Section 16

G.R. No. L-38570 May 24, 1988

DOMINGO !D"!, petitioner,
vs.
#I$%N&% %RI$&!, etc., R"NDIO !'(!%&O, an) !N&ONIO G. R!MOS, respondents.
Antonio de los Reyes for petitioner.
Lazaro A. Marques for private respondents.
N!R#!S!, J.:
Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and determination of causes. It should be
their constant effort to assure that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch.
Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except on meritorious grounds; and
the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge. It goes without
saying, however, that that discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised, in the light of the
attendant circumstances. ome reasonable deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or
tolerated to the end that cases may be ad!udged only after full and free presentation of evidence
by all the parties, specially where the deferment would cause no substantial pre!udice to any part.
"he desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the
precipitate loss of a party#s right to present evidence and either in plaintiff#s being non$suited or the
defendant#s being pronounced liable under an ex parte!udgment.
... %"&rial courts have ... the duty to dispose of controversies after trial on
the merits whenever possible. It is deemed an abuse of discretion for them,
on their own motion, to enter a dismissal which is not warranted by the
circumstances of the case# %'unicipality of (ingras v. )onoan, *+ Phil. ,+*$
+- ./-+01&. 2hile it is true that the dismissal of an action on grounds
specified under ection 3, 4ule /5 of the 4evised 4ules of Court is
addressed to their discretion %6lores v. Phil. 7lien Property 7dministrator,
/05 Phil. 55* %/-801; 'ontelibano v. )enares, /03 Phil. //0 ./-+*1;
7dorable v. )onifacio, /0+ Phil. /98- ./-+-1; Inter$Island :as ervice, Inc.
v. (e la :erna, ;$/583/, <ctober /-, /-88, /* C47 3-0&, such discretion
must be exercised soundly with a view to the circumstances surrounding
each particular case %=ernus$anciangco v. anciangco, ;$/98/-, 7pril 9*,
/-89, , C47 /90-&. If facts obtain that serve as mitigating circumstances
for the delay, the same should be considered and dismissal denied or set
aside % 4udd v. 4ogerson, /+ 7;4 9d 859; Cervi v. :reenwood, /,5
Coloma /-0, 389 P. 9d /0+0 ./-8/1&, especially where the suit appears to
be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably negligent and no in!ury
results to defendant %95 C.J.. 93+$38; /+ 7;4 3rd 8*0&. <re||
an1! %7binales vs. Court of 6irst Instance of >amboanga City, )r. I, 50
C47 +-0, +-+&.
It is true that the allowance or denial of petitions for postponement and the
setting aside of orders previously issued, rest principally upon the sound
discretion of the !udge to whom they are addressed, but always predicated
on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or
of the parties of the case, the ends of !ustice and fairness would be served
thereby %Camara =da. de >ubiri v. >ubiri, et al., ;$/85,+, (ecember /5,
/-88&. 2hen no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is
not manifest, the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been
filed accordingly, it is sound !udicial discretion to allow them %4exwell Corp.
v. Canlas, ;$/85,8, (ecember 30, /-8/&. %Panganiban vs. =da. de ta.
'aria, 99 C47 50*, 5/9&.
In the civil action at bar, the "rial Court re!ected the plaintiffs plea for cancellation of one of three
%3& hearing dates, the very first such plea made by that party, upon a ground not entirely
unmeritorious in the premises, and under such circumstances as would not be productive of any
appreciable delay in the proceedings or any substantial pre!udice to the defendants, and
summarily dismissed the complaint. uch a dismissal was unwarranted and relief therefrom must
be accorded.
"he action that was thus summarily dismissed had been brought by (omingo Padua %petitioner
herein& in the Court of 6irst Instance at ?ue@on City.
1
In that action Padua sought to recover
damages for the in!ures suffered by his eight$year old daughter, ;u@viminda, caused by her being
hit by a truck driven by 4undio 7b!aeto and owned by 7ntonio :. 4amos %private respondents
herein&. Padua was litigating in for"a pauperis.
"rial of the case having been set in due course, Padua commenced presentation of his evidence
on (ecember 8, /-53. Ae gave testimony on direct exBmination in the course of which reference
was made to numerous documents, marked Cxhibits ), )$/ to )$/0-.
2
7t the close of his
examination, and on motion of defendants# counsel, the previously scheduled hearing of (ecember
/9,/-53 was cancelled, and Padua#s cross$examination was reset on (ecember /5,
/-53.
3
Aowever, the hearing of (ecember /5,/-53 was also cancelled, again at the instance of
defendants# counsel, who pleaded sickness as ground therefor; and trial was once more slated to
Dtake place on 'arch 8, 'arch 5 and /3, /-5,, all at -E00 o#clock in the morning.D
4
7fter defendants# attorney had twice sought and obtained cancellation of trial settings, as above
narrated, it was plaintiff Padua#s counsel who next moved for cancellation of a hearing date. In a
motion dated and filed on 'arch /, /-5,,
5
copy of which was personally served on defendants#
lawyer
6
Padua#s counsel alleged that he had Danot#er #earin$ on Mar%# &' 1()* in +arla% ,ourt of
-irst .nstan%e entitled/ 0alud 1upitas vs. Mariano A2ella' ,ivil ,ase 3o. *(4* #i%# is of 1(&&
stint' and said %ourt in +arla% is anxious to ter"inate said %ase on%e and for all ,D and that the
cancellation would Dat any rate ... leave plaintiff and defendants to 567 #earin$ dates on Mar%# )
and 18' 1()*9D and on these premises, he asked Dt#at t#e #earin$ on Mar%# &' 1()* ... 2e ordered
%an%elled.D Fo opposition was filed by the defendants to the motion, whether on the ground that
the motion had not been properly set for hearing, the clerk having merely been reBuested to
Dsubmit the ... motion upon receipt ... for the consideration of the Court,D
7
or some other ground.
7part from filing this motion on 'arch /, /-5,, plaintiffs counsel took the additional step of sending
his client#s wife to the Court on the day of the trial, 'arch 8,/-5,, to verbally reiterate his
application for cancellation of the hearing on that day. "his, 'rs. Padua did. "he respondent Judge
however denied the application and dismissed the case. Ais Aonor#s <rder, dictated on that day,
'arch 8, /-5,, reads as followsE
8
2hen this case was called for hearing today, neither plaintiff nor counsel
appeared. "he plaintiffs wife, however, appeared in Court and informed the
Court that the plaintiffs counsel had to attend to a very important case in
the provinces.
"he hearing for today was fixed by the plaintiff himself in open court after
consulting his calendar and hence the Court will not grant the
postponement on the ground that the plaintiffs counsel had a very important
case in the provinces. Feither did the plaintiff himself appear.
In view hereof, let this case be dismissed.
Padua moved for reconsideration,
9
but this was denied.
10
Aence, this petition.
"he "rial Court unaccountably ignored the fact that defendants# counsel had twice applied for and
been granted postponements of the trial; that plaintiffs counsel had filed a written motion for
postponement five %+& days prior to the hearing sought to be transferred, and this was the very first
such motion filed by him; that although the motion for postponement could have been ob!ected to,
no opposition was presented by defendants, which was not surprising considering that their
counsel had himself already obtained two %9& postponements; that the ground for cancellation was
not entirely without meritE the counsel had a case in the "arlac Court scheduled on the same day,
'arch 8, /-5,, which had been pending since /-8, and which the "arlac Court understandably
was anxious to terminate; that the Padua motion for postponement sought cancellation of only one
%/& of three settings, leaving the case to proceed on the two %9& subseBuent hearing dates; and the
motion had been verbally reiterated by plaintiffs wife on the day of the hearing sought to be
cancelled, Gnder the circumstances, and in the light of the precedents set out in the opening
paragraphs of this opinion, the respondent Judge#s action was unreasonable, capricious and
oppressive, and should be as it is hereby annulled.
2AC4C6<4C, the writ of certiorari is granted and the <rder of the Court a quo dated 'arch 8,
/-5,, dismissing the petitioner#s complaint, and the <rder dated 'arch /3, /-5, denying
petitioner#s motion for reconsideration, are hereby 7FFG;;C( 7F( C" 7I(C; Civil Case Fo.
?$/5+83 is hereby 4CIF"7"C( and the 4egional "rial Court which has replaced )ranch H=III of
the Court of 6irst Instance in which the action was pending at the time of dismissal, is (I4CC"C(
to continue with the trial of the petitioner#s action and decide the same on the merits in due course.
G.R. No. L-25769 Dece*+e, 10, 1974
-R!N$IS$O -LOR%S an) -R!N$IS$O !NG%L, petitioners,
vs.
%OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, respondent.
Arturo :ial%ita for petitioner -ran%is%o -lores.
:osi"o Rivas for petitioner -ran%is%o An$el.
;ffi%e of t#e 0oli%itor <eneral Antonio =. >arredo and 0oli%itor ?i%ente A. +orres for respondent.

