1

Vojtch Hladk

Empedocles Sphairos

(To Tom Vtek for Empedoclean initiation)
1


The basic outlines of the philosophical conception of Empedocles of Acragas are well attested
and sufficiently known.
2
In attempting to respond to new questions posed by Parmenides who
thus determined the further course of Classical philosophy Empedocles was probably the first
thinker
3
to formulate the notion of four basic elements or roots (pt(:) (B 6.1), as they are
also often called. These elements are distinguished by qualitative differences and together form a
kind of a material from which all other things are composed. Empedocles even calls them gods
since they have no beginning and no end, and eternal existence is one of the basic properties of
traditional Greek gods.
4
On the other hand, this conception of four basic, immutable, and eternal
constituents of all things also meets the constraint which appears at that time and is generally
accepted in later Classical philosophy which states that it is impossible for things to be created
out of nothing. In the background of all the changes and mutations of things, of their creation
and destruction, thus necessarily persists an immutable foundation. From the transformations of
this foundation everything else is created and back to it everything reverts.
5


1
The original Czech version of this article was published as Empedoklev Sfairos [Empedocles Sphairos], in:
Filosofick asopis, 54.3, 2006, p. 393410. I wish to thank Tom Vtek, Filip Karfik, Jakub Jirsa, and Zdenk
Kratochvl for their numerous and most valuable comments.
2
Fragments and testimonia of Empedocles thoughts (so-called A fragments) are referenced according to their
standard edition by Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, 1951, p. 308374 (DK 31). For the text of B fragments,
however, we rely mainly on the edition of Rosemary Wright whose translation we also generally use.
The basic works which present an overall interpretation of Empedocles philosophy include the abovementioned
commented edition of Empedocles text by Wright, 1995 (where one also finds an overview of further relevant
literature, p. 299314), the relevant section of KirkRavenSchofield, 1984, and an extensive chapter dedicated to
Empedocles in Guthrie, 1980. One also needs to take into account the important works of OBrien, 1969, Kingsley,
1995, 2003, a complete translation by Inwood, 2001, and the monumental, though highly idiosyncratic and thus
controversial book by Bollack, 1965, 1969, 1969, which presents a detailed analysis and commentary on Empedocles
treatise On Nature. This work was later complemented by Bollacks analysis of another writing of Empedocles, the
Purifications, Bollack, 2003. One could extend a comment similar to one about Bollack to Tom Vteks
Empedoclean opus magnum, 2001, 2006, which is doubtless the most significant contribution to Empedoclean
research published in our lands (see our review Hladk, 2002). For a comprehensive bibliography of works on
Empedocles, see https://sites.google.com/site/empedoclesacragas/bibliography-a-z [accessed on 8th May 2014].
3
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica A, 4, 985a3133 (= DK A 37) but also Hahm, 1977, p. 99.
4
Cf. B 6, further also B 7B 9. In case of fragment B 6, we leave aside the very old, complicated, and for the aims of
our study largely irrelevant discussion about the correctness of identifying the particular elements with the two divine
couples, Zeus and Hera and Nstis (probably Persephone) and Adneus (Hades), though for many reasons the
following ordering seems most likely to us: ZeusAir (Aither), HeraEarth, NstisWater, HadesFire.
5
Cf. B 11, B 12 and Parmenides verses DK 28 B 8.510.
2
The four basic, permanent elements, from which in various proportions all things are
composed, help explain the extraordinary variety of things but not the dynamics of constant
change, of creation and destruction. Empedocles therefore adds to his world two creative causes,
namely Love (tX:g;) and Strife (txo;), which influence the elements or rather, act within
them. While Love is trying to unite them and thus create particular things as well as the structure
of the entire universe, Strife hampers this process since it has a tendency to separate the
elements, to maintain their original purity and mutual division.
6
A comparison which likens
these two forces structuring the Empedoclean universe to two painters jointly decorating with
colours sacrificial statues indicates that both Love and, something surprisingly, Strife have their
share in creating things from the basic elements (B 23.18). On the other hand, it is somewhat
unexpected that though Love just like the elements and fully within the intentions of traditional
Greek theology is called a goddess, in particular Aphrodite or the Cypriot female,
7
Strife is not
explicitly referred to as a god in any of the preserved fragments.
8
That, however, does not mean
that Strife is not an active, world-forming principle and that we should see it as in some sense
derived from the joint action of the four elements and Love. In surviving fragments, it clearly
figures as an independent force.
9
Perhaps one could claim that unlike the elements and Love,
whom Empedocles identifies with the Olympic gods who create and maintain the general order
of the universe, Strife is one of the dark, destructive divinities of traditional Greek religion who
do not belong among the Olympians, that is, among gods sensu stricto.
Meanwhile, the mutual balance of Love and Strife keeps changing so one could say that
when it comes to their influence on the four elements over time, the two forces compete and tug
in opposite directions.
10
While in the usual course of events in the world, Love and Strife act in
conjunction and according to the prevailing influence of one or the other, elements have a greater
or smaller tendency to unite and maintain larger and more complex units, at some juncture of the
cosmic cycle there naturally also arise situations when one of the forces completely prevails.
When Strife gains full dominance, the world disintegrates in the original elements which became

