McIntosh, Facial Feedback Hypotheses, ME, 1996

Motivation and Emotion, Vol. 20, No.
2, 1996
Facial Feedback Hypotheses: Evidence,
Implications, and Directions I
Dani el N. McInt osh 2
This review evaluates f our f aci al f eedback hypotheses, each proposing a certain
relation between the f ace and emotions. It addresses criticisms o f the data,
consi ders i mpl i cat i ons f o r e mot i onal and soci al processes, and advi ses
directions f o r f ut ure research. The current data support the following: Facial
actions are sensitive to social context, yet correspond to the affective di mensi on
o f emot i ons; mat ches with specific emot i ons are unlikely. They modul at e
ongoi ng emot i ons , a n d initiate t hem. These t wo cl ai ms have r ecei ved
substantially improved support, in part due to studies controlling f or effects o f
experimental demand and t ask difficulty. Facial action may i nf l uence the
occurrence o f specific emotions, not simply their valence and intensity. Facial
action is not necessary f o r emotions. There are multiple and nonmut ual l y
exclusive plausible mechani sms f or f aci al effects on emotions. Future work
must f ocus on determining the relative contributions o f these mechanisms, and
the parameters o f their effects on emotions.
Smile when you read this! Proponents of facial feedback hypotheses claim
that doing so cause you to like this article more, and make your mood
more positive. Skeptics disagree. Despite a century of discussion of this
question, research has been strongly evident for less than 25 years, and our
knowledge regarding facial effects on emotion is changing rapidly. The
most recent comprehensive reviews concluded that facial actions influence
emotions (Adel mann & Zajonc, 1989; Manstead, 1988). Nonetheless, ques-
tions about t he interpretation of the data and the importance of t he effect
1I appreciate t he helpful comments of Harry Gollob, Greg McHugo, Catherine Reed, Craig
Smith, and R. B. Zajonc on earlier drafts of this paper.
2Address all correspondence to Daniel N. Mclntosh, Department of Psychology, University
of Denver, Denver, Colorado 80208.
121
0146-7239/96/060~0121509.50/~ 1996 Plenum Publishing Corporation
122 Mcl ntosh
keep t he i dea cont roversi al (Buck, 1984; Fri dl und, 1994; Mat s umot o, 1987).
Fur t her , t he nat ur e and mechani s ms o f t he p h e n o me n o n are de ba t e d even
a mong suppor t er s. Less di scussed are r easons why psychologists s houl d car e
about this p h e n o me n o n .
EVOLUTI ON OF FACIAL FEEDBACK HYPOTHESES
Th e i dea t hat t he face i nf l uences emot i ons has adapt ed and mu t a t e d
over t he years, provi di ng vari at i on and viability t o its descendant s. Psychol o-
gists st udyi ng t he effect s of t he face on emot i ons t race t hei r i nspi r at i on t o
Char l es Darwi n and William James. Dar wi n (1872/1955) not ed t hat enhanc-
ing or i nhi bi t i ng t he expressi on of an e mot i on al t ers t he i nt ensi t y of t hat
emot i on. He wr ot e this in or de r t o expl ai n why expressi on is an i mpor t a nt
t opi c for, and explicable f r om, a nat ur al i st perspect i ve; he also n o t e d t hat
emot i onal expressi ons serve a soci al -communi cat i ve funct i on. However , so-
mat i c i nf l uence on e mot i on is ne i t he r a pr i mar y concer n, nor i nt egr al t o
his t heori zi ng. James (1890/1950) went f ur t her , pr oposi ng t hat physi ol ogi cal
changes, i ncl udi ng facial act i on, a r e t he emot i ons. The body changes, and
t he subj ect i ve exper i ence of e mot i on follows. Somat i c i nput is essent i al t o
t he t heory. Thi s cont r ast is one r oot of t he debat e sur r oundi ng facial f eed-
back. For t he "Jamesi an" e mot i ons t heori st s, a small effect is i mpor t ant ,
as it per t ai ns t o under s t andi ng det ai l s of emot i ons processes. Ot he r s typi-
cally consi der t he effect i nt er est i ng onl y i f it plays a rol e in "everyday phe-
n o me n a " ( Fr i dl und, 1994, p. 182).
Al t hough a st r ong cri t i que by Ca nnon (1927) mut e d cons i der at i on of
f eedback, t wo ideas revived i nt er est in t he effects of facial mo v e me n t i n
t he 1960s. First, Tomki ns (1962) gave t he face a pr i mar y r ol e i n hi s e mo-
t i ons t heory: " The face expresses affect, bot h t o ot hers, and t o t he self, via
f eedback, whi ch is mor e r api d and mor e compl ex t han any s t i mul at i on of
whi ch t he sl ower movi ng visceral or gans are capabl e" (p. 205). Thi s avoi ded
Ca nnon' s criticisms by maki ng visceral changes unnecessary, and by pl aci ng
t he f ocus on a par t of t he body relatively unt ouc he d by Cannon' s analysis
(see al so Gel l hor n, 1964). Bui l di ng on this, Izard (1971) i ndi cat ed t hat dis-
cr et e facial conf i gur at i ons are a pr i mar y de t e r mi na nt of t he qual i t y of t he
fel t emot i on. As wi t h James, facial act i on is a f undament al c o mp o n e n t i n
this appr oach.
Th e second i dea is based on t he t wo-fact or t heor y of emot i on, i n whi ch
i nt ensi t y of e mot i on is associ at ed wi t h gener al i zed physiological ar ousal ,
and t he specific e mot i on is me di a t e d by cogni t i ve processes ( Schacht er &
Si nger, 1962). Bern (1967) bui l t on t hi s not i on by discussing how e mot i ona l
exper i ence may be based i n par t on cogni t i ve sel f - per cept i on processes.
Thi s t heor y suggests t hat facial conf i gur at i on may be one sour ce of infor-
Facial Feedback Hypotheses 123
mation used in making self-attributions of emotions (Laird, 1974), but facial
effects on emotion are not fundament al to it.
A decade later, these two theoretical branches bore empirical fruit.
Laird (1974) developed the self-perception view of emotional experience
and tested the role facial action plays. He indicated that if people are in-
duced to express an emotion, they may then feel that emotion. Lanzetta
and colleagues found that individuals who feigned not experiencing pain
during electric shock showed fewer physiological and subjective pain re-
sponses t han those who pr et ended to be experiencing unbearable pain
(Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith, & Kleck, 1976; see also Kleck, Vaughan, Cart-
wright-Smith, Vaughan, Colby, & Lanzetta, 1976).
By t he late 1970s, this theorizing and data gave currency to t he idea
that facial movement could influence emotions. The term facial f eedback
hypothesis was coined because the effect had become somewhat separated
from its theoretical parents (Ellsworth & Tourangeau, 1981; Tourangeau &
Ellsworth, 1979). The label carries connotations regarding the nat ure of
the process. For consistency's sake, I use the term to denote the general
area of analysis, but note that not all proposed mechanisms assume that
facial effects involve feedback. Further, there are variations on what rela-
tion is suggested by the term. The diversity of hypotheses labeled "facial
feedback" has confused the debate about such effects, making the associa-
tion between facial patterns and emotions less clear. However, careful con-
sideration of the data supports the existence of some specific relations, and
provides information relevant to emotions (and other) processes. It is time
to move past demonstrations of an effect, and to use the data as a basis
for addressing more sophisticated questions and applications. The first step
in this process is clarifying what is known.
EVALUATION OF CONTEMPORARY FACIAL FEEDBACK
HYPOTHESES
There are four common general proposals related to facial feedback.