-%RN!NDO, J.:p
7 plea based on the constitutional right to a speedy trial
1
led this Court to act affirmatively on
a %ertiorariproceeding for the dismissal of a case then pending in the Court of 7ppeals.
Considering the length of time that had elapsed, it is readily discernible why an inBuiry into the
matter is well$nigh unavoidable. "he accusation for robbery against petitioners 6rancisco 6lores
and 6rancisco 7ngel was filed as far back as (ecember 3/, /-+/. "he decision rendered on
Fovember 9-, /-++ found them guilty of the crime charged. "he notice of appeal was filed on
(ecember *, /-++.
2
6or a period of three years, until 6ebruary /0, /-+*, no action was taken by
the Court of 7ppeals. <n that day, there was a resolution remanding the records of the case to the
lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the disposition
of the case.
3
uch a resolution was amended by a second resolution dated 7ugust +, /-+-, which
granted the motion for counsel of appellants, now petitioners, to set aside the decision so that
evidence for the defense on certain new facts or matters may be received and that a new decision
in lieu of the old one may be rendered in accordance with the facts as found.
4
7ccordingly, the
case was returned to the lower court with the former decision set aside so that the trial could be
had, but nothing was done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear
notwithstanding the six or seven dates set for such hearing.
5
It was further alleged that when
thereafter he did take the witness stand, his testimony was far from satisfactory, characteri@ed as a
mere DfiascoD as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime; there was even a
failure to identify the two accused.
6
Instead of rendering a new decision, the former one having
been set aside as reBuired by the Court of 7ppeals, the lower court merely sent back the records
to the appellate tribunal.
7
7t that stage, five more years having elapsed without anything being
done, petitioners sought the dismissal of the cases against them due to such inordinate delay in
their disposition, which covered the period of (ecember *, /-++ to 'ay /0, /-8+, a period of
almost a decade; thus did they invoke their constitutional right to a speedy trial.
8
4espondent
Court of 7ppeals was unresponsive, notwithstanding the vigorous plea on the part of counsel for
petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second motion for reconsideration dated January 9*,
/-88. In the answer on behalf of the People of the Philippines, the facts as above set forth were
substantially admitted. Aowever, a special and affirmative defense raised was that the case was
not properly captioned, as the People of the Philippines, against whom it is filed, is not a tribunal or
an office exercising !udicial functions and that without the Court of 7ppeals being made a party to
the petition, it cannot be said that it stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 'oreover,
on the merits, the view was expressed that under the circumstances, it was not adeBuately shown
that the right to a speedy trial had been violated, as the Court of 7ppeals had taken all the steps
necessary to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the original trial.
<n the above undisputed facts, there is more than sufficient warrant for the conclusion that the
right to a speedy trial, so @ealously guarded in both the /-3+ and the present Constitutions, had
not been accorded due respect. "here is thus merit in the petition.
/. "he constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision, A%e2edo v.
0ar"iento,
9
Dmeans one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, ... .D
10
"hus, if the
person accused were innocent, he may within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety
and apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense
as to the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to present
any valid defense. 7s was also pointed out in armientoE D"he remedy in the event of a non$
observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or
by %ertiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case.D
11
"he above ruling is a
reiteration of the doctrine announced, even before the /-3+ Constitution, in ,onde v. Rivera,
12
a
/-9, decision. In that case, Justice 'alcolm announced categorically that the trial, to comply with
the reBuirement of the then organic law, the Philippine 7utonomy 7ct, must be Dfree from
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.D
13
6urtherE D2e lay down the legal proposition that,
where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant
against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year,
the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by #a2eas %orpus to obtain his freedom.D
14
In the first upreme Court decision after the /-3+ Constitution took effect, =eople v.
,asta@eda,
15
where it was shown that the criminal case had been dragging on for almost five
years and that when the trial did finally take place, it was tainted by irregularities, this Court set
aside the appealed decision of conviction and acBuitted the accused. 7s was pointed out by
the ponente, Justice ;aurelE D"he :overnment should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of !ustice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to
see that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be
immediately discharged from the custody of the law.D
16
It was on the basis of the above !udgment
that the dismissal of a second information for frustrated homicide was ordered by this Court, where
the evidence disclosed that the first information had been dismissed after a lapse of one year and
seven months from the time the original complaint was filed during which time on the three
occasions the case was set for trial, the private prosecutor twice asked for postponements and
once the trial court itself cancelled the entire calendar for the month it was supposed to have been
heard.
17
"he same result followed in As$uerra v. 1e la ,osta,
18
where the first complaint was filed
on 7ugust 9-, /-38, the accused having been criminally prosecuted for an alleged abuse of
chastity in a !ustice of the peace court but after over a year and three months, with the lower court
twice dismissing the case, he still had to face trial for the same offense on a new information, thus
compelling him to resort to a mandamus suit to compel the lower court to terminate the case was
his right to a speedy trial was violated, a remedy deemed appropriate by this Court.
"here was another occasion where Justice ;aurel spoke for this Court on this specific issue. "hat
was in Mer%ado v. 0antos.
19
Aere, for a period of about twenty months, the accused was arrested
four times on the charge of falsifying his deceased wife#s will. "wice, the complaints were
subseBuently withdrawn. "he third time he was prosecuted on the same charge, he was able to
obtain a dismissal. "hen came on the part of the provincial fiscal, a motion for reinvestigation. "he
lower court was in a receptive mood. It ordered that the case be heard on the merits. "he accused
moved to dismiss, but he did not succeed. Ae tried the Court of 7ppeals, but he failed again. Ae
elevated the matter to this Court; he prevailed. It was stressed in Justice ;aurel#s opinionE D7n
accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. ... Ae cannot be oppressed by
delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending
trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed.D
20
"he opinion likewise considered as not
decisive the fact that the provincial fiscal did not intervene until an information was filed charging
the accused with the crime of falsification the third time. "husE D"he Constitution does not say that
the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced
and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private
individuals. 2here once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial,
irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authori@ed to be
commenced.D
21
"he latest decision in point,A%e2edo v. 0ar"iento,
22
presented an even clearer
case. "he information for damage to property was filed on 7ugust 3, /-+-. "here the matter rested
until 'ay /-, /-8+, when the accused moved to dismiss. "he lower court denied the motion in his
order of July /0, /-8+. "wo more years elapsed, the period now covering almost eight years, when
the trial was commenced. 2hen one of the witnesses for the prosecution failed to appear, the
provincial fiscal sought the postponement, but the accused countered with a motion for dismissal.
"he lower court acceded, and this Court sustained him, even if thereafter it changed its mind and
reinstated the case.
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be speedy. In the
absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. In this case then, as of
'ay /0, /-8+, when they moved to dismiss in the Court of 7ppeals, petitioners could validly
contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances
permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of 7ppeals of their cases that should be deemed
material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an
end to suits elevated to them. 2hat is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous
decision in the resolution of 7ugust +, /-+-, petitioners could validly premise their plea for
dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. "hat is the sole basis for the conclusion reached by us
I considering the controlling doctrine announced with such emphasis by this Court time and time
again.
9. "hat is about all that needs be said. "he crucial issue has been met. "he decisive Buestion has
been answered. "here is an affirmation of the worth of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Fot
too much significance should be attached to the procedural defect pointed out in the answer of the
People of the Philippines that the Court of 7ppeals should have been made the party respondent.
2hat cannot be sanctioned was its failure to accord respect to this particular constitutional right. It
did amount at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion. 2hatever deficiency in the pleading
may then be singled out, it cannot obscure the obvious disregard of one of the most important
safeguards granted an accused. "o deny petitioners the remedy sought would be to exalt form
over substance. 7t any rate, the petition could be considered, and rightly so, as being directed at
the Court of 7ppeals. 'oreover, the defenses that could have interposed to !ustify the action taken
were invoked by the People of the Philippines. "hey certainly did not avail. <ur decisions on the
right to a speedy rial speak too categorically to be misread. "his is one of those situations then
where, in the apt language of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, 'akalintal, Dtechnicalities should
give way to the realities of the situation.D
23
2AC4C6<4C, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order of the Court of 7ppeals in C7$
:4 Fo. /88,/$4 entitled, People v. 6rancisco 6lores, et al., of eptember 9*, /-8+ denying the
motion to dismiss as well as its order of January *, /-88 denying the motion for reconsideration,
and the order of January 9*, /-88 denying the second motion for reconsideration are hereby set
aside, nullified, and considered of no force and effect. "he criminal case against petitioners in the
aforesaid C7$:4 Fo. /88,/$4 are ordered dismissed. Costs de ofi%io.
Section 17
G.R. No. 7081 Se/te*+e, 7, 1912
&.% "NI&%D S&!&%S, plaintiff$appellee,
vs.
&!N &%NG, defendant$appellant.
,#as A. M%1onou$#' for appellant.
;ffi%e of t#e 0oli%itor <eneral Barvey' for appellee.
(O.NSON, J.:
"his defendant was charged with the crime of rape. "he complaint allegedE
"hat on or about eptember /+, /-/0, and before the filing of this complaint, in the city
of 'anila, Philippine Islands, the said "an "eng did willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
and employing force, lie and have carnal intercourse with a certain <liva Pacomio, a
girl 5 years of age.
7fter hearing the evidence, the Aonorable Charles . ;obingier, !udge, found the defendant guilty
of the offense ofa2usos des#onestos, as defined and punished under article ,3- of the Penal
Code, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of , years 8 months and // days of prision
%orre%%ional, and to pay the costs.
6rom that sentence the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error in this
courtE
I. "he lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the physicians about having taken
a certain substance from the body of the accused while he was confined in !ail and
regarding the chemical analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the physical
condition of the accused with reference to a venereal disease.
II. "he lower court erred in holding that the complainant was suffering from a venereal
disease produced by contact with a sick man.
III. "he court erred in holding that the accused was suffering from a venereal disease.
I=. "he court erred in finding the accused guilty from the evidence.
6rom an examination of the record it appears that the offended party, <liva Pacomio, a girl seven
years of age, was, on the /+th day of eptember , /-/0, staying in the house of her sister, located
on Ilang$Ilang treet, in the city of 'anila; that on said day a number of Chinamen were gambling
had been in the habit of visiting the house of the sister of the offended party; that <liva Pacomio,
on the day in Buestion, after having taken a bath, returned to her room; that the defendant followed
her into her room and asked her for some face powder, which she gave him; that after using some
of the face powder upon his private parts he threw the said <liva upon the floor, placing his private
parts upon hers, and remained in that position for some little time. everal days later, perhaps a
week or two, the sister of <liva Pacomio discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal
disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that <liva related to her sister
what happened upon the morning of the /+th of eptember. "he sister at once put on foot an
investigation to find the Chinaman. 7 number of Chinamen were collected together. <liva was
called upon to identify the one who had abused her. "he defendant was not present at first. later
he arrived and <liva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to violate her.
Gpon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of
his clothing and examined. "he policeman who examined the defendant swore from the venereal
disease known as gonorrhea. "he policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the
body of the defendant and turned it over to the )ureau of cience for the purpose of having a
scientific analysis made of the same. "he result of the examination showed that the defendant was
suffering from gonorrhea.
(uring the trial the defendant ob!ected strongly to the admissibility of the testimony of <liva, on the
ground that because of her tender years her testimony should not be given credit. "he lower court,
after carefully examining her with reference to her ability to understand the nature of an oath, held
that she had sufficient intelligence and discernment to !ustify the court in accepting her testimony
with full faith and credit. 2ith the conclusion of the lower court, after reading her declaration, we
fully concur. "he defense in the lower court attempted to show that the venereal disease of
gonorrhea might be communicated in ways other than by contact such as is described in the
present case, and called medical witnesses for the purpose of supporting the contention. Judge
;obingier, in discussing that Buestion saidE
2e shall not pursue the refinement of speculation as to whether or not this disease
might, in exceptional cases, arise from other carnal contact. "he medical experts, as
well as the books, agree that in ordinary cases it arises from that cause, and if this was
an exceptional one, we think it was incumbent upon the defense to bring it within the
exception.
"he offended party testified that the defendant had rested his private parts upon hers for some
moments. "he defendant was found to be suffering from gonorrhea. "he medical experts who
testified agreed that this disease could have been communicated from him to her by the contact
described. )elieving as we do the story told by <liva, we are forced to the conclusion that the
disease with which <liva was suffering was the result of the illegal and brutal conduct of the
defendant. Proof, however, that <liva constructed said obnoxious disease from the defendant is
not necessary to show that he is guilty of the crime. It is only corroborative of the truth of <liva#s
declaration.
"he defendant attempted to prove in the lower court that the prosecution was brought for the
purpose of compelling him to pay to the sister of <liva a certain sum of money.
"he defendant testifed and brought other Chinamen to support his declaration, that the sister of
<liva threatened to have him prosecuted if he did not pay her the sum of P80. It seems impossible
to believe that the sister, after having become convinced that <liva had been outraged in the
manner described above, would consider for a moment a settlement for the paltry sum of P80.
Aonest women do not consent to the violation of their bodies nor those of their near relatives, for
the filthy consideration of mere money.
In the court below the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made by
the )ureau of cience of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested,
was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea. "hat to
admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. Judge ;obingier, in
discussing that Buestion in his sentence, saidE
"he accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any Buestions,
and the mere fact that an ob!ect found on his person was examinedE seems no more to
infringe the rule invoked, than would the introduction in evidence of stolen property
taken from the person of a thief.
"he substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his ob!ection, the examination
was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering
from said disease. 7s was suggested by Judge ;obingier, had the defendant been found with
stolen property upon his person, there certainly could have been no Buestion had the stolen
property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. o also if the
clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the
commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no ob!ection to taking such for the purpose
of using the same as proof. Fo one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the
clothing in the case indicated, taken from the defendant, could not be used against him as
evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be reBuired to give testimony against
himself.
"he Buestion presented by the defendant below and repeated in his first assignment of error is not
a new Buestion, either to the courts or authors. In the case of Aolt vs. G.. %9/* G.., 9,+&, 'r.
Justice Aolmes, speaking for the court upon this Buestion, saidE
)ut the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself, is a pro#i2ition of t#e use of p#ysi%al or "oral %o"pulsion, to extort
communications from him, not an ex%lusion of #is 2ody as eviden%e' #en it "ay 2e
"aterial. "he ob!ection, in principle, would forbid a !ury %court& to look at a person and
compare his features with a photograph in proof. 'oreover we are not considering how
far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited,
whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material,
is competent.
"he Buestion which we are discussing was also discussed by the supreme court of the tate of
Few Jersey, in the case of tate vs. 'iller %5/ F.J. law 4eports, +95&. In that case the court said,
speaking through its chancellorE
It was not erroneous to permit the physician of the !ail in which the accused was
confined, to testify to wounds observed by him on the back of the hands of the
accused, although he also testified that he had the accused removed to a room in
another part of the !ail and divested of his clothing. "he observation made by the
witness of the wounds on the hands and testified to by him, was in no sense a
compelling of the accused to be a witness against himself. If the removal of the clothes
had been forcible and the wounds had been thus exposed, it seems that the evidence
of their character and appearance would not have been ob!ectionable.
In that case also %tate vs. 'iller& the defendant was reBuired to place his hand upon the wall of
the house where the crime was committed, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not his hand
would have produced the bloody print. "he court said, in discussing that BuestionE
It was not erroneous to permit evidence of the coincidence between the hand of the
accused and the bloody prints of a hand upon the wall of the house where the crime
was committed, the hand of the accused having been placed thereon at the reBuest of
persons who were with him in the house.
It may be added that a section of the wall containing the blood prints was produced before the !ury
and the testimony of such comparison was like that held to be proper in another case decided by
the supreme court of Few Jersey in the case of Johnson vs. tate %30 =room, F.J. ;aw 4eports,
95/&. "he defendant caused the prints of the shoes to be made in the sand before the !ury, and the
witnesses who had observed shoe prints in the sand at the place of the commission of the crime
were permitted to compare them with what the had observed at that place.
In that case also the clothing of the defendant was used as evidence against him.
"o admit the doctrine contended for by the appellant might exclude the testimony of a physician or
a medical expert who had been appointed to make observations of a person who plead insanity as
a defense, where such medical testimony was against necessarily use the person of the defendant
for the purpose of making such examination. %People vs. 7gustin, /-- F.J., ,,8.& "he doctrine
contended for by the appellants would also prevent the courts from making an examination of the
body of the defendant where serious personal in!uries were alleged to have been received by him.
"he right of the courts in such cases to reBuire an exhibit of the in!ured parts of the body has been
established by a long line of decisions.
+#e pro#i2ition contained in section + of the Philippine )ill that a person shall not be compelled to
be a witness against himself, is si"ply a pro#i2ition a$ainst le$al pro%ess to extra%t fro" t#e
defendantCs on lips' a$ainst #is ill' an ad"ission of #is $uilt.
'r. 2igmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in discussing the Buestion before us, saidE
If, in other words, it %the rule& created inviolability not only for his .physical control1 in
whatever form exercised, then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself
up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the
law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his
possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles I a clearredu%tio ad
a2surdu". .n ot#er ords' it is not "erely %o"pulsion that is the kernel of the privilege,
. . . buttesti"onial %o"pulsion. %, 2igmore, sec. 9983.&
"he main purpose of the provision of the Philippine )ill is to pro#i2it %o"pulsory oral exa"ination
of prisonersbefore trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or
declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. %People vs. :ardner, /,, F. J., //-.&
"he doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a
defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. uch an application of the prohibition
under discussion certainly could not be permitted. uch an inspection of the bodily features by the
court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine )ill, because it
does not call upon the accused as a witness I it does not call upon the defendant for his
testimonial responsibility. 'r. 2igmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the accused,
is not testimony but his body his body itself.
7s was said by Judge ;obingierE
"he accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any Buestions, and
the mere fact that an ob!ect found upon his body was examined seems no more to
infringe the rule invoked than would the introduction of stolen property taken from the
person of a thief.
"he doctrine contended for by the appellant would also prohibit the sanitary department of the
:overnment from examining the body of persons who are supposed to have some contagious
disease.
2e believe that the evidence clearly shows that the defendant was suffering from the venereal
disease, as above stated, and that through his brutal conduct said disease was communicated to
<liva Pacomio. In a case like the present it is always difficult to secure positive and direct proof.
uch crimes as the present are generally proved by circumstantial evidence. In cases of rape the
courts of law reBuire corroborative proof, for the reason that such crimes are generally committed
in secret. In the present case, taking into account the number and credibility of the witnesses, their
interest and attitude on the witness stand, their manner of testifying and the general circumstances
surrounding the witnesses, including the fact that both parties were found to be suffering from a
common disease, we are of the opinion that the defendant did, on or about the /+th of eptember,
/-/0, have such relations as above described with the said <liva Pacomio, which under the
provisions of article ,3- of the Penal Code makes him guilty of the crime of Da2usos
des#onestos'D and taking into consideration the fact that the crime which the defendant committed
was done in the house where <liva Pacomio was living, we are of the opinion that the maximum
penalty of the law should be imposed. "he maximum penalty provided for by law is six years
ofprision %orre%%ional. "herefore let a !udgment be entered modifying the sentence of the lower
court and sentencing the defendant to be imprisoned for a period of six years of prision
%orre%%ional, and to pay the costs. o ordered.
%M%&%RI! #ILL!-LOR, petitioner,
vs.
RI$!RDO S"MM%RS, 01e,i22 o2 t1e $ity o2 Mani3a, respondent.
Alfredo ,alupitan' and <i22s' M%1onou$# E Fo#nson for petitioner.
Assistant ,ity of -is%al -elix for respondent.
M!L$OLM, J.:
"he petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her to her liberty.
"he facts are not dispute. In a criminal case pending before the Court of 6irst Instance of the city of
'anila, Cmeteria =illaflor and 6lorentino ouingco are charged with the crime of adultery. <n this
case coming on for trial before the Aon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of 6irst Instance, upon the
petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the city of 'anila, the court ordered the defendant Cmeteria
=illaflor, nor become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or two
competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. "he accused refused to obey the order
on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision
relating to self$incrimination. "hereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be
committed to )ilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination reBuired by the court.
"he sole legal issue from the admitted facts is whether the compelling of a woman to permit her
body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the
Philippine )ill of 4ights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in
the Constitution of the Gnited tates and practically all state constitutions and in the common law
rules of evidence, providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. %President#s Instructions to the Philippine Commission; 7ct of Congress of July /,
/-09, section +, paragraph 3; 7ct of Congress of 7ugust 9-, /-/8, section 3; paragraph 3; Code of
Criminal Procedure, section /+ .,1; Gnited tates Constitution, fifth amendment.& Counsel for
petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the
representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional
provision. "he trial !udge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it is brought to our notice
that a !udge of the same court has held on an identical Buestion as contended for by the attorney
for the accused and petitioner.
"he authorities are abundant but conflicting. 2hat may be termed the conservative courts
emphasi@e greatly the humanitarianism of the constitutional provisions and are pleased to extend
the privilege in order that its mantle may cover any fact by which the accused is compelled to make
evidence against himself. %Compare tate vs. Jacobs ./*+*1, +0 F. C., 9+- with tate vs. 7h
Chuey ./*5-1, /, Fev., 5-. 0ee further tate vs. 7h Fordstrom ./*-31, 5 2ash., +08; tate vs.
Aeight ./-091. //5 Iowa., 8+0; "hornton vs. tate ./-031, //5 2is., 33*.& 7 case concordant with
this view and almost directly in point is People vs. 'cCoy %./*531, ,+ Aow. Pr., 9/8&. 7 woman
was charged with the crime of infanticide. "he corner directed two physicians to go to the !ail and
examine her private parts to determine whether she had recently been delivered of a child. he
ob!ected to the examination, but being threatened with force, yielded, and the examination was
had. "he evidence of these physicians was offered at the trial and ruled out. "he court said that the
proceeding was in violation of the spirit and meaning of the Constitution, which declares that Dno
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.D Continuing, the
court saidE D"hey might as well have sworn the prisoner, and compelled her, by threats, to testify
that she had been pregnant, and had been delivered of a child, as to have compelled her, by
threats, to allow them to look into her person, with the aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she
had been pregnant and been delivered of a child. . . . Aas this court the right to compel the
prisoner now to submit to an examination they are of the opinion she is not a virgin, and has had a
childK It is not possible that this court has that right; and it is too clear to admit of argument that
evidence thus obtained would be inadmissible against the prisoner.D
It may be revealing a !udicial secret, but nevertheless we cannot refrain from saying that, greatly
impressed with the weight of these decisions, especially the one written by 'r. Justice 'cClain, in
tate vs. Aeight, supra, the instant case was reported by the writer with the tentative
recommendation that the court should lay down the general rule that a defendant can be
compelled to disclose only those parts of the body which are not usually covered. )uth having
disabused our minds of a too sensitive appreciation of the rights of accused persons, and having
been able, as we think, to penetrate through the ma@e of law reports to the policy which lies behind
the constitutional guaranty and the common law principle, we have come finally to take our stand
with what we believe to be the reason of the case.
In contradistinction to the cases above$mentioned are others which seem to us more progressive
in nature. 7mong these can be prominently mentioned decisions of the Gnited tates upreme
Court, and the upreme Court of these Islands. "hus, the always forward looking !urist, 'r. Justice
Aolmes, in the late case of Aolt vs. Gnited tates %./-/01, 9/* G. ., 9,+&, in resolving an ob!ection
based upon what he termed Dan extravagant extension of the 6ifth 7mendment,D saidE D"he
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material.D %0ee also, of same general tenor, decision of 'r.
Justice (ay in 7dams vs. Few Jork ./-031, /-9 G. ., +*+.& "he upreme Court of the Philippine
Islands, in two decisions, has seemed to limit the protection to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self$incrimination. "he constitutional limitation was said to be Dsimply a prohibition
against legal process to extract from the defendant#s own lips, against his will, an admission of his
guilt.D %G. . vs. "an "eng ./-/91, 93 Phil., /,+; G. . vs. <ng iu Aong ./-/51, 38 Phil., 53+, and
the derivatory principle announced in /8 Corpus Juris, +85, +8*, citing the Gnited tates upreme
Court and the upreme Court of the Philippine Islands as authority.&
7lthough we have stated s proposition previously announced by this court and by the highest
tribunal in the Gnited tates, we cannot unconcernedly leave the sub!ect without further
consideration. Cven in the opinion 'r. Justice Aolmes, to which we have alluded, there was
inserted the careful proviso that Dwe need not consider how far a court would go in compelling a
man to exhibit himself.D <ther courts have likewise avoided any attempt to determine the exact
location of the dividing line between what is proper and what is improper in this very broad
constitutional field. )ut here before us is presented what would seem to be the most extreme case
which could be imagined. 2hile the Gnited tates upreme Court could nonchalantly decree that
testimony that an accused person put on a blouse and it fitted him is not a violation of the
constitutional provision, while the upreme Court of Fuevada could go so far as to reBuire the
defendant to roll up his sleeve in order to disclose tattoo marks, and while the upreme Court of
the Philippine Islands could permit substances taken from the person of an accused to be offered
in evidence, none of these even approach in apparent harshness an order to make a woman,
possibly innocent, to disclose her body in all of its sanctity to the ga@e of strangers. 2e can only
consistently consent to the retention of a principle which would permit of such a result by adhering
steadfastly to the proposition that the purpose of the constitutional provision was and is merely to
prohibit testimonial compulsion.
o much for the authorities. 6or the nonce we would prefer to forget them entirely, and here in the
Philippines, being in the agrreable state of breaking new ground, would rather desire our decision
to rest on a strong foundation of reason and !ustice than on a weak one blind adherence to
tradition and precedent. 'oreover, we believe that an unbiased consideration of the history of the
constitutional provisions will disclose that our conclusion is in exact accord with the causes which
led to its adoption.
"he maxim of the common law, 3e"o tenetur seipsu" a%%usare, was recogni@ed in Cngland in
early days, but not in the other legal systems of the world, in a revolt against the thumbscrew and
the rack. 7 legal shield was raised against odious inBuisitorial methods of interrogating an accused
person by which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever present temptation to commit the
crime of per!ury. "he kernel of the privilege as disclosed by the textwriters was testimonial
compulsion. 7s forcing a man to be a witness against himself was deemed contrary to the
fundamentals of republican government, the principle was taken into the 7merican Constitutions,
and from the Gnited tates was brought to the Philippine Islands, in exactly as wide I but no
wider I a scope as it existed in old Cnglish days. "he provision should here be approached in no
blindly worshipful spirit, but with a !udicious and a !udicial appreciation of both its benefits and its
abuses. %4ead the scholarly articles of Prof. 2igmore in + Aarvard ;. 4. ./*-/1, p. 5/, and /+
Aarvard ;. 4., /-09, p. 8/0 found in , 2igmore on Cvidence, pp. 308- et seB., and G. . vs.
Favarro ./-0,1, Phil., /,3.&
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once more to elements
and ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal trial. 7s we view it, the ob!ect of having
criminal laws is to purgue the community of persons who violate the laws to the great pre!udice of
their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then
provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. Fo rule is intemended to be so rigid
as to embarrass the administration of !ustice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth. Fo accused
person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to establish the truth. 6or
instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make the defendant admit her guilt might only
result in including her to tell a falsehood. )ut no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial
reason be held to be detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in
order to acBuit a guilty person.
<bviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law cause of the
Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own
body. It is extremely abhorrent to one#s sense of decency and propriety to have the decide that
such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another#s
ga@e. 7s 'r. Justice :ray in Gnion Pacific 4ailway Co. vs. )otsford %./*-/1, /,/ G. ., 9+0& said,
D"o compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a
stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass.D Conceded, and yet,
as well suggested by the same court, even superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let
alone is the inherent which the public has in the orderly administration of !ustice. Gnfortunately, all
too freBuently the modesty of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer, without any mental
evasion, Buestions which are put to them; and such a tendency to degrade the witness in public
estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure. )etween a sacrifice of the
ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for
refined notions of delicacy, law and !ustice cannot hesitate.
"he protection of accused persons has been carried to such an unwarranted extent that criminal
trials have sometimes seemed to be like a game of shuttlecocks, with the !udge as referee, the
lawyers as players, the criminal as guest of honor, and the public as fascinated spectators. 7gainst
such a loose extension of constitutional guaranties we are here prepared to voice our protest.
6ully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is
a shock to one#s sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this
!urisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental
influences. <nce again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self$incrimination. "he corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular
inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. "he proviso is that torture of force shall be
avoided. 2hether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course,
be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians
due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is
absolutely necessary. Indeed, no ob!ection to the physical examination being made by the family
doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.
7lthough the order of the trial !udge, acceding to the reBuest of the assistant fiscal for an
examination of the person of the defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should,
nevertheless, be understood as sub!ect to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal.
"he writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. "he costs shall be taxed against the
petitioner. o ordered.
G.R. No. 32025 Se/te*+e, 23, 1929
-R!N$IS$O '%L&R!N, petitioner,
vs.
-%LI4 S!MSON, (5)6e o2 t1e Secon) (5)icia3 Di0t,ict, an) -R!N$IS$O (OS%, ,o7incia3
-i0ca3 o2 I0a+e3a, respondents.
<re$orio =. -or"oso and ?i%ente -or"oso for petitioner.
+#e respondents in t#eir on 2e#alf.
ROM"!LD%8, J.:
"his is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent
!udge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting
from the latter.
"he order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner#s
handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified.
"here is no Buestion as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings; but the
respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the
order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and again which the
instant action was brought, is based on the provisions of section /8*5 of the 7dministrative Code
and on the doctrine laid down in the cases of People vs. )adilla %,* Phil., 5/*&; Gnited tates vs.
"an "eng %93 Phil., /,+&; Gnited tates vs. <ng iu Aong %38 Phil., 53+&, cited by counsel for the
respondents, and in the case of =illaflor vs. ummers %,/ Phil., 89& cited by the !udge in the order
in Buestion.
<f course, the fiscal under section /8*5 of the 7dministrative Code, and the proper !udge, upon
motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or
misdemeanor. )ut this power must be exercised without pre!udice to the constitutional rights of
persons cited to appear.
7nd the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones ;aw and incorporated in :eneral <rders, Fo. +*.
"herefore, the Buestion raised is to be decided by examining whether the constitutional provision
invoked by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute what is en!oined upon him by the order
against which these proceedings were taken.
aid provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones ;aw which %in panish& readsE D 3i se
le o2li$ara a de%larar en %ontra suya en nin$un pro%eso %ri"inal D and has been incorporated in our
Criminal Procedure %:eneral <rders, Fo. +*& in section /+ %Fo. , & and section +8.
7s to the extent of the privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the Cnglish text of the Jones