6
Cf. B 16 (including the context of the fragment in Hippolytus, Refutatio omnium haeresium 7,29,9.411.1), B 17.710,
B 20, B 26, 56.
7
Cf. B 17.24, B 22.5, B 71.4, B 86, B 87, eventually also B 73.1, B 75.2, B 98.3, B 95.1.
8
The only counterexample may be the location B 128.1, where Ares is mentioned. It should be noted, however, that
this passage does not unambiguously support an identification of Ares and Strife because Strife is not explicitly
mentioned and other gods, including the equally destructive u6ot;, are listed here as well. We can also compare
expression x:o; from B 21.7, which in this particular context also need not be understood as referring to a
personified god.
9
Perhaps, we could rather understand it as meaning that while Love is a force which in the immense cosmic vortex
unites various elements (cf. B 35), Strife represents an equally fundamental tendency to gather all scattered or mixed,
yet by their nature related parts of each particular element back in their homogenous masses (cf. B 22, B 109)?
10
Cf. B 35, especially verses 913 in B 36.
3
fully separate.
11
If, on the other hand, Love completely prevails, the elements form a perfect,
divine, and all-encompassing Sphairos.
12
Unlike in the former case, however, it is not quite clear
what this would imply. It may seem at this point, the elements will fully blend to such degree that
they become indistinguishable
13
and form a sort of entirely amorphous mixture.
14
Analogically to
a situation whereby under the rule of Strife cosmos disintegrates in its original elements, in the
mixture of Sphairos, too, all things previously created by the unifying efforts of Love would cease
to exist. Love would thus act as a sort of blind force, ultimately as devastating as the destructive
Strife, while Strife would paradoxically have a creative impact, because by dividing more united
and more complex things, it would lead to the formation of less united, simpler things.
However tempting this interpretation of Empedocles concept of the universe may be and
even leaving aside other problems it may cause, it does not explain, for example, why both in his
physical poem On Nature and in the Purifications
15
Empedocles presents Strife, unlike Love, as
utterly and unambiguously damaging and destructive.
16
The notion that Love is not an equally
powerful and with respect to Strife symmetric force may be based on the fact that in the
Empedoclean world, Love creates something new by binding the basic elements together. The
influence of Strife, on the other hand, ultimately just leads to a state where the elements
completely separate and regain their erstwhile purity. Love can thus act without relying on any
previous creations of the Strife, since what arises when Strife fully dominates is nothing more
than purified but otherwise eternally and immutably existing elements. Strife cannot create by
disintegrating some more complex thing into something simpler but still consisting of a mixture
of basic elements without fundamentally relying on the previous unifying agency of Love. In
Empedocles world, each cosmic cycle must be initiated by Love, which gradually prevails and
unifies the elements, thereby creating both the world as such and the particular things in it. Only

11
Cf. B 17.710, B 20, B 26.56 as well as B 30 [7] and B 31 [8], which in all likelihood describe a disintegration of a
fully united Sphairos (see below).
12
Cf. B 27B 29 [15]. Our interpretation leans toward the traditional reconstruction of Empedocles cosmic cycle,
which is nowadays perhaps most clearly advocated by OBrien, 1969 (see also Long, 1974, p. 397425). It would also
very nicely correspond to the cosmogonic myth in Platos Statesman (268d8274e4), which could be seen as a parody
of a thus reconstructed Empedoclean cycle and its curious zoogony (see below and in our article dedicated
exclusively to this question).
13
Cf. B 27 [12].
14
See also a fitting description of such a state presented in Jan Patokas interpretation, 1968, p. 136: The elements,
ground into the finest and almost fully equal particles, form a sort of ideal solution in which everything is united in
equal parts and equal manner so that there is no difference between one place and another. The universe is then
filled with homogeneous mixture so that it forms an immense, everywhere equally filled sphere []. This is
Sphairos (translation by A. Piltov, translator) In Vtek, 2001, p. 159, n. 2, one can also find references to other
scholars who interpret Sphairos in the same way.
15
As a recently discovered and published Empedocles text contained in the so-called Strasbourg papyrus shows,
these two poems, traditionally seen as distinct, at the least significantly overlap as to their subject and it also seems
increasingly likely that jointly, they formed one compact conceptual system. For most recent contribution to this
issue, see Primavesi, 2013. ??a dal??
16
For other descriptions where Strife is depicted as highly negative, disintegrative, or destructive force, see B 17.8.19,
B 20.4, B 26.6, B 27a [3], B 109.3, B 115.14 as well as Aristotle, Metaphysics 985a57 (= DK A 39).
4
after it reaches its zenith, Strife appears and its destructive force dissolves what Love had
created.
17
All of the above, however, fails to answer one key question: According to Empedocles,
what does the world look like when Love fully prevails? In other words, what does the Sphairos
look like?

The Divine Sphairos

There survive only relatively short passages of Empedocles text that describe Sphairos in the
culmination of its existence, forming just over half a dozen fragments:

[1] There the swift limbs (yu) of the sun are not distinguished

in this way it is held fast in the close covering of harmony, a rounded (xuxXo:tpg;)
Sphere, rejoicing in encircling solitude (ovigt ttptgytt). (B 27)
18


[2] There the shining form of the sun is not shown,
nor the shaggy might of earth, nor sea. (B 27)
19


[3] no discord (o:ot;) or unseemly warring (6pt;) in the limbs (tXttootv) [of Sphere]. (B 27a)
20


[4] for two branches do not spring from his back,
he has no feet, no swift knees, no organs of reproduction,
but he was spherical (opo;) and equal on every side (<tv:o0tv> loo; tu:t). (B 29)
21


[5] ..but he is equal <to himself> in every direction (tv:o0tv oo; <to>) and completely boundless
(ttv ottipv),
a rounded (xuxXo:tpg;) Sphairos rejoicing in encircling solitude (ovigt ttptgytt). (B 28)
22


