Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 38, No.

5, 2006

Science Education as Emancipatory: The case of Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy of meta-

Reality
Michalinos Science 2006 O 5 382006 Article OctoberUK © riginal Philosophy Ltd
0013-1857Zembylas Emancipatory Educational Philosophy and Theory EPAT Education as
of Education Society of Australasia Oxford, Blackwell Publishing

M Z
Open University of Cyprus and Michigan State University, USA

Abstract In this essay, I argue that Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy of meta-Reality

creates the middle way to theorize emancipation in critical science education:
between empiricism and idealism on the one hand, and naïve realism and relativism,
on the other hand. This theorization offers possibilities to transcend the usual
dichotomies and dualisms that are often perpetuated in some feminist and
multiculturalist accounts of critical science education. Further, metaReality
suggests a radically new way to re-visit the suspect notion of emancipation. The
implications for critical science education are discussed. Keywords: meta-Reality,
emancipation, Roy Bhaskar, critical realism, critical science education
Introduction In recent proposals being advanced for science education a
reassessment of Western culture and the subsequent role of school science is being
introduced—e.g. fundamental questions of power relations, social justice, and
knowledge production in science and schools are being raised (Atwater 1996; Barton
& Osborne, 2001; Barton et al., 2003; Harding, 1998). The driving goal of these
proposals has been to promote images of critical science education, that is,
approaches in science education that acknowledge how science is situated within
larger social and political values. Critical science education draws primarily
from feminist, constructivist, multiculturalist and occasionally, postmodernist
ideas that science is a subjective way of making sense of the world. Critical
science education recognizes both the subjective and the social aspects of the
scientific enterprise while at the same time arguing for social justice and
liberation from oppressive knowledges and ideologies. However, issues of social
justice and inclusion in science education have often been theorized at the
expense of an explicit focus on the theme of emancipation—i.e. of contributing to
eliminating oppression and creating conditions for effective agency. That is, does
science education have or should it have an essential emancipatory impulse? The
idea that science education could or should be emancipatory has been a target of
criticism, notably but not exclusively by a revival of skepticism as exemplified in
© 2006 The Author Journal compilation © 2006 Philosophy of Education Society of
Australasia Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4
2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
666 Michalinos Zembylas forms of work that might be characterized as politically
conservative or philosophically postmodernist. Nevertheless, under this influence,
‘critical’ approaches in science education very often combine a perpetuation of
Enlightenment beliefs in the emancipatory character of knowledge with an
epistemological skepticism. This skepticism is used to challenge ideas and forms
of practice that are regarded as ‘dominant’ and ‘oppressive’ (e.g. a ‘male’ view
of science). However, there seems to be a contradiction between the idea of
knowledge as emancipatory and an application of skepticism (Hammersley, 2002).
‘[S]kepticism undermines any claim that emancipation has taken place or could take
place’ (ibid., p. 34). Also, according to Hammersley, the task of subverting
dominant ideas and practices so as to create possibilities for something new is
inherently problematic, because skepticism does not leave any way of justifying a
desire for something new and different. Is there, then, a ‘third path’ to this
problematic? In this essay, I argue that Roy Bhaskar’s recent philosophy of meta-
Reality (2002a, 2002b, 2002c)—which extends his earlier ideas on critical realism—
creates the middle way to theorize emancipation in critical science education:
between empiricism and idealism on the one hand, and naïve realism and relativism,
on the other hand. This theorization offers possibilities to transcend the usual
dichotomies and dualisms that are often perpetuated in some feminist and
multiculturalist accounts of critical science education. Further, meta-Reality
suggests a radically new way to re-visit the suspect notion of emancipation.