;aw, which is the original one, reads as followsE DFor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself.D
"his text is not limited to de%lara%ion but says Dto 2e a itness.D 'oreover, as we are concerned
with a principle contained both in the 6ederal constitution and in the constitutions of several states
of the Gnited tates, but expressed differently, we should take it that these various phrasings have
a common conception.
In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the variations of wording in the
constitutional clauses; this much is conceded %ante, par. 99+9&. It is therefore
immaterial that the witness is protected by one constitution from #testifying#, or by
another from #furnishing evidence#, or by another from #giving evidence,# or by still
another from #being a witness.# "hese various phrasings have a common conception, in
respect to the form of the protected disclosure. 2hat is that conceptionK %, 2igmore
on Cvidence, p. *83, /-93 ed.&
7s to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or
furnishing of evidence.
"he rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused
of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the
pressure toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the
evidence obscure, t#at is t#e duty of %ourts li2erally to %onstrue t#e pro#i2ition in favor
of personal ri$#ts' and to refuse to per"it any steps tendin$ toard t#eir invasion.
Aence, t#ere is t#e ellGesta2lis#ed do%trine t#at t#e %onstitutional in#i2ition is dire%ted
not "erely to $ivin$ of oral testi"ony' 2ut e"2ra%es as ell t#e furnis#in$ of eviden%e
2y ot#er "eans t#an 2y ord of "out#, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the
accused has a right to hold secret. %9* 4. C. ;., paragraph 90, page ,3, and notes.&
%Cmphasis ours.&
"he Buestion, then, is reduced to a determination of whether the writing from the fiscal#s dictation
by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter#s handwriting and determining whether he
wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the
scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.
2henever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cross$examination be compelled to write in open
court in order that the !ury maybe able to compare his handwriting with the one in Buestion.
It was so held in the case of )radford vs. People %,3 Pacific 4eporter, /0/3& inasmuch as the
defendant, in offering himself as witness in his own behalf, waived his personal privileges.
<f like character is the case of prouse vs. Com. %*/ =a., 35,,35*&, where the !udge asked the
defendant to write his name during the hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.
)ut the cases so resolved cannot be compared to the one now before us. 2e are not concerned
here with the defendant, for it does not appear that any information was filed against the petitioner
for the supposed falsification, and still less as it a Buestion of the defendant on trial testifying and
under cross$examination. "his is only an investigation prior to the information and with a view to
filing it. 7nd let it further be noted that in the case of prouse vs. Com., the defendant performed
the act voluntarily.
2e have also come upon a case wherein the handwriting or the form of writing of the defendant
was obtained2efore the criminal action was instituted against him. 2e refer to the case of People
vs. 'olineux %8/ Fortheastern 4eporter, 9*8&.
Feither may it be applied to the instant case, because there, as in the aforesaid case of prouse
vs. Com., t#e defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting.
2e cite this case particularly because the court there gives prominence to the defendant#s right to
decline to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. "he following appears in the body of said
decision referred to %page 305 of the volume cited&E
+#e defendant #ad t#e le$al ri$#t to refuse to rite for Hinsley. Be preferred to a%%ede
to t#e latterCs request, and we can discover no ground upon which the writings thus
produced can be excluded from the case. %Cmphasis ours.&
6or the reason it was held in the case of 6irst Fational )ank vs. 4obert %,/ 'ich., 50-; 3 F. 2.,
/--&, that the defendant could not be compelled to write his name, the doctrine being stated as
followsE
"he defendant being sworn in his own behalf denied the endorsement.
Ae was then cross$examined the Buestion in regard to his having signed papers not in
the case, and was asked in particular whether he would not produce signatures made
prior to the note in suit, and whether he would not write his name there in the court.
"he !udge excluded all these inBuiries, on ob!ection, and it is of these rulings that
complaint is made. "he ob!ect of the Buestions was to bring into the case extrinsic
signatures, for the purpose of comparison by the !ury, and we think that the !udge was
correct in ruling against it.
It is true that the eminent Professor 2igmore, in his work cited %volume ,, page *5*&, saysE
Measurin$ or p#oto$rap#in$ the party is not within the privilege. For it is
the re"oval or repla%e"ent of his garments or shoes. For is the reBuirement that the
party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. 4eBuiring him to
make spe%i"ens of #andritin$ is no more than reBuiring him to move his body . . .D
but he cites no case in support of his last assertion on specimens of handwriting. 2e
note that in the same paragraph 998+, where said authors treats of D)odily Cxhibition.D
and under preposition D/. 7 great variety of concrete illustrations have been ruled
upon,D he cites many cases, among them that of People vs. 'olineux %8/ F. C., 9*8&
which, as we have seen, has no application to the case at bar because there the
defendant voluntary gave specimens of his handwriting, while here the petitioner
refuses to do so and has even instituted these prohibition proceedings that he may not
be compelled to do so.
6urthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands,
or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it reBuires the application of
intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to
furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent
fiscal clearly states. Cxcept that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of
producing documents or chattels in one#s possession. 7nd as to such production of documents or
chattels. which to our mind is not so serious as the case now before us, the same eminent
Professor 2igmore, in his work cited, says %volume ,, page *8,&E
. . . 998,. =rodu%tion or .nspe%tion of 1o%u"ents and ,#attels. I /. It follows that the
production of documents or chattels by a person %whether ordinary witness or party$
witness& in response to a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form
of pro%ess treatin$ #i" as a itness % i.e. as a person appearing before a tribunal to
furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for truthtelling&, may be refused under the
protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded. %7nd he cites the case of
People vs. :ardner, /,, F. J., //-; 3* F.C., /003&
2e say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who
is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is reBuired to furnish evidence against himself.
7nd we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of
documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the
act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. 7nd for
this reason the same eminent author, Professor 2igmore, explaining the matter of the production
of documents and chattels, in the passage cited, addsE
6or though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and though the documents
or chattels 2e already in existen%e and not desired to 2e first ritten and %reated 2y
testi"onial a%t or utterance of the person in response to the process, still no line can
be drawn short of any process which treats him as a witness; because in virtue it would
be at any time liable to make oath to the identity or authenticity or origin of the articles
produced. %.2id., pp. *8,$*8+.& %Cmphasis ours.&
It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner#s handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Cxhibit 7, it should not be a
difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. )ut even supposing
it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained
herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might
be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of !ustice, but such cases
are accidental and do not constitute the raison dC etre of the privilege. "his constitutional privilege
exists for the protection of innocent persons.
2ith respect to the !udgments rendered by this court and cited on behalf of the respondents, it
should be remembered that in the case of People vs. )adilla %,* Phil., 5/*&, it does not appear that
the defendants and other witnesses were Buestioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did
not refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege, as they
could certainly do.
"he privilege not to give self$incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed,
maybe waived by any one entitled to invoke it. %9* 4. C. ;., paragraph 9-, page ,,9,
and cases noted.&
"he same holds good in the case of Gnited tates vs. "an "eng %93 Phil., /,+&, were the
defendant did not oppose the extraction from his body of the substance later used as evidence
against him.
In the case of =illaflor vs. ummers %,/ Phil., 89&, it was plainly stated that the court preferred to
rest its decision on the reason of the case rather than on blind adherence to tradition. "he said
reason of the case there consisted in that it was the case of the examination of the body by
physicians, which could be and doubtless was interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion of
the petitioner therein to furnish evidence by means of testi"onial a%t. In reality she was not
compelled to execute any positive act, much less a testimonial act; she was only en!oined from
something preventing the examination; all of which is very different from what is reBuired of the
petitioner of the present case, where it is sought to compel him to perform a positive' testi"onial
a%t, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparison. )esides, in the
case of =illamor vs. ummers, it was sought to exhibit something already in existence, while in the
case at bar, the Buestion deals with something not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought to
compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence not yet in existence; in
short, to create this evidence which may seriously incriminate him.
imilar considerations suggest themselves to us with regard to the case of Gnited tates vs. <ng
iu Aong %38 Phil., 53+&, wherein the defendant was not compelled to perform any testi"onial a%t,
but to take out of his mouth the morphine he had there. It was not compelling him to testify or to be
a witness or to furnish, much less make, prepare, or create through a testimonial act, evidence for
his own condemnation.
2herefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the respondents and those
under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take
down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
2ithout express pronouncement as to costs. o ordered.
G.R. No. L-29169 !5650t 19, 1968
ROG%R $.!#%8, petitioner,
vs.
&.% .ONOR!'L% $O"R& O- !%!LS, &.% %OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S an) &.%
9!RD%N O- &.% $I&: (!IL O- M!NIL!, respondents.
Astanislao A. -ernandez and -austo Ar%e for petitioner.
;ffi%e of t#e 0oli%itor <eneral for respondents.
S!N$.%8, J.:
"he thrust of petitioner#s case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking
!urisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment
upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his conviction
/
he was denied his constitutional
right not to be compelled to testify against himself. "here is his prayer, too, that, should he fail in
this, he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the
Court of 7ppeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said
court to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely Buestions of law.
"he indictment in the court below I the third amended information I upon which the !udgment of
conviction herein challenged was rendered, was for Bualified theft of a motor vehicle, one %/&
"hunderbird car, 'otor Fo. A-JA$/,3003, with Plate Fo. A$/88,* Pasay City #89 together with its
accessories worth P99,900.00. 7ccused were the followingE Petitioner herein, 4oger Chave@,
4icardo umilang alias D4omeo =asBue@D, Cdgardo P. Pascual alias D:ingD Pascual, Pedro
4ebullo alias DPitaD, ;uis 7sistio alias D)abyD 7sistio, ;oren@o 'eneses aliasD;oryD 'eneses, Peter
(oe, Charlie (oe and Paul (oe.
9
7verred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the /,th day of Fovember, /-89, in
?ue@on City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the
consent of the owner thereof, (y un Aiok y ;im, in asporting the motor vehicle above$described.
Gpon arraignment, all the accused, except the three (oes who have not been identified nor
apprehended, pleaded not guilty.1p#I1.@Jt
<n July 93, /-83, trial commenced before the !udge presiding )ranch IH of the Court of 6irst
Instance of 4i@al in ?ue@on City.
"he trial opened with the following dialogue, which for the great bearing it has on this case, is here
reproducedE.
C<G4"E
"he parties may proceed.
6IC7; :4CCI7E
;ur first itness is Ro$er ,#avez .one of the accused1.
7""J. C74)<F .Counsel for petitioner Chave@1E
I am Buite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused 4oger Chave@, with this move
of the 6iscal in presenting him as his witness. . o2Ke%t.
C<G4"E
<n what ground, counselK .
7""J. C74)<FE
<n the ground that I have to confer with my client. It is really surprising that at this
stage, without my being notified by the 6iscal, my client is being presented as witness
for the prosecution. I want to say in passing that it is only at this very moment that I
come to know about this strategy of the prosecution.
C<G4" %"o the 6iscal&E
Jou are not withdrawing the information against the accused 4oger Chave@ by making
.him a1 state witnessK.
6IC7; :4CCI7E
I am not making him as state witness, Jour Aonor.
. a" only presentin$ #i" as an ordinary itness.
7""J. C74)<FE
As a "atter of ri$#t' 2e%ause it ill in%ri"inate "y %lient' . o2Ke%t.
C<G4"E
"he Court will give counsel for 4oger Chave@ fifteen minutes within which to confer
and explain to his client about the giving of his testimony.
x x x x x x x x x
C<G4"E .after the recess1
7re the parties readyK .
6IC7;E
2e are ready to call on our first witness, 4oger Chave@.
7""J. C74)<FE
7s per understanding, the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me to confer
with my client.
I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the prosecution
this morning after I have explained to him the conseBuences of what will transpire.
C<G4"E
2hat he will testify to does not ne%essarily in%ri"inate #i"' %ounsel.
And t#ere is t#e ri$#t of t#e prose%ution to asL any2ody to a%t as itness on t#e
itnessGstand in%ludin$ t#e a%%used.
If there should be any Buestion that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to
interpose his ob!ection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that
the answer of this witness to the Buestion would incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not reBuire the witness to answer
Buestions which would incriminate him.
>ut surely' %ounsel %ould not o2Ke%t to #ave t#e a%%used %alled on t#e itnessstand.
7""J. C74)<FE
I submit.
x x x x x x x x x
7""J. C4G> .Counsel for defendants Pascual and 'eneses1E .
'7J I" P;C7C "AC C<G4"E
"his incident of the accused 4oger Chave@ being called to testify for the prosecution is
something so sudden that has come to the knowledge of this counsel.
"his representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the information.
6or which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet whatever
testimony this witness will bring about. I therefore move for postponement of today#s
hearing.
C<G4"E
"he court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross$examination of this
witness.
7""J. C4G>E
I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this criminal
case are those only listed in the information.
I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as witness for the
prosecution.
C<G4"E
"hat#s the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused and will
give them time within which to prepare for their cross$examination of this witness.
"he court ill not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.
,all t#e itness to the witness stand.
A?.1A3,A -;R +BA =R;0A,M+.;3
4<:C4 CA7=C>, 3/ years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently detained at
the 'anila Police (epartment headBuarters, after being duly sworn according to law,
declared as followsE
7""J. I)7C< .Counsel for defendant ;uis 7sistio1E
2I"A "AC ;C7=C <6 "AC C<G4"E
"his witness, 4oger Chave@ is one of the accused in this case Fo. ?$+3//.
"he information alleges conspiracy. Gnder 4ule /93, ection /9, it statesE
#"he act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co$conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.#
C<G4"E
"hat is premature, counsel. Feither the court nor counsels for the accused know what
the prose%ution events to esta2lis# by calling this witness to the witness stand.
7""J. I)7C<E
I submit.
C<G4"E "he 6iscal may proceed.
3
7nd so did the trial proceed. It began with the Ddirect examinationD of 4oger Chave@ by D6iscal
:reciaD.
Came the !udgment of 6ebruary /, /-8+. "he version of the prosecution as found by the court
below may be briefly narrated as followsE
7 few days before Fovember /9, /-89, 4oger Chave@ saw Johnson ;ee, a Chinese, driving a
"hunderbird car. 2ith 4icardo umilang %movie actor 4omeo =asBue@& in mind, whom he knew
was in the market for such a car, Chave@ asked ;ee whether his car was for sale. ;ee answered
affirmatively and left his address with Chave@. "hen, on Fovember /9, Chave@ met umilang at a
barbershop informed him about the "hunderbird. )ut umilang said that he had changed his mind
about buying a new car. Instead, he told Chave@ that he wanted to mortgage his )uick car for
P/0,000.00 to cover an indebtedness in Pasay City. Gpon the suggestion of Chave@, they went to
see ;uis 7sistio, who he knew was lending money on car mortgages and who, on one occasion,
already lent 4omeo =asBue@ P3,000.00 on the same )uick car. 7sistio however told the two that
he had a better idea on how to raise the money. Ais plan was to capitali@e on 4omeo =asBue@#
reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car
and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. 7sistio would then
register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chave@ known to be a car agent was included in the
plan. Ae furnished the name of Johnson ;ee who was selling his "hunderbird. 1p#I1.@Jt
In the morning of Fovember /,, Chave@ telephoned Johnson ;ee and arranged for an
appointment. ometime in the afternoon. Chave@ and umilang met ;ee in his "hunderbird on
Aighway +,. umilang was introduced as the interested buyer. umilang#s driver inspected the
car, took the wheel for a while. 7fter umilang and ;ee agreed on the purchase price
%P9/.000.00&, they went to )inondo to Johnson ;ee#s cousin, (y un Aiok, in whose name the car
was registered. "hereafter, they went to see a lawyer notary public in ?ue@on City, known to
Chave@ for the drafting of the deed of sale. 7fter the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by
umilang as the vendee, (y un Aiok the vendor, and umilang#s driver and Johnson ;ee the
witnesses thereto.
7s payment was to be made at Cugene#s restaurant in ?ue@on City, all of them then drove in the
"hunderbird car to that place. "he deed of sale and other papers remained in the pockets of
Johnson ;ee.
7t Cugene#s, a man approached umilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at
the (alisay "heater. umilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to
the restaurant. 7t the same time he reBuested ;ee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note
bearer.
,
"hen, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. 6or umilang, who had left the table to
pose for pictures with some fans and come back, again left never to return. o did Chave@, who
disappeared after he left on the pretext of buying cigarettes. "he two Chinese could not locate
umilang and Chave@. "hey went out to the place where the "hunderbird was parked, found that it
was gone. "hey then immediately reported its loss to the police. 'uch later, the F)I recovered the
already repainted car and impounded it.
4ight after the meeting at Cugene#s, Chave@, umilang and 7sistio converged that same day at
)arrio 6iesta, a restaurant at Aighway +, near the )alintawak monument in Caloocan. "here,
7sistio handed to umilang P/,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P*00.00 as the latter#s share in
the transaction. <n the /,th of Fovember, the registration of the car was transferred in the name of
umilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of 7sistio in Caloocan.
6rom the court#s decision, 4icardo umilang#s version, corroborated in part by 7sistio, may be
condensed as followsE
In the last week of eptember, /-89, umilang saw 4oger Chave@ at a gas station. "he latter
informed him that there was a "hunderbird from Clark 6ield for sale for a price between
P90,000.00 and P99,000.00. Chave@ said that it could be held for him with a down payment of
P/0,000.00.
"o raise this sum, umilang and Chave@, on <ctober /, went to the house of a certain Fena
Aernae@ de los 4eyes who wrote out a check for P+,000.00 as a loan to umilang. "hat check was
exhibited in court. umilang and Chave@ then went to Pasay City to see a certain 'ario )alta@ar,
an agent of the Pasay City 'ayor, and Farsing Cailles, Chief of the 6ire (epartment. umilang
asked the two for a P/0,000$loan backed up by the P+,000.00$check aforesaid on condition that it
should not be cashed immediately as there were not enough funds therefor. )alta@ar and Cailles
agreed to give the money the nextday as long as the check would be left with them and umilang
would sign a promissory note for P/0,000.00. )alta@ar later informed umilang that Chave@ picked
up the money the next day. 6our or five days afterwards, Chave@ returned P,,000.00 to umilang
because P8,000.00 was enough for the deposit. 7nd so, umilang gave back the P,,000.00 to
)alta@ar.
7bout the end of <ctober or at the beginning of Fovember, Chave@ asked umilang for another
P3,000.00. umilang sent Chave@ to )alta@ar and Cailles, with a note reBuesting that they
accommodate him once more. Ae also sent a check, again without funds. )alta@ar gave the
money after verifying the authenticity of the note.
<n Fovember /,, Chave@ appeared at umilang#s house with the news that the car was ready if
umilang was ready with the rest of the money. o umilang got P-,000.00 from his mother and
another P,,000.00 from his aparador. Ae immediately gave P8,000.00 to Chave@, intending to pay
out the balance upon the car#s delivery. It was then that Chave@ told umilang that the car was
already bought by a Chinese who would be the vendor.
"he purchase price finally agreed upon between umilang and Johnson ;ee was P9/,000.00, plus
P+00.00 agents commission at the expense of the buyer. umilang told ;ee that he already paid
part of the price to Chave@.
7t Cugene#s, Chave@ asked umilang for the balance. umilang accommodated. "here, umilang,
also saw a friend, D:ingD Pascual. In the course of their conversation at the bar, umilang
mentioned the proposed transaction thru Chave@. Pascual warned that Chave@ was a DsmartD
agent and advised that umilang should have a receipt for his money. 7 certain )imbo, a friend of
Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chave@ to sign.
7fter umilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his fans, )imbo showed
him the receipt already signed by Chave@. umilang reBuested Pascual and )imbo to sign the
receipt as witnesses. 7nd they did. "his receipt was offered as an exhibit by the prosecution and
by umilang.
2hen umilang was ready to leave Cugene#s, Johnson ;ee turned over to him the deed of sale,
the registration papers and the keys to the car. 7fter shaking hands with ;ee, umilang drove
away in the car with his driver at the wheel.
"wo or three days afterwards, umilang dropped by the )arrio 6iesta on his way to a film shooting
at )ulacan. Ae saw 7sistio with many companions. 7sistio liked his "hunderbird parked outside.
7sistio offered to buy it from him for P99,+00.00. 7s the offer was good, and knowing 7sistio#s and
his friends# reputation for always getting what they wanted, umilang consented to the sale. 7sistio
tendered a down payment of P/,000.00; the balance he promised to pay the next day after
negotiating with some financing company. )efore said balance could be paid, the car was
impounded.
"he trial court gave evidence to umilang#s averment, strengthened by )alta@ar#s and Cailles#
corroborations, that he paid good money for the car. umilang was thus cleared. o was 7sistio
whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. 7nd so, the prosecution#s theory of
conspiracy was discounted.
7s to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro 4ebullo alias DPitaD and ;oren@o
'eneses alias D;oryD. "he accused D:ingD Pascual was also acBuitted for in the first place he was
not identified by Johnson ;ee in court.
7s to 4oger Chave@, however, the court had this to sayE D4oger Chave@ does not offer any
defense. 7s a matter of fact, #is testi"ony as itness for t#e prose%ution esta2lis#es #is $uilt
2eyond reasona2le dou2t.D
+
"he trial court branded him Da self$confessed culpritD.
8
"he court
further continuedE
It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company 4oger Chave@
tried to drag his co$accused down with him by coloring #is story it# fa2ri%ations which
he expected would easily stick together what with the newspaper notoriety of one and
the sensationalism caused by the other. )ut 4oger Chave@#a%%usations of 7sistio#s
participation is utterly uncorroborated. 7nd coming, as it does, from a man who has
had at least two convictions for acts not very different from those charged in this
information, the Court would be too gullible if it ere to $ive full %reden%e to #is
ords even if they concerned a man no less notorious than himself.
5
"he trial court then came to the conclusion that if Johnson ;ee was not paid for his car, he had no
one but 4oger Chave@ to blame.
"he sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except 4oger Chave@ who was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified t#eft. Ae was accordingly sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than ten %/0& years, one %/& day, as minimum and not
more than fourteen %/,& years, eight %*& months and one %/& day as maximum, to indemnify (y un
Aiok andLor Johnson ;ee in the sum of P9/,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. "he
"hunderbird car then in the custody of the F)I was ordered to be turned over to 4icardo umilang,
who was directed to return to 7sistio the sum of P/,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay
P9/,+00.00, representing the balance of the contract price for the car.
"he foregoing sentence was promulgated on 'arch *, /-8+. 4oger Chave@ appealed to the Court
of 7ppeals.
<n 7pril /*, /-8*, the Court of 7ppeals reBuired 7tty. Fatividad 'arBue@, counsel for 4oger
Chave@, to show cause within ten days from notice why Chave@# appeal should not be considered
abandoned and dismissed. 4eason for this is that said lawyer received notice to file brief on
(ecember 9*, /-85 and the period for the filing thereof lapsed on January 95, /-8* without any
brief having been filed.
<n 'ay /3, /-8*, 7tty. 'arBue@ registered a detailed written explanation. he also stated that if
she were allowed to file appellant#s brief s#e ould $o alon$ it# t#e fa%tual findin$s of the court
below but will show however that its conclusion is erroneous.
*
<n 'ay /,, /-8*, the Court of 7ppeals, despite the foregoing explanation, resolved to dismiss the
appeal. 7 move to reconsider was unavailing. 6or, on June 9/, /-8*, the Court of 7ppeals,
through a per curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its 'ay /, resolution dismissing the appeal,
directed the City 2arden of 'anila where Chave@ is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest
issued by the Court of 7ppeals, to turn him over to 'untinlupa )ilibid Prisons pending execution of
the !udgment below, and ordered remand of the case to the ?ue@on City court for execution of
!udgment.
It was at this stage that the present proceedings were commenced in this Court.
Gpon the petitions, the return, and the reply, and after hearing on oral arguments, we now come to
grips with the main problem presented.
2e concentrate attention on that phase of the issues which relates petitioner#s assertion that he
was compelled to testify against himself. 6or indeed if this one Buestion is resolved in the
affirmative, we need not reach the others; in which case, these should not be pursued here.
/. Petitioner#s plea on this score rests upon his averment, with proof, of violation of his right I
constitutionally entrenched I against self$incrimination. Ae asks that the hand of this Court be
made to bear down upon his conviction; that he be relieved of the effects thereof. Ae asks us to
consider the constitutional in!unction that DFo person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself,D
-
fully echoed in ection /, 4ule //+, 4ules of Court where, in all criminal prosecutions,
the defendant shall be entitledE D%e& "o be exempt from being a witness against himself.D .
It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with Dthe fundamentals
of a republican governmentD;
/0
that .i1t may suit the purposes of despotic power but it can not
abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom.D
//
'r. Justice 7bad antos
recounts the historical background of this constitutional inhibition, thusE D D"he maxim 3e"o
tenetur seipsu" a%%usare had its origin in a protest against the inBuisitorial and manifestly un!ust
methods of interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in the continental system, and,
until the expulsion of the tuarts from the )ritish throne in /8**, and the erection of additional
barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, was not uncommon
even in Cngland. 2hile the admissions of confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely
made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be
asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the
Buestions put to him may assume an inBuisitorial character, the temptation to press, the witness
unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into
fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those
of ir Ficholas "hrockmorton, and Gdal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to
give rise to a demand for its total abolition. "he change in the Cnglish criminal procedure in that
particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no !udicial opinion, but upon a general and
silent acBuiescence of the courts in a popular demand. )ut, however adopted, it has become firmly
embedded in Cnglish, as well as in 7merican !urisprudence. o deeply did the iniBuities of the
ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the 7merican colonists that the states, with
one accord, made a denial of the right to Buestion an accused person a part of their fundamental
law, so that a maxim which in Cngland was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this
country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.D %)rown vs. 2alker, /8/ G.., +-/,
+-5; ,0 ;aw. ed., */-, *9/&.D
/9
'r. Justice 'alcolm, in expressive language, tells us that this
maxim was recogni@ed in Cngland in the early days Din a revolt against the thumbscrew and the
rack.D
/3
7n old Philippine case ./-0,1
/,
speaks of this constitutional in!unction as Dolder than the
:overnment of the Gnited tatesD; as having Dits origin in a protest against the inBuisitorial
methods of interrogating the accused personD; and as having been adopted in the Philippines Dto
wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of reBuiring accused persons to
submit to !udicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the offenses with which they were
charged.D
o it is then that this right is Dnot merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to
the discretion of the courtD; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive
right;
/+
it is fundamental to our scheme of !ustice. Just a few months ago, the upreme Court of
the Gnited tates %January 9-, /-8*&, speaking thru 'r. Justice Aarlan warned that D.t1he
constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and
foresighted.D
/8
It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern.
"o repeat, it is mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right. "aMada
and 6ernando %Constitution of the Philippines, ,th ed., vol. I, pp. +*3$+*,& take note of M.0. vs.
3avarro' supra' which reaffirms the rule that the constitutional proscription was established on
broad grounds of public policy and humanity; of policy because it would place the witness against
the strongest temptation to commit per!ury, and of humanity because it would be to extort a
confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors.
/5
"herefore, the court may not extract from a defendant#s own lips and against his will an admission
of his guilt. For may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of
facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the
commission of a crime. )ecause, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand I with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine
will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be
the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him
from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational !udgment would in our
opinion be sufficient. o is moral coercion Dtending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant.D
/*
9. 2ith the foregoing as guideposts, we now turn to the facts. Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal
case. Ae was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People
during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner ob!ected and invoked the privilege of self$
incrimination. "his he broadened by the clear cut statement that #e ill not testify. )ut petitioner#s
protestations were met with the !udge#s emphatic statement that it Dis the right of the prosecution to
ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand in%ludin$ t#e a%%used'D and that defense
counsel D%ould not o2Ke%t to have the accused called on the witness stand.D "he cumulative impact
of all these is that accused$petitioner had to take the stand. Ae was thus peremptorily asked to
create evidence against himself. "he foregoing situation molds a solid case for petitioner, backed
by the Constitution, the law, and !urisprudence.
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. 2hereas an
ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each
Buestion reBuiring an incriminating answer is shot at him,
/-
and accused may altogether refuse to
take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all Buestions.
90
6or, in reality, the purpose of
calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him.
9/
"he rule positively
intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person Dto furnish
the missing evidence necessary for his conviction.D
99
"his rule may apply even to a co$defendant
in a !oint trial.
93
7nd the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be
compelled to furnish evidence against himself Dis not the probability of the evidence but it is
the %apa2ility of a2use.D
9,
"hus it is, that it was undoubtedly erroneous for the trial !udge to placate
petitioner with these wordsE.
2hat he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
7nd there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the
witness$stand including the accused.
If there should be any Buestion that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to
interpose his ob!ection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that
the answer of this witness to the Buestion would incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not reBuire the witness to answer
Buestions which would incriminate him.
)ut surely, counsel could not ob!ect to have the accused called on the witness stand.
Paraphrasing Chief Justice 'arshall in 7aron )urr#s "rial, 4obertsons 4ep. I, 90*, 9,,, Buoted in
=III 2igmore, p. 3++,
9+
2hile a defendant#s knowledge of the facts remains concealed within his
bosom, he is safe; but draw it from thence, and he is exposedD I to conviction.
"he !udge#s words heretofore Buoted I D)ut surely counsel could not ob!ect to have the accused
called on the witness standD I wielded authority. )y those words, petitioner was enveloped by a
coercive force; they deprived him of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice; the realities of human
nature tell us that as he took his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no
genuine consent underlay submission to take the witness stand. Constitutionally sound consent
was absent.
3. Pre!udice to the accused for having been compelled over his ob!ections to be a witness for the
People is at once apparent. "he record discloses that by leading Buestions Chave@, the accused,
was made to affirm his statement given to the F)I agents on July /5, /-83 at +E00 o#clock in the
afternoon.
98
7nd this statement detailed the plan and execution thereof by umilang %=asBue@&,
7sistio and himself to deprive the Chinese of his "hunderbird car. 7nd he himself proceeded to
narrate the same anew in open court. Ae identified the "hunderbird car involved in the case.
95
"he decision convicting 4oger Chave@ was clearly of the view that the case for the People was
built primarily around the admissions of Chave@ himself. "he trial court described Chave@ as the
Dstar witness for the prosecutionD. Indeed, the damaging facts forged in the decision were drawn
directly from the lips of Chave@ as a prosecution witness and of course 4icardo umilang for the
defense. "here are the uneBuivocal statements in the decision that Deven accused Chave@D
identified Dthe very same "hunderbird that Johnson ;ee had offered for saleD; that Chave@
Dtestimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that
Chave@ is Da self$confessed culpritD. 1p#I1.@Jt
,. 2ith all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate
himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has
waived his right. Ae did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer
himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner
nevertheless answered the Buestions inspite of his fear of being accused of per!ury or being put
under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. Ais testimony is not of his own
choice. "o him it was a case of compelled submission. Ae was a cowed participant in proceedings
before a !udge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain
silent. For could he escape testifying. "he court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at
least on direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial.
It matters not that, after all efforts to stave off petitioner#s taking the stand became fruitless, no
ob!ections to Buestions propounded to him were made. Aere involve is not a mere Buestion of self$
incrimination. It is a defendant#s constitutional immunity from being called to testify against himself.
7nd the ob!ection made at the beginning is a continuing one. 1p#I1.@Jt
"here is therefore no waiver of the privilege. D"o be effective, a waiver must be certain
and unequivo%al, andintelli$ently' understanda2ly' and illin$ly made; such waiver following only
where li2erty of %#oi%e has been fully accorded. 7fter a claim a witness cannot properly be held to
have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence.D
9*
"he teaching in Fo#nson vs.
:er2st
9-
is thisE DIt has been pointed out that Dcourts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiverD of fundamental constitutional rights and that we Ddo not presume acBuiescence in the loss
of fundamental rights.D 7 waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinBuishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.D Renuntiatio non praesu"itur.
"he foregoing guidelines, !uxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to,
make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt,
still, his original claim remains valid. 6or the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives
protection $ even to t#e $uilty.
30
+. "he course which petitioner takes is correct. Ba2eas %orpus is a high prerogative writ.
3/
It is
traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally
restrained such as when the accused#s constitutional rights are disregarded.
39
uch defect results
in the absence or loss of !urisdiction
33
and therefore invalidates the trial and the conseBuent
conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated.
3,
"hat void !udgment of conviction
may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus.
3+
"his
writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the
defendant.
38
"hus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of 7ppeals does
not preclude a recourse to the writ.
35
"he writ may be granted upon a !udgment already
final.