[6] For he [i.e. the divinity] is not equipped with a human head on the limbs (yu),

17
In a great majority of relevant places, Empedocles speaks first about things uniting through the agency of Love
and only later about them subsequently disintegrating due to the force of Strife (see B 8.4, B 9.14, B 17.110.1617,
B 20.25, B 22, and B 26.59). Since he describes the cosmic cycle in the opposite direction only in one fragment (B
21.78), it would seem that he indeed believed that the phase when Love starts uniting things together in a certain
sense precedes the stage when Sphairos disintegrates due to Strife.
18
= 21 Wright, 33 Inwood, transl. Wright, 1995.
19
= 19, 31 Inwood, transl. Wright, 1995. Wright and other editors do not see the first two quotations as one
fragment as Diels and Kranz did, but two distinct ones.
20
= 98 Wright, 5 Inwood, transl. Wright, 1995. Unlike other editors of Empedocles text, Wright rejects the notion
that this fragment should be related to Sphairos, cf. Wright, 1995, p. 255256. She places it in the Purifications, behind
fragment B 134.
21
= 22 Wright, 34 Inwood. Transl. Wright, 1995 (modified). Wright, 1995, freely joints fragments B 28 and B 29 into
one, in her ordering number 22 and in fragment B 29 claims that the last verse is not original.
22
= 22 Wright, 34 Inwood.
5
[for two branches do not sprout from his back,]
he has no feet, now swift knees, no shaggy genitals,
but he is mind (pgv) alone (o0vov), holy (itpg) and inexpressible (o0to:o;),
darting through the whole cosmos (xoov otv:) with swift thoughts (pov:iot). (B 134)
23


[7] But when great Strife (txo;) had grown in the limbs (tXttootv) [of Sphere]
and leapt upward to its honours as the time was being completed,
a time of exchange for them [i.e. Love and Strife], which has been defined by a broad oath. (B
30)
24


[8] For one by one all the limbs (yu) of god (0too) began to tremble (B 31)
25


Already the first two fragments (B 27 [12]) clearly show that Sphairos is created by a
complete and fully harmonious union of the basic elements which form the Empedoclean
universe. That is why at this stage, it is impossible to distinguish the sun, the earth, and the sea,
that is, the basic forms which in our world embody the elements of fire, earth, and water, since
elements in their unmixed state cannot be apprehended. The same naturally holds also of the air,
though it is not mentioned here explicitly. The following fragment (B 27a [3]), then states that
Sphairos does not contain any conflict or disagreement, which only confirms the preliminary
hypothesis that it comes into existence at the apex of the unifying effort of Love. The claim that
Sphairos is held fast in the close covering of harmony could perhaps be understood as
amounting to a claim that Love, having harmoniously united it, protects Sphairos from the
disintegrative effect of Strife which would come from outside. It is also rather characteristic that
this passage does not mention the cosmological Strife (txo;) but rather just the merely human
discord (o:ot;) and warring (6pt;). Yet, as we shall we, Strife is not altogether beaten and it
is but waiting for its chance.

23
= 97 Wright, 131 Inwood, transl. Wright, 1995 (modified). Wright leaves out the second verse of this fragment.
What is more important, however, is that she as well as other editors and interpreters, including Diels and Kranz
includes it in the Purifications, though at the same time, she points to a clear connection with the preceding fragment.
Regarding pgv itpg, she understands it in physical terms as a perfect mixture of four elements, in which just like
in blood (see here below) rests the thinking ability. According to her interpretation, however, the pgv itpg is not
a Sphairos, perfectly blended from the four elements, but rather just its remnant in the world after it was
decomposed by Strife (see Wright, 1995, p. 253255.) The same division of these fragments between two different
poems and between Sphairos and another, more partial, divinity (Amnonius, the source of B 134, mentions Apollo)
is adopted by Bollack, 2003, p. 9596. Amnonius himself, however, apparently links Empedocles words to a divine
universe (cf. ttp :o0 0tiou tv:o; sc. xpyv:vo; ooo; otX; ototvtvo;, In Aristotelis librum De
interpretatione commentarius, 249.5 Busse). This, as well as other reasons we introduce later, in our view indicates that
the description presented here may be related to Sphairos directly, that is, more closely than generally supposed. But
be it as it may, it is certain that there exists a strong link between the two abovementioned fragments, and thus at
least an analogy to the description of Sphairos in B 29 and divinity in B 134, from which similar properties naturally
follow for both.
24
= 23 Wright, 35 Inwood, transl. Wright, 1995 (modified).
25
= 24 Wright, 36 Inwood, transl. Wright, 1995 (modified).

6
To form a clearer idea of the actual appearance of the Sphairos, we should focus
especially on the first, second, fifth, third, and partly also the fourth of the fragments quoted
above (B 27 [12], B 28 [5], B 29.3 [4]), since they directly reflect a description of perfect and sole
existing being given in his poem by Parmenides. As the name itself, derived from the Greek
op (sphere), suggest, Empedocles Sphairos is round, which is further emphasised by the
epithet rounded (xuxXo:tpg;).
26
Later philosophical tradition will concur that this is a perfect
shape, as the line but he is equal <to himself> in every direction (tv:o0tv oo; <to>) also
attests. These words also reconfirm the supposition of a harmonious, fully regular distribution of
matter contained in the Sphairos.
27
The image of a Sphere rejoicing in encircling solitude
should be probably understood as referring to the notion that it includes all of the four elements
which constitute the world in their entirety. Outside Sphairos, there is thus nothing be it united
and formed by Love, or separated and pure due to the effect of Strife.
28
We could understand the
idea that it is completely boundless in the same way. If, to wit, there is nothing outside Sphairos
since it contains everything, one also apparently cannot speak of any border that would separate
it from something external.
29

