WI LLI AM P.

ALSTON
WHAT' S WRONG WI TH I MMEDI ATE KNOWLEDGE?
ABSTRACT. Immediate knowledge is here construed as true belief that does not owe
its status as knowledge to support by other knowledge (or justified belief) of the same
subject. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a criticism of attempts to show the
impossibility of immediate knowledge. I concentrate on attempts by Wilfrid Sefiars and
Laurence Bonjour to show that putative immediate knowledge really depends on
higher-level knowledge or justified belief about the status of the beliefs involved in the
putative immediate knowledge. It is concluded that their arguments are lacking in
cogency.
In this paper I will consider what seem to me the most interesting
current arguments for the impossibility of immediate knowledge. !
shall conclude that they all fail to foreclose that possibility. I shall not
explicitly argue that the possibility is realized, though it will become
clear in the course of my argument where I think that obvious ex-
amples are to be found.
Attacks on immediate knowledge are nothing new. They were a
staple of nineteenth-century absolute idealism, a and were prominent
also in its American offshoot, pragmatism. 2 But after a hiatus from
roughly 1920-1950, these attacks have been resumed in English-
speaking philosophy, with the revival of pragmatist and holistic ways of
thinking in such philosophers as Quine, Sellars, Rorty, and Davidson.
I feel that the time is ripe for a critical review of these arguments in
their most recent guises. Before starting on that I should make it
explicit that my rejection of these arguments does not imply that I
consider everything in recent pragmatism, holism, and coherence
theories to be unsound.
.
Let me specify at the outset in what sense I will be defending the
possibility of immediate knowledge, since the term is by no means
unambiguous. The rough idea is that whereas mediate knowledge
depends for its status as knowledge on other knowledge of the same
subject, immediate knowledge does not. Mediate knowledge is,
Synthese 55 (1983) 73-95. 0039-7857/ 83/ 0551-0073 $02.30
Copyright 0 1983 by D. ReideI Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.
74 WI LLI , AM P. ALSTON
immediate knowl edge is not, mediated by ot her knowledge. To make
this more precise we will have to dig down into the concept of
knowledge, and that takes us into a highly controversial territory. If
we could suppose that knowl edge is true justified belief, plus some
fourt h requi rement to avoid Get t i er-t ype counterexamples, we c o u l d
make the distinction bet ween mediate and immediate knowl edge hang
on the distinction bet ween mediate and immediate justification, which
coul d then be explained as follows.
I S is mediately justified in believing that p - S is justified in
believing that p by virtue of some relation this belief has to
some ot her justified belief(s) of S.
II. S is immediately justified in believing that p - S is justified
in believing that p by virtue of something ot her than some
relation this belief has to some ot her justified belief(s) of S.
However , some cont emporary epistemologists think that what con-
verts true belief into knowledge is reliability rat her than justification,
where a "rel i abl e" true belief is one that has originated, and/or is
sustained, in a way that is generally reliable, that will generally
pr oduce true rather than false beliefs. 3 To further compound the
confusion, some reliability theorists take reliability to be, or to be an
adequat e criterion for, justification. 4 In this paper I want to avoid
these controversies so as to focus on the issues raised by the
arguments I will be examining. I can do this by leaving open just
exactly what it is that plays the role in the concept of knowl edge that
many cont emporary theorists assign to justification. I shall coin a
neutral term, ' epistemization' , for the function performed by what ever
fills this role. That is, an "epi st emi zer" will be what converts true
belief into knowledge, perhaps subj ect to some further condition for
avoiding Get t i er counterexamples. Justification and reliability will be
two leading candidates for the role of epistemizer (or the same
candidate, dependi ng on how ' justification' is explained). 5 We can
then distinguish bet ween mediate and immediate epistemization in the
same terms we used above for distinguishing mediate and immediate
justification.
III. S' s belief that p is mediately epistemized - S' s belief that p
is epistemized by some relation this belief has to some ot her
epistemized belief(s) of S.
I MMEDI ATE KNOWLEDGE 75
I V. S' s bel i ef t hat p is i mmedi at el y epi st emi zed - S' s bel i ef t hat
p is epi st emi zed by somet hi ng ot her t han some r el at i on this
bel i ef has t o some ot her epi st emi zed belief(s) of S.
Put at i ve medi at e epi st emi zers are (a) havi ng adequat e evi dence f or
t he bel i ef in quest i on and (b) t he bel i ef in quest i on havi ng been
ar r i ved at by i nf er ence in a way t hat will gener al l y pr oduc e t r ue
beliefs. I mmedi at e epi st emi zat i on is a wast ebasket cat egor y. It
embr aces any f or m of epi st emi zat i on t hat does not i nvol ve r el at i ons t o
ot her epi st emi zed bel i efs of t he same subj ect . He nc e t he r ange of
concei vabl e i mmedi at e epi st emi zers is muc h wi der. Popul ar candi dat es
i ncl ude (a) i mmedi at e exper i ence of what t he bel i ef is about , (b) f or
cer t ai n speci al cases, si mpl y t he t r ut h of t he bel i ef, or t he f act t hat it is
bel i eved or under s t ood, (c) fact s about t he ori gi n of t he bel i ef, e. g. ,
t he f act t hat a cer t ai n per cept ual bel i ef arose f r om nor mal per cept ual
pr ocesses.
Pl ausi bl e candi dat es f or i mmedi at e knowl edge i ncl ude one' s know-
l edge of t he si mpl est l ogi cal and mat hemat i cal t rut hs: ' No pr oposi t i on
is bot h t r ue and fal se' , ' 2 + 3 = 5' - and one' s knowl edge of one' s own
cur r ent st at es of consci ousness: ' I feel r el i eved' , ' I am t hi nki ng about
next s ummer ' s vacat i on' . In bot h sort s of cases it seems i mpl ausi bl e t o
suppose t hat one knows t he i t em in quest i on onl y by vi r t ue of
knowi ng or bei ng justified in bel i evi ng somet hi ng else, on whi ch t he
first knowl edge is based. Request s f or evi dence or r easons f or one' s
fi rst -person cur r ent consci ous st at e at t ri but i ons are cl ear l y out of
pl ace. " Wh a t do you mean, what r eas on do I have f or supposi ng t hat I
f eel r el i eved? I j ust do, t hat ' s all. ' ' 6 Agai n, al t hough ' 2 + 3 = 5' can be
der i ved f r om ot her pr oposi t i ons (as can ' I feel r el i eved' , f or t hat
mat t er ) , one nor mal l y feel s no need t o do so or t o be abl e t o do so, in
or der t o know it t o be t he case. It seems t hat we can see t hat 2 + 3 = 5,
j ust by consi der i ng t hat pr oposi t i on itself. A si mpl e per cept ual bel i ef,
e. g. , t hat t her e is a t r ee in f r ont of me, or if you per f er , t hat I see a t r ee
in f r ont of me, is a mor e cont r over si al case. A nor mal adul t coul d
pr ovi de a r eason if pressed: " I t l ooks like a t r ee" , or " I am havi ng t he
ki nd of exper i ence I woul d have if I wer e seei ng a t r ee" . But it seems
t hat a bei ng t oo unsophi st i cat ed t o c ome up wi t h any such r easons
coul d still have per cept ual knowl edge t hat t her e is a t r ee in f r ont of
hi m j ust by vi r t ue of f or mi ng t hat bel i ef by nor mal per cept ual pr o-
cesses in nor mal ci r cumst ances.