Indeed, Bhaskar is an interesting case of a philosopher who attempts to synthesize
tensions into a workable problematic. The question is: Where could the philosophy
of meta-Reality take science education in terms of the issue of emancipation? The
time is surely ripe for realizing the potential of Bhaskar’s contributions in
science education, given that science education has been characterized by ever-
growing concerns about inequalities, on all dimensions and scales, globally and
locally. The idea that science education has a ‘critical’ purpose—i.e. its
function is, among other things, to challenge social institutions, public policies
and practices so as to bring progressive change—is a possibility that deserves
attention. Core components of Bhaskar’s ideas of critical realism are first briefly
outlined in order to set out the context in terms of critical realism’s role in
the development of his philosophy of meta-Reality and the relevance to the
dialectic of emancipation. Then, I examine how key concepts of Bhaskar’s meta-
Reality thinking may be employed to illuminate the analysis of inequalities and
social injustices in critical approaches in science education. In particular, I
suggest that science education can translate the philosophically abstract
conceptions of meta-Reality into concrete propositions that can ground an
emancipatory potential. The important idea emphasized here is how the goals of
science education are transformed in order for science teaching and learning to be
able to respond to the political and ethical consequences that science (education)
has in the world. It is advocated that science teaching and learning should
contain elements that empower participants to initiate transformations that
promote social justice and emancipation. The theme of emancipation expresses a
desire, a hope, an aspiration, an objective and a commitment to act. If science
educators wish to participate in changing the world, then the
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Science Education as Emancipatory 667 notion of emancipation has to be
problematized and somehow included in contemporary visions of critical science
education. The Perspective of Bhaskar’s Critical Realism The name ‘critical
realism’ is a combination of two terms that have been important in understanding
Bhaskar’s contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences: ‘transcendental
realism’ and ‘critical naturalism.’ Transcendental realism refers to his argument
about the realist conception of science and is summarized as follows: ‘For science
[ … ] is a social activity whose aim is the production of the knowledge of the
kinds and ways of acting of independently existing and acting things’ (Bhaskar,
1978, p. 24). Critical naturalism, on the other hand, is relevant to the
methodological question of whether it is possible to speak of ‘laws of society and
of human behavior’ in the same way one talks about the ‘laws of nature’ (Bhaskar,
1979/1989). Bhaskar answers in the affirmative, but situates his answer to take
into account the nature of the social sciences, i.e. human agency and the role of
social institutions. A critical realist perspective joins transcendental realism
and critical naturalism in a conception of dialectical linkage in which the issue
is not of whether social entities are real but of how they are real. Bhaskar’s
critical realism accepts metaphysical realism over idealism; at the same time, it
adheres to an anti-foundational approach to knowledge, because rather than defining
reality to fit the mind, it accepts that knowledge is conceptually and socially
mediated. As our access to the world is socially and conceptually mediated it is
important to examine critically the concepts we use to understand the world.
Bhaskar thus creates a ‘third way’ that avoids the pitfalls of distinguishing
between the blunt reality of the world and what scientists say about it (Hartwig &
Sharp, 1999). Critical realism ‘embraces naturalistic explanations in the social
sciences without ignoring, at the same time, the fact men and women, unlike
natural entities, actively reproduce their social world’ (Harvey, 2002, p. 163).
Thus Bhaskar hopes to avoid the dualism between the real and the non-real,
suggesting that the question ‘what is real’ is irrelevant and offers little help
in providing demonstrations of real social entities (Nash, 1999). After all,
Bhaskar tells us, if the purpose is to describe or explain what the world is like,
then one is already committed to a realist ontology: there is no point in trying
to explain an ‘unreal’ world, and if the statements of our theories do not refer
to things that exist they might just as well be about anything or nothing. Bhaskar
(1978) states clearly that the relationship between science and reality seems
problematic only if one either accepts the social character of science, but denies
that its object of study is independent of all social activity (the epistemic
fallacy), or if one accepts the independence of reality, but denies the social
character of science (ontic fallacy). Bhaskar’s distinction between the
independence of objects and our knowledge of the world has a number of
consequences for understanding the nature of science. One of the most important is
that it allows us to maintain a certain type of epistemological relativism, while
at the same time avoiding a descent into ontological skepticism concerning
knowledge claims. That is, it allows us to see how changing knowledge
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668 Michalinos Zembylas or unchanging objects is possible (Bhaskar, 1979/1989).
