Defense Pacts and International Trade

Author(s): Andrew G. Long

Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 40, No. 5 (Sep., 2003), pp. 537-552
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R F1'1 SEARCHI -
2003
Journal of
Peace Research,
vol. 40, no. 5, 2003,
pp.
537-552
Sage
Publications
(London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New
Delhi)
www.sagepublications.
com
[0022-3433(200309)40:5; 537-552; 035591]
Defense Pacts and International Trade*
ANDREW G. LONG
Department
of
Political
Science,
Florida State
University
Theories of international
political
influences on trade maintain that shared alliance commitments affect
bilateral commercial
exchange.
The most
prominent
of these
suggests
that trade
produces
a
security
externality threatening
states,
but that a
military
alliance alleviates these concerns,
leading
to
greater
trade
among
allies. Yet
past empirical analyses produce
inconsistent
findings
with
respect
to the effect
of
military
alliances on bilateral trade levels. This article
presents
a new
argument
to
explain
the incon-
clusive
findings
in
previous
studies. The
potential
increase in
military power
from
efficiency gains
through
trade is a
positive security externality only
when a commitment to defend one's alliance
partner
exists. In
essence,
cooperative security agreements
that
require
states to
give military
assistance to each
other if attacked
(i.e.
defense
pacts)
will lead to
greater
trade
among
their members than
agreements
in
which the members
promise neutrality, non-aggression,
or consultation. The
analysis distinguishes
alliances that include commitments of defense from those that do not,
and uses two different sources
of alliance data to examine the effects of defense
pacts
on trade levels between
major powers
from 1885
to 1990. The results demonstrate that defense
pacts
are associated with
higher
trade
among
alliance
members,
but that trade between members of non-defense
pacts
is
statistically indistinguishable
from
trade between non-allies. This article
recognizes
that a link between economic and
security
issues exists
and
emphasizes
their mutual
relationship.
Introduction
Are
military security
alliances
important
factors in the decisions of
governments
to
raise or lower
tariffs,
institute non-tariff
barriers,
etc.? Do
private
actors consider the
political-military
ties of their home
country
when
they
establish
trading relationships
with
foreign counterparts?
While
hypotheses
developed
in the literature on this
subject
are
compelling, they
have not been
supported
consistently by empirical analyses.
Statistical
models demonstrate that
partners
in a
military
alliance have
higher,
lower,
or
*
The author thanks
Ashley
Leeds,
Will Moore,
Sara
Mitchell,
Dale
Smith,
Stephen
Shellman, Michaela Mattes,
and three
anonymous
reviewers for
helpful
comments.
Data for
replication
can be downloaded at
http://www.
ruf.rice.edu/-leeds/atop.html
and
correspondence
can be
directed to
aglong@rice.edu.
similar trade levels than non-allied countries
(Gowa
&
Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994;
Mansfield &
Bronson, 1997; Morrow,
Siverson &
Tabares, 1998, 1999; Mansfield,
Milner &
Rosendorff, 2000).
In
short,
a
review of the evidence for the effect
(if
any)
of alliances on the extent of commercial
exchange
between states
presents
one with an
empirical puzzle.
I
suggest
that the mixed
findings
about
the
relationship
between alliances and trade
are
due,
in
part,
to a
gap
between con-
ceptualization
and
operationalization.
The
difficulty
lies in the selection of an indicator
for
military
alliance that does not match the
concept employed
in the
theory.
Scholars
writing
on this
topic
build their theories on
a
concept
of
military
alliance that considers
the
partners
to a
treaty obligated
to defend
537
l
538 journal
of
PEACE RESEARCH
one another. An
'ally'
functions as a
military
partner
in the event of war in the
logic
of
the
argument. Yet, when
designing empiri-
cal
analyses,
researchers include a much
broader
range
of
security agreements
in the
category
of
military
alliance than
necessary
to
capture
the
concept
in their
argument.
I
question
the choice in
previous
research
designs
to
operationalize
alliance as
any
of
three
types
of formal
agreements (defense
pact, neutrality/non-aggression pact,
or
entente) when the
argument
rests on the
commitment of states to aid one another in
the event of war. The
type
of
obligation
undertaken
by
the members of the
treaty
is
important;
alliances that contain
pledges
of
military
assistance in the event of attack,
defense
pacts,
should lead to
greater
trade
among
allies.
Choosing
an indicator that
corresponds
to its
concept
allows me to shed
some
light
on the
empirical puzzle
surrounding
the
relationship
between
alliances and international trade.
Within two different alliance datasets, I
distinguish
alliances that include commit-
ments of
military
assistance in the event of
attack
(defense pacts)
from those that do not
(non-defense pacts)
and examine trade levels
between
major powers
from 1885 to 1990 to
test the
hypothesis
that defense
pacts
affect
international trade. The evidence is com-
mensurate with
my argument:
defense
pacts
are associated with
higher
trade
among
alliance members, but trade between
members of non-defense
pacts
is
statistically
indistinguishable
from trade between non-
allies. This
relationship
between defensive
allies and international trade is not contin-
gent upon polarity
in the international
system,
as
previous arguments contend, and
holds when
using
data from the Correlates of
War
(COW) or Alliance
Treaty Obligations
and Provisions (ATOP) collections.
The
findings
in this
study support
the
'realist'
theory
of
security
externalities
(Gowa, 1994) and substantiate
arguments
suggesting
that
power
and
security may
affect international trade
(e.g.
Krasner,
1976). However, the
argument
also lends
credibility
to 'institutionalist'
approaches
advocating
that scholars
pay
more attention
to how states
design
their
relationships
with
one another and the international
agree-
ments between them
(e.g. Downs, Rocke &
Barsoom, 1996; Fearon, 1998; Lake, 1999).
Moreover, this article
provides
further
evidence that economic issues and
security
issues are related, which
suggests
that ana-
lyzing
their connection is
important.
While
proponents
of the liberal
peace hypothesis
suggest
that trade deters conflict between
states
(e.g.
Polachek, 1980; Russett & Oneal,
2001), this
study
finds that
security cooper-
ation influences bilateral trade as well.
The article
begins by discussing
the
alliance-trade
relationship.
I examine some
common definitions of alliance to illustrate
the need for careful
matching
of definition,
concept,
and statistical indicator, and review
three
arguments
for
why
one should or
should not
expect
a
relationship
between
alliances and trade. Next, I
report
on some
mixed
empirical
evidence
regarding
alliances
and international trade. In the third section,
I
argue
that
previous
statistical
analyses
of
the
relationship
between alliances and trade
produce
inconclusive results because
scholars have tested their theories with an
insufficiently discriminatory operationaliza-
tion of alliance.