In the third, seventh, and eighth of the abovementioned fragments (B 27a [3], B 30 [7],
and B 31 [8]) we learn that Sphairos is supposed to have some sort of limbs (tXg, or, in the last
of these fragments, yu), which are always mentioned in connection with claiming that it is
between these limbs Strife that manages to get in, separating them, thus breaking apart their
erstwhile harmony.
30
It would also seem that this expression can hardly be understood as
denoting the four original elements, since in Empedocles and all other relevant authors, neither
of these Greek expressions attested already in Homer refers to anything but parts of a human
or other animal body.
31
Meanwhile, Strife penetrating in-between the limbs of Sphairos is rather

26
Cf. Parmenides verse DK 28 B 8.43: like to the mass (yxt) of a rounded (tuxxXou) sphere (oipg;), transl.
Graham, 2010.
27
See also Parmenides: being equal to itself in all directions (o yop tv:o0tv loov) (B 8.49, transl. Graham,
2010) and moreover, a few lines earlier, immediately after the verse quoted in the previous note, equally (lootXt;)
resistant from the centre in every (tv:gt) direction (B 8.44, transl. Graham, 2010).
28
Cf. Parmenides: [being] is whole (oXov) of one kind (ouvoytvt;) (B 8.4), text and transl. Graham (pace DK).
29
On this point, Empedocles clearly disagrees with Parmenides who repeatedly claims that the perfect being does
have clear-cut borders; cf. his verses B 8.26.31.42.49. In a number of places Empedocles seems to reject the idea that
something external, not included could exist outside the universe (:o tv), that is, outside the whole of the world
consisting of the four basic elements (see B 17.3134, B 13, B 14).
30
If fragment B 134 [6] one indeed speaks about the Sphairos, we could add another use of yu. In this case, at
least this passage would clearly speak about the limbs of Sphairos before it is invaded by Strife. That would lend
further support to the hypothesis we develop below.
31
Cf. LiddellScottJonesMcKenzie, s. v., p. 362, 1099, Supplement, p. 206. For the use of yu in the writings of
Empedocles, see also B 2.1, B 3.8, B 20.3, B 61.4, B 62.8, B 100.22, B 115.3, and B 118.10, and for the use of tXg
see B 20.1, B 35.11, B 62.7, B 63, B 82.2, and B 101.1. Cf. also the related expression op0pot in verse B 17.22. It is
true that in fragment B 35, three verses below there follows a description of the mixing of elements (B 35.1417). If,
however, we chose to adopt in this passage a reading which identifies the elements with the tXg and such reading
is certainly grammatically plausible then on the basis of verses for he [i.e. Strife] had not yet perfectly and
7
reminiscent of Homeric descriptions of the deaths of heroes fighting at Troy where one strike,
well aimed at just the right spot could literally break the body down into its individual limbs.
32
In
this sense, the limbs of Sphairos would form the structure of its body, whose individual parts
can be distinguished from the outside. One thus would not have to descend all the way to the
basic elements from which things and animals are composed. Moreover, if Empedocles intended
to refer to the elements which form the Sphairos, he would probably choose different, better
suited words, or perhaps mention the elements explicitly. Should we perhaps understand the
limbs of the perfect, all-embracing Sphairos as a more complex formation, one which is formed
by the mixing of pure elements yet is not just their simple, homogeneous mixture but rather a
structure whose individual parts are clearly differentiated even when everything is perfectly mixed
together? In the following, we try to find further support for this somewhat unusual
interpretation of Sphairos, whereby it is understood as a sort of vast organism, that is, a whole
including various parts, which are ultimately composed of the basic elements. It seems, however,
that one could object that such a reading runs counter other descriptions of Sphairos found in
other surviving fragments, which reject the notion that Sphairos has differentiated organs or
limbs. As a matter of fact, we shall see in subsequent discussion that these two readings are not
mutually exclusive.
When Empedocles claims in the fourth quoted fragment that Sphairos does not have
legs, knees, generative organs, and two branches do not sprout from his back (B 29.12 [4]),
it does not necessarily imply that it has no limbs in sense of body parts. It is more likely that what
is intended is a criticism of an anthropomorphic image of divine beings. What is proposed is a
round and symmetric shape, as the statements at the end of this fragment (B 29.3 [4]) clearly
confirms. Regardless of whether the fragment which follows in our ordering (B 134 [6]) relates to
Sphairos or some other being of divine nature, its almost identical wording amply confirms that
Empedocles resolutely rejects the traditional Homeric notion of gods who share all too many