They may not be equally valid. To best grasp what we know about this
process, it is important to specify which hypothesis is being tested. I have
organized this review around the four questions. Three are based on the
scheme used in Adel mann and Zajonc' s (1989) review, although t he cate-
gorization of studies is slightly different. The first does not imply causality:
(1) Does facial configuration correspond to emotions? The next two hold
facial actions as able to influence emotions: (2) Does facial movement
modulate emotions in the presence of ot her emotional stimuli; and (3) can
facial action initiate emotions, even with no (other) emotional stimuli pre-
124 Mcl nt osh
sent ? Th e l ast quest i on follows Tour angeau and El l swort h (1979): (4) Is
facial act i on necessary f or t he pr es ence of emot i ons ? Not e t hat causal i t y is
not unavoi dabl y i mpl i ed i n t he necessi t y hypot hesi s. I t may be t ha t par -
t i t ul ar facial conf i gur at i ons ar e an essent i al c ompone nt of emot i ons , but
serve no causal funct i on. Cut t i ng across all f our quest i ons is t he i ssue of
what e mot i ona l out c ome is s uppor t ed. Is t he face associ at ed wi t h t he de-
gr ee of posi t i ve or negat i ve affect onl y ( d i me n s i o n a l versi ons), or is t he r e
a l i nk t o specific e mo t i o n s - - a n g e r r at her t han sadness, for exampl e ( c at e -
gorical ver si ons) ? Tests of t he hypot heses per t ai ned most l y t o t he di me n-
si onal ques t i on t hr ough t he mi d-1980s (Wi nt on, 1986). One ques t i on f or
t he pr es ent review, t hen, is t o consi der t he degr ee of s uppor t f or t he cat e-
gorical versi ons evi dent si nce t hat t i me.
I ns t ead of not i ng every st udy, I emphasi ze st udi es f r om t he l at e 1980' s
onwards, as t he last compr ehens i ve reviews wer e publ i shed t hen. Fur t her ,
r esear ch si nce t hat t i me has addr es s ed pr i mar y met hodol i c cri t i ci sms a nd
begun t o fill s ome concept ual gaps; I will focus on what has be e n l ear ned.
I spend little space on bet ween- subj ect s versions of t he hypot heses. Th e s e
hol d t ha t t hos e i ndi vi dual s wh o are mor e expressive s houl d exper i ence
mor e i nt ense emot i ons. Th e r e is no such positive association. Peopl e wh o
t e nd t o express mor e do not f eel mor e, in fact, t hei r physi ol ogy t e nds t o
be less react i ve (Buck, 1980; e.g., Lanzet t a & Kleck, 1970). Al t h o u g h re-
l at ed t o t he p h e n o me n o n at hand, this ar ea deserves a s epar at e review.
Th e wi t hi n-subj ect s versi ons are t he hypot heses pr esent l y at issue. Wi t hi n
individuals, does facial act i on cor r es pond t o or cause changes in exper i ence
and physi ol ogy?
Do Facial Actions Correspond to Emotions?
Thi s hypot hesi s si mpl y st at es t hat facial pat t er ns covary wi t h emot i ons .
Suppor t i ve st udi es fi nd t hat e mot i on associates wi t h visually obs er ved facial
activity (Buck, Savin, Mi l l er, & Caul , 1972; Ekma n, Fri esen, & Ancol i ,
1980) and facial el ect r omyogr aphy ( EMG; Caci oppo, Petty, Losch, & Ki m,
1986; Di mbe r g 1988). E MG not onl y changes as a resul t of ma ni pul a t i on
of e mot i ons (i.e., t he probabi l i t y of a part i cul ar EMG pat t er n gi ven t he
associ at ed affective st at e is hi gh), but also predi ct s sel f - r epor t ed e mot i ons
(i.e., t he probabi l i t y of an affective st at e is hi gh gi ven a par t i cul ar E MG
st at e) ( Caci oppo, Mart zke, Petty, & Tassinary, 1988).
The s e st udi es s uppor t st rongl y t he di mensi onal versi on of t he cor r e-
s ponde nc e hypot hesi s. Al t hough many st udi es simply have not c he c ke d f or
cat egori cal effect s (i.e., wi t hi n- val ence di fferences), mos t t hat di d have be e n
largely unsuccessful or i nconsi st ent (Camras, Hol l and, & Pat t er son, 1993;
e.g., Brown & Schwartz, 1980; Fri dl und, Schwartz, & Fowler, 1984;
Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979). Note that the lack of correspondence be-
tween specific facial patterns and particular emotional experiences does not
contradict t he data showing that people can identify archetypal facial pat-
terns associated with categorized emotions (see, e.g., Ekman, 1994). Know-
ing that a certain pattern is typical of anger, for example, is different t han
consistently possessing that pat t ern when anger is felt.
The difficulty in finding categorical correspondence suggests a funda-
mental problem. There may be too many antecedents and contexts for fa-
cial movement for one-t o-one relations bet ween muscle pat t erns and
particular emotions to be the rule ('lhssinary & Cacioppo, 1992). Note that
this analysis leaves room for a modulating or initiating function of facial
action. Many variables may influence facial action, reducing correspon-
dence. Nonetheless, particular facial patterns may still sway emotional state.
The lack of correspondence simply suggests nonfacial influences on emo-
tion, and nonemotional influences on facial movement.
The social context of the actor is one variable that affects facial dis-
plays. A likely primary function of facial motion is communication of i nner
state or intent to others. Buck (1980, 1994), for example, does a nice job
portraying how facial actions are influenced by both internal states and
social factors. Going further, some (e.g., Fridlund, 1994) argue that facial
configurations are a function of social context or communicative intent
only, not emotional state. Consistent with the notion that there is strong
social effect on facial activity, audience effects on smiles are found as early
as 10 months of age (Jones, Collins, & Hong, 1991; for adult data, see
Chovil, 1991, Kraut & Johnston, 1979). There are two problems with t he
position that social considerations are the sole influence on facial pattern-
ing, however. To begin, facial action can vary as a function of affective
state even when the movements are too small for observers to notice (Ca-
cioppo, Bush, & Tassinary, 1992). Thus, studies finding no visible changes
in connection with emotional stimuli or state are not evidence that facial
action and emotions are independent. More important, social modulation
does not preclude a connection to emotional state. Recent work demon-
strates that facial movement is influenced by both factors. Cacioppo et al.
(1992) found that:(1) EMG varied with the affective content of slides even
when participants viewed them privately;(2) facial responses were similar
during social vs. asocial emotional stimuli; and (3) movement varied with
affective t one of stimuli even when individuals were told to inhibit expres-
sion to avoid communicating their emotional responses. Hess, Banse, &
Kappas (1995) compared women' s reactions to films varying in emotional
strength under conditions varying in sociality and interpersonal relationship.
Facial action was influenced by both social factors and emotional intensity
126 Mclntosh
(see also Kr aut , 1982). Th e dat a show a cl ear cor r es pondence i n val ence
bet ween affect i ve st at e and facial pat t er ns. A cat egori cal associ at i on be-
t ween specific e mot i ons and pat t er ns is difficult t o find, per haps becaus e
of ot he r (e.g., social) i nf l uences on facial mot i on.
Gi ven t he above fi ndi ngs, what are s ome di r ect i ons f or f ut ur e wor k?
One is t o fol l ow t he l ead of Smi t h (1989), and sear ch f or c or r e s ponde nc e s
bet ween specific facial move me nt s (e.g., t he eyebr ow frown), a nd di st i nct
c ompone nt s of e mot i ons (e.g., apprai sal s and physical changes). Thi s level
of analysis may allow f or mor e pr eci se descri pt i ons of what fact ors ar e as-
soci at ed wi t h whi ch facial actions, and whi ch aspect s of emot i ons . Th e di-
mens i onal fi ndi ngs are consi st ent wi t h this appr oach; ext endi ng t hi s level
of analysis t o o t h e r di mens i ons and facial movement s has pot ent i al t o un-
t angl e t he mut ual i nf l uences affect i ng t he cor r es pondence be t we e n facial
act i ons and emot i onal processes.
Does Facial Movement Modulate Emotions?