Equipped
with this new
insight,
the fourth section describes the
research
design necessary
to evaluate the
effect of defense
pacts
on trade. I construct
a statistical model to estimate international
trade levels and test
my hypothesis
on
major
power
trade from 1885 to 1990. The initial
analysis supports my expectations,
and a
subsequent
test with an alternative
sample
of alliance data
produces
a similar result. I
conclude with some remarks on the
impli-
cations of these
findings
and
suggestions
for
further
study.
volume 40 / number 5 /
september
2003
Andrew G.
Long
DEFENSE PACTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The Alliance-Trade
Relationship
What Is an Alliance?
It is useful at this
point
to discuss some
common
conceptions
of what
types
of
agree-
ments between states constitute alliances.
Multiple
definitions of alliance exist in inter-
national relations literature, but with a
minimal amount of variation on the
common theme of
cooperation
between
states in
security
or
military
affairs. For
example, Holsti, Hopmann
& Sullivan
(1973: 4) broadly
define an alliance as 'a
formal
agreement
between two or more
nations to collaborate on national
security
issues'. A narrower definition restricts the
scope
of an alliance between states to 'the
conditions under which
they
will or will not
employ military
force' (Russett, 1971: 263).
While these definitions
require
that the
agreement
between the states be formal,
others include informal
alignments
in their
definition as well
(Walt, 1987).1
For the
purposes
of this
study,
I consider an alliance
to be 'a written
agreement, signed by
official
representatives
of at least two
independent
states, that includes
promises
to aid a
partner
in the event of
military conflict, remain
neutral in the event of conflict, refrain from
military
conflict with one another, or
consult/cooperate
in the event of inter-
national crises that create a
potential
for
military
conflict'
(Leeds
et al., 2002:
238).
Not
every military agreement
entered into
by
a
pair
of states
qualifies
as an alliance, but
multiple types
of
security agreements
do
meet this definition. In other words, the defi-
nition above is broad
enough
for the
promises
made
by
the
parties
to
vary
con-
siderably.
For
example,
in some
military
security agreements,
states
pledge
to consult
when a threat arises, and in others
they
promise
to defend each other with
military
1
See
Snyder (1997) for an excellent treatment of
align-
ments versus alliances.
force if attacked.
Conceptually, military
alliances can be a means to different ends,
whether intended to increase
security,
deter
an
enemy,
or exercise control over the
ally
(Morrow, 1991), and
they require
different
commitments from their members.
Data-collection efforts intended to
identify
the
agreements
defined as
military
alliances between states
recognize
this vari-
ation in the
obligations
of the
parties. Many
researchers utilize the data collected
by
the
Correlates of War
(COW) project
to
identify
alliance commitments between interstate-
system
members for statistical
analysis.
The
COW alliance data has classified alliances
between states
according
to 'the
response
required
in certain
specified contingencies'
(Singer
& Small, 1966: 5).
The
types
of
alliance, classified
by
the
general obligation
of the members, are:
I.
Defense
Pact: Intervene
militarily
on the
side of
any treaty partner
that is attacked
militarily.
II.
Neutrality
and
Non-aggression
Pact:
Remain
militarily
neutral if
any
co-
signatory
is attacked.
III. Entente: Consult and/or
cooperate
in a
crisis, including
armed attack.
This
typology
of
military
alliances fits well
with
many
of the definitions offered above,
including
the one
adopted
for this
study.
All
three
types
of
agreement
can be considered
collaboration or
cooperation by
two or more
states in
security/military
affairs. It is
import-
ant to note, however, that while each of the
three
types
is a
pledge
of
cooperation,
each
requires
the states to adhere to a distinct obli-
gation:
come to a
partner's aid, remain
neutral, or consult in a crisis. As a result, one
should be
wary
of
adopting
similar
expec-
tations for different
types
of
agreements;
all
military
alliances cannot be
expected
to have
identical influences on state behavior.
In studies of the alliance-trade relation-
ship,
for
example,
researchers
rely
on the
539
540 journal
of
PEACE RESEARCH
COW data to create their statistical indi-
cators
(e.g.
Gowa & Mansfield, 1993; Mans-
field & Bronson, 1997; Morrow, Siverson &
Tabares, 1999). Gowa (1994),
for instance,
adopts
the definition of Holsti, Hopmann
&
Sullivan (1973) mentioned above and then
identifies allied states with COW alliance
data. However,
I will
argue
below that the
logic
of theories that
anticipate higher
levels
of trade
among
allies is not
applicable
to all
types
of alliances.
Why
Some Alliances Increase Trade
There are two reasons to
expect
some
alliances to have a
positive
effect on bilateral
trade. The first concerns the actions of
national
governments pursuing security
in
an anarchic international
system.
Scholars
working
within a realist
perspective argue
that
government
leaders discriminate in
favor of allies and
against
adversaries when
they
formulate trade
policy. Deriving
their
argument
from an
optimal
tariff
game,
Gowa
& Mansfield (1993; see also Gowa, 1994)
contend that
security
externalities arise
through trade, and influence
governments
to
direct their
foreign
economic
policies
to
favor allies instead of adversaries. Because the
efficiency gains
in real income from trade can
be used to increase
military capabilities (i.e.
military power),
states must be concerned
about others
using
these
gains
from trade for
such a
purpose.
Trade with an
adversary
enlarges
the income of a
potential
or real
enemy,
and
'any
increase in the real income
of its adversaries decreases the
security
of a
state'
(Gowa, 1994: 38).
In contrast, the
gains
from trade with
allies do not constitute a similar threat
because
any gain
in real income devoted to
military
use
by
an alliance member
augments
the
security
of the entire alliance. In other
words, trade
among
allies reinforces the
political-military power
of the alliance, but
trade between adversarial countries
presents
a
security
threat. With the use of force a
constant threat in a
system
structured
by
anarchy,
states must be aware of the
military
power
of both allies and
potential
or real
adversaries and will
manipulate
trade
policy
in order to facilitate trade with allies and
restrict trade with adversaries.
