(Corporate Finance Project) After viewing the initial proposal to look at J Sainsbury as a candidate for takeover, I can see many potential reasons for such a move to be a success and that should create value for the shareholders of Kwik-E-Mart (our company). Alongside all the reasons to move forward with the takeover, there are several problems that need to be addressed that could increase the risk of profitability in the acquisition. Not to liken this proposal to Walmarts acquiring of Asda, which since 1999 has been somewhat a success, but previous to this Walmart acquired two German grocery companies, which were subsequently sold at billion dollar losses in the mid-2000s, these were due to several issues including cultural differences and not understanding the market before entering. A quote from a report written about Walmarts failed exploits in Germany; Wal-Marts failure on the German market has been the inevitable result of its inability caused by an astounding degree of ignorance of key principles of internationalization strategies and intercultural management to select and implement an adequate entry and business strategy. 1 We therefore would need to be fully in tune with the UK business culture and consumer base and be clinical in our implementation of our strategies. Our key sales markets being Central America and Asia, are in itself very widespread due to the large marketplace available, however it is understandable to see the European market and especially the UK as a country to be good place to move into for diversification purposes, and some much needed corporate governance and corporate social responsibility expertise. To begin establishing a supermarket brand within the UK, would be very time consuming, and costly, as the biggest four supermarkets in the UK, Tesco, Asda, J Sainsbury, Morrison, account for 76.2% of the UK grocery market. These companies have been trading for many decades with 3 of them close to or over 100 years old. With this in mind, it would be unfavourable to try and build our brand in the UK (a highly contested market), and acquisition would be the most efficient way to enter. The UK consumers seem to have a brand loyalty, which would make it hard to build a reputation, but would make for a good reason to acquire a company with strong branding and loyalty such as J Sainsbury. However to use this takeover as just an exercise for diversification would in my opinion, be a mistake and not in the best interest for the shareholders. Even though it will hedge our risk when certain regions arent performing well, our shareholders can diversify their risk and exposures
1 Why did Wal-Mart fail in Germany? By Andreas Knorr and Andreas Arndt 2
themselves by investing in companies such as J Sainsbury or other firms of their choice and rationale, at a much cheaper price than the total costs involved in the acquisition. Unless we can exploit synergies and economies of scale to cost-cut and improve growth, we will not find shareholder approval in this deal, as creating a more diversified firm with less risk, may actually transfer wealth from stockholders to bondholders, which will leave investors further disappointed if we fail to see value creation by going through the acquisition. If this was to happen and even though it may be an extreme case, it would lead the views of Kwik-E-Mart being under threat of takeover, being strengthened, if the share price of our firm was to fall in such a case. Diversification of product lines could be a great reason for the merger, to introduce European lines, some of which are synonymous with prestige and great quality, and vice versa bring American products across the Atlantic to the British market. However in recent times, we faced criticisms of too many foreign products being sold in our stores, personally more choice the better, but we need to stay in line with our customers views, as we do not want to alienate our domestic market and be at the risk of harming our business. Although, what does come with a more global product line, is a bigger global buying power, which should give us better margins on some our products as well as J Sainsbury products. We have a conservative estimate of 0.7% reduction in J Sainsbury cost of sales, which should not only reduce their costs, but ours also, for global brand products we will be able to negotiate better contracts with suppliers, for example brand name global appliances. Although this synergy has a short to medium term hurdle, due to current contracts in place for both us and them, and so immediate synergy might not be realised. My opinion would be to on acquiring, not to rebrand J Sainsbury, as it already has a loyal customer base and is a recognised brand in the UK. Therefore we would not inquire any costs, as we would run J Sainsbury as a subsidiary carrying on with its own name and branding. However, this would make it harder to sell our own branded products, as a cost saving synergy, as it would then rival J Sainsbury another of our brands if we were to buy them. We could however, merge production facilities and have all our own brand food stuffs for example at the same processing, packaging and manufacturing facilities. Following on from facilities, the wider integration between ourselves and J Sainsbury would have to be behind the scenes, as we do not want to have a major impact on the current brand that is working well in the UK, which is 3rd in market share and not far behind 2nd placed Asda. In the initial information provided, you have calculated additional growth in sales and reduction in cost of sales, but I also believe we can save costs in IT; J Sainsbury will have a large IT team and on-going costs to maintain their online grocery service. I believe we could integrate the teams and make 3
savings, in personnel and server costs. We could also save on wages paid by ourselves and J Sainsbury to maintain a 24/7 team on hand to tend to the IT networks, as we could consolidate our teams and theirs, due to our different time zones, so we can cater their night and vice versa. With online sales growth in both the US and UK markets, growing strongly, over time this consolidation of IT, could be a great cost saving synergy. J Sainsburys online sales growth is better than its rivals. 2