3*
6or, as explained in Fo#nson vs. :er2st'
3-
the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary
remedy must be li2erally $iven effe%t
,0
so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. "he
propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional
right, in this wiseE
ince the ixth 7mendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the
assistance of Counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential
!urisdictional prereBuisite to a 6ederal Court#s authority. 2hen this right is properly
waived, the assistance of Counsel is no longer a necessary element of the Court#s
!urisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If the accused, however, is not
represented by Counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his
constitutional right, the ixth 7mendment stands as a !urisdictional bar to a valid
conviction and sentence depriving him of his liberty. A %ourtCs Kurisdi%tion at t#e
2e$innin$ of trial "ay 2e lost Din t#e %ourse of t#e pro%eedin$sD due to failure to
%o"plete t#e %ourt I as the ixth 7mendment reBuires I 2y providin$ ,ounsel for an
a%%used #o is una2le to o2tain ,ounsel, who has not intelligently waived this
constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this reBuirement of the
ixth 7mendment is not complied with, t#e %ourt no lon$er #as Kurisdi%tion to
pro%eed. "he !udgment of conviction pronounced by a court without !urisdiction is void,
and one i"prisoned t#ereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus.
,/
Gnder our own 4ules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused 4oger Chave@ whose case
presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. ection / of 4ule
/09 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, Dto all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to restate thatE D7 void !udgment is
in legal effect no !udgment. )y it no rights are divested. 6rom it no rights can be obtained. )eing
worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are eBually worthless. It neither binds nor bars
any one. 7ll acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. "he parties attempting
to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. ... D
,9
8. 4espondents# return
,3
shows that petitioner is still serving under a final and valid !udgment of
conviction for another offense. 2e should guard against the improvident issuance of an order
discharging a petitioner from confinement. "he position we take here is that petitioner herein is
entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect to Criminal Case ?$+3// of the Court of
6irst Instance of 4i@al, ?ue@on City )ranch, under which he was prosecuted and convicted.
Gpon the view we take of this case, !udgment is hereby rendered directing the respondent 2arden
of the City Jail of 'anila or the (irector of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of
petitioner 4oger Chave@ by reason of the !udgment of the Court of 6irst Instance of 4i@al, ?ue@on
City )ranch, in Criminal Case ?$+3//, entitledD=eople of t#e =#ilippines' plaintiff' vs. Ri%ardo
0u"ilan$' et al.' accused,D to discharge said 4oger Chave@ from custody, unless he is held, kept
in custody or detained for any cause or reason other than the said !udgment in said Criminal Case
?$+3// of the Court of 6irst Instance of 4i@al, ?ue@on City )ranch, in which event the discharge
herein directed shall be effected when such other cause or reason ceases to exist.
Fo costs. o ordered.
G.R. No. 133025 -e+,5a,y 17, 2000
%OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, plaintiff$appellee,
vs.
R!D%L G!LL!RD%, accused$appellant.
D!#ID%, (R., C.J.:
"his is an appeal from the !udgment of the 4egional "rial Court of "ayug, Pangasinan, )ranch +/,
finding accused$appellant 4adel :allarde
/
%hereafter :7;;74(C& guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder in Criminal Case Fo. "$/-5* and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of re%lusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Cditha "alan %hereafter C(I"A7& the amount of
P50,000 as actual damages.
9
<n 9, June /--5, :7;;74(C was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide
in an information whose accusatory portion reads as followsE
"hat on or about the 8th day of 'ay /--5, in the evening, amidst the field located at
)rgy. "renchera, .'1unicipality of "ayug, .P1rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the !urisdiction of this Aonorable Court, the above$named accused, and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with one C(I"A7 "7;7F, a minor$/0 years of age,
against her will and consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the nose and
mouth of the said minor resulting to her death and then bury her in the field, to the
damage and pre!udice of the heirs of said C(I"A7 "7;7F.
3
(uring the arraignment on / eptember /--5, :7;;74(C, with the assistance of counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty.
,
"rial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the
holding of the pre$trial conference.
"he witnesses presented by the prosecution were 'ario 6ernande@, Jaime Cabinta, 4osy
Clemente, 6elicisimo 'endo@a, 7lfredo Corte@, 4enato 6ernande@, P<, <scar ). ;ope@, and (r.
Perfecto "ebangin. "he relevant and material facts established by their testimonies are faithfully
summari@ed in the 7ppellee#s )rief as followsE
In the evening of 'ay 98, /--5, at the house of spouses Cduardo and Clena "alan in
)rgy. "renchea, "ayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. 7mong them were
appellant 4adel :allarde, 6rancisco, 4enato, Cdwin, all surnamed 6ernande@, 4omel
Aernande@, Jaime Cabinta, 4osy Clemente, Jon "alen, Foel 7rellaga and 4amil
)argon. Idling by was Cditha, /0 year old daughter of spouses "alan. 7 fluorescent
lamp illuminated them as they partook beer %"F dated <ctober /3, /--5, pp. 3$,&.
7fter a while, 4oger stood up and invited Jaime and appellant to dine in the kitchen. 7s
they partook of the meal, appellant suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen
to urinate. <utside the house, he chanced upon appellant and Cditha talking to each
other. Jaime whistled at appellant but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted
towards the road leading to his house %.d., pp. ,$8&.
"hereafter, Cditha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime
followed her and asked where she was going. Cditha answered that she would look for
appellant. oon Cditha left enroute to where appellant fled %.d., pp. 5$*&.
)y /0E00 o#clock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime,
6rancisco, Cdwin and 4ose regrouped at 4enato#s place where they talked and
relaxed. 'oments later, 4oger arrived and informed them that Cditha was missing.
4oger asked the group to help look for her %.d., p. /0&.
Clena "alan informed his uncle, )arangay Cx$kagawad 'ario 6ernande@, about her
daughter#s disappearance. "he latter, together with his son Cdwin, wife =irginia and
nephew 6reddie Corte@ wasted no time in !oining their neighbors search the houses,
dikes and fields to look for the missing child. "he searchers used a lighted rubber tire
%"F dated ept. 9,, /--5, pp. *$/0 and 9,&.
2hen Jaime mentioned that appellant was the last person he saw talking to Cditha, the
searchers went back to the house of appellant. 7bout 5 meters away from appellant#s
house, one of the searchers, 7lfredo Corte@, found Cditha#s left foot slipper %"F dated
<ctober 99, /--5, pp. ,$8&. uddenly, Cdwin 6ernande@ announcedE D"ata, 4adel is
hereND pointing to the toilet about 8 meters away from appellant#s house. "he searchers
found appellant sBuatting with his short pants. Ais hands and knees were covered with
soil. 2hen confronted by ex$kagawad Aernande@ why he was there, appellant
answered he was relieving himself %.d., pp. //$/8&.
7sked where Cditha was, appellant repliedE DI do not know, I did not do anything to
her.D 2hen told I Daccording to Jimmy, you were with Cditha.D appellant responded DI
let her go and brought her back to the dike and let her go home.D "o the next Buestion,
Dwhere did you come from since a while a go you were not yet in this toiletKD appellant
answered DI was with Oiko, I was asleep in their house. <ne of the searchers 'ario
)ado, got angry and countered that appellant#s statement was impossible because
Oiko was with him drinking %.d., pp. /8$90&.
7fter the confrontation at the toilet, Cx$kagawad 6ernande@ brought appellant to )rgy.
Captain 6elicisimo 'endo@a, informing the latter that appellant was the last person
seen talking with the missing child. 6ernande@ then re!oined the searchers % .d., pp. 9/$
99&.
)ack in the field, =irginia 6ernande@ tripped on a wet ground. 7s she reached for her
slipper, she saw Cditha#s right foot slipper %the other one was earlier found near the
house of appellant& %.d., pp. 93$9,&.
7round 3 meters farther from Cditha#s right foot slipper; another slipper was found. It
was old, * to - inches in length and appellant was seen wearing it in the morning of
that day %"F dated ept. 9+, /--5, pp. 9+&.
"he searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. 7long the way, they saw a wide
hole among the disheveled grass. Cx$kagawad 6ernande@ accidentally dropped the
lighted rubber tire and as his nephew 6reddie picked it up, the latter exclaimedE DGncle,
look at this loose soilND Cx$kagawad 6ernande@ forthwith scratched some earth aside
and then Cditha#s hand pitted out. "he 6ernande@ screamed in terror %.d., pp. +$8&.
'eantime, )arangay Captain 'endo@a heard shouts sayingE Dhe is here, she is now
here already deadND 'indful of appellant#s safety, )rgy. Captain 'endo@a decided to
bring appellant to the municipal building. <n their way though, they met policemen on
board a vehicle. Ae flagged them down and turned over the person of appellant,
sayingE DAere is the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. ince you are already
here, I am giving him to youD %"F dated <ct. 9/, /--5, pp. ,$+&.
"he policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the people found Cditha.
<ne of the policemen shoved more soil aside. "he lifeless Cditha was completely
naked when she was recovered. %.d., pp. -$/0&
"he cause of Cditha#s death as revealed in the postG"orte" examination showed
Dsuffocation of the lungs as a result from powerful covering of the nose and mouth,
associated with laceration of the vagina and raptured hymen %Cxh. D"D, "F dated <ct.
93, /--5, pp. 99$93&.
+
<n the other hand, :7;;74(C was the lone witness for the defense. Ae interposed a denial and
the alibi that he was at home with his mother and brothers at the time the crime occurred. Ae
declared that he is /* years old, single, a former construction worker. Ae knew C(I"A7, a
neighbor whom he considered as a sister because she used to come to his house. "hey never had
a Buarrel or misunderstanding. Ae neither raped not killed Cditha.
8
<n cross$examination by the prosecutor and to Buestions propounded by the court, :7;;74(C
admitted that he saw Cditha on the night of 8 'ay /--5 in her parent#s house, particularly in the
kitchen. Ae was there because he !oined a group drinking Colt ,+ beer, as he was called by 4udio
6ernande@. Ae drank and had dinner in the kitchen. 7fter dinner he returned to the drinking place
and eventually went home because he was then a little drunk. Ae knows Ogd. 'ario 6ernande@,
but after he left the "alan residence he did not see Ogd. 6ernande@ anymore. Ogd. 6ernande@ saw
him inside his %:allarde#s& toilet on the night of 'ay 8; thereafter 6ernande@ took him to the
barangay captain and later he was turned over to the PFP at Camp Farciso 4amos. "he police
informed him that he was a suspect in the rape and killing of Cditha "alan, and he told them that
he did not commit the crime. 7t the "alan residence he was wearing short pants and rubber
slippers. 6ernande@ asked him at the police headBuarters to pull down his shorts and he complied.
Ae was then wearing briefs with a hemline that was a little loose. Ae was informed that a cadaver
was recovered near his house. 2hen he was asked Buestions while in police custody, he was not
represented by any lawyer.
:7;;74(C further declared on cross$examination and on Buestions by the court that he
considered Cditha "alan as a sister and her parents also treated him in a friendly manner. 2hen
he came to know that Cditha#s parents suspected him of the crime, he was still on friendly terms
with them. Aowever, he did no go to them to tell them he was innocent because they brandished a
bolo in anger.
6inally, he testified that in the evening of 'ay 8 he came to know that Cditha died. he was still
alive when he was drinking at the back of the "alan house and left for home. 6rom the time he
arrived, he never left again that night, and his mother and brothers knew it for a fact.
5
<n /9 6ebruary /--*, the trial court rendered a decision convicting :7;;74(C of the crime of
murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal
knowledge. It observedE
Cxh. D"D and (r. "ebangin#s testimony thereon show that the late Cditha "alan
sustained slit wounds inflicted as a means of suffocating her to death, a laceration of
the lower portion of her vagina, and a ruptured hymen. 2hat allegedly oo@ed from her
vagina was blood, coupled with dirt. Aad then been observed the presence of even !ust
a drop of seminal fluid in or around her vagina, the Court would readily conclude that
the laceration and rupture resulted from phallic intrusion. 2ithout such observation,
however, Dcarnal knowledgeD as element of rape would be an open Buestion.
"he trial court did not appreciate the alternative circumstance of intoxication either as a mitigating
or aggravating circumstance pursuant to 7rticle /+ of the 4evised Penal Code because
:7;;74(C#s alleged inebriation on the night of 8 'ay /--5, was not satisfactorily proven.
7s to the civil aspect of the case, the trial court considered the stipulation of the parties on 95
<ctober /--5 fixing a liBuidated amount of P50,000 as actual damages, and leaving the matter of
moral damages to the discretion of the court. "he trial court was not inclined to award moral
damages because the Devidence before it tends to disclose that on the night of 8 'ay /--5, before
she died, Cditha was a much$neglected child.D
7ccordingly, in its decision
*
of /9 6ebruary /--*, the trial court decreedE
2AC4C6<4C, his guilt having been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court
hereby convicts the accused 47(C; :7;;74(C J AC4'<7 of the crime of
'G4(C4, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of re%lusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the late Cditha "alan in the negotiated sum of P50,000.00.
-
Ais motion for reconsideration,
/0
having been denied by the trial court in its 4esolution
//
of 9*
6ebruary /--*, :7;;74(C seasonably appealed to us.
2e accepted the appeal on - eptember /--*.
In his 7ppellant#s )rief filed on /8 'arch /---, :7;;74(C alleges that the trial court committed
the following errorsE
/. In convicting .him1 of the crime of murder in an information for rape with homicide.
9. In concluding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that .he1
was responsible for the death of Cditha "alan.
3. In not acBuitting .him1 on the ground of notches of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
/9
2e sustain :7;;74(C#s contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in an
information charging him of rape with homicide. 7 reading of the accusatory portion of the
information shows that there was no allegation of any Bualifying circumstance. 7lthough it is true
that the term DhomicideD as used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical in!uries committed by
reason or on the occasion of rape,
/3
it is settled in this !urisdiction that where a complex crime is
charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offense, the
accused can be convicted of the other.
/,
In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder
in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the Bualifying circumstance must be
sufficiently alleged and proved. <therwise, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged.
/+
It is fundamental that every
element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. "he main purpose of
reBuiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense. Ae is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.
/8
In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any Bualifying circumstance, :7;;74(C
cannot be convicted of murder. 7n accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with
which he is charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried. It matters not how
conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of
any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information for which he is tried, or is
necessarily included in that which is charged. Ae has a right to be informed of the nature of the
offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. "o convict an accused of a higher
offense than that charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried would be an
unauthori@ed denial of that right.
/5
Fevertheless, we agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution, although
circumstantial, was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of :7;;74(C for the
death of C(I"A7.
(irect evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may
draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.
/*
"he prosecution is not always tasked to present direct
evidence to sustain a !udgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily
absolve an accused from any criminal liability.
/-
Cven in the absence of direct evidence, conviction
can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence, provided that the established circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
90
"he rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence, as long as the following reBuisites are presentE %/& there must be more than one
circumstance; %9& the inference must be based on proven facts; and %3& the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.
9/
"he importance of circumstantial evidence is more apparent in the prosecution of cases of rape,
where it is homicide. "he nature of the crime of rape, where it is usually only the victim and the
rapist who are present at the scene of the crime, makes prosecutions for the complex crime of
rape with homicide particularly difficult since the victim can no longer testify against the perpetrator
of the crime. In these cases pieces of the evidence against the accused are usually
circumstantial.
99
"he circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analy@ed and taken together, leads to no
other conclusion than that :7;;74(C, and no other else, killed C(I"A7 and that he is guilty
therefor. 2e Buote with approval the lower court#s enumeration of the circumstantial evidence in
this caseE
/. :allarde, /*, and Cditha, /0, were neighbors and friends, even as she used to
freBuent his place.
9. )oth were at the "alan residence on the night of 'ay 8, /--5 while neighbors
indulged themselves in beer.
3. 7mong said neighbors Cabinta saw them hand in hand by the toilet situated five %+&
meters east of the "alan kitchen.
,. 7fter Cabinta whistled he saw :allarde run home towards north after letting go of
Cditha#s hands. Feighbor Clemente also noticed that :allarde disappeared, and that
Cditha returned to the kitchen.
+. Cabinta followed Cditha back to the kitchen, and saw her holding a kerosene lamp.
he told him that she was going to look for D(alpac,D and off she went in the same
direction :allarde took.
8. :allarde wore short pants and rubber slippers at the drinking place. ubseBuently
he was seen wearing shorts in his own toilet.
5. 7t past /0E00 in the evening during an intensive search for the then missing Cditha,
her lifeless body was found in a shallow grave situated some distance behind
:allarde#s residence.
*. )efore Cditha#s body was discovered, a searcher found a girl#s slipper %Cxh. D)D&, +$8
inches long, among thickets seven meters away from :allarde#s house.
-. 7nother searcher saw a second slipper %Cxh. )$/&, of the same color and si@e as the
first one. )oth slippers were Cditha#s, the searchers recalled.
/0. 7 third rubber slipper %Cxh. DCD& was thereafter found in the field, near Cxh. D)$/.D It
was an old slipper, *$- inches long and with a hole at the rear end.
//. oil stuck to each one of the three slippers.
/9. :allarde was not at home when searchers went to look for him there, after Cabinta
told them that Cditha was last seen with :allarde.
/3. 2hen :allarde was discovered sBuatting in the dark toilet behind his house and
beside the thickets, his shorts were up and on. Ais hands and knees were soiled.
/,. 7t the toilet he was asked the innocent Buestion of where Cditha was and he
answered revealingly, thusE DI did not do anything to herD and DI let her go and brought
her back to the dike and let her go home.D
/+. 2hen asked where he had been, as the toilet was first seen empty, :allarde said
he was with Oiko and he slept at the latter#s house, which answer 'ario )ado promptly
refuted saying, D=ulva of your mother. . . Oiko was with me drinking.D )ado and Oiko
were not at the place of the "alans that night.
/8. Janked out of the dark toilet near his own house, :allarde !oined Ogd. 'ario
6ernande@ sans protest.
/5. (r. "ebangin found on Cditha#s cheeks two slit wounds, each being an inch away
from her nostrils. )oth wounds were fresh and reddish.
6rom the lower portion of Cditha#s vagina blood oo@ed, accompanied by dirt.
Aer hymen was ruptured and was still bleeding.
"he medico$legal concluded that there must have been a forceful covering of Cditha#s
nose and mouth because of the presence of the slit wounds on both sides of her face,
and that in 30 seconds unconsciousness and weakening resulted, with the vaginal
in!uries contributing to her death.
93
7s to the crime of rape, there is much to be desired with respect to the prosecution#s evidence
therefor, but not for the reason adduced by the trial court, namely, the absence of spermato@oa in
C(I"A7#s private part and thereabout. It is well settled that the absence of spermato@oa in or
around the vagina does not negate the commission of rape.
9,
<ur doubt on the commission of rape
is based on the fact that there is at all no convincing proof that the laceration of the vagina and the
rupture of the hymen of C(I"A7 were caused in the course of coitus or by a male organ. <ur
meticulous reading of the testimony of (r. "ebangin disclosed that he was never asked if the
laceration and the rupture could have been caused by the penis of a human being. Feedless to
state, these could have been caused by any ob!ect other than the penis of a person.
2e cannot sustain the contention of :7;;74(C that he was not positively identified as the
assailant since there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of the crime. It does not follow
that although nobody saw :7;;74(C in the act of killing C(I"A7, nobody can be said to have
positively identified him. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per
se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. "here are two types
of positive identification. 7 witness may identity a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the
perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. "his
constitutes direct evidence. "here may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not
have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify
a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or
one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of
the crime. "his is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken
chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly
positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be
convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no
conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. uch a proposition is absolutely
absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only
matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.
9+
If resort to
circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of
direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.
7s discussed above, the circumstantial evidence as established by the prosecution in this case
and enumerated by the trial court positively established the identity of :7;;74(C, and no one
else, as the person who killed C(I"A7.
2e cannot agree with the trial court#s re!ection of the photographs %Cxhibits DI,D DJD and DOD& taken
of :7;;74(C immediately after the incident on the ground that Dthe same were taken while
.:7;;74(C1 was already under the mercy of the police.D "he taking of pictures of an accused
even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his
constitutional right against self$incrimination.
"he constitutional right of an accused against self$incrimination
98
proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not
reBuired.
95
"he essence of the right against self$incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.
9*
Aence, it has been held that a
woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine
her pregnancy;
9-
and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have
a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;
30
to expel morphine from his mouth;
3/
to have the
outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints;
39
and to be photographed
or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done.
33
"here is also no merit in :7;;74(C#s argument that the failure of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the place and time of the commission of the crime is fatal and will !ustify
his acBuittal.
"he place, time and date of the commission of the offense are not essential elements of the crime
of rape with homicide. "he gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowledge of a woman and that
on the occasion of or as a reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed. Conviction may
be had on proof of the commission of the crime provided it appears that the specific crime charged
was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information, within the period
of the statute of limitation, and within the !urisdiction of the court.
3,
"he allegation of the place of commission of the crime in the complaint or information is sufficient if
it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential
ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the !urisdiction of the court.
3+
"he rule merely
reBuires that the information shows that the crime was committed within the territorial !urisdiction of
the court. "he Court may even take !udicial notice that said place is within its !urisdiction.
38
7s to the time of the commission of the crime, the phrase Don or aboutD employed in the
information does not reBuire the prosecution Dto prove any precise date or time,D but may prove
any date or time which is not so remote as to surprise and pre!udice the defendant.D
35
Contrary to the claim of :7;;74(C, the prosecution was able to establish the proximate time of
the commission of the crime, which was sometime between -E00 p.m., when :7;;74(C left the
house of "alan followed by C(I"A7, and /0E30 p.m., when the body of C(I"A7 was found. "his
was further corroborated by the examining physician who testified, on the basis of the degree
of ri$or "ortis, that C(I"A7 died more or less, at /0E00 p.m. of 8 'ay /--5.
3*
;ikewise, :7;;74(C#s alibi and bare denial deserve no consideration. Ae did not present
witnesses who could confirm his presence in his house. Fo member of his family corroborated him
on this matter. "he defenses of denial and alibi, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self$serving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary
value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
3-
'oreover, even assuming that :7;;74(C#s claim is true, his stay in his house did not preclude
his physical presence at the lo%us %ri"inis or its immediate vicinity. "he place where the body of
C(I"A7 was found buried was a few meters from his house, the place pointed to in the alibi and
can be reached in a short while. 6or the defense of alibi to prosper, the reBuirements of time and
place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when
the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
,0
)esides, no evil motive has been established against the witnesses for the prosecution that might
prompt them to incriminate the accused or falsely testify against him. It is settled that when there is
no showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that the witnesses were not so actuated and their testimonies are thus entitled to
full faith and credit.
,/
"estimonies of witnesses who have no motive or reason to falsify or per!ure
their testimonies should be given credence.
,9
2ith respect to :7;;74(C#s claim that he was arrested without warrant, suffice it to say that any
ob!ection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea.
,3
"he records show no ob!ection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and
trial.
,,
:7;;74(C#s assertion that he was denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest
is negated by his voluntary submission to the !urisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the
voluntary and counsel$assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by his active participation
in the trial thereafter.
,+
It is settled that any ob!ection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in
the acBuisition by the court of !urisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the ob!ection is deemed waived.
,8
It is much too late in the day to
complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed and the accused
arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a !udgment of conviction rendered against
him.
,5
=erily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
!udgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error; such arrest does not
negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
,*
Aomicide, which we find to be the only crime committed by :7;;74(C, is defined in 7rticle 9,- of
the 4evised Penal Code and is punished with re%lusion te"poral. In the absence of any modifying
circumstance, it shall be imposed in its medium period. :7;;74(C is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate entence ;aw. 7ccordingly, he can be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from ten %/0& years of the medium period of prision "ayor as minimum to seventeen %/5&
years and four %,& months of the medium period ofre%lusion te"poral as maximum.
7s to the civil aspect of the case, the parties agreed on P50,000 as liBuidated damages. "his
should be construed as actual damages. Aowever, as indemnity for death, the additional sum of
P+0,000, per current case law, should be awarded.
2AC4C6<4C, the assailed decision of the 4egional "rial Court, )ranch +/, "ayug, Pangasinan,
in Criminal Case Fo. "$/-5* finding accused$appellant 47(C; :7;;74(C guilty of the crime of
murder is hereby modified. 7s modified, 47(C; :7;;74(C is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Aomicide, defined under 7rticle 9,- of the 4evised
Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten %/0&
years of the medium period of of prision "ayor as minimum to seventeen %/5& years and four %,&
months of the medium period of re%lusion te"poral as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim,
Cditha "alan, the sum of P50,000 as liBuidated actual damages and P+0,000 as indemnity for the
death of Cditha "alan.
Costs against accused$appellant 47(C; :7;;74(C in both instances.1Np#i1.nOt
< <4(C4C(.
G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969
!RS%NIO !S$"!L, (R., petitioner$appellee,
vs.
'O!RD O- M%DI$!L %4!MIN%RS, ,e0/on)ent-a//e33ant, S!L#!DOR G!&'ON&ON an)
%NRI;"%&! G!&'ON&ON, inte,7eno,0-a//e33ant0.
,onrado >. Anriquez for petitionerGappellee.
;ffi%e of t#e 0oli%itor <eneral Arturo A. Alafriz' Assistant 0oli%itor <eneral Antonio A. +orres and
0oli%itor =edro A. Ra"irez for respondentGappellant.
>ausa' A"pil and 0uarez for intervenorsGappellants.
-%RN!NDO, J.:
"he broad, all$embracing sweep of the self$incrimination clause,
/
whenever appropriately
invoked, has been accorded due recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the
Constitution.
9
)ermude@ v. Castillo,
3
decided in /-35, was Buite categorical. 7s we there statedE
D"his Court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may
prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad
interpretation favorable to the person invoking it.D 7s phrased by Justice ;aurel in his concurring
opinionE D"he provision, as doubtless it was designed, would be construed with the utmost liberality
in favor of the right of the individual intended to be served.D
,
Cven more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case of ,a2al v.
Hapunan,
+
where it was held that a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the 7nti$:raft
;aw
8
cannot be reBuired to take the witness stand at the instance of the complainant. o it must be
in this case, where petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be
compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an
administrative charge for malpractice. "hat was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal.
7rsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner$appellee, filed on 6ebruary /, /-8+ with the Court of 6irst
Instance of 'anila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary in!unction against the )oard
of 'edical Cxaminers, now respondent$appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of
an administrative case
5
for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would
present as his first witness herein petitioner$appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice
charge. "hereupon, petitioner$appellee, through counsel, made of record his ob!ection, relying on
the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. 4espondent$appellant,
the )oard of Cxaminers, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next
scheduled hearing, on 6ebruary /9, /-8+, petitioner$appellee would be called upon to testify as
such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent
authority.
Petitioner$appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand,
the )oard of Cxaminers was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to
respect the constitutional right against self$incrimination, the administrative proceeding against
him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being Buasi$criminal in character. 2ith his
assertion that he was entitled to the relief demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the
respondent )oard from compelling him to testify as witness for his adversary and his readiness or
his willingness to put a bond, he prayed for a writ of preliminary in!unction and after a hearing or
trial, for a writ of prohibition.
<n 6ebruary -, /-8+, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary in!unction issue
against the respondent )oard commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with
such an administrative case, to await the !udicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner$appellee
posting a bond in the amount of P+00.00.
"he answer of respondent )oard, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call
petitioner$appellee to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self$incrimination
being available only when a Buestion calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It
further elaborated the matter in the affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner$
appellee#s remedy is to ob!ect once he is in the witness stand, for respondent Da plain, speedy and
adeBuate remedy in the ordinary course of law,D precluding the issuance of the relief sought.
4espondent )oard, therefore, denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion.
"here was a motion for intervention by alvador :atbonton and CnriBueta :atbonton, the
complainants in the administrative case for malpractice against petitioner$appellee, asking that
they be allowed to file an answer as intervenors. uch a motion was granted and an answer in
intervention was duly filed by them on 'arch 93, /-8+ sustaining the power of respondent )oard,
which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished, in their
opinion, from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. "hey likewise alleged that the
right against self$incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
7 decision was rendered by the lower court on 7ugust 9, /-8+, finding the claim of
petitioner$appellee to be well$founded and prohibiting respondent )oard Dfrom compelling the
petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his
consent and against himself.D Aence this appeal both by respondent )oard and intervenors, the
:atbontons. 7s noted at the outset, we find for the petitioner$appellee.
/. 2e affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle
announced by us in ,a2al v. Hapunan.
*
In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an
order of Judge Oapunan, it appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having
been filed against petitioner under the 7nti$:raft 7ct,
-
the complainant reBuested the investigating
committee that petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand, which reBuest was granted. Gpon
petitioner#s refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge for contempt was filed against him in the
sala of respondent Judge. Ae filed a motion to Buash and upon its denial, he initiated this
proceeding. 2e found for the petitioner in accordance with the well$settled principle that Dthe
accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory Buestions, but, also, to
take the witness stand.D
It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter referred
to an a administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the 7nti$:raft 7ct authori@ing the
forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or employee may acBuire, manifestly out proportion
to his salary and his other lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. "he
proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal
aspect. "he case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. Ae could
suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for
some an even greater deprivation.
"o the argument that ,a2al v. Hapunan could thus distinguished, it suffices to refer to an
7merican upreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character.
/0
In the language of Justice
(ouglasE D2e conclude ... that the elf$Incrimination Clause of the 6ifth 7mendment has been
absorbed in the 6ourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals,
and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation
of a livelihood as a price for asserting it.D 2e reiterate that such a principle is eBually applicable to
a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical
profession.
9. "he appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent )oard and
intervenors$appellants that the constitutional guarantee against self$incrimination should be limited
to allowing a witness to ob!ect to Buestions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability
being subseBuently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of
another 7merican decision,
//
is the protection against Dany disclosures which the witness may
reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other
evidence that might be so used.D If that were all there is then it becomes diluted.lap#i1.@et
"he constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. 7s far back as /-0+, we
had occasion to declareE D"he accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot
be used as a presumption of his guilt.D
/9
<nly last year, in ,#avez v. ,ourt of Appeals,
/3
speaking
through Justice anche@, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant Dto
forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand I with undiluted,
unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will.D
2hy it should be thus is not difficult to discern. "he constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and
that the truth must be revealed, such desirable ob!ectives should not be accomplished according to
means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. 'ore
and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. "o Buote from Chief Justice 2arren,
Dthe constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord
to the dignity and integrity of its citi@ens.D
/,
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity
on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether
physical or mental, current !udicial opinion places eBual emphasis on its identification with the right
to privacy. "hus according to Justice (ouglasE D"he 6ifth 7mendment in its elf$Incrimination
clause enables the citi@en to create a @one of privacy which government may not force to
surrender to his detriment.D
/+
o also with the observation of the late Judge 6rank who spoke of Da
right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. "hat right is the hallmark of our
democracy.D
/8
In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible ob!ection could
be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. 2e hold that in an
administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent )oard of
'edical Cxaminers cannot, consistently with the self$incrimination clause, compel the person
proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.