Allies
may
also trade more for a second
reason. In commercial
exchanges
with
foreign counterparts,
or in locations outside
the home state, investments
by
a firm are
often
relation-specific,
or
unique
to a
single
exchange relationship. Relation-specific
assets 'cannot be
redeployed
without sacrifice
of
productive
value'
-
and are
subject
to
opportunism,
or 'self-interest
seeking
with
guile' (Williamson, 1985: 47-56). Thus, the
threat of
opportunistic
behavior
by
a
foreign
government
can hinder trade. However,
foreign governments
should be less
likely
to
act
opportunistically
toward allies because
doing
so will reduce trade between the states
and reduce the
political-military power
of
the alliance. Trade is
likely
to be
greater
between allies rather than adversaries because
'alliances can
help regulate opportunism by
foreign governments' (Mansfield
& Bronson,
1997: 95).
On the other hand, engaging
in
oppor-
tunism
against
the firms of one's
adversary
has fewer
repercussions
in the realm of
military security.
Firms that wish to
maximize the
expected profitability
of their
investments
-
by avoiding opportunism
-
will invest in assets that service allies'
markets. Ceteris
paribus,
states that are mili-
tarily
allied will have
greater
trade because
firms know allies are less
likely
to take advan-
tage
of one another
by raising
trade barriers.
As an alternative
explanation
for
greater
trade
among allies, Morrow, Siverson &
Tabares
(1998) contend that the observed
relationship
between alliances and trade can
be accounted for
by
their common link to
democracy.
The authors stress the
tendency
for democracies to form
military
alliances
and
align
with each other
during
militarized
volume 40 / number 5 /
september
2003
Andrew G.
Long
DEFENSE PACTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
conflict
(Leeds
et al., 2002; Siverson &
Emmons, 1991; Werner & Lemke, 1997).
One should
expect
trade to be
greater
between countries with 'limited' forms of
government
that adhere to the rule of law.
The risk to firms of unfair treatment
by
a
foreign government
is
likely
to be lower in
countries with limited, democratic
regimes
(Dixon & Moon, 1993). Political
systems
with
open polities
and
judicial systems
are
less
likely
to confiscate an
agent's
assets, treat
the
agent unfairly
in a
legal dispute,
or enact
protectionist
measures that will hurt
foreign
interests. Firms should be
encouraged
to
trade in states with democratic
systems
because 'the
political
risk of
arbitrary
treat-
ment
by
the host
government'
is smaller
(Morrow, Siverson & Tabares, 1998: 651).
If
democracies are more
likely
to
ally
with one
another, empirical
tests must control for
democracy
to avoid
finding
a
spurious
relationship
between alliances and inter-
national trade.
Some Inconclusive
Findings
Empirical analyses
demonstrate that alliances
have a
positive impact
on trade after World
War II. In statistical
analysis,
Gowa &
Mansfield (1993) identify
a
pair
of states as
allies if
they
are
partners
in
any
defense
pact,
neutrality
or
non-aggression pact,
or entente
in the COW alliance dataset.2
They
test the
security
externalities
argument among
major
powers
from 1905 to 1985 and find an
insignificant
coefficient on their alliance vari-
ables for the
multipolar
era before WWI1,
but a
positive, significant
effect of alliances
on trade in the
bipolar
Cold War
period.
In
a
subsequent
article, Mansfield & Bronson
(1997) also show that alliances
among
all
states, not
just major
powers,
are associated
2
They
also coded
any major powers
that
fought
on the
same side of a war as allies, and the United States and
Japan
were considered allies from 1951 to 1985.
with
higher
trade between states in the
post-
WWII time
period.
Morrow, Siverson & Tabares (1998) also
test the
hypothesis
that alliances are associ-
ated with
higher
trade levels
using
a similar
dichotomous variable that indicates states are
allies when
they
are
partners
to
any
defense
pact, neutrality pact,
or entente. Their model
of bilateral trade includes a control variable
for the likelihood that
jointly
democratic
states will trade more
(Dixon
& Moon,
1993; Bliss & Russett, 1998). The results of
their
analysis
show a
positive
coefficient on
their alliance variable after WWII and a
negative
coefficient on their alliance variable
before WWII.
They
conclude that alliances
are
positively
related to trade in
bipolar
systems, though
the coefficient is not statisti-
cally significant,
and
negatively
related to
trade in
multipolar systems.3
To account for the
apparent disparity
in
the alliance-trade
relationship
over time,
some scholars
suggest
that
changes
in
systemic polarity
affect alliance cohesiveness.
States have a
greater
number of
options
in a
multipolar system
than in a
bipolar system,
and the
availability
of these
options
will force
states to be more
wary
of trade with allies
when the
system
is
multipolar.
Allies will
trade less in
multipolar systems,
then,
because 'the threat that a member will exit or
abandon an
existing
alliance to
join
an
alternative one' is
high (Gowa, 1994: 52).
However, systemic polarity
is an
unsatisfying
explanation
for variance in the observed
relationship
between alliances and inter-
national trade. Alliance cohesiveness does
not
predict
less trade between allies than
adversaries; yet
a
negative relationship
during periods
of
multipolarity
is found con-
sistently.
One could also
hypothesize
that
3
A more recent
study by Mansfield, Milner & Rosendorff
(2000)
controls for democratic
regime type
and finds
alliances
positively
related to trade after WWII when inter-
acted with the
presence
of a
preferential trading arrange-
ment between the states.
541
542 journal
of
PEACE RESEARCH
trade between
multipolar
alliance
partners
will be
higher
than trade between adver-
saries, but not as
high
as trade levels between
allies in
bipolar systems.
In sum, empirical
evidence for a relation-
ship
between alliances and trade is inconsis-
tent; studies find
positive, negative,
and
insignificant relationships depending
on the
time
period
of the
study
and the
specification
of the model. Given the
persuasive argu-
ments
regarding security
externalities and
opportunism by foreign governments,
an
empirical puzzle
exists. In the next section, I
provide
an alternative
explanation
that
may
help
to resolve this
puzzle.
Re-evaluating Military
Alliances and
International Trade
Why might
there be no clear
picture
of the
relationship
between alliances and inter-
national trade? The answer lies in a breach
between the theoretical
concept
and the
statistical indicator. Previous
empirical
tests
utilize an indicator of
military
alliance that
encompasses
all
types
of
military agreements,
while the
concept
of alliance in the
theory
refers to a
specific type
of
agreement,
the
defense
pact
described above.
In
empirical
tests of the
security
external-
ities
argument,
two states are allies if
they
are
party
to an alliance of
any type
coded
by
Singer
& Small
(1966). However, the
concept
of alliance utilized in the
theory
does
not describe all three of the
Singer-Small
alliance
types.
