~ 17 82.

/ames O. Bennett
Peirce and the Logic
of Fallibilism
In this paper I explore the relationship between fallibilism and the-
conception of knowledge as justified true belief. I use the work of C.
S. Peirce as a springboard for my discussion, and the issues are ap-
proached through consideration of some papers on Peirce's view of
fallibilism.
1
In the first section, I explore "the logic of fallibilism"
as it bears on the conception of "criteria of truth." In the second
section, I examine an attempt to render Peirce's doctrine of fallibilism
consistent with the view that knowledge is justified true belief and the
assertion that we are justified in making claims of the sort, "I know that
p." In the final section, I argue that we are not, in fact, justified in
making such claims. We may indicate the precise nature of our cogni-
tive situation more accurately, and the logic of fallibilism requires that
we should.
In his paper, "Truth and Fallibilism," Konstantin Kolenda states that,
"one of the unresolved questions about Peirce's account of truth is
whether he meant to provide its meaning or its criteria." He adds
that there have been some conflicting opinions in recent literature,
and that he has argued that "Peirce's definition of truth makes such a
criterion inaccessible." However, Kolenda proceeds to suggest thaj^
such "criteria of truth" might nevertheless by formulated, as a kind of
helpful supplement to a definition.
Envisage now the following situation. Your description of
a phenomenon (1) is borne out by perceptions, yours and
everyone else's, and (2) coheres with all other descriptions,
conceptually and empirically connected with that phenome-
non. Can you say that your belief is true? To answer this
question we need more than just the definition of truth.
...But if in addition to the definition, we also have adequate
relevant criteria, the answer to our question is yes. We can say
354 James O. Bennett
that the belief characterized above is true, because it satisfies
the applicable criteria of truth . . . In other words, we can
make truth claims on the basis of adequate criteria which are
consonant with the definition of truth.
When Kolenda speaks of such criteria enabling us to "make truth
claims," he does not have in mind mere statements to the effect that
we have reason to believe that a certain claim is true; he seems rather to
understand the "making of a truth claim" as an incorrigible statement
that we have indeed found the truth.
Do we make such claims? Peirce thought that we do. For,
he. said that '. . . upon innumerable questions, we have already
reached the final opinion'. Here we may include such indubit-
able propositions as those describing everyday familiar objects
... Of all of them we may be certain that their truth-value
will not be reversed, no matter how long anyone wished to
inquire into them. Under some circumstances, we are in the
position to claim that all the relevant data and their logical
interpretants are in.
This line of thought is entirely antithetical to fallibilism in general,
and to the spirit of Peirce's thought in particular. It is no accident that
"criteria of truth" are rendered inaccessible by Peirce's conception of
truth, for they are incompatible with his theory of knowledge. If such
criteria were not accessible, they would be absolutely useless, and if
they were accessible, they would allow us to be aware of the particular
occasions on which we were in possession of the truth. This'latter
situation would constitute precisely that state of certainty which fal-
libilism is essentially concerned to deny. William James characterized
the issue as follows:
The absolutists in this matter say that we not only can attain
to knowing the truth, but we can know when we have attanied
to knowing it; while the empiricists think that although we
may attain it, we cannot infalliby know when. To know is
one thing, and to know for certain that we know is another.
Peirce and the Logic of Fabilism 355
(Of course, James' terminology is somewhat obscure in this context;
one need only substitute 'Opponents of fallibilism' for 'absolutists',
and 'fallibilists' for 'empiricists', in order to render the passage more
clear.)
Peirce expressed the same view in similar language.
7
He criticized
Sir William Hamilton for the assertion that 'To know, and to know
that we know, are one and the same thing."
8
More explicitly, he wrote
elsewhere:
Perhaps we may already have attained to perfect knowledge
about a number of questions; but we cannot have an unshake-
able opinion that we have attained such perfect knowledge
about .iny given question. That would be not only perfectly
to know, but perfectly to know that we do perfectly know,
which is what is called sure knowledge.