completely stood as far as the furthest limits of the circle, but part (:o tv) remained within and part (:o 6t) had
gone out of the limbs (tXtv) (B 35.1011, transl. Wright, 1995, modified) we would have to assume that in the
course of unification of the world described in B 35, Strife is still active in some elements, while in others it is already
absent. Even such reading is certainly possible but a simpler interpretation results from avoiding an identification of
elements and the tXg. If, on the other hand, we understand tXg as parts of the world which is being united, the
result is an equally meaningful interpretation. An identification of tXg with the four basic elements is thus here, as
well as in all other relevant places, unnecessary. It would also seem that this is the reading and interpretation
favoured by Bollack, 1969, vol. III, p. 202203, and Wright, 1995, p. 208.
32
Cf. Homer, Iliad IV.469, VI.27, VII.12, 16, 131, XI.240, 260, XIII.435, 671672, XV.435, 581, XVI.312, 341, 400,
465, 606607, 805, XVII.524, XXI.406, XXIII.726, 880, Odyssey XVIII.238, 242, 341, i.e., mainly places where one
hero frees or unties the limbs of another (lyse de gyia). Remarkable is also a passage where Ares enters a heros body
(see Iliad XVII.210212) and a remark that illness, old age, or death take the life force from the limbs (see Odyssey
XI.200201, 393394, XV.354, cf. XXI.283) or enters the limbs which are then gripped by fatigue, fear, or sadness
(see Iliad III.34, V.811, VII.6, 215, VIII.452, X.95, 390, XIII.85, XIV.506, XVIII.31, XX.44, XXII.448, XXIV.170,
and Odyssey XI.527, XVIII.88). Pallas Athena or Poseidon, on the other hand, can infuse human limbs with strength
(see Iliad XIII.61, Odyssey XVIII.6970, XXIV.367368).
8
properties and propensities with us, the mortals. In Greater Greece, similar claims were certainly
not new. We have already mentioned that Sphairos in many ways resembles Parmenides perfect
Being. Moreover, it is well known that already before Parmenides, a similar criticism of the
traditional conception of gods was mounted by Xenophanes of Colophon. In familiar fragments
(DK 21 B 14, B 15, and B 16), he unequivocally rejects both any external similarity between gods
and humans and the notion that, according to Homers and Hesiods description, gods could
commit evil or immoral acts (see DK 21 B 11). He challenges the tradition and proposes a new,
radically rationalist philosophical concept of divinity:

One god is greatest among gods and men,
not at all like mortals in body or in thought (vg). (DK 21 B 23)

whole he sees, whole he thinks (vot), and whole he hears (DK 21 B 24)

always he abides in the same place, not moving at all,
nor is it seemly for him to travel to different places at different times. (DK 21 B 26)

but completely without toil he shakes all things by the thought of his mind (vou ptvi). (DK
21 B 25)
33


It is quite apparent that Xenophanes concurs with Empedocles in several points. His god
is one, just like it is a property of the Sphairos to be solitary by itself after it included everything
that exists in the world. Neither the one god nor the Sphairos in any respect of their appearance
resemble anything mortal. And finally, according to the sixth fragment quoted above (B 134 [6]),
Empedocles also identifies divinity (or, as we suppose, the Sphairos) with a thought (pgv) that
pervades the whole universe, all there is. Naturally, the two thinkers also diverge at some points.
For example, one cannot say about the Sphairos that it abides in the same place. Rather, at some
point, as the time was being completed, it breaks apart due to the workings of re-emerging
Strife. Yet though it is not eternal but mortal, there is no doubt it is indeed a god (as fragment B
31 [8] confirms).
34

Meanwhile, if we are right in supposing, as described above, that unlike Love, Strife is not
considered a god, then to remain fully in line with what Empedocles wished to express in his
philosophy one ought to say that Sphairos should be seen as divine only derivatively. At the point
of its birth, due to the influence of unequivocally divine Love, the four elements of which it
consists harmoniously unite. The four elements bear the names of gods and also posses the

33
Translation Lesher, 2001, p. 31.
34
This is perhaps what Empedocles wanted to express with the masculine ending in po;, which distinguishes it
from the usual feminine form op.
9
traditionally divine attribute of immortality and persistence in time, and that is why this newly
created world, i.e., the Sphairos, is in a certain sense also necessarily divine. Under the guidance
of the divine principle of Love, the Sphairos comes to include all divine elements which go into
its making, and just one non-divine principle, Strife, remains excluded.
35
In this perfect state or at
least during a period immediately leading to it, the most important god seems to be Love, which
is supposed to be worshipped by non-bloody sacrifices that do not disturb the harmonic unity of
the sacrificed animal.
36
Love is the basis of the transitory divinity of the Sphairos, which
harmoniously includes all divine and immutable foundations of the world represented by four
original roots. In this sense, the Sphairos could perhaps be seen as a god even greater than Love,
because Love is in the end only the structuring principle or the main cause of the birth of its
body and Sphairos ultimately includes it as well. At this point, it really becomes, just like in
Xenophanes, one godgreatest among gods and men (DK 21 B 23.1). Yet we know that this
greatness is fragile because it cannot last longer than a time of exchange for them [i.e., Love and
Strife], which has been defined by a broad oath (B 30.23 [7]).

Mixing, Zoogony, and Cosmology

Our interpretation of Sphairos as a kind of all-embracing structure consisting of more basic
distinct parts is not, however, based solely on the description of the appearance of the world at
the point of greatest dominance of Love, which we describe above. It is also motivated by our
understanding of the processes of mixing and blending which lead to the establishment of the
Sphairos. Certain reservations regarding the notion that Sphairos is an amorphous mixture of the
four basic elements without any distinguishable limbs or parts could be based on the fact that
Empedocles makes a similar claim about the blood.
37
The image of Sphairos as a huge sphere
filled by blood is odd to say the least, and it rather incompatible with what the above-quoted
fragments claim. The strangeness is not substantially mitigated by the fact that Empedocles
believed blood around the heart to be the seat of human thought (in B 105), which would quite
well correspond with the sixth fragment quoted above (B 134 [6]), according to which divinity
(or, as we suppose, the Sphairos) is identical to the mind. We shall come back to this problem
later.

