #hen
anno.n"ing the de"ision to gi<e .p on the ai#an se".rity "ommitment: the ;.4. "o.ld still rea22irm its se".rity
"ommitments #ith other nations and strengthen its e?er"ises #ith other "o.ntries: th.s red."ing the .nease
a>o.t dis"arding ai#an.
Ta*#an #a$ ,o!s n+cl!a$
Li"tor 4o$&+s: KFormer +rigadier 6eneral: Former head o2 (rmy Dntelligen"eM: C26
9(sian imes: =D2 it "omes to a shooting #ar@: *-2%-$: http)33###.atimes."om3atimes3&hina3HD2%(d%3.html 33 La"kA
Bne "o.ld "all this arti"le a #orst-"ase s"enario 2or the ne# (meri"an "ent.ry. Why #orst "aseJ +e"a.se o2 the hard lessons 2rom history.
he 'omans did not "onsider the #orst-"ase s"enario #hen Hanni>al "rossed the (lps #ith his elephants and ro.ted themN or #hen Hanni>al en"ir"led and annihilated
the n.meri"ally s.perior 'oman army at the +attle o2 &annae. Ta*#an %!cla$!s *n%!&!n%!nc! \ &hina has anti"ipated and long prepared
itsel2 2or this e<ent. (2ter o>ser<ing QBperation 4.mmer 1.lse ,%4Q #hen ;4 air"ra2t "arrier >attle gro.ps "on<erged in the #aters o22 &hinaRs "oast in mid-8.ly
thro.gh (.g.st o2 2%%4: &hinese planners >egan preparing to 2a"e its o#n #orst-"ase s"enario) the possi>ility o2 "on2ronting a total o2 1! "arrier >attle gro.ps
"omposed o2 12 2rom (meri"a and three 2rom its "lose +ritish ally. &hinaRs strategists re2er to its "o.nter-strategy to de2eat 1! or more air"ra2t "arrier >attle gro.ps as
the QassassinRs ma"eQ or shashau&ian. (2ter proper "oordination #ith '.ssia and Dran and a"ti<ating their pre<io.sly agreed strategi" plan: troops and #eapon systems
are pre-positioned. &hina then la.n"hes a missile >arrage on ai#an . &ommand and "ontrol nodes: military >ases: logisti"s
"enters: <ital #ar ind.stries: go<ernment "enters and air de2ense installations are sim.ltaneo.sly hit #ith short and
medi.m range >allisti" missiles armed #ith "on<entional: anti-radar: thermo >ari" and ele"tro-magneti" p.lse #arheads.
he assassinRs ma"e) &hinaRs anti-satellite #eapons 6lee and e"stasy soon t.rn to sho"k as monitor s"reens s.ddenly go >lank. hen all "omm.ni"ation <ia satellites
goes dead. &hina has dra#n its se"ond Q tr.mp "ard Q Kthe assassinRs ma"eM >y a"ti<ating its mane.<era>le QparasiteQ mi"ro-satellites
that ha<e .nkno#ingly "l.ng to <ital KNB'(DM radar and "omm.ni"ation satellites and ha<e either Oammed: >linded or
physi"ally destroyed their hosts. his is "omplemented >y spa"e mines that mane.<er near ad<ersary satellites and
e?plode. 4e"ret &hinese and '.ssian gro.nd->ased anti-satellite laser #eapons also >lind or >ring do#n ;4 and +ritish
satellites .sed 2or &4D4' K"ommand: "ontrol: "omm.ni"ation: "omp.ters: intelligen"e: s.r<eillan"e and re"onnaissan"eM. (nd to ens.re red.ndan"y and make
s.re that the ad<ersary &4D4' system is "ompletely Q>lindedQ e<en temporarily: h.ndreds o2 sele"t &hinese and '.ssian in2ormation #arriors Kha"kersM spe"i2i"ally
trained to atta"k their ad<ersaryRs &4D4' systems sim.ltaneo.sly la.n"h their "y>er o22ensi<e. For a 2e# pre"io.s min.tes: the ;4 and ;/ ad<an"ing
"arrier >attle gro.ps are st.nned and >linded >y the Qma"eQ: ie: a de2ensi<e #eapon .sed to temporarily >lind a stronger opponent. +.t the #ord
ma"e has another meaningN one #hi"h is deadlier and .sed in "om>ination #ith the 2irst. Fissile >arrage on ad<an"ing "arrier >attle gro.ps ( 2e# se"onds a2ter
the Q>la"ko.tQ: literally h.ndreds o2 short and medi.m-range >allisti" missiles KDF73031131!s: DF4s: DF21Y3(s: some o2 #hi"h are
mane.<era>leM pre-positioned on the &hinese mainland: and stealthy: sea-skimming and highly-a"".rate "r.ise missiles KS812s:
S822s: /H31(31s: S8*3s: &3%1s: &*%2s: 44-N-22s: 44-NY-2$327s: 3F!4s P HN3sM deli<ered 2rom plat2orms on land: sea and air ra"e to#ard
their respe"ti<e designated targets at s.personi" speed . (ir"ra2t "arriers are allotted a >arrage o2 more than t#o do5en "r.ise missiles ea"h: 2ollo#ed
>y a >arrage o2 short and medi.m-range >allisti" missiles timed to arri<e in rapid s.""ession. &hinese and '.ssian missiles "o"ked +oth &hinese and '.ssian
inter-"ontinental >allisti" missiles KD&+FsM: s.>marine-la.n"hed >allisti" missiles K4L+FsM: and the t#o "o.ntriesR e?tensi<e air de2ense systems ha<e >een
"oordinated and ready to respond in the e<ent that the ;4 and ;/ de"ide to retaliate #ith a n."lear atta"k . (meri"a "rippled on
three maOor 2ronts Dn O.st a 2e# ho.rs Kor daysM a2ter the o.t>reak o2 general hostilities: (meri"a: the #orldRs lone s.perpo#er:
2inds itsel2 >adly "rippled militarily in three maOor regions o2 the #orld) -ast (sia: &entral (sia and the Fiddle -ast. Dmpossi>leJ
;n2ort.nately: the ans#er is no. &hina no# has the kno#-ho# and the 2inan"ial reso.r"es to mass-prod."e h.ndreds: i2 not
tho.sands: o2 Foskit: Sakhont and 6ranit-type s.personi" anti-ship "r.ise missiles and QsC.allQ-type ro"ket torpedoes
against #hi"h ;4 and ;/ air"ra2t "arriers and s.>marines ha<e no kno#n de2ense. Dran: on the other hand: already possesses the same
s.personi" "r.ise missiles that "an destroy any ship in the 1ersia 6.l2: in"l.ding air"ra2t "arriers. '.ssia and &hina: mean#hile: are operating on 2amiliar gro.nds "lose
to their territory: "ompared to the ;4: #hi"h needs to "ross the (tlanti" and 1a"i2i" to replenish troops and logisti"s. 6rimmer s"enarios here is a s"enario grimmer
than des"ri>ed a>o<e: ho#e<er: and that is i2 strategi" planners >elonging to that elite gro.p "alled the 1roOe"t 2or the Ne# (meri"an
&ent.ry de"ide to la.n"h a n."lear Q2irst strikeQ against &hina and '.ssia and risk a (+t+all/-ass+$!% %!st$+ct*on> 1MDn
de2ense o2 ai#an ... or 2M Dn la.n"hing a Qpre<enti<e #arQ to stop &hina 2rom "at"hing .p e"onomi"ally and militarily. Br: i2 &hina de"ides to start an o22ensi<e against
ai#an #ith a one-megaton n."lear >.rst 4% kilometers a>o<e the "enter o2 the island. Br: i2 &hina and '.ssia de"ide to arm a n.m>er o2 their short and medi.m-range
>allisti" missiles and s.personi" "r.ise missiles #ith ta"ti"al n."lear #arheads in de2ending themsel<es against ;4 and ;/ air"ra2t "arrier >attle gro.ps. Land-
atta"k <ersions o2 these s.personi" "r.ise missiles armed #ith n."lear #arheads "arried >y stealthy &hinese and '.ssian
s.>marines "an also p.t (meri"an "oastal "ities at great risk to n."lear de<astation . 4trategi" planners m.st also "onsider
these #orst-"ase possi>ilities.