The things that exist become progressively known through a dialectical interaction
of human theory and experience with the world. Thus, science advances by
progressively uncovering deeper levels of understanding as part of an open-ended
process; according to Bhaskar, the development of science is neither cumulative in
the positivist sense, nor discontinuous in the Kuhnian view (Allan, 1998). It is
for this reason that we have to acknowledge the general relativity of our
knowledge. Consequently, Bhaskar views humans as both constrained by nature and
free, within limits, to determine the course of history. Bhaskar’s critical
realism has received widespread acclaim for the clarity of its ontological
derivations. To make a contemporary comparison, it seems to me that his views are
along the same lines as those discussed in current posthumanist discourses in
which neither the human nor material agency is ‘in control.’ In these discourses,
emergence replaces teleological assumptions and a dynamic network between humans
and nonhumans replaces the liberal humanist tradition of ‘controlling’ and
‘dominating’ (Hayles, 1999; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Pickering, 1995). Thus it is
argued that scientific culture is not only a field of knowledge, but it also
includes the ‘made things’ of science, skills, social relations, machines and
instruments, scientific facts and theories, biographical, historical, cultural,
gender, and class backgrounds of participants. The importance of both Bhaskar’s
views and posthumanist accounts consists not only in understanding how new
scientific knowledge is produced, but also in appreciating the transformation of
both the material and the social dimensions of science. Critical realism has an
ontology claiming that reality is socially constructed whilst maintaining that
underlying structures and mechanisms of the real world determine social
arrangements and understandings. Seen like this, critical realism mitigates the
detrimental influences of strong forms of constructivism that assume the world is
purely a human construct, and the narrowly calculative rationality of positivism
that treats knowledge as simply the accumulation of sense-experiences. This is why
Bhaskar’s realist philosophy is called ‘critical’ in that, by talking of
‘reclaiming reality’ (Bhaskar, 1989), one can be critical of the prejudices,
errors, and philosophical false trails that have covered or disguised reality. As
it is shown below, Bhaskar uses this ‘reclaimed reality’ as the only basis for
emancipatory social practice (Corson, 1991; Hughes & Sharrock, 1997). The
Philosophy of Meta-Reality and Possibilities for Emancipation The philosophy of
meta-Reality is basically grounded on Bhaskar’s earlier work on critical realism
but goes beyond it. As Bhaskar (2002b) explains: ‘Although [metaReality] is
consistent with, sustains, and arose as a result of internal dialectic within the
developing trajectory of critical realism, it transcends and goes beyond critical
realism’ (p. 174, ft. 8). He also writes elsewhere: ‘[Meta-Reality] accepts but
goes beyond critical realism, insofar as it pinpoints the reality of non-dual
states and phases of being, showing how they underpin and sustain the totality of
all forms of human, and indeed all, life’ (p. 8). Finally, he gives the stigma of
the differences between meta-Reality and critical realism, when he argues that:
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Science Education as Emancipatory 669 The main difference between the philosophy
of meta-Reality and critical realism [ … ] is that critical realism has been
founded on the principle of non-identity, and as such reflects the limitations of
the world of duality; whereas the philosophy of meta-Reality stresses identity,
identification and unity; and the ubiquity and centrality of non-dual states and
phases of being in our social life. (2002c, pp. ix–x, author’s emphasis) Key in
developing this philosophical position has been Bhaskar’s efforts to explore how
humans can work themselves and an emancipated society simultaneously in virtue of
powers and properties that are more than social (Morgan, 2003)—Bhaskar terms this
‘universal self-realization.’ This is something that Bhaskar has been working on
since he has first theorized about the notion of critical realism, but after his
book From East to West (2000) he began to explore a ‘spiritual turn’ in the
problem of being and becoming. This exploration is extended in a further seven
texts, all currently being published. In the three books that are considered here
(Bhaskar, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c), I will attempt to sketch what meta-Reality is and
what significance this philosophy may have for theorizing emancipation. Bhaskar
(2002b) uses the term ‘meta-Reality’ to refer to beyond reality as currently
understood: ‘The “Meta” here connotes both the idea of transcendence, that is the
idea of going to a level beyond or behind, or behind or between reality, while at
the same time the “Reality” in the title makes it clear that this level is itself
still real, and so part of the very same totality that critical realism has been
describing all along’ (p. 175, fn. 8). In another excerpt, Bhaskar’s efforts to
transcend dualities is stated more explicitly: ‘Perhaps it is best not to call the
philosophy of meta-Reality a realism, as realism connotes the idea of a split or
opposition between a world and its description, that is insofar as the very
concept of realism is itself dualistic [ … ] it could be said to be a philosophy
of truth rather than reality’ (2002a, pp. xxiii–xxiv). According to Bhaskar,
reality as currently understood limits the possibilities of being; thus, he refers
to current reality as ‘demi-reality.’ Some of the elements of demi-reality are
exploitation, oppression, conflict, commodification, egoism, environmental
degradation, alienation, aggression, apathy and cynicism (Bhaskar, 2002a). These
elements entail our isolation and lack of connection and consist aspects of
dualism. Consequently, false knowledge—which from the view of meta-Reality
includes limiting oneself to demi-reality—refers to ideas that seem real but do
not correspond in an adequate way to an object of reference (Bhaskar, 2002a). For
Bhaskar, then, meta-Reality is dialectical: while the ‘parasitic’ nature of demi-
reality is acknowledged, a distinct potential of meta-Reality emerges as that
which liberates and produces a new emergent mode of existence (Bhaskar, 2002b).
