IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF EFFINGHAM COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

ANDREW BRANTLEY, )
)
Appellant )
) Civil Action No.:
vs. ) SU14CV046W
)
SUPERINTENDENT OF )
EFFINGHAM COUNTY )
BOARD OF ELECTIONS )
AND REGISTRATION )
)
Appellee )
)
and )
)
VERA JONES )
)
Appellee )

BRIEF OF APPELLANT ANDREW BRANTLEY

COMES NOW, Appellant ANDREW BRANTLEY (Appellant) and files this Brief of
Appellant to show the Court the following:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.
On March 14, 2014, the Appellant filed a challenge of the qualifications of Candidate
Vera Jones (Appellee), as authorized by O.C.G.A 21-2-6 challenging that the Appellee is
holding public funds in violation of the statutes and constitution of the State of Georgia.
2.
On April 4, 2014, the Effingham County Board of Elections (Board) held a hearing
regarding the Appellants challenge. Appellee, through her attorney, filed a Motion to Dismiss,
which was untimely and did not address the issues raised by the Appellant, which were before
the Board. The Board granted the Appellees motion to dismiss without considering the
evidence presented in the Appellants challenge therefore not requiring the Appellee to prove her
qualifications. In the dismissal of the Appellants challenge, the Board provided no findings of
fact, conclusions of law and relied solely on the irrelevant statements provided by the Appellee
Jones attorney. In the case of, Haynes v. Wells, 273 Ga. 106 (Ga. 2000), the Supreme Court of
Georgia held that after a candidate has filed an affidavit attesting to their qualifications, the
entire burden is placed upon a Candidate to affirmatively establish his eligibility for
office. By pre-emptively dismissing the Appellants challenge pursuant to a motion to dismiss
filed less than one (1) day prior to the hearing, the Board displayed an unwarranted exercise of
discretion as described in O.C.G.A. 21-2-6(e)(6). Appellant timely objected to the filing of
the motion as reflected in the record before this Court.
3.
The Appellants challenge addressed the issuance of a check for $739,844.86 issued in
error by Effingham County Finance Department, the demand by the County for the return of the
money and the refusal/failure of the Appellee Jones, individually or as a principal stockholder
and officer of her closely held corporation, DM Jones Construction, Inc, to return the monies
paid in error. The facts giving rise to Appellants challenge petition were given through various
submissions by Appellant, submitted during the hearing, but not reviewed by the Elections
Board. These facts included the sworn affidavits of seven (7) former Effingham County
Commissioners who were seated when the erroneous overpayment was made. The Appellants
challenge relied on O.C.G.A. 45-2-1(2) which states in part: Any holder or receiver of public
money of this state or any county thereof who has refused or failed when called upon after
reasonable opportunity to account for and pay over the same to the proper officer shall be
ineligible to hold any civil office; and the Georgia Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Paragraph
3 which states in part, No person who is the holder of public funds illegally shall be entitled to
hold any office or appointment of honor or trust in the State.
The Board had a duty to the citizens of Effingham County to ensure that all candidates
are qualified to hold office and the preemptive dismissal of the Appellants challenge based on a
motion to dismiss filed by Appellee resulted in the Appellee again avoiding giving any type of
sworn testimony to prove her claims. Additionally, the Board did not consider any of the
evidence submitted from the public record evidencing the claims of the Appellant Brantley. The
record contains all such public records, however, the Board of Elections did not consider those
filings and did not review them during their executive session as all five (5) copies remained on
the desk of the Clerk and were not taken from the hearing room. Thus, the Appellee Jones, has
again, without justification, avoided addressing the alleged disqualifications. Therefore,
Appellee Jones, having failed to address the various points and evidences presented by Appellant
Brantley, leaves the initial concerns as expressed in Appellants challenge, regarding whether or
not the Appellee is qualified to hold office, unanswered.
The Appellants challenge presented sufficient evidence to support the following facts:
1) That the Appellee and her company, DM Jones Construction, Inc. were not due any
taxpayer monies as all contracts required (pursuant to the Georgia Development Impact Fee Act
O.C.G.A. 36-71-1 ) re-payment for any services of any developer to be repaid solely from
impact fees actually paid.
2) That the Appellee sent several writings to the County claiming that the County owed
her company the full payment of $739,844.86 for infrastructure that her company constructed, in
violation of the False Claims Act O.C.G.A. 23-3-121 and in violation of the Georgia
Development Impact Fee Act O.C.G.A. 36-71-1 ;
3) The writings that the Appellee sent to the County contained false and misleading
statements that induced the County finance department to erroneously issue the full payment.
4) That Vera Jones, as evidenced by business records of Effingham County, in her own
writing admitted that she was not due the entire claim and was only due the approximate
$150,000.00 in actual impact fees charged;
4.
The Appellees close held corporation, DM Jones Construction, Inc. (DMJ) contracted
with the county to install wastewater infrastructure that would provide service to two
subdivisions that they were developing. In the contract, DMJ agreed to install infrastructure that
would service 299 lots and the County would reimburse DMJ via impact fees collected from
South Effingham Plantation and Buckingham Plantation.. As of current, only 60 impact fees
have been collected and delivered to Effingham County of the 299 planned lots leaving a max
total of $150,000 in impact fees that DMJ could have collected on to date. Therefore, as of date
of the check, February 14, 2007, Appellees closely held corporation has been paid $589,844.86
more than the County had collected. The overage in these monies was paid, pursuant to County
records, by use of tax payer monies for a short term loan to cover the overage. The Appellee and
her closely held corporation continue to hold and refuse to return, these public monies. DM
Jones Construction, Inc., with the advice and consent of Vera Jones, its chief officer, voluntarily
chose to construct the applicable infrastructure, having submitted to Effingham County various
unrealistic and unreasonable plans to development of 299 lot subdivision. However, D.M. Jones,
Construction, Inc. failed to develop such lots and fraudulently invoiced the County as if those
lots had been constructed. As of the date of this writing, those lots are still not developed (see
public record Effingham Tax Assessor Various lots of Parcel 375-18 and Parcel 375-0051
117 undeveloped acres Buckingham Plantation). Not only has the Appellee received a gross
overpayment in error, D.M. Jones Construction, Inc. and Appellee Jones, have failed to even
meet the basic terms of any contract with Effingham County and have prevented the County
from generating revenue from those potential customers promised by Appellee Jones and
endangering the financial viability of Effingham County.
5.
Acting in her individual and personal capacity, the Appellee submitted an informal and
extremely unprofessional invoice requesting full payment for work done by DMJ. The invoice,
as documented through business records of Effingham County in the Appellants challenge,
consists of four pages of emails in which the Appellee requests full payment because she states
that she paid for the entire project up front out of our pocket. The Appellee knew that she was
not entitled to the full amount of payment as reimbursement was required, in conformation with
the Georgia Development Impact Fee Act, only as impact fees were collected. In her handwritten
notes on the emails, the Appellee also acknowledges the approved amount and that it was
coming from the collected impact fees. According to Georgia Law, specifically doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil, Paul v. Destito, 250 Ga. App. 631(2001), the False Claims Act,
O.C.G.A. 23-3-121 and Effingham County Code of Ordinances Chapter 1, Section 1-20,
officers and directors of a corporation become intertwined to a point that the corporation is a
mere alter ego any of the directors or officers, corporate protection is not valid and the directors
and or officers can be held personally liable for their fraud, abuse, or gross negligence. The
Appellant Brantley contends that the Appellee Jones acted in her individual capacity, to make
and submit false writings and therefore should not be afforded any corporate protection. (Please
see various emails obtained under Open Records Act from Effingham County)