HEG ?AD ) TERRORISM
H!,!(on/ ca+s!s t!$$o$*s(
Innoc!nt an% 4a$&!nt!$ 9 9Falo.: 2oreign poli"y analyst at &ato #ho 2o".ses on (2ghanistan and 1akistan:
and ed: <i"e president 2or de2ense and 2oreign poli"y st.dies at &ato: =-s"aping the 6ra<eyard o2 -mpires) (
4trategy to -?it (2ghanistan:@http)33###."ato.org3p.>s3#tpapers3es"aping-gra<eyard-empires-strategy-e?it-
a2ghanistan.pd2A
&ontrary to the "laims that #e sho.ld .se the ;.4. military to sta>ili5e the region and red."e the threat o2 terrorism: a 2%%*
st.dy >y the '(ND &orporation 2o.nd that ;.4. poli"ies emphasi5ing the .se o2 2or"e tend to "reate ne# terrorists. Dn =Ho# errorist
6ro.ps -nd) Lessons 2or &o.ntering al Haida:@ 4eth 8ones and Fartin Li>i"ki arg.e that the ;.4. military =sho.ld generally resist >eing dra#n into "om>at operations
in F.slim so"ieties: sin"e 9a ;.4. militaryA presen"e is likely to in"rease terrorist re"r.itment.@ 22 4ome poli"ymakers "laim the #ar is
#orth #aging >e"a.se terrorists 2lo.rish in 2ailed states. +.t that arg.ment "annot a""o.nt 2or terrorists #ho thri<e in "entrali5ed states that ha<e the so<ereignty to
reOe"t e?ternal inter2eren"e. 23 hat is one reason #hy militants 2ind san"t.ary in neigh>oring: n."leararmed 1akistan. Dn this respe"t: and perhaps most important: is
the >elie2 that o.r presen"e in the region helps 1akistan: #hen in 2a"t the seemingly open-ended ;.4. presen"e in (2ghanistan risks "reating
#orse pro>lems 2or 1akistan. (massing troops in (2ghanistan 2eeds the per"eption o2 a 2oreign o"".pation:
spa#ning more terrorist re"r.its 2or 1akistani militias and th.s pla"ing .nd.e stress on an already #eakened nation. &hristian 4"ien"e Fonitor
"orrespondent (nand 6opal 2inds: =Dn late 2%%7: as many as 27 gro.ps merged to 2orm an .m>rella ali>an mo<ement: the ehreek-e-ali>an: .nder g.errilla leader
+ait.llah Fehs.d.@ He "ontin.es: =hree o2 the most po#er2.l: on"e-2e.ding "ommandersGFr. Fehs.d and Fa.lalems 2or the go<ernment in
Dslama>ad: #hi"h is deeply .npop.lar 2or many reasons: in"l.ding its alignment #ith ;.4. poli"ies. 2! here are also indi"ations that it has raised tensions in
;5>ekistan and other &entral (sian "o.ntries. For Dslami" militants thro.gho.t the region: the ;.4. o"".pation o2 (2ghanistan
G like the o"".pation o2 DraCGis an in"reasingly potent re"r.iting tool. Bnly >y prolonging o.r military
presen"e do #e allo# the ali>an: 6.l>.ddin Hekmatyars Hi5>-e Dslami: the HaCCani net#ork: and e<en 1akistani ali>an militants to re2rame
the "on2li"t and their position #ithin it as a legitimate de2ense against a 2oreign o"".pation. Dn this respe"t: poli"ymakers
sho.ld re"ogni5e that not e<eryone #illing to resist ;.4. inter<ention is ne"essarily an enemy o2 the ;nited 4tates. Fost importantly: #e m.st .nderstand that not e<ery
Dslami" 2.ndamentalist is a radi"al Dslamist: let alone one #ho is hell->ent on la.n"hing a terrorist atta"k against the (meri"an homeland.
H!, ca+s!s t!$$o$ an% &$ol*1
La/n! 29 'esear"h Fello# #ith the &enter on 1ea"e and Li>erty at he Dndependent Dnstit.te and Fary 8.lia
and 6eorge '. 8ordan 1ro2essorship o2 Dnternational (22airs at the 6eorge +.sh 4"hool o2 6o<ernment and
1.>li" 4er<i"e at e?as (PF ;ni<ersity
K&hris: (meri"as Fiddle -ast grand strategy a2ter DraC) the moment 2or o22shore >alan"ing has arri<ed: 'eview of International Studies ()**+
Dn addition to so2t >alan"ing: asymmetri" strategies are another type o2 nontraditional >alan"ing that is >eing employed to "ontest
;4 prima"y . When employed >y states: asymmetri" strategies mean the a"C.isition o2 #eapons o2 mass destr."tion KWFDM "apa>ilities. 'egional
po#ers , espe"ially those on the ;4 hit list like Dran and 4addam H.sseins DraC , "annot sl.g it o.t toe-to-toe against the ;4 dominant high-te"h "on<entional
2or"es. +e"a.se they are threatened >y the ;4: ho#e<er: these states seek other methods o2 o22setting (meri"an po#er: and diss.ading Washington 2rom .sing its
military m.s"le against them. WFD , espe"ially the possession o2 n."lear #eapons , is one #ay these states "an le<el the strategi" playing
2ield and deter the ;4 2rom atta"king them. errorism is another asymmetri" strategy , one employed >y non-state a"tors like Al,
-aeda and similar Oihadist gro.ps , to resist ;4 dominan"e . he .se o2 asymmetri" strategies to oppose (meri"an po#er ,
espe"ially in the Fiddle -ast #here ;4 poli"y has an imperial dimension , ill.strates the di"t.m that empires
ine<ita>ly pro<oke resistan"e.
Posen 0,- $ord %nternational &rofessor of &olitical Science and 'irector of the Security Studies
&rogram at the (assachusetts %nstitute of Technology !)arry . &osen, *The +ase for
estraint,, http%&&www.the$american$interest.com&article.cfm'piece())*" -&
Today the most imminent U.S. security pro"lem has to do not with con3uest or intimidation "ut safety. Here, at
least, the consensus view is correct. The main discrete threat is al-Jaeda, "ut if the foregoing analysis is right, there are deeper forces feeding
that organi:ation than its interpretation of religious te<ts. These forces could give rise to other violent
organi:ations. In other words, al-Jaeda is not t!e pro"lem, "ut a particularly threatening e<ample of a condition of
glo"al disorder and disaffection capa"le of giving rise to numerous such groups, Islamist and otherwise. This
condition is the pro"lem, which +merican power and actions over the years have done a good deal, al"eit
inadvertently, to cause, "ut cannot now easily or "y themselves redress.
Y! 29 - Dire"tor o2 the -ast (sian 4t.dies 1rogram P (ssistant 1ro2essor o2 Dnternational 'elations at +oston ;ni<ersity 9Fin Se: =he ;.4. Hegemony and
Dmpli"ation 2or &hina@ pages 23-31: http)33"hinaipa.org3"paC3<1i131aperTSe.pd2 33alisa yangA
-inally, disadvantaged groups and nations in the world may "lame on the U.S for their difficulties due to the
unipolar structure. The U.S ma5es an easy target for glo"al grievances and in8ustice. -or instance, the various terrorist
attac5s on the U.S cannot totally "e ascri"ed to the e<ercise of power. $any countries have institutional, historical, and geographical roots in their
economic underdevelopment and political insta"ility. 7ecause the U.S is the most powerful nation in the world, it can "e an
easy "lame for the e<tremist groups.
To conclude, 4alt:Fs statement may not reali:e due to the specific power, interest, and institutional features of the U.S hegemony, "ut it is also right
in implying that an un"alanced power can "e revisionist and despotic. $eanwhile, a hegemon can "ecome easy
target for glo"al grievance and result in disastrous terrorists attac5 on the civilians. How to e<ercise power well and how
to prevent terrorist attac5 should "e the attention of +merican hegemony and how to restrict hegemonic a"uses should "e the focus of other nations in
the world
HEG ?AD ) WAR
Pulcifer 0+- U.S. analyst of international conflicts, .==M- !+sh ulcifer, Tellow ages, #U.S. Hegemony% the Dynamics of 9lo"al ower', G-.S-22,
http%((www.scoop.co.n:(stories(HB=M=G(S==.2G(us-hegemony-the-dynamics-of-glo"al-power.htm)
The United States has failed to persuade the world to support its 3uest for glo"al hegemony. The "elief that +merica is the
Dindispensa"le nationD that needs to continually e<pand its sphere of influence has "een met with resistance
from many, "oth inside and outside its "orders. This failure of persuasion means that the U.S. will find it difficult to
secure control around the world and instead will "e met with challenges from other states claiming different
ideologies, hoping to surmount the U.S. in glo"al attractiveness and influence. Instead of continuing this failed
attempt to remain a glo"al hegemon, the U.S. should instead recogni:e the li5elihood of its wea5ened future
position and wor5 to create empowered glo"al institutions that could prevent one state from ever achieving too
much power. The "attles fought "etween the great ,uropean states in the two world wars e<emplified the need
to restrain individual states from "ecoming rogue superpowers. +fter 4orld 4ar I, the Beague of Nations was created. This
organi:ation was not given enough power and it "ecame o"solete with the "loodshed of the Second 4orld 4ar. +fter Hitler6s and Hirohito6s armies fell,
the need for a restraining organi:ation was felt once again. The United Nations was created in order to provide an effective tool
for tempering the power of individual states. 4hile achieving many great humanitarian successes, the United
Nations has largely failed in its other mission to chec5 the power of dominant states. It was a"le to restrain
wea5 states effectively, "ut due to its lac5 of a strong military or economic capa"ility, powerful states simply
ignored the decrees of the United Nations when they didn6t suit their interests. Instead of the United Nations preserving
world order after the fall of 9ermany and Capan, a fragile power "alance developed from the rivalry "etween the Soviet Union and the United States.