This liberation, however, is not a matter of moving someone beyond demi-reality;
on the contrary, it is an act of transformation by embodied beings that enable the
agent to qualitatively change societies through praxis (Morgan, 2003). Bhaskar
turns our attention to the powers and potentials that humans possess that are more
than social and make social transformation possible—i.e. he explores this in terms
of a notion of ‘in-the-world’ (2002b, p. 179) spiritualism in the sense of
connectedness with the world. Various elements of connectedness can be brought
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670 Michalinos Zembylas to the fore to create the enlightened individual within
society whose activity contributes towards the achievement of the ‘eudaimonistic
society’ (2002b, p. 33). Specifically, Bhaskar argues that we have the capacity to
experience non-dual states. By non-dual states he means varieties of fundamental
connections with what we otherwise perceive in a dualistic manner, from the
position of the egoistic ‘I’ (2002a, p. 37). These connections take the form of
‘transcendental identification’ (2002b, p. 10), something that we engage in all the
time without realizing it (e.g. when we listen, read, watch, play musical
instruments etc.). All these activities entail an element of ‘identity,’ an
indication of the rhythms of a fundamental inter-penetration of being. An example
in which Bhaskar (2002b) refers to is that of Newton and gravity: Bhaskar
maintains that Newton was in transcendental identification with gravity.
Consequently, we are all connected, Bhaskar argues, thus non-duality is a real
state that is basic to all beings, i.e. a necessary condition for all social
interaction and all human agency. For Bhaskar this is an experience of a basic
unity or identity. His point is that if we do not allow this unity or identity to
occur—there are many heteronomies that keep intervening such as, our egoism,
jealousy, egoism, aggression, apathy and so on—then watching, listening etc. is
disrupted. Thus at some level in being non-duality is a real state indicative of a
real trans-individual something; this real state sustains the possibility of
everything else (Morgan, 2003). In other words, according to Bhaskar, the world of
duality in which we live depends upon and is sustained by a realm of non-duality.
The implication of the experience of non-duality is one of a basic unity or
totality in difference, and it is in this context that Bhaskar’s emancipatory
agenda can be realized. The ‘ground state’ qualities of human beings,
differentiated though they are, are linked to those of other human beings through
what he labels the ‘cosmic envelope’ (2002a, pp. 54–59; 2002b, p. 207). In a
sense, he means that, ‘everything is within everything’ (Morgan, 2003, p. 125);
this unity-in-difference is referred to as ‘co-presence’ (2002a, pp. xviii, 71–77,
155–158; 2002b, p. 215), and, it is at this level that the subject-object duality
collapses and the argument for a ‘eudaimonistic society’ is constructed. ‘I
literally become not only one with the other, I am the other, because the other is
co-present within me (and I within her)’ (2002b, p. 16). Thus, the condition of
possibility for action is a basic-level unity of difference. Because humans are a
part of this connectivity, a ‘eudaimonistic society’ can be manifest through them.
This requires that they are attuned to their ground state which means they are
aware of this ‘re-enchanted’ reality. This also means that a liberated society
cannot consist of individuals who will not accept or understand or work towards a
society that is fundamentally connected, for only in that manner, Bhaskar
contends, can true change and eudaimonia emerge in our times. As Bhaskar writes
characteristically, ‘The possibility of human emancipation depends upon expanding
the cone of non-duality within our lives’ (2002b, p. 11). Self-realization,
according to Bhaskar, generates right–action that will provide the momentum for
positive self and social transformation. But for the ‘rightness’ to be
emancipatory, love as the positive content of response is seen as empowering
right-action (freeing action from psycho-social constraints or harmful
socialization). As Morgan explains, ‘Bhaskar wants to establish through non-
duality that connection
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Science Education as Emancipatory 671 is real, and that connection has a certain
quality—co-presence—whose further quality— love—is significant for each element
(including you and me) within the totality which is connected’ (2003, p. 136).