6.
On April 14, 2014, the Board filed their final disposition stating their decision to grant
the Appellees Motion to Dismiss and on April 24, 2014, the Appellant filed this Appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
7.
The standard of review is an appellate standard in which the court cannot substitute its
judgment as to the weight of the evidence on question of fact. The Superior Court may affirm the
decision or remand the case for further proceedings, but may reverse or modify the decision if
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions of the superintendent are:
(1) In violation of the Constitution or laws of this state;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the Superintendent;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedures;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion. O.C.G.A. 21-2-6(e).
In the absence of legal error, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to interfere with a
verdict supported by some evidence even when the verdict may be against the preponderance of
the evidence.

ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY
8.
The Board failed to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law in its final written
decision. The Board is a legislatively created agency authorized to hear contested cases
concerning the qualification of candidates in Effingham County. As such, the Board is required
to make and provide in writing, findings of fact and conclusions of law. Judicial review of an
administrative decision is a two-step process. The steps are as follows; the reviewing court first
determines whether there is sufficient evidence to support the agencys finding of fact and then,
second, examines the soundness of the agencys conclusions of law. Handel v. Powell, 670
S.E.2d 62, 65 (2008)
The Board, in its written decision failed to make any findings of fact relating to the
issues. In fact, the Board made no findings of fact whatsoever. Furthermore the Board stated no
conclusions of law whatsoever that formed the basis for its decision. The Board had a duty to
make a determination of facts as alleged by the Challenger and to determine whether the
evidence that was submitted supported those facts. The Challenger submitted evidence that
supported its allegations. Jones submitted no evidence in dispute of the Challengers evidence.
The Board may only make findings of fact based upon evidence that is presented. The Board, in
its written decision, simply stated that the Board made no statement about the existence or lack
thereof of a debt owed by Jones to Effingham County. The Court has the authority to either
remand or reverse the decision of the Board, in whole or in part. The Appellee was fully
appraised of the issues and factual allegations plead by the Appellant in his Petition and in his
pre-hearing memorandum.
The Appellant respectfully requests that the Court determine that based upon the
evidence on record, Vera Jones was a holder of public funds illegally and that Jones, when called
upon by public officials, failed or refused to account for or return the money, or grant any any
other relief that the Courts deems fair and just. There is no evidence on the record to find
otherwise. The Board did not decide otherwise. An appellate courts duty is not to review
whether the record supports the decision of the local governing body or administrative agency..
The court is to affirm if any evidence on the record substantiates the agencys findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The court gives deference to the factual findings of the agency ... [and]
may reject those findings only if they are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable probative, and
substantial evidence on the whole record; or arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse
of discretion of clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. Decisions are not reviewed de novo.
Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 589 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. App. 2003).
Based on the evidence as a whole, it would have been clearly erroneous for the Board to
have decided findings of fact otherwise. The Board's failure to make findings of fact constitutes
an unwarranted exercise of discretion.
9.
The court should make conclusions of law the Appellee, as a holder of public funds
illegally is not entitled to hold any office or appointment of honor or trust in the state. Also, the
court should conclude as a matter of a law that jones as a holder or receiver of public money of
this county, who refused or failed when called upon after reasonable opportunity to account for
and pay over the same to the proper officer, shall be ineligible to hold any civil office; and shall
be sufficient reason for vacating any office held by such person.
A plain language read of O.C.G.A. 45-2-1(2) shows that the disqualification statute
applies to all persons except those persons who commit such acts while holding a commission.
The instruction sentence to states The following persons are ineligible to hold any civil office;
and the existence of any of the following facts shall be a sufficient reason for vacating any office
held by such person; but the acts of such person, while holding a commission, shall be valid as
the acts of an officer de facto, namely:
(2) All holders or receivers of public money of this state or any county thereof who have
refused or failed when called upon after reasonable opportunity to account for and pay over the
same to the proper officer;
The first sentence of this statute makes a bright line distinction between persons who
commit the acts specified in 45-2-1 (2) in the course of their duties and a public official and all
other persons who commit the acts. The statute clearly states that ineligibility to hold office shall
not apply to persons who have committed the acts in the performance of their official duties.
However, the statue also states plainly that if the existence of any acts are committed by any
other person, not included in the exclusion group, that person is not eligible to hold office. The
plain language meaning of a holder of money that is used by the legislature is defined in the
Georgia Uniform Commercial Code, article 3. A holder is a person who has obtained or received
possession of property or financial instruments, but does not own legal title to the financial