Th e modul a t i on hypot hesi s st at es t hat facial act i on can affect e mot i ons
dur i ng ongoi ng emot i onal experi ences. Thi s may r ef er t o i nt ensi t y (e.g.,
f r owni ng whe n al r eady sad mi ght make one sadder ) or quality of exper i ence
(e.g., smi l i ng whe n sad may make t he sadness bi t t ersweet ). However , t est s
of this hypot hesi s have f ocused on changes in intensity. The e mo t i o n t heo-
ries t hat f or me d t he earl y basis f or facial f eedback f ocused on t he r ol e of
t he face i n ongoi ng e mot i ona l exper i ence (Izard, 1981; Tomki ns, 1981).
Thus , de mons t r a t i ons of modul a t i on are i mpor t a nt f or eval uat i ng t hes e
views. Addi t i onal l y, this is a pot ent i al causal funct i on, and t he i ssue of cau-
sality is i mpl i ed in f ol k t heori es, in how peopl e i nt er pr et ed t he i ni t i al t heo-
ries (El l swort h & Tour angeau, 1981), by Izard' s (1981, 1990) pr opos i t i ons ,
and by t he earl i est st udi es. Fur t her , i f a causal rol e is est abl i shed, t hi s in-
cr eas es t h e pr act i cal i mpl i c a t i ons of t he p h e n o me n o n ( Tour a nge a u &
El l swort h, 1979). Wh e t h e r it be by modul at i on or i ni t i at i on, this is t he cru-
cial quest i on r egar di ng facial feedback: Does t he face do mor e t ha n expr ess
emot i ons ; does it also change t he m?
Wh e n par t i ci pant s are i nst r uct ed how t o al t er t hei r faces mus cl e by
muscl e, t hei r r esponses t o st i mul i are s omet i mes i nf l uenced by t he pa t t e r n
in whi ch t hei r faces are set (Lai rd, 1974; Rut l edge & Hupka, 1985), but
not always ( Tour angeau & Ellsworth, 1979). Exaggerat i on or i nhi bi t i on of
expr essi ons whi l e exper i enci ng st i mul i also pr ovi de uneven s uppor t f or t he
modul a t i on hypot hesi s (Bush, Barr, McHugo, & Lanzet t a, 1989; Mc Ca n n e
& Ande r s on, 1987; Ohi r a & Kur ono, 1993). Concer ns about d e ma n d effect s
(Buck, 1980; Manst ead, 1988) and quest i ons about t he s uppor t for t he cat e-
gorical hypot hesi s ( Wi nt on, 1986) pl ague this work.
A r ecent st udy provi des mor e sol i d s uppor t f or t he modul a t i on hy-
pot hesi s, whi l e also addressi ng per si st ent concerns. Usi ng i magery t o gen-
e r a t e e mo t i o n s , Hess, Kappas , Mc Hu g o , La nz e t t a , a nd Kl eck (1992)
c ompa r e d t he t i me it t ook i ndi vi dual s t o r each f our emot i onal st at es dur i ng
t hr ee condi t i ons. I n t he "Feel " condi t i on part i ci pant s gener at ed an e mo-
t i on. For t he "Feel - and- Show" condi t i on t hey gener at ed t he t arget e mo t i o n
and di spl ayed t he facial conf i gur at i on consi st ent wi t h it. I n t he "Show" con-
di t i on t hey pos ed an expression. I n t he Feel condi t i on, subjects t ook l onger
t o achi eve t he e mot i on st at e t han i n t he Feel -and-Show condi t i on. Th e ad-
di t i on of facial act i on faci l i t at ed t he sel f-generat i on of t he emot i ons. The s e
dat a addr ess several concerns. First, d e ma n d is an unl i kel y expl anat i on f or
t he effects, as t he meas ur e is i ndi rect , and part i ci pant s di d not know t hat
r esponse l at ency was bei ng assessed. Second, per cei ved t ask difficulty was
not associ at ed wi t h st r onger negat i ve and weaker positive emot i onal feel -
ings. Finally, because t wo positive and t wo negat i ve emot i onal st at es wer e
used, and t her e wer e di fferences i n sel f - r epor t ed emot i ons consi st ent wi t h
facial expressi on, it pr ovi des evi dence f or t he cat egori cal versi on of t he hy-
pot hesi s.
Whe n physiological measur es are used, it is i mpl ausi bl e t hat partici-
pant s are simply conf or mi ng t o exper i ment al de ma nd (Buck, 1980). Lan-
zet t a and col l eagues (Colby, Lanzet t a, & Kleck, 1977; Kl eck et al., 1976;
Lanzet t a et al., 1976) r epor t t hat al t erat i ons of pai n expressi ons dur i ng
shock i nf l uence bot h el ect r oder mal r esponse ( EDR) and subj ect i ve r epor t .
Thes e st udi es show t hat facial and bodi l y act i on i nfl uence physiological and
subj ect i ve status. Al t hough pai n is not a clearly emot i onal out c ome (Buck,
1980; Tour angeau & Ellsworth, 1979), t he st udi es r epor t ed by Lanzet t a et
al. i ncl uded E DR assessment dur i ng ant i ci pat i on of electric shock. Facial
posi ng dur i ng this anxi et y-provoki ng i nt erval i nf l uenced EDR in t he s ame
way. Ot he r r esear ch also fi nds effect s on emot i onal responses, a l t hough
t he s uppor t is une ve n (Ianni , St et t ner , & Fr e e dma n, 1986; Zuc ke r ma n,
Kl or man, & Lar r ance, 1981).
Some r ecent st udi es addr ess t he issue of exper i ment al d e ma n d by al-
t eri ng facial act i on by having peopl e engage in emot i on- anal ogous facial
move me nt . Effect s of facial conf i gur at i on on r esponses pr ovi de s uppor t f or
t he modul a t i ng funct i on. Strack, Mar t i n, & St e ppe r (1988) i nst r uct ed par -
t i ci pant s t o hol d a pe n in t hei r t eet h, lips, or nondomi na nt hand. Th e first
pr oduces a smile-like pat t er n, t he s econd inhibits it, and t he t hi r d is a con-
t rol condi t i on. Indi vi dual s f ound car t oons mor e humor ous dur i ng t he si mu-
l at ed smile, and less humor ous whe n t hei r smiles wer e suppr essed. Zaj onc,
Mur phy, and I ngl ehar t (1989) cr eat ed facial act i ons anal ogous t o posi t i ve
128 Mcl nt os h
and negative configurations by having participants pronounce vowels. In
one study, speakers read aloud stories with either a high frequency of t he
vowel ~/, or none of that vowel. Voicing g/results in facial activity similar
to a frown or scowl. If facial action alters the affective impact of t he stories,
t hen t he participants should experience more negative feelings duri ng the
high-ii story t han during t he no-t~ one. They did. Larsen, Kasimatis, and
Frey (1992) attached golf tees to participants' brows. Contraction of the
corrugator supercilii causes the tips of the two tees to touch, and produces
an action generally associated with sad facial expressions, among others.
When individuals kept t he tees together, they reported that sad photo-
graphs made t hem sadder than when they were instructed to keep t he tees
apart. They found no differences between the tasks on rated difficulty, sug-
gesting that this is not t he reason for the different emotion rating.
In summary, reviews compl et ed in the late 1980s concluded t hat facial
action modul at ed ongoing emotions (Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989; Manst ead,
1988). Since these reviews, additional studies have addressed this issue, and
the majority have been supportive. The greater number of scientists and
methods that find the effect increases confidence that it is not artifactual.
Further, t he mor e recent positive efforts have responded to t he met hodo-
logical criticisms of the earlier ones, and address directly issues of experi-
mental demand, effort effects, and categorical effects. Only work on t he
latter, however, begins to address the issue of qualitative (vs. intensity)
modulation; future work should address this more directly. Despi t e t he
stronger empirical basis, however, t he number of studies with nonsignificant
results suggests that t he effect is not large, the outcome may be moder at ed
by unmeasured variables, some research is using unreliable measures or
invalid manipulations, or some combination of these. One task is t o estab-
lish clearly conditions under which facial action modulates emot i onal ex-
perience.
