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Safety systems have standards that have come into being in the last couple of decades which provide guidance (prescriptive and performance based) in the design of safety systems. Consensus based standards requirements resulting from compromises due to philosophical differences and/or vested interest has resulted in sometime vague requirements or in some cases effectively optional “equivalent or not” requirements in meeting performance requirements. The requirement of meeting the somewhat nebulously defined “recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice,” commonly known as RAGAGEP, in OSHA 1910.119 by meeting consensus standards compounds the problem. What is sometimes ignored is the philosophical side of design which establishes the design culture that safety systems are designed in. While somewhat related the design culture is not synonymous with the safety lifecycle requirements nor is it strictly established by company standards and procedures (though these play a part). A poor design culture in safety systems can be just as bad a poor company safety culture because the design culture must deal with the design decisions, tradeoffs, and details of the design which are many times invisible in the standards. It can lead to a poorly designed safety system which may be marginal in performance and in some cases can lead to a failure to perform at critical times.
The design culture is the conceptual framework/structure that the design function is performed within. The general structure is established by the company’s technical practices (formal and informal) but it is strongly influenced by the competency of the design team leaders and their personal philosophies and work ethic as well as the overall company’s ethos. It is not a static structure but evolves and adapts to changing conditions, however, it can be subject to a drift to failure a la Sidney Decker. Heuristic rules or principles can provide the conceptual building blocks and boundary limits of a philosophical structure or culture. Examples of such rules in general society are the Seven Deadly Sins (and corresponding Seven Virtues), Gandhi’s Seven Social Sins, and the Boy Scout’s Motto. The principles of an effective design culture for safety systems can be distilled into conceptual rules to establish an overarching philosophical structure and boundaries that can help establish and stabilize the culture to provide an effective culture for designing safety systems.
This paper will discuss how conceptual rules can help establish an effective design culture. Twelve such conceptual rules for the design culture for safety systems and their application will be discussed. These conceptual-rules can provide a conceptual framework for a general design philosophy that can provide a sustainable environment for the effective and safe design of safety systems.
Originaltitel
Conceptual Framework for an Effective Design Culture for Safety Systems Rev 2
Safety systems have standards that have come into being in the last couple of decades which provide guidance (prescriptive and performance based) in the design of safety systems. Consensus based standards requirements resulting from compromises due to philosophical differences and/or vested interest has resulted in sometime vague requirements or in some cases effectively optional “equivalent or not” requirements in meeting performance requirements. The requirement of meeting the somewhat nebulously defined “recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice,” commonly known as RAGAGEP, in OSHA 1910.119 by meeting consensus standards compounds the problem. What is sometimes ignored is the philosophical side of design which establishes the design culture that safety systems are designed in. While somewhat related the design culture is not synonymous with the safety lifecycle requirements nor is it strictly established by company standards and procedures (though these play a part). A poor design culture in safety systems can be just as bad a poor company safety culture because the design culture must deal with the design decisions, tradeoffs, and details of the design which are many times invisible in the standards. It can lead to a poorly designed safety system which may be marginal in performance and in some cases can lead to a failure to perform at critical times.
The design culture is the conceptual framework/structure that the design function is performed within. The general structure is established by the company’s technical practices (formal and informal) but it is strongly influenced by the competency of the design team leaders and their personal philosophies and work ethic as well as the overall company’s ethos. It is not a static structure but evolves and adapts to changing conditions, however, it can be subject to a drift to failure a la Sidney Decker. Heuristic rules or principles can provide the conceptual building blocks and boundary limits of a philosophical structure or culture. Examples of such rules in general society are the Seven Deadly Sins (and corresponding Seven Virtues), Gandhi’s Seven Social Sins, and the Boy Scout’s Motto. The principles of an effective design culture for safety systems can be distilled into conceptual rules to establish an overarching philosophical structure and boundaries that can help establish and stabilize the culture to provide an effective culture for designing safety systems.
This paper will discuss how conceptual rules can help establish an effective design culture. Twelve such conceptual rules for the design culture for safety systems and their application will be discussed. These conceptual-rules can provide a conceptual framework for a general design philosophy that can provide a sustainable environment for the effective and safe design of safety systems.