property. The argument of the Appellee purports that the Court should make a conclusion of
law, directly opposite to that which the plain language of the statute requires. This argument
should be rejected where a plain language read of the statute requires an opposite conclusion. In
support of its position, the Appellee relies only on the hearsay opinions of Cathy Cox, a former
secretary of state and that the hearsay statements of Attorney Cole, counsel to the Board. Mr.
Cole's hearsay statement is based upon a hearsay statement he made about a discussion that he
had with a member of the state Attorney General's office.
Both hearsay opinion statements are not allowed as evidence under Georgia laws.
Hearsay evidence, when objected to by the other party, is not allowed as evidence and
furthermore is unlawful in the state of Georgia. The Appellant made a timely objection to the
hearsay evidence on the day prior to the hearing when it first received a copy of the motion to
dismiss. Opinion testimony is not allowed as evidence unless the proponent meets the
requirements set forth in the rules of civil procedure. Finally, even if the hearsay opinion
statements could pass those hurdles to admissibility, the opinions are nothing more than personal
opinions. There is no citation of law, or reference to appellate authority. There is no reference
whatsoever that would qualify these statements as acceptable expert opinions.
Based on the foregoing Appellant respectfully request that the Court rule that the Board,
based upon the record, should have concluded as a matter of law that, Appellee, Vera Jones was
a holder of public funds, that the County officials demanded that she return the funds, that the
Appellee refused or failed to return or account for the public money and therefore, Vera Jones is
ineligible to hold civil office as a matter of law under OCGA 45-2-1 (2).
10.
The Board allowed the Appellee's motion to dismiss to be submitted the evening before
the scheduled challenge hearing. The Board heard the Appellee's motion at the hearing and rules
in favor of the motion. The Board had not promulgated any of its own rules of procedure. The
Georgia Administrative Procedure Act does not provide a rule for the submission of motions to
dismiss. Therefore, the Board must next go to the GA rules of Civil Procedure which provide for
a ten day notice to the non-moving party. The Boards decision violated the Appellant's rights to
procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The
Board exceeded its authority and it acted upon unlawful procedure in allowing this motion to be
heard on that date. Therefore, the Appellant requests that the Court reverse the ruling of the
Board allowing the Appellees motion to dismiss.
11.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Board based its decision to allow the Appellee's motion to
dismiss based upon the Appellee's argument that the money was paid to a corporation, then the
Board committed Error. The facts did show that the Vera Jones submitted the false writings and
claim to the County, which caused the County to erroneously send a check to Vera Jones
company D.M. Jones Construction, Inc. However this fact does not in and of itself provide any
complete immunity for Jones, not does it exempt her from the statute. In order to form a decision
as to whether Vera Jones had individual liability would require the Board to allow the parties to
introduce and examine witnesses. The Board refused to allow the parties to examine, or cross
examine any witnesses. There are several legal theories that could and would hold prevent Jones
from attempting to use the corporation as a defensive shield. For example, Jones and the
corporation could be found to be co-conspirators or co-tortfeasors. Further, under O.C.G.A 23-
3-120 et seq, the Taxpayer False claims act, directors and officers have direct liability for acts
such as those in this matter. Where the County received federal funding at that time, the Federal
False Claims act would also apply and Jones would not be shielded from liability.
CONCLUSION
Appellee Vera Jones has held public monies of Effingham County now for more than 7 years.
Although demand has been made for repayment, Appellee Vera Jones has refused to repay any
monies. Her excuses are varied and imaginative, but none of her excuses, defenses, or
statements address the crux of this issue, ie: money was paid to DM Jones Construction, Inc. in
error, the amount of money is significant, demand was made to repay the money, DM Jones
Construction, Inc. and Vera Jones, as the instigator, have refused to repay the monies to
Effingham County, and as such Vera Jones is disqualified from running for public office under
the present laws and constitution of the State of Georgia. Although Appellant Brantley has
brought forward much evidence, the Court nor the Elections Board should place that burden on
him. The burden for proving her qualifications rests solely on Vera Jones who has yet to give
any testimony or appear in Court to answer to any of these charges. Mr. Brantley accepts and
relies on the public record that the County has taken no action to forgive or otherwise discharge
the monies due to be returned by Appellant Vera Jones although Ms. Jones has had more than 6
years (3.5 as Commissioner) to clear up this issue, that no opinion of any qualified attorney
knowledgeable of all facts has stated that Appellant Vera Jones received the monies legally, and
that, to this date, Appellant Vera Jones has yet to give a sworn statement as to the monies being
paid in error.
Appellant Mr. Brantley has shown that there is more than enough evidence to have Vera
Jones, Appellant, disqualified. The fact that Ms. Jones relied on a motion to dismiss in light of
the challenges and overwhelming public evidence provided by Mr. Brantley instead of proving
her qualifications as required by law, points to a person who is concerned to give a sworn
statement, be cross examined, and someone who has sought to use the Voter Election Board and
the Citizenry of Effingham County to further cover her bad acts.





Respectfully submitted, this ____ day of May, 2014.

______________________________
Warren E. Ratchford
State Bar No. 595127
Richard R. Rafter
State Bar No. 591860

Attorneys for Appellant
1575 Highway 21 S
Springfield, GA 31329
912-754-7800

801 N. Oak Street
Post Office Box 176
Springfield GA 31329
912 754 7200