Can Facial Action Initiate Emotions
The second causal facial feedback hypothesis holds that peopl e can
initiate emotions through facial movement. This has often been consi dered
a stronger hypothesis than modulation; however, initiating an emot i onal
state when none is present is not necessarily a more powerful effect than
altering an extant state elicited by ot her stimuli.
Several studies demonst rat e initiation (e.g., Duncan & Laird, 1977,
1980), and more recently, categorical effects have been addressed. In one
study, participants contracted muscles involved in fear, anger, sadness, and
disgust, in turn, and rated their emotions subsequent to each cont ract i on
on t hese feel i ngs, pl us happi ness, surpri se, agreeabl eness, and i nt er est ( Du-
clos, Lai r d, Schnei der , Sexter, St e m, & Van Li ght en, 1989). Fear rat i ngs
wer e significantly hi gher dur i ng t he f ear expressi on t han i n any of t he o t h e r
t hr ee, and sad was hi gher dur i ng t he sad pat t er n. Ange r and di sgust wer e
not significantly di f f er ent i at ed f r om each ot her , but wer e f r om f ear and
sadness. The s e dat a suggest t hat facial pat t er ns can s omet i mes i ni t i at e e mo-
t i on- s peci f i c e xpe r i e nc e ( see al so Lai r d, Cuni f f , She e ha n, Shul ma n, &
St r um, 1989). However , this wor k is vul nerabl e t o pot ent i al exper i ment al
d e ma n d effects.
Physi ol ogi cal meas ur es are less likely t o be pr oduct s of de ma nd, and
t her e is s ome evi dence t hat physi ol ogy is al t er ed by facial mani pul at i ons.
An earl y de mons t r a t i on of aut onomi c out comes of facial pat t er ns was re-
por t e d by Ekma n, Levenson, and Fri esen (1983). Wi t h repl i cat i on, however ,
t he n u mb e r of physi ol ogi c changes t hat reliably di ffer wi t h facial expr essi on
has di mi ni s hed ( Zaj onc & Mcl nt os h, 1992). Most consi st ent l y p r o d u c e d are
l ower hear t r at e ( HR) i ncreases dur i ng t he disgust facial pat t er n t ha n dur -
ing anger, fear, and sadness, and l arger i ncreases in fi nger t e mp e r a t u r e
dur i ng t he anger conf i gur at i on t han in f ear ( Levenson, Ekman, & Fr i esen,
1990; see Shor t t , Bush, McCabe, Got t man, & Katz, 1994, for a par t i al r ep-
lication; cf Tour angeau & Ellsworth, 1979).
Le ve ns on et al. (1990) col l ect ed i nf or mat i on on part i ci pant s' subj ect i ve
exper i ences dur i ng facial expressions. Facial conf i gur at i ons pr oduc e d self-
r epor t s of t he associ at ed e mot i on on a significant pr opor t i on of trials. Al -
t hough t he muscl e-by-muscl e mani pul at i on may cause some exper i ment al
d e ma n d t o r epor t t he associ at ed emot i on, t he physiological di f f er ent i at i on
t hey f ound makes this less plausible. Th e connect i on of t hese out c ome s t o
facial pa t t e r ni ng is bol st er ed by t he fi ndi ng t hat whe n par t i ci pant s' faces
best ma t c he d pr ot ot ypi cal emot i onal expressions, t he physiological di ffer-
ences wer e st rongest , and sel f - r epor t ed emot i ons mos t evi dent . I n o n e ex-
per i ment , Levens on et al. addr ess t he concer n t hat physiological di f f er ences
are r el at ed t o vari at i ons in t he difficulty r equi r ed t o pose t he expressi on,
r at her t ha n e mot i on pr oduc e d as a resul t of t he expression. No cor r el at i ons
bet ween difficulty and t he magni t ude of physiological change wer e signifi-
cant , and sor t i ng t he emot i onal expressi ons by difficulty di d not p r o d u c e
gr oups t hat ma t c he d sets f ound when gr oupi ng by aut onomi c ner vous sys-
t e m ( ANS) dat a. Di fferent i al effort is t hus not a likely expl anat i on f or t he
ANS results.
An o t h e r exampl e of facial act i ons i ni t i at i ng emot i ons is r e p o r t e d by
Zaj onc et al. (1989). They had individuals pr onounc e /i ( anal ogous t o a
scowl) or o (rel axed face) f or one mi nut e. Th e p h o n e me i/ caus ed a sig-
ni fi cant i ncr ease in f or ehead t emper at ur e, whi ch has been associ at ed wi t h
negat i ve feel i ngs (e.g., Mcl nt osh, Zaj onc, Vig, & Emer i ck, in press; Zaj onc,
130 Mcl nt osh
Murphy, & Mclntosh, 1993; see discussion of the Vascular Theory of Emo-
tional Efference, below). Participants liked the o sound better and rat ed it
as more pleasant than a. In anot her study, participants repeat ed several
vowel sounds. Voicing/i increased forehead temperature, ah, and e (which
produces a smile analog) decreased it. The least liked sound was ti; ah and
e were liked most. The findings have been replicated, with t he effect of
voicing t he vowels on mood remaining when level of difficulty of speaking
them is statistically controlled (Mclntosh et al., in press).
Furt her evidence for an initiatory function of facial action is provided
by Hess et al. (1992). Participants' heart -rat e patterns were consistent
across conditions in which they were asked to simply feel an emotion, sim-
ply display it, or do both. Individuals physiologically responded in t he dis-
play-only condition in ways similar to the conditions in which they were to
feel t he emotion. Also, they report ed feeling emotions when t hey were
asked to display an emotion, but not to feel it. This study gives evidence
of within-valence differentiation, providing support for the categorical ver-
sion of the initiation hypothesis.
A new type of data supporting the initiating hypothesis has recently
emerged. Based on brain lateralization of emotions (Davidson, 1992), Schiff
and Lamon (1989; Schiff, Esses, & Lamon, 1992) examined the influence
of unilateral facial action. Coders blind to condition rated the number and
valence of emotion propositions used by participants in telling stories based
on mood sensitive pictures from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT);
there is little chance that demand characteristics influenced these data. Par-
ticipants t ended to feel sad or depressed when contracting t he left comer
of their mouths. Following a right facial half-smile, they felt positive and
energetic. Although Wissing and Wessels (1992) replicated these results,
the effect may not occur among women.
In summary, support for the initiation hypothesis has been slower to
obtain than for correspondence and modulation. Recent work, however,
provides stronger evidence for categorical and dimensional versions using
a variety of manipulations, and both self-report and physiological outcomes.
Is Facial Action Necessary for Emotions?
The necessity hypothesis states that emotions cannot occur without fa-
cial activation. Although it has t ended to be thought of as indicating that
facial movement is a necessary cause, it may also refer to facial changes
as being an inextricable component of emotions, without such expressions
themselves being causal. The latter is essentially a strong correspondence
hypothesis. Thus, the low association between categories of emot i ons and
facial patterns argues against this position. More generally, people experi-
ence emotions during times of facial paralysis, most commonly in REM
dreaming when there is striate muscle paralysis (see Fridlund, 1994, for
expanded examples). These occurrences make it difficult to maintain this
hypothesis.
However, one version has not been empirically refuted, largely because
it is difficult to test. Perhaps central nervous system (CNS) representations
of facial expressions can meet the hypothesized need for such patterns with-
out actual facial motion (Izard, 1977, 1990; Tomkins, 1962; cf Damasio' s,
1994, somatic-marker hypothesis). Facial action or a neurocognitive repre-
sentation of facial action may be necessary for emotions. It is not clear
how this is functionally different than a completely central approach, except
that it may predict different consequences of damage to particular brain
regions, as alternate structures might be necessary for emotional experience
if representations are needed than if they are not.