35
Cf. B 17.1620, transl. Wright, 1995.
36
Cf. B 128, usually included in the Purifications and clearly related to the Golden Age, and thus apparently to the
period of full dominance of Love.
37
Cf. B 98, cf. A 86,10. I am indebted to Professor David Sedley for drawing my attention to this aspect of
Empedocles philosophical conception and its relevance to our problem.
10
Another circumstance which seems to present a problem for interpreting Sphairos as a
sort of formless mixture of the four basic elements is the way in which Empedocles describes
their blending due to the influence of Love. To wit, this process always results in some more
complex organic units, such as plants, animals, people, or even gods, that is, in Empedocles
words, mortal beings.
38
Large homogenous masses formed by the prevalence of one element, that
is, the sea, the sun, the sky, and the earth, on the other hand, are described as akin to the original
elements in their pure form and sometimes, they are even identified with the elements.
39
It would
thus seem that the mixing of elements leads to the creation of some sort of structured entities
consisting of clearly distinguishable parts. It is therefore natural to ask whether the Sphairos is in
this respect somehow different from other organisms which also originated from blending of the
elements. Perhaps we could find an answer in the way Empedocles describes the origins of life.
The best source for understanding Empedocles views on this matter is Aetius systematic
presentation though it is open to many different interpretations (A 72).
40
As Empedocles direct
fragments confirm in particular points, the first three generations of living beings were in his view
born or sprouted directly from the elemental masses, such as earth and water. Meanwhile, the
development of life in the first three generations progressed in such a way that first of all, isolated
parts (limbs of the future bodies) grew from the life-giving mass of the basic element, especially
the earth.
41
These parts then started in a rather haphazard manner to merge into higher units, a
process which was at first that is, in the second generation unsuccessful (B 59), leading to the
formation of various fantastic and legendary creatures consisting of parts that could not be
naturally united and would in future belong to different animal species (B 60, B 61). Because such
beings could not survive, they gradually in the third generation had to give way to more
successful and viable creations of the original zoogony, which grew together naturally and formed
a compact entities (:v Xouv), thus acquiring a somewhat more lasting, though still rather
imperfect shape.
42
These embryonic forms then, in the fourth generation, became independent of
the original embryonic masses and the organisms thus created no longer multiplied by simple

38
Cf. B 9.13, B 21.912, B 23.58, B 26.34, B 35.7.1617, B 71.3.
39
See, for example, B 17.18, B 21.7, B 22.12, B 27 [12], B 71.2.
40
Empedocles [says] that the first generations of animals and plants were not at all unified (XoxXgpou;), but put
together from incompatible limbs (oouutot 6t :o; opiot;); the second of compatible limbs (ouuotvv
:v tpv) like apparitions (tl6Xovt;); the third of whole natures (:v Xouv);
40
the fourth no longer
from homogenous things (tx :v oiv) such as earth and water, but now from each other (6t' oXXgXv), some
because of compacted nourishment, some also from the stimulation of feminine beauty producing a motion of seed.
The kinds of all animals are distinguished by the quality of the blend (Transl. Graham, 2010, modified.) This text
was preserved in Pseudo-Plutarchs Placita philosophorum, 908d16908e9.
41
Cf. B 57, B 58 and the probably preceding formation of bones in B 96.
42
Cf. B 62; regarding the description of zoogony, especially of this stage, we prefer the description proposed in
KirkRavenSchofield, 1984, p. 391395, see especially, p. 394, n. 17. On ouXout; :tot from B 62.4, cf. Wright,
1995, p. 216217.
11
mixing of the original elements or independent limbs but rather from each other (6t' oXXgXv)
within a species.
For our purposes, meanwhile, what is important is that the limbs figure here as a sort of
building blocks, the first things to arise from the basic elements. Limbs are thus something that
helps create higher organisms, held together with the rivets of affection (B 87),
43
which are,
however, at some point disturbed by Strife and the more complex beings thus disintegrate back
in their original simple parts (B 20, B 58). On the other hand, even when limbs thus join in larger
units, Empedocles does not claim that the shape they assumed in the first stage of zoogony in
any basic way changed. In higher organisms they thus merely grow together without dissolving or
blending with one another, without fundamentally changing in the process of joining. When
Empedocles speaks about the birth of one out of many and its subsequent disintegration back to
its original state, he can have in mind a union of many, that is, a fusion of the four basic elements
in all-encompassing one, which he claims to be the universe and which would in our
interpretation correspond to the Sphairos.
44
On the other hand, however, a similar description
holds of a process whereby more complex beings are formed by the growing together of simpler,
but no longer elementary, parts (B 20.15). The Empedoclean world thus fundamentally relies on
the process of transformation of many into one. At the beginning of this process are the basic
elements in their pure form, at its end a perfect, unified Sphairos, and between these two
boundaries higher organisms are formed by an agglomeration of limbs. Limbs themselves,
meanwhile, are formed by the mixing of the basic elements. They are a kind of original building
parts, still attached to the primordial elemental masses.
This zoogony is embedded in a corresponding cosmogony. After Strife dissolves the
perfect Sphairos back in its original elements, Love starts uniting them again from the centre of
the thus created structure (B 35.313). Empedocles statements to the effect that the four roots
take turns in their dominance (B 17.2829, B 26.1) could be perhaps understood as referring to a
gradual shift of the point of highest intensity of the influence of Love from one to another, that
is, from the Earth, at the centre of the universe, which thanks to Love already acquired a firm,
compact form and is most united with the other elements, to the sea, the air, and the fire in their
turn. In comparison with the Earth, these elements are, in this sequence, increasingly volatile, less
bounded, and therefore also purer.
45
This also has certain consequences for the origin of life: as