9
The fallibilist does not wish to deny that we may often have know-
ledge. If knowledge is justified true belief, then the fallibilist may
grant that in all probability many of our justified beliefs are, as a mat-
ter of fact, true. The issue in question is whether we can know that the
belief in question happens, as a matter of fact, to be true. Now this
question is a bit tricky, because the phrase 'knowing that we know'
has at least two possible senses. If 'knowing' here means 'possessing
justified true belief', then it does seem that we can "know that we
know." That is, if we have a justified belief that happens to be true,
and we have a justified belief that belief constitutes a case of know-
ledge, and if belief happens, as a matter of fact, to be true, then we
have a justified true belief about a justified true belief we know that
we know.
However, neither James nor Peirce would judge that analysis to be
of much significance. The intent of their remarks concerns the question
of whether we can be aware of those cases in which justified true be-
lief is actually attained. Thus, James asks whether we can know when
we attain truth, and Peirce questions whether we can "have an unshake-""
able opinion" that we have attained knowledge. In the preceding para^
graph, wherein the sense in which we can "know that we know" was
discussed, it was simply supposed hypothetically that the belief
356 James O. Bennett
in question happened to be true. But how could one be aware of that
fact?
This question brings us back to the notion of "criteria of truth."
The phrase has an odd ring to it. Could it be that it represents a mis-
guided attempt to answer the (rhetorical) question just posed? One
might naturally assume that, given the characteristics of knowledge
as justified true belief, there must be one or more criteria by which we
can discern whether each obtains. Thus, we speak of criteria of belief
(such as a willingness to act), and criteria of good evidence (such as
fair sampling). One might naturally be led to suppose, therefore, that
there also could and should be "criteria of truth." However, it will
be obvious upon a moment's reflection that if we did have such criteria,
and if they were different from the criteria of good evidence, then we
would have no need of evidence. Why worry about whether or not
one has good evidence for a belief if one has access to other criteria
that will allow him/her (directly) to determine its truth? Or, to put it
another way, why should one be content to operate within the inferior
realm of "mere" belief (with the risk that attends reliance upon proba-
bility) if one has access to logical procedures that guarantee the pos-
session of truth?
Incidentally, one aspect of Peirce's attack upon the Cartesian phil-
osophy is his criticism of the criterion of clarity "as the first condition
of infallibility." Peirce notes, "The disctinction between an idea seeming
clear and really being so, never occurred to him."
10
In other words,
even if we did have in our possession what appeared to be criteria of
certain knowledge, such criteria, could still be mistakenly applied]
Moreoever, that insight renders the very conception of criteria of certain
knowledge problematic, for in what possible sense could such criteria
function thereby providing us with certainty if their very applica-
tion was always attended with an element of uncertainty? A similar
point would apply to the concept of "criteria of truth." If such cri-
teria were not completely sufficient in practice to inform us as to when
truth was possessed, then they could (at best) provide us with "mere"
probability; in that case such criteria would be functioning as evidence,
and thus would not allow us to be aware of having passed beyond the
possession of justified belief.
The fallibilist must hold that we can never pass beyond a state of
Peirce and the Logic of Pibilism 357
justified belief to an unmediated (and thus error-free) awareness or
"the way things are." To suppose that we can be aware of when the
truth condition for knowledge has been satisfied is to think that we
can somehow get beyond justified belief. The fallibilist, therefore,
must maintain that the most we can do is to assert that we have good
reason to believe that the truth condition has been satisfied. However,
it is important to realize that in that case we have not gone beyond
justified belief. To have good reason to think that the truth condition
has been satisfied is to have good reason to think that the proposition
in question is true. But that is precisely what it means to have justi-
fied belief.
These considerations should be sufficient to indicate that the very
notion of "criteria of truth" is a red herring. Whenever we state that
we believe a proposition, we are saying that we think it is true.
13
If
we also have good reasons for our belief, then we have done all we
can toward achieving justified true belief. It is the height of naivete
to suppose that further epistemolgica! inquiry might disclose certain
criteria which would allow us to make pronouncements such as the
following: "In addition to believing p, and having good reasons for
that belief, we also have ascertained that 'p is true,' actually is true."
This is not to say that justified true belief is not different from justi-
fied belief, but that the difference is beyond our control. We cannot
perform some additional operation that will enable us, at will, to pass
beyond the latter to the former.
The question of the proper relationship between fallibilism and the
conception of knowledge as justified true belief is explored in Robert
Almeder's paper, "Fallibilism and the Ultimate Irreversible Opinion."