Part of the J Sainsburys success has been their sustainability and responsibility campaigns, for example J Sainsbury was the first to back and sell Fairtrade products in the UK, and is currently the largest seller of Fairtrade produce in the world. 3 We could bring these networks and marketing teams that made Fairtrade in the UK a success and scale it up to the American market which is a much larger consumer audience. Another initiative they have used is to promote domestic produce, a region we have been lacking and have even seen criticism over, due to stocking too many foreign goods, we could learn from J Sainsbury strategies that would help us regain faith as a supermarket from the American consumers. My valuation of J Sainsbury will be a valuation on the multiples and comparables with other UK supermarket firms. Another option would be to use the discounted cashflow method however, J Sainsbury has had several years of negative free cashflows and therefore, I do not wish to use this method of discounted cashflows, as basing it on the historical figures, the valuation of J Sainsbury would be too far from the reality. DCF tries to find the intrinsic value of the firm, and in this circumstance a company with possible anomalies in its FCFs and therefore the calculations will be off. It is also very sensitive to inputs such as terminal growth, current profitability and J Sainsburys weighted average cost of capital. Valuation by comparables attempts to price the company relative to similar peer firms such as Tesco, Morrison and Marks & Spencer. This gives us an idea on how it is currently priced against its peers. Comparables also therefore takes into account for market consensus, rather than DCFs based purely on fundamentals. I will not be comparing J Sainsbury with any other firms from outside the UK, due to having different financial cultures in terms of capital structure and debt to equity norms. The multiples I will be using to compare firms will be several different financials but will all be using Enterprise Value of the company rather than the stock price. This is because as an acquirer we are looking at the entire business, debt included, as we would be taking on this obligation for any outstanding liabilities. Another benefit of this is we will avoid any distortion of valuations due to
varying cash reserves between firms. (Enterprise Value is calculated as EV = market capitalisation + (long-term debt cash & cash equivalents).
The table above 4 compares some selected financials between 4 UK listed supermarkets. Firstly the Market Capitalisation is the stock price multiplied by the total amount of outstanding shares. This is the total value of all the equity in the firm, when you add debt and subtract cash reserves you get the EV value. Debt/EV is a figure which shows you the portion of the total value of the company that is arrived from debt. With all the firms having very similar Debt/EV it shows that J Sainsbury does not have an irregular capital structure for the sector. EV/Sales shows us the EV as a function of Sales, however this does rely on the firms all having similar profitability margins. However, even so in this case if we were to simplify the figure as cost per unit sales, J Sainsbury is the cheapest out of the 4 firms shown. The next two columns are the most interesting; these show us the EV as a multiple of Earnings Before Interest & Tax (EBIT) and Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation & Amortisation (EBITDA). Again for these a lower figure the better, however here we can see that J Sainsbury is slightly higher than both Morrison and Marks & Spencer. J Sainsbury is significantly lower in this respect compared to Tesco, and these could be explained by the fact, J Sainsbury carry out a large amount of sustainability agendas, which can have an adverse effect on profitability margins, for example on Fairtrade goods where the idea is to not to aim for the best margin but rather help the farmers and producers of the goods. This could be improved by our conservative estimates of an additional 2% sales growth, 0.7% fall in cost of sales to sales ratio and 12% in administrative costs to sales ratio. All of these benefits would be shown by an increase in EBIT and EBITDA, and therefore the EV/EBIT and EV/EBITDA would fall. I have also included EV/CF to show you that although the EV/EBIT may not be as desirable, the EV/CF is still very healthy and the
4 Bloomberg Terminal 5
best out of the 4 firms. Pay only a small attention to the EV/FCF as this shows how much of an anomaly the FCF data has been for the past few years, and I expect within the next few years to come back into normal figures, as marked by Tesco who also have a high EV/FCF and are still a monopoly in the UK supermarket sector, therefore we shouldnt be put off by J Sainsbury FCF figures for the past couple of years. Using some assumptions I will attempt to recalculate some of the comparables using our projected additional growth and savings we can offer J Sainsbury. Firstly, an additional 2% in sales growth, using J Sainsburys expected sales figures for 2013 from Bloomberg and adding an additional 2%, I can get a better EV/Sales figure. This may seem an odd thing to do due to not account for projected growth in the EV of J Sainsbury without our input, however I am assuming this informational being publically available is already price incorporated and discounted in the stock price and therefore the EV shall remain ceteris paribus. EV/Sales, without 2% additional growth in sales, becomes 0.40 which is even better of an already leading figure in the industry. The projected EV/Sales falls to 0.39 without our intervention and therefore I see with our predicted 1% for the following 4 years that EV/Sales will fall further potentially around 0.35 or 0.36 in total. 5