G.R. No. 100295 !/,i3 26, 1994
L!$IDO L. M!!, (R., an) (. LOR%N8O #%RG!R!, petitioners,
vs.
S!NDIG!N'!:!N, respondent.
Astelito =. Mendoza for =la%ido L. Mapa' Fr.
-ile"on -lores for F. Lorenzo ?er$ara.

"NO, J.:
"he denial of the right to be free from further prosecution of a cooperative witness who has been
granted immunity is the core issue posed in this petition. <n balance are important rights in
conflictE the right of an individual who has surrendered his constitutional prerogative to be silent to
the tate to be exempt from further prosecution; the right of the tate to prosecute all persons who
appear to have committed a crime and its prerogative to revoke the immunity it has granted to an
accused for breach of agreement; and the extent of the !urisdiction of the andiganbayan as an
impartial tribunal to review the grant of immunity extended by the PC:: to an accused.
6irst, the facts.
<n January 90, /-*5, petitioners Placido ;. 'apa and ;oren@o =ergara, together with :regorio
'a. 7raneta III, 6ernando )alatbat, 4amon 7viado, Jr., (ominador ;ope@, Jr., 6ernando
'aramag, Jr., and Jose Crisanto, Jr., were charged with violation of the 7nti$:raft and Corrupt
Practices 7ct %4.7. 30/-& as amended, docketed as Case Fo. //-80 in the respondent court, as
followsE
"hat on or about and during the period from 'arch /-*+ and 'arch /-*8,
in 'etro 'anila, Philippines, and within the !urisdiction of the Aonorable
andiganbayan, accused Placido ;. 'apa, Jr., J. ;oren@o =ergara, 4amon
6. 7viado, Jr., (ominador ;ope@, Jr., 6ernando 'aramag, Jr., Jose C.
Crisanto, Jr., acting in various capacities as management officials of the
Philippine Fational )ank %PF)&, Fational Investment and (evelopment
Corporation %FI(C& andLor Pantranco Forth Cxpress Inc. %PFCI&, all
government$owned and controlled corporations, as well as (olores
Potenciano of );"), acting in concert in the performance of their duties, in
utter neglect of their fiduciary responsibilities, and with intent to gain,
conspiring and confederating with one another and with accused :regorio
'a. 7raneta III, son$in$law of former President 6erdinand C. 'arcos and
therefore related to the deposed President by affinity within the third
degree, and 6ernando )alatbat, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully,
with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, without proper board
resolution and in disregard of better offers, promote and facilitate the sale
of a ma!or portion of the public utility assets of the Pantranco Cxpress, Inc.,
for a consideration of C=CF AGF(4C( C=CF"J$6I=C 'I;;I<F
%P55+,000,000.00& PC<, Philippine Currency, to the Forth Cxpress
"ransport, Inc. %FC"I&, which the accused knew to be a newly organi@ed
paper corporation with a purported paid$up capital of only 6I=C 'I;;I<F
%P+,000,000.00& PC< and owned and controlled by accused :regorio
'a. 7raneta III, by misleading, inducing andLor unduly influencing the
)oard of (irectors of PF), FI(C and PFCI into approving a 'emorandum
of 7greement and later a Purchase 7greement with manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous terms and conditions which made possible the premature
delivery of said PFCI assets to FC"I without any down payment, and
which, inter alia, allowed FC"I to operate PFCI#s franchises and utili@e,
even before the execution of the said Purchase 7greement, not only the
PFCI assets sub!ect of the proposed sale, but also other utility buses and
properties of PFCI not covered by the sale, thereby allowing FC"I to derive
an income from said operation between the period of actual delivery and
execution of the Purchase 7greement of the sum of CI:A"J$6I=C
'I;;I<F IH AGF(4C( CI:A"J$FIFC "A<G7F(, <FC AGF(4C(
CI:A"J %P*+,8*-,/*0.00& PC< before the actual payment of the agreed
6I6"J$6I=C 'I;;I<F %P++,000,000.00& PC< down payment, thereby
giving accused :regorio 'a. 7raneta III unwarranted benefits, advantages
andLor preferences and causing undue in!ury to the damage and pre!udice
of the :overnment in the amount of 6<G4 AGF(4C( 'I;;I<F
%P,00,000,000.00& PC<, and such other amounts as may be awarded
by the Court.
C<F"474J "< ;72.
Cxcept for petitioner 7raneta, all the accused in Criminal Case
Fo. //-80 were arraigned. "heir trial started on eptember 90, /-**.
In the interim, the late President 6erdinand C. 'arcos and 'rs. Imelda 4. 'arcos were charged in
Few Jork with violations of the 4acketeer Influenced and Corrupt <rgani@ation 7ct %4IC<& by
transporting to the Gnited tates and concealing the investment of money through cronies and
offshore organi@ations. "o insure the conviction of the 'arcoses, the prosecution solicited the
testimonies of witnesses. 7mong these witnesses were petitioners =ergara and 'apa. Petitioner
=ergara was interviewed in /-*5 by PC:: lawyers Oendall and everina 4ivera and by Gnited
tates Prosecutor Charles ;a )ella. Petitioner 'apa was interviewed on Fovember /,, /-** and
7ugust //, /-*- also by Prosecutor ;a )ella at the behest of former ecretary of Justice edfrey
<rdone@ and former PC:: Chairman 'ateo Caparas. 7fter their interviews, petitioners were
reBuested to testify in the said 4IC< cases against the former 6irst Couple. "hey were promised
immunity from further criminal prosecution. "hey agreed.
<n 'ay /8, /--0, the Philippine :overnment through the PC::, and the petitioners formali@ed
their separate agreements in writing. "he agreement with petitioner 'apa providedE
2AC4C7, 4CPG);IC has reBuested '7P7 to make himself available as
a witness in the case entitled DGnited tates of 7merica vs. 6erdinand C.
'arcos, et al.,D more particularly in the on$going trial of the case;
2AC4C7, '7P7 is a defendant or respondent in several civil and
criminal cases which the 4CPG);IC has filed or intends to file in relation to
this participation in various contracts that are alleged to have resulted in the
accumulation of ill$gotten wealth by 6erdinand and Imelda 'arcos in
violation of Philippine laws, rules and regulations;
2AC4C7, on the basis of '7P7#s express intent to make himself
available as witness in the case entitled DGnited tates of 7merica vs.
6erdinand C. 'arcos, et al.,D and in light of 4CPG);IC#s re$appraisal of the
civil and criminal cases which it has filed or intends to file against '7P7
under the terms and conditions herein below set forth.
F<2, "AC4C6<4C, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises,
the parties agree as followsE
/. '7P7 shall make himself available as a witness in the case entitled
DGnited tates of 7merica vs. 6erdinand C. 'arcos, et al.D
9. In consideration of the same, 4CPG);IC grants '7P7 immunity from
investigation, prosecution and punishment for any offense with reference to
which his testimony and information are given, including any offense and
commission of which any information, directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony or other information is used as basis thereof, except a
prosecution for per!ury andLor giving false testimony.
3. ;ikewise, in consideration of such cooperation, and in light of
4CPG);ICPs review of the cases both civil and criminal which it has filed or
intends to file against '7P7 within the purview of Cxecutive <rders Fos. /,
9, /, and /,$7, the 4CPG);IC shall cause the dismissal or exclusion of
'7P7 as party defendant or respondent in all PC:: initiated civil cases
and criminal proceeding or investigation.
,. "he immunity has been granted by the 4CPG);IC to '7P7 on the basis
of and relying on '7P7#s promise of cooperation as described herein. In
case of breach of his commitment to fully cooperate and make himself
available as a witness in the case entitled DGnited tates of 7merica vs.
6erdinand C. 'arcos, et al.D, the immunity herein granted shall forthwith be
deemed revoked, and of no force and effect.
+. "he parties agree that the grant of immunity from criminal prosecution to
'7P7 and his exclusion from PC:: initiated civil cases and criminal
proceeding or investigations has been undertaken in the exercise of the
PC::#s authority under Cxecutive <rder Fos. /, 9, /, and /,$7.
7ccordingly, nothing herein shall be construed as an admission by '7P7
of any criminal or civil liability.
"he agreement with petitioner =ergara statedE
2AC4C7, 4CPG);IC has reBuested =C4:747 to make himself
available as a witness in the case entitled DGnited tates of 7merica vs.
6erdinand C. 'arcos, et al.,D more particularly in the on$going trial of the
case;
2AC4C7, =ergara is a defendant in Criminal Case Fo. //-80 entitled
DPeople vs. :regorio 'a. 7raneta, et al.D, now pending before the
andiganbayan, econd (ivision;
2AC4C7, on the basis of =C4:747Ps express intent to make himself
available as witness in the case entitled DGnited tates of 7merica vs.
6erdinand C. 'arcos, et al.,D and in the light of 4CPG);IC#s re$appraisal of
=C4:747#s participation in Criminal Case Fo. //-80, the 4CPG);IC
approved to grant immunity to =C4:747 under the terms and conditions
hereinbelow set forth.
F<2, "AC4C6<4C, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises,
the parties agree as followsE
/. =C4:747 shall make himself available as a witness in the case entitled
DGnited tates of 7merica vs. 6erdinand C. 'arcos, et al.D
9. In consideration of the same, 4CPG);IC grants =C4:747 immunity
from investigation, prosecution and punishment for any offense with
reference to which his testimony and information are given, including any
offense and commission of which any information, directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information is used as basis thereof,
except a prosecution for per!ury andLor giving false testimony.
3. ;ikewise, in consideration of such cooperation, and in light of
4CPG);ICPs review of =C4:747Ps participation in Criminal Case Fo.
//-80, the 4CPG);IC shall cause the dismissal of =C4:747 from
Criminal Case Fo. //-80.
,. "he immunity has been granted by the 4CPG);IC to =C4:747 on the
basis of and relying on =C4:747#s promise of cooperation as described
herein. In case of breach of h is commitment to fully cooperate and make
himself available as a witness in the case entitled DGnited tates of
7merica vs. 6erdinand C. 'arcos, et al.D, the immunity herein granted shall
forthwith be deemed revoked, and of no force and effect.
+. "he parties agree that the grant of immunity from civil and criminal
prosecution to =C4:747 and his exclusion from Criminal Case Fo. //-80
has been undertaken in the exercise of the PC::#s authority under
Cxecutive <rders Fos. /, 9, /, and /,$7. 7ccordingly, nothing herein shall
be construed as a admission by =C4:747 of any criminal liability.
<n the same day, 'ay /8, /--0, former PC:: Chairman 'ateo Caparas wrote to petitioner 'apa
the following letterE
(ear irE
2ith reference to the agreement executed between yourself and the
4epublic of the Philippines on 'ay /8, /--0, we would like to confirm
that among the criminal cases which the 4epublic agrees to cause the
dismissal of the case entitled DPeople of the Philippines vs. 'r. :regorio
'a. 7raneta III, et. al., D Criminal Case Fo. //-80 of the andiganbayan.
2e understand that in that case the prosecution is in the process of closing
its evidence with the submission of its offer of documentary evidence and
that it is your intention thereupon to submit a 'otion to (ismiss for failure of
the prosecution to prove its case. 2e affirm that if, because of the situation
of the case, it would not be possible for the 4epublic to file the necessary
motion to cause the dismissal thereof, then we shall upon submission of
your 'otion to (ismiss offer no ob!ection to its favorable consideration by
the court in relation to you.
2e also affirm our understanding that we shall arrange with the G..
prosecutors the grant of immunity in your favor no less broad or extensive
than that granted to 'r. Jaime C. ;aya.
=ery truly yours,
%:(.& '.7.". Caparas
7 similar letter was sent to petitioner =ergara.
"he petitioners complied with their respective undertaking. "hey travelled to Few Jork to testify
against the 'arcoses. "heir travel fare and hotel accommodations were even furnished by the
PC::. )ut despite their availability and willingness to testify, the G prosecutors decided not to
call them to the witness stand. "he result was a debacle for the G prosecutors and the PC::.
'rs.Imelda 'arcos was acBuitted by the !ury. Carlier, former President 'arcos was delisted as an
accused as he died in the course of the proceedings.
"he legal struggle shifted back to the prosecution of petitioners in Criminal Case Fo. //-80 before
the respondent court. <n the basis of the immunity granted to them, petitioners filed a Joint 'otion
to (ismiss on <ctober 99, /--0. (eputi@ed PC:: prosecutors =ivencio ). (ionido and 7ngel J.
Para@o filed a 'anifestation interposing no ob!ection to petitioners# 'otion, vizE
"hat herein accused Placido ;. 'apa, Jr. and J. ;oren@o =ergara were
granted immunity by the Presidential Commission on :ood :overnment
from criminal liability arising from cases which PC:: had or intends to file
against them;
"he PC::, therefore, interposes no ob!ection to the Joint 'otion to
(ismiss filed by accused Placido ;. 'apa, Jr. and J. ;oren@o =ergara in
Criminal Case Fo. //-80$PC:: by reason of the immunity aforestated.
(espite PC::#s concurrence, the respondent court denied the Joint 'otion to (ismiss, by a vote
of ,$/.
1
Petitioners were undaunted. <n 7pril *, /--/, they filed a 'otion for 4econsideration. "his
was followed on 'ay 93, /--/, by a upplement to the 'otion for 4econsideration. "he deputi@ed
prosecutors again filed a 'anifestation reiterating PC::#s acBuiescence to petitioners# 'otion for
4econsideration. 4espondent court, however, refused to budge from its prior position. It denied
petitioners# motions.
Aence, this recourse where petitioners charge the respondent court with grave abuse of discretion
in denying their 'otion to (ismiss and 'otion for 4econsideration. "hey pose the following issuesE
9.00.a. (oes the fact that the information provided by petitioners to the
Presidential Commission on :ood :overnment %PC::& did not refer to
Criminal Case Fo. //-80 make the immunity granted to them inapplicable
to Criminal Case Fo. //-80K
9.00.b. Is it necessary that information furnished the PC::, which would
become basis of the grant of immunity, be submitted to the andiganbayan
in order that it may determine whether such information is necessary to
ascertain or prove the guilt or liability of a respondent, defendant or an
accused in an action involving the recovery of ill$gotten wealthK
9.00.c. (oes the fact that the prosecution in the 4IC< cases did not
actually present petitioners as witnesses abrogate the immunity granted to
themK
9.00.d. 2as the immunity granted to petitioners too late considering that
when it was granted, the prosecution in Criminal Case
Fo. //-80 had already rested its caseKD
"he proceedings before us took a new wrinkle with the appointment of 7tty. (avid Castro as
Chairman of PC::. In its Comment dated January 8, /--9, the PC:: somersaulted from its
stance supporting the petitioners. Its Comment statesE
/. "he Presidential Commission on :ood :overnment has indeed granted
'essrs. Placido ;. 'apa, Jr., and Jesus ;oren@o =ergara immunity from
investigation, prosecution and punishment for any offense for which civil
and criminal cases have been or to be filed against them within the purview
of Cxecutive <rders Fos. /, 9, /, and /,$7 2ut su%# i""unity is
%onditional.
9. "he conditions for giving such immunity is the cooperation said
petitioners shall give to said Commission by way of information and
testimony in cases now pending or to be filed before the andiganbayan
against other defendants therein to prove the latter#s acBuisition or
accumulation of property or properties in violation of existing laws.
3. 6ailure on the part of petitioners Placido 'apa, Jr. and Jesus =ergara to
testify in favor of the government and against other defendants on matters
referred to in the i""ediately pre%edin$ para$rap# nullifies t#e i""unity
$ranted to 2ot# defendants %emphasis supplied&.
It reiterated its breakaway from petitioners in its Comment to the 4eply of petitioners dated June
/0, /--9, where it adopted the respondent andiganbayan#s Buestioned 4esolution and
Concurring <pinions dated
'arch 8, /--/. It further stressed that D."1he granting of #Immunity# from criminal liability andLor
prosecution is a matter sub!ect to the court#s !udicious determination and approval, after applying
the test of compliance and the standard of reasonableness with the rigid reBuirements for such
grant under ection + of Cxecutive <rder Fo. /,$7, as amended.D "he olicitor :eneral defended
the stance of the PC:: and the respondent court.
2e find merit in the petition.
"he practice of granting government, its officials, and some accused or respondents immunity from
suits, has a long history.
2e begin with the Constitution which expressly grants some of these immunities. 7rticle H=I,
section 3 provides that Dthe tate may not be sued without its consent.D "he classic !ustification for
the non$suability of the tate is that provided by 'r. Justice <liver 2endell AolmesE D. . . there can
be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.D
2
7rticle
=I, section // of the Constitution also grants parliamentary immunities, vizE D7 enator or 'ember
of the Aouse of 4epresentatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. Fo member shall be
Buestioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof.D 'r. Justice Isagani 7. Cru@ explains the rationale for this immunity in the
following mannersE D. . . "he first is intended to ensure representation of the constituents of the
member of the Congress by preventing attempts to keep him from attending its sessions. "he
second enables the legislator to express views bearing upon the public interest without fear of
accountability outside the halls of the legislature for his inability to support his statements with the
usual evidence reBuired in the court of !ustice. In other words, he is given more leeway than the
ordinary citi@en in the ventilation of matters that ought to be divulged for the public good.D
3
"he
President was also immuni@ed from suit during his tenure in the /-53 Constitution.
7side from the Constitution, Congress has enacted laws giving immunity to witnesses to facilitate
the solution of crimes with high political, social and economic impact against the people. ome of
these statutory grants are related in the impugned 4esolution. "hus, P( 5,- providesE
ection /. 7ny person who voluntarily gives information about any violation
of 7rticles 9/0, 9//, 9/9 of the 4evised Penal Code, 4epublic 7ct Fo.
30/-, as amended; ection 3,+ of the Internal 4evenue Code and ection
380, of the "ariff and Customs Code and other provisions of the said
codes penali@ing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials
concerned; and other laws, rules and regulations punishing acts of graft,
corruption and other forms of official abuse; and who willingly testified, such
violator shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense
with reference to which his information and testimony were given, and may
plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such
prosecutionE =rovided, "hat this immunity may be en!oyed even in cases
where the information and the testimony are given against a person who is
not a public official but who is a principal or accomplice, or accessory in the
commission of any of the above$mentioned violationsE =rovided, furt#er,
"hat this immunity may be en!oyed by such informant or witness
notwithstanding that he offered or gave bribe or gift to the public official or
is an accomplice for such gift or bribe$giving; 7nd, =rovided, finally, "hat
the following conditions concurE
/. "he information must refer to consummated violations of any of the
above$ mentioned provisions of law, rules and regulations;
9. "he information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the
accused public officer;
3. uch information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the
tate;
,. uch information and testimony can be corroborated on its material
points; and
+. "he informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
;ikewise, under P( Fo. /**8, the 7grava 6act 6inding )oard, created to conduct a fact$finding
inBuiry in the 7Buino$:alman double murder case, was given the power to compel testimony of a
witness. In exchange for his testimony, such a witness was extended transactional immunity from
later prosecution. ection + of said P( Fo. /**8 statesE
Fo person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing
books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in
obedience to a subpoena issued by the )oard on the ground that his
testimony or the evidence reBuired of him may tend to incriminate him or
sub!ect him to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence
produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any
transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having
invoked his privilege against self$incrimination to testify or produce
evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from
prosecution and punishment for per!ury committed in so testifying, nor shall
he be exempt from prosecution and punishment for per!ury committed in so
testifying, nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
Indeed, as early as 7pril /8, /-+/, 4.7. 809, establishing a minimum wage law, extended
transactional immunity to persons who testify or produce books, papers or other records and
documents before the ecretary of ;abor or a 2age )oard. 7 similar but not identical power is
given to the prosecution under section -, 4ule //- of the /-*+ 4ules on Criminal Procedure to
discharge an accused to be utili@ed as a state witness.
<ur immunity statutes are of 7merican origin. In the Gnited tates, there are two types of statutory
immunity granted to a witness. "hey are the transactional immunity and the used$and$derivative$
use immunity. "ransactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. )y its grant, a
witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or
transaction.
4
In contrast, by the grant of use$and$derivative$use immunity,
a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subseBuent
prosecution.
5
In Hasti$ar vs. M0,
6
the rationale of these immunity grants is well explained, vizE
"he power of government to compel persons to testify in court or before
grand !uries and other governmental agencies is firmly established in
7nglo$7merican !urisprudence . . . "he power to compel testimony, and the
corresponding duty to testify, are recogni@ed in the ixth 7mendment
reBuirements that an accused be confronted with the witnesses against
him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . .
xxx xxx xxx
)ut the power to compel testimony is not absolute. "here are a number of
exemptions from the testimonial duty, the most important
of which is the 6ifth 7mendment privilege against compulsory
self$incrimination. "he privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental
values and aspirations, and marks an important advance in the
development of our liberty. It can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, administrative or !udicial, investigatory or ad!udicatory; and it
protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could
be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might
be so used. "his Court has been @ealous to safeguard the values that
underlie the privilege.
Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep in 7nglo$7merican
!urisprudence, are not incompatible with these values. 4ather, they seek a
rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and the
legitimate demands of government to compel citi@ens to testify. "he
existence of these statutes reflects the importance of testimony, and the
fact that many offenses are of such a character that the only persons
capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime.
Indeed, their origins were in the context of such offenses, and their primary
use has been to investigate such offenses . . . %C&very tate in the Gnion,
as well as the (istrict of Columbia and Puerto 4ico, has one of more such
statutes. "he commentators, and this Court on several occasions, have
characteri@ed immunity statutes as essential to the effective enforcement of
various criminal statutes. . .
2e shall now examine the powers granted to PC:: by Cxecutive <rder Fo. /,, as amended, to
grant immunity from criminal prosecution. "he pertinent sections provideE
xxx xxx xxx
ec. 9. ection , of Cxecutive <rder Fo. /, dated 'ay 5, /-*8 is hereby
amended to read as followsE
ec. ,. 7 witness may refuse on the basis of his privilege against self$
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before
the andiganbayan if the witness believes that such testimony or provision
of information would tend to incriminate him or sub!ect him to prosecution.
Gpon such refusal, the andiganbayan may order the witness to testify or
provide information.
"he witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his
privilege against self$incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order %or any information directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony, or other information& may be used against the witness
in any criminal case, except a prosecution for per!ury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the other.#
ec. 3. ection + of Cxecutive <rder Fo. /, dated 'ay 5, /-*8 is hereby
amended to read as followsE
ec. +. "he Presidential Commission on :ood :overnment is authori@ed to
grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides
information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such Commission
to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant or
accused has acBuired or accumulated the property or properties in Buestion
in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain
or prove the latter#s guilt or his civil liability. "he immunity thereby granted
shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony
before the andiganbayan when reBuired to do so by the latter or by the
Commission.
"here are obvious differences between the powers granted to the PC:: under sections , and +.
ection , deals with the power which PC:: can use to compel an unillin$ itness to testify. <n
the other hand, section + speaks of the power which PC:: can wield to secure information from
a friendly itness. Gnder section ,, the hostile witness compelled to testify is not immuni@ed from
prosecution. Ae can still be prosecuted but Dno testimony or other information compelled under the
order %or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information&
may be used against the witness in any criminal case . . . .D In contrast, under section +, the
friendly witness is completely immuni@ed from prosecution.
"he case at bench involves an exercise of power by PC:: under
section +, supra. Petitioners are not hostile but friendly witnesses. It is not disputed that they
furnished information to the PC:: during their interviews conducted by PC:: lawyers and G
prosecutor ;a )ella. (ue to their cooperation, they were extended immunity from prosecution by
the PC::. In return, they flew to Few Jork to testify in the 4IC< trial of Imelda 'arcos. 7s they
were witnesses for the prosecution, their expenses were shouldered by the PC:: itself. 7t the last
minute, however, G prosecutor ;a )ella decided to dispense with their testimony. "he rest is
history. "he prosecution failed to convict 'rs. 'arcos.
"he first issue is whether the respondent court has !urisdiction to review the immunity granted by
PC:: in favor of the petitioners. 2e sustain the !urisdiction of the respondent court. "o be sure,
we have grappled with this once slippery issue in the case of Repu2li% vs. 0andi$an2ayan, /53
C47 58, *0$*/, and we heldE
2e first ascertain whether or not the andiganbayan has !urisdiction to look
into the validity of the immunity granted by the PC:: to Jose J. Campos
which was extended to his son, petitioner$intervenor herein,
Jose Campos, Jr.
xxx xxx xxx
"he powers of the PC:: are not unlimited. Its !urisdiction over cases
involving ill$gotten wealth must be within the parameters stated in Cxecutive
<rder Fo. /,. Fecessarily, the !urisdiction of the andiganbayan which is
tasked to handle the ill$gotten wealth cases must include the !urisdiction to
determine whether or not the PC:: exceeded its power to grant immunity
pursuant to the provisions of Cxecutive <rder Fo./,.
It should also be noted that the respondent court has already acBuired !urisdiction to try and decide
Case Fo. //-80 where petitioners stand accused of violating 47 30/-. It has started receiving the
evidence of the prosecution against the petitioners. Petitioners, with the conformity of PC::, then
claimed their immunity via a motion to dismiss addressed to the respondent court. "he motion to
dismiss is thus a mere incident well within the !urisdiction of the respondent court to resolve.
"he next issue is a finer and more difficult one, i.e., gauging the range of the power of the
respondent court to review the exercise of discretion of the PC:: granting immunity to petitioners
pursuant to section + of C.<. Fo. /,, as amended.
4espondent court, thru the olicitor :eneral, pushes the proposition that said power of review is
plenary in reach. It is urged that its plenitude and panoply empower the respondent court to
reverse the grant of immunity made by the PC:: by supplanting the latter#s !udgment. "he
submission will warrant the respondent court in examining the intrinsic Buality of the given
information or testimony, i.e., whether it truly establishes the Dunlawful mannerD in which the
respondent, defendant or accused has acBuired or accumulated the property or properties in
Buestion. ;ikewise, it will give a warrant to the respondent court to change the !udgment made by
the PC:: that the witness# information or testimony is DnecessaryD to ascertain or prove the guilt
or civil liability of the respondent, defendant or accused.
2e are not prepared to concede the correctness of this proposition. Feither the text nor the texture
of C.<. Fo. /,, as amended, lends color to the suggested interpretation. ection + of C.<. Fo. /,,
as amended, vests no such role in respondent court. In instances, where the intent is to endow
courts of !ustice with the power to review and reverse tactical moves of the prosecution, the law
confers the power in clear and certain language. "hus, under section - of 4ule //-, the
prosecution in the exercise of its discretion may tactically decide to discharge an accused to be a
state witness but its decision is made sub!ect to the approval of the court trying the case. It has to
file a proper motion and the motion may be denied by the court if the prosecution fails to prove that
it has satisfied the reBuirements of the rule on discharge of a witness. "he rule is crafted as to
leave no iota of doubt on the power of the court to interfere with the discretion of the prosecution
on the matter. In the case at bench, C.<. /,, as amended, is eloBuently silent with regard to the
range and depth of the power of the respondent court to review the exercise of discretion by the
PC:: granting a section + immunity. "his silence argues against the thesis that the respondent
court has full and unlimited power to reverse PC::#s exercise of discretion granting a section +
immunity. ;egitimate power can not arise from a vacuum.
2e observe that in contrast to our other laws on immunity, section + of C.<. Fo. /,, as amended,
confers on the PC:: the power to grant immunity alone and on its own authority. "he exercise of
the power is not shared with any other authority. For is its exercise sub!ect to the approval or
disapproval of another agency of government. "he basic reason for vesting the power exclusively
on the PC:: lies in the principles of separation of power. "he decision to grant immunity from
prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision
to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher ob!ective. It is a deliberate
renunciation of the right of the tate to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a
crime. Its !ustification lies in the particular need of the tate to obtain the conviction of the more
guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. 2hether or not the
delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant,
are Buestions addressed solely to the sound !udgment of the prosecution. "he power to prosecute
includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not
to prosecute. In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the !urisdiction of
the respondent court is limited. 6or the business of a court of !ustice is to be an impartial tribunal,
and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Cvery now and
then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral
courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. 6or fairness
demands that courts keep the scales of !ustice at eBuipoise between and among all litigants. (ue
process demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and
perpetually level.
Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we hold that in reviewing the grant of a section +
immunity made by the PC:: to the petitioners, the power of the respondents court can go no
further than to pass upon itspro%edural re$ularity. "he respondent court should only ascertainE %a&
whether the person claiming immunity has provided information or testimony in any investigation
conducted by the PC:: in the discharge of its functions;
%b& whether in t#e 2ona fide Kud$"ent of t#e =,<<, the information or testimony given would
establish the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused has acBuired or
accumulated the property or properties in Buestion; and %c& whether in t#e 2ona fide Kud$"ent of
t#e =,<<, such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the guilt or civil liability
of the respondent, defendant or accused. 4espondent court cannot substitute its !udgment to the
discretion of the PC:: without involving itself in prosecution and without ceasing to be a court
catering untilted !ustice.
7pplying this standard, we hold that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioners# motion to dismiss based on a claim of immunity granted by the PC::
under section + of C.<. /,, as amended.
"he records show that petitioners provided information to the PC:: relating to the prosecution of
the 4IC< cases against the 'arcoses in Few Jork. "hey gave the information in the course of
interviews conducted by PC:: lawyers Oendall and everina 4ivera and G prosecutor Charles
;a )ella. "hey collaborated with the prosecution.
ec. + reBuires that the information should relate to Dany caseD which PC:: can prosecute as
mandated by the Constitution and C.<. Fos. /, 9, /, and /,$7. It does not limit said information to
be given only in a case where the informant is himself an accused or a respondent. uch a reading
adopted by the respondent court is unduly restrictive of the intendment of section + of C.<.
Fo. /,, as amended, even as it is clearly in contravention of its plain language.
It is also fairly established that the pieces of information given by the petitioners would in the
!udgment of the PC::, establish the Dunlawful mannerD with which the 'arcoses acBuired or
accumulated their properties and were DnecessaryD to prove their guilt. "he totality of the
circumstances of the case established this element. "hus, after their interview, the PC:: was
obviously convinced of the evidentiary value of the information given by the petitioners. It forthwith
signed and sealed an agreement with petitioners extending them immunity from prosecution. In the
case of petitioner 'apa, Dthe 4epublic shall cause the dismissal or exclusion of '7P7 as party
defendant or respondent in all PC:: initiated civil cases and criminal proceeding or investigation.D
In the case of petitioner =ergara, Dthe 4epublic shall cause the dismissal of =ergara from Criminal
Case Fo. //-80.D "his commitment was reiterated by former Chairman 'ateo Caparas of PC::
in his 'ay /8, /--0 letters to the petitioners, as related above. "he parties# agreements were then
implemented. Petitioners travelled to Few Jork to testify in the 4IC< cases against the 'arcoses.
It was even the PC:: that shouldered their expenses. 7ll these circumstances prove the
!udgment of the PC:: that the pieces of information given by petitioners would establish the
Dunlawful mannerD with which the 'arcoses acBuired their wealth.
Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the failure of petitioners to testify in the 4IC< cases
against the 'arcoses in Few Jork can not nullify their immunity. "hey have satisfied the
reBuirements both of the law and the parties# implementing agreements. Gnder section + of C.<.
Fo. /,, as amended, their duty was to give information to the prosecution, and they did. Gnder
their 'emorandum of 7greement, they promised to make themselves available as witnesses in the
said 4IC< cases, and they did. Petitioners were ready to testify but they were not called to testify
by the G prosecutors of the 4IC< case. "heir failure to testify was not of their own making. It was
brought about by the decision of the G prosecutors who may have thought that their evidence
was enough to convict the 'arcoses. ince petitioners# failure to testify was not of their own
choosing nor was it due to any fault of their own, !ustice and eBuity forbid that they be penali@ed by
the withdrawal of their immunity. Indeed, initially, the PC:: itself adopted the posture that the
immunity of petitioners stayed and should not be disturbed. It !oined the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioners in the respondent court. 2hen the respondent court denied the motion, PC:: stuck to
its previous position as it again !oined the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. It is only in
this petition for review on %ertiorari that PC::, after a change of Chairman, flip$flopped in its
position.
2e also rule that there was nothing irregular when PC:: granted a section + immunity to
petitioners while they were already undergoing trial in Criminal Case Fo. //-80. ection + of C.<.
/,, as amended, does not prohibit the PC:: from granting immunity to persons already charged
in court and undergoing trial. 7s long as the privilege of immunity so given will in the !udgment of
the PC:: assist it in attaining its greater ob!ectives, the PC:: is well within legal grounds to
exercise this power at any stage of the proceedings. "his section + immunity frees and releases
one from liability, and as it inures to the benefit of an accused, it can be invoked at any time after
its acBuisition and before his final conviction. <ur regard for the rights of an accused dictates this
result. "hus, we have consistently held that laws that decriminali@e an act or a grant of amnesty
may be given retroactive effect. "hey constitute a bar against the further prosecution of their
beneficiaries# regardless of the appearance of their guilt. "o be sure, the guilt of the petitioners in
Criminal Case Fo. //-80 has yet to be established beyond doubt. "he PC:: itself does not
appear certain and confident of the strength of its evidence against the petitioners in said criminal
case. "he records show that petitioners 'apa was granted immunity not only because of the
information he gave to the prosecution but also D. . . in light of 4epublic#s revie of the cases both
civil and %ri"inal #i%# it #as filed or intends to file against . . .D him. imilarly, petitioner =ergara
was granted immunity D. . . in light of 4epublic#s revie of =ergara#s participation in Criminal Case
Fo. //-80 . . . .D 7fter reviewing its evidence against the petitioners, PC:: appears to have
sensed the sterility of its efforts of continuing their prosecution. Its former chairman, '.7.".
Caparas, learned that petitioners would file a 'otion to (ismiss Criminal Case Fo. //-80 after
PC:: rest its evidence, Dfor failure of the prosecution to prove its case.D In his 'ay /8, /--0
letters to the petitioners, he assured them that Dwe shall . . . offer no ob!ection to its favorable
consideration.D "his is a patent admission that petitioners# 'otion to (ismiss has merit and that the
PC:: cannot prove its case against the petitioners in Criminal Case Fo. //-80.
6inally, we re!ect respondent court#s ruling that the grant of section + immunity must be strictly
construed against the petitioners. It simplistically characteri@ed the grant as special privilege, as if
it was gifted by the government, ex $ratia. In taking this posture, it misread the raison dCetre and
the long pedigree of the right against self$incrimination visGaGvis immunity statutes.
"he days of inBuisitions brought about the most despicable abuses against human rights. Fot the
least of these abuses is the expert use of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine even the
guiltless. "o guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right against self$
incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civili@ed countries. <ver the years,
however, came the need to assist government in its task of containing crime for peace and order is
a necessary matrix of public welfare. "o accommodate
the need, the right against self$incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. Immunity statutes in
varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness to testify despite
his plea of the right
against self$incrimination. "o insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a witness
is given what has come to be known as transactional or a use$derivative$use immunity, as
heretofore discussed. ?uite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonan@a from government.
"hose given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it I the surrender of their precious right
to be silent. <ur hierarchy of values demands that the right against self$incrimination and the right
to be silent should be accorded greater respect and protection. ;aws that tend to erode the force of
these preeminent rights must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual.
"he government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly.
IF =IC2 2AC4C<6, the resolutions of the respondent court dated 'arch 5, and June 3, /--/ are
annulled and set aside and the 7mended Information against the petitioners in Criminal Case Fo.
//-80 is ordered dismissed. Fo costs.
Section 19
G.R. No. L-5793 !5650t 27, 1953
%OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, plaintiff$appellee,
vs.
!L'%R&O %S&OIS&!, defendant$appellant.
Ra"on 1ioLno and Fose P. 1ioLno for appellant.
-irst Assistant 0oli%itor <eneral Ruperto Hapunan Fr. and A%tin$ 0oli%itor Antonio ,onsin$ for
appellee.
&"!8ON, J.<
Prosecuted in the Court of 6irst Instance of ;anao for homicide through reckless imprudence and
illegal possession of firearm under one information, the appellant was acBuitted of the first offense
and found guilty of the second, for which he was sentenced to one year imprisonment. "his appeal
is from that sentence raising factual legal and constitutional Buestions. "he constitutional Buestion,
set up after the submission of the briefs, has to do with the ob!ection that the penalty I from + to
/0 years of imprisonment and fines I provided by 4epublic 7ct Fo. , is cruel and unusual.
7s to the facts. "he firearms with which the appellant was charged with having in his possession
was a rifle and belonged to his father, )runo Cstoista, who held a legal permit for it. 6ather and son
lived in the same house, a little distance from a 95$hectare estate belonging to the family which
was partly covered with cogon grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. 6rom a spot in the
plantation /00 to /90 meters from the house, the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit
(iragon (ima a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chicken and whose presence
was not perceived by the accused.
"he evidence is somewhat conflicting on whether the owner of the rifle was with the accused at the
time of the accidental killing.
)runo Cstoista testified that on the morning of the accident, 6ebruary /0, /-,-, his son told him
that there were wild chickens on the plantation Dscratching palay and cornD plants and asked if he
might shoot them; that )runo told his son to wait, got the rifle from the house or locker, handed it
over to 7lberto who is a Dsharp$shooterD and Dshoots better,D and walked about 90 meters behind
the young man; that )runo was that far from 7lberto when the latter fired and accidentally
wounded their servant.
"he defendant#s key testimony isE D2hen I heard wild rooster crowing I told my father about the
said wild rooster crowing near our house and he told me to shoot the said wild rooster, so I went to
shoot it.D
)runo#s testimony at the trial is in direct contradiction to his and his son#s statements at the
Constabulary headBuarters on the same morning of the shooting, and sworn to by them before the
!ustice of the peace soon after.
)runo related on that occasion that 7lberto Dwent to hunt for wild rooster;D that Dlater on my son
7lberto came to inform me that he had accidentally hit our laborer;D ?ueried Dwho was with 7lberto
when he went out hunting,D )runo replied, D Ae was alone.D
<n his part, the defendant declared on the same occasion that (iragon (ima, after being shot,
reBuested to be taken to his %(ima#s& house; that as the accused was able to carry the wounded
man only about +0 meters, (ima asked the defendant to call )runo Dwho was in the houseD I
which 7lberto did. "o the Buestion who his companion was when he shot at a rooster, 7lberto said,
DI was alone.D
"here is not the slightest ground to believe that these affidavits contained anything but the truth,
especially that part regarding )runo#s whereabouts when the defendant used the rifle. )oth affiants
are very intelligent, the affidavits were executed immediately upon their arrival at the Constabulary
headBuarters, there is no hint of any undue pressure brought to bear upon either of them, and,
above all, they stood to gain nothing from the statement that the accused was unaccompanied. In
contrast, )runo#s testimony in court was interested, given with his son#s acBuittal in view. 7nd
especially is the father#s veracity in court to be distrusted because by 7lberto#s unsolicited
admission, he had been in the habit of going out hunting in other places and for target practices,
and because by )runo#s unwitting admission, his son, who had no gun of his own, is a
sharpshooter and shoots better.
It being established that the defendant was alone when he walked to the plantation with his father#s
gun, the next Buestion that presents itself isE (oes this evidence support conviction as a matter of
lawK
In Mnited 0tates vs. 0a"son %/8 Phil., 393&, cited by defense counsel, it was held that carrying a
gun by order of the owner does not constitute illegal possession of firearm. "he facts in that case
were that a shotgun and nine cartridges which belonged to one Pablo Padilla, who had a proper
permit to possess them, were sei@ed by the police from amson while walking in the town of anta
4osa, Fueva Cci!a. Padilla was to use the shotgun in hunting that day and, as he was coming
along on horseback, sent amson on ahead.
4epublic 7ct Fo. ,, amending section 98-9 of the 4evised 7dministrative Code, in it pertinent
provision is directed against any person who possesses any firearm, ammunition therefor, etc. 7
point to consider in this connection is the meaning of the word Dpossesses.D
It goes without saying that this word was employed in its broad sense as to include DcarriesD and
Dholds.D "his has to be to is the manifest intent of the 7ct is to be effective. "he same evils, the
same perils to public security, which the 7ct penali@es exist whether the unlicensed holder of a
prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. "o accomplish the ob!ect of this law the proprietary
concept of the possession can have no bearing whatever. D<wnership of the weapon is necessary
only insofar as the ownership may tend to establish the guilt or intention of the accused.D It is
remarkable that in the Gnited tates, where the right to bear arms for defense is ensured by the
federal and many state constitutions, legislation has been very generally enacted severely
restricting the carrying of deadly weapons, and the power of state legislatures to do so has been
upheld.
In the light of these considerations, it is a mistake to point to Mnited 0tates vs. 0a"son' supra' as
authority for the appellant#s plea for acBuittal. "he implied holding in that case that the intention to
possess is an essential element of a violation of the 6irearms ;aw was not intended to imply title or
right to the weapon to the exclusion of everyone else. "he court did not mean only intention to own
but also intention to use. 6rom the very nature of the sub!ect matter of the prohibition control or
dominion of the use of the weapon by the holder regardless of ownership is, of necessity, the
essential factor.
"he terms DcontrolD and DdominionD themselves are relative terms not susceptible of exact
definition, and opinions on the degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to constitute a
violation vary. "he rule laid down by Gnited tates courts I rule which we here adopt I is that
temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a
statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of weapon. 7 typical example of such
possession is where Da person picks up a weapon or hands it to another to examine or hold for a
moment, or to shoot at some ob!ect.D %anderson vs. tate, + .2., /3*; C.J., 99&
7ppellant#s case does not meet the above test. Ais holding or carrying of his father#s gun was not
incidental, casual, temporary or harmless. 7way from his father#s sight and control, he carried the
gun for the only purpose of using it, as in fact he did, with fatal conseBuences.
Incidentally, herein lies a fundamental difference between the case at bar and the 0a"son case.
7lthough amson had physical control of his employer#s shotgun and cartridges, his possession
thereof was undoubtedly harmless and innocent, as evidenced by the fact that, apparently, he bore
them in full view of the people he met and of the authorities. Gnlike the appellant herein, amson
carried the gun solely in obedience to its owner#s order or reBuest without any inferable intention to
use it as a weapon. It is of interest to note that even in the Gnited tates where, as stated, the right
to bear arms as a means of defense is guaranteed, possession such as that by amson is by the
weight of authority considered a violation of similar statutes.
2ithout deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the duration of imprisonment, it is our
opinion that confinement from + to /0 years for possessing of carrying firearm is not cruel or
unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or
curb. "he rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the
:overnment, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful
weapons, !ustify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If
imprisonment from + to /0 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain
circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. "he constitutionality of
an act of the legislature is not to be !udged in the light of exceptional cases. mall transgressors
for which the heavy net was not spread are like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet
such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Cxecutive
for clemency or reduction of the penalty. %7rt. +, 4evised Penal Code; People vs. (e la Cru@, -9
Phil., -08.&
"he sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the penalty authori@ed by 4epublic 7ct
Fo. ,. "he !udgment is therefore modified so as to sentence the accused to imprisonment for five
years. Aowever, considering the degree of malice of the defendant, application of the law to its full
extent would be too harsh and, accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be furnished to
the President, thru the ecretary of Justice, with the recommendation that the imprisonment herein
imposed be reduced to six months. the appellant will pay the costs of both instances.
=aras' ,.F.' =a2lo' >en$zon' =adilla' Monte"ayor' Reyes' Fu$o' >autista An$elo' and La2rador'
FF.' concur.
R % S O L " & I O N
1e%e"2er 8' 1(Q8
&"!SON, J.<
"he constitutionality if 4epublic 7ct Fo. ,, with reference to the penalty therein provided, was
carefully considered. In branding imprisonment for five years too harsh and out of proportion in this
case, we had in mind that six months was commensurate and !ust for the appellant#s offense,
taking into consideration his intention and the degree of his malice, rather than that it infringes the
constitutional prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. D"he fact that the punishment authori@ed by the statute is severe
does not make it cruel and unusual.D %9, C.J.., //*5$//**.& Cxpressed in other terms, it has been
held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be Dflagrantly and plainly oppressive, D
Dwholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community.D %.de".& Aaving in mind the necessity for a radical measure and the public interest at
stake, we do not believe that five years# confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to
appellant#s and similar case, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the
extent of being shocking to public conscience. It is of interest to note that the validity on
constitutional grounds of the 7ct in Buestion was contested neither at the trial nor in the elaborate
printed brief for the appellant; it was raised for the first time in the course of the oral argument in
the Court of 7ppeals. It is also noteworthy, as possible gauge of popular and !udicial reaction to the
duration of the imprisonment stipulated in the statute, that some members of the court at first
expressed opposition to any recommendation for executive clemency for the appellant, believing
that he deserved imprisonment within the prescribed range.
"he sufficiency of the evidence for appellant#s conviction under 4epublic 7ct Fo. , likewise had
received close attention and study. "here is no need on our part to add anything to what has been
said, except to point out for clarification that the references to defendant#s previous uses of his
father#s gun and the fatal conseBuences of his last use of it, were made simply to emphasi@e that
his possession of the prohibited weapon was not casual, incidental, or harmless. Ais previous
conduct was relevant in determining his motive and intention, and to disprove the claim that his
father followed his son so as not to lose control of the firearm. It was far from the thought of the
court to condemn the appellant for acts with which he had not been charged or of which he had
been pronounced innocent.
"he confiscation of the gun is, in our opinion, in accordance with section / of the 4epublic 7ct Fo.
,, which readsE
CC"I<F /. ection twenty$six hundred and ninety$two of the 4evised 7dministrative
Code, as amended by Commonwealth 7ct Fumbered fifty$six, is hereby further
amended to read as followsE
CC. 98-9. Gnlawful manufacture, dealing in, acBuisition, disposition, or possession of
firearms, or ammunition therefor, or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition. I 7ny person who manufactures, deals in,
acBuires, disposes, or possesses, any firearm, parts of firearms, or ammunition
therefor, or instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms or ammunition in violation of any provision of sections eight hundred and
seventy$seven to nine hundred and six, inclusive, of this Code, as amended, shall,
upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than a year and
one day nor more than five years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less
than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in the discretion of the
court. If the article illegally possessed is a rifle, carbine, grease gun, ba@ooka, machine
gun, submachine gun, hand grenade, bomb, artillery of any kind or ammunition
exclusively intended for such weapons, such period of imprisonment shall not be less
than five years nor more than ten years. 7 conviction under this section shall carry with
it the forfeiture of the prohibited article or articles to the Philippine :overnment.
"he possession of any instrument or implement which is directly useful in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition on the part of any person whose business or
employment does not deal with such instrument or implement shall be prima facie
proof that such article is intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition.
"his provision does not say that firearms unlawfully possessed or carried are to be confiscated
only if they belong to the defendant, nor is such intention deducible from the language of the act.
2e are inclined to, and do, believe that, except perhaps where the lawful owner was innocent of,
or without fault in, the use of his property by another, confiscation accords with the legislative
intent.
2e can foresee the ob!ection that such legislation deprives one of his property without due
process of law. "he answer to this is that ownership or possession of firearms is not a natural right
protected by the Constitution. 7bove the right to own property is the inherent attribute of
sovereignty I the police power of the state to protect its citi@ens and to provide for the safety and
good order of society. %/8 C.J.., +3-, +,0.& pursuant to the exercise of police power, the right to
private property may be limited, restricted and impaired so as to promote the general welfare,
public order and safety. %.d., 8//.& "he power of the legislature to prohibit the possession of deadly
weapon carries with it the power to provide for the confiscation or forfeiture of weapons unlawfully
used or allowed by the licensed owner to be used.
"he motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.
G.R. No. 120034 !5650t 20, 1996
%OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, plaintiff$appellee,
vs.
(OS%-IN! !. %S!R!S an) RODRIGO O. LI'%D, accused$appellant.
4 C < ; G " I < F