Almeder addresses the question as to whether a fallibilist such as Peirce'
is committed to a view that is contradictory. The apparent contra-
diction lies in the fact that "saying 'I know thatp' offers a guarantee
which saying 'but I may be mistaken" withdraws."
15
One possible move
for the fallibilist is simply to drop the truth condition from the concept.
of knowledge, but Almeder rejects this alternative: 'this will be utterly
unacceptable because if there is anything that philosophers agree upon__
358 James O. Bennett
it is that knowledge cannot be false."
16
Almeder suggests an ingenious solution to the apparent dilemma
one which seemingly allows us without contradiction to retain truth
as a necessary condition for knowing, and also the idea that we may
always be mistaken. According to this line of thought, "saying that
a statement p is true means that the rules of confirmation embedded
in the conventions of our current conceptual framework fully authorize
our asserting p or writing it down for acceptance."
17
However, there
is an evolution of conceptual frameworks in the history of thought,
as they approximate ever more closely the way things actually are.
This means that, while we may be optimistic about the general dkection
in which an inquiry is proceeding, we may never be quite certain at
any given time that the present conceptual framework is the final one
the one so fully adequate as not to be subject to overthrow at some
future time.
Given this set of assumptions, the expression 'I know that
p, but I may be mistaken' need not inconsistently imply
that p is true and possibly it is not. Rather it would simply
mean that, given the semantic rules of our current conceptual
framework, the assertion (or inscription) of p is authorized
although it is logically possible that the conceptual framework
in which p is presently authorized may be replaced by a
future and more" adequate conceptual framework in which
the assertion (or inscription) of p may not be authorized.
And there is nothing at all contradictory about this.
There may be nothing contradictory in that line of thought, but as an
attempt to rescue the doctrine of fallibilism from its critics it must be
regarded as a cure that is worse than the ill. The problem lies in the
suggestion that to say that a statement is true means that it is "author-
ized" by "rules of confirmation embedded in the conventions of our
current conceptual framework."
20
If that is so, then "we must consider
truth and knowledge a matter of what we are fully authorized in writing
down relative to our present conceptual framework . . ."
21
Now this
is just a fancy way of stating that truth is relative to available evidence,
and that move virtually destroys fallibilism altogether! If 'true' means
Perce and the Logic ofFaibiUsm 359
nothing more than 'warranted by existing rules of confirmation' (or
'warranted by available evidence'), then in so far as we are conscientious
in our attendance to existing rules of confirmation (or available evi-
dence), we could never be said to hold beliefs that were actually not true,
and so we could never be wrong. (We would, of course, be led to
replace some beliefs by others, but the earlier beliefs could not be
regarded in retrospect as false; we would have to regard them as having
been true at that earlier time, just as the latter beliefs would be regarded
as true at the later time.) Almeder's attempted reconciliation of the
concept of knowledge as justified true belief with the doctrine of fal-
libilism fails, then, because it destroys one of the very elements that
it seeks to preserve.
One reason that Almeder goes astray involves an ambiguity with
respect to his characterization of some of Peirce's statements. Almeder
attributes to Peirce the following view:
What is established as true amounts to no more than what
we are authorized in asserting (or writing down) relative
to our present body of information; and so what is true
today may not be true tomorrow.
22
Now the phrase 'what is established as true' might refer to what actually
is true, or it might refer only to what is considered to be true. The
passages in Peirce's writings cited by Almeder concern "what is estab-
lished as true" only in the latter sense.
23
That is, Peirce states only
that what we consider to be true today, we may not so consider tomor-
row. This claim does not carry with it the implication that truth is
relative to evidence, and so Peirce's actual statements do not warrant
Almeder's characterization of his view.
24
In summary, a claim that truth is relative to an existing conceptual
framework might mean that truth is what evidence warrants, or it might
mean that we are entitled to assert as true what evidence warrants."
In Peirce's thought, "truth is relative to our conceptual framework"
only in the second sense. In the first sense, human fallibility is greatly
reduced, because truth is not independent of our modes of belief a
possibility that Peirce denies. ("There would not be any such thing
as truth unless there were something which is as it is independently of
360 James O. Bennett
how we may think it to be."