76 WI LLI AM P. ALSTON
I should make it explicit that what I am going to be defending in this
paper is what we may call "wholly immediate knowl edge". Recent l y it
has been pointed out by several writers that one might think of certain
beliefs as justified partly immediately and partly mediately, in such a
way that the belief has justification sufficient for knowledge only by
combining the t wo sources. 7 Thus it might be that a percept ual belief
is justified to some extent just by being formed by normal percept ual
processes in normal circumstances, but that this is not sufficient for
knowl edge (even given truth and what ever may be required over and
above justification and truth). In addition, the belief woul d have to
"coher e" with ot her things one knows, or it would have to be
support ed by reasons for supposing that the conditions of percept i on
are normal. In that instance we might speak of a case of percept ual
knowl edge as "partly i mmedi at e" since part of what epistemizes the
belief is something ot her than its relation to ot her justified beliefs of
the same subject. This is an interesting suggestion and wort hy of
careful examination, but in this paper I shall restrict myself to the
question of the possibility of wholly immediate knowledge.
The question of the possibility of immediate knowl edge is frequently
assimilated to the question of the viability of foundationalism, but the
questions are distinct. Foundationalism is a t heory of the structure of
knowledge. It holds, to put it briefly, that all mediate epistemization
ultimately rests on immediately epistemized beliefs. Trace back a
chain of mediate epistemization and you will eventually reach an
immediately epistemized belief. Clearly foundationalism entails the
possibility of immediate epistemization, but not vi ce versa. One could
recognize that some beliefs are immediately epistemized but deny that
mediate epistemization always rests on such beliefs, as foundationalism
maintains. I will not be discussing the contentions of one or anot her
version of foundationalism, ot her than the possibility of immediate
epistemization.
Much of the at t ack on immediate knowl edge has focused on some
particular putative immediate epistemizer. The coocept of immediate
awareness has been extensively criticized, in absolute idealism, in
pragmatism, and in more recent writings. 8 The notion of a belief' s
being "self-justified" has come in for a good deal of attack. 9 Such
opponent s often assume that disposing of their chosen target will
amount to the elimination of immediate knowledge. But even where
such arguments succeed in unmasking a particular alleged epistemizer
I MMEDI ATE KNOWLEDGE 77
t hey fail in their more ambitious task, because of the indefinite
plurality of possible i mmedi at e epistemizers. Even if there is some-
thing radically wrong with the concept of an i mmedi at e experience of
a particular or of a fact, there is still the claim that some beliefs are
sel f-warrant ed, the claim that some beliefs are epistemized by a
reliable noninferential origin, and so on. One could set out to discredit
all the immediate epistemizers that have actually been put forward,
one by one. But at best such a procedure would fail to show that all
possibilities have been eliminated.
In this paper I am going to confine myself to argument s that are
directed against any sort of immediate epistemization and immediate
knowledge. In keeping with this restriction I shall even forego con-
sidering an i mport ant argument to the effect that wherever an im-
mediate justification for a belief is defeasible we can be (sufficiently)
justified in the belief only if we are justified in believing that no
defeating circumstances obtain. 1 Since there are putative immediate
justifications that do not seem to have this prima facie character, e.g.,
my justification for supposing that I feel tired now, or for supposing
that 2 + 3 = 5, this argument, even if successful, would not rule out all
immediate knowledge.
.
As a preliminary to examining the arguments I take most seriously, I
shall dispose of some tempting but misdirected argument s that turn
out to hit some other target instead.
(1) First I will briefly note that some theorists seem to suppose that
the beliefs involved in immediate knowledge must be infallible, incor-
rigible, or indubitable, 11 and hence that by showing that none of our
beliefs enj oy those immunities, one will have shown that there can be
no immediate knowledge. At least opponents of "foundat i onal " or
' "basic" beliefs, which must be immediately epistemized to fill that
role, have often supposed that such beliefs must enj oy such im-
munities. 12 But a moment ' s reflection will assure us that there is
nothing in the concept of immediate epistemization, any more than in
the concept of mediate epistemization, that limits its application to
beliefs that cannot (in some significant sense) be mistaken, refuted, or
reasonably doubted.
(2) I have a sense that it is a rather widely shared view that a belief
78 WI LLI AM P. ALSTON
can be immediately epistemized only if it in no way depends on other
knowledge of the same subject, only if it could be held without the
subject's knowing anything else; though I must confess to some
difficulty in finding this explicitly affirmed in print. 13 In any event, if
t hat were a condition of immediate knowledge it would be a serious
liability, for there are powerful reasons for denying the possibility of
knowledge that is isolated to that extent. Speaking with absolute
generality, it is plausible to hold that I can' t know something of the
form ' x is P' without having general knowledge as to what it is for
something to be P. And getting down to standard putative cases of
immediate knowledge, it is a widely held view that I can' t have
knowledge only of my own conscious states. Such knowledge, and
hence any particular instance of such knowledge, presupposes that I
know something about the ways in which states of consciousness are
manifested in publicly observable behavior and demeanor. And as for
'2 + 3 = 5' and the like, it is very plausible to hold that one could not
have knowledge of a particular arithmetical truth without knowing at
least some significant part of a larger arithmetical system. If one tried
to teach a child that 2 + 3 = 5 while keeping him ignorant of, e.g.,
'1 + 1 = 2', he would fail miserably. Of course, these contentions can
be, and have been, controverted. But since I will be arguing that they
are, in any event, irrelevant to the issue of immediate knowledge, I
need not defend them. It is enough for my present purpose that they
have been held with some show of reason.
I want to deny that the cases of depe~ndence just cited are in-
compatible with the existence of immediate knowledge. How can this
be? Well, it all depends on the sort of dependence involved. Im-
mediate knowledge requires independence of other knowledge, so far
as the epistemization of belief is concerned. Immediate knowledge is
knowledge in which the belief involved is not epistemized by a relation
to other knowledge or epistemized belief of the same subject. But in
the above cases what is alleged is that the very existence of the belief
depends on other knowledge. Unless I know what it is to be P,
I can' t so much as form the belief that x is P, for I lack the concept
of P. Unless I know something about outward criteria of conscious
states I.cannot so much as form the belief that I feel tired, for I lack
the concept of feeling tired. Unless I know something about the rest
of the number system I cannot so much as form the belief that 2 + 3
= 5, for I lack the requisite concepts. But all this says nothing as
I MMEDI ATE KNOWLEDGE 79
to what epistemizes t he belief, once f or med, and it is on this t hat t he
classification i nt o i mmedi at e or medi at e depends. The quest i on of
what epi st emi zes a bel i ef onl y arises once the belief is f or med. That
quest i on presupposes t he exi st ence of t he belief and hence presupposes
any necessary condi t i ons of t hat exi st ence. It is t hen a f ur t her quest i on
whet her t he bel i ef is epi st emi zed and, if so, by what . He nc e it is a
f ur t her quest i on whet her t hat epi st emi zat i on is medi at e or i mmedi at e.