For
example,
both Gowa &
Mansfield
(1993) and Mansfield & Bronson
(1997) argue
that alliances alleviate the
security externality produced by
trade.
'Trade
among
allies is
likely
to enhance
the
security
of all the
parties'
and 'bolster
the
aggregate political-military power
of the
alliance' (Mansfield & Bronson, 1997: 94).
Thus, any
state
party
to an alliance 'increases
its own
security' through
trade with allies
because trade increases a state's real income
(Gowa, 1994: 38).
For the
logic
of this
argument
to follow, alliances must include
the
promise
to intervene
militarily
in the
event of attack.
Certain alliances, namely
those classified
as defense
pacts, obligate
the members to
provide military
assistance to a
partner
in the
event of an attack
upon
the
partner's
sover-
eignty
and/or territorial
integrity.
These
particular
alliances commit states to defend
each other,
letting
them count on their
partners' military capabilities
as well as their
own.4 Therefore, trade is a
positive
external-
ity among
defense
pact
members because
only
defense
pacts obligate
states to use their
forces to aid one another in hostilities. The
security
externalities
argument
tells us that
governments
are
likely
to reduce barriers to
trade with allies, but
they
will
only
reduce
trade restrictions for states with which
they
share defensive alliance commitments.
The same
insight regarding
defense
pacts
arises when one
adopts
the
perspective
of the
firm that Mansfield & Bronson
(1997)
employ. Foreign governments
should be less
inclined to
expropriate
the assets of an
ally's
firm, or enact trade barriers
against
an
ally.
Opportunistic
behavior
against
an
ally's
firms would reduce the
military power
of the
entire coalition, but
only
when the states
commit to defend one another in the first
place.
Furthermore, defense
pacts provide
infor-
mation to firms
seeking
to establish com-
mercial
exchange relationships
that are less
likely
to be hindered
by
conflict in the
future; firms realize that a state with allies
promising
to defend it is less
likely
to be
4
In order for states to consider
gains
in
military capabili-
ties
by partners
as their own, they
should
perceive
the
alliance is reliable. Leeds, Long
& Mitchell (2000) report
that 72% of alliances where members
pledge
active
military
support
are reliable when war occurs, and 74.5% of all
alliance commitments are reliable. Moreover, if leaders did
not think an alliance
obligation
such as defense was
likely
to be
upheld,
it is
unlikely
that such an
agreement
would
be formed (Leeds, Long
& Mitchell, 2000).
volume 40 / number 5 /
september
2003
Andrew G.
Long
DEFENSE PACTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
attacked. If defense
pacts
deter attack
by
a
challenger,
firms should use this information
in
making
decisions to establish trade. In the
event the
ally
is attacked, a firm's own
government
is
obligated by
the alliance
treaty
to
protect
the
trading relationships
of its
firms.
To elaborate, assume states A and B are
members of a defense
pact.
State A
gets
involved in militarized confrontation with a
third
party, C, and a firm from State B has
made investments
facilitating
trade to/from
state As
territory,
or with one of As firms. A
defense
pact obligates
the
government
of B
to aid the
government
of A, protecting
its
firm's investments in trade with A.5 The
assurance of
protection by
one's own
govern-
ment should
encourage
trade between states,
suggesting higher
trade levels between
pairs
of states
(dyads)
that have defense
pacts.
Hence, defense
pacts
should be associated
with
higher
levels of trade between the
member states:
Hypothesis:
Pairs of states that
promise
to
provide
one another with active
military
assistance in the event of
attack
by
a third
party
will have
higher
levels of trade, ceteris
paribus,
than
dyads
without
defense
pacts.
The
emphasis
on alliances
containing
obli-
gations
of defense would be
misplaced
if
5
Investments in trade should not be confused with
Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI). While FDI
may
be used to facili-
tate trade, domestic investment is also
relation-specific
when it is
designed
to
expand production
for
export
to a
foreign
market. If trade were shut off between the two
states, the firm would suffer a loss on the domestic invest-
ment to the
degree
that the assets are
relation-specific,
or
cannot be converted to an alternative use without cost
(Yarbrough
&
Yarbrough, 1992). The loss could
equal
the
entire investment if the
good
or service cannot be
exported
to an alternative market. For
example,
automobile
pro-
ducers in
Japan
would suffer severe losses on cars built to
meet US
safety
and emission standards if that market were
closed.
every
alliance
treaty obligated
the
partners
to
come to each other's aid when attacked
by
a
third
party.
But within COW alliance data
specific
to this
study,
in
only
62% of the
cases where a
pair
of
major power
states is
allied in a
given year
have
they signed
a
defense
pact,
or
category
I, alliance
treaty.
Further, only
49% of alliances include obli-
gations by
the states to defend one another
in the Alliance
Treaty Obligations
and Pro-
visions (ATOP)
dataset from 1815 to 1944
(Leeds et al., 2002). Thus, around half of
alliance treaties in the ATOP dataset do not
entail a
promise
to defend an
ally,
and should
not be considered as such.
States cannot
rely
on their allies to defend
them when the treaties
they sign only stipu-
late
neutrality
or consultation in the event of
a crisis or
military
confrontation.6 Conse-
quently,
the effect of non-defense
pacts
on
trade between states
may
be
wholly
different
from that of defense
pacts,
and researchers
interested in
testing arguments
such as those
sketched above should
carefully separate
defense
pacts
from non-defense
pacts.
An
operationalization
of alliance that fails to dif-
ferentiate defense
pacts
and non-defense
pacts
could distort the effect of alliances on
trade in
empirical
evaluation. One
possible
consequence
is that the estimated coefficient
for the alliance variable
may
be inconsistent
in studies that use different
samples.
When
military
assistance is not
promised,
there is
no reason to believe that the same behavior
regarding
trade
policy
and investment
decisions
by trading
firms will hold.
Further, developing hypotheses
about the
effects of other
types
of alliance commit-
ments besides defense
pacts
is
certainly
con-
ceivable. Such an exercise is
beyond
the
scope
of this
study.
If the theories articulated
by
previous
authors about defense
pacts prove
6
For
example, Leeds, Long
& Mitchell (2000) report only
2 out of 82 instances from 1815 to 1944 in which states
fulfilled their alliance commitment
beyond
the
obligations
called for in the
treaty.