Recurri ng Cri ti ci sms o f Facial Feedback Studi es
Fridlund (1994) has organized several of the frequent concerns regard-
ing facial feedback data. First, studies often contain implicit suggestions to
participants about how they should act (Buck, 1980). As detailed above,
recent work makes it unlikely that participants know what is expected and
respond in ways consistent with the hypotheses. Regarding dependent vari-
ables, the physiological data would be difficult for subjects to generat e in
response to experimental demand, and the individual differences in re-
sponse to t he manipulations do not follow a pattern expected if experi-
mental demand were the cause (Laird, 1984). Further, the latency measure
(Hess et al., 1992) and TAT procedure (Schiff & Lamon, 1989) are indi-
cators of effects not sensitive to demand. On the manipulation side, several
studies have used tasks that are unlikely to cue the participants as to t he
expected response (e.g., Strack et al., 1988; Zajonc et al., 1989).
Second, Fridlund (1994) suggests that these just ment i oned facial tasks
(e.g., holding a pen in one' s teeth) are silly or embarrassing, and this is
what causes the changes in emotion. However, that both negative and posi-
tive affective changes result from the tasks makes this confound less plau-
sible. For example, why does voicing e make one feel silly, and voicing a
make one embarrassed, and not the reverse; why is reading a story with
many/ / ' s more aversive than humorous?
The third concern is the confounding of negative faces with difficulty.
Because people can smile using only one muscle, the zygomaticus major
which pulls the corners of the mout h up, and negative patterns need acti-
132 Mcl nt os h
vation and coordination of more than one muscle, participants may like
the smile conditions bet t er simply because they are easier (Fridlund, 1994).
This criticism is refut ed by the studies that find reports of effort or difficulty
to be unrel at ed to the manipulation or emotion. Further, smiles utilizing
two muscles (adding t he orbicularis oculi, which crinkles the corners of t he
eyes) are more associated with positive affect than those using only the
one (Ekman, 1992). This should not be the case if effort is the cause of
more negative feelings.
Fourth, specific to those studies in which people modify their expres-
sions during ongoing emotional experiences, those told to modify their ex-
pressions may regul at e their facial configuration by doing things (e.g.,
producing ment al images) that also modify feelings. As t here are several
affirmative studies that do not use this manipulation, it is not a strong cri-
tique of t he hypotheses.
Summary: The Status of Facial Feedback Research
Recent studies address long-standing criticisms of facial feedback stud-
ies, and provide a firmer foundation on which to evaluate the propositions.
Especially in the case of the initiation hypothesis, recent work has dramati-
cally increased t he supportive evidence. Further, additional support for
categorical effects is emerging. Nonetheless, the phenomena remain elu-
sive. Despite the stronger empirical bases for the effects, research on facial
feedback hypotheses leave a number of significant questions unanswered.
Scholars need to evaluate conditions under which facial movement alters
emotions, the mechanisms by which they do so, and the size of the effect
under different conditions and by varying mechanisms. Further, the impli-
cations of these phenomena need exploration. These issues constitute t he
necessary next area of scientific focus.
POSSIBLE MECHANISMS FOR FACIAL EFFECTS ON EMOTIONS
The primary research question should now be how facial feedback in-
fluences emotions. One way to categorize mechanisms is by whet her they
are part of an emotions theory, or whet her the effects are due to a mor e
general process. The Jamesian camp holds that the influence of facial ac-
tion on emotions is the result of the emotions system (e.g., Ekman, 1992;
Izard, 1971; Tomkins, 1962). For the others, the theoretical focus is on mor e
general processes (e.g., Buck, 1980; Fridlund; 1994; Laird, 1974). With t he
exception of Laird, those supporting the latter mechanisms view t he effects
as minor. The Jamesian group views even minor effects as important, due
to their connection to understanding human emotional processes.
"Jamesian" Mechani sms: Facial Feedback as Part of Emot i ons Theori es
CNS Connections. The dominant emotions-theory view of facial feed-
back effects sees facial movements as part of the package of events that
make up each emotion, or emotion program. These hypothesized programs
are viewed as coordinating people' s responses to emotion-eliciting situ-
ations; they suppose a connection between the motor cortex and ot her parts
of the brain (especially the limbic region; Kelley & Stinus, 1984) involved
in physiological changes during emotions (Ekman, 1992; Levenson et al.,
1990). Activating one part of the response set is thought to stimulate t he
others. If voluntary expressive actions simulate the innate emotional con-
figuration, t hen the expression-specific feeling state may be initiated (Izard,
1990). Neural tracts may lead from facial muscles or skin to an integration
cent er after the expression is produced, or the feedback may occur earlier,
for example in the firing of the muscles (Matsumoto & Lee, 1993). Leven-
son et al. (1990) think it likely that commands from the motor cortex to
the facial nucleus are accompanied by parallel signals to the ANS. Damasio
(1994) describes a neural network by which bodily states provide the input
for the subjective feelings associated with emotions.
Obviously, there is opportunity for much empirical specification. Stud-
ies of people with spinal lesions, lesions in the distal facial nerve tracts, or
t emporary neuromuscular blocks would address these possibilities (Matsu-
mot o & Lee, 1993). For example, people with spinal damage may be mor e
subjectively emotionally excitable since the injury, yet experience less so-
matic emotional responses (Bemlond, Nieuwenhuyse, Fasotti, & Schuer-
man, 1991). Emot i ons are mul t i component i al phenomena, involving
subjective state and a variety of physical events. Examining the effects of
damage to part of the system provides data on the organization of t he
system. The report of Bermond et al. (1991) shows that aspects of emot i ons
can be altered by physical damage, but that the changes are not always
coordinated among components of emotions.
One concern with many CNS approaches is that they are based heavily
on the evidence for facial action creating specific, categorical, emotion-re-
lated patterns of ANS response. If facial action is conceived as starting
neurophysiological states corresponding to emotions, this presupposes t he
existence of such patterns. However, it is difficult to say whether t he ANS
changes caused by facial action are emotional. Not all methods of gener-
ating facial actions and of inducing emotions consistently show ANS pat-
134 Mc l n t o s h
terns (Cacioppo, Klein, Berntson, & Hatfield, 1993; Zajonc & McIntosh,
1992)
Some theorists may not expect a high degree of consistency, however.
One t heory indicates that only facial muscle patterns that closely mat ch
highly specific configurations should induce emotions (Hager & Ekman,
1981; Levenson et al., 1990). Inexact or partial replications of emotional
expressions should not, thus, induce the emotion or cause the physiological
changes. In Izard' s (1990) scheme, partial activation may cause t he feeling
state, but only if ot her areas of the face are not sending signals for ot her
emotions. Note, however, that it may be that central processes are t he key
to facial feedback effects, even if current categorical theories of emotions
are incorrect; it would simply require some modification of some CNS theo-
ries.
Work on the effects of unilateral muscular contractions is also based
on a CNS connection between facial action and emotion. This research
focuses on the subjective experience of emotion, rather than physiological
changes. Results are consistent with studies of brain lateralization of emo-
tion (Davidson, 1992). Integrating these methods will provide information
on brain functioning in emotions and on the parameters of CNS-face-emo-
tion connections.
Not e that Izard' s (1971, 1977) view differs from the purely central
views (Ekman, 1992; Levenson et al., 1990), as peripheral feedback plays
an important role. Izard (1990) notes that mechanoreceptors in facial skin
respond vigorously to facial muscle movement and are sensitive to t he
slightest movement. It is this patterning that provides distinctions among
emotions. The next proposed mechanism also goes beyond purely central
mechanisms.