Safety systems have standards that have come into being in the last couple of decades which provide guidance (prescriptive and performance based) in the design of safety systems. Consensus based standards requirements resulting from compromises due to philosophical differences and/or vested interest has resulted in sometime vague requirements or in some cases effectively optional “equivalent or not” requirements in meeting performance requirements. The requirement of meeting the somewhat nebulously defined “recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice,” commonly known as RAGAGEP, in OSHA 1910.119 by meeting consensus standards compounds the problem. What is sometimes ignored is the philosophical side of design which establishes the design culture that safety systems are designed in. While somewhat related the design culture is not synonymous with the safety lifecycle requirements nor is it strictly established by company standards and procedures (though these play a part). A poor design culture in safety systems can be just as bad a poor company safety culture because the design culture must deal with the design decisions, tradeoffs, and details of the design which are many times invisible in the standards. It can lead to a poorly designed safety system which may be marginal in performance and in some cases can lead to a failure to perform at critical times.
The design culture is the conceptual framework/structure that the design function is performed within. The general structure is established by the company’s technical practices (formal and informal) but it is strongly influenced by the competency of the design team leaders and their personal philosophies and work ethic as well as the overall company’s ethos. It is not a static structure but evolves and adapts to changing conditions, however, it can be subject to a drift to failure a la Sidney Decker. Heuristic rules or principles can provide the conceptual building blocks and boundary limits of a philosophical structure or culture. Examples of such rules in general society are the Seven Deadly Sins (and corresponding Seven Virtues), Gandhi’s Seven Social Sins, and the Boy Scout’s Motto. The principles of an effective design culture for safety systems can be distilled into conceptual rules to establish an overarching philosophical structure and boundaries that can help establish and stabilize the culture to provide an effective culture for designing safety systems.
This paper will discuss how conceptual rules can help establish an effective design culture. Twelve such conceptual rules for the design culture for safety systems and their application will be discussed. These conceptual-rules can provide a conceptual framework for a general design philosophy that can provide a sustainable environment for the effective and safe design of safety systems.
By William (Bill) L. Mostia, Jr. PE Fellow SIS-TECH Solutions, LP. Conceptual Framework for an Effective Design Culture for Safety Systems By William (Bill) L. Mostia, Jr. PE Fellow SIS-TECH Solutions, LP. Copyright 2012 by W.L. Mostia, All rights reserved Origins of the Paper Credit: Image - http://vividvida.blogspot.com/2011/01/jhaneros-success- formula.html So what does a conceptual framework look like related to culture and how do I get one? Culture, like many human structures, is fraught with invisible complexities and non-deterministic responses which have puzzled psychologist and anthropologist alike over the years. Conceptual Framework Culture, like many human structures, is fraught with invisible complexities and non-deterministic responses which have puzzled psychologist and anthropologist alike over the years. One approach is to model an individuals culture similar to an house or building. Where the supports that hold up the house represent the principles that supports the conceptual framework. Principles that people live by can be very complex but over the years some principles have on the macro level been simplified or codified into sets heuristic rules. Some examples potential support pillars that have been codified in society are: 1. The Ten Commandments, 2. The Seven Deadly Sins, 3. The Boy Scout Code, 4. Benjamin Franklins 13 Virtues, and 5. Gandhis Seven Deadly Social Sins. Conceptual Framework Principles that people live by can be very complex but over the years some principles have on the macro level been simplified or codified into sets heuristic rules. Some examples potential support pillars that have been codified in society are: 1. The Ten Commandments, 2. The Seven Deadly Sins, 3. The Boy Scout Code, 4. Benjamin Franklins 13 Virtues, and 5. Gandhis Seven Deadly Social Sins. To build our conceptual framework model for our design group, we need some building blocks in the form of principles for the design group to live by. Our model of the cultural conceptual framework consists of principles (support pillars) codified into a set of heuristic rules. Conceptual Framework To build our conceptual framework model for our design group, we need some building blocks in the form of principles for the design group to live by. Our model of the cultural conceptual framework consists of principles (support pillars) codified into a set of heuristic rules. 1. The Dupont Rule Dont design anything that you wouldnt bet your own life or family members on a 24-7 basis. Because that is what you are asking the people who will operate the process that the safety system will be installed on to bet their life on, e.g. That the safety system will function when needed on 24/7 basis for the life of your design. If you are not willing, dont do it. Heuristic Rules (Principles) 1. The Dupont Rule Dont design anything that you wouldnt bet your own life or family members on a 24-7 basis. Because that is what you are asking the people who will operate the process that the safety system will be installed on to bet their life on, e.g. That the safety system will function when needed on 24/7 basis for the life of your design. If you are not willing, dont do it. It seems that we dont always have time to do it right the first time but we always seem have time to do it over (typically on somebody elses nickel). With safety systems we do not always have that luxury. If you dont do it right the first time, will there be an opportunity to do it over correctly before the safety system fails? 