543
544
journal
of
PEACE RESEARCH
to be
supported empirically,
then it will be a
worthy
endeavor to
expand upon
those
theories to consider the effects of non-
defense
pacts,
but for now I restrict attention
to
testing
the
hypothesis
that
defense-pact
members trade more than
non-defense-pact
members or non-allied states.
Research
Design,
Model,
and
Estimation
In this
study,
the unit of
analysis
is the
dyad-
year
in a cross-sectional time-series
design
of
the
major powers
from 1885 to 1990.7 The
countries in the
sample
are the United
States,
Great
Britain, France,
Germany, Italy,
Austria-Hungary, Japan,
Russia/Soviet
Union,
and China. Two factors dictate the
spatial
and
temporal
domain of the
study.
First,
the choice of
major powers
is driven
by
a desire to be as consistent as
possible
with
previous
work
examining
the effect of
alliances on international trade
(Gowa
&
Mansfield, 1993; Morrow,
Siverson &
Tabares, 1998, 1999).
Data restrictions limit
the
temporal
domain of the
study.
The
dependent
variable is the annual level of real
trade within a
dyad.
While this
study
focuses on the effect of
defense
pacts
on
trade,
other economic and
political
factors influence bilateral trade levels
as well.
Thus,
I
begin by specifying
a
gravity
equation
of international trade between a
pair
of states
(Anderson, 1979;
Bergstrand,
1985,
1989).
Its
properties
can be derived from
any
of the standard trade theories
(Deardorff,
1998).
The
gravity
model is so named because
it
produces
a baseline model of
aggregate
trade flows between countries from the size of
the countries' national incomes and
popu-
lations and the level of resistance between
them. To reflect
transportation
costs,
scholars
7
I followed the COW
designations
of
major power
status
exclusively (Small
&
Singer,
1982).
The
years
1914-19 and
1939-49 are excluded,
owing
to
missing
or unreliable trade
and GDP data.
often include the
geographic
distance
between states in the resistance term of the
equation.
In accordance with the
predictions
of the
gravity
model,
the distance between
countries and
population
size should both be
inversely
related to
trade,
while
greater
national income should increase trade. To this
model,
I will introduce other
political
vari-
ables of interest.
To test the
hypothesis
that defense
pacts
should be associated with
greater
trade in a
dyad,
I estimate the
following
statistical
model. The model is
specified
in
multiplica-
tive
form,
but actual estimation is
performed
after
taking
the natural
log
of the
equation:8
DT.t
=
a(GB) (DEFt_
4) (NDEFt_, 5)
(SIMP6) (MID,t_l7)
(JDEMP8)
where
D
Tit
is
dyadic
trade
(the
sum of i's
imports
from
j
and
j's imports
from
i)
in
year
t
G is the set of variables for the
gravity part
of the
equation
in
year
t and
pj
is the set
of coefficients for these variables
DEFt_1
and
NDEFt_1
are dichotomous vari-
ables for defense
pacts
and non-defense
pacts, respectively,
in
year
t-l
JDEM
is a dichotomous variable for
joint
democracy
in
year
t
SIM is the
weighted similarity
score, S,
for
the
dyad
in
year
t
MIDt_1
is the
presence
of a militarized inter-
state
dispute
(MID)
between the states in
year
t-l
a is a constant term and is a
lognormally
distributed error term.
The variables for the
gravity
(G)
part
of the
model are the
product
of the
gross
domestic
products
(GDPs)
of the states in each
dyad,
the
product
of the
populations
of the states
8 Dichotomous variables are coded either one or zero. The
values of the
dummy
variables in the
antilogarithmic
form
of the
equation
are then e and
1,
respectively.
volume 40 / number 5 /
september
2003
Andrew G.
Long
DEFENSE PACTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
in each
dyad,
and the distance between the
pair
of states.9
To the basic
gravity
model, I add variables
measuring
two
types
of alliance
obligation
between states, as well as other
political
vari-
ables that are
likely
to affect bilateral trade.
The COW
coding
scheme allows me to create
two dichotomous variables
representing
alliance
obligations
between
major powers
(Singer
& Small, 1966; Small &
Singer,
1969). The first is coded one in a
given
obser-
vation
only
when the alliance commitment
between the states in a
year
is a level I com-
mitment, a defense
pact,
and zero otherwise.
The second is coded one in a
dyad-year
when
the members of the
dyad
have either a level II
(neutrality/non-aggression)
or level III
(entente)
alliance commitment, and zero
otherwise. This allows me to differentiate
among
three
groups
of
dyads: (1) those that
have
defense-pact
alliances, (2) those that
have
non-defense-pact alliances, and (3)
those that are not allied. These variables are
mutually
exclusive and should
distinguish
the
influence of defense
pacts
on
dyadic
trade
versus other non-defensive alliance commit-
ments; non-allied
dyads
remain the reference
category. Although
other
empirical
studies
demonstrate that there is
very
little concern
for
simultaneity
bias in models of the
relationship
between alliances and trade
(Morrow, Siverson & Tabares, 1998;
9
The author thanks
John Oneal for
sharing
trade and
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data. Trade and GDP are
measured in constant (1982-84) US dollars.
Missing
GDP
data are
predicted
for 36 observations
following
the
instructions of Russett & Oneal (2001). I include the GDP
and
population figures
in the model as the
product
of the
two countries' individual GDP and
population values, in
accordance with theories of international trade based on
models of
imperfect competition (Eichengreen
& Irwin,
1995). Population
data is from the COW
capabilities
index
(Singer,
Bremer &
Stuckey, 1972). Distance is the
'great
circle' distance between the
capitals
of the states, unless the
states are
contiguous,
in which case
they
are
assigned
a
distance of one mile
(Fitzpatrick
& Modlin, 1986). The
population, distance, foreign policy similarity, democracy,
and COW alliance data were
acquired using
the EUGene
program (Bennett & Stam, 2000). Data on militarized
conflict is from Maoz (1999).
Mansfield & Bronson, 1997, see also Lai &
Reiter, 2000),
as a
precaution
I
lag
the
defense
pact
and
non-defense-pact
variables.10
One must control for other
political
influ-
ences on trade as well. First, similar
regime
types among
states
may
also affect their trade
(Bliss & Russett, 1998; Dixon & Moon,
1993). As mentioned above, Morrow,
Siverson & Tabares (1998) warn us that
because democracies are more
likely
to
ally
with one another, a test of the effects of
alliances on trade should control for
domestic
regime type.