The Vascular Theory of Emotional Efference (I/TEE). Zajonc and col-
leagues (Zajonc & McIntosh, 1992; Zajonc et al., 1989, 1993) present a
manner by which affect can be altered via facial action that does not rely
on self-perception, cognitive appraisal, or activation of hypothesized CNS
emotion programs. Brain t emperat ure is influenced by the cavernous sinus,
a venous configuration that envelops the internal carotid just before t he
carotid enters the brain. Air inhaled through the nose cools the blood of
the cavernous sinus during normal breathing. Thus, nasal breathing cools
the brain (Kluger & D' Alecy, 1975). VTEE assumes that cooling of t he
brain is hedonically positive (perhaps due to temperature effects on neuro-
chemical processes). Indeed, direct cooling of the hypothalamus in rats
leads to t he same behavior demonstrated by rats receiving pleasurable elec-
trical stimulation (Berridge & Zajonc, 1991).
In humans, there is evidence for the postulated chain of events. Be-
cause facial actions that resemble emotional patterns influence t he amount
of air inhaled via t he nose (Mclntosh et al., in press), they may have af-
fective consequences. Repeatedly voi ci ng/ / ( pr oduci ng a scowl) decreases
the amount of air individuals inhale through the nose, leads to increased
t emperat ure at specific forehead points (a measure of brain t emperat ure
increase; see Mclntosh et al., in press for discussion), and generates nega-
tive affect (Mclntosh et al., in press; Zajonc et al., 1989). Direct manipu-
l at i on of br eat hi ng (e. g. , pi nchi ng t he nose shut ) al t ers f o r e h e a d
t emperat ure and affect (Mclntosh et al., in press), and changing the tem-
perat ure of air inhaled changes forehead temperature and affect (Zajonc
et al., 1989). This mechanism explains dimensional effects of facial move-
ment only, and does not predict ANS changes following facial action.
"Darwinian" Mechanisms: Facial Feedback as By-Product
Conditioning. Specific facial expressions may become conditioned to
certain subjective or physiological states. The typical presence of a smile
when one is happy, for example, may cause the smile to become a classically
conditioned stimulus for happiness. Involuntary expressions are likely to be
more strongly connected to emotional responses than voluntary ones, as
the former will more consistently be tied to the emotion; voluntary expres-
sions may be formed, exaggerated, and suppressed based on social context
(Buck, 1980). This view can account for facial effects on subjective expe-
rience and most physiological changes, both dimensional and categorical
effects, and modulation and initiation. Further, it is also consistent with
the differences found in between-subjects vs. within-subjects tests of t he
hypothesis (Buck, 1980). Two findings suggest that conditioning is not t he
sole explanation for facial feedback data, however. First, it is not clear using
this explanation why a muscle contraction on the left side of t he body
evokes a different subjective state than the same movement on t he right
side, given that movements on both sides of the face are consistently pai red
with the state. Second, it is difficult to consider pairing of emot i on and
expression to be the sole reason for the newer data supporting categorical
effects of facial action when there is such variable correspondence bet ween
expression and discrete emotions.
Self-Perception. A second approach that predicts emotional effects of
facial action is self-perception theory (Bem, 1967). From this perspective,
the face provides data to the person regarding what he or she is feeling.
Findings for both initiation and modulation are consistent with this model.
Because this model predicts categorical effects, those results are especially
i mport ant (Duclos et al., 1989); previous difficulty in finding t hem has
caused some to doubt this mechanism (Winton, 1986). The effects of uni-
136 Mc l n t o s h
lateral contractions and emotion-analog tasks (e.g., pen holding) are some-
what inconsistent with this theory. For example, Strack et al. (1988) point
out that their findings using oral pen holding count er a self-perception in-
terpretation, because subjects' attention is drawn away from t he face, and
the facial configuration is constrained which should lead to participants dis-
counting its effect.
Dramaturgy. Fridlund (1994) describes a dramaturgical rout e by which
facial action could lead to altered emotions. People may use sensations
from their faces to assume a role. They t hen might recruit memori es or
images to induce the emotion consistent with that role. This shares with
the self-perception mechanism the idea of the face as data used by t he
person, but instead of the information being related to how one is feeling,
it is instead relevant to how one should be acting. For example using an
example from Laird' s (1974) study, when a person is "instructed t o move
facial muscles to form a smile at a Ku Klux Klan slide [this person] is
being asked implicitly to take an amused stance toward t hem" (Fridlund,
1994, pp. 178-179). If one forms an angry face, it follows, one will t ake on
an angry role, which may involve acting angry by making a fist, yelling, and
perhaps thinking angry thoughts.
Note that Fridlund (1994) separates the behavior from the emot i on;
"acting" angry is not "is" angry. This may be a problematic distinction, in
that the action may lead to experience, even if experience incongruent with
the socially-expected action is suggested. In one study, subjects asked under
hypnosis to display one emotion and experience anot her report ed being
unable to experience one incongruent with their expressions (Pasquarelli
& Bull, 1951). Nonetheless, this proposal suggests that emotional behavior,
at least, can be influenced by facial patterning.
This analysis points to the necessity of understanding the social context
in which the facial action occurs. Unresolved here are results of conflicting
social requests. It would be interesting to see the facial expressions, sub-
jective reports, and ANS changes in people asked to display anger, yet be
sad. How would role taking influence their responses? What effect would
the inner sadness have on the behavior? What effect would the anger dis-
play have on the felt sadness?
Multiple Causality
These different proposals should not be viewed as mutually exclusive.
The influence of the face on emotions is likely multiply det ermi ned. No
single proposed mechanism easily accounts for the variety of findings. For
example, VTEE does not address asymmetry in brain activity associated
wi t h cer t ai n smiles, but does uni quel y pr edi ct di fferences in t e mpe r a t ur e
and br eat hi ng associ at ed wi t h affect i ve changes (see Mcl nt os h et al., in
press). Part of t he conf usi on i n t he l i t er at ur e is probabl y due t o di f f er ent
mechani s ms cont r i but i ng di fferent i al l y t o varying findings. The r e ma y be
di f f er ent mechani s ms f or cat egori cal vs. di mensi onal effects, for physi ol ogi -
cal vs. subj ect i ve effects, and f or t he combi nat i ons of t hese. For exampl e,
per haps onl y cer t ai n highly preci se facial pat t er ns activate t he CNS mecha-
nisms pr oduci ng cat egori cal physi ol ogi cal effects, yet less exact e mot i on-
a n a l o g o u s c o n f i g u r a t i o n s c a us e c h a n g e s i n s ubj ect i ve va l e nc e d u e t o
br eat hi ng- r el at ed t e mpe r a t ur e changes ( VTEE) . Some mechani s ms mi ght
be mor e power f ul , or mor e gener al t ha n ot hers. Possibly t he pr i mar y cause
varies by emot i on, wi t h di sgust expressi ons i nduci ng associ at ed feel i ngs via
act i vat i on of a cent r al emot i ons pr ogr am, and smiles cr eat i ng posi t i ve feel -
ings due t o classical condi t i oni ng, for exampl e. Fur t her i nvest i gat i on i nt o
all t he pr opos e d mechani s ms is necessary, as is careful cons i der at i on of
whi ch effect s are connect ed wi t h whi ch met hods and out comes. Le a r ni ng
mor e about t he mechani s ms of facial f eedback will hel p us t o unde r s t a nd
emot i ons processes, poi nt t o i nf l uences on emot i ons (i ncl udi ng sour ces of
i ndi vi dual di fferences), and will assist in consi der i ng any appl i cat i ons of
t he effect . However , f or s ome pur pos es , t he specific me c ha ni s m is not
highly i mpor t a nt i f t he effect is l arge e nough (Capel l a, 1993; Izard, 1990).
Even if t he i nf l uence of t he face is due t o classical condi t i oni ng or r ol e
playing, t he effect exists.
I MPLI CATI ONS OF FACIAL EFFECTS ON EMOTI ON
Implications for Emotions Theories
Much of t he dri ve in i nvest i gat i ng facial f eedback comes f r om t hos e
in t he J ames i an c a mp who view it as an i nt egral fact or in huma n e mot i ona l
processes. The fi ndi ngs r egar di ng cor r es pondence are i mpor t ant her e, as
t hey de mons t r a t e t hat t he face is associ at ed wi t h emot i on, not j us t social
communi cat i on. I ndeed, this may be all t hat is ne e de d for t he da t a t o be
consi st ent wi t h s ome t heor i es (see Tomkins, 1962, 1981).