"NO, J.:p
7ccused Josefina 7. Csparas was charged with violation of 4.7. Fo. 8,9+ as amended by 4.7.
Fo. 5+- for importing into the country twenty %90& kilograms of DshabuD in Criminal Case Fo. -,$
+*-5 before the 4"C of Pasay City, )r. //,.
7fter arraignment, the accused escaped from !ail and was tried in absentia. <n 'arch /3, /--+,
the trial court found her guilty as charged and imposed on her the death penalty.
7s the accused remains at large up to the present time, the issue that confronts the Court is
whether or not it will proceed to automatically review her death sentence. "he issue need not
befuddle us. In the /-/0 ground$breaking case of M.0. vs. La$una, et al.,
1
we already held thru
'r. Justice 'oreland, that the power of this Court to review a decision imposing the death penalty
cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts, viz.E
xxx xxx xxx
It is apparent from these provisions that the !udgment of conviction and
sentence thereunder by the trial court does not, in reality, conclude the trial
of the accused. uch trial is not terminated until the upreme Court has
reviewed the facts and the law as applied thereto by the court below. "he
!udgment of conviction entered on the trial is not final, can not be executed,
and is wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by
the upreme Court. In a sense the trial court acts as a commissioner who
takes the testimony and reports thereon to the upreme Court with his
recommendation. 2hile in practice he enters a !udgment of conviction and
sentences the prisoner thereunder, in reality, until passed upon by the
upreme Court, it has none of the attributes of a final !udgment and
sentence. It is a mere recommendation to the upreme Court, based upon
the facts on the record which are presented with it. "his is meant in no
sense to detract from the dignity and power of Courts of 6irst Instance. It
means simply that that portion of panish procedure which related to cases
where capital punishment was imposed still survives.
xxx xxx xxx
"he reBuirement that the upreme Court pass upon a case in which capital
punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one
having for its ob!ect simply and solely the protection of the accused. Aaving
received the highest penalty which the law imposes, he is entitled under the
law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it
is founded placed before the highest tribunal of the land to the end that its
!ustice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. uch
procedure is merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Feither the courts
nor the accused can waive it. It is a provision of the law that brooks no
interference and tolerates no evasions. %emphasis supplied&
"he ;aguna case interpreted section +0 of :eneral <rders Fo. +* as amended, which providesE
xxx xxx xxx
It shall not be necessary to forward to the upreme Court the record, or any
part thereof, of any case in which there shall have been an acBuittal, or in
which the sentence imposed is not death, unless such case shall have
been duly appealed; but such sentence shall be executed upon the order of
the court in which the trial was had. "he records of all cases in which the
death penalty shall have been imposed by any Court of 6irst Instance,
whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, and of all cases in which
appeals shall have been taken shall be forwarded to the upreme Court for
investigation and !udgment as law and !ustice shall dictate. "he records of
such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of the upreme Court within
twenty days, but not earlier than fifteen days after the rendition of sentence.
"he /-3+ Constitution did not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. Its section 9%,& of 7rticle
=III provided for review by this Court of death penalty cases. )oth our 4ules of Court of /-,0
2
and
/-8,
3
reBuire the transmission to this Court of the records of all cases in which the death penalty
shall have been imposed by the trial court, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, for
review and !udgment as the law and !ustice shall dictate. It will be noted that these rules were
taken from the second part of :eneral <rders Fo. +*, as amended by ection , of 7ct Fo. /-,.
4
Fecessarily, our case law under the /-3+ Constitution reiterated the ;aguna ruling. "hus, in the
/-+3 case of=eople vs. ?illanueva,
5
we held that the withdrawal of an appeal by a death convict
does not deprive this Court of its !urisdiction to review his conviction, viz.E
7n accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to death may be
allowed to withdraw his appeal like any other appellant, in an ordinary
criminal case before the briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal
does not remove the case from the !urisdiction of this court which under the
law is authori@ed and called upon to review the decision though
unappealed. ConseBuently, the withdrawal of the appeal in this case could
not serve to render the decision of the People#s Court final. In fact, as was
said by this court through Justice 'oreland in the case of M. 0. vs. La$una,
/5 Phil. +39, speaking on the matter of review by this court of a decision
imposing the death penalty, the !udgment of conviction entered in the trial
court is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly without force or
effect until the case has been passed upon by the upreme Court en
consulta; that although a !udgment of conviction is entered by the trial court,
said decision has none of the attributes of a final !udgment and sentence;
that until it has been reviewed by the upreme Court which finally passes
upon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and that this automatic review
by the upreme Court of decisions imposing the death penalty is something
which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade.
"he /-5/ case of =eople vs. ,ornelio, et al.,
6
involves the escape of a death convict. In no
uncertain terms, we held that the escape of a death convict does not relieve this Court of its duty of
reviewing his conviction. In the /-59 case of =eople vs. 1a2an, et al.,
7
the ponen%ia of former
Chief Justice 6ernando further stressed, to witE
xxx xxx xxx
Fow, as to the law. It would appear that respondent (emaisip is unaware of
ection - of 4ule /99. "husE D"he records of all cases in which the death
penalty shall have been imposed by any Court of 6irst Instance, whether
the defendant shall have appealed or not, shall be forwarded to the
upreme Court for review and !udgment as law and !ustice shall dictate.
"he records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of the upreme
Court within twenty %90& days but not earlier than fifteen %/+& days, after
rendition or promulgation of the sentence in the form prescribed by section
// of 4ule ,/. "he transcript shall also be forwarded as provided in section
/9 of 4ule ,/ within five %+& days after the filing thereof by the
stenographer.D "he penalty imposed on appellant (aban y :an@on in the
!udgment of Fovember 9/, /-8- being one of death, the case was properly
elevated to this Court. 'oreover, until after this Court has spoken, no
finality could be attached to lower court decision. 7s explained in former
Chief Justice 'oran#s Comments on the 4ules of CourtE DIn this connection,
it must be emphasi@ed that the !udgment of conviction imposing the death
penalty entered in the trial court, is not final, and cannot be executed and is
wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the
upreme Court en consulta; that although a !udgment of conviction is
entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a final
!udgment and sentence; and that until it has been reviewed by the upreme
Court which finally passes upon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and
this automatic review by the upreme Court is something which neither the
court nor the accused could waive or evade.D "he mere fact of escape of
appellant; therefore, could not be relied upon by respondent (emaisip as
sufficient cause for his failure to file appellant#s brief.
"hen came the /-53 Constitution which likewise did not prohibit the death penalty.
8
ection -,
4ule /99 continued to provide the procedure for review of death penalty cases by this Court.
ection /0, 4ule /99 of the /-*+ 4ules on Criminal Procedure even reenacted this procedure of
review. ignificantly, it expressly used the term Dautomatic review and !udgmentD by this Court. <ur
case law continued its fealty to the ;aguna rule. "hus, in the /-58 case of =eople vs. 0alilin$, et
al.,
9
we held, thru former Chief Justice 7Buino, that this Court is not precluded from reviewing the
death sentence of an accused who is at large. In the /-*, case of =eople vs.>uynay, et al.,
10
we
reiterated the rule that the escape of a death convict will not automatically result in the dismissal of
his appeal.
6inally, we have the /-*5 Constitution which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty unless
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes Congress so provides.
11
<n (ecember /3, /--3,
Congress reimposed the death penalty in cases involving the commission of heinous crimes. "his
revived the procedure by which this Court reviews death penalty cases pursuant to the 4ules of
Court. It remains automatic and does not depend on the whims of the death convict. It continues to
be mandatory, and leaves this Court without any option.
12
2ith due respect to the dissenting opinions of our esteemed colleagues, section * of 4ule /9, of
the 4ules of Court which, inter alia, authori@es the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant
!umps bail, has no application to cases where the death penalty has been imposed. In death
penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. "his is the text and tone of section /0, 4ule /99,
which is the more applicable rule, viz.E
ec. /0. +rans"ission of Re%ords in ,ase of 1eat# =enalty. R .n all %ases
#ere t#e deat# penalty is i"posed 2y t#e trial %ourt' t#e re%ords s#all 2e
forarded to t#e 0upre"e ,ourt for auto"ati% revie and Kud$"ent, within
twenty %90& days but not earlier than %/+& days after promulgation of the
!udgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration.
"he transcript shall also be forwarded within ten %/0& days after the filing
thereof by the stenographic reporter.
imilarly, the reliance in =eople vs. ,odilla,
13
by our dissenting colleagues is misplaced. Codilla is
not a death penalty case. <nly the penalty of re%lusion perpetua was imposed on appellant.
ConseBuently, we ruled that the escape of the appellant or his refusal to surrender to the proper
authorities !ustifies dismissal of his appeal.
<ur dissenting brethren also make a distinct cut between D. . . a death convict, i.e. one convicted to
death by a trial court who remains in the custody of the law, and who voluntarily withdraws his
appeal and a death convict, i.e., one convicted to death by the trial court but who escapes from the
custody of the law during the pendency of the appeal.D "hey rationali@e the distinction by holdingE
It should be clear in the first case, that even if the death convict withdraws
his appeal from the trial court#s !udgment convicting him to death, the
appellate court may still and nonetheless review the !udgment of conviction
for the convict$appellant has at least remained in the custody of the law to
await final verdict in his case. In the second case, however, the accused no
longer recogni@es and respects the authority of law and the duly$constituted
authorities in general and this Court in particular. uch supercilious conduct
of an escapee cannot and should not be taken lightly by the Court. 4espect
for and recognition of the authority of the Court is an essential and implicit
element in an effective and credible !udicial system.
Fo one, it should be stressed, should be allowed to make a mockery of the
!ustice system by, in one breath, seeking its protection and even vindication
via an automatic review of a death sentence and, in another breath
continuing to be a fugitive from !ustice and repudiating the very authority of
the system whose protection he seeks and invokes.
2e hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing !urisprudence mandating our review of
all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the court.
Fothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authori@ing the tate to take life must be
as error$free as possible. 2e must strive to reali@e this ob!ective, however elusive it may be, and
our efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his appeal or has escaped.
Indeed, an appellant may withdraw his appeal not because he is guilty but because of his wrong
perception of the law. <r because he may want to avail of the more speedy remedy of pardon. <r
because of his frustration and misapprehension that he will not get !ustice from the authorities. For
should the Court be influenced by the seeming repudiation of its !urisdiction when a convict
escapes. <urs is not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty cases. Fo litigant can
repudiate this power which is bestowed by the Constitution. "he power is more of a sacred duty
which we have to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a citi@en is our concern not
only in crimes that slight but even more, in crimes that shock the conscience. "his concern cannot
be diluted.
"he Court is not espousing a Dsoft, bended, approachD to heinous crimes for as discussed above,
we have always reviewed the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the will of the convict.
<ur unyielding stance is dictated by the policy that the tate should not be given the license to kill
without the final determination of this Aighest "ribunal whose collective wisdom is the last,
effective hedge against an erroneous !udgment of a one$!udge trial court. "his enlightened policy
ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends all rights, a matter of societal
concern that transcends the personal interest of a convict. "he importance of this societal value
should not be blurred by the escape of a convict which is a problem of law enforcement. Feither
should this Court be moved alone by the outrage of the public in the multiplication of heinous
crimes for our decisions should not be directed by the changing winds of the social weather. ;et us
not for a moment forget that an accused does not cease to have rights !ust because of his
conviction. "his principle is implicit in our Constitution which recogni@es that an accused, even if he
belongs to a minority of one has the right to be right, while the ma!ority, even if overwhelming, has
no right to be wrong.
IF =IC2 2AC4C<6, the counsel for the accused is given a new period of thirty %30& days from
notice hereof within which to file the )rief of the accused Josefina 7. Csparas.
< <4(C4C(.

