Advancing Pipeline IMP With Management Systems

1
AdvancingPipelineIntegrityManagement
Programs(IMP)with
ManagementSystems(MS)
RafaelG.Mora,P.Eng.
1 of33
20October2011,Calgary,AB
Theviews,opinionsandrecommendationsexpressedinthisseminardonot
necessarilyreflectAPEGGAandmyemployersnoraretheyobligatedtoadoptthem
AdvancingIntegrityManagementPrograms(IMP)withManagementSystems(MS)
Purpose
RaiseawarenessofanapproachtoadvancePipeline
I i M P (IMP) i IntegrityManagementPrograms(IMP)using
ManagementSystems(MS)toincreasetheir
effectivenessinreducingriskstothepublic,
environmentandbusiness.
2 of 33
2
Outline
1. Purpose
2. TerminologyandConceptualDefinitions
I t it M t (IM) E l ti 3. IntegrityManagement(IM)Evolution
FromMaintenancetoIMPwithMS
LearningandEvolvingfromFailures[ClassExercise]
IMP/MSIndustryandRegulatoryFramework[GroupExercise]
4. AdvancingPipelineIMPwithMS
I i IMP i h MS C i d El
3 of 33
InterconnectingIMPwithMS:CategoriesandElements
LessonsLearnedandStrategiesforAdvancing
IntegrityCorePurpose
4 of 33
3
PipelineSystemHazardsandThreats
PipelineorFacilityHazard
Anysituation,eventand/orconditionthat
h th t ti l t f il f th
ANALOGY
hasthepotentialtocauseafailureofthe
pipeline
PipelineorFacilityThreat
Anabnormalstateofthepipethatcanbe
created and grown by one or more pipeline
Box
5 of 33
createdandgrownbyoneormorepipeline
hazards;astatethatcouldbecomeactive
orinactivewiththecapacitytocausea
failuretothepipe.
SnakeintheBox
PipelineIntegrityisthestatus ofa
i li idi
WhatisPipelineIntegrity?
pipelineproviding
StructuralResistance
Reliabilityand
Availability
tooperatesafely andreliably fora
definedperiod
6 of 33
p
4
PipelineIntegrityManagementProgram
Process tocontinuouslydevelop,
implement,measure,and
manage theintegrityofapipeline g g y p p
through:
Identification&Susceptibility,
Assessment,
Mitigation,
Preventionand
7 of 33
Monitoring
OfRiskstoensureasafe,
environmentallyresponsible,
reliableservice
ISOManagementSystems
0
1
OperatingPrinciple
I
S
O
9
0
0
1
8 of 33
Managementsystem refersto
whattheorganizationdoesto
manageitsprocesses,oractivities,
sothatitsproductsorservices
meettheobjectivesithassetitself
I
S
O
1
4
0
0
1
Courtesyof InternationalOrganizationofStandardization
5
ManagementSystems
commitment
9 of 33
Provideaholistic,systemic,systematic,sustainable,optimaland
integratedwaytoachievecompanygoals
IMP[MajorElements]withMS[Categories]
Policyand
Commitment
Management
Review
Planning
Checking&
CorrectiveActions
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
o
u
s
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
10 of 33
Implementation
6
AdvancingIntegrityManagementPrograms(IMP)with
IntegrityManagement(IM)Evolution
FromMaintenancetoIMPwithMS
Learning and E ol ing from Fail res [Class E ercise]
11 of33
LearningandEvolvingfromFailures[ClassExercise]
IMP/MSIndustryandRegulatoryFramework[GroupExercise]
From Maintenance towards IMS
IMPwithManagementSystems
Regulatorand
IndustryDriven
Management
C i
Managers
Continuous
HolisticOriented
Commitment
SystematicCheckingand
CorrectiveActions
Checking
(CAP)
Review
Improvement
IntegrityManagementProgram
Regulatory
driven
(Consequence)
Maintenance
12 of 33
RiskBased
Approach
ThreatManagement
Oriented
Maintenance
Criticality
Oriented
Probability
ofFailure
Businessand
Safety
Employee
Consequence
Retain&
Restore
Function
7
1995/6 NationalEnergyBoard(NEB)PublicInquiryonSCC
1997 CEPASCCRecommendedPractices(firstversion)