4ith the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 6/=s, it was finally time to see if the United Nations could fulfill its mandate to control world order. During
its trial decade, the U.N. had a few nota"le successes, such as its prevention of Saddam Hussein from remaining in control of ;uwaitA
however, wea5 states felt that the United Nations was merely a handmaiden of the United States, a country
whose economic and military power was so strong that it could manipulate individual mem"er states to vote in its favor. 7ut the
U.N.6s ma8or failures were most evident in its powerlessness to intercede in military disputes. Not intervening in the *wandan genocide was one of the
greatest tragedies of the 2//=s and directly tarnished the reputation of the United Nations as an effective military force. *wanda proved that in order for
an organi:ation li5e the U.N. to e<ist, it needed an independent military free from the restraints and policies of mem"er states. 7ut it was not until
the invasion of Ira3 in .==M that the U.N.6s true impotence was revealed. The ina"ility of the U.N. to restrain
the United States from attac5ing Ira3 proves that the U.N. is completely incapa"le of enforcing resolutions that
"ind powerful states to international law. This ina"ility, though already well 5nown, is most evident in the U.N.6s decades-long failure to
restrain Israel from its occupation of foreign lands. 7ut the U.N.6s restraining ina"ility in .==M was magnified "y the fact that
the country the U.N. could not restrain was the all-powerful United States, ironically also a country that
pu"licly cherishes the very ideals for which the U.N. stands. The United States has almost always "een an outspo5en proponent of
the U.N., often citing its resolutions as 8ustifications for punishing a vile government. Tet in .==M, the U.S. showed that it now considers the U.N. to "e
only a servant of U.S. policy and that it6s openly willing to defy the rulings of this international "ody that it, itself, helped to create. In doing so, the
U.S. has wea5ened the United Nations and will indirectly cause less international cooperation and a higher
potential for regional conflict. The effects of this pu"lic disavowal have not yet "egun to "e seen. It will ta5e time for states to reassess their
interests and decide on how they will alter their national policies. 7ut if the U.N. continues to "e ignored "y the United States, these states will "e forced
to alter their national policies, focusing less on international cooperation and more on strict national o"8ectivesA these states will no longer "e a"le to
achieve national o"8ectives through the United Nations and will now have to ta5e unilateral actions to secure their interests, as was done "y the U.S. in
Ira3. The U.S., however, still has the possi"ility to mend the damage done to the U.N. If the 7ush administration were to affirm une3uivocally that the
United Nations was needed to re"uild Ira3 and was imperative for the creation of a future Ira3i government, it would restore the U.N.6s credi"ility. The
United States would have to ta5e a less hands on approach in Ira36s political, economic and military futureA moreover, the U.S. could push for an
international peace5eeping force to "e deployed throughout all of Ira3, giving a real possi"ility that the Ira3i people would see the U.S. action as
li"eration rather than occupation. These actions would reassert the traditional U.S. "elief in the importance of the United Nations as an effective force in
world order. The "uttressing of the United Nations "y the United States would wor5 to protect U.S. interests in the future. It is true that the U.S. will "e
"etter a"le to achieve more narrow national o"8ectives "y circumventing the U.N., "ut this will only "e possi"le in the short-term. Bac5ing the attraction
necessary to "e a glo"al hegemon and wea5ening the power of other states through its re8ection of the United Nations,
other states will wor5 to rival the U.S. in economic and military power. Bi5e all great powers, the superiority of
the United States will most li5ely "ecome diminished in the future. Therefore, in order to secure long-term U.S. interests, the United
States should wor5 to reinforce the United Nations, or to create a new glo"al "ody that will "e a"le to restrain individual states effectively. 4hile such an
institution may damage some U.S. short-term interests, in the end it could help to protect the United States and other countries from ma8or military
conflicts. +s of now, however, there are no real signs that the 7ush administration is interested in falling "ac5 on the traditional U.S. stance toward the
United Nations. It is true that internationalists amongst the administration, such as Colin owell, have sought to soften the anti-U.N. rhetoric coming
from entagon officials li5e Secretary of State Donald *umsfeld. 7ut even the internationalists seem to "e falling in line with the 7ush Doctrine that calls
for a more internationally proactive U.S., not necessarily wor5ing within the guidelines put forth "y the United Nations. If this waning influence of the
United Nations continues along with a proactive U.S. on the international scene, there will "e definite reactions throughout the world. 7ecause
states are not convinced of the +merican economic, political and societal models, they will react negatively
toward hegemonic U.S. assertions and will wor5 to limit the power of the United States. If these states cannot
use the U.N. to limit the power of the U.S., they will use other means such as "uilding alliances and increasing
their economic independence from 4ashington. -inally, in order to protect their interests, they will pump
more money into their militaries. Such a future does not "ode well for an improved sense of world order that all
humanity so desperately desires.

***HEG GOOD
HEG GOOD ) ASIAN WAR
H!,!(on/ 0!/ to As*an sta'*l*t/
4oo0 !t al .2 9Fal"olm: 2ormer 1rogram Dire"tor 2or -ast (sia at the Lo#y Dnstit.te: Dean o2 the 4"hool o2
Dnternational 4t.dies at Flinders ;ni<ersity:Q1o#er and &hoi"e) (sian 4e".rity F.t.res:Q 8.ne:
http)33asiase".rity.ma"2o.nd.org3images3.ploads3>logTatta"hments3(sianTse".rityT2.t.resT-T2inalT<ersion.pd2A
Dn the a>sen"e o2 #ar or a".te se".rity "ompetition: it has >e"ome tempting to "on"ei<e o2 pea"e and e"onomi"
dynamism as imm.ta>le 2eat.res o2 (sias strategi" en<ironment. Set these e?ist largely as a >y-prod."t o2 ;4
prima"y: and the strategi"ally predi"ta>le en<ironment that (meri"as preponderant po#er has .nderpinned. (lternati<e se".rity orders are
possi>le: and in none o2 them "an pea"e and sta>ility >e taken 2or granted: sin"e the regions po#er transitions
"ontin.e to .n2old against the >a"kdrop o2 di<ergent national interests: histori"al mistr.st: signs o2 in"reasingly
strident nationalism: .nresol<ed territorial disp.tes: the proli2eration o2 game"hanging military te"hnologies:
and gro#ing "ompetition 2or energy and reso.r"es.
HEG GOOD ) ASIAN PROLIFERATION
H!,!(on/ sol!s As*an &$ol*1!$at*on
L*!'!$ CD K'o>ert: 1ro2essor o2 6o<ernment and Dnternational (22airs at 6eorgeto#n ;ni<ersity:he (meri"an
-ra) 1o#er and 4trategy 2or the 21
st
&ent.ry: p. 174M
aken together: these As*an *nol!(!nts a$! not #*t"o+t $*s0: espe"ially <is-a-<is North /orea: &hina-
ai#an: and the .n"ertain 2.t.re o2 a n."lear-armed 1akistan. Nonetheless: the A(!$*can !n,a,!(!nt
&$o*%! s >oth $!ass+$anc! an% %!t!$$!nc! an% th.s !as!s t"! s!c+$*t/ %*l!((as o1 t"! 0!/ stat!s t"!$! :
in"l.ding "o.ntries that are (meri"aRs allies >.t remain s.spi"io.s o2 ea"h other. 6i<en the history o2 the
region: an A(!$*can #*t"%$a#al #o+l% '! l*0!l/ to t$*,,!$ a$(s $ac!s an% t"! acc!l!$at!% &$ol*1!$at*on o1
n+cl!a$ #!a&ons< Dt is th.s no e?aggeration to des"ri>e the (meri"an presen"e as pro<iding the Qo?ygenQ
"r."ial 2or the regionRs sta>ility and e"onomi" prosperity.
H!, sol!s As*an &$ol*1!$at*on
Wo$t-!l 2B 1h.D L1 o2 Foreign 1oli"y and De2ense 4t.dies at he Heritage Fo.ndation
KLarry: *United States (ilitary $orces in #sia (aintain the &eace and #dvance 'emocracy,"
A(!$*cas primary regional s!c+$*t/ *nt!$!sts a$! '!st s!$!% '/ &$!s!$*n, t"! sta'*l*t/ o1 No$t"!ast As*a: an area
plag.ed >y #ar 2or most o2 the past "ent.ry. W*t"o+t an A(!$*can (*l*ta$/ &$!s!nc!: deep histori"al animosities and t!$$*to$*al
%*s&+t!s among '.ssia: &hina: 8apan: and the t#o /oreas #o+l% l!a% to a (aEo$ $ac! 1o$ (*l*ta$/ %o(*nanc!<
( deli"ate >alan"e has e?isted sin"e the end o2 World War #o: #hen 8apan reno.n"ed o22ensi<e military 2or"e and reOe"ted n."lear #eapons. 1.lling o.t ;4 troops
#o.ld destroy that >alan"e. (meri"as military presen"e in Northeast (sia "as &$o*%!% t"! ,l+! 1o$ s!c+$*t/ a$$an,!(!nts
that o22ered prote"tion to its allies and reass.ran"es that helped a<ert an arms ra"e among enemies that ha<e 2o.ght ea"h other 2or "ent.ries. (meri"as
>ilateral se".rity treaties #ith 8apan and 4o.th /orea: respe"ti<ely: ens.re that ;nited 4tates military: politi"al: and e"onomi" interests in the region are prote"ted. he
2or#ard presen"e o2 ;.4. troops also ser<es to prote"t the demo"ra"ies o2 4o.th /orea and ai#an 2rom hostile threats >y
Leninist di"tatorships in North /orea and &hina. Fa&an %!&!n%s on t"! &$!s!nc! o1 U<S. military 1o$c!s< Dt maintains its pea"e "onstit.tion:
es"he#s the de<elopment o2 an o22ensi<e military 2or"e: and 2eels se".re in a n."lear age #*t"o+t a n+cl!a$ a$s!nal
'!ca+s! o1 A(!$*can s!c+$*t/ ,+a$ant!!s. For 4o.th /orea: the presen"e o2 ;.4. "om>at 2or"es has "reated the "onditions that permitted
demo"ra"y and a market e"onomy to 2lo.rish. Dn 4o.th /orea: the <oters ele"ted a "andidate that #ants to p.rs.e dialog.e #ith North /orea. hey ele"ted a "andidate
#ho emphasi5ed engaging North /orea regardless o2 North /oreas rea"tions or re"ipro"ity. -<en tho.gh there ha<e >een protests: >oth 4o.th /orean presidential
"andidates: and the maOority o2 the "iti5ens o2 4o.th /orea: "ontin.e to re"ogni5e the sta>ility and se".rity that the ;.4. presen"e in /orea pro<ides. It *s
*(&!$at*! 1o$ A(!$*cans to $!(!('!$ t"at in the 2inal analysis: the 1o$#a$% %!&lo/(!nt o2 ;.4. troops s!$!s
A(!$*can *nt!$!sts e<en as it ad<an"es o.r <al.es.