I include a dichot-
omous variable for
joint democracy
created
from the
Polity
III data to avoid
finding
a
spurious
correlation between alliances and
international trade
(Jaggers
& Gurr, 1995).
The
joint democracy
variable is coded one
when both states have scores
greater
than or
equal
to six in the current
year
on the
Polity
III institutionalized
democracy
scale.
Second, war between states is
likely
to
disrupt
trade between them. Not
only
is war
likely
to
destroy production
and
transporta-
tion networks, but states
may
also
imple-
ment restrictions on the
enemy
as
part
of war
strategy (Anderton
& Carter, 2001).11
However, Pollins (1989a,b) demonstrates
that conflict short of war can also reduce
trade; therefore, it is useful to include a
measure of
military
conflict that
captures
militarized
disputes
short of war. I do so
by
utilizing
the COW Militarized Interstate
Disputes
dataset (Jones,
Bremer &
Singer,
1996). The variable MID is coded one when
any
militarized interstate
dispute (ongoing
and
originating)
occurs between the
pair
of
states in the
previous year,
zero otherwise.12
10
Results for the
analysis
when these variables are coded
for defense
pact
or non-defense
pact
in the current
year
do
not
significantly
differ from those shown.
ll
This view is not universal; see Barbieri &
Levy (1999,
2001).
12
The MID variable is
lagged
one
year
to minimize endo-
geneity
bias in estimation. A number of scholars
report
empirical
evidence that trade reduces conflict
(e.g.
Russett
& Oneal, 2001).
545
546 journal
of
PEACE RESEARCH
In addition, Morrow, Siverson & Tabares
(1998) argue
that trade will be reduced
by
the
potential
for conflict between two states.
They suggest
that states with common
foreign policy
interests have a lower
poten-
tial for
military
conflict and
operationalize
two states' common interests with the
taub
measure of their alliance
portfolios.
But
Sig-
norino & Ritter (1999: 131) show that
taub
can be an inaccurate measure of the simi-
larity
of states'
foreign policy
interests
because the 'concordant rank
orderings
of
alliance
partners
do not
necessarily imply
similar
types
of alliance commitments to
each of the
partners'. They develop
a
spatial
measure of
foreign policy similarity, S, that I
use in this model to
represent
common
interests. S
ranges
from
negative
one for
completely
dissimilar interests to
positive
one for
perfectly
similar interests. Because
the natural
log
of
any
value less than or
equal
to zero is undefined, the
similarity (SIM)
scores are re-scaled to
range
from 1 to 3. The
advantage
of
using
S to measure similar
foreign policy
interests is the
ability
to
specify
the alliance commitments one con-
siders relevant
(regional
or
global)
and to
weight
commitments
by
the
military capa-
bilities of the alliance
partner(s).
This is a
study
of
major
powers,
so we should control
for common interests
beyond
a state's
region.
Thus, I choose to include the
global,
weighted
S-score for the
dyad
to
adequately
control for common interests.
Estimating
cross-sectional time-series
data
requires special
consideration because
data measured over time and across different
units can make estimates of the standard
errors in
Ordinary
Least
Squares (OLS)
regression
unreliable. The error variances for
each cross-section
(dyad) may
be hetero-
skedastic and/or
contemporaneously
corre-
lated, while the errors within cross-sections
are
likely
to be correlated (autocorrelation)
because data is measured over time. OLS
estimates will be consistent but inefficient
from
violating
the
'panel
error'
assumptions,
which inhibits a researcher's
ability
to draw
appropriate
inferences from the
analysis.
One
strategy
for
coping
with these
potential
problems
involves
estimating
a fixed effects
model to account for unobserved differences
between each
dyad (i.e. unit
heterogeneity)
(Green, Kim & Yoon, 2001). However, some
explanatory
factors in the model, for instance
joint
democracy, vary
little over time in
my
sample,
and a fixed effects model
essentially
includes
dummy
variables for each
dyad.
If
explanatory
variables do not exhibit con-
siderable variation, the
completely
atheoret-
ical
dyadic
dummies are
likely
to 'soak
up'
variation in trade that can be accounted for
by
variables with theoretical
importance
(Beck & Katz, 2001).
In addition, to
account for
dynamics
within the data, the
fixed effects model would need to include a
lagged dependent variable, and the inclusion
of such a variable can bias coefficient esti-
mates when other
explanatory
variables
(e.g.
GDP, population)
exhibit
strong
serial corre-
lation (Achen, 2000). Therefore, I estimate
the model
using
Generalized Least
Squares
(Prais-winsten) regression,
but
adjust
the
standard errors for
panel heteroskedasticity,
contemporaneous correlation, and a first
order
autoregressive (arl) process.
The
results
presented
are consistent coefficients
and efficient
panel-corrected
standard errors
(PCSEs) (Beck
& Katz,
1995).13
Results
The coefficient estimates for the model are
reported
in the first column of Table I.
According
to the
hypothesis developed
above, I
expect dyads
in which the states are
allied
by
defense
pact
to exhibit
higher
levels
13
All models were estimated
using
the STATA 7.0 statisti-
cal
program
with the
xtpcse
command with
options
corr(arl) and
pairwise.
The
xtpcse
command accounts
for
gaps
in the
sample
due to
missing
data
by restarting
the calculation of the rho coefficient after each
missing
observation.
volume 40 / number 5 /
september
2003
Andrew G.
Long
DEFENSE PACTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Table I. Correlates of War (COW) Defense Pacts and
Dyadic
Trade:
Major
Powers, 1885-1990
Defense pact
Alliance
Dyadic
GDP
Dyadic population
Distance
COW defense
pactr_
COW non-defense
pactr_
COW alliance, l
Joint
democracy
Similarity
MID_
i
Constant
Wald chi2
p
> chi2
.902
-1.63
-.093
.335
.059
.458
-.499
-.016
22.3
N
(.083)**
(.328)**
(.051)*
(.191)*
(.094)
(.157)**
(.767)
(.133)
(6.00)**
555.6
.000
.32
1281
.919 (.084)**
-1.65 (.334)**
-.095 (.051)
.109 (.097)
.478 (.160)**
-.270 (.660)
-.013 (.132)
22.1 (6.04)**
542.76
.000
.32
1281
Estimates are unstandardized GLS (Prais-winsten) regression
coefficients with
panel
corrected standard errors (PCSEs).
Standard errors for one-tailed tests are listed in
parentheses.