2. NASA Rule - Do it right the first time, every time. It seems that we dont always have time to do it right the first time but we always seem have time to do it over (typically on somebody elses nickel). With safety systems we do not always have that luxury. If you dont do it right the first time, will there be an opportunity to do it over correctly before the safety system fails? This is about doing the right thing or making the right decision, not because its easy, convenient, or panders to vested interests but because its ethically correct. 3. Do the Right Thing - This is about doing the right thing or making the right decision, not because its easy, convenient, or panders to vested interests but because its ethically correct. 4. Three Little Piggy Rule This rule is based on a metaphor from the childrens fairy tale where each of the three little pigs built a house (safety system) to protect themselves from the big bad wolf (the hazard) One was built of straw, one of wood, and one of brick with only the house of brick surviving the wolf. Ed Marszal once stated it succinctly, When in doubt, build it stout! This rule is based on a metaphor from the childrens fairy tale where each of the three little pigs built a house (safety system) to protect themselves from the big bad wolf (the hazard) One was built of straw, one of wood, and one of brick with only the house of brick surviving the wolf. Image Credit: emily @ http://www.bluecoat.gloucs.sch.uk/early-years/pre-school/news/865-blue-coat-pre-school- newsletter-march-2012 5. KISS Keep It Simple, Stupid is a design principle that was articulated by Kelly Johnson (1910- 1990) of Lockheed Skunk Works fame. Keep It Simple, Stupid is a design principle that was articulated by Kelly Johnson (1910- 1990) of Lockheed Skunk Works fame. How do we really do this? Competency, experience, and professionalism are the hallmarks and strengths of this principle. 6. There is no substitute for knowing what you are doing - 7. FOLLOW THE STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS. Standards and regulations (company standards included too) is the minimum state and not the maximum state. Meeting the minimum is an important principle but not does not mean you have designed an effective safety system. Standards and regulations (company standards included too) is the minimum state and not the maximum state. Meeting the minimum is an important principle but not does not mean you have designed an effective safety system. This is a matter of selection of instrumentation and the use of design techniques to design a reliable, dependable system. 8. Selection of Safety System Technology Being on the bleeding edge of technology or generally even on the leading edge increases the risk that the system will not function properly or as expected. Being on the bleeding edge of technology or generally even on the leading edge increases the risk that the system will not function properly or as expected. Safety and reliability are interlinked in safety system design. While you can have a reliable system that is not safe, you cannot have a safe system that is not reliable. Safety system design typically involves a reliance on statistics, failure distributions, and reliability calculation models. One should always understand the uncertainties and limitations of these calculations in the real world. 9. Calculations do not justify or prove anything Paul Gruhn once said that Statistics were like spies; if you torture them enough, theyll tell you anything. Do not let your tombstone read: He calculated the corners and cut them with ease to please till it collapsed one day to his dismay on judgment day. If you cant put it in writing that is clear, concise, and logical, you dont understand it. 10. Compos Mentis (Sound Mind) Rule A design must include consideration of lifecycle reliability, how it will be constructed (constructability), how it will be operated (operability) and how it will be maintained (maintainability), tested (testability), and sustained over the life of the system (sustainability). 11. Dont Forget the abilities Reliability, Operability, Maintainability, Sustainability, Constructability, & Testability A design must include consideration of lifecycle reliability, how it will be constructed (constructability), how it will be operated (operability) and how it will be maintained (maintainability), tested (testability), and sustained over the life of the system (sustainability). No team has been successful without leadership and a design team is no exception. 12. Leadership Leadership is not synonymous with supervision or management, though there are cases where the leadership comes from supervision or management but at the atomic (lowest) level, it is individual based. Leadership is the single most important determinate in the day to day organizational/ group climate [5] and in determining the long term direction, continuity, and consistency in a design group. Leadership is not synonymous with supervision or management, though there are cases where the leadership comes from supervision or management but at the atomic (lowest) level, it is individual based. 13. TANSTAAFL Principle - There Aint No Such Thing as A Free Lunch A principle in the project management world, which illustrates this, is that a project has three design elements fast, good, or cheap, but you can only achieve two out of three of these elements. The model consisted of Bakers Dozen (13) principles that make up the structure of the conceptual framework which guides peoples actions and decisions regarding designing safety systems. Conclusions What are your engineering design principles? How do you make critical decisions? What principles does your safety system design group use? The model consisted of Bakers Dozen (13) principles that make up the structure of the conceptual framework which guides peoples actions and decisions regarding designing safety systems. What are your engineering design principles? How do you make critical decisions? What principles does your safety system design group use? We are proven in use.