HEG GOOD ) 4ENTRAL ASIA
H!,!(on/ 0!/ to &$!!nt con1l*ct *n 4!nt$al As*a
H*ll . 4enior Fello# in Foreign 1oli"y at the +rookings Dnstit.tion KFiona: Fay: =he &a."as.s and &entral (sia) Ho# the ;nited 4tates and Dts (llies &an 4ta<e
B22 a &risisM
Dn the ne?t t#o years: the &a."as.s and &entral (sian states "o.ld >e"ome 5ones o2 interstate "ompetition similar to the
Fiddle -ast and Northeast (sia. -"onomi" and politi"al "rises: or the Dntensi2i"ation o2 #ar in &he"hnya or (2ghanistan: might lead to the Q+alkani5ationQ o2 the
regions. his: in t.rn: "o.ld res.lt in military inter<ention >y any o2 the maOor po#ers. 6i<en the 2a"t that >oth
.rkey and Dran threatened inter<ention in the &a."as.s at the peak o2 the Nagorno-/ara>akh #ar in 1002-
1003: this risk sho.ld >e taken serio.sly. ;n2ort.nately: the &a."as.s and &entral (sian states la"k the "apa"ity to
ta"kle "rises #itho.t o.tside help. -"onomi" "ollapse has prod."ed so"ial dislo"ation and e?treme po<erty.
Widespread "orr.ption and the entren"hment o2 aging leaders and their 2amilies ha<e eroded s.pport 2or "entral go<ernments and "onstrained the de<elopment o2 a ne#
generation o2 leaders. he internal #eakness o2 the &a."as.s and &entral (sian states: "om>ined #ith >r.tal regional #ars: makes them
e?tremely <.lnera>le to o.tside press.reGespe"ially 2rom '.ssia. (ltho.gh '.ssia itsel2 is #eak: it is 2ar stronger than
all the states "om>ined: and #hile its dire"t in2l.en"e o<er their a22airs has de"lined sin"e the "ollapse o2 the 4o<iet ;nion: it remains the dominant
e"onomi": politi"al: and military 2or"e. he West #ill ha<e to assist the states in >olstering their instit.tional "apa"ity and in promoting "ooperation among them.
(meri"an engagement remains "r."ial gi<en its #eight on the international stage: the potential threats to its o#n se".rity: and
the 2a"t that it has le<erage in the regions. Dn spite o2 a 2e# glit"hes: the &a."as.s and &entral (sian states ha<e >een re"epti<e to the
;nited 4tates and are among its 2e# potential allies in a 5one #here other states are not so amena>le to ;.4.
a"ti<ity. 'egional "o.ntries need (meri"an moral and material s.pport to maintain independen"e in the 2a"e o2 in"reasing press.res: and its g.idan"e in dealing #ith
presidential transition "rises and addressing h.man rights a>.ses. -<en #ith limited politi"al and 2inan"ial reso.r"es: ;.4. leadership "an do a great
deal to de2.se regional tensions and mitigate pro>lems. Ho#e<er: this #ill only >e possi>le i2 a poli"y is de2ined early and "omm.ni"ated
"learly: i2 there is a parti".lar 2o".s on partnership #ith -.ropean allies in addressing regional "hallenges: and i2 '.ssia is en"o.raged to >e"ome a 2or"e 2or sta>ility
rather than a 2a"tor 2or insta>ility in the regions.
HEG GOOD ) 4HINA WAR
T$ans*t*on #a$ #*ll "a&&!n o!$ Ta*#an
Gol%st!*n = - 1ro2essor o2 6lo>al 1oliti"s and Dnternational 'elations [ ;ni<ersity o2 1ennsyl<ania 9(<ery
6oldstein: =1o#er transitions: instit.tions: and &hinaRs rise in -ast (sia) heoreti"al e?pe"tations and
e<iden"e:@ 8o.rnal o2 4trategi" 4t.dies: Lol.me 3%: Dss.e 4 P ! (.g.st 2%%7: pages $30 , $*2A
he ai#an "ase o22ers the strongest e<iden"e "on2irming the pessimisti" predi"tions o2 po#er-transition theory.
Set: the other "ases des"ri>ed a>o<e s.ggest that po#er-transition theory may also ha<e rele<an"e >eyond the ai#an 4trait. Despite &hinas ".rrently "ooperati<e
>eha<ior in 4o.theast (sia and /orea: po#er-transition theory predi"ts tro.>le ahead on"e a rising state gains the a>ility to
press its demands against regional ri<als and the ".rrently dominant ;4 po#er >ehind them that it m.st no#
a""ommodate. he a>sen"e o2 a "hallenge #hile it is easily re>.22ed is interpreted as simply the rational "hoi"e o2 a "ost-sensiti<e a"tor: >iding its time .ntil it
"an a"t on its pre2eren"es #ith the e?pe"tation that it "an pre<ail at an a""epta>le pri"e. Dn "onsidering the longer-term prospe"t o2 a rising &hina: po#er-transition
theory dire"ts attention to the <ision that o.tgoing leader 8iang Uemin arti".lated in 2%%2 , that at least the 2irst t#o de"ades o2 the t#enty-2irst "ent.ry #ill >e a ]period
o2 strategi" opport.nity d.ring #hi"h a less dangero.s international en<ironment pro<ides &hina #ith a "han"e to emphasi5e the moderni5ation program that #ill
ena>le the "o.ntry to a"hie<e the stat.s o2 a tr.e great po#er. 1o#er-transition theory: then: s.ggests that &hinas present poli"ies in
the 4o.th &hina 4ea and to#ards tension on the /orean penins.la mean only that +eiOing is st."k making the
>est o2 its disad<antageo.s position d.ring the early stages o2 its as"ent. he theorys e?pe"tation is that the ".rrent approa"h
em>ra"ing m.ltilateral instit.tions to manage sometimes "on2li"ting interests in these t#o "ases #ill not last. When &hina e<ent.ally has the po#er to shape o.t"omes
in #ays that ser<e its national interests: either the e?isting instit.tions #ill >e"ome <ehi"les 2or +eiOing to e?er"ise greater in2l.en"e: or &hina #ill "ease to rely on them.
his perspe"ti<e: in other #ords: en<isions a &hinese great po#er treating international instit.tions in the (meri"an 2ashion , #orking thro.gh them #hen they "an
2a"ilitate the e?er"ise o2 Washingtons po#er: >.t resorting to .nilateral or ;4-led ad ho" "oalitions #hen it "on"l.des that this approa"h >etter ser<es (meri"an
interests. Dnstit.tionalist theory and its e?pe"tations a>o.t the role an in"reasingly po#er2.l: >.t also in"reasingly
#ealthy and e"onomi"ally integrated: &hina #ill play in "oming de"ades is not: ho#e<er: de"isi<ely dis"redited
>y the sit.ation in the ai#an 4trait. and .ntil there is a noti"ea>le "hange in the ".rrently "ooperati<e: m.ltilateral approa"h to managing relations in
the 4o.th &hina 4ea and on the /orean penins.la: it is pla.si>le to <ie# the ai#an "ase as an important e?"eption to the
>roader .se2.lness o2 instit.tionalist theory: not a pre<ie# o2 #hat &hina #ill do else#here #hen its gro#ing po#er make this 2easi>le: as po#er-
transition theory s.ggests. he assertion that ai#an is an e?"eption "an >e de2ended >y arg.ing that 2e# international
iss.es rise to the le<el o2 e?istential 5ero-s.mness that "hara"teri5es this disp.te: "ertainly not any o2 the
2oreseea>le disagreements in (sia that &hina may ha<e #ith its neigh>ors or the ;4 in a #orld #here the
Fani"haean str.ggle >et#een ri<al ideologi"al systems has disappeared. ;nlike typi"al territorial: >o.ndary: or
e"onomi" disp.tes: the ai#an C.estion is a>o.t the s.r<i<al o2 the polity that has >een "reated on the island
sin"e 1040: and to a lesser e?tent a>o.t the a>ility o2 the &&1 regime on the mainland to ens.re its leadership
o<er the 2ar2l.ng and ethni"ally di<erse territories it inherited 2rom its prede"essors. For many on the island o2 ai#an:
ho#e<er great the >ene2its o2 instit.tionali5ing ties #ith the mainland: these material gains "annot o22set the loss o2 politi"al identity
entailed in 2inally a""epting that they are to >e part o2 the larger &hinese nation-state. For many on the mainland: ho#e<er
small the "ost that #o.ld 2ollo# 2rom #riting o22 politi"al "ontrol o2 ai#an Kespe"ially sin"e the islands relati<e e"onomi" and military signi2i"an"e diminishes as
&hinas "apa>ilities gro#: and sin"e e"onomi" relations "an "ontin.e #itho.t politi"al integrationM: this material loss pales in "omparison to the domesti" and
international impli"ations 2or the regimes rep.tation. History Kand: as importantly: the interpretation o2 history 2ostered >y the &&1 o<er the past !* yearsM make it
di22i".lt 2or +eiOings leaders to a""ept ]losing ai#an #itho.t a str.ggle. Doing so #o.ld almost "ertainly >e
read as a >etrayal o2 #hat has ro.tinely >een presented as their o>ligation to 2inally 2.l2ill the modern nationalist
mo<ements "entral task o2 .ni2ying a &hina #hose territories #ere split apart d.ring the era #hen +eiOing had >een .na>le to
stand .p to 2oreign meddling. ;nlike the other 2lashpoints e?amined here: the ai#an disp.te is one in #hi"h a rising
&hina #ill almost "ertainly insist on satis2ying demands long 2r.strated >y (meri"an preponderan"e.