**
p
< .01;
*
p
< .05
of trade. The results
support
this
hypothesis.
The coefficient on the variable
measuring
whether the states are
partners
in a COW
level I alliance (defense pact)
is
positive
and
statistically significant
at the conventional
.05 level. States that are members of defense
pacts have, on
average,
a level of trade that is
37%
higher
than the level of trade between
unallied states.14 Defense
pact
members also
appear
to trade at
higher
levels than states
that have an alliance commitment described
in this
study
as a non-defense
pact.
The
coefficient on the
non-defense-pact variable,
although positive,
is
statistically insignificant.
A test of the difference between these two
14
Calculating
the substantive effect of a dichotomous
variable on a
dependent
variable in
logarithmic
form is
done in STATA 7.0 with the
logdummy
command. The
effect can be
closely approximated by
100 X
(ecfflcient- 1)
and
interpreted
as the
percentage change
in the
dependent
variable associated with a
change
in the
dummy
variable
from zero to one (Giles, 1982; Kennedy, 1998). Similarly,
the substantive effect of the
independent
variables that are
continuous is calculated
by multiplying
the coefficient
by
100 and is
interpreted
as the
percentage change
in the
dependent
variable associated with a one
percent change
in
the
independent
variable. For
example,
a one
percent
change
in
dyadic
GDP is associated with 90%
change
in
dyadic trade, on
average.
In Table I, the substantive effect
of defense
pacts
is about half that of
dyadic
GDP.
coefficients
produces
a
chi-square
value of
2.59, which is
significant
at the .10 level.
To check the robustness of the
support
for
my hypothesis,
I also estimated a model that
included a dichotomous variable, labeled
COWAlliancer l,
which is coded one for
any
alliance
agreement,
level I, II or III, between
the states in the
previous year,
and zero
otherwise. Results of estimation for the
model that included this variable and not the
defense-pact
or
non-defense-pact
variables
are shown in the second column of Table I.
The coefficient for the variable
measuring
any type
of alliance
(defense pact;
neutral-
ity/non-aggression pact;
or
entente) between
the states is
insignificant.
With
regard
to the control variables in the
model, the variables
representing
the
gravity
equation predict
trade
according
to
expec-
tations. A
greater
distance between two states
and a
larger dyadic population
reduces trade
between states as indicated
by
the
negative
coefficients on these variables. The coefficient
for
dyadic
GDP is also in the
expected
direc-
tion: the coefficient is
positive
and
significant.
In line with
previous empirical
studies of
trade (Bliss & Russett, 1998; Dixon & Moon,
547
548 journal
of
PEACE RESEARCH
1993; Morrow, Siverson & Tabares, 1999;
Mansfield, Milner & Rosendorff, 2000), the
coefficient for
joint democracy
is
positive
and
significant
in both models
presented
in Table
I. The
similarity
of interests variable, S, is
insignificant
in both models, which fails to
support
the claim that states with common
interests
engage
in more trade. The
presence
of a militarized interstate
dispute
between
two states also has no discernible influence
on
dyadic
trade in the
following year.15
There exists an additional source of
alliance data with which to test the
hypothe-
sis about defensive alliance commitments
developed
above. The Alliance
Treaty
Obli-
gations
and Provisions
(ATOP)
dataset has
some
advantages
over the COW alliance data,
but is limited
by
the shorter
temporal
domain
(1815-1944) that it covers. The ATOP data
is not a
simple
subset of the COW alliance
data; there is variance in the case lists. While
the two datasets
employ
similar definitions of
a
military alliance, the ATOP dataset
identifies 81 alliances that are not
part
of the
COW alliance list, and excludes 15 alliances
in the COW list over the 1815-1944 time
period (Leeds et al., 2002).
To test
my hypothesis,
I create two
dichotomous variables from the ATOP data
designed
to
distinguish
alliances
containing
obligations
of defense from those that offer no
such commitment.16 The first variable is
coded one for a
dyad-year
when the states
share
membership
in an alliance that
obligates
them to aid one another in the event of attack
by
a third
party,
zero otherwise. In ATOP,
multiple
commitments can be included in the
same alliance
treaty
between states; as
long
as
the
treaty
includes a
pledge
of active defense,
I consider the
agreement
a defense
pact.
The
second dichotomous variable I construct is
15 The
insignificant relationship
between militarized
conflict and trade is counter to the
expectations
of both
'realist' and 'liberal'
paradigms.
16
Alliance data to construct these and
subsequent
variables
are available at the ATOP
project
website:
http://www.ruf.
rice.edu/-leeds/atop.html.
coded one for a
dyad
when the states have
any
other alliance commitment, but not a
defensive
obligation,
and zero otherwise. I
insert these two variables into a statistical
model of trade constructed
exactly
as before;
the
only
difference in this model is the use of
the ATOP alliance data to create the defense-
pact
and
non-defense-pact
variables and the
shortened
temporal
domain.
The outcome of this second test is
markedly
similar to the
analysis
just
dis-
cussed. The coefficients on the ATOP
defense-pact
and
non-defense-pact
variables
in the first column of Table II further
support
the evidence
presented
in the test
using
COW alliance data. Partners in ATOP
defense
pacts
exhibit 22%
greater
trade levels
than non-allied states. Non-defense
pacts,
again,
are
positive
but
insignificantly
related
to trade.
Plus,
a
chi-square
test of the differ-
ence between the coefficients is
significant
at
the .05 level. Neither do the
signs
and
significance
levels of the coefficients for the
control variables in the model
change
from
the
previous findings
with COW alliance
data. Joint
democracy, dyadic GDP, dyadic
population,
and distance all remain statisti-
cally significant
and in the
expected
direc-
tion; similarity
and
MID,_1
are
insignificant.
Finally,
I
report
the results from a fourth
model, again
to check the robustness of the
results, in the second column of Table II. In
this
model,
I substitute a variable coded one
for
any type
of ATOP alliance commitment
(defense, offense, neutrality, non-aggression
or
consultation)
between two states in the
previous year,
and zero otherwise, for the
defense-pact
and
non-defense-pact
variables.
The variable ATOP
Alliance,_1
is
insignifi-
cant, while the other control variables remain
quite
similar to the model
differentiating
between defensive and non-defensive
alliance commitments.
The
positive
and
statistically significant
coefficients for the COW and ATOP
defense-pact
variables are remarkable when
volume 40 / number 5 /
september
2003
Andrew G.