To suppose t hat t he condi t i ons for f or mi ng t he belief are t hemsel ves
condi t i ons of epi st emi zat i on, and hence det er mi nat i ve of t he choi ce
bet ween medi at e and i mmedi at e, is to confuse levels of quest i oni ng. It
. . . . . I
woul d be hke argui ng t hat smce a necessary condi t i on of my maki ng a
r equest (orally) is t hat I have vocal chords, part of what justifies me in
maki ng t hat r equest is t hat I have vocal chords. The exi st ence of
i mmedi at e knowl edge is qui t e compat i bl e wi t h a t hor ough- goi ng
coher ence t heor y of concept s, accor di ng to whi ch one coul d not have
a single concept wi t hout havi ng a whol e syst em of concept s, and even
wi t h the f ur t her vi ew t hat t he possession of a syst em of concept s
requi res havi ng vari ous pi eces of knowl edge i nvol vi ng t hose
concepts.14
(3) It is ver y plausible to suppose t hat any belief, however it arose,
can be eval uat ed for t rut h, j ust i fi cat i on, or rat i onal i t y by r ef er ence to
reasons or evi dence. However I came to bel i eve t hat 2 + 3 = 5 or t hat
t here is a t ree in f r ont of me, or even t hat I feel t i red, it is possible, for
me or for someone else, t o l ook for reasons for supposi ng t hat it is t r u e
or false. And somet i mes such reasons can be f ound. Ther e is even
some plausibility in hol di ng t hat it is always, in principle, possible to
find such reasons. But whet her or not t he l at t er cl ai m is correct , it will
at least fol l ow t hat any belief is subject to assessment in t erms of
reasons or evi dence. And it has been t hought t hat this is i ncompat i bl e
wi t h supposi ng t hat any belief is i mmedi at el y epi st emi zed. But agai n
this is j ust a confust i on. To say t hat a belief is i mmedi at el y epi st emi zed
is not to i mpl y t hat it coul d not also be medi at el y epi st emi zed, even at
t he same time. It is onl y to say t hat t here is an epi st emi zat i on, not
i nvol vi ng ot her knowl edge or epi st emi zed belief of t he same subj ect ,
t hat is sufficient for knowl edge. 15 Epi st emi c over det er mi nat i on is j ust
as possible as the causal vari et y. Just as t he exi st ence of one set of
causal l y sufficient condi t i ons does not rul e out t he possibility of
anot her set, so the exi st ence of one (medi at e) epi st emi zat i on is qui t e
compat i bl e wi t h t he exi st ence of anot her (i mmedi at e) one.
80 WI L L I AM P. AL S T ON
.
Now I turn to the criticisms I will take more seriously. They all involve
what we may call the "Level Ascent" argument. According to this
argument, when we consider any putative bit of immediate knowledge
we find that the belief involved really depends for its epistemization on
some higher-level reasons t hat have to do with its epistemic status,
with the r e l i a b i l i t y of its mode of formation, or with what it is that is
supposed to epistemize the belief. In recent decades the Level Ascent
argument has been prominent in the writings of Wilfrid Sellars, and I
shall first look at its Sellarsian form. 16 It may be doubted that Sellars
can be counted among the foes of immediate knowledge, for he is
wont to present his position as a sort of synthesis of foundationalism
and coherentism. 17 But as we shall see, the foundationalist ingredient
in the brew does not include any recognition of full-blooded im-
mediate knowledge.
The earliest explicit rejection of immediate knowledge known to me
in Sellars' works comes in an oft-quoted section of "Empiricism and
the Philosophy of Mind" (EPM), first published in 1956. Having dis-
posed, to his satisfaction, of the view that the "authority" of obser-
vational reports stems from their correctly formulating the content of
nonpropositional awarenesses that are "self-authenticating", Sellars
goes on to consider what alternative there might be. He begins with
the following possibility.
An o v e r t or c o n v e r t t o k e n of ' Th i s is g r e e n ' i n t h e p r e s e n c e of a g r e e n i t e m. . , e xpr e s -
s es obs e r va t i ona l k n o wl e d g e if a nd onl y if i t is a ma n i f e s t a t i o n of a t e n d e n c y t o p r o d u c e
o v e r t or c o n v e r t t oke ns of ' Th i s is g r e e n ' - g i v e n a c e r t a i n s et - if a n d onl y if a g r e e n
o b j e c t is b e i n g l ooke d at i n s t a n d a r d condi t i ons . ( 1963, p. 167)
This is what has since come to be known as a reliability account of
observational knowledge. What makes this a case of knowledge is that
the belief (or in this case the statement) stems from a habit t hat can be
relied on to produce true beliefs (statements). This would be one form
of the view that such knowledge is immediate knowledge; for the
specified necessary and sufficient condition does not require the sub-
ject to have other knowledge or justified belief. But Sellars does not
accept this account. It "won' t do as it stands" (p. 167). Although the
"authority" of the report stems from "the fact that one can infer the
presence of a green object from the fact that someone makes this
report" (p. 167), i.e., from the fact that the report was a manifestation
I MME DI AT E KNOWL E DGE 81
of a reliable t endency, still "t o be the expression of knowledge, a
report must not only have authority, this authority must i n s o me s ens e
be recogni zed by the person whose report it is" (p. 168). In ot her
words, "no tokening by S n o w of ' This is green' is to count as
' expressing observat i onal knowl edge' unless it is also correct to say of
S that he n o w knows the appropriate fact of the form X is a rel i abl e
s y mp t o m o f Y , namely t h a t . . , ut t erances of ' This is green' are
reliable indicators of the presence of green obj ect s in standard con-
ditions of pe r c e pt i on. . . " (p. 169). In still other terms, Jones does not
k n o w that this is green unless he is abl e to t ake the formation of his
st at ement (belief) in these circumstances as a reason for supposing that
a green obj ect is present (p. 168). Since what is requi red for knowing
that this is green (over and above true belief, i.e., what is required for
epistemization) includes Jones' s having certain specific pieces of
knowl edge and the ability to use t hem to support the proposition in
question, Sellars is clearly denying that observat i onal knowl edge is or
can be immediate knowledge, as that t erm was explained above. His
reason for denying it clearly falls under our "Level Ascent " rubric.
One' s belief count s as knowl edge only if one knows something about
the epistemic status of that belief, viz., that it counts as a reliable sign
of the fact believed. And, equally clearly, this move coul d be used
against a n y claim to immediate knowledge.
The exposition in EPM leaves things insufficiently explicit in at least
two respects. The first and less serious has to do with the way in which
the view is supposed to give something to the foundationalist. In an
oft -quot ed passage, SeUars writes:
Th e r e is cl ear l y s ome point t o t he pi c t ur e of huma n knowl e dge as r est i ng on a l evel of
pr opos i t i ons - obs e r va t i on r e por t s - whi c h do not r es t on ot he r pr opos i t i ons i n t he s ame
way as ot he r pr opos i t i ons r es t on t hem. On t he ot he r hand, I do wi sh t o i nsi st t hat t he
me t a p h o r of ' f ounda t i on' is mi s l eadi ng in t hat it keeps us f r om s eei ng t hat if t he r e is a
l ogi cal di me ns i on i n whi c h ot he r empi r i cal pr opos i t i ons r es t on obs er vat i on r epor t s ,
t he r e is a not he r l ogi cal di me ns i on i n whi ch t he l at t er r est on t he f or mer . (1963, p. 170)
The discussion in EPM, summarized in the previ ous paragraph, makes
clear the way in which Sellars thinks that observat i on report s rest on
ot her propositions, but not the way in which he thinks that t hey do not
(i.e., the way in which others rest on them). The second and more
serious respect is that no adequat e support is given for the position.
The aut hor just lays it down that "t o be the expression of knowledge,
a report must not only have authority, this authority must i n s o me
s ens e be recogni zed by the person whose report it is" (p. 168). 18
82 WI L L I AM P. AL S T ON
Are ot her writings of Sellars more explicit in these two respects?
The most systematic presentation of Sellars' general epistemology
known to me is the third of the Mat chet t e lectures, given in 1971 at
the University of Texas, and published under the general title of ' The
Structure of Knowl edge' (SK) in Act i on, Knowl edge and Real i t y:
Critical Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. H. N. Cast aneda
(1975). There we shall find that t hough the first lack is filled, the
second is not. 19
In the third of these lectures, entitled ' Epistemic Principles' , he
makes two distinctions bet ween observat i on reports and, e.g., the
generalizations that are traditionally thought to be based on them.