25
) To say that truth is independent of our
modes of belief must mean, among other things, that even though an
existing conceptual framework does authorize us in asserting certain
statements to be true, those statements might nevertheless be false.
Preservation of the distinction between what actually is true and what
we are entitled at any given time to assert to be true is essential to
fallibUism.
26
Almeder's discussion is significant, in so far as it raises the question of
the proper relationship between fallibilism and the conception of know-
ledge as justified true belief. If knowledge is understood to involve
truth, then to say, "I know that p," does seem to offer a guarantee
that the qualification, "but I may be mistaken," seems to withdraw.
If Almeder's solution to this problem is inadequate, what alternatives
remain?
My suggestion is this: the fallibilist must challenge one's right to
assert, "I know that p." Strictly speaking, one should say either, "I
believe that I know that p," or "I know thatp, ifp is, in fact, true."
However, it must be noted that both assertions are actually just long-
winded and cumbersome ways of expressing the fact that one has good
reason to believe that p is true. If that is so, then there is really no
point in using the term 'know'. At best it is superfluous, and at worst
it is highly misleading, in that it suggests that the person making the
assertion has managed to pass beyond a state of justified belief.
It is time for philosophers to face up to the question as to whether
the difference between justified belief and knowledge is composed
of anything within human control. Philosophers who suppose that
it is should inform the rest of us as to just what the "criteria of truth"
are, and how those criteria can afford us the certainty that would enable
them to transcend the general category of evidence i.e. that which
contributes to the justification of our beliefs. If the difference is not
within our control, then we can never be aware of when justified belief
is rendered knowledge as a result of the de facto truth of the belief
in question. If that is so, then we are never warranted in stating that
"we (or I) know that p." The logical chasm between the assertions
Peirce and the Logic of Fatlibilism 361
"we know that p" and "we believe that we know thatp" is absolute;
we cannot bridge that gap through some set of operations such as the
construction and satisfaction of "criteria of truth."
The considerations adduced here indicate that it is unnecessary and
misleading ever to state, "I know that p," where truth is understood
to be a necessary condition for knowledge, if one wants to speak in-
purely logical terms, one can say simply, "there is overwhelming evi-
dence for p." That expresses exactly the truth of the matter, without
needlessly going beyond it. (Incidentally, scientists as opposed to
philosophers seem content generally to express themselves in this
more accurate, if humble, manner.) If one wants to speak in psycho-
logical terms, one can say, "I am certain of p." (We are all certain about
any number of things; however, this does not guarantee our infallibility.)
Finally, if one wants to express one's certainty with illuminating pre-
cision, one can say, "I believe thatp more strongly than any conceivable
evidence that might be supposed by others to count against it."
27
This latter statement sufficiently indicates the degree of strength that
some of our beliefs attain, and nevertheless it does not controvert the
view of fallibilism; even so radical a statement leaves open the pos-
sibility that the belief might nevertheless be false.
28
If, strictly speaking, it is pointless and misleading ever to state, "I
know that p," then the value of the verb 'to know' is open to serious
question.
29
As one philosopher has stated, knowing "isn't something
we do, it's something we get to by what we do." It is widely held
that knowing is not a psychological process, and thus that we do not
need a verb to denote a state of mind of the form, "knowing" (along
with wishing,wondering, etc.). I am arguing here that neither is knowing
a distinct logical activity, because it is simply not a distinct activity
at all. The activity that is involved in cases of knowledge that which
results in knowledge, sometimes is the gathering and evaluation of
evidence; and all that we are ever warranted in asserting is the fruit of
that activity the possession of justified belief.
If 'knowledge' is a perfectly respectible noun, then it is natural to
suppose that there is a verb corresponding to it. However, just as one
can possess composure without "composing," so can one possess know-
ledge without "knowing." That is, one possesses knowledge by having
justified beliefs that happen to be true not by performing some unique
362 James O. Bennett
mental operation that is qualitatively different from believeing on the
basis of evidence, or by employing some logical procedure that trans-
cends the gathering and evaluation of evidence. Of course, it would
be futile and thus foolish to propose that everyone cease to use the
term 'know', for people in any event will continue to use it when refer-
ring to beliefs for which the evidence is overwhelming. There is, how-
ever, an important point involved here, for many contemporary phil-
osophers in their analyses of concepts rely heavily on the actual pat-
terns of ordinary language. Thus, there seems to be a tendency to
reason as follows: since (1) knowledge must refer only to what is true,
and thus when we know we are in possession of the truth, and (2) it
is perfectly legitimate to state in many contexts, "I (or we) know that
p," then (3) the doctrine of fallibilism, that it is theoretically possible
that any of our beliefs might actually be false, must be false.