Long
DEFENSE PACTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Table II. Alliance
Treaty Obligations
and Provisions (ATOP) Defense Pacts and
Dyadic
Trade:
Major
Powers, 1885-1944
Defense pact
Dyadic
GDP
Dyadic population
Distance
ATOP defense
pactr_
ATOP non-defense
pactr_
ATOP
alliancer_l
Joint
democracy
Similarity
MIDr_l
Constant
Wald chi2
p
> chi2
.673
-.688
-.133
.200
.039
.463
-.407
-.045
7.10
N
Alliance
(.121)**
(.210)**
(.020)**
(.097)*
(.071)
(.161)**
(.472)
(.042)
(4.14)*
100.92
.000
.66
958
.673
-.696
-.131
.057
.461
-.361
-.045
7.26
(.121)**
(.210)**
(.020)**
(.069)
(.162)**
(.470)
(.042)
(4.15)*
95.53
.000
.66
958
Estimates are unstandardized GLS (Prais-winsten) regression
coefficients with
panel
corrected standard errors (PCSEs).
Standard errors for one-tailed tests are listed in
parentheses.
**
p
< .01;
*
p
< .05
one recalls that no
previous study
demon-
strates a
positive relationship
between
alliances and international trade before
WWII. Yet the inferences I am able to draw
here are not
contingent
on the time
period
of
the
analysis.
I conduct three
investigations
into whether
systemic polarity
influences
the
relationship
between alliances and trade,
utilizing
the COW alliance data, and find no
significant pattern
in the
relationship
between
alliances
(or defense
pacts)
and international
trade based on the
polarity
of the
system.17
To elaborate, I first code a variable one
for
years
in which states were allied after
1945
(bipolar allies) and zero otherwise, and
then code a variable one for
years
in which
states were allied before 1945
(multipolar
allies) and zero otherwise. Neither variable
produced
a
significant
coefficient when
estimated in a model on the full
sample
that
included the other
gravity
and
political
variables. Second,
I estimate the model on
bipolar
and
multipolar
time
periods
separately.
For the
years
after 1945, when
17
The limited
temporal
domain of the ATOP data at this
time
prevents
one from
investigating any polarity
effects.
the
system
is considered
bipolar by
Gowa
(1994),
the COW defense
pact
variable was
perfectly
collinear with the
joint democracy
variable in the
sample
and was
dropped
from the model, which
suggests
that con-
trolling
for
democracy
is
important
in esti-
mating
the
relationship
between
military
alliances and trade, as Morrow, Siverson &
Tabares (1998) recommend. In the multi-
polar
era before WWII, the
defense-pact
variable was
positive
and
significant
and the
non-defense-pact
variable was
insignificant.
Finally,
I code four dichotomous variables
to
distinguish
between
bipolar defense-pact
allies, multipolar defense-pact allies, bipolar
non-defense-pact allies, and
multipolar
non-
defense-pact
allies. When I estimate the
model with these variables, both of the
non-defense-pact
variables are
insignificant,
and the
multipolar defense-pact
variable
is
positive
and
significant.
The
bipolar
defense-pact
variable is still
highly
correlated
with the
joint democracy
variable (r
=
.64)
and is
negative
and
insignificant.18
18
These results are available from the author upon request.
549
550 journal
of
PEACE RESEARCH
Thus, the evidence in this
study
does not
conform to Gowa's (1994) expectations
regarding
the effect of
systemic polarity
on
the
relationship
between alliances and inter-
national trade. The inconsistent results from
previous analyses may
be attributable not to
variations in the
power configuration
of the
system,
but to use of an indicator for
alliances that did not
correspond
with the
concept
in the
theory.
Conclusion
This
study
demonstrates that a breakdown
between
concept
and statistical indicator
may
be
responsible
for the
empirical puzzle
about the influence of alliances on trade
levels between
major powers.
In a statistical
analysis
of
dyadic
trade between
major
powers
from 1885 to 1990, I find
support
for the
hypothesis
that defense
pacts
are
positively
related to
dyadic
trade levels, and
that their
non-defense-pact counterparts
are
not
significantly
related to trade in a
dyad.
While
many
scholars conduct
inquiries
into
the link between trade and conflict, with a
focus on the
potential
for trade to reduce the
probability
of interstate conflict, this article
suggests
that the link between economics
and
security
also runs in the other direction.
Military cooperation
can influence com-
mercial
exchange. Extending
the
spatial/
temporal
domain of this
study
to further
investigate
this
linkage presents
itself as a
direction of future research.
Furthermore, a
theory
of how other
alliance commitments
might
influence bilat-
eral trade is
necessary. Hypotheses
about the
effect of offensive, neutrality, non-aggression,
and even consultation
pledges
should be
developed.
For
example,
within some
types
of
alliances, trade could
produce
a
negative
security externality. Non-aggression pacts,
for
instance, are
atypical
of alliances in
general.
In these
agreements,
states
pledge
to refrain
from the use of force in their relations.
Why
would the leaders of states form such an
agree-
ment unless
they
desired assurance
against
future conflict? In other words,
non-aggression
pacts
can
signal
imminent conflict between
the states, or
represent
a foundation for future
peace. Hypotheses
about the
relationship
between trade and
non-aggression pacts,
along
with other
types
of commitment,
should be
explored
in more detail.
In addition, research
designs
that
opera-
tionalize alliances with a
single
variable are
overaggregating
the
many types
of obli-
gations
that states
agree
to when
forming
military
alliances. If the theories tested
concern
specific types
of alliance commit-
ments, researchers
may
be
subjecting
their
hypotheses
to more difficult tests than neces-
sary
and
obfuscating important
relation-
ships.
Scholars concerned with the effect of
alliances on other
types
of economic interac-
tions
(capital flows, foreign
direct invest-
ment, etc.),
as well as
cooperation
and
conflict in
general,
need to
contemplate
the
implications
of
collapsing
alliances into a
single category
of commitment for both their
theories and their
empirical
tests.
Finally, studying
the influence of foreign
policies
on the behavior of firms or states
requires taking
into account the
specific
obligations
that states make in
forming
military agreements.
To recommend a course
of action most beneficial to
policymakers,
scholars of international relations need to
develop
an acute
understanding
of the
implications
of certain
policy
actions. This
may
sometimes
require
theories of the effects
of
specific
alliance commitments
by states,
rather than theories that consider all alliances
to have identical
consequences.
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ANDREW G. LONG, b. 1976, MS in Political
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volume 40 / number 5 /
september
2003