1999 NEB OnShore Regulation
CanadianPipelineIntegrityManagementHistory
1999 NEB On ShoreRegulation
13 of 33
StrategiestoLearnfromFailure(e.g.ChallengerExplosion)byAmyEdmondson,HBR
HBR:HarvardBusinessReview
CEPA:CanadianEnergyPipelineAssociationCSA:CanadianStandardAssociation
2005ERCB PipelineRegulation IM
2005CSAZ662Suppl.#1 AnnexNIMP
2006 ERCBandBCOGCadoptedAnnexN
2007 CEPA I t it Fi t I iti ti SCC RP
CanadianPipelineIntegrityManagementHistory
2007 CEPAIntegrityFirstInitiative SCCRP
2010 NEBIncidentReductionProject
Increasedincidents
2010BPMacondoPlatform Consequence
2011BCOGCstartedformalIMPSelf
AssessmentReview conformance
2011 SafetyAdvisories(Dents,Records)
14 of 33
y ( , )
2011 NEBNOPRCManagementSystems;
2011 NEBPerformanceMeasures
2011 SanBruno,CAPipelineExplosion
InvestigationReport
ERCB:EnergyResourcesConservationBoardBCOGC:BritishColumbiaOilandGasCommission
NOPRC:NoticeofProposedRegulatoryChangeHBR:HarvardBusinessReview
CourtesyofNASA
8
1968 FirstNaturalGasPipelineSafetyAct:
creationofOfficeofPipelineSafety(nowPHMSA)within
USDepartmentOfTransportation
1979 ActofNaturalGasandLiquidPipeline
USAPipelineIntegrityManagementHistory
q p
Safety;1988;1992;1996
1999 2001MajorPipelineIncidents(e.g.
Bellingham,WA;Carlsbad,NM;SouthRiding,VA;
Bridgeport,AL,etc)
2000 HazardousLiquidsIMPRegulation
2002 PipelineSafetyAct
2003 Gas IMP Regulation
15 of 33
2003 GasIMPRegulation
2006 MajorLeakinAlaska(LowStressPipeline)
2011 AdvanceNoticeofProposedRuleMaking
(ANPRM):SanBruno,CAPipelineExplosion
2010Sep 9San Bruno,CA Gas Transmission Pipeline Explosion
PHMSA:PipelineandHazardousMaterialsSafetyAdministration
HCA:HighConsequenceAreas
Whathappenedon9September2010?
1956GasTransmissionLine132
Ruptured
[MP 39 28] San Bruno [MP39.28]SanBruno,
California(17km,12minutesfromSanFrancisco)
GlenviewDrive&EarlAvenue
8peopledied&66injured.38homesdestroyed;70damaged
Craterof7.8mx21.6m;8.4mpipeflew30m.south
16 of 33
396psi(2730KPa)failurepressurebutlocationnotimmediately
identified
IneffectiveSCADA(pinpointfailurelocation)
95mintostopflow(manualvalves)
SCADA:SupervisoryControlandDataAcquisition
9
Destroyed Damaged
PotentialImpactCircle:125m
Consequences:220m
17 of 33
Whydidtheexplosionoccur?[TechnicalRootCauses]
Fracturethatoriginatedinthepartially
18 of 33
weldedlongitudinalseamweldofoneof
thesix(6)shortpipesectionspups
Theseamwelddefectgrewovertime,but
failedunderoverpressure(ElectricalWork
atMilpitasTerminal)
10
ClassExercise:WhatIMPandMSContributedtotheFailure?
1956pipelineexemptedfromhydrostatic
testing(i.e.Grandfathered,1968Regulation)
Visiblemanufacturingdefectsince1956
relocation:6shortlengthpipes
OverpressurefromElectricalworkat
MilpitasTerminal
Keypipelinerecordsmissing
IMPauditsdidnotidentifytheissue
Manualvalvesclosedafter95minutes.
Consequence exceeded Potential Impact
19 of 33
ConsequenceexceededPotentialImpact
Circle
Nodesignandmaterialconsiderations
Previous2008pipeexplosiondueto
inappropriateinstallationandpipe
selection.Post2010Leakalsoidentified
Exercise:
WhatIMP/MSconceptualelementsaremissing?
Identifyapproach(IMPorIMP/MS);IMPorMSelements
missinginthefollowingstandardsorregulations:
1. CSAZ66211andAPI11602001
2. CSAZ66211andASMEB31.8S2010
3. CSAZ66211andBSPAS55:2008
4. CSAZ66211andPERUDS0872007EM
5. CSAZ66211andUSACFR 192
6. CSAZ66211andUSACFR 195
7. API1160andASMEB31.8S2010
8. BSPAS55:2008andASMEB31.8S2010
20 of 33