HEG GOOD ) EAST ASIA
US H!,!(on/ an% st$on, all*anc!s *n East As*a sol!s a la+n%$/ l*st o1 *(&acts
Lie.tenant &olonel 4"ott . P!t!$son: 1! Far"h 8226 K;nited 4tates Farine &orps 'eser<e: ;.4. (rmy War
&olege =-ast (sia 4.mmit 4teps o#ard &omm.nity to 1re<ent 6reat 1o#er Hegemony and Dmpli"ations 2or
;.4. 1oli"y@ http)33###.dti".mil3"gi->in36et'Do"J(DX(D(44*7$0PLo"ationX;2Pdo"X6et'Do".pd2M
;nited 4tates Dn<ol<ement in -ast (sia) History and &ontemporary Dnterests he ;nited 4tates has >een an (sia-1a"i2i" po#er 2or o<er a
"ent.ry: and has long <ie#ed (sia as a <ast market 2or trade and a so.r"e o2 ra# materials. -arly dire"t politi"al
in<ol<ement in the internal a22airs o2 -ast (sian states in"l.ded the opening o2 8apan to 2oreign trade: inter<ention in the +o?er 'e>ellion in &hina: and the anne?ation
o2 the 1hilippines in 1*0*. he ;nited 4tates and the -.ropean great po#ers #orked in "onO.n"tion #ith 8apan 2or an e?tended
period o2 time: in"l.ding inter<ention in the +o?er re>ellion: the Leag.e o2 Nations K>.t ;4 #as not a mem>erM: and the Washington and London Na<al reaties
o2 1022 and 103%. Dnternal "hanges #ithin 8apan res.lted in an in"reasingly militant 2oreign poli"y and the s.>seC.ent in<asion o2 Fan"h.ria in 1031. 'elations
>et#een the #estern po#ers and 8apan degenerated a2ter this: ".lminating in all o.t #ar #ith the 8apanese empire d.ring the "o.rse o2 World War #o. ;nited 4tates
interests in -ast (sia soon "oales"ed aro.nd the &old War strategy o2 "ontaining the 4o<iet ;nion: its per"ei<ed "lient states: and the "omm.nist threat to other states in
the region. he ;nited 4tates >e"ame hea<ily in<ol<ed in the /orean and Lietnamese "on2li"ts in an e22ort to "ontain the spread o2 "omm.nism in -ast (sia. he end o2
the &old War has generated inC.iry among poli"y makers and analysts as to the interests o2 the ;nited 4tates in -ast (sia today: and the role it sho.ld .ndertake in the
2.t.re o2 -ast (sia.1 he ;nited 4tates in<ested hea<ily in the ind.strial re>irth o2 8apan a2ter the de<astation o2 the 4e"ond World War. &ontin.ed in<estment in -ast
(sia trans2ormed the partnership >et#een the ;.4. and its allies into =a "apitalist >.l#ark against the 4o<iet ;nion and Faos &hina.@2 &ontin.ing &old War
tensions led Washington into a n.m>er o2 >ilateral se".rity arrangements and allian"es #hi"h remain in e22e"t
today. Formal m.ltilateral se".rity arrangements ha<e a mi?ed re"ord in -ast (sia. Follo#ing the s.""ess2.l "reation o2 the North (tlanti" reaty Brgani5ation in
-.rope: the ;nited 4tates helped esta>lish the 4o.theast (sia reaty Brgani5ation K4-(BM. his organi5ation #ithered .nder the
stress o2 the ;.4. #ar in Lietnam and #as dissol<ed in 1077.3 Dn 1071: the ;nited /ingdom: (.stralia: Ne# Uealand: Falaysia: and 4ingapore esta>lished the Fi<e
1o#er De2en"e (rrangements in response to de"oloni5ation and res.lting tensions >et#een Dndonesia and Falaya. his pa"t "ontin.es today: ha<ing >een rea22irmed >y
the De2ense Finisters o2 these nations in 2%%4 #ho noted its rele<an"e to the "ontemporary se".rity "hallenges 2a"ing the region.4 he primary se".rity allian"es o2 the
;nited 4tates in the region today in"l.de) K1M the ;.4. , 1hilippines F.t.al De2ense reaty o2 10!1N K2M the 10!1 (NU;4 pa"t #ith (.stralia KNe# Uealand has not
>een part o2 the pa"t sin"e 10*! d.e to its stand on n."lear #eaponsMN K3M the ;.4. - 'ep.>li" o2 /orea F.t.al De2ense reaty dating 2rom 10!4N K4M the ;.4.-hailand
(llian"e: dating 2rom the 10!4 Fanila 1a"t esta>lishing the no# de2.n"t 4-(B Kthe hanat'.sk "omm.niC.^ o2 10$2 re"ommitted >oth states to m.t.al de2enseMN
and K!M the ;.4.-8apan reaty o2 F.t.al &ooperation and 4e".rity: dating 2rom 10$%.! he ai#an 'elations ("t o2 1070 a22irms the "ommitment o2 the ;nited 4tates
to a pea"e2.l settlement o2 the 2.t.re o2 ai#an and allo#s pro<ision o2 #eapons 2or ai#ans sel2-de2ense: >.t does not "learly resol<e the am>ig.ity o2 ;.4. poli"y
to#ard the .ltimate iss.e o2 armed inter<ention on >ehal2 o2 ai#an.$ hese allian"es ha<e had the pra"ti"al e22e"t o2 s.>Oe"ting
a"tions and relationships o2 the states in the region to the #ishes and poli"ies o2 the great po#ers:7 there>y
inhi>iting intraregional de<elopment and "ooperation.* Dt appears that the notion o2 an -ast (sian &omm.nity
is dri<en in part >y a desire to esta>lish a se".rity regime that is not di"tated >y the great po#ers. he end o2 the &old
War led Washington to reassess its <ision and se".rity strategy 2or -ast (sia. he -ast (sia 4trategy 'eports #ere prod."ed in 100%: 1002: 100!: and 100*.0 No
similar report has >een iss.ed >y the administration o2 1resident 6eorge W. +.sh: >.t mem>ers o2 the Department o2 4tate ha<e set 2orth: in testimony >e2ore
&ongressional "ommittees and spee"hes >e2ore interested parties: a "oherent and "onsistent message o2 ;.4. poli"y interests in -ast
(sia. hese poli"y goals are deri<ed 2rom the 2%%2 !ational Security Strategy of the United States. From a >road perspe"ti<e: the 1resident has e?pressed in the
!ational Security Strategy KN44M.* a "ommitment to h.man rights: politi"al and e"onomi" 2reedom: sel2-determination: and a >alan"e o2 po#er that 2a<ors h.man
2reedom. he N44 pro<ides little spe"i2i" g.idan"e on (sia-1a"i2i" a22airs: >.t does mention &hina in the "onte?t o2 a =great po#er@ and #el"omes the emergen"e o2 a
=strong: pea"e2.l: and prospero.s &hina.@11 he N44 also re"ogni5es Dndonesia 2or taking "o.rageo.s steps to "reate a demo"ra"y and respe"t 2or the r.le o2 la#:12
reiterates the importan"e o2 ;.4. allian"es #ith (.stralia: 8apan: /orea: hailand: and the 1hilippines: and
e?presses appre"iation 2or assistan"e pro<ided >y 4ingapore and Ne# Uealand in the #ar against terrorism.13
4pe"i2i" ;.4. poli"y interests in -ast (sia ha<e >een arti".lated >y <ario.s Department o2 4tate o22i"ials. hese goals 2.lly s.pport the 1residents <ision arti".lated in
the 2%%2 National 4e".rity 4trategy o2 the ;nited 4tates: and in"l.de) K1M promotion o2 demo"ra"y and h.man
rightsN K2M e"onomi" gro#th and prosperityN K3M pea"e and regional sta>ilityN K4M reOe"tion o2 radi"al Dslam and
assistan"e in "om>ating terrorismN K!M a pea"e2.l and prospero.s partnership #ith &hinaN K$M non-proli2eration
o2 #eapons o2 mass destr."tionN K7M assistan"e 2ighting international "rime and dr.g tra22i"kingN and K*M
en<ironmental preser<ation and disease pre<ention. Dmpli"it in these interests are the pea"e2.l re.ni2i"ation o2 /orea and the pea"e2.l
resol.tion o2 the stat.s o2 ai#an
HEG GOOD ) E4ONOMY
P$*(ac/ *s 0!/ to t"! ,lo'al !cono(/
T"a/!$ 2= (sso"iate 1ro2essor at Fisso.ri 4tate ;ni<ersity 9+radley =(meri"an -mpire) ( De>ate@ Kpg 43-44MA
-"onomi" prosperity is also a prod."t o2 the (meri"an -mpire. Dt has "reated a Li>eral Dnternational -"onomi"
Brder KLD-DMGa net#ork o2 #orld#ide 2ree trade and "ommer"e: respe"t 2or intelle"t.al property rights: mo>ility
o2 "api_tal and la>or marketsGto promote e"onomi" gro#th. he sta>ility and prosperity that stems 2rom this
e"onomi" order is a glo>al p.>li" good 2rom #hi"h all states >ene2it: parti".larly stat!s in the hird World. he
American Empire has created this networ! not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well$being of the United States. +n *,,-, the Secretary of .efense
/il0liam 1ohen put this well when he ac!nowledged that 2economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability./ soldiers "reate the "onditions
in #hi"h the (meri"an e"onomy may thri<e: and G#e are a>le to shape the en<ironment 9o2 international
politi"sA in #ays that are ad<antageo.s to .s and that are sta>ili5ing to the areas #here #e are 2or#ard deployed:
there>y helping to promote in<estment and prosperity...business follows the flag.2 3erhaps the greatest
testament to the benefits of the American Empire comes from .eepa! 4al, a former +ndian foreign
service diplomat, researcher at the /orld 5an!, prolific author, and now a professor who started his
career confident in the socialist ideology of post$independence +ndia that strongly condemned empire.