First (a point that was at least implicit in EPM), the former differs
from the latter in being "non-inferential" in the sense that they are
not, typically, arrived at on the basis of inference of any sort. They are
formed "spont aneousl y" (pp. 324, 342). But this is not a difference in
epistemic status, at least not according to Sellars's lights. It does not
constitute a way in which observat i on reports "do not rest on ot her
propositions in the same way as ot her propositions rest on t hem".
Sellars spells out the distinctively epistemic difference as follows. The
way in which ot her propositions rest on observat i on reports is given by
the following schema:
I have good reasons, al l t hi ngs considered, for bel i evi ng p;
So, p;
So, I have good reasons, all t hi ngs consi dered, for bel i evi ng q. (p. 335)
Her e we are justified in believing q because it "can be correctly
inferred, inductively or deductively, from ot her beliefs which we are
justified in holding" (p. 336). But the way in which an observat i on
report is justified is given by the following schema:
I j ust t hought - out - l oud ' Lo! Her e is a red appl e'
(no count ervai l i ng condi t i ons obt ai n);
So, t her e is good r eason to bel i eve t hat t her e is a r ed appl e in f r ont of me.
Not i ce t hat al t hough t he justification of t he belief t hat t her e is a red appl e in f r ont of
(Jones) is an inferential justification, it has t he pecul i ar char act er t hat its essential
permi se asserts t he occur ence of t he very same belief in a specific context. It is this fact
whi ch gives t he appear ance t hat such beliefs are s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g and hence gives t he
justification t he appear ance of bei ng n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l . (p. 342)
Thus the respect in which an observat i on r epor t does not rest on ot her
I M M E D I A T E K N O W L E D G E 83
propositions is simply that its justification does not depend on the
justification of the ot her beliefs on the same level. The beliefs that
Jones must be justified in believing in order that he be justified in
believing B (that there is a red apple in front of him) are beliefs about
B, that it occurred in certain circumstances that satisfy certain con-
ditions. In fn. 12 on p. 342 Sellars refers to a passage in his essay
' Phenomenalism' , in which he says that the kind of credibility
generat ed for B by the above schema is a "trans-level credibility"
(1963, p. 88). 20
Thus the thesis that observat i on report s do not rest on ot her pro-
positions, as Sellars understands that thesis, does not imply that t hey
express immediate knowledge, as we have explained that notion.
SeUars remains commi t t ed to the thesis that I know that t here is a red
apple before me only if I know the rel evant facts about what gives my
ut t erance its "aut hori t y".
But what about some reason for accepting this position? Her e SK is
less satisfactory, t hough the hints are br oader than in EPM. For one
thing, Sellars talks as if it is central to the concept of justification that
it involves having reasons for the justificandum.
P r e s u ma b l y , t o b e j us t i f i e d i n b e l i e v i n g s o me t h i n g i s t o h a v e g o o d r e a s o n s f o r b e l i e v i n g
i t , as c o n t r a s t e d wi t h i t s c o n t r a d i c t o r y . (p. 332)
I s i t n o t pos s i bl e t o c o n s t r u e ' I k n o w t h a t - p ' as e s s e n t i a l l y e q u i v a l e n t t o ' p , a n d I h a v e
r e a s o n s g o o d e n o u g h t o s u p p o r t a g u a r a n t e e . . . ' ? (p. 333)
Against this background, the question:
I f k n o wl e d g e is j u s t i f i e d t r u e b e l i e f , h o w c a n t h e r e b e s u c h a t h i n g as s e l f - e v i d e n t
k n o wl e d g e ? A n d i f t h e r e i s n o s u c h t h i n g as s e l f - e v i d e n t k n o wl e d g e , h o w c a n any t r u e
b e l i e f be , i n t h e r e l e v a n t s e ns e , j u s t i f i e d ? (p. 332)
hangs:
u l t i ma t e l y o n a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t wo wa ys i n wh i c h t h e r e c a n be , a n d o n e c a n h a v e ,
g o o d r e a s o n s f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t - p . (p. 334)
That distinction is the one bet ween same-level and trans-level reasons
that we have just been discussing.
Well, i f it is essential to the epistemic justification of a belief that
the bel i ever have adequat e reason for her belief, then t here can be no
immediate justification, and, if justification is necessary for knowledge,
no immediate knowledge. But unless that claim is itself defended in
some way, it is t oo close to the question at issue to advance the
84 WI LLI AM P. ALSTON
discussion. It is very close indeed; the principle of justification through
reasons alone is precisely what the partisan of immediate knowledge is
denying. For to have reasons for a belief is to have ot her knowl edge or
justified belief that supports the belief in question. And immediate
justification is justification for which that is not required.
We may find something far enough back to advance the discussion,
by considering the way in which Sellars hints that all justification is
higher-level in character. It always consists of showing, or of the
capacity to show, that one' s belief is justified, or reasonable, or that
one has adequat e reasons for it. Not e that the two schemat a of
justification that were cited on p. 82 have as their conclusion not the
proposition the justification of the belief in which is in question, but
rather a higher-level proposition to the effect that the subj ect has
good reasons, or that there are good reasons, to believe the lower-
level proposition. And of the second schema Sellars say, "Li ke all
justification arguments, it is a higher-order thinking" (p. 342). One
could wish the aut hor to be more explicit, but this does suggest that
Sellars is thinking of epistemic justification in general as consisting of,
or requiring, the capacity of the subj ect to pr oduce adequat e reasons
for supposing that it is reasonable to bel i eve the proposition justified.
If this is the case, then justification does require adequat e reasons;
for I coul dn' t have the capacity to produce adequat e reasons without
there being such reasons to produce. But why should we suppose that
this either is or is required for epistemic justification? We frequently
t ake ourselves to know things with respect to which we have no such
capacity. I oft en suppose myself to know that my wife is upset about
something, where I would be hard pressed to specify how I can tell,
i.e., hard pressed to specify what makes it reasonable for me to bel i eve
this. The same goes for much of our supposed knowledge about
history, geography, and physical regularities. In the face of all this,
why should we accept the thesis that justification essentially involves
the capacity to demonst rat e reasonableness?
It is tempting to suppose that Sellars has fallen victim to the
pervasi ve confusion bet ween the activity of justifying a belief -
showing the belief to be reasonable, credible, or justified - and a
belief' s being justified, where this is some kind of epistemic state or
condition of the believer vis-~i-vis that belief, rather than something he
is or might be doing. 21 There are enough locutions that are ambiguous
bet ween these two to provi de a spawning ground for the confusion.
I MMEDI ATE KNOWLEDGE 85
(' The belief is justified.' ' What does it take to justify the belief?' ) One
who has fallen into the confusion will realize, of course, that we can' t
require S to have actually gone t hrough the activity of j ust i fyi ng/ 3 in
order to be justified in accepting b. But if still in the toils of the
confusion, he is likely to take it as obvious that at least S must be
capable of justifying B in order to be justified in accepting B. e:
But perhaps Sellar's higher-level slant on justification has a more
respectable origin. Perhaps he is simply exhibiting the widespread
t endency of epistemologists to think of knowledge as the exclusive
possession of critically reflective subjects, where being "critically
reflective" essentially involves the t endency to ask, and the capacity to
answer, questions as to what it is that justifies one' s beliefs or makes
t hem reasonable. If one has to be that kind of subject in order to have
knowledge, t hen knowledge does require what Sellars says it does.
And I would agree that insofar as one not only has the attitude of
critical reflection concerning one' s beliefs, but also the ability to carry
the reflection to a successful conclusion, one knows something iff one
has the abilities Sellars requires. But it seems clear that none of us
satisfy that ant ecedent condition with respect to all our beliefs, and
that many human subjects, and all lower animals, satisfy it with respect
to few or none of their beliefs. An examination of the epistemic status
of one' s beliefs is a highly sophisticated exercise that presupposes a
massive foundat i on or less rarefied cognitive achievements. Presum-
ably epistemology is not limited to understanding the condition of
philosophers and other choice spirits who have achieved a consider-
able ability in maki ng explicit what it takes to render one or another
sort of belief rational. It is, more generally and more basically, an
at t empt to understand the nature and conditions of such cognitive
achievements as getting accurate information about the immediate
envi ronment t hrough perception, one' s awareness of what one is
thinking or feeling at the moment , and one' s recollection of what
happened to one in the past. If terms like ' knowledge' are confined to
the cognitive achievements of-critically reflective subjects, we shall
have to find a new t erm for the territory in its full extent.
The above should not be t aken to imply, nor does it imply, that
reflective knowledge of one' s knowledge and of the epistemic status of
one' s beliefs is not valuable; nor does it imply that there are not
important goals for the at t ai nment of which it is necessary. It would
seem to be required for answering scepticism, for being fully self-
86 WI L L I AM P. AL S T ON
conscious about one' s cognitive situation, and, more generally, for
doing epistemology, an activity I am scarcely in a position for
branding as pointless. But all this is quite compatible with the point
just urged that one can genuinely have propositional knowledge
without being capable, and especially without being fully capable, of a
reflective assessment of that knowledge. We must not confuse epis-
t emol ogy with its own subject-matter.
.
In his essay, ' Can Empirical Knowl edge Have a Foundation?' (1978),
Laurence Bonj our mounts an argument against immediate knowledge
that displays many of the features of Sellars's attack. Let' s consider
whet her Bonj our does any bet t er by way of providing support for the
crucial contentions of that attack.
Bonj our is concer ned to show the impossibility of "basic beliefs",
beliefs that are justified otherwise than by ot her justified beliefs, what
we have been calling "i mmedi at el y justified beliefs". The central
argument runs as follows.
If basi c bel i efs ar e t o pr ovi de a s ecur e f oundat i on f or empi r i cal knowl edge, if i nf er ence
f r om t he m is t o be t he sol e basi s f or t he j ust i fi cat i on of ot he r empi r i cal bel i efs, t hen t hat
f eat ur e, wha t e ve r it may be, in vi r t ue of whi ch a bel i ef qual i fi es as basi c mus t al so
cons t i t ut e a good r e a s on f or t hi nki ng t hat t he bel i ef is t rue. 23 If we l et '~b' r e pr e s e nt t hi s
f eat ur e, t hen f or a bel i ef B t o qual i fy as basi c in an accept abl e f oundat i oni s t account ,
t he pr emi s es of t he f ol l owi ng a r gume nt mus t t hems el ves be at l east j ust i f i ed;
(i) Bel i ef B has f eat ur e ~b.
(ii) Bel i ef s havi ng f eat ur e ~b ar e hi ghl y likely t o be t r ue.
The r e f or e , B is hi ghl y likely t o be t r ue.
. . An d if we now assume, r eas onabl y e nough, t hat f or B t o be j ust i fi ed f or a par t i cul ar
pe r s on (at a par t i cul ar t i me) it is necessar y, not me r e l y t hat a j ust i f i cat i on f or B exi st in
t he abst r act , but t hat t he pe r s on i n ques t i on be in cogni t i ve possessi on of t he j ust i -
fi cat i on, we ge t t he r esul t t hat B is not basi c af t er all si nce its j ust i fi cat i on de pe nds on
t hat of at l east one ot he r empi r i cal bel i ef. (pp. 5- 6)
It is clear that this argument passes my test for a general argument
against immediate knowledge. The argument is quite indifferent as to
what the feature ~b is. It could be "formulating the cont ent of an im-
mediate awareness", or "being a true self-presenting proposition",
I MMEDI ATE KNOWLEDGE
87
or "bei ng formed by a reliable percept ual process", or what-you-will,
and the argument will be just as strong, or just as weak.
As already indicated, I am not at all disposed to quarrel with the
claim that premises (i) and (ii) must be true whenever B is immediately
(or mediately) justified (and hence that the conclusion must be true as
well since it is a valid argument). To admit so much is no more than to
agree that any justifying feat ure must be "t rut h-conduci ve". But this
is perfect l y compat i bl e with the existence of immediate knowledge.
The premise " B is justified by virtue of having feat ure ~b, which is
t rut h-conduci ve" has no t endency to support " B is justified by the fact
that the subj ect has adequat e reasons for it". It is the further
requi rement that is the clinker: "For B to be justified for a particular
person (at a particular time) it is necessary, not merely that a justi-
fication for B exist in the abstract, but that the person in question be
in cognitive possession of it." In ot her words, in order that I be
justified in accepting B I must know, or be justified in believing, the
premises of the above argument. And why should we suppose that?
Again, unless some significant grounds are adduced, our opponent of
immediate knowl edge has done nothing more impressive than to
affirm the contradictory.
Now Bonj our, like Sellars, roundly affirms that justification, in
general, requires possession of adequat e reasons by the subj ect (pp. 5,
'7). And so, as in Sellars, when confront ed with a putatively basic belief
we are driven to higher-level reasons. But, again, this by itself is to
repeat the position rather than to defend it. In Bonj our' s article there
is rather more ground than in Sellars for suspecting a confusion
bet ween j u s t i f y i n g a b e l i e f and b e i n g j u s t i f i e d i n a bel i ef . Aft er enun-
ciating "' the traditional concept i on of knowl edge as a d e q u a t e l y j u s t i f i e d
t rue b e l i e f " he writes: "Now the most natural way to justify a belief is
by produci ng a justificatory argument . . . . " The obvi ous suggestion is
that "justified" in the conditions for knowl edge means "having been
the target of a successful activity of justifying", rat her than, e.g., "it' s
being all right for the subj ect to hold it". He backs out of this in the
next paragraph when he writes, "a person for whom a belief is infer-
entially justified need not have explicitly rehearsed the justificatory
argument in question to others or even to himself", but he feels he is
still left with the requi rement that "t he inference be available to him
if the belief is called into question by others or by hi ms el f . . , and that
the availability of inference be, in the final analysis, his reason for
88 WI L L I AM P. AL S T ON
holding the belief" (p. 2). And three pages later, after opining that
"t he very idea of an epistemically basic empirical belief is extremely
paradoxical", he supports the opinion by writing: "For on what basis is
such a belief to be justified, once appeal to further empirical beliefs is
ruled out ?" (p. 5; emphasis mine; see also the first paragraph of p. 8).
However , Bonj our also has a way of defending the demand for
reasons that is different from anything in Sellars, and we ought to
consider that. In spelling out the concept of justification that is
involved in his argument he writes:
Knowl edge requi res e p i s t e m i c justification and t he distinguishing charact eri st i c of this
part i cul ar species of justification is, I submit, its essential or i nt ernal rel at i onshi p t o t he
cogni t i ve goal of t rut h. Cogni t i ve doi ngs are epistemically justified, on this concept i on,
onl y if and t o t he ext ent t hat t hey are ai med at this goal - whi ch means roughl y t hat one
accept s all and only beliefs whi ch one has good r eason t o t hi nk are t rue. To accept a
belief in t he absence of such a reason, however appeal i ng or even mandat or y such
accept ance mi ght be from ot her st andpoi nt s, is t o negl ect t he pursui t of t rut h; such
accept ance is, one mi ght say, e p i s t e m i c a l l y i r r e s p o n s i b l e . My cont ent i on is t hat t he idea
of bei ng epistemically responsi bl e is t he core of t he concept of epistemic justification.