9. BSPAS55:2008andPERUDS0872007EM
10. USACFR 1952007andAPI11602001
11. USACFR 1922004andASMEB31.8S2010
12. USACFR 1952007ANDCFR 1922004+SanBrunoANPRM
11
AdvancingIntegrityManagementPrograms(IMP)with
AdvancingPipelineIMPwithMS
InterconnectingIMPwithMS:CategoriesandElements
Lessons Learned and Strategies for Ad ancing
21 of33
LessonsLearnedandStrategiesforAdvancing
II.Planning(Plan)
III.Implementation(Do)
I.PolicyandCommitment(Promise)
IMP withMS(Elements)
8. Structure,AuthorityandResponsibilities
9. Training,CompetenceandEvaluation
1. Goals,TargetsandObjectives
l
IV Checkin and Correcti e Action
10. Communication,Awareness,
ParticipationandConsultation
11. Mitigation
12. Prevention
13. Monitoring
14. FitnessForServiceAssessment
15. InformationManagement
2. StrategyandContingencyPlanning
3. LegalandRegulatoryRequirements
4. Identification/SusceptibilityofHazardsand
threats
5. ConsequenceAssessment
6. RiskAssessment
7. IntegrityPlanandSchedule
22 of 33
V.ManagementReview(Act/Manage)
IV.CheckingandCorrectiveAction
16. RegularChecking/Verification
17. InvestigationofIncidentsandNon
Conformances
18. CorrectiveandPreventativeActionPlans
19. ManagementofChange
20. InternalandExternalAudit
21. PerformanceEvaluation(Indicators)
22. ContinuousImprovementPlan
12
PolicyandCommitment(1/2)
LessonsLearned:MindfulLeadersandPhronesis
(*)
AllInclusivePolicy
Context(Consequences)andAbilitytoAchieve
ABalancedMypeople,Environmentand
B i Business
Appropriatetonature,scaleandpotential
impacts
FrameworkforWhatTodoandNottodo
ALiveCommitment
Communicatedtoallworkingfororonbehalfof
theCompany
23 of 33
Demonstratedbyconsistentactionssupporting
Regions(e.g.Resources,leadership)
ToContinualImprovement
ToComplywithlegalrequirements
WalktheTalk(PolicyandCommitment)
CourtesyofScientificAmerican
andInfoBarrel
(*)Phronesis:abilitytomakedecisionsconsideringthequalityoflife(society,environment,commongood,etc.)
PolicyandCommitment(2/2)
LessonsLearned:MindfulLeadersandPhronesis
AdapttoMeetThePolicy
NewRisks:acquisitions,specialregions
NewTimes:SocietalRiskAversionto
IncidentsandEffectsonEnvironment
Usefulfor
PlanningandImplementation
Introducingchangestoperpetualpractices
notalignedwithPolicy
DocumentingCommitmenttoall
h h ld d k h ld
24 of 33
shareholdersandstakeholders
WalktheTalk(PolicyandCommitment)
Sourcehttp://linchikwok.blogspot.com
13
Planning(1/3)
LessonsLearned:SystematicandSystemicApproach
PolicybasedHowto&Whento
DefineGoals,TargetsandObjectivesconsistent
with Policy withPolicy
StrategywithinIssueFramework
CurrentandFutureKnowledgeandTechnology,
Regulatory/SocietyAversion,LegalFrameworks
AvoidOverconfidenceinPastSuccesses
HarvardsCEOStudy:whatworkedinthepastalways
works?Tendencytorepeatduetorepeatedsuccess
25 of 33
ChangingfromRuntofailuretoAnticipate
ViewtheFullLifeCycle:DesigntoAbandonment
LegalRequirementCompliance:Whointhe
CompanyiswatchingforCompliance?
Prepare,PrepareandPrepare
Planning(2/3)
ThreatSusceptibilityandIdentification
Identifyallhazardseverytime:theycanbe
thesame,worse,disappearornew
Forinstance,age,pressure,newfluids,newpractices,
etc.
Hazardsmayincreasesusceptibilitytoa
giventhreat;or
Newintegritythreats
Forinstance,Evenifthreatwasnottherebefore,it
does not means it does not exist (e g SCC or
26 of 33
doesnotmeansitdoesnotexist... (e.g.SCCor
growingseamweldanomalies)
Existingthreatsmaydisappearorgrow
Frommitigation,operatingconditions,etc
14
Planning(3/3)