6e has abandoned the position of his youth and is now one of the strongest proponents of the American
Empire. 4al has traveled the world and, in the course of his 7ourneys, has witnessed great poverty and
misery due to a lac! of economic development. 6e reali8ed that free mar!ets were necessary for the
development of poor countries, and this led him to recogni8e that his faith in socialism was wrong. 9ust
as a conservative famously is said to be a liberal who has been mugged by reality, the hard 2evidence
and experi0ence2 that stemmed from 2wor!ing and traveling in most parts of the hird /orld during
my professional career2 caused this profound change.: 4al submits that the only #ay to >ring relie2 to the
desperately poor "o.ntries o2 the hird World is thro.gh the (meri"an -mpire. -mpires pro<ide order: and this
order Qhas >een essential 2or the #orking o2 the >enign pro"esses o2 glo>ali5ation: #hi"h promote
prosperity.Q68 6lo>ali5ation is the pro"ess o2 "reating a "ommon e"onomi" spa"e: #hi"h leads to a gro#ing
integration o2 the #orld e"onomy thro.gh the in"reasingly 2ree mo<ement o2 goods: "apital: and la>or. Dt is the
responsi>ility o2 the ;nited 4tates: Lal arg.es: to .se the LD-B to promote the #ell->eing o2 all e"onomies: >.t
parti".larly those in the hird World: so that they too may enOoy e"onomi" prosperity.
HEG GOOD ) FREE TRADE
H!, 0!/ to 1$!! t$a%!
Walt 28 ("ademi" Dean at the 8ohn F. /ennedy 4"hool o2 6o<ernment at Har<ard ;ni<ersity: 'o>ert and 'enee +el2er 1ro2essorship in Dnternational (22airs
K4tephen: =(meri"an 1rima"y) Dts prospe"ts and pit2alls@: Na<al War &ollege 'e<ie#: 4pring 2%%2: Lol. LL: No. 2M
+y 2a"ilitating the de<elopment o2 a more open and li>eral #orld e"onomy: (meri"an prima"y also 2osters
glo>al prosperity. -"onomi" interdependen"e is o2ten said to >e a "a.se o2 #orld pea"e: >.t it is more a"".rate
to say that pea"e en"o.rages interdependen"eG>y making it easier 2or states to a""ept the potential
<.lnera>ilities o2 e?tensi<e international inter"o.rse.1% Dn<estors are more #illing to send money a>road #hen
the danger o2 #ar is remote: and states #orry less a>o.t >eing dependent on others #hen they are not "on"erned
that these "onne"tions might >e se<ered. When states are relati<ely se".re: they #ill also >e less 2i?ated on ho#
the gains 2rom "ooperation are distri>.ted. Dn parti".lar: they are less likely to #orry that e?tensi<e "ooperation #ill >ene2it others more and
there>y pla"e them at a relati<e disad<antage o<er time.11 +y pro<iding a tranC.il international en<ironment: in short: ;.4.
prima"y has "reated politi"al "onditions that are "ond."i<e to e?panding glo>al trade and in<estment. Dndeed:
(meri"an prima"y #as a prereC.isite 2or the "reation and grad.al e?pansion o2 the -.ropean ;nion: #hi"h is o2ten
to.ted as a tri.mph o2 e"onomi" sel2-interest o<er histori"al ri<alries. +e"a.se the ;nited 4tates #as there to prote"t the -.ropeans
2rom the 4o<iet ;nion and 2rom ea"h other: they "o.ld sa2ely ignore the >alan"e o2 po#er #ithin Western
-.rope and "on"entrate on e?panding their o<erall le<el o2 e"onomi" integration. he e?pansion o2 #orld trade
has >een a maOor so.r"e o2 in"reased glo>al prosperity: and ;.4. prima"y is one o2 the "entral pillars .pon
#hi"h that system rests.12 he ;nited 4tates also played a leading role in esta>lishing the <ario.s instit.tions
that reg.late and manage the #orld e"onomy. (s a n.m>er o2 "ommentators ha<e noted: the ".rrent era o2
=glo>ali5ation@ is itsel2 partly an arti2a"t o2 (meri"an po#er. (s homas Friedman p.ts it: =Witho.t (meri"a on d.ty: there #ill >e no
(meri"a Bnline.@13
HEG GOOD ) FAPANESE PROLIFERATION
H!,!(on/ 0!/ to &$!!nt Fa&an!s! &$ol*1!$at*on
(n in"ipient dri2t to#ard m.ltipolarityG#hi"h is the prereC.isite 2or the ;nited 4tates to adopt an o22shore >alan"ing strategyGis already
apparent in -ast (sia. Dri<en >y 2ears o2 ;.4. a>andonment in a 2.t.re -ast (sian "risis: 8apan has em>arked
on a >.ild.p o2 its military "apa>ilities and has e<en hinted that it is thinking a>o.t a"C.iring n."lear #eapons.
Foreo<er: the past se<eral years ha<e seen a signi2i"ant es"alation in tensions >et#een &hina and 8apan : 2.eled >oth
>y nationalism and >y disp.tes o<er "ontrol o2 the 4o.th &hina and -ast &hina seas K#hi"h may "ontain large energy depositsM.
H!, 0!/ to &$!!nt Fa&an &$ol*1
?$oo0!s 25 4enior Fello# 2or National 4e".rity (22airs at he Heritage Fo.ndation. He is also a mem>er o2 the
"ongressional ;.4.-&hina -"onomi" and 4e".rity 'e<ie# &ommission K1eter: Heritage: Why the World 4till Needs (meri"aRs
Filitary Fight: Noer 24: 2%%*M
A(!$*can (*l*ta$/ might has >een primarily responsi>le 2or 8apanese se".rity sin"e the end o2 World War DD. his has not only allo#ed 8apan to prosper
e"onomi"ally and politi"ally--like 4o.th /orea and 6ermany: D might add-->.t "as also 0!&t Fa&an at &!ac! #*t" *ts n!*,"'o$s< T"!
&$!s!nc! o1 U<S< 1o$c!s an% t"! A(!$*can n+cl!a$ %!t!$$!nt "as also 0!&t Fa&an 1$o( !;!$c*s *n, a n+cl!a$
o&t*on t"at (an/ '!l*!! *t (*,"t ta0!: "onsidering the rise o2 &hina: North /oreaRs n."lear >reako.t: its ad<an"ed s"ienti2i" and te"hni"al "apa-
>ilities: and indigeno.s n."lear po#er ind.stry--a prod."er o2 a signi2i"ant amo.nt o2 2issile material 2rom its rea"tors. 1oliti"al and histori"al "onsiderations aside:
(an/ '!l*!! t"at Fa&an co+l% @+*c0l/ Eo*n t"! onc!-!;cl+ s*! n+cl!a$ #!a&ons cl+' *1 *t c"os! to %o so:
$!s+lt *n, *n +n1o$!tol% c"all!n,!s to $!,*onal s!c+$*t/ .
HEG GOOD ) KOREAN WAR
H!, 0!/ to &$!!nt Ko$!an #a$
LetRs start #ith the /orean 1enins.la. -<er sin"e the "ease-2ire agreement >et#een North /orean and &hinese 2or"es and the ;nited Nations #as "on"l.ded in 10!3:
t"! Un*t!% Stat!s (*l*ta$/ "as '!!n t"! &$!%o(*nant 1o$c! $!%+c*n, t"! $*s0 o1 anot"!$ con1l*ct on t"!
di<ided Ko$!an P!n*ns+la . Dndeed: e<en today--!! years hen"e--an (meri"an 2o.r-star general leads the &om>ined For"es &ommand o2 ;.4. and
'ep.>li" o2 /orea 2or"es that keep the pea"e against a North /orean regime that still har>ors dreams o2 .niting--militarily i2 ne"essary--the North and 4o.th .nder its
despoti" r.le. Nearly 3%:%%% ;.4. soldiers stand sho.lder to sho.lder #ith $!%:%%% 4o.th /orean 2or"es a"ross a s.rely misnamed demilitari5ed 5one KDFUM-- arg.a>ly
the last <estige o2 the &old War--deterring o<er one million: ideologi"ally dri<en North /orean troops. -<en tho.gh pea"e has not >een o22i"ially
de"lared >et#een the t#o nations: t"! o%%s o1 a con1l*ct '$!a0*n, o+t a"ross the DFU $!(a*n sl*( %+! to
A(!$*ca3s co((*t(!nt to sta'*l *t/ on t"! &!n*ns+la . D #o.ld s.ggest that a's!nt t"! presen"e o2 (meri"an 2or"es and
the military might >ehind it: in"l.ding an e?tension the U<S<3s n+cl!a$ +('$!lla to So+t" Ko$!a: t"! "*sto$/ o1 t"!
&ast D2 /!a$s (*,"t '! @+*t! %*11!$!nt 2rom #hat has >een re"ord ed today. ( se"ond /orean #ar has >een--and still
is--a distin"t >.t .n2ort.nate possi>ility: and D #o.ld spe".late that a ne# #ar #o.ld >e e<en more horri2i" than the last: i2 that is possi>le. Dn Far"h
2%%*: a North /orean ne#s reader on state tele<ision said that i2 the 4o.th /orean go<ernment made e<en the slightest gest.re o2 an atta"k: Q-<erything #ill >e in
ashes: not O.st a sea o2 2ire: i2 o.r ad<an"ed pre-empti<e strike on"e >egins.Q &onsidering that the "apital o2 4o.th /orea-- 4eo.l: a "ity o2 more than 1% million--lies
#ithin range o2 1%:%%% pie"es o2 /orean 1eopleRs (rmy artillery: #hi"h "o.ld rain an estimated one million ro.nds on the "ity in the opening ho.rs o2 a "on2li"t: D think
#e ha<e to take that "ommentator at his #ord.