It would seem that the fallibilist must reject either 1 or 2. A radical
alternative not explored in this paper involves the denial of 1. (While
I find this alternative plausible, it runs so contrary to the stream of
contemporary thought that its defense would need- to be lengthy, and
thus would, be out of place in this discussion.)
31
Almeder sought to
retain both 1 and 2, and yet reject 3, by defining 'truth' in such a way
that even a true belief can be overturned at a later time. From my
point of view, this is eating our cake and having it too. The fundamental
move in this discussion has been to challenge 2, by pointing out that
if we must qualify assertions of knowledge by stating that we believe
that we know (as I believe we must), then actually we are not asserting
any more than the possession of justified belief. If "I know thatp,"
is replaced by "there is overwhelming evidence for p," then fallibilism
is not threatened by the type of argument just mentioned.
32
The University of Tennessee
NOTES
. 1. There is a significant and often disregarded ambiguity in Peirce's con-
ception of fallibilism. It is usually taken to be the view that in any particular
case what we believe to be true might, in fact, be false. This amounts to saying
that error is always possible, though not necessarily actual. However, in at least
one passage Peirce explicitly links fallibilism with the view that all our knowledge
Peirce and the Logic of Fattibism 363
claims are tinged with some degree of error: Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce (hereafter referred to as CP), Vols. I-VI ed. Hartshorne and Weiss (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1931-1935; Vok VII-
VIII ed. Burks (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1958),
Vol. I, Paragraphs Number 171 and 172 (hereafter written as 1.171-1.172). Now
it is one thing to say that we cannot be aware of when we possess the truth, and
quite another to say that in no instance do we know the truth completely. I find
this latter claim problematic, in that it seems to presuppose the very sort of know-
ledge about reality that it attempts to deny. Thus, throughout this paper fallibfl- ( <
ism is taken as the view that error is always possible, though not necessarily actual, ' ---'
J
as Peirce states in the following passage.
There is nothing, then, to prevent our knowing outward things as
they really are, and it is most likely that we do thus know them in
numberless cases, although we can never be absolutely certain of
doing so in any special case. (CP, 5.311)
2. Konstantin Kolenda, "Truth and Fallibilism," Transactions of the
Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. XV (1979), p. 251.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid,, p, 253. Kolenda expresses this general line of thought in another
paper, "Two Falubflists in Search of Truth," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soci-
ety, Sup. Vol. LI (1977), pp. 99-100.
5. Kolenda, "Truth and Fauibilism," pp. 253-254. Incidentally, Kolenda
elsewhere notes that "Peirce's fallibilism . . . is conceptually connected with his
theory of signs, according to which every conception is indefinitely translatable
into further conceptions" ("Two Fallibilists. . .", pp. 101-102). In support of
the apparently contradictory claim that sometimes "all the relevant data and
their logical interpretants are in," Kolenda does not cite Peirce, but rather Norman
Malcolm ("Truth and Fallibilism," p. 258)! Interestingly, however, even Malcolm's
analysis fails to justify the claims made by Kolenda (see f.n. no. 28 of this paper).
6. William James, "The Will to Believe," in The Will to Believe and Other
Essays on Popular Philosophy and Human Immortality (New York: Dover Pub-
lications, Inc., 1956), p. 12.
7. For two other discussions of Peirce's views on "knowing that we know,"
see David Savan, "Peirce's Infallibilism," in Studies hi the Philosophy of Charles
Sanders Peirce, ed, Moore arid Robin (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts
Press, 1964), pp. 190-211, and Robert G. Meyers, "Skepticism and the Criterion in
Peirce," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. XIV (1978), pp. 3-17.