RisksContinuouslyChanging
Threatsmaycome(susceptible)andgo(ID)
Consequencesalsochange;mainlytogrow
Risk Assessment: a 3 part Evaluation RiskAssessment:a3partEvaluation
1. HighestRisk:LikelihoodxConsequence
2. HighestLikelihood:maycauseadominoeffect
3. HighestConsequence:asmalllikelihoodisenough
PlanandSchedulewithStakeholders
OperationsandEngineeringaregoodalliesin
Planning
27 of 33
PrepareforFailure(ContingencyPlanning)
Aninterdepartmentalprocess:ReadytoFix,LearnandChange.
Improvementisrequired
CourtesyofJacob&Jordanand
GlobalEconomicIntersection
Implementation
LessonsLearned: WalktheTalk
EnableDoerswithAuthorityand
Competency
Avoid good dreams but not Authority to do Avoid gooddreams ,butnotAuthoritytodo
CompetencyismorethanTraining:FocusedPlan
ResponsibilitiestocompetentStaff
MitigateandMonitoring
MitigativeMeasuresarenotfinaluntil
monitoring
Ifissuesshowup,informstakeholders
28 of 33
Prevention
SeemsExpensiveatthebeginning,butpaysoffin
thelongterm(avoidedcosts)
EmpowertoMitigateandLearntoPrevent
15
CheckingandCorrectiveActions(1/2)
LessonsLearned: aProactiveWhatsNotWorking?
CheckingtoStriveforContinuous
Improvement
Didweimplementwhatweplan?Whynot?
Whydidnotweanticipateatypeof
failure/finding?(effectiveness)
Whatwasmissing?(adequacy)
DoIhavethequalified/competentstaffthat
weneed?(Who)
Aretheresultsalignedwith(What):
29 of 33
Policy
Goals
Objectives
Doweknowwhatisnotworking?
LessonsLearned: WhatisChanging?
AgingandNewOperationalNeeds
NewThreatsonOldThreats(i.e.
CorrosionorSCConConstructionDents)
Inactivetoactive(I.e.Corrosion,SCC)
WeatherChanges
NewTechnologiesandKnowledge
InspectionandMonitoring
BetterProcessestoresolveissues
ManagementSystems
External Changes
30 of 33
ExternalChanges
Populationdensityandenvironmentally
sensitiveareas
IndustryandRegulatoryFramework
NewProductNeeds(e.g.Oil,LNG)
Whatischanging,butnotunderourcontrol?
16
LessonsLearned: aSystemicCorrectiveActionPlan?
ChangeManagementorMOC
NewAcquiredBusiness>OneSafetyCulture
New/UpcomingTechnology,Standard,
Regulation > Effective Transition Regulation>EffectiveTransition
CheckingtoStriveforContinuous
Improvement
RepeatedNonConformances/Non
Compliances?Failures?
WhoisChecking?
InternalAudits,ifindependenceisassured
E t l A dit if th F t S k
31 of 33
ExternalAudits,iftheyareFreetoSpeak
CorrectiveActionPlan
AreyousureisOneOfforisitSystemic?
CommitmentofSeniorManagement
Letsdosomeaboutit...
ManagementReview
LessonsLearned: ResponsibleLeader
ResponsibilityenablingReview
YouhavetherighttoReviewasYouare
Responsible.
Continual Review to ensure Plans ContinualReviewtoensurePlans,
ImplementationandCheckingarealignedwith
yourGoals
OpenYourMindtoseeOthersView
Understandingwhatisgoingon
Seeotherperspectives,butaligningwith
Companysgoals
Look for potential over delegation to
32 of 33
Lookforpotentialoverdelegationto
inexperiencedoruntrainedstaff
LookOutside
Whatisgoingonoutside(Regulators,
Landowners,Public,Shareholders)andhowit
relatestoyourreview
17
AdvancingIntegrityManagementPrograms(IMP)
withManagementSystems(MS)
RafaelG.Mora,P.Eng.
33 of33
Email:rafmora@yahoo.com

Advancing Pipeline IMP With Management Systems

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originalbeschreibung:

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Advancing Pipeline IMP With Management Systems

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

1

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen