Notes on Bernard Williams

The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and the ambitions of Ethics

Not just Utilitarianism has difficulties, but also the very project of a systematic ethic
theory.

Tension in Sidgwicks Utilitarian principles that could lead to radical change and an
application of those principles serving in good part to justify the status quo.
Tension between radical consequences and conservative inclinations.

The methods of ethics to which the title refers are egoism, intuitionism and
utilitarianism.
Sidgwick regarded the fundamental question of ethics as in what way is it reasonable or
rational to live? (p.156.)

Sidgwick thought reason alone could not adjudicate the claims of egoism and morality, and
had a suspicion only religious principles could do so. (Principles which he did not think it
appropriate to introduce into a science of ethics (p.156.)

Sidgwick felt The Method of Ethics had shown the moral option should take the form of the
Utiltiarian theory (p.157)
Arrived at this conclusion through an extensive survey of commonsense morality.

Sidgwick regards intuition not as a capacity for discerning fundamental ethical truths, but
rather a part of the psychology of ethics.
Chiefly concerned with intuition as part of a method, which, roughly, takes the reflective or
even the relatively unreflective convictions of everyday moral thought and uses them to
arrive at basic and supposedly certain moral truths or, again, to reach conclusions about
unfamiliar cases. (p.157.)

Sidgwick finds it a reproach to any theory which tries to derive from that morality a set of
clear, definite and certain moral principles which will be specific enough to decide uncertain
cases. (p.158.)
Calls an outlook which claims to do this dogmatic intuitionism.

But Sidgwick thinks theres a higher, and better level of intuitionism which involves:
Starting with received moral opinion
Justifying and explaining a good deal of it in terms of some more general principles.
Then applying those same general principles as a way to criticise the parts of the received
moral wisdom which doesnt quite hang so well with the rest.
He thinks this can only be done through the principles of Utilitarianism.

Sidgwicks contrast of Utilitarianism and intutionism has many failings. there is no fixed set
of expectations against which commonsense opinions are being tested for coherence,
definiteness and completeness.

Three fundamental principles, from Sidgwick:
1) The golden rule (pretty much). If a kind of conduct that is right (or wrong) for me is
not right (or wrong) for someone else, it must be on the ground of some difference
between the two cases, other than the facts that I and he are different persons
2) Substantive principle of prudence. Principle of impartiality over all the times of ones
life. It is rational to pursue ones own good on the whole (have an impartial concern
for all parts of our conscious life).
3) Principle of universal benevolence. From the point of view of the universe, my good
is no more good than anothers. as a rational being I am bound to aim at good
generally so far as it is attainable by my efforts not merely at a particular part of
it.(p.382 MOE)

Final task Sidgwick identifies as needing to be done in order to demonstrate that this set of
principles uniquely determines Utilitarianism as the ethic theory capable of systematizing
our moral intuitions
This is the identification of the Universal Good with universal happiness.
Sees happiness to be interpreted in terms of pleasure (and he has complex vies on pleasure).
Each persons objectives or rationally organized set of preferences that will become the raw
material of the additive sum of universal good. (p.162.)

Sidgwick insisted that a moral system should not imply that actions must always be taken
as the result of conscious rational calculation. (p.162.)
He saw that from the point of view of Utilitarianism it must simply be an empirical question
what motivations actually lead to the greatest good; and, in particular whether the
motivation of thinking about the greatest good is likely to lead to the greatest good.(p.163).

As Sidgwick put it (p.354) the dictates of reason ought always to be obeyed, but it does not
follow that the dictation of reason is always a good. (p.162.)
Sidgwicks Utilitarianism then can account for various things (e.g. certain dispositions of
character, disposition to tell the truth, to be loyal to ones friends etc.) which are often
thought of as having an intrinsic or non-Utilitarian value.

A Utilitarian analysis of these things from the outside, from the point of view of the
teleological Utilitarian consciousness treats them instrumentally

Then, there is an uneasy gap/dislocation between
the spirit of that is supposedly justified and
the spirit of the theory that supposedly justifies it.
A distinction between theory and practice.

Problem for the practice of the theorist:
Uneasy duel consciousness of believing in the intrinsic value of certain things, and that their
justification is only instrumental.

Quote from Sidgwick: (paraphrase) if a utilitarian doubts whether a certain better ethical
rule would act for the best if known by other members of the community (it could be
dangerous advice to certain people), then on Utilitarian principles, it may be right to do and
privately recommend, under certain circumstances, what it would not be right to advocate
openly. (supposing a largely public announcement of this rule could be harmful) it may be
right to teach openly to one set of persons what it would be wrong to teach to others.
Mentions esoteric morality.
a Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his conclusions
should be rejected by mankind generally; or even that the vulgar should keep aloof from his
system as a whole, in so far as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations
render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands. (all Sidgwick quotes p.489-90 MoE)
Williams: Utilitarianism emerges as the morality of an elite.
A class of theorists is distinguished from a class of other persons.
The theorists are to hold and deploy the truth of the Utilitarian justification of non-
Utilitarian dispositions.
Colonial similarity. Government House Utilitarianism. (p.166)
This deals with some of the moral schizophrenia (my words) that Sidgwicks theory seems to
entail. But the problem remains for the theorists.

Theory today is more likely to identify the required distinction between theory and practice
as a distinction between
the time of theorizing and
the time of practice.
(the cool hour of reflection (Butler))

Artificiality of the requirement of full commitment to some things (e.g. the values of
friendship, truth) and alternating to an alien reflection.

Extremely nave conception of what is going on in the cool hour (p.167)
The idea that cool and articulated reflection must be authoritatively revealing about ones
structure of values is not itself a very sophisticated belief.

Sidgwick complained of the conflicts and unclarities in the world when he criticised
intutionism, however his theory cannot eliminate them.
Deconstruction on Williams argument: (p.168)
1) We have dispositions of action and judgement.
2) They are related to our general unclarities and conflicts and our sense of
divergent claims.
3) Practically, these dispositions are very valuable.
4) Sidgwick sought to clear up the divergences.
5) His theory cannot eliminate them.


..

Sigwicks theory fails the test of being open. (publicity test)
Publicity requirement: if a theory in question governs the practice of a given group, then it
must be possible for everyone in that group to know that it does (p.169)

there is simply no conceivable exercise that consists in stepping completely outside myself
and from that point of vieww evaluating in toto the dispositions, projects, and affections
that constitute the substance of my own life. (p169-70).

Compares archimedian point desired in ethics to that in science.
the analogy to it presents an insoluble problem to ethical theory. (p.170)

I agree with SIdgwick, such a theory must aim to be a theory for practice, and to be closely
related to reasons for action.