Savan states that the proposition that "we cannot know for certain that we know"
is the central thesis of Peirce's fallibilism" (p. 207). However, in discussing what
he terms Peirce's m fallibilism a position that Savan claims "does not conflict
with Peirce's fallibilism" (p. 208) Savan asserts that we may not only possess
364 James O. Bennett
beliefs that happen to be true, but that we may know that they are true (p. 201).
Moreoever, after having noted Peirce's criticism of Hamilton's claim that "to know,
and to know that we know, are one and the same thing" (p. 207), in a closing
summary and reconstruction of Peirce's view Savan is led to assert that "To know,
and to know that you know are one and the same" (p. 209)! Meyers' discussion
is more sound, although I think that his remark that "Knowledge and mere belief
are clearly different states of mind. . ." (p. 10) is contrary to the entire thrust
of Peirce's view.
8. CP, 7.419.
9. CP, 4.63.
10. CP, 5.391. Literally, this is not fair to Descartes the distinction
did occur to him. However, the spirit of Peirce's remark is legitimate: Descartes
failed to deal adequately with the problem that the distinction engenders.
11. Compare with Wittgenstein: "But can it be seen from a rule that cir-
cumstances logically exclude a mistake in the employment of rules of calcula-
tion? What use is a rule here? Mightn't we (in turn) go wrong in applying it?"
On Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), no. 26.
12. See, for instance, CP, 5.416.
13. As Peirce pointed out. See CP, 5.375.
14. Robert Almeder, "Fallibflism and the Ultimate Irreversible Opinion,"
American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph No. 9 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
(1975), pp. 33-54.
15. Ibid., p. 33.
16. Ibid., p. 34.
17. Ibid., p. 35,
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 40.
22. Ibid., p. 36.
23. For example, in some of the passages cited by Almeder, Peirce states
that a person must consider what he/she cannot doubt to be absolutely true (or,
"indubitable"); nevertheless, he adds, the belief may actually be false (5.451,
5.419, 5.416, 5.498, 6.498). If the point of these remarks were that what is
actually true is "no more than what we authorized in asserting," it would make
no sense to state that beliefs for which there is overwhelming evidence might
nevertheless be false.
24. In fairness to Almeder, it should be noted that he is concerned to argue
that Peirce had two views of knowledge and truth. Almeder recognizes the less
relativistic strain in Peirce's thought that I am emphasizing, but he thinks that
passages such as those mentioned in the previous footnote can only be seen as
indicating the presence of a second (and conflicting) view. I find nothing in the
passages he cites or in his argument to warrant this conclusion.
Peirce and the Logic of Fallibilism 365
25. CP, 7.659.
26. Thus, the independence of truth, the objectivity of truth, and fal--
libism are all intimately related notions. To deny any of these is to deny the"
others. Confusion over this point is evident in two companion papers, "Two
Fallibilists in Search of the Truth," by Susan Haack and Konstantin Kolenda
(Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Sup. Vol. LI, pp. 63-104. Haack con-
cludes that it is difficult to combine objectivism and fallibilism (p. 82), but fails
to explain why. Indeed, she ascribes to Peirce a "criteria! theory of truth," which
she finds to be at odds with his fallibilism, because the former is linked with sub-
jectivism (pp. 79 and 81). Thus, her discussion implies that fallibilism is incompat-
ible with subjectivism, but she nevertheless (inexplicably) concludes that it is
incompatible with objectivism as well! Kolenda, after agreeing that "to take fal-
libilism seriously is to create problems for the notion of truth" (p. 85), sets out
to show that fallibilism can after all be combined with "the possibility of ob-
jective knowledge" (p. 85). The heart of Kolenda's view involves the assertion
that "the truth of a belief is relative to the corroborating evidence available and
can change overtime, without inconsistency, if there are sufficiently radical changes
in the relevant evidence" (p. 100). As I have already pointed out in the body of
the paper, this view virtually destroys fallibilism altogether.