For EV/EBIT, I will account for the savings in cost of sales to sales ratio and administrative costs from Bloombergs 2012 filed accounts, and this should give a higher EBIT and therefore lower EV/EBIT. I have calculated that the EV/EBIT will drop to 9.31 whilst EV/EBITDA falls to 6.20. These figures are produced using 2012 posted figures on J Sainsburys admin costs, sales and sales costs. These figures now show J Sainsbury as very cheap relative to the likes of Tesco, it becomes best in terms of EV/EBITDA and close to best for EV/EBIT. This is all whilst J Sainsbury undertakes great levels of social responsibility and sustainability projects, which would reduce profitability, small sacrifice if its image is what makes it so successful, and something we need to be taking note of. As for valuing the firms equity, using my new calculated amount of EBITDA which is 1526 million, times this value by the old EV/EBITDA of 7.47, I get a new EV of 11,403 million, subtracting for debt from the EV, I value the equity in the firm to be 8627 million. With 1890 million shares outstanding, I value each share at 456.5p. At a current share price of 380.4p, this represents possible 76.1p premium or exactly 20% at current market rate. Therefore it is my suggestion to move forward with this acquisition as long as we pay below this premium. The lower the better, as it will give us a better return, but we will be gaining many things aside from wealth gain, such as the expertise and knowledge, which can be used in our own business, in areas already outlined as concerns in current operating markets. I wouldnt advise paying any higher as a premium, as even though this is using
5 Data is calculated using Bloomberg for J Sainsburys financial reports 6
conservative figures for synergy levels, we need to be able to create value for our shareholders for this to go ahead, as we are not doing this to just diversify or empire build, because this would mean we would be paying over the odds and would fall victim to what is known as the winners curse. This trap is easy to fall into if we dont Separate price from value. The intrinsic value of a target company is a function of its future free cash flows, predicated on how it transforms market position, organisation, capital and other assets into performance. 6 We need to be paying less than the intrinsic value + synergies, for this to be profitable and reduce the risk of long term failure. The graph 7 shown nicely visualises on our stand point dependant on the value, and price point paid, although we would need a better intrinsic value method such as DCF model, which can be done as further diligence after this report. For financing this acquisition, there are several possibilities, as to how we could do this. We could buy the firm in cash, pay with shares or leverage and borrow to buy J Sainsbury. Our firm is cash rich, and therefore it may be best and simplest to go with this route, but ill explore the alternatives that are options. To pay with our own shares, may not be the best option, with our depreciated value in stock, as usually when there are acquisitions with payment in shares, it signals the acquirers share price is overvalued, and with our current undervalue in stock, we wouldnt want our stock price to fall further. On the other side our stock is an undervalued currency at the moment, so it would be not a good idea to use as payment anyway. We could go down the leveraged buyout route, by borrowing ourselves, if we do not have enough cash reserves to buy the company entirely. This would however change our debt to equity ratios in the firm and may alter our investors views on the health of the firm, although we would have the advantage of being able to borrow either using ours or J Sainsburys cost of capital and use J Sainsburys assets as the collateral on the loans. For this we could talk to the J Sainsburys management and have them take out loans to cover our shortfall, and they would go through a share buyback scheme, and we would take over the firm using our cash reserves for the remaining cost, however we would receive a much more
6 and 7 Making M&A Pay: Avoiding the Winner's Curse by Milyae Park
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debt loaded company. The other downside to this would our interest costs go up, even if is a tax shield. For these reasons, if the acquisition does go ahead, I would go with using as much as possible of our cash reserves, which we have built up and would be distributing to our shareholders eventually anyway, and instead we can retain these funds and hopefully create more value for them in the long term by this deal. The key for the acquisition to go ahead is to be not bullied by the J Sainsburys shareholders into paying over the odds for their shares, as my calculated maximum premium to be offer is 20%, but it below 2012s average premium paid, which at the time was at an 11 year high. 8
8 CNN Companies are paying up for deals 8
References Andreas Knorr and Andreas Arndt Why did Wal-Mart fail in Germany? http://www.iwim.uni-bremen.de/publikationen/pdf/w024.pdf BBC Wal-Mart abandons German venture http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5223432.stm
Bradley, Don B., III. Urban, Bettina Wal-Mart's learning curve in the German market. Journal of International Business Research http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Journal-International-Business-Research/166850563.html
J Sainsburys Annual Report and Financial Statements http://www.j-sainsbury.co.uk/media/649393/j_sainsbury_ara_2012.pdf J Sainsburys Sustainability Report http://www.j-sainsbury.co.uk/media/1377005/jsainsbury_20x20_sustainability_brochure.pdf Milyae Park Making M&A Pay: Avoiding the Winner's Curse http://law.wustl.edu/courses/lehrer/spring2006/CourseMat/2006/winners%20curse%20making_pay .pdf CNN Companies are paying up for deals http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/07/31/companies-are-paying-up-for-deals/ Google Finance (Stock price) (Accessed: 24 April 2013) https://www.google.com/finance?q=SBRY