Because an awareness of non-duality is basic to an emancipatory agenda, any
philosophy or model of duality cannot fully attain emancipation, of whatever
political, social or religious kind (Bhaskar, 2002a). Thus, the concept of
universal self-realization is an act of emancipation. A philosophical position
that coheres around these ideas has the potential, according to Bhaskar, to
overcome some challenging issues of others who worked on constructing an
emancipatory agenda. In developing his philosophical position, Bhaskar clearly
confirms many aspects of the great philosophical traditions of the past. Thus, one
may ask, where is the originality in this new philosophy? The originality, in my
view, resides in the elaboration of specific philosophical arguments for this whole
way of looking at the world, and bringing them to bear on the project of
emancipation. It is on the level of ontology that Bhaskar proceeds to offer his
critique of both modernist and postmodernist ideas. In fact, this is where meta-
Reality diverges from both modernist and postmodernist projects. Bhaskar’s ideas
of meta-Reality (e.g. co-presence, universal self-realization, connectivity,
transcendental identification, non-duality) are introduced in order to emphasize
the concrete singularity of every universal selfrealization and its significance in
the project of emancipation. While the common ground of both modernism and
postmodernism is their anti-ontological position, meta-Reality is precisely
grounded in the proposition that a critique of the forms of thought is a critique
of the forms of being. The essentiality of difference is retained as an act of
emancipation. Assessing Bhaskar’s Argument for the Emancipatory Potential of
Science Education First of all, it is important to be clear about what is meant by
the ‘emancipatory potential of science education.’ There are at least two
components to this. The first is the idea that through science education students,
teachers and researchers can be freed from erroneous beliefs (of course, this is
not unique to science education). As I have shown earlier, this is central to
Bhaskar’s philosophical position of metaReality. The second goes even further and
claims that science education can participate in a process of social
transformation for freeing people from oppressive social arrangements. And to make
a connection to Bhaskar’s views, by contrast with most constructivists and
postmodernists, this depends on the notion that science education can provide
knowledge about why things came to be the way they are, and about how they might
change in order to do things differently, e.g. more justly. An example of this
could be why the institutionalization of environmental education has subverted its
potential as a transformative educational practice and how we might need to find
ways to unite social and ecological perspectives. This last claim—i.e. how to act
based on the knowledge produced—is the most controversial, and I will further
analyze it. The idea that science can provide more than just factual knowledge is
not unique to Bhaskar, of course; though his justification for it is new in
important respects
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672 Michalinos Zembylas (Hammersley, 2002). Hammersley refers to two aspects with
respect to Bhaskar’s justification. The first one has to do with the notion that
some values are embedded in any kind of research and discourse. In other words,
through their work, researchers and educators, for example, provide knowledge that
may show how some beliefs are better than others; this often serves to legitimate
them, their ideas, and their institutions. The second aspect has to do with the
implications of the previous one, i.e. that researchers and educators can draw
conclusions from their work to the effect that people may need to abandon some
(erroneous) beliefs and adopt others. An example would be the institutionalization
of environmental education within general education that prevents educators,
students and citizens from realizing its socially and ecologically transformative
goals; to adopt these transformative goals, the institutionalization of
environmental education has to be abandoned. The idea behind Bhaskar’s argument,
according to Hammersley (2002), is that social science (e.g. science education)
can and should produce critiques of dominant ideas and institutions. Any
‘critical’ approach in this respect would expect science educators and researchers
to engage in critical assessment of the ‘findings’ of their work as well as the
social and political implications of this work. Of course, one could never be
absolutely certain that a belief is ‘false’; however, this does not mean that we
cannot legitimately criticize arguments and argue that some ideas may be better
than others. Therefore, based on Bhaskar’s views, the role of a critical science
educator would be to constantly and explicitly problematize the relationship
between beliefs and their social functioning. Thus, from Bhaskar’s point of view,
science education in its critical role can make progress in uncovering dimensions
of social reality that are hidden from us in various ways—e.g. What does it mean
to teach science in ways that value the epistemological and cultural background
held by all students, especially those who are underprivileged? By uncovering
societal, psychological and political mechanisms, science education can
potentially help us penetrate ideologies that seek to mask social realities, some
of which may be oppressive and exploitative. That is, if concealed personal and
social inequalities and oppressions are uncovered through the efforts of science
educators, then these inequalities and oppressions may come to be seen as the
source of unwanted situation. In this way, science education contributes directly
to social critique. An example of this may be found in Barton et al.’s (2003) work
with urban youth living in poverty in which the researchers produce knowledge that
critiques current reform initiatives in science education. Some other more general
examples in which meta-Reality views can provide a basis for helping science
educators promote an emancipatory agenda are the following. First, meta-Reality
can promote the notion of science-as-practice—i.e. students construct their own
research questions based on their interests, negotiate problems and solutions with
their peers, and critically evaluate different discursive and material practices
in pursuing solutions. Because science is an activity through which students can
experience co-presence and connectivity with nature and their peers, considering
what students bring with them provides a totally different perspective about the
nature of science and ways of knowing science. Second, meta-Reality can inspire a
powerful link between children, science, and society through which self-
realization
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Science Education as Emancipatory 673 can be promoted. For example, scientific
concepts emerge from dealing with everyday problems and needs in children’s
communities; these problems and needs are fundamental in the production of science
and scientific knowledge. Simultaneously, the produced scientific knowledge can
contribute to construct science in children’s lives in ways that are empowering
and socially transformative for the communities in which they live—that is,
scientific knowledge can be used to strengthen relationships of solidarity.