HEG GOOD ) PROLIFERATION
H!, sol!s &$ol*1
?$oo0!s 25 4enior Fello# 2or National 4e".rity (22airs at he Heritage Fo.ndation. He is also a mem>er o2 the "ongressional ;.4.-&hina -"onomi" and 4e".rity
'e<ie# &ommission K1eter: Heritage: Why the World 4till Needs (meri"aRs Filitary Fight: Noer 24: 2%%*M
+eyond 6eopoliti"s (nd >eyond geopoliti"sJ T"! Un*t!% Stat!s (*l*ta$/ "as also '!!n a c!nt$al &la/!$ *n t"! att!(&ts to
"alt #eapons o2 mass destr."tion KWMDH an% 'all*st*c (*ss*l! &$ol*1!$a t*on < Dn 2%%3: 1resident +.sh "reated the 1roli2eration 4e".rity
Dnitiati<e K14DM: an initiati<e to "o.nter the spread o2 WFD and their deli<ery systems thro.gho.t the #orld. he ;.4. militaryRs "apa>ilities help p.t teeth in the 14D: a
<ol.ntary: m.ltilateral organi5ation o2 0%-pl.s nations #hi"h .ses national la#s and Ooint military operations to 2ight proli2eration. While many o2 the 14DRs e22orts arenRt
made p.>li" d.e to the potential 2or re<ealing sensiti<e intelligen"e so.r"es and methods: some operations do make their #ay to the media. For instan"e: a""ording to
the ;.4. 4tate Department: the 14D stopped e?ports to DranRs missile program and hea<y #ater- related eC.ipment to ehranRs n."lear program: #hi"h many >elie<e is
a"t.ally a n."lear #eapons program. Dn the same <ein: the Un*t!% Stat!s *s also %!!l o&*n, t"! #o$l%3s (ost &$o%*,*o+s-!!$
'all*st*c (*ss*l! %!1!ns! s/st!( to &$ot!ct t"! A(!$*can "o(!lan%: *ts %!&lo/!% t$oo&s: all*!s: an% 1$*!n%s:
*ncl+%*n, E+$o&! . While missile de2ense has its "riti"s: it may pro<ide the >est ans#er to the spread o2 >allisti" missiles and the .n"on<entional payloads:
in"l.ding the WFD: they may "arry. ;n2ort.nately: the missile and WFD proli2eration trend is not positi<e. For instan"e: 1% years ago: there #ere only si? n."lear
#eapons states. oday there are nine mem>ers o2 the on"e-e?"l.si<e n."lear #eapons "l.>: #ith Dran perhaps kno"king at the door. #enty-2i<e years ago: nine
"o.ntries had >allisti" missiles. oday: there are 2* "o.ntries #ith >allisti" missile arsenals o2 <arying degrees. his defensive system #ill not only pro<ide deterren"e
to the .se o2 these #eapons: >.t also pro<ide poli"ymakers #ith a greater range o2 options in pre<enting or responding to s."h atta"ks: #hether 2rom a state or non-state
a"tor. 1erhaps 6eneral rey B>ering: the Dire"tor o2 the Fissile De2ense (gen"y: said it >est #hen des"ri>ing the <al.e o2 missile de2ense in "o.ntering the gro#ing
threat o2 WFD and deli<ery system proli2eration) QD >elie<e that one o2 the reasons #eR<e seen the proli2eration o2 these missiles in the past is that there has histori"ally
>een no de2ense against them.Q
HEG GOOD ) RUSSIA
H!, 0!/ to c"!c0 $!s+$,!nt R+ss*a: c"!c0 ?al0an con1l*cts: an% s+sta*n NATO
(nd #hat o2 -.ropeJ D hope #e "an all agree that N(B #as a "riti"al element in the se".rity o2 -.rope d.ring the &old War. Dn 2a"t: D #o.ld arg.e that (meri"an
military po#er #as a sine %ua non o2 N(BRs s.""ess d.ring the &old War. oday: the likelihood o2 a maOor #ar in -.rope is thank2.lly O.st a>o.t nil: >.t tro.>ling
iss.es s."h as +osnia and /oso<o ha<e reC.ired (meri"an mil itary parti"ipation--and leadership . +.t #hat a>o.t the
res.rgen"e o2 '.ssia on the edges o2 N(B and the -.ropean ;nionJ Whi"h dire"tion #ill Fos"o# take in the years to "omeJ DtRs not 2.lly "lear: >.t
some o2 the signs are C.ite omino.s. We do kno# that '.ssian 1rime Finister Lladimir 1.tin has promised a nearly 3% per"ent in"rease in the '.ssian de2ense >.dget
2or 2%%0 2or reasons that "an only >e asso"iated #ith a desire >y Fos"o# to e?ert in"reasing le<erage in its tradition al sphere o2
in2l.en"e--and perhaps >eyond. We also kno# '.ssia has "ond."ted more >allisti" mis sile tests this year than any year
sin"e the end o2 the &old War. We 2.rther kno# that the /remlin has planted a 2lag on the sea>ed at the North 1ole: asserting "laims to an area the si5e o2
Fran"e: 6ermany: and Dtaly "om>ined--an area #hi"h may hold one-third o2 the #orldRs total .ndis"o<ered energy reser<es. '.ssian a"tion in 6eorgia and threats
against ;kraine arenRt "om2orting: either. &onsidering the #eak de2ense spending in -.rope: #ho #ill >e a>le to stand .p to this new
'.ssia i2 ne"essaryJ D #o.ld s.ggest that: a>sent (meri"an military might: N(B--or any 2.t.re -.ropean de2ense
2or"e--might >e little more than a paper tiger in the shado# o2 the '.ssian >ear. (nd #ho #ill pro<ide >alan"e to DranRs rise in the Fiddle
-astJ DtRs my <ie# that Dran has grand am>itions 2or itsel2: in"l.ding regional hegemony: attempting to e?ert its in2l.en"e a"ross the Fiddle -ast 2rom the 1ersian 6.l2
to the Fediterranean 4ea. Whi"h "o.ntryRs military is "apa>le o2 proOe"ting s.22i"ient po#er into that part o2 the #orld to pre<ent s."h a potentially desta>ili5ing t.rn o2
e<entsJ Bnly the ;nited 4tates. he same is tr.e 2or the ;.4.-N(B operations in (2ghanistan and &oalition operations in
DraC today. Fe#--i2 any--"o.ntries today "o.ld s.stain po#er-proOe"tion operations 2or so long so 2ar 2rom their shores.
HEG GOOD ) TERRORISM
H!,!(on/ 0!/ to sol! t!$$o$*s( ) $*s0s !;t*nct*on
Kno#l!s .2 9'o>ert: Lisiting (ssistant 1ro2essor at &hi"ago-/ent &ollege o2 La#: Q-N H;-4DBN4)
'-41BN4-4 B H- -N H;-4DBN4:Q William Fit"hell La# 'e<ie#: <ol 3$: !%$1A
Nonetheless: there are some #ho arg.e that #e are already li<ing in a m.ltipolar #orld: and that rog.e states and terrorist gro.ps like al Haeda are
o.r tr.e ri<als. (d<an"es in te"hnology #ill - i2 they do not already - ena>le terrorists or rog.e states to deploy small
n."lear and >iologi"al #eapons to threaten (meri"an "ities: making .p in sheer mayhem #hat they la"k in armies and na<ies. (
n."lear e?plosion in a large metropolitan area - s."h as Ne# Sork - has the potential to "hange li2e as #e kno# it. Dn this sense: al Haeda "an
>e <ie#ed as an e?istential threat. !0 Ho#e<er: the "apa"ity 2or small gro.ps to le<erage e?tremism into great destr."tion does not alter the
2.ndamental str."t.re o2 geopoliti"s. Not all e?istential threats are the same. ( n."lear de<i"e #o.ld >e O.st as dangero.s in the hands o2 a domesti" gro.p or a lone
#ol2 as it #o.ld >e in the hands o2 al Haeda. Dt #o.ld >e a mistake to ass.me that these ne# threats are >est p.rs.ed >y gi<ing the e?e".ti<e >ran"h greater de2eren"e.
Dn 2a"t: the dangers 2rom terrorism make e<en "learer the need to adhere to esta>lished prin"iples. he ;nited 4tates #ill o"".py a glo>al leadership role 2or de"ades to
"ome. 4.""ess2.l management o2 glo>al "rises - in"l.ding a "atastrophi" terrorist atta"k - lies not in "o.nter >alan"ing ri<als: >.t in >etter
management o2 the international system. he ;nited 4tates "annot hope to ta"kle large-s"ale glo>al pro>lems -
terrorism espe"ially - i2 the rest o2 the #orld loses "on2iden"e in (meri"an leadership. he >est #ay 2or "o.rts to help "arry
o.t this task is to ens.re that the politi"al >ran"es adhere to the r.le o2 la#.
HEG GOOD ) WAR
H!, 0!/ to sta'*l*t/ ) t$ans*t*on a#a/ #*ll 1a*l an% $!s+lt *n #a$
A"an, an% S"* .. 9S.han: &arnegie -ndo#ment 2or Dnternational 1ea"e and Lin 4hi: &ol.m>ia ;ni<ersity: =A(!$*cas %!cl*n!> A
"a$'*n,!$ o1 con1l*ct an% $*al$/:I 8an.ary 22nd: 2%11 http)33###.eastasia2or.m.org32%113%13223ameri"as-de"line-a-har>inger-o2-"on2li"t-and-
ri<alry3
B<er the past t#o de"ades: no other state has had the a>ility to serio.sly "hallenge the ;4 military. ;nder these
"ir".mstan"es: moti<ated >y >oth opport.nity and 2ear: many a"tors ha<e >and#agoned #ith ;4 hegemony and
a""epted a s.>ordinate role. &anada: most o2 Western -.rope: Dndia: 8apan: 4o.th /orea: (.stralia: 4ingapore
and the 1hilippines ha<e all Ooined the ;4: "reating a stat.s C.o that has tended to m.te great po#er "on2li"ts.