43
Transl. Wright, 1995.
44
Cf. B 26.57. The origins of a united whole made of the four elements is also mentioned in B 17.12.711.1617
and in all likelihood also in B 35.56.
45
Extant fragments say that earth, unlike the other basic elements, contains fire, air, and water. Regarding these
elements, on the other hand, we have no such testimony. It would thus seem that earth is more mixed with them
than they with it. Cf. And many fires burn beneath the surface of earth (B 52, transl. Wright, 1995).
12
we saw in the excerpt from Aetius, in the fourth generation the earth and the water lost their
erstwhile productivity because in comparison with the previous stage of the worlds development,
they assumed a much firmer form and Love prevailed in them over the Sphairos. That naturally
also means that the turbulent and irregular primordial processes during which Love constantly
conflicted with Strife
46
had stopped and the focus of their activity shifted directly into living
beings. The same could also be said of the Earth surface in general because it is the locus of
various biological, atmospheric, and other reactions caused by the mixing of the four basic
elements (cf. B 73). Another two reports from Aetius may lend some support to our admittedly
somewhat speculative reconstruction:

Empedocles [says] the distance along the breadth [of the earth] is greater than the height from
earth to heaven, which is its altitude above us, and accordingly the heaven (:o0 oupvo0) is more
elongated [in a horizontal direction] owing to the world's (:ov xoov) being shaped like an egg
(tt tptXgoi; xto0t). (A 50)
47


Empedocles says that the cosmos (xoov) is one (v) and not that that the cosmos (:ov
xoov) is all (:o tv). Rather, it is but a small part of all (:o0 tv:;), the rest being inert matter
(oypgv 0Xgv). (A 47)
48


Based on his observations, Empedocles thus apparently believes the world to be egg-
shaped, because on its less protuberant side is the inert matter, that is, the masses of basic
elements not yet united with it, probably mainly fire and air, which are naturally furthest removed
from the centre of the universe. This current shape of the world is thus clearly distinct from the
perfectly round Sphairos, which comes into being at the moment when Love fully unites
everything there is, that is, the entire mass of the basic elements.

It is well known that Empedocles was fascinated by the volcanic activity, as witnessed by statements such as [Air]
with deep roots sank down over the earth(B 54, transl. Wright, 1995), sea, sweat of earth (B 55, transl.
Wright, 1995) as well as B 56. Let us also note that numerous sources testify to the effect that during the second half
of the cosmic cycle, after Strife starts acting again, it is the air that first separates from the Sphairos and only then the
fire, earth, and water also break away (cf. A 30, A 49). When the world begins to be reunited by Love, however, we
are in a radically different situation. It would seem that the elements separated by Strife are arranged in the universe
in such a way that earth is in the middle, it is surrounded by water, and then follows the air and the fire. Though
Empedocles does not mention the sequence in which the elements start gradually merging (and Aristotle in the
abovementioned fragment A 42 even claims that Empedocles omits a description of this part of the cosmic cycle), it
is evident that if Love starts acting again from the centre of the universe, it must gradually spread its unifying
influence through the elements in the order noted above.
46
These are described by the following fragment: And now hear this how fire, as it was being separated, brought
up by night the shoots of men and pitiable women, (). First, whole-nature forms, having a share of both of water
and heat, sprang up from the earth; fire, as it tended to reach its like, kept sending them up (B 62, transl. Wright,
1995).
47
Transl. Wright (1995).
48
Authors own translation.??
13
Regarding our knowledge of the gradual formation of more complex, higher beings from
the primordial simple, basic elements, one thing remains unclear, and it is an issue of key
importance to us. To wit, question remains how one should imagine the process in which the
creations formed in the manner described above further unite into a perfect Sphairos once Love
gains even more influence in the world. Should we believe that at that juncture the creatures in
existence, that is, beings created in the fourth generation, perish because they become part of the
immense organism of the Sphairos? Or will Love unite them with everything else in such a way
that they come to voluntarily observe a harmonious order Love would establish, without having
to physically merge with the Sphairos to form one whole? In this case, the unity of the Sphairos
would not necessitate the extinction of individual animals.
One finds various hints that could be seen as supporting either alternative but based on
fragments attributed usually to the poem On Nature, the former seems more likely. In the
description of Sphairos in the fragment quoted above in the first place (B 27 [12]), it would
seem that in the Sphairos, one cannot distinguish the sun, the earth, and the sea. In the least, that
implies that such world bears little resemblance with the world as we know it. Moreover, some
fragments indicate that when the one is created out of many by merging (that is, more united
entities are formed by a fusion less united ones), then in the new unity the original multitude
ceases to exist.
49
Within the framework of our interpretation it would imply that analogically to
the merging of the primordial independent limbs and body parts into higher beings, these beings
then blend into a unified Sphairos. The latter option, on the other hand, finds support in some
fragments usually ascribed to the Purifications which describe the paradise of the original state of
the world and its subsequent disintegration, whereby this can be in all likelihood identified with
the time of the greatest dominance of Love, the creation of the Sphairos, and its subsequent
dissolution after Strife starts gaining influence once again. In this context, Empedocles also
speaks of mutual harmony which regulated the lives of the earlier beings (in B 128 and B 130).
Moreover, Empedocles also holds that all things have intelligence (pvgotv) and a
share of thought (v:o;)(B 110.10),
50
and this changes with according to transformations
which individual things experience (cf. B 106), so that one could perhaps even speak of a mutual
link between their physical constitution and thinking. All of this, by the way, lends even more
support to the claim that Sphairos need not be seen as full of blood, as we noted at the beginning
of this section. After all, Empedocles in numerous places emphasises the need for correct