Finally, meta-Reality can provide a reconceptualization of the goals of science
learning, that is, science can become a tool of change in the community and
empower children to engage in science in compelling ways. For instance, the
emphasis on promoting critical scientific literacy—unlike the traditional emphasis
on ‘knowledge,’ and ‘skills’—offers direction for emancipatory science education
through its recognition that effective analysis of ideology, power, knowledge and
authority in science and science education requires not only ‘rational inquiry’
and dialogue, but also excavation of the emotional investments that underlie any
ideological commitment, the histories and norms of participation, and the
possibilities for action and change. In this manner, much of dualism will have to
be abandoned as the idea of non-duality manifests at every level of science
learning. Furthermore, the insights gained from the philosophy of meta-Reality
problematize how contemporary science educators may often alienate underprivileged
groups of children. Such insights provide powerful arguments in considering the
role of culture and power in school science and theorizing about the role of
science in society. For example, it is not enough just to encourage all learners
to celebrate and study the contributions of men and women from various ethnic
backgrounds to the advancement of science (Rodriguez, 1998) or to study
traditional ecology (Snively & Corsiglia, 2001). There need to be opportunities
for learners to empower themselves to learn science in meaningful ways, and this
requires a new philosophy of identity. For example, as I mentioned earlier,
striving for promoting science-aspractice in science education can simultaneously
address issues of equity and inclusion. This means creating opportunities for
engaging in ‘real’ science, i.e. science that is real for the students, that
respects the advantages of students’ cultural identity and language without
downgrading the realism about this world. A philosophy of metaReality could
inspire investigations in science education that would encourage a more hopeful
vision of school science, one that is more responsive to students’ needs and more
effective in promoting a richer understanding of the world. For example, to take
on an issue that was already raised earlier with respect to what it means to teach
science to underprivileged children, at the heart of metaReality philosophy is the
notion of presence and absence. One may argue that, in serious tension with some
of the dominant ideas in science education (e.g. conceptual change, scientific
literacy etc.), is the lack of theorizing the absence of particular groups of
people, ideas and beliefs. The notion of what/who is absent and present in
contemporary science education discourse is crucial to conceptualizing and
theorizing change and transformative action; the lack of concern for particular
people or ideas does not simply indicate an epistemological or ontological absence
but an ethical absence too. A world of pure presences would be impossible; all the
absences we leave behind have profound implications for science education.
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674 Michalinos Zembylas Bhaskar’s theorization of co-presence and connectivity
reveals that individuals, things, situations and contexts of action not only
consist of what is visibly present but are also existentially connected with
everything that is not present. The importance of this notion is that it
foregrounds the fact that our emancipation cannot be realized, unless it is
inclusive. Anything short of that would be ontologically and ethically lacking.
Thus, a lack of concern for the absence of particular individuals, conditions or
aspects subverts the ideas of co-presence and connectivity; the significance of
this lack of concern lies not simply in the non-presence of those individuals,
conditions or aspects, but in the resulting non self-realization of our potential.