Ho#e<er: as the hegemony that dre# these po#ers together #ithers: so #ill the p.lling po#er >ehind the ;4
allian"e. he res.lt #ill >e an international order #here po#er is more di22.se: (meri"an interests and in2l.en"e
"an >e more readily "hallenged: and "on2li"ts or #ars may >e harder to a<oid. (s history attests: po#er de"line and
redistri>.tion res.lt in military "on2rontation. For e?ample: in the late 10th "ent.ry (meri"as emergen"e as a
regional po#er sa# it la.n"h its 2irst o<erseas #ar o2 "onC.est to#ards 4pain. +y the t.rn o2 the 2%th "ent.ry: a""ompanying the
in"rease in ;4 po#er and #aning o2 +ritish po#er: the (meri"an Na<y had >eg.n to "hallenge the notion that
+ritain ]r.les the #a<es. 4."h a notion #o.ld e<ent.ally see the ;4 attain the stat.s o2 sole g.ardians o2 the
Western Hemispheres se".rity to >e"ome the order-"reating Le<iathan shaping the international system #ith
demo"ra"y and r.le o2 la#. De2ining this ;4-"entred system are three key "hara"teristi"s) en2or"ement o2 property
rights: "onstraints on the a"tions o2 po#er2.l indi<id.als and gro.ps and some degree o2 eC.al opport.nities 2or
>road segments o2 so"iety. (s a res.lt o2 s."h politi"al sta>ility: 2ree markets: li>eral trade and 2le?i>le 2inan"ial
me"hanisms ha<e appeared. (nd: #ith this: many "o.ntries ha<e so.ght opport.nities to enter this system: proli2erating sta>le and "ooperati<e relations.
Ho#e<er: #hat #ill happen to these ad<an"es as (meri"as in2l.en"e de"linesJ 6i<en that (meri"as a.thority: altho.gh
s.llied at times: has >ene2ited people a"ross m."h o2 Latin (meri"a: &entral and -astern -.rope: the +alkans:
as #ell as parts o2 (2ri"a and: C.ite e?tensi<ely: (sia: the ans#er to this C.estion "o.ld a22e"t glo>al so"iety in
a pro2o.ndly detrimental #ay. 1.>li" imagination and a"ademia ha<e anti"ipated that a post-hegemoni" #orld #o.ld ret.rn to the
pro>lems o2 the 103%s) regional >lo"s: trade "on2li"ts and strategi" ri<alry. F.rthermore: m.ltilateral instit.tions
s."h as the DFF: the World +ank or the WB might gi<e #ay to regional organisations. For e?ample: -.rope and
-ast (sia #o.ld ea"h step 2or#ard to 2ill the <a"..m le2t >y Washingtons #ithering leadership to p.rs.e their
o#n <isions o2 regional politi"al and e"onomi" orders. Free markets #o.ld >e"ome more politi"ised G and:
#ell: less 2ree G and maOor po#ers #o.ld "ompete 2or s.prema"y. (dditionally: s."h po#er plays ha<e histori"ally possessed a 5ero-
s.m element. Dn the late 10$%s and 107%s: ;4 e"onomi" po#er de"lined relati<e to the rise o2 the 8apanese and Western
-.ropean e"onomies: #ith the ;4 dollar also >e"oming less attra"ti<e. (nd: as (meri"an po#er eroded: so did
international regimes Ks."h as the +retton Woods 4ystem in 1073M. ( #orld #itho.t (meri"an hegemony is one #here great
po#er #ars re-emerge: the li>eral international system is s.pplanted >y an a.thoritarian one: and trade
prote"tionism de<ol<es into restri"ti<e: anti-glo>alisation >arriers. his: at least: is one possi>ility #e "an
2ore"ast in a 2.t.re that #ill ine<ita>ly >e de<oid o2 .nri<alled ;4 prima"y.
US "!,!(on*c %!cl*n! ca+s!s n+cl!a$ t$ans*t*on #a$s
I0!n'!$$/ 25 K8ohn is a pro2essor o2 1oliti"s and Dnternational (22airs at 1rin"eton ;ni<ersity. he 'ise o2 &hina and the F.t.re o2 the West &an the Li>eral
4ystem 4.r<i<eJ: Foreign (22airs: 8an3Fe>M
1o#er transitions are a re".rring pro>lem in international relations . (s s"holars s."h as 1a.l /ennedy and 'o>ert 6ilpin ha<e
des"ri>ed it: #orld politi"s has >een marked >y a s.""ession o2 po#er2.l states rising .p to organi5e the
international system. ( po#er2.l state "an "reate and en2or"e the r.les and instit.tions o2 a sta>le glo>al order
in #hi"h to p.rs.e its interests and se".rity. +.t nothing lasts 2ore<er) long-term "hanges in the distri>.tion o2
po#er gi<e rise to ne# "hallenger states: #ho set o22 a str.ggle o<er the terms o2 that international order. 'ising
states #ant to translate their ne#ly a"C.ired po#er into greater a.thority in the glo>al system -- to reshape the
r.les and instit.tions in a""ordan"e #ith their o#n interests. De"lining states: in t.rn: 2ear their loss o2 "ontrol
and #orry a>o.t the se".rity impli"ations o2 their #eakened position. hese moments are 2ra.ght #ith danger. When a state
o"".pies a "ommanding position in the international system: neither it nor #eaker states ha<e an in"enti<e to
"hange the e?isting order. +.t #hen the po#er o2 a "hallenger state gro#s and the po#er o2 the leading state
#eakens: a strategi" ri<alry ens.es: and "on2li"t -- perhaps leading to #ar -- >e"omes likely. he danger o2 po#er transitions is "apt.red
most dramati"ally in the "ase o2 late-nineteenth-"ent.ry 6ermany. Dn 1*7%: the ;nited /ingdom had a three-to-one ad<antage in
e"onomi" po#er o<er 6ermany and a signi2i"ant military ad<antage as #ellN >y 10%3: 6ermany had p.lled
ahead in terms o2 >oth e"onomi" and military po#er. (s 6ermany .ni2ied and gre#: so: too: did its
dissatis2a"tions and demands: and as it gre# more po#er2.l: it in"reasingly appeared as a threat to other great
po#ers in -.rope: and se".rity "ompetition >egan. Dn the strategi" realignments that 2ollo#ed: Fran"e: '.ssia:
and the ;nited /ingdom: 2ormerly enemies: >anded together to "on2ront an emerging 6ermany. he res.lt #as
a -.ropean #ar. Fany o>ser<ers see this dynami" emerging in ;.4.-&hinese relations. QD2 &hina "ontin.es its impressi<e e"onomi"
gro#th o<er the ne?t 2e# de"ades:Q the realist s"holar 8ohn Fearsheimer has #ritten: Qthe ;nited 4tates and &hina are likely to
engage in an intense se".rity "ompetition #ith "onsidera>le potential 2or #ar.Q
H!, 0!/ to &$!!nt a$(s $ac!s: (*scalc: co(&!t*to$s an% n!# t"$!ats
K"al*l-a% .. KUahlmay #as the ;nited 4tates (m>assador to the ;nited Nations .nder 1resident 6eorge W. +.sh. He has >een in<ol<ed #ith ;.4. poli"y
makers at the White Ho.se:4tate Department and 1entagon sin"e the mid-10*%s. http)33###.nationalre<ie#."om3arti"les32!0%243e"onomy-and-national-se".rity-
5almay-khalil5adJpageX2M
(meri"an retren"hment "o.ld ha<e de<astating "onseC.en"es. Witho.t an (meri"an se".rity >lanket: regional po#ers "o.ld rearm
in an attempt to >alan"e against emerging threats. ;nder this s"enario: there #o.ld >e a heightened possi>ility
o2 arms ra"es: mis"al".lation: or other "rises spiraling into all-o.t "on2li"t. (lternati<ely: in seeking to
a""ommodate the stronger po#ers: #eaker po#ers may shi2t their geopoliti"al post.re a#ay 2rom the ;nited
4tates. -ither #ay: hostile states #o.ld >e em>oldened to make aggressi<e mo<es in their regions. (s ri<al po#ers rise:
(sia in parti".lar is likely to emerge as a 5one o2 great-po#er "ompetition. +eiOings e"onomi" rise has ena>led
a dramati" military >.ild.p 2o".sed on a"C.isitions o2 na<al: "r.ise: and >allisti" missiles: long-range stealth
air"ra2t: and anti-satellite "apa>ilities. &hinas strategi" moderni5ation is aimed: .ltimately: at denying the
;nited 4tates a""ess to the seas aro.nd &hina. -<en as "ooperati<e e"onomi" ties in the region ha<e gro#n:
&hinas e?pansi<e territorial "laims G and pro<o"ati<e statements and a"tions 2ollo#ing "rises in /orea and
in"idents at sea G ha<e roiled its relations #ith 4o.th /orea: 8apan: Dndia: and 4o.theast (sian states. 4till: the
;nited 4tates is the most signi2i"ant >arrier 2a"ing &hinese hegemony and aggression.

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HEGEMONY FILE - 4 WEEK

Hegemony File - 4 Week.........................................................................................................................................1

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