(p. 5)
Some of the transitions in this line of t hought are unconvincing as they
stand. Accept i ng "all and only beliefs which one has good reason to
think are t rue" is by no means the same thing as aiming at the goal of
truth, even if we modi fy the former to "accept i ng all and only beliefs
that one takes oneself to have good reasons to think are t rue". To
suppose it is obvi ous that they come to the same thing is to assume the
anti-immediacy thesis that is at issue. But what I want to focus on at
the moment is the support given this transition by what follows - the
concept i on of justification as epistemic responsibility.
To think of epistemic justification as amounting to epistemic res-
ponsibility is to treat the former as a normat i ve concept , one that
belongs to a circle of concept s that includes duty, obligation, blame,
reproach, right, and wrong. Bonj our is thinking of being justified in
believing that p as either having done one' s epistemic dut y in so
believing, or as not having violated any epistemic dut y in so believing.
If we want to keep epistemic justification in line with ot her species of
the genus, we will have to opt for the latter. What I am justified in
doing is not always something I have an obligation to do, but it is
always something that I am permi t t ed to do, something the doing of
which does not violate any obligations. To say that I am justified in
I MME DI AT E KNOWL E DGE 89
taking a taxi to the airport (and charging it to my expense account) is
not to imply that I have a dut y to t ake a taxi, rat her than a bus; it is
only to imply that I am allowed to do so, that doing so does not violate
any regulations. So let' s say that, on a normat i ve construal, S' s being
justified in believing that p amounts to S' s not violating any epistemic
obligation in believing that p.
This pushes the question back to "Why should we suppose that one
who bel i eves that p without having adequat e reason for supposing p to
be true is violating any intellectual obl i gat i on?" If I have acquired a
propensity to form percept ual beliefs in circumstances favorabl e to
their truth, why suppose that I am violating some epistemic obligation
by manifesting that propensity, where I don' t have any good reason
for supposing that the circumstances are propitious? Why woul dn' t an
accept abl e set of epistemic norms permi t me to form beliefs in that
way? So far a s I can see, Bonj our woul d have to reply as follows.
T o be r e s pons i bl e i n my doxa s t i c de c i s i ons I h a v e t o ma k e t h e m i n t he l i ght of t he
r e a s o n s avai l abl e t o me , f or t ha t is all I h a v e t o go on. Th e r e f o r e wh a t is r e qui r e d of me
as a s e e ke r af t er t r ut h, as a c ogni t i ve s ubj e c t , is t ha t I de c i de b e t we e n be l i e vi ng t ha t p
a n d r e f r a i ni ng f r o m t ha t bel i ef o n t he bas i s of wh a t e v e r r e l e v a n t r e a s o n s ar e avai l abl e t o
me . To ma k e t h e de c i s i on o n a ny o t h e r bas i s or i n a n y o t h e r wa y woul d be t o f l out my
i nt el l ect ual obl i gat i ons . It woul d be " e pi s t e mi c a l l y i r r e s pons i bl e " . 24
If this is the way the wind blows, then it shows, first of all, that
Bonj our is assuming that obligations and the like at t ach directly to
believing and refraining from believing, and hence that he is assuming
believing and the reverse to be under vol unt ary control. "Ought
implies can. " He is assuming that, with respect to each candidate for
belief, the subj ect has a choi ce as to whet her or not to bel i eve it. This
voluntaristic version of a normat i ve concept i on of justification can be
cont rast ed with an nonvoluntaristic version according to which belief
is not, either in general or ever, under vol unt ary control, and in-
tellectual obligations at t ach rat her to the various things peopl e can do~
(voluntarily) to affect their belief-forming process. Second, even
grant ed the voluntarism, Bonj our' s demand for reasons woul d not be
support ed by a severel y obj ect i vi st version, on which a believing' s
being in accord with my obligations is simply a mat t er of whet her that
believing is in fact in violation of any obligation, what ever I believe,
know, or justifiably bel i eve about the matter. If one of my obligations
is to refrain from a percept ual belief if the conditions of percept i on are
90 WI L L I AM P . AL S T ON
abnormal, then whet her I violated that obligation in a believing that p
woul d be a mat t er of whether, in fact, the conditions were abnormal,
not on whet her I believed, knew or justifiably bel i eved that the
conditions are abnormal. On that version justification hangs on the
way things are, rat her than on what reasons I have that bear on the
question. To squeeze a universal demand for reasons out of the
concept of justification, Bonj our will have to be using a more sub-
j ect i ve version of a voluntaristic normat i ve conception, according to
which one has satisfied one' s obligations in a belief i f f one knows or is
justified in believing that the obj ect i ve requirements have been
satisfied. On that reading it wi l l be the case that one is proceedi ng as
one ought in believing that p only if one has adequat e reason for
supposing that q, where q amounts to what ever is required by the
rel evant (objective) epistemic obligations.
Thus we have found one not disreputable ground for the universal
demand for reasons. But however respectable, the subj ect i ve-vol un-
taristic-normative concept i on of justification is not immune from
criticism, especially as regards the claim that justification in this sense
is a necessary condition of knowledge. I myself am disinclined to allow
that justification on any normat i ve concept i on is necessary for know-
ledge. The reason for this is as follows. Normat i ve concept i ons like
obligation and reproach apply only to beings that are capabl e of
governing their conduct in accordance with norms, principles, or
rules. It is for lack of this capacity that we refrain from using such
concept s in application to very small children and lower animals. But
surely these creat ures are not devoi d of knowledge. Bot h infants and
dogs acquire knowl~edge about their immediate physical envi ronment
t hrough perception. If Bonj our denies this last claim we have an
opposition quite similar to the earlier opposition bet ween Sellars and
myself as to whet her subjects should be credited with knowl edge only
to the extent that t hey are capabl e of critical reflection on the epis-
temic status of their beliefs.
But even if we empl oy some sort of normative concept i on of
justification, there are strong obj ect i ons to a voluntaristic version
thereof. It seems clear that belief is not, in general, under direct
vol unt ary control. When I seem to myself to see a t ruck coming down
the street, or when I am in any of the innumerable situations, percep-
tual and otherwise, where it seems obvi ous to me that something is or
is not the case, I do not have the capacity to bel i eve or refrain from
I MME DI AT E KNOWL E DGE 91
b e l i e v i n g at wi l l , as I c h o o s e . I f i n t h e a b o v e s i t u a t i o n I we r e t o s e t
my s e l f t o r e f r a i n f r o m b e l i e v i n g t h a t a t r u c k i s c o mi n g d o wn t h e s t r e e t ,
p e r h a p s i n o r d e r t o p r o v e t o my s e l f t h a t I c a n, I wo u l d n ' t k n o w h o w
t o b e g i n . I wo u l d n ' t k n o w wh a t b u t t o n t o pus h. ( Of c o u r s e , I c a n
u n d e r t a k e a r e g i me n t h a t i s d e s i g n e d t o g r a d u a l l y we a n my s e l f a wa y
f r o m r e l i a n c e o n t h e s e n s e s ; b u t e v e n i f I s h o u l d s u c c e e d i n t hi s , t h a t is
a d i f f e r e n t s t or y. T h e r e a r e ma n y t h i n g s n o t t h e ms e l v e s u n d e r d i r e c t
v o l u n t a r y c o n t r o l t h a t I c a n a f f e c t b y wh a t I d o , e . g. , my h e a l t h a n d
my we a l t h . ) Wh e t h e r I c a n e v e r b e l i e v e at wi l l i s a ma t t e r I wi l l n o t g o
i nt o. Ho we v e r t h a t q u e s t i o n i s r e s o l v e d , i t i s c l e a r t h a t b e l i e f is n o t
a l wa ys , o r e v e n g e n e r a l l y , a ma t t e r of c h o i c e . He n c e a c o n c e p t i o n of
j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t p r e s u p p o s e s v o l u n t a r y c o n t r o l of b e l i e f c a n n o t b e
a p p l i e d t o b e l i e f i n g e n e r a l . On t h a t c o n s t r u a l , j u s t i f i c a t i o n c a n n o t b e a
g e n e r a l r e q u i r e me n t f or k n o wl e d g e . 25
T h u s i n Bo n j o u r , as i n Se l l a r s , t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t p u t a t i v e l y i m-
me d i a t e k n o wl e d g e r e a l l y r e s t s o n h i g h e r - l e v e l r e a s o n s i t s el f r e s t s o n a
f o u n d a t i o n of s a nd. 26'27
University of Syracuse
NOTES
a Bosanquet, 1911, Bk. II, Ch. IX; Bradley, 1914, Ch. VIII; 1922, Terminal Essay II;
Blanshard, 1939, Chs. XXV-XXVII.