Th e evi dence in s uppor t of t he modul at i on hypot hesi s is qui t e i mpor -
t ant t o several emot i ons t heori es, specifically t hat of Izard (1977, p. 64),
in whi ch facial expressi on can modul a t e experi ence onl y when t he expres-
sion is "sufficiently veridical. " Thes e results t hus mai nt ai n t he pl ausi bi l i t y
of Izard' s t heory. Th e CNS t heor i es also r emai n plausible, especially as t he
evi dence for t he i ni t i at i on f unct i on grows. The wor k s uppor t i ng cat egor i cal
effect s is especially i mpor t ant , as t hese are pr edi ct ed by t hese t heor i es. As
138 Mc l n t o s h
these findings are historically weaker and more controversial, furt her work
should address clearly the existence of categorical effects. As our knowl-
edge of neuropsychological processes related to emotions grows, it is likely
the CNS theories will be modified. Data from the facial feedback studies
are useful in that they might point to neural systems that should be exam-
ined for t hei r emot i onal function. Given recent advances in neuropsy-
ehological met hods, it is an opport une time to do t he empirical work
necessary to specify the CNS theories. The ambiguity of ANS specificity
may be less relevant if CNS patterns associated with emotions can be iso-
lated.
Facial feedback findings are also relevant to a central issue in emotions
theories: Is cognition necessary for emotions? Facial feedback may be an
example of noncognitive processes influencing emotion, but this depends
on one' s definition of cognition, and on which mechanisms are responsible
for t he effect. VTEE may not require cognition. Some conditioning and
CNS theories may require only the simplest kind, and then only if cognition
is defined to include immediate perceptual knowledge (see Buck, 1980,
1994). The dramaturgical and self-perception routes may need t he complex
information processing of higher-level cognition. The most recent work
(e.g., Mcl nt osh et al., in press; Schiff & Lamon, 1989, Strack et al., 1988,
Zaj onc et al., 1989) casts doubt on the necessity of cognitive appraisal.
Physical processes appear enough to generate feelings. Just as evidence of
more central processes and cognitive and social influences makes a com-
pletely peripheral/facial theory of emotion untenable, so the facial feedback
dat a makes a compl et el y cognitive t heory less plausible (Berkowitz &
Devine, 1995).
Finally, the work in facial feedback is relevant to the question of t he
existence of basic emotions (see Duclos et al., 1986). Work on the cate-
gorical versions of the hypotheses often presumes the existence of basic
emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1992). Evidence regarding categorical effects should
be taken into account in the discussions about the nature of emotions.
The relevance of these findings for understanding basic processes of
emotions notwithstanding, facial effects on emotion are more likely impor-
tant the larger their effects are. Matsumoto (1987) reported a small to mod-
erat e effect size (.343), and both proponents and critics of the hypotheses
consider the results as consistent with their views. More affirmative studies
have been published since. However, data from modulation studies indicate
that the consequences of facial patterning are much smaller than the in-
fluence of t he stimuli (e.g., Kraut, 1982; Laird, 1974; Lanzetta et al., 1976;
Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979). "Turning your frown upside-down" may
make you feel bet t er than not doing so, but isn't likely to make you feel
happy if your new car has just been rear-ended. However, when the context
is less powerful than a car accident, the initiation function of facial move-
ment may play an important role. Once an emotion state is, even weakly,
initiated, memories, appraisals, and behaviors may be influenced to be con-
sistent with this state, and amplify the original weak state caused by t he
facial pattern. Below, implications beyond emotion theories are considered.
Implications for Emotion Regulation
Attention toward how individuals regulate or control their emotions
has increased recently (see Wegner & Pennebaker, 1993). The ability of
voluntary facial action to modulate and initiate emotions indicates that in-
dividuals can regulate their emotions by controlling their facial movements.
Athletes who "put on a game face" of anger, may increase the aggression
with which they perform.
This has both psychological and social applications. Wikan (1989), for
example, describes the role of expression as personal and social emot i on
management in North Bali. There is social pressure to smile during tragedy.
Explicit in this practice is the understanding of expressions as causes of
inner feelings. If one is socially pressured to smile in the aft ermat h of
trauma, it may decrease the feelings of depression that follow. On t he ot her
hand, being coerced to display one emotion while feeling anot her creates
conflict (Hochschild, 1983); facial feedback research may shed light on what
occurs in these circumstances. Understanding the individual and social uses
of facial feedback to regulate emotions has importance for both everyday
emotion regulation and psychotherapy (Gellhorn, 1964; see Izard, 1971, for
an extended discussion). This may be one method, for example, for people
to begin to alter affective responses to certain circumstances.
Implications for Social Processes
One active area of interest in facial feedback is in research on emo-
tional contagion, or socially-induced affect (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson,
1994; Levenson, in press, Mclntosh, Druckman, & Zajonc, 1994). This is
fitting. Strong early evidence for facial feedback came from studies of Lan-
zetta and colleagues (e.g., Lanzetta et al., 1976), whose initial work was
based in part on research demonstrating socially-induced affect among
monkeys (see Mclntosh et al., 1994; McHugo & Smith, this issue). Facial
mimicry is one way in which emotions may be socially shared.
The early data led to exploration of the role of the face in the vicarious
instigation of affect. Vaughan and Lanzetta (1981) found that participants
who amplified their facial responses to the other' s pain showed increased
140 Mc l n t o s h
E DR a nd HR c ompa r e d t o t hose who i nhi bi t ed facial movement , or wer e
gi ven no i nst ruct i ons. Vi cari ous e mot i ona l experi ence appear ed me d i a t e d
by facial act i ons of t he part i ci pant . Co mb i n e d wi t h t he evi dence t ha t pe opl e
mi mi c t h e e mo t i o n a l expr es s i ons o f ot her s , facial f eedback pr ovi de s a
me c ha ni s m f or one per son' s e mot i ons t o i nfl uence anot her ' s (e.g., Bus h et
al., 1989; Hat f i el d et al., 1994; Mc l nt os h et al., 1994). For mi ng one ' s face,
ei t her aut omat i cal l y or i nt ent i onal l y, i nt o t he same pat t er n as a n o t h e r per -
son' s may, via facial feedback, l ead t o over l ap of subjective or physical e mo-
t i onal exper i ence. Dyadi c r appor t is a not he r i nt er per sonal process t hat may
rely in par t on facial f eedback (Capel l a, 1993). Mut ual mimicry, a nd resul -
t ant s har ed emot i ons may s moot h social i nt eract i on. Ra ppor t a nd e mpa -
t h y - a n d t her ef or e facial f e e dba c k- - a r e i mpor t ant for a wi de var i et y of
nor mal social f unct i ons (Hat fi el d et al., 1994; Levenson, in press; Mc l n t o s h
et al., 1994).
Di ffi cul t i es in such processes may be associ at ed with pat hol ogy. Ear l y
pr obl ems i n mi mi cki ng ot her s may be associ at ed wi t h autism, a nd may l ead
t o s ome o f t he social deficits aut i st i c i ndi vi dual s experi ence ( Roger s & Pen-
ni ngt on, 1991). Facial f eedback is i nvol ved in this, as, via mimicry, it coul d
pr ovi de t he subj ect i ve exper i ence of ot her s ' emot i ons t hat allows nor ma l
i ndi vi dual s t o devel op unde r s t a ndi ngs of ot hers. Neurol ogi cal pr obl e ms
wi t h t he s oma t i c f e e dba c k s ys t em ma y be as s oci at ed wi t h s o c i o p a t h y
( Damasi o, 1994).