The discussions of Haack and Kolenda appear to reflect the following sort of
inference: "if it is always possible to be in error, then there can be no such thing
as objective truth." However, that conclusion just does not follow, and indeed
there would be a problem for the fallibilist who held truth not to be objective
(or non-relativistic), for the following reason. To the extent that truth is relative
whether to cultures, conceptual frameworks, or available evidence the pos-
sibility of error is reduced. Under the most extreme form of relativism a com-
plete subjectivism in which truth was held to be relative to the momentary opinion
of the individual error would not even be possible. Conversely then, as one
moves in the opposite direction on this "relativity spectrum" toward a non-
relativistic conception of truth the possibility of error must increase. It is only
logical, therefore, that one who held truth to be absolute (or completely free of
subjectivism) would also hold that error is always possible. Far from undermining
the notions of absolute or totally objective truth (or knowledge), fallibilism is
actually essential to them.
A related source of confusion about the relationship between fallibilism and
truth is the idea that probability measures degrees of truth. If that is so, then'
a denial of absolute certainty would entail a denial of complete truth. Peirce,
however, explicitly rejects the idea that truth varies with probability (CP, 8.3),
and rightly so. If truth is indeed independent of our modes of belief (i.e. not
relative to available evidence), then beliefs that are highly improbable may never-
theless be completely true, while beliefs that are highly probable may neverthe-
less be completely false. This divergence is possible because, while truth is not
relative to available evidence, probability is.
366 James O. Bennett
27. Or, even more strongly, "There is nothing whatever that could happen
in the next moment or the next year that would by me be called evidence that
there is not an ink-bottle here now." Norman Malcolm, Knowledge and Certainty
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 67.
28. As Malcolm himself stated. Whether or not one "uses 'know' in the
strong sense" is determined by "one's present attitude." Nothing in one's attitude
can guarantee genuine infallibility, and thus even when one is "using 'know' in
the strong sense" one may nevertheless be in error (op, eft., p. 72).
29. Compare with Wittgenstein: "And in fact, isn't the use of the word
'know' as a preeminently philosophical word although wrong?" Op. cir., no. 415.
Also see no. 12 and no. 443.
30. A. D. Woozley, "Knowing and Not Knowing," reprinted in Knowledge
and Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 98. Woozley also states,
"Maybe we ought to say 'I think I know that...' more often than we do" (p. 99).
I have argued that we must say that, but also that such a qualification robs 'know*
of its force.
31. Almeder's remark to the contrary, not all philosophers are agreed that
truth is a necessary condition for knowledge. No less keen an epistemologist than
C. L Lewis denied it; see An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Il-
linois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1962), p. 323. It might be noted that Lewis
was a fallibilist who was heavily influenced by Peirce.
32. This paper was initiated under the financial support of a Faculty Research
Grant from the Office of Graduate Studies and Research of The University of Ten-
nessee. I would like to express my gratitude for their generous assistance.
Book Reviews
Studies in the Scientific and Mathematical Philosophy of Charles S.
Peirce
Carolyn Bisele
Edited with a Preface by Richard M. Martin
The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1979
xii + 386 pp.
Carolyn Bisele has been identified with the scholarly recovery of C.
S. Peirce's work in mathematics and science as well as in the history of
science since the early 50's when her articles on Peirce first began to
appear. These articles, along with the detailed introductions to the
four volumes of Peirce's The New Elements of Mathematics, extensively
edited by her, comprise for the most part Studies in the Scientific and
Mathematical Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce.
The majority of the essays deal with mathematics in one form or .
another. Some deal with rather specific mathematical problems with -
which Peirce was concerned, viz., map-projection, the four-color prob-
lem, Fermatian Inference, problems relating to probability and conti-
nuity. Others deal with mathematical border areas, viz., mathematical
economics and the teaching of mathematics. The New Elements is a
collection of Peirce's unpublished papers, including textbook manuscript
material, much of which is intrinsically interesting and some of which
represents clear advances in mathematical pedagogy.
The scientific essays are much less technical in nature. Rather they
are historical in the double sense that (a) they treat Peirce's scientific
productivity against the background of 19th century science and (b)
they are concerned with his special interests in the history of science
and in certain historical figures, especially Galileo and Kepler.
Prior to the appearance of these mathematical, scientific, and his-
torical essays, the assumption of most Peirce scholars was that Peirce
was primarily a logician and that his principal contributions were in
the area of logic, including his early formulation of pragmatism-and his'
subsequent refinement (pragmaticism). ''Other scholars assumed that
Peirce's principal contribution lay in the direction of metaphysical _
speculation, his categoriology, the system he was attempting to con-