Consequently, meta-Reality ideas provide the ‘impulse’ that may inspire dialectic
on emancipation in science education, giving rise to efforts to overcome this
lack, and to overcome constraints that prevent self-realization. The goal of
emancipation, then, requires the problematization of what produces these absences;
this entails a reflection upon historical conditions, practices and struggles, and
the possibilities of their transcendence. To conclude, in addressing the question
of the emancipatory potential of science education, the philosophy of meta-Reality
allows us to do two things: to establish some characteristics of emancipation in
the context of science education, and to inquire into the conditions of
possibility for making emancipation a reality in this context. The philosophy of
meta-Reality enables science educators to defend the possibility of an
emancipatory potential, and to establish a general conception of what constitutes
emancipation. The act of emancipation, as Bhaskar tells us, is relevant to
understanding how non-duality is an integral part of our lives. Science education
has much to contribute towards this direction. The ideas of co-presence, non-
duality, universal self-realization, transcendental identification, and
connectivity can be promoted through science learning and teaching and help us
understand in deeper ways how to engage in self-transformation as a kind of
becoming free from unwanted sources of determination (Bhaskar, 2002c). These ideas
provide some useful directions for inquiry into the conditions of possibility for
making emancipation a socially transformative goal in science education. The
values involved in this project include solidarity with those who are suffering
from current policies and a sense of justice that leads to indignation where
policies are implemented without concern for those who suffer the consequences.
Conclusion The aim of this article has been twofold. First, to discuss Bhaskar’s
philosophy of meta-Reality and its contribution to theorizing emancipation;
second, to illustrate the significance of various ideas of this philosophy in the
context of science education with respect to its emancipatory potential. An
analysis of the emancipatory potential of science education, grounded in the
philosophy of meta-Reality provides an interesting alternative to modernist and
postmodernist accounts. The problem with both modernist and postmodernist
conceptions of inquiry, based on Bhaskar’s views, is that neither can sustain an
idea of social critique, or of mechanisms associated with social transformation.
However, following Bhaskar’s views, one may
© 2006 The Author Journal compilation © 2006 Philosophy of Education Society of
Australasia
Science Education as Emancipatory 675 argue that a meta-Realist philosophy can
provide the foundation for a critical science education. Science educators can
build upon the philosophy of meta-Reality to argue that one needs to analyze
educational knowledge in terms of power relations, differential allocation of
resources, the education of underprivileged children, and many other factors.
Meta-Reality can be utilized to show the practically inadequate and often vacuous
philosophical bases of approaches dominating educational circles and policy
agendas. More theoretical exploration and empirical research informed by these
ideas could enable us to further qualify some of the elements of the philosophy of
meta-Reality with respect to the dialectic of emancipation. Over the years,
‘Bhaskarian’ critical realism has established itself as a significant intellectual
force in the social sciences, and its potential in a number of theoretical and
practical disciplines continues to be explored (Cruickshank, 2002). Bhaskar’s
recent philosophy of meta-Reality is a contribution that will undoubtedly steer
even more discussions and explorations. Areas of consonance and divergence between
the philosophy of meta-Reality and the nature of science in the context of science
education have not been investigated in depth. It can be argued that Bhaskar’s
philosophy of meta-Reality supports the concept of a postfoundational and
dialectical model of reality. The implications of this model, and the potential of
other critical realist ideas for science education could be further examined in
the future. It may be argued, though, that the combination of meta-Reality’s
epistemological relativism and ontological realism allows science education to
follow a middle path between the extremes of other dominant positions, which are
ultimately susceptible to the foundationalism of positivism, the regression of
idealism, or the extreme relativism of some postmodernist positions. The
philosophy of meta-Reality is uniquely positioned to provide an interesting
alternative to some of the tensions besetting contemporary science education—
especially in instances where modern and postmodern influences are involved in a
recalcitrant conflict. The postfoundationalist aspects of meta-Reality enable it to
appropriate deconstructionist research methods, but deploy them from within a
realist framework. Most importantly, perhaps, the implications of a meta-Realist
philosophy go beyond traditional goals of science education, indicating a
conception of science education as an emancipatory enterprise. By virtue of its
evolutionary aspects of human development, the philosophy of meta-Reality raises
significant challenges to dominant views of pedagogy and praxis in science
education. Given its concern with absenting constraints upon human freedom, it is
claimed that the philosophy of meta-Reality reveals the real task of science
education as facilitating the emergent rationality and emotionality of students
towards emancipation. In light of this emancipatory mission, the possible
contribution of the philosophy of meta-Reality to the field of science education is
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