Finally, social cont ext pr obabl y i nf l uences facial f eedback pr ocesses in
at l east t wo ways. First, how mu c h i ndi vi dual s express, and what t hey ex-
press is st rongl y i nf l uenced by who t hey are wi t h (Fri dl und, 1994); t he facial
f eedback hypot heses suggest t hat this will affect t he emot i ons pe opl e have
i n such ci rcumst ances. For exampl e, whe n subjects are bei ng obser ved dur -
i ng el ect ri c shock, t hei r facial movement s , sel f - r epor t ed feelings, a nd physi-
cal ar ousal are all l ower t han whe n al one (Kl eck et al., 1976). Second, soci al
cues are a not he r i nfl uence on emot i ons ; when t hey are st rong t hey may
out wei gh effect s of facial feedback.
DI RECTI ONS AND QUESTI ONS
Res ear ch has de mons t r a t e d t hat t he face can i nfl uence emot i ons . And,
t her e ar e a n u mb e r of pot ent i al l y i mpor t a nt i mpl i cat i ons of this p h e n o me -
non. However , t he ar ea is in n e e d of de ve l opme nt and r ef i nement . On e
issue f or s ubs equent wor k is di scer ni ng t he ci rcumst ances unde r whi ch t he
effect s ar e mos t powerful . First, overal l effect size shoul d be r eeval uat ed,
addi ng t he r ecent fi ndi ngs t o t hose us ed i n Mat s umot o' s (1987) me t a a na -
lysis. I n doi ng t hi s wor k, t he not i on of one st udy, one vot e s houl d be
avoided; certain manipulations, measures, and procedures are mor e con-
vincing than others. Further, an examination of the effects for the different
hypotheses would be useful. The power of facial action may vary with in-
dividual differences, the facial manipulation used (muscle-by-muscle, ana-
log pat t erns, amplification), varying out comes (memories, ANS, CNS,
subjective experience), and the social context.
Some individual differences have been found relating to sensitivity to
internal cues (Laird, 1984). Katkin (1985), for example, has found clear
individual differences in the ability to consciously detect heartbeats. People
who possess more accurate autonomic self-perception may be mor e likely
to experience facial feedback effects--physical cues may be more powerful
for them. A quite consistent finding is that when environmental cues are
minimized, men detect physiological changes more readily t han women
(Katkin, 1985; Pennebaker & Roberts, 1992). This suggests that facial feed-
back effects would be more powerful among men than women, especially
to the extent self-perception of somatic cues is responsible for t he effects.
Compatible with this is Wissing and Wessels' (1992) finding that unilateral
facial contractions worked only for men.
However, much research finds effects of facial action in mixed-gender
samples, and Ohira and Kurono (1993) found effects in a sample of Japa-
nese women. Two possibilities are suggested. First, only some mechanisms
may be gender related; work should attempt to determine if mechanisms
of facial feedback differ across gender. Second, any gender difference may
be cultural, and by implication, so might some facial feedback effects (see
Pennebaker & Roberts, 1992 for discussion of possible causes of t he gender
difference). In general, finding individual, gender, and cultural differences
in facial feedback and related effects may help untangle the mechanisms
responsible for the phenomena. If there are cultural differences, for exam-
ple, the mechanisms should be evaluated with respect to how well t hey can
account for these.
Katkin' s (1985) work also suggests a situational effect on visceral self-
perception. Accuracy of heartbeat detection increases with physically or
psychologically-induced arousal. This suggests that in situations of high
arousal, somatic feedback effects (including facial) may be enhanced.
One potentially relevant difference in manipulation is whet her t he fa-
cial motion is voluntary or posed. Facial actions are under dual neurological
control. Voluntary and involuntary (or, perhaps, const ruct ed vs. over-
l eamed, see Fridlund, 1994) facial actions involve different neural paths
(Matsumoto & Lee, 1993). Izard (1990) claims that this is one reason why
studies in which the experi ment er manipulates participants' faces show
lower effect sizes than those using spontaneous faces. He (Izard, 1981,
1990) suggests that for voluntary facial movements to elicit or regulate emo-
142 Mcl ntosh
tion strongly, the movements must be congruent with ongoing cognitive
processes.
How different are voluntary and involuntary patterns? Smith, McHugo,
and Lanzetta (1986) demonst rat ed that the pattern of muscle activation in
posed happiness, anger, and sadness were highly similar to that generat ed
during imagery of past experiences of the respective emotions; however,
during sadness, muscle activity over the brow was more evident in t he im-
agery task than in the posed expression. Is this difference (and potential
ones of similar magnitude) enough to affect facial feedback effects? Some
say so. Hager and Ekman (1981) indicate that only faces that very closely
match basic emotion patterns will elicit emotions; effects of precision of
expression are discussed by Levenson et al. (1990). The differences in in-
nervation and muscle action between voluntary and manipulated facial ac-
tions may influence the extent of facial feedback. Future work needs to
continue to determine the degree differences in facial patterns rel at ed to
this manipulation, and evaluate whet her this difference is significant for
facial feedback effects.
One important direction would be to further link facial feedback ef-
fects with data on more general somatic feedback effects (see Buck, 1984;
Fridlund, 1994). One example of this is Duclos et al. (1989), who examined
both facial and posture feedback. Anot her is Schiff and Lamon (1994), who
extended their work on unilateral facial contractions to squeezing a ball in
either the right or left hand. Thei r findings were parallel with those of t he
facial contraction studies report ed above. Most of the proposed mecha-
nisms for facial feedback are relevant to postural, and perhaps vocal feed-
back effects, for instance (Hatfield et al., 1994). For example, can breathing
as one does while angry cause feelings of anger by activating the emotions
program also initiated by an angry facial pattern? Expanding the research
mor e completely to the body will provide information on both the mecha-
nism and the power of facial feedback effects.
CONCLUSION
Recent evidence bolsters previous work demonstrating that facial ac-
tion corresponds to emotions, and can modulate and initiate emotional ex-
peri ence. Ther e is still no evidence that facial action is necessary for
emotions. Evidence for categorical effects has grown. Support for the phe-
nomena is not always obtained, however. This is likely due to causes of
facial movement beyond emotional state (e.g., communicative intent), and
to influences on emotion in addition to facial feedback (e.g., cognitive ap-
praisal). Further, a lack of knowledge regarding the parameters of feedback
processes makes finding t he effect mor e difficult. Fut ure work may isolate
a more const rai ned process t hat is more reliable.
A focus on det ermi ni ng t he cont ri but i on of various mechani sms t o fa-
cial feedback effects is necessary. Knowl edge of h o w facial actions i nfl uence
emot i ons will advance under st andi ng of emot i ons processes in general , and
will clarify t he role of t he face in emot i onal and social domains. Such in-
f or mat i on will also assist in defi ni ng t he paramet ers within which f eedback
effects occur. Det ermi ni ng medi at ors and moderat ors of facial f eedback
will provide a more solid f oundat i on on which t o examine bot h basic ques-
tions and applications of this phenomenon.
Even if t he Jamesi an mechani sms (i.e., those t hat include facial feed-
back as i nt egral to emot i onal processes) are not support ed, t he existence
of facial feedback effects has significant implications. Facial i nfl uence on
emot i ons may play a particularly i mpor t ant role in an array of i nt rapersonal
and i nt erpersonal dynamics (e.g., emot i on regulation and socially-induced
affect). Research on these applications of facial feedback effects shoul d
proceed in parallel to devel opment of investigation of the basic phenomena.
A quart er-cent ury of rapidly expandi ng research has laid t he ground-
work for exploring complex and difficult questions about facial f eedback
processes. To progress, the field must move past replication of demonst r a-
tions of such phenomena to focused work on discerning their mechani sms,
paramet ers, and applications. Thi s work has started, with several pr ogr ams
of research now addressing some of these points. Ther e is much mor e t o
be done; t he next 25 years shoul d be an exciting time to investigate this
el ement of emot i onal and social processes.
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