z Peirce, 'Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man', 1934; Dewey,
1938, Ch. VIII.
3 Armstrong, 1973; Goldman, 1976, 1979; Swain, 1981.
4 Goldman, 1979; Swain, 1981.
5 I will continue to use the term 'justification' when discussing epistemologists who
think of knowledge in those terms. I shall use ' epistemization' when I am striving for
maximum generality.
6 The inappropriateness of .the request for reasons here has moved some to deny that
this is a case of knowledge. That move, I believe, would have to be defended with the
same arguments we shall be criticizing in the body of the paper. Since these arguments
are directed against the possibility of immediate knowledge, they can be used either to
discard the immediacy and keep the knowledge, or to discard the knowledge and keep
the immediacy.
7 See, e.g., Firth, 1964. This should not be confused with prima facie immediate
justification where the justification, when it comes off, is wholly immediate, but where
the justification could be "overriden" or "defeated" if conditions are not propitious,
(Pollock, 1972, pp. 39 ft.; Chisholm, 1977, Ch. 4.) Thus one might take the belief that
there is a tree in front of one to be prima facie justified by ones just having a certain
92 WI L L I AM P. AL S T ON
vi sual experi ence; t hen if condi t i ons are abnor mal in a cer t ai n way t hat justification is
"cancel l ed". Her e i n order to be justified i n t he belief t here is no part i cul ar ot her
justified belief t he subj ect has to have.
8 For an influential r ecent at t ack see W. Sellars, ' Empi ri ci sm and t he Phi l osophy of
Mi nd' , i n Sellars, 1963.
9 See, e.g., Aune, 1967, Ch. II; Lehrer, 1974, Ch. V; Will, 1974, Ch. 7.
lO See, e.g., Di cker, 1980, Ch. I.
11 For t he distinctions bet ween t hese terms, see Al st on, 1971.
12 See, e.g., Aune 1967, Ch. II, Will, 1974, Ch. 7, and, for a response, Al st on, 1976a.
13 In Will, 1974, p. 203, t her e is a passage t hat mi ght be i nt er pr et ed i n this way.
14 See Fi rt h, 1964. The above consi derat i ons equally hol d agai nst t he less t empt i ng
vi ew t hat t he impossibility of i mmedi at e knowl edge is shown by t he fact t hat , for con-
cept ual reasons, one can' t have a part i cul ar b e l i e f wi t hout havi ng many ot her bel i ef s as
well.
15 Not e t hat IV, does n o t read: "S' s belief t hat p is i m m e d i a t e l y epi st emi zed - S' s belief
is epi st emi zed o n l y by somet hi ng ot her t han some rel at i on this belief has t o some ot her
epi st emi zed belief(s) of S. " The ' onl y' was omi t t ed specifically t o allow for t he possibility
t hat t he belief mi ght also (cont emporaneousl y) be medi at el y epistemized. A paral l ed
poi nt hol ds for III.
16 No doubt , Sellars' best known sally i n this ar ena is his at t ack on "gi venness" and t he
i dea t hat foundat i onal beliefs are justified by vi r t ue of formul at i ng what is gi ven in a
nonproposi t i onal cogni t i ve act. But because of my limitation t o g e n e r a l argument s
agai nst i mmedi at e knowl edge I will not be discussing t hat aspect of his polemic.
For di fferent react i ons to t he Level Ascent ar gument see Sosa, 1980, where i t is
cal l ed t he "Doxast i c As cent " argument , and Meyers, 1981.
17 In speaki ng of Roder i ck Fi r t h (1964) he refers to " one aspect of his ent erpri se, whi ch
is, as I would put it, to reconci l e as far as possible t he claims of t hose who stress
warrant edness gr ounded i n expl anat ory coher ence (among whom I count myself) wi t h
t he claims of t hose who stress t he non-i nferent i al warrant edness of cer t ai n empi ri cal
st at ement s (among whom I also count myself)". (1979, p. 174)
18 To be" sure, Sellars prefaces this r emar k wi t h " For we have seen t h a t . . . " , but it is not
cl ear t o me j ust where i n t he essay he supposes it t o have been seen. Per haps he was
t hi nki ng of this passage.
St at ement s per t ai ni ng t o this level, in or der to ' express knowl edge' must not only be
made, but , so to speak, must be wort hy of bei ng made, c r e di bl e , t hat is, i n t he sense
of wort hy of credence. Fur t her mor e, and this is a cruci al poi nt , t hey must be made
i n a way whi ch i n v o l v e s this credibility. For where t her e is no connect i on bet ween
t he maki ng of a st at ement and its aut hori t y, t he assert i on may express c o n v i c t i o n ,
but it can scarcely be said t o express knowledge. (p. 164)
If this is i nt ended to be an ar gument for t he cruci al cl ai m quot ed above f r om p. 168,
t hen I will have to r et r act my st at ement t hat Sellars "j ust lays i t down". But if t hi s be
support , i t is qui t e i nadequat e t o t he task. I will agree t hat knowl edge requi res some
connect i on bet ween " t he maki ng of a st at ement and its aut hori t y", i.e., i n this case,
bet ween t he maki ng of a st at ement and t he fact t hat i t was made i n ci rcumst ances in
whi ch it is likely to be true. A merel y acci dent al concat enat i on of t he two would be a
I MME DI AT E KNOWL E DGE 93
case in whi ch it was j ust a mat t er of l uck t hat t he st at ement was t rue, and bei ng r i ght by
acci dent is not knowledge. But , and this is t he cruci al poi nt , Sellars' s candi dat e for t he
connect i on is not t he onl y possibility. Sellars t hi nks t hat if t her e is to be a " connect i on"
i t will have t o be a rel at i vel y sophi st i cat ed one in second i nt ent i on; it will have to be t hat
t he speaker makes her st at ement i n r ecogni t i on t hat t he ci rcumst ances are propi t i ous for
its t rut h. But t her e is a humbl er candi dat e, t he one t hat is al ready bui l t i nt o t he initial
suggest i on t hat Sellars t hi nks we must go beyond, viz., t hat t he st at ement "i s a
mani fest at i on of a t endency t o pr oduce over t or cover t t okens of ' Thi s is gr een' - gi ven
a cer t ai n set - if and onl y if a gr een obj ect is bei ng l ooked at i n st andard condi t i ons" (p.