49
Cf. B 17.35; regarding the interpretation of this difficult passage, see KirkRavenSchofield, 1984, p. 373374, n.
7, and further Wright, 1995, p. 31.
50
Transl. Wright (1995). Cf. also: There by the will of chance (ttpvgxtv otv:) all things have thought. (B
103, transl. Wright, 1995).
14
thinking about the nature of the world
51
and his verse: But come, hear my words, for learning
brings an increase of wisdom (ptv; tt)! (B 17.14)
52
may thus in fact be an exhortation, in a
literal sense physically supported, to collaborate in the word of Love since it is Love that causes
things to be born of the primordial pure elements and to gradually acquire mind.
It would thus seem that in Empedocles world an increase in Love leads to an increase in
thinking. Does it imply that when people try to understand the nature of the world and live in
harmony with its basic principle thus revealed they contribute to the harmony of the universe
and its unification under the rule of Love? The full text of the abovementioned fragment (B 110)
is as follows:

If you push them [i.e. my words] firmly under your crowded thoughts (uto tpti6tootv)
and contemplate them favourably with unsullied and constant attention,
assuredly all these will be with you through life,
and you will gain much else from them,
for of themselves they will cause each thing to grow (tt) into the character (0o;),
according to the nature (ot;) of each.
But if you yourself should reach out for things of a different kind,
for the countless trivialities which come among men and dull their meditations,
straightaway these [i.e. the words] will leave you as the time come round,
longing to reach their own (ov u:v) familiar kind;
for know that all things have intelligence (pvgotv) and a share of thought (v:o;). (B 110)
53


In Empedocles view, the first zoogony, which happens so to say blindly and has to pass
through numerous trials and tragic mistakes, leads to the creation of higher, independent
organisms endowed by the thinking ability. In this connection, may be tempting to identify
Sphairos with a mindholy and inexpressible (B 134.4 [6]) as a number of scholars have done.
It would imply that while on the material level, the gradual mixing of the basic elements
ultimately leads to the creation of a huge, all-encompassing organism of the Sphairos, its
consequence is also the birth of a unified cosmic mind.
This still does not, however, answer the question of what place the independent
organisms created in the previous stages of the agency of Love would occupy in the Sphairos.
Based on the Purifications, it may seem that all things have intelligence and a share of thought
because all living creatures are pervaded by the daimones who gradually reincarnate from one thing

51
Cf. B 15.1, B 23.9, B 114.3, B 133.3.
52
Transl. Wright (1995).
53
Transl. Wright (1995).
15
into another and can thus persist in the world even if the body they happen to occupy ceases to
exist.
54
Should we interpret fragments describing the elysian life of creatures during the utmost
ascendancy of Love and the existence of the Sphairos more or less literally, and assume that just
like everything else they, too, will grow together and form one immense organic being and their
individual minds in harmony with others jointly create one sacred mind? Or should we rather
believe that though all beings physically merge, their particular minds, in the previous world
incarnated as daimones, remain in the broader framework of the Sphairos independent and
separate? Or and seems to be the most likely reading should we assume that though the
Sphairos is otherwise a fully fused and homogenous entity, living beings retain there some sort of
space for their own lives, largely independent of the Sphairos? In this interpretation, living
creatures since they are in a world created and fully dominated by Love would continue their
lives in voluntary harmony with the Sphairos. Regrettably, surviving fragments do not offer a
definite answer to these questions. And as we indicated above, the same unfortunately holds also
of the basic question of how one should imagine the Sphairos. In that case, moreover, we are
faced with yet another problem: If, as Empedocles believes, it is a great sin to follow the path of
Strife and commit murder implied in a violent dissolution of the unity of a body and the eating of
meat,
55
then what or who ultimately causes the disintegration of the Sphairos and the current
woefulness of life, which Empedocles bewails and laments so much?
56


English translation Anna Piltov

54
Cf. B 115 as well as B 117. It remains to be seen, however, what happens to the daimones themselves when Strife
fully dominates Empedocles world, causing the full separation of the elements. Based on what we know, there does
not seem to be any way they could survive this phase of the cosmic cycle intact. Just like all other composite things,
the daimones, too, should necessarily cease to exist.
55
Cf. B 115, B 128.710 and further B 136139.
56
Empedocles himself in fragment B 30 [7] speaks of a time of exchange for them [i.e. Love and Strife], which has
been defined by a broad oath, but elsewhere bemoans having put my trust in raving strife (B 115.14, transl.
Wright). In some fragments, he laments the time when Strife gained dominance, thus ending the previous blessed
era, and describes a world full of mutual killing where peoples lives are sheer suffering (cf. B 115.1314, B 121, B
122, B 124, B 128, B 130, and B 136). This image would best fit the period after the disintegration of the Sphairos
due to the increasing force of Strife.
16
Bibliography
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Graham, D.W. (2010; ed. and transl.), The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and
Selected Testimonies of The Major Presocratics, 2 vols., Cambridge: University Press.
Inwood, B. (2001; ed. and transl.), The Poem of Empedocles, Toronto: University of Toronto Press
(2nd edn.).
Lesher, J.H. (2001; transl.) Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, Toronto: University of Toronto,
2001.
Wright, M.R. (1995; ed. and transl.), Empedocles, The Extant Fragments, Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing (2nd edn.).

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17
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