167). Tha t is, t he mer e fact t hat t he part i cul ar ut t er ance is a mani fest at i on of a general
t endency t o make such ut t er ances only in t r ut h- conduci ve ci rcumst ances is i t s e l f a
" connect i on bet ween t he st at ement and its aut hor i t y" t hat r emoves t he case from t he
class of lucky guesses or acci dent al hits; and t hi s is t rue whet her or not t h e speaker
knows t h a t t he ci rcumst ances are propitious. What we need f r om Sellars is a r eason
for t hi nki ng t hat this si mpl er " connect i on" is not enough, and t hat t he hi gher - l evel -
knowl edge connect i on is requi red for knowl edge of t he l ower-l evel -proposi t i on.
19 In anot her pri me source for Sellars' general epistemology, ' Mor e on Gi venness and
Expl anat or y Coher ence' (1979), he a s s u me s t hat i t is reasonabl e to accept i nt rospect i ve,
percept ual , and memor y (IPM) j udgment s onl y because it is reasonabl e t o accept t he
hi gher l evel j udgement t hat I PM j udgment s are general l y t rue (pp. 177, 178, 180). But
i n t hat article t he focus is on what i t t akes t o be justified in t hose hi gher l evel argument s,
and as a resul t t he cl ai m about what i t t akes to be justified i n I PM j udgment s is not even
discussed, much less adequat el y support ed.
2o I n scrutinizing t he above schemat a one may be st ruck by t he fact t hat in t he second
schema, unlike t he first, t he premi ses make no r ef er ence t o t he justification of any ot her
beliefs of t he subj ect . And f r om this one may i nfer t hat Sellars supposes t hat t he
justification of obser vat i onal beliefs depends in no way on t he justification of ot her
beliefs. But this is n o t Sellars' s position. He is commi t t ed t o hol di ng bot h t hat an
obser vat i onal bel i ef can be correct l y i nferred f r om t he premi ses of t he appropri at e
schema of t he second sort, a n d t hat such a belief is justified onl y if t he bel i ever knows,
or is justified i n bel i evi ng, t hose premises. (See, e.g., p. 342.)
21 " The essential poi nt is t hat i n charact eri zi ng an epi sode or st at e as t hat of k n o w i n g ,
we are not gi vi ng an empi ri cal descri pt i on of t hat epi sode or st at e; we are pl aci ng it i n
t he logical space of reasons, of justifying and bei ng abl e to justify what one says."
( EPM; 1963, p. 169)
22 Al t hough I am per haps t oo much gi ven t o seeing i nst ances of anot her confusion, a
l evel confusi on bet ween, e.g., bei ng justified in bel i evi ng t h a t p and bei ng justified in
bel i evi ng t h a t o n e i s j u s t i f i d i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t p (Al st on 1976b, 1980), I can hardl y find
Sellars guilty of this charge, i n vi ew of what we have al ready not ed t o be his cl ear
r ecogni t i on of t he distinction. It is wort hy of not e, t hough, t hat if one di d fail to make
t he distinction, as many epistemologists do (Al st on 1976b, 1980), this coul d easily l ead
one to t he Epi st emi c Ascent argument . For, clearly, i n or der to be justified i n t he hi gher
l evel belief t h a t o n e i s j u s t i f i e d i n t he l owe r l e v e l be l i e f , one must have reasons t hat have
t o do wi t h t he epistemic st at us of t hat lower l evel belief. And so if one fails to
di st i ngui sh t he two justifications, one will aut omat i cal l y t ake it t hat such reasons are
requi red for bei ng justified in t he l ower l evel belief. It may be t hat such a confusi on
94 WI L L I AM P. AL S T ON
plays a role i n Bonj our ' s position, to be discussed below, but I will not pursue t hat
possibility.
23 Bonj our supports this claim, cogent l y i n my opi ni on, as follows. " . . . knowl edge
requi res epistemic justification, and t he distinguishing charact eri st i c of this part i cul ar
species of justification is, I submit, its essential or i nt ernal rel at i onshi p to t he cogni t i ve
goal of t r ut h . . . . A corollary of this concept i on of epistemic justification is t hat a
satisfactory defense of a part i cul ar st andard of epistemic justification must consist i n
showing i t t o be t r ut h- conduci ve, i.e., i n showing t hat accept i ng beliefs in accor dance
wi t h its di ct at es is likely t o l ead t o t r ut h (and mor e likely t han any proposed al t er-
nat i ve)". (p. 5)
24 In consi deri ng t he reliabilist posi t i on t hat S knows t hat p pr ovi ded S has a t rue belief
t hat p t hat was f or med in a rel i abl e manner (whet her or not S knows it t o be reliable),
Bonj our writes: " But P himself has no r eason at all for t hi nki ng t hat B is likely to be
t rue. Fr om his perspect i ve, it is an acci dent t hat t he belief is true. And t hus his
accept ance of B is no mor e rat i onal or responsi bl e f r om an epistemic st andpoi nt t han
would be t he accept ance of a subj ect i vel y similar belief for whi ch t he ext ernal rel at i on
in quest i on failed t o obt ai n" (p. 8).
2s The concept s of justification ment i oned here, as well as ot hers, are di st i ngui shed and
i mer r el at ed i n a still unpubl i shed paper, ' Concept s of Epi st emi c Justification' .
26 The consi derat i ons of sect i ons 3 and 4 can also be used agai nst t he posi t i on Mi chael
Williams t akes i n his book Groundless Belief. I have not explicitly discussed his
ar gument s in t he body of t he paper, for he does not squarely oppose t he possibility of
any i mmedi at e knowl edge as does Sellars and Bonj our. He recogni zes t he possibility
t hat , e.g., per cept ual beliefs mi ght be justified j ust by vi r t ue of havi ng been reliably
formed, even if t he subj ect knows not hi ng about t hat (p. 69). But he hol ds t hat if t hat is
t he whol e story, such beliefs do not meet t he foundat i onal i st ' s r equi r ement s si nce a
"pot ent i al infinite regress of j ust i fi cat i on" has not been cl osed off (p. 69). Thi s is
because empi ri cal fact s will have t o be pr oduced to justify t he supposi t i on t hat t he
per cept ual beliefs i n quest i on were reliably produced. " . . . To say t hat t here is an
empirical pr esumpt i on in favor of beliefs of a cer t ai n ki nd bei ng t rue is t o t race t he
pri ma-faci e credibility of t hese beliefs t o f ur t her general facts and t hus to lead oursel ves
back i nt o t he very regress from whi ch intrinsically credi bl e beliefs are supposed t o
l i berat e us" (p. 76; see also 158-161). Of course, ff someone makes t he hi gher l evel
st at ement t hat cer t ai n per cept ual beliefs are reliably pr oduced and t herefore credible, he
will need reasons for t hat st at ement and he will not be at t he t ermi nus of a regress of
justification. But t hat does not imply t hat t he per cept ual bel i ever i n quest i on needs
reasons t o be justified i n hol di ng his first-level per cept ual beliefs, and hence it doesn' t
imply t hat he is not at t he t ermi nus of a regress of justification. (See Al st on, 1976b.)
Williams does not hi ng to suppor t t hat claim, and if he were t o suppor t it wi t h con-
si derat i ons of t he sort depl oyed by Sellars and Bonj our t he same responses would be i n
order.
27 Thi s paper has profi t ed great l y f r om comment s by Rober t Audi and J onat han
Bennet t .
I MMEDI ATE KNOWLEDGE 95
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