G.R. No. 132601 (an5a,y 19, 1999
L%O %$.%G!R!:, petitioner,
vs.
S%$R%&!R: O- ("S&I$%, ET AL., respondents.
4 C < ; G " I < F

"NO, J.:
6or resolution are public respondents# Grgent 'otion for 4econsideration of the 4esolution of this
Court dated January ,, /--0 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and upplemental
'otion to Grgent 'otion for 4econsideration. It is the submission of public respondents thatE
/. "he (ecision in this case having become final and executory, its execution
enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. "he
issuance of the "4< may be construed as trenching on that sphere of
executive authority;
9. "he issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous
precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is
always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. "o
be certain, whatever Buestion may now be raised on the (eath Penalty ;aw
before the present Congress within the 8$month period given by this
Aonorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Gnder the time honored "axi" lex futuro, Kudex praeterito, the law looks
forward while the !udge looks at the past, . . . the Aonorable Court in
issuing the "4< has transcended its power of !udicial review.
+. 7t this moment, certain circumstancesLsupervening events transpired to the
effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has
become nil, to witE
a. "he public pronouncement of President Cstrada that he will
veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous
crimes.
b. "he resolution of Congressman :ole@, et al., that they are
against the repeal of the law;
c. "he fact that enator 4oco#s resolution to repeal the law only
bears his signature and that of enator Pimentel.
In their upplemental 'otion to Grgent 'otion for 4econsideration, public respondents attached a
copy of Aouse 4esolution Fo. 89- introduced by Congressman :ole@ entitled D4esolution
expressing the sense of the Aouse of 4epresentative to re!ect any move to review 4epublic 7ct
Fo. 58+- which provided for the re$imposition of death penalty, notifying the enate, the Judiciary
and the Cxecutive (epartment of the position of the Aouse of 4epresentative on this matter, and
urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death
penalty law.D "he 4esolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen %//3& congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contendsE %/& the stay order. . . is within the scope of
!udicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional
prerogatives; %9& the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; %3& the
Court did not lose !urisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; %,&
public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court#s !urisdiction; and %+& there is no
certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress
convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasi@e that the instant motions concern matters that are not
incidents in :.4. Fo. //5,59, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic
review of his conviction by this Court. "he instant motions were filed in this case, :.4. Fo. /3980/,
where the constitutionality of 4.7. Fo. */55 %;ethal In!ection ;aw& and its implementing rules and
regulations was assailed by petitioner. 6or this reason, the Court in its 4esolution of January ,,
/--- merely noted the 'otion to et 7side of 4odessa D)abyD 4. Cchegaray dated January 5,
/--- and Cntry of 7ppearance of her counsel dated January +, /---. Clearly, she has no legal
standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the tate is properly
represented by the olicitor :eneral.
2e shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I
6irst. 2e do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost
its !urisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner.
<bviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final !udgments can no longer be altered in
accord with the principle that Dit is !ust as important that there should be a place to end as there
should be a place to begin litigation.D
1
"o start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its
final (ecision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the (ecision of
this Court that became final. "hese metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Cntry of
Judgment in this case, vizE
CF"4J <6 JG(:'CF"
"his is to certify that on ;%to2er 16, 1((S a decision rendered in the above$
entitled case was filed in this <ffice, the dispositive part of which reads as
followsE
2AC4C6<4C, the petition is (CFIC( insofar as
petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute
%4epublic 7ct Fo. */55& as unconstitutional; but
:47F"C( insofar as ections /5 and /- of the
4ules and 4egulations to Implement 4epublic 7ct
Fo. */55 are concerned, which are hereby declared
IF=7;I( because %a& ection /5 contravenes
7rticle *3 of the 4evised Penal Code, as amended
by ection 9+ of 4epublic 7ct Fo. 58+-; and %b&
ection /- fails to provide for review and approval
of the ;ethal In!ection 'anual by the ecretary of
Justice, and un!ustifiably makes the manual
confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties
including the accusedLconvict and counsel.
4espondents are hereby en!oined from enforcing
and implementing 4epublic 7ct Fo. */55 until the
aforesaid ections /5 and /- of the 4ules and
4egulations to Implement 4epublic 7ct Fo. */55
are appropriately amended, revised andLor
corrected in accordance with this (ecision.
< <4(C4C(.
and that the same has, on 3ove"2er 8, 1(SS become final and executory
and is hereby recorded in the )ook of Cntries of Judgment.
'anila, Philippine.
Clerk of Court
)yE %:(& "C4CI"7 :. (I'7IIP
7cting Chief
Judicial 4ecords <ffice
"he records will show that before the Cntry of Judgment, the ecretary of Justice, the Aonorable
erafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on <ctober 9/, /--* a Compliance where he submitted the
7mended 4ules and 4egulations implementing 4.7. Fo. */55 in compliance with our (ecision. <n
<ctober 9*, /--*, ecretary Cuevas submitted a 'anifestation informing the Court that he has
caused the publication of the said 7mended 4ules and 4egulations as reBuired by the
7dministrative Code. It is crystalline that the (ecision of this Court that became final and
unalterable mandatedE %/& that 4.7. Fo. */55 is not unconstitutional; %9& that sections /5 and /- of
the 4ules and 4egulations to Implement 4.7. Fo. */55 are invalid, and %3& 4.7. Fo. */55 cannot
be enforced and implemented until sections /5 and /- of the 4ules and 4egulations to Implement
4.7. Fo. */55 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this (ecision was not altered a whit by
this Court. Contrary to the submission of the olicitor :eneral, the rule on finality of !udgment
cannot divest this Court of its !urisdiction to execute and enforce the same !udgment. 4etired
Justice Camilo ?uiason synthesi@ed the well established !urisprudence on this issue as
followsE
2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a !udgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its
powers nor the case. )y the finality of the !udgment, what the court loses is
its !urisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Cven after the !udgment
has become final the court retains its !urisdiction to execute and enforce
it.
3
"here is a difference between the !urisdiction of the court to execute its
!udgment and its !urisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. "he
former continues even after the !udgment has become final for the purpose
of enforcement of !udgment; the latter terminates when the !udgment
becomes final.
4
. . . 6or after the !udgment has become final facts and
circumstances may transpire which can render the execution un!ust or
impossible.
5
In truth, the arguments of the olicitor :eneral has long been re!ected by this Court. 7s aptly
pointed out by the petitioner, as early as /-/+, this Court has uneBuivocably ruled in the case
of 1ire%tor of =risons v. Fud$e of -irst .nstan%e,
6
vizE
"his upreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which
constitute !urisprudence on the sub!ect, that in criminal cases, after the
sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same
cannot change or alter its !udgment, as its !urisdiction has terminated . . .
2hen in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for
execution, in the event that the !udgment has been affirmed, it performs a
ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. )ut it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending
of the cause that the !udicial authority terminates by having then passed
completely to the Cxecutive. "he particulars of the execution itself, which
are certainly not always included in the !udgment and writ of execution, in
any event are absolutely under the control of the !udicial authority, while the
executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for
carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
:etting down to the solution of the Buestion in the case at bar, which is that
of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that
postponement of the date can be reBuested. "here can be no dispute on
this point. It is a well$known principle that notwithstanding the order of
execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper
time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death.
Gnder the common law this postponement can be ordered in three waysE
%/& )y command of the Oing; %9& by discretion %ar2itrio& of the court; and %3&
by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common
law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the
convict has once been placed in !ail the trial court can not reopen the case
to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the
ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date
of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that
after the %court& has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the
execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that
ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate
the emergency and to order a postponement. "hen the Buestion arises as
to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be
addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and so to who
has !urisdiction to make the investigation.
"he power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of !urisdiction. It cannot be
the sub!ect of substantial subtraction for our Constitution
7
vests the entirety of !udicial power in
one upreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. "o be sure, the
important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to
intervene and ad!ust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary
power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and !ustice.
8
6or
this purpose, ection 8 of 4ule /3+ provides that Dwhen by law !urisdiction is conferred on a court
or !udicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of
such !urisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.D
It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own (ecision to
give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged
by petitioner. "he Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law
enacted by Congress.1Np#i1.nOt
"he more disBuieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no
!urisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the
!udiciary. ince the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the
!urisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unBuestioned !urisdiction, this Court
promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out
the rules on execution of !udgments. "hese rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts
have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of
execution of their decisions. 4ule 3- governs execution, satisfaction and effects of !udgments in
civil cases. 4ule /90 governs !udgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this
Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cru@ Dwithout independence
and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as
champions of !ustice.D
9
Aence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it
enhances its independence. Gnder the /-3+ Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co$existent
with legislative power for it was sub!ect to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement.
"hus, its ection /3, 7rticle =III providesE
ec./3. "he upreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. aid rules shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. "he existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared 4ules of Court, sub!ect to the power
of the upreme Court to alter and modify the same. "he Congress have the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
"he said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re
Cunanan
10
Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the upreme Court regarding
admission to the practice of law, enacted the )ar 6lunkers 7ct of /-+3
11
which considered as a
passing grade, the average of 50Q in the bar examinations after July ,, /-,8 up to 7ugust /-+/
and 5/Q in the /-+9 bar examinations. "his Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In
his ponen%ia, 'r. Justice (iokno held that D . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
!udgment I a !udgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these !udgments even now, for
!ustifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may do so. 7ny attempt on the part of these department would be a clear
usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in Buestion.D
12
"he venerable !urist further
ruledE DIt is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.D )y its
ruling, this Court Bualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to Drepeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines.
"he ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the /-53 Constitution. 6or the /-53
Constitution reiterated the power of this Court Dto promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the
)atasang Pambansa . . . .D 'ore completely, ection +%9&+ of its 7rticle H providedE
xxx xxx xxx
ec.+. "he upreme Court shall have the following
powers.
xxx xxx xxx
%+& Promulgate rules
concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the
integration of the )ar, which,
however, may be repealed,
altered, or supplemented by
the )atasang Pambansa.
uch rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.
2ell worth noting is that the /-53 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the
!udiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the
)ar.
13
"he /-*5 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent !udiciary. 7mong others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its ection +%+&, 7rticle =III providesE
xxx xxx xxx
ec. +. "he upreme Court shall have the following
powersE
xxx xxx xxx
%+& Promulgate rules
concerning the protection
and enforcement of
constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated )ar, and
legal assistance to the
underprivileged. uch rules
shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify
substantive rights. 4ules of
procedure of special courts
and Buasi$!udicial bodies
shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the upreme
Court.
"he rule making power of this Court was expanded. "his Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. "he
Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special
courts and Buasi$!udicial bodies. )ut most importantly, the /-*5 Constitution took away the power
of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In
fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress, more so with the Cxecutive. If the manifest intent of the /-*5 Constitution is
to strengthen the independence of the !udiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that
this Court has no !urisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded
to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.
"o be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the !urisdiction of this Court to
control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. 7s aforestated, our
(ecision became final and executory on Fovember 8, /--*. "he records reveal that after
Fovember 8, /--*, or on (ecember *, /--*, no less than the ecretary of Justice recogni@ed the
!urisdiction of this Court by filing a 'anifestation and Grgent 'otion to compel the trial !udge, the
Aonorable "helma 7. Ponferrada, 4"C, )r. /0,, ?ue@on City to provide him D. . . a certified true
copy of the 2arrant of Cxecution dated Fovember /5, /--* bearing the designated execution day
of death convict ;eo Cchegaray and allow %him& to reveal or announce the contents thereof,
particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when reBuested.D "he relevant
portions of the 'anifestation and Grgent 'otion filed by the ecretary of Justice beseeching this
Court Dto provide the appropriate reliefD stateE
xxx xxx xxx
+. Instead of filing a comment on Judge
Ponferrada#s 'anifestation however, herein
respondent is submitting the instant 'anifestation
and 'otion %a& to stress, inter alia, that the non$
disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the
exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders
nugatory the constitutional guarantee that
recogni@es the people#s right to information of public
concern, and %b& to ask this Aonorable Court to
provide the appropriate relief.
8. "he non$disclosure of the date of execution
deprives herein respondent of vital information
necessary for the exercise of his power of
supervision and control over the )ureau of
Corrections pursuant to ection 3-, Chapter *, )ook
I= of the 7dministrative Code of /-*5, in relation to
"itle III, )ook I= of such 7dministrative Code,
insofar as the enforcement of 4epublic 7ct Fo. */55
and the 7mended 4ules and 4egulations to
Implement 4epublic 7ct Fo. */55 is concerned and
for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that
laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence
are faithfully observed.
5. <n the other hand, the willful omission to reveal
the information about the precise day of execution
limits the exercise by the President of executive
clemency powers pursuant to ection /-, 7rticle =II
%Cxecutive (epartment& of the /-*5 Philippine
Constitution and 7rticle */ of the 4evised Penal
Code, as amended, which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out Dwithout pre!udice to
the exercise by the President of his executive
powers at all ti"es.D %Cmphasis supplied& 6or
instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e.,
postpone the execution of a sentence to a day
certain %People v. =era, 8+ Phil. +8, //0 ./-351& in
the absence of a precise date to reckon with. "he
exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might
even work to the pre!udice of the convict and defeat
the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable
statute as when the date at execution set by the
President would be earlier than that designated by
the court.
*. 'oreover, the deliberate non$disclosure of
information about the date of execution to herein
respondent and the public violates ection 5, 7rticle
III %)ill of 4ights& and ection 9*, 7rticle II
%(eclaration of Principles and tate Policies& of the
/-*5 Philippine Constitution which readE
ec. 5. "he right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recogni@ed.
7ccess to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development shall, be
afforded the citi@en, sub!ect to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
ec. 9*. ub!ect to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the tate adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest.
-. "he Dright to informationD provision is self$
executing. It supplies Dthe rules by means of which
the right to information may be en!oyed %Cooley, 7
"reatise on the Constitutional ;imitations, /85
./-591& by guaranteeing the right and mandating the
duty to afford access to sources of information.
Aence, the fundamental right therein recogni@ed
may be asserted by the people upon the ratification
of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act
of the ;egislature %.d., at p. /8+& 2hat may be
provided for by the ;egislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to be
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent
with the declared tate policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
%Constitution, 7rt. II, ec. 9*&. Aowever, it cannot be
overemphasi@ed that whatever limitation may be
prescribed by the ;egislature, the right and the duty
under 7rt. III, ec. 5 have become operative and
enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the Few
Charter.D %(ecision of the upreme Court An
>an% in ;egaspi v. Civil ervice Commission, /+0
C47 +30, +3,$+3+ ./-*51.
"he same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner
Cchegaray was filed by his counsel, 7tty. "heodore "e, on (ecember 5, /--*. Ae invoked his
client#s right to due process and the public#s right to information. "he olicitor :eneral, as counsel
for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner#s motion on the ground that this Court has no
more !urisdiction over the process of execution of Cchegaray. "his Court granted the relief prayed
for by the ecretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its 4esolution of (ecember
/+, /--*. "here was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now
estopped from contending that this Court has lost its !urisdiction to grant said relief. "he !urisdiction
of this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.
II
econd. 2e likewise re!ect the public respondents# contention that the Ddecision in this case
having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the
executive department . . .. )y granting the "4<, the Aonorable Court has in effect granted reprieve
which is an executive function.D
14
Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition,
ection /-, 7rticle =II of the Constitution which readsE
Cxcept in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final !udgment.
Ae shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
ma!ority of all the members of the Congress.
"he text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public
respondents. "he provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final !udgment. It
also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a ma!ority of
all the members of the Congress. "he provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the
power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused
who has been convicted by final !udgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be
claimed in the appropriate courts. 6or instance, a death convict who become insane after his final
conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity.
15
7s observed by 7ntieau, Dtoday, it is
generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from executing the death
sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution.D
16
"he suspension of such a death
sentence is undisputably an exercise of !udicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential
power of reprieve though its effects is the same I the temporary suspension of the execution of
the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend 4.7.
Fo. 58+- by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. "he effect of such an amendment
is like that of commutation of sentence. )ut by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by
Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the
President to commute final sentences of conviction. "he powers of the Cxecutive, the ;egislative
and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple
reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various tates in the Gnited
tates, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of
convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the
power of the President to grant reprieves. 6or the public respondents therefore to contend that only
the Cxecutive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co$eBual and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
III
"hird. "he Court#s resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its
proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by
vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his =ery Grgent 'otion for Issuance of "4< on (ecember 9*, /--*
at about //E30 p.m. Ae invoked several grounds, vizE %/& that his execution has been set on
January ,, the first working day of /---; %b& that members of Congress had either sought for his
executive clemency andLor review or repeal of the law authori@ing capital punishment; %b./& that
enator 7Builino Pimentel#s resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that
capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen %/3& other senators; %b.9& enate
President 'arcelo 6ernan and enator 'iriam . (efensor have publicly declared they would seek
a review of the death penalty law; %b.3& enator Paul 4oco has also sought the repeal of capital
punishment, and %b.,& Congressman alacrib )aterina, Jr., and thirty five %3+& other congressmen
are demanding review of the same law.
2hen the =ery Grgent 'otion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would
only resume session on January /*, /---. Cven then, Chief Justice Ailario (avide, Jr. called the
Court to a pecial ession on January ,, /--/
17
at /0. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner#s =ery
Grgent 'otion. "he Court hardly had five %+& hours to resolve petitioner#s motion as he was due to
be executed at 3 p.m. "hus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner#s
allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the (eath Penalty ;aw are mere
speculations or not. "o the Court#s ma!ority, there were good reasons why the Court should not
immediately dismiss petitioner#s allegations as mere speculations and surmises. "hey noted that
petitioner#s allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publici@ed in the print
and broadcast media. It was also of !udicial notice that the //th Congress is a new Congress and
has no less than one hundred thirty %/30& new members whose views on capital punishment are
still unexpressed. "he present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the
(eath Penalty ;aw %4.7. Fo. 58+-& and the ;ethal In!ection ;aw %4.7. Fo. */55&. In contrast, the
Court#s minority felt that petitioner#s allegations lacked clear factual bases. "here was hardly a time
to verify petitioner#s allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. 7nd verification from Congress
was impossible as Congress was not in session. :iven these constraints, the Court#s ma!ority did
not rush to !udgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the
execution of petitioner. "he suspension was temporary I Duntil June /+, /---, coeval with the
constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes
certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made.D "he extreme caution taken
by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping
the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. 7s
life was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionali@e haste and the hysteria of some partisans.
"he Court#s ma!ority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by
his counsel. It was believed that law and eBuitable considerations demand no less before allowing
the tate to take the life of one its citi@ens.
"he temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystalli@ation
of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. "he public respondents,
thru the olicitor :eneral, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that
Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. Ae names these supervening events as
followsE
xxx xxx xxx
a. "he public pronouncement of President Cstrada that he will veto any law
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. "he resolution of Congressman :ole@, et al., that they are against the
repeal of the law;
c. "he fact that enator 4oco#s resolution to repeal the law only bears his
signature and that of enator Pimentel.
18
In their upplemental 'otion to Grgent 'otion for 4econsideration, the olicitor :eneral cited
Aouse 4esolution Fo. 89- introduced by Congressman :ole@ entitled D4esolution expressing the
sense of the Aouse of 4epresentatives to re!ect any move to review 4.7. Fo. 58+- which provided
for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the enate, the Judiciary and the Cxecutive
(epartment of the position of the Aouse of 4epresentative on this matter and urging the President
to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law.D "he :ole@
resolution was signed by //3 congressman as of January //, /---. In a marathon session
yesterday that extended up 3 o#clock in the morning, the Aouse of 4epresentative with minor, the
Aouse of 4epresentative with minor amendments formally adopted the :ole@ resolution by an
overwhelming vote. Aouse 4esolution Fo. 9+ expressed the sentiment that the Aouse D. . . does
not desire at this time to review 4epublic 7ct 58+-.D In addition, the President has stated that he
will not reBuest Congress to ratify the econd Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous
crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court#s "4< should now be lifted as it
has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.
7 last note. In /-99, the famous Clarence (arrow predicted that D. . . the Buestion of capital
punishment had been the sub!ect of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long
as men believe in punishment.D
19
In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be
unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been
regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti$death
partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. "o be sure, any debate, even if it is no
more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. )ut when the debate deteriorates to
discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the ma!ority rule to
tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the )ill of 4ights to the
minority fully hold. 7s Justice )rennan reminds us D. . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution I
and particularly the )ill of 4ights I to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of
temporary political ma!orities.D
20
'an has yet to invent a better hatchery of !ustice than the courts.
It is a hatchery where !ustice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown
away by the winds of rage. "he flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the
rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. "he business of courts in rendering !ustice is to
be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the
most hated by society.
21
IF =IC2 2AC4C<6, the Court grants the public respondents# Grgent 'otion for 4econsideration
and upplemental 'otion to Grgent 'otion for 4econsideration and lifts the "emporary
4estraining <rder issued in its 4esolution of January ,, /---.
"he Court also orders respondent trial court !udge %Aon. "helma 7. Ponferrada, 4egional "rial
Court, ?ue@on City, )ranch /0,& to set anew the date for execution of the convictLpetitioner in
accordance with applicable provisions of law and the 4ules of Court, without further delay.
< <4(C4C(
.
Section 20
September 30, 1975
A.M. No. 297-
AVELINA SERAFIN, complainant,
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE SANTIAGO LINDAYAG, respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:The Court finds from the documentary evidence and established facts of the case that
respondent municipal ud!e !rossly failed to perform his duties properly and is unfit for the office and
therefore orders his separation from the service. "t is self#evident from the very face of the $criminal
complaint$ for estafa, and the supportin! s%orn statements filed %ith and s%orn to before him as %ell as
the very notes of preliminary e&amination ta'en by him that the $criminal$ char!e a!ainst complainant
sho%ed no vesti!e of the essential elements of estafa but simply recited complainant(s failure to pay the
creditors as alle!ed offended parties a simple indebtedness. )espondent ud!e(s subse*uent crass attempt at
e&culpation by the submission of spurious evidence to cover up his liability is more reprehensible than his
!uilt under the char!e and sho%s his un%orthiness for the office.
Teehankee J.!
!e "o#rt finds from t!e doc#mentar$ evidence and establis!ed facts of t!e case t!at
respondent m#nicipal %#d&e &rossl$ failed to perform !is d#ties properl$ and is #nfit
for t!e office and t!erefore orders !is separation from t!e service. 't is self-evident
from t!e ver$ face of t!e (criminal complaint( for estafa, and t!e s#pportin& s)orn
statements filed )it! and s)orn to before !im as )ell as t!e ver$ notes of preliminar$
e*amination ta+en b$ !im t!at t!e (criminal( c!ar&e a&ainst complainant s!o)ed no
vesti&e of t!e essential elements of estafa b#t simpl$ recited complainant,s fail#re to
pa$ t!e creditors as alle&ed offended parties a simple indebtedness. -espondent
%#d&e,s s#bse.#ent crass attempt at e*c#lpation b$ t!e s#bmission of sp#rio#s
evidence to cover #p !is liabilit$ is more repre!ensible t!an !is &#ilt #nder t!e c!ar&e
and s!o)s !is #n)ort!iness for t!e office.
"omplainant ori&inall$ filed on /ctober 19, 1971 )it! t!e Secretar$ of 0#stice t!e
instant administrative complaint for capricio#s and malicio#s admission in !is co#rt of
a criminal complaint forestafa a&ainst complainant and ca#sin& !er )ron&f#l arrest and
detention, a&ainst respondent Santia&o 1inda$a&, m#nicipal %#d&e of 2#i&#into,
3#lacan. /n 4ecember 25, 1971, t!en 6*ec#tive 0#d&e Andres Sta. Maria to )!om
t!e administrative complaint !ad been referred sent !is indorsement to t!e
4epartment of 0#stice recommendin& t!e e*oneration of respondent on t!e &ro#nd
t!at complainant, assisted b$ !er co#nsel, !ad filed a motion to )it!dra) !er
complaint.
No f#rt!er action )as ta+en #ntil 0an#ar$ 29, 1973 )!en t!e 4epartment of 0#stice
for)arded t!e record of t!e case to t!is "o#rt. After t!e transfer to t!is "o#rt of t!e
po)er of administrative s#pervision over all inferior co#rts )it! t!e po)er to discipline
and dismiss %#d&es #nder t!e 1973 "onstit#tion, 1 t!e "o#rt, in vie) of t!e &ravit$ of
t!e c!ar&es as borne o#t b$ t!e doc#mentar$ evidence, referred ane) on /ctober 29,
1973 t!e complaint to t!e 4istrict 0#d&e of 3ali)a&, 3#lacan for investi&ation and
report, not)it!standin& t!e previo#sl$ reported )it!dra)al of t!e complaint. !e
"o#rt per its -esol#tion of 4ecember 19, 1973 denied respondent,s petition to
(consider t!e matter close and terminated( b$ virt#e of t!e previo#s recommendation
in 1971 of 0#d&e Sta. Maria and directed t!e 4istrict 0#d&e to proceed )it! t!e
investi&ation.
/n 7ebr#ar$ 11, 1978, t!e "o#rt received t!e overl$ lon& and detailed 38-pa&e
9sin&le-space: report 2 of t!e investi&ation cond#cted b$ 0#d&e 0#an 7. 6c!iverri of
t!e 3ali)a& co#rt of first instance. !e complaint )it! its doc#mentar$ evidence, t!e
'nvesti&ator,s -eport and record of t!e proceedin&s and t!e evidence of record ampl$
s#bstantiate t!e complaint, not)it!standin& complainant,s desistance beca#se s!e
after)ards too+ pit$ on respondent and no lon&er )anted to be involved in t!e case,
as manifested b$ !er )!en s!e appeared at t!e !earin& and s#bmitted t!e
doc#mentar$ evidence s#pportin& !er complaint, p#rs#ant to t!e process iss#ed b$
t!e 'nvesti&atin& 0#d&e for !er attendance.
!e criminal complaint for estafa a&ainst complainant 9doc+eted as "riminal "ase No.
1;02: )as filed on 0#l$ 21, 1971 )it! respondent %#d&e b$ t!en 2#i&#into c!ief of
police 0#an <. 6strella at t!e instance of "armelito Mendo=a, t!en m#nicipal secretar$
and !is )ife "ora=on Mendo=a. Said complaint s)orn to b$ said police c!ief before
respondent %#d&e on its face does not c!ar&e an$ crime b#t merel$ recites
complainant,s fail#re to pa$ a simple indebtedness, t!#s>
!at on or abo#t t!e 20t! da$ of 0#l$ 1971, in t!e M#nicipalit$ of 2#i&#into, <rovince
of 3#lacan, <!ilippines and )it!in t!e preliminar$ %#risdiction of t!is ?onorable "o#rt,
t!e above-named acc#sed )it! intent of &ain did t!en and t!ere )illf#ll$, #nla)f#ll$
and felonio#sl$ o)e t!e s#m of /N6 ?/@SAN4 7'A6 ?@N4-64 9<1,500.00: <6S/S,
<!ilippine "#rrenc$, t!at said amo#nt !as lon& been d#e since 0an#ar$ 25, 1971 and
Mrs. Avelina N. Serafin failed to pa$ !er acco#nt in spite of d#e notice sent b$
re&istered mail and #p to t!e present s!e failed to settle !er obli&ation. 3
!e s#pportin& statements 8 e*ec#ted and s)orn to b$ t!e Mendo=a spo#ses as
offended parties before respondent %#d&e li+e)ise s!o) on t!eir ver$ face t!at t!eir
complaint )as abo#t a simple debt of <1,500.00 borro)ed b$ complainant from Mrs.
Mendo=a and )!ic! s!e !ad failed to repa$ despite !er promise to do so b$ 0an#ar$
and 7ebr#ar$, 1971. 93ot! s)orn statements recite t!at complainant borro)ed t!e
amo#nt - (a$ #m#tan&..... si &inan& Avelina N. Serafin( and did not pa$ t!e same.:
!e notes ta+en d#rin& t!e preliminar$ e*amination cond#cted b$ respondent 5,
consistin& of seven simple .#estions propo#nded b$ police c!ief 6strella as (private
prosec#tor( and of seven simple ans)ers t!ereto &iven b$ "armelito Mendo=a s!o)
be$ond do#bt t!at t!ere is no vesti&e of t!e essential elements of estafa as provided in
Article 315 of t!e -evised <enal "ode b#t t!at t!e$ !ad simpl$ lent complainant t!e
s#m of <1,500.00 )it!o#t an$ collateral or sec#rit$ beca#se complainant )as an old
friend 9(sapa&+at mata&al na namin& si$an& +aibi&an(:, t!at t!e$ believe !er to be a
&ood person 9(at an& pani)ala namin a$ mab#ti si$an& tao(: and t!at )!en t!e$
)rote !er a letter of demand, s!e promised to pa$ t!em and said t!at if s!e failed to
+eep !er promise, t!e$ co#ld &et !er val#able t!in&s at !er !ome.
'n t!e same notes of preliminar$ e*amination, t!ere is recorded as one (searc!in&
.#estion and 9sic: provided for b$ -ep#blic Act sec. 9sic: ;( ; )!at appears to be
respondent,s .#estion as to )!et!er complainant !ad paid t!e mone$ ta+en b$ !er
and Mendo=a,s ans)er in t!e ne&ative, statin& t!at s#c! non-pa$ment )as t!e reason
)!$ t!e$ filed t!e complaint so t!at s!e )o#ld be p#nis!edB 7
'n admittin& s#c! a (criminal complaint( t!at )as plainl$ civil in aspects from t!e ver$
face of t!e complaint and t!e (evidence( presented, and iss#in& on t!e same da$ t!e
)arrant of arrest #pon !is #tterl$ baseless findin& (t!at t!e acc#sed is probabl$ &#ilt$
of t!e crime c!ar&ed,( respondent &rossl$ failed to perform !is d#ties properl$ C
)!ic! in t!is instance )as to dismiss t!e complaint o#tri&!t since it is elementar$ t!at
non-pa$ment of an indebtedness is not a criminal act, m#c! less estafaD and t!at no
one ma$ be criminall$ c!ar&ed and p#nis!ed for non-pa$ment of a loan of a s#m of
mone$.
'n rec+lessl$ iss#in& t!e )arrant of arrest on 0#l$ 22, 1971, respondent f#rt!er
enabled police c!ief 6strella as (private prosec#tor( of complainant,s creditors, t!e
Mendo=as, to avail of t!e despicable practice of some police officers to #se t!e
)arrant as a means of !arassment and serve it on Sat#rda$s )!en t!e person
arrested cannot raise bail, as in fact complainant )as arrested on a Sat#rda$, 0#l$ 25,
1971 at a time )!en t!e bondin& companies )ere closed for b#siness and s!e
conse.#entl$ !ad to #nder&o t!e !#miliation of bein& detained for t!ree da$s in t!e
m#nicipal %ail #p to 0#l$ 25, 1971 )!en s!e finall$ s#cceeded in p#ttin& #p t!e
<1,000.-bail bond fi*ed for !er release. 5
A modic#m of circ#mspection on t!e part of respondent co#ld !ave easil$ prevented
s#c! an in%#stice and tramplin& #pon of t!e complainant,s basic ri&!ts. 'ndeed, t)o
mont!s after)ards, #pon t!e merit of complainant,s co#nsel,s motion to .#as! t!e
criminal complaint 9)!ic! motion, !o)ever, some!o) and notabl$ &ot lost from t!e
record of t!e case, infra: respondent in an /rder dated September 30, 1971
#ltimatel$ fo#nd t!e .#as!al motion as ()ell ta+en( and ordered t!e dismissal of t!e
case 5A+1t&<.
!e 0#diciar$ Act, -ep#blic Act No. 29;, precisel$ re.#ires in section 57 t!ereof t!at
(9N:o )arrant of arrest s!all be iss#ed b$ an$ m#nicipal %#d&e in an$ criminal case
filed )it! !im #nless !e first e*amines t!e )itness or )itnesses personall$, and t!e
e*amination s!all be #nder oat! and red#ced to )ritin& in t!e form of searc!in&
.#estions and ans)ers.( -espondent #tterl$ failed to compl$ )it! t!is re.#irement of
searc!in& .#estions and ans)ers in !is e*amination of t!e complainin& )itness.
Eorse, t!e one .#estion propo#nded b$ !im s!o)s t!at !e did compre!end t!at t!e
(criminal( complaint involved a mere fail#re to pa$ a simple indebtedness and $et !e
fo#nd probable ca#se of t!e !erein complainant,s &#ilt of estafa and fort!)it! iss#ed
t!e )arrant of arrest a&ainst !er C )!ic! )o#ld indicate t!at eit!er !e believed t!at
non-pa$ment of an indebtedness constit#tes t!e crime of estafa )!ic! )o#ld ma+e !im
&#ilt$ of &ross i&norance of t!e la) or alt!o#&! +no)in& t!e la), of nevert!eless
disre&ardin& it and &ivin& d#e co#rse to t!e to)n police c!ief,s (prosec#tion( on be!alf
of t!e m#nicipal secretar$ )!ic! )o#ld constit#te an #tter betra$al of !is oat! of
office to render %#stice to ever$ man.
't s!o#ld also be noted t!at t!e "o#rt directed t!e 'nvesti&atin& 0#d&e to incl#de in
!is report of investi&ation certified tr#e copies of t!e complete records of t!e criminal
case t!#s filed a&ainst complainant. !is co#ld not be )!oll$ complied )it!, d#e to
t!e loss of some of t!e records of t!e said "riminal "ase No. 1;02, attrib#ted b$
respondent to dama&e )ro#&!t b$ t!e 1972 floods.
Stran&el$ eno#&!, !o)ever, t!e motion to .#as! filed b$ complainant t!ro#&! co#nsel
)!ic! )as event#all$ &ranted b$ respondent after t)o mont!s )as alle&edl$ never
fo#nd. Said motion to .#as! )o#ld !ave been most li+el$ on t!e self-evident &ro#nd
t!at t!e facts c!ar&ed do not constit#te an offense since no evidence )!atever )as
presented b$ !erein complainant in s#pport t!ereof and respondent,s order of
September 30, 1971 &rantin& t!e same and dismissin& t!e case made no mention of
an$ co#nter-evidence from complainant b#t simpl$ &ranted t!e same as (meritorio#s
and )ell-ta+en(. 9 'f so, t!e motion to .#as! )o#ld !ave f#rt!er reinforced t!e
complaint t!at respondent eit!er o#t of i&norance or partialit$ and malice iss#ed t!e
baseless )arrant of arrest. -espondent, not)it!standin& t!e !earin& &iven !im on
September 12, 1978 b$ t!e "o#rt and a f#rt!er opport#nit$ to s#bmit a memorand#m
)!ic! )as filed b$ !im on November 11, 1978, did never clarif$ or e*plain to t!e
"o#rt,s satisfaction t!is matter as )ell as !is ot!er anomalo#s actions, as set fort! in
t!is decision /5o5c.#7.
!e alle&ed loss of some records of t!e case f#rt!ermore f#rnis!ed respondent t!e
occasion to incl#de in t!e records of t!e case 9as s#bmitted b$ !im to t!e
'nvesti&ator: a p#rported Amended "omplaint 10 alle&edl$ e*ec#ted and s)orn to
before !im b$ police c!ief 6strella on t!e same date as t!e ori&inal criminal complaint
9)!ic! )o#ld introd#ce t!e element of estafa b$ alle&in& t!at complainant borro)ed
t!e s#m of <1,500.00 from t!e Mendo=as on t!e promise to b#$ on t!eir be!alf some
ornamental lamps b#t t!at s!e defra#ded t!em, neit!er b#$in& t!e lamps nor
ret#rnin& t!e mone$: and anot!er set of p#rported notes of preliminar$ e*amination
11 based on t!e Amended "omplaint )!ic! respondent alle&edl$ cond#cted )it!in 30
min#tes of t!e e*amination cond#cted b$ !im as per t!e ori&inal notes of preliminar$
e*amination, 12 supra, 9)!ic! )o#ld apparentl$ %#stif$ !is findin& of probable ca#se
and iss#ance of t!e )arrant of arrest: C b#t bot! doc#ments )ere fo#nd b$ t!e
'nvesti&ator to be sp#rio#s. 7rom an e*amination of t!e record and t!e evidence, t!e
"o#rt finds in order t!e 'nvesti&ator,s findin&s and concl#sion, as follo)s>
'ndeed, t!e alle&ed amendment 96*!. 2: and t!e Notes of t!e <reliminar$
6*amination 96*!s. 1, 1-a, 1-3, 1-c and 1-d: if admitted as &en#ine and a#t!entic
part of t!e records of "rim. "ase 1;02 )o#ld find t!e c!ar&es of t!e complainant
!erein entirel$ baseless. 3#t, as indicated in pa&es 17-15 !erein, even onl$ a
s#perficial e*amination of t!e appearance and condition of t!ese doc#ments, t!e
manner it )as probabl$ treated and dirtied, t!e alle&ed si&nat#re of "!ief of <olice
0#an <. 6strella, as )ell as t!e absence of (staple-!oles on t!e top and sides of t!ese
doc#ments( )!ic! are present in t!e admitted &en#ine and a#t!entic records of said
"rim. "ase 1;02, )o#ld lead #s to t!e inescapable concl#sion t!at t!ese 6*!ibits 91,
1-a, 1-b, 1-c, 1-d and 2: are definitel$ not &en#ine and a#t!entic parts of t!e records
of "rim. "ase No. 1;02 Fd!N3G9A.
't is conceivable t!at t)o preliminar$ e*aminations of a criminal case co#ld ta+e place
)it!in t!e space of 30 min#tes after t!e first one )as ta+en.
<ainf#l as it ma$ be, )e feel d#t$ bo#nd to concl#de and so find t!at respondent
acted )!imsicall$, and capricio#sl$ in &ivin& d#e co#rse to t!e estafa complaint 96*!. 1
4:, and iss#in& t!e )arrant for t!e arrest of Avelina N. Serafin, complainant !erein,
especiall$ considerin& t!at later on Sept. 30, 1971, said respondent fo#nd t!at t!e
Motion to G#as! filed b$ co#nsel for t!e acc#sed )as (meritorio#s and )ell ta+en t!e
same is &ranted( and conse.#entl$ t!e case )as dismissed. 13
'n t!e "o#rt,s vie), s#c! a crass attempt at e*c#lpation and cover-#p b$ t!e
s#bmission of sp#rio#s evidence as s#pposed records of t!e criminal case is more
repre!ensible t!an !is &#ilt #nder t!e c!ar&e and s!o)s !is #n)ort!iness for t!e
office.
A )ord as to t!en police c!ief 0#an <. 6strella. !e "o#rt !as e*amined t!e t)o
complaints alle&edl$ e*ec#ted b$ !im as of t!e same date, 0#l$ 21, 1971 and f#ll$
conc#rs )it! t!e 'nvesti&ator,s observation t!at a comparison of 6strella,s alle&ed
si&nat#re on t!e p#rported Amended "omplaint )it! !is admittedl$ &en#ine si&nat#re
on t!e ori&inal complaint 96*!s. A and 4: 18 )o#ld s!o) t!at t!e former alle&ed
si&nat#re is (N/ 26N@'N6(. 15 -espondent never presented 6strella at t!e
investi&ation to testif$ as to t!e a#t!enticit$ of !is alle&ed si&nat#re or t!e alle&ed
second preliminar$ e*amination based on t!e p#rported Amended "omplaint. 'n
respondent,s memorand#m s#bmitted to t!is "o#rt on November 11, 1978, t!ere is,
!o)ever, s#bmitted as Anne* (A( a p!otocop$ of an affidavit p#rportedl$ e*ec#ted on
September 30, 1978 b$ 6strella attestin& to !is !avin& e*ec#ted an Amended
"omplaint and as to t!e &en#ineness of !is si&nat#re t!ereon, not)it!standin& t!e
evident dissimilarit$ and disparit$ t!ereof, to t!e na+ed e$e, )it! !is admittedl$
&en#ine si&nat#re on t!e ori&inal complaint. !is matter s!all be referred to t!e
National 3#rea# of 'nvesti&ation for t!e determination of t!e &en#ineness of said
si&nat#re on t!e p#rported Amended "omplaint, as no) belatedl$ claimed b$ 6strella
in !is affidavit and contrar$ to t!e 'nvesti&ator,s findin&, )!ic! claim if determined to
be #ntr#e, )o#ld )arrant !is criminal prosec#tion 3m7l330H.
!is referral, !o)ever, can in no )a$ affect t!e disposition of t!e case at bar. S#c!
belated affidavit of 6strella can not be admitted at t!is sta&e. Nevert!eless, ass#min&
t!at t!ere )ere s#c! a p#rported amended complaint and a second preliminar$
e*amination cond#cted b$ respondent on t!e basis t!ereof, still a %#d&e of
discernment and circ#mspection )o#ld !ave been )ar$ of s#c! a second s)orn
complaint on t!e ver$ same da$ totall$ contradictor$ of t!e first complaint )!ic!
referred to a plain indebtedness and )as manifestl$ oblivio#s of t!e sacredness of an
oat! and intended to ma+e o#t a case of instant estafa re&ardless of t!e tr#e facts, as
recited b$ t!e alle&ed offended parties in t!eir ori&inal s)orn statements and demand
letter for pa$ment.
6ven prescindin& from t!e a&&ravation of t!e cover-#p, t!e "o#rt finds t!at t!e
penalt$ of dismissal is called for, in line )it! t!e precedents and standards set b$ it.
'n t!e analo&o#s case of "arreon vs. 7lores, 1; t!e "o#rt ordered t!erein respondent
m#nicipal %#d&e,s separation from t!e service for !avin& rendered a verdict of
conviction a&ainst t!erein complainant for alle&ed t!eft of abo#t a cavan of pala$
)!ic! co#ld in no )a$ be fact#all$ or le&all$ %#stified, in t!at t!e essential elements of
#nla)f#l ta+in& and t!at t!e propert$ stolen belon&ed to anot!er )ere lac+in&.
As stressed t!erein b$ t!e "o#rt citin& ot!er precedents, (9A: %#d&e )!o disre&ards
deliberatel$ or is i&norant of t!e basic f#ndamentals of la) and %#stice is #nfit to
contin#e in office. -espondent,s separation from t!e service is t!#s called for, in line
)it! t!e "o#rt,s action in adiar vs. "aces 17 9dismissin& t!erein respondent %#d&e for
dereliction of d#t$ in resolvin& a motion to dismiss a criminal case onl$ after 15
mont!s and failin& to file t!e same and serve a cop$ t!ereof on t!e prosec#tion: and
in M#nicipal "o#ncil of "asi&#ran G#e=on vs. Morales 15 9dismissin& t!erein
respondent %#d&e for #n%#stified absences from !is station and bein& (#nmindf#l of
t!e e*i&encies of t!e p#blic service and ne&lectf#l of !is d#ties to t!e pre%#dice of t!e
residents of "asi&#ran(:.(
A""/-4'N21H, respondent is !ereb$ dismissed from t!e office of m#nicipal %#d&e of
2#i&#into, 3#lacan.
!e "ler+ of "o#rt is directed to endorse to t!e "!ief, National 3#rea# of
'nvesti&ation, t!e ori&inal complaint and p#rported amended complaint bot! alle&edl$
e*ec#ted b$ former 2#i&#into c!ief of police 0#an <. 6strella as per !is affidavit
s#bmitted )it! respondent,s memorand#m of November 11, 1978 as )ell as ot!er
pertinent doc#ments and e*!ibits for comparison and determination of t!e
&en#ineness of said si&nat#res and for t!e filin& of t!e proper criminal prosec#tion
s!o#ld t!e findin&s of t!e National 3#rea# of 'nvesti&ation so )arrant.
S/ /-46-64
-LOR%N&IN! !. LO8!NO vs. &.% .ONOR!'L% !N&ONIO M. M!R&IN%8
G.R. No. L-63419 < Dece*+e, 18, 1986
:!, J.:
-act0< "hese petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under )P 99 popularly
known as the )ouncing Checks law. "he defendants in those cases moved seasonably to Buash
the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute
being unconstitutional. "he parties adversely affected have come to us for relief.
I005e< 2oF )P 99 offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt %therefore
making any prosecution under the statute unconstitutional&
.e3)< No. "he constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that evolved
gradually during the early part of the nineteenth century in the various states of the 7merican
Gnion as a result of the people#s revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by
common law, which permitted creditors to cause the incarceration of debtors who could not pay
their debts. ;ater, our fundamental law outlawed not only imprisonment for debt, but also the
infamous practice, native to our shore, of throwing people in !ail for non$payment of the %edula or
poll tax.
"he gravamen of the offense punished by )P 99 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non$
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. "he law is not intended or designed to coerce a
debtor to pay his debt. "he thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. )ecause of its deleterious effects on
the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. "he law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.
"he enactment of )P 99 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by
the imposition of penal sanctions. It had been reported that the approximate value of bouncing
checks per day was close to 900 million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the
Central )ank, it averaged between +0 minion to *0 million pesos a day.
)y definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. It
is a written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the payment of
all events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash and
payable on demand. Gnlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an
amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the
drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon
its presentation to the bank. "here is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the
instrument wig be paid upon presentation. 6or this reason, checks have become widely accepted
as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. 7lthough not legal tender, checks have come to
be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. "he
basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefulness
of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nit 7ny practice
therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless
checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.
"he effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. "he
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an in!ury to the public. "he
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold,
can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, in!ure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 7s aptly statedE
"he #check flasher# does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars
of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of !udgment to place him in the same category
with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition
against# imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was intended as a shield and not a sword.
"he enactment of )P 99 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to
the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. Police power is a dynamic force that
enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times. "here are occasions when the police
power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. "hus, )P 99 does not conflict with
the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
Section 21
DECISION


CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review
[1]
of the Decision
[2]
dated 14 November 2001 of the Court of Appeas
den!in" the petition for certiorari fied b! petitioner and its #esoution dated 24 $anuar! 2002 den!in"
reconsideration.

The Facts

%ased on a compaint fied b! petitioner &hiippine 'avin"s %an( )*petitioner+,- respondents
&edrito and .oria %ermo! )*respondent spouses+, were char"ed with estafa thru fasification of a pubic
document in the #e"iona Tria Court- /ania- %ranch 01 )*tria court+,. The 2nformation- doc(eted as
Crimina Case No. 345164130- ae"ed7

That on or about /a! 11- 1334- and for sometime prior and
subse8uent thereto- in the Cit! of /ania- &hiippines- the said accused- bein" then
private individuas- conspirin" and confederatin" to"ether and mutua! hepin"
each other- did then and there wifu!- unawfu! and feonious! defraud the
&hiippine 'avin"s %an( a ban(in" institution- du! or"ani9ed and e:istin" under
&hiippine ;aws :::- thru fasification of a pubic document in the foowin"
manner- to wit7 the said accused prepared- for"ed and fasified or caused to be
prepared- for"ed and fasified an owner<s cop! of Transfer Certificate of Tite No.
20=404- which is an imitation of- and simiar to the Transfer Certificate of Tite
No. 20=404 issued b! the #e"ist[er] of Deeds for the Cit! of /ania- and therefore-
a pubic document- b! then and there t!pin" on the ban( spaces thereon the tite
no.- description of a parce of and containin" an area of 060 s8uare meters- ocated
in /aate- this Cit!- the names of the accused as the re"istered owners thereof- and
then si"nin"- fasif!in" and simuatin" the si"nature of *A;2C2A D. .AN>?N+-
#e"ister of Deeds- appearin" on the ower ri"ht hand portion of the 1
st
pa"e of said
document@ the name *AD.A#D? C. CA'T#?+- Act". Deput!- appearin" on the
ri"ht hand midde portion of the 0
rd
pa"e- and imprintin" thereon severa entries
purported! showin" that the annotation thereon was a mort"a"e in favor A. C.
A"uia and 'ons- which was canceed on Bebruar! 1=- 1334- thereb! ma(in" it
appear- as it did appear- that accused are the re"istered owners of the said propert!-
under said TCT No. 20=404 which purported! is the owner<s cop! of said tite-
when in truth and in fact- as the said accused fu! we (new- the same is an
outri"ht for"er!- as the owner<s dupicate cop! of said Transfer Certificate of Tite
No. 20=404 is in possession of the spouses AD.A# and A;C2#A A;A/? b!
reason of the previous mort"a"e of the said propert! in favor of the atter since
Bebruar! 1=- 1334 and which was ater sod to them on $une 13- 1336@ that once
the said document has been for"ed and fasified in the manner above set forth- the
said accused presented the same to the &hiippine 'avin"s %an( and used the said
tite as coatera in obtainin"- as in fact- the! did obtain a oan in the sum
of &1-000-000.00 from the said ban(- and once in possession of the said amount
of &1-000-000.00 with intent to defraud- the! wifu!- unawfu! and feonious!
misappropriated- misappied and converted the same to their own persona use and
benefit- to the dama"e and preDudice of the said &hiippine 'avin"s %an( in the
aforesaid amount of &1-000-000.00- &hiippine Currenc!.
[0]

Epon arrai"nment- respondent spouses peaded *not "uit!+ to the char"e.

The tria court set the pre5tria on 11 $une 133=. After the hearin" on that da!- the tria court
issued the foowin" ?rder )*11 $une 133= ?rder+,7

Fhen the case was caed for hearin"- Att!. /aria Concepcion &uru"anan-
who entered her appearance as private prosecutor and Att!. Abino Achas- defense
counse- appeared andupon their stipuation- the! admitted the Durisdiction of the
Court and the identities of the accused.

Epon motion of Att!. &uru"anan- private prosecutor- Doined b! pubic
prosecutor Antonio 2srae- without obDection from Att!. Achas- et the initia
hearin" for the reception of the evidence for the prosecution be set on $une 11-
133= at 1700 a.m.- as previous! schedued.
[4]
)Amphasis suppied,



The minutes of the hearin"- which respondent spouses si"ned- bore the foowin" handwritten
notation under the headin" *remar(s+7 *&ostponed. Epon Doint a"reement of counses.+
[6]
This was the on!
notation made under *remar(s.+ Nowhere in the one5pa"e minutes of the hearin" did it state that an! of the
accused made an! stipuation or admission.

Durin" the hearin"s of 11 $une 133= and 0 'eptember 133=- the prosecution presented the testimonies
of Beisa Crisostomo )*Crisostomo+,- mana"er of petitioner<s ;ibertad /ania %ranch- and one
Germeni"ido Caua" )*Caua"+,- aso an empo!ee of petitioner. Crisostomo testified that she came to (now
respondent spouses when the! appied for a oan in Bebruar! 1334. Crisostomo stated that respondent
spouses presented to her Transfer Certificate Tite No. 20=404 )*TCT No. 20=404+, issued in their name
over a parce of and in /aate- /ania )*/aate ot+, which the! offered as coatera for the oan.
Crisostomo further stated after the approva of respondent spouses< oan appication- respondent spouses
e:ecuted in her presence a rea estate mort"a"e of the /aate ot in favor of petitioner as securit! for their
oan. Caua" testified that he was tas(ed to re"ister petitioner<s certificate of sae over the /aate ot
[4]
with
the #e"ister of Deeds of /ania but the atter refused to do so because the /aate ot had been mort"a"ed
and sod to the spouses Ad"ar and Avira Aamo.
[=]

After presentin" the testimonies of Crisostomo and Caua"- the prosecution rested its case.

2nstead of presentin" its evidence- the defense fied- with eave of court- a demurrer to evidence on the
"round that the prosecution faied to identif! respondent spouses as the accused in Crimina Case No. 345
164130. The prosecution- throu"h the private prosecutor- opposed the motion caimin" that Crisostomo and
Caan" had identified respondent spouses. The prosecution aso pointed out that as borne b! the 11 $une
133= ?rder- respondent spouses stipuated on their identit! durin" the pre5tria.
[1]


The Ruling of the Trial Court


2n its ?rder of 21 Apri 1331 )*21 Apri 1331 ?rder+,- the tria court "ranted respondent
spouses< motion- dismissed Crimina Case No. 345164130- and ac8uitted respondent spouses. The 21 Apri
1331 ?rder reads7

The basic issues to resove here bois down on )sic, the determination
of whether the accused were identified b! the prosecution witnesses as the
perpetrators of the act compained of durin" the tria of the case and whether the!
admitted their identities as the accused named in the information.

After carefu! "oin" over the en"th and breadth of the testimonies of the
two prosecution witnesses- there is nothin" in the transcript which woud si"ht!
indicate that the! identified the accused as the persons who obtained a oan from
the &hiippine 'avin"s %an( and e:ecuted the correspondin" documents. The
identification of an accused [b! the witness] ma! be made b! pointin" to him
direct! in open court ::: or [b!] steppin" down from the stand and tappin" his
shouder. 2f the accused is not present durin" the tria- his identification ma! be
effected throu"h his pictures attached to the bai bond or some other means. The
identification of an accused as the perpetrator of an offense is essentia in the
successfu prosecution of crimina cases. %! the accused<s enterin" a ne"ative pea
to the ae"ations in the information- he denies that he committed the offense. Ge
cannot even be compeed to "ive his name durin" the arrai"nment and for which
the Court ma! enter a pea of not "uit! for him.

As to the stipuation of facts re"ardin" the admission of the Durisdiction of
the court and the identities of the accused- a cursor! readin" of the ?rder of $une
11- 133= reveas that their e:press conformit! to the stipuation of facts entered
into b! their counse with the private prosecutor was never as(ed of them.
Considerin" that the admission of the identities of the accused as the perpetrators
of the crime here char"ed is a matter which adverse! affects their substantia
ri"hts- such admission must have to invove their e:press concurrence or consent
thereto. This consent is manifested in their si"nin" the pre5tria order containin"
such admissions. As to the minutes of the proceedin"s of $une 11- 133=- suffice it
to state that there is nothin" to it )sic, which woud even hint that a stipuation of
facts ever too( pace.

FGA#AB?#A- for insufficienc! of evidence- et this case be- as the same
is hereb!- D2'/2''AD and accused &edrito %ermo! and .oria Cisconde
[%ermo!] are- as the! are hereb!- ac8uitted of the crime char"ed- with costs de
oficio.
[3]



The prosecution- a"ain throu"h the private prosecutor- sou"ht reconsideration but the tria court denied
its motion in the ?rder of 21 /a! 1331.

&etitioner fied a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeas. The 'oicitor .enera Doined
the petition.


The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

2n its Decision dated 14 November 2001- the Court of Appeas- as earier stated- denied the petition. 2t
hed7

2n support of the demurrer to evidence- the defense counse ar"ued that
neither of the witnesses presented b! the prosecution was abe to identif! the
accused as ae"ed! those who committed the crime the! were prosecuted for.

:::

&etitioner- however- ar"ues that the testimonies of the two witnesses the!
presented identified the accused spouses as the perpetrators of the crime. :::

Fe are not convinced. The ::: testimon! proves on! one thin"7 that
a coupe purportin" to be the %ermo! spouses presented themseves to the %an(
and obtained the oan. Fhether the! are the same husband and wife accused in this
case for Astafa is a different stor!. The faiure of the prosecution to point in open
court to the persons of the accused as the same persons who presented themseves
to the %an( is a fata omission. The! coud be impostors who- armed with the fa(e
tite- presented themseves to the %an( as the persons named in the tite. The
prosecution "oofed. Gad the witnesses been as(ed to point to the two accused as
the same coupe who appeared before the %an( to obtain the oan- there woud
have been no doubt on their crimina iabiit!.

&etitioner further ar"ued that the aw itsef does not prescribe the wa!s
to identif! the accused- ::: [.]

True- there is no standard form provided b! aw [for] identif!in" the
accused. $urisprudence and tria practice show that the accused is usua!
identified b! the witnesses- prompted b! the counse- b! either pointin" at him or
steppin" down the witness< stand and tappin" him on the shouder- or b! means of
photo"raphs. The tria court correct! pointed this out. Gow ese can identification
be done- it ma! be as(ed.

The petitioner aso ar"ues that *the identities of private [respondents]
were cear! estabished as a resut of the stipuation b! and between the
prosecution )thru the private prosecutor, and the defense.+ 2t insists that the ?rder
dated $une 11- 133=- is sufficient admission b! the accused as to their identities-
and [was] ae"ed! si"ned b! them and their counse as re8uired under 'ection 2
of #ue 111 of the #ues on Crimina &rocedure. There is no merit to this
ar"ument. 2f ever stipuations were made on $une 11- 133=- these must be made in
writin"- which must be si"ned b! the accused and counse as their conformit! to
such stipuations. The records- however- show that the ?rder dated $une 11- 133=-
mere! stated what transpired durin" that particuar hearin" and what the counses
si"ned was the minutes for the same hearin". Gence- the identities of the accused
were not stipuated upon for faiure to comp! with the re8uirements under the
#ues of Court. The tria court correct! rued that *there [was] nothin" ::: which
woud even hint that a stipuation of facts ever too( pace.+

:::

2n fine- we are more than convinced that the tria court was correct in
"rantin" the demurrer to evidence for insufficienc! of evidence on account of ac(
of proper identification of the accused. %ut even assumin" that the tria court
erred- the ac8uitta of the accused can no on"er be reviewed either on appea or on
petition for certiorari for it woud vioate the ri"ht of the accused a"ainst doube
Deopard!. :::

2n the case at bench- it is cear that this petition see(s to review the
Dud"ment of the tria court- which aread! had Durisdiction over the subDect matter
and of the persons of this case. The tria court had Durisdiction to resove the
demurrer to evidence fied b! the accused- either b! den!in" it or b! dismissin" the
case for ac( of sufficient evidence. 2f the demurrer is "ranted- resutin" [in] the
dismissa of the crimina case and the ac8uitta of the accused- this can no on"er
be reviewed uness it can be shown that the tria court committed "rave abuse of
discretion amountin" to e:cess or ac( of Durisdiction. 2n this case- assumin" the
tria court committed an error- the petitioner has not shown that it committed "rave
abuse of discretion amountin" to ac( [or] e:cess ::: of Durisdiction. The error- if
an!- is mere! an error of Dud"ment.
[10]


&etitioner sou"ht reconsideration caimin" that the Court of Appeas contradicted itsef when it hed-
on one hand- that the tria court<s error did not amount to "rave abuse of discretion and stated- on the other
hand- that an! error committed b! the tria court can no on"er be reviewed without vioatin" respondent
spouses< ri"ht a"ainst doube Deopard!. &etitioner aso contended- for the first time- that it is the tria court<s
dut! to insure that the accused si"n the pre5tria order or a"reement embod!in" respondent spouses<
admissions and that its faiure to do so shoud not be ta(en a"ainst the prosecution.

The Court of Appeas denied petitioner<s motion in the #esoution of 24 $anuar! 2002 which
reads7

The petitioner seems to have misunderstood our ruin" re"ardin" the issue
on doube Deopard! in connection with [the] petition for certiorari. &etitioner
ar"ues that our ruin" has been contradictor! for sa!in" on one hand that *even
assumin" that the tria court erred- the ac8uitta of the accused can no on"er be
reviewed either b! appea or on petition for certiorari for it woud vioate the ri"ht
of the accused a"ainst doube Deopard!+ whie sa!in" on the other hand *assumin"
that tria court committed an error- the petitioner has not shown that it committed
"rave abuse of discretion amountin" to ac( e:cess )sic, or e:cess of Durisdiction.+
&etitioner as(s7 *Fhich is which thenH+ I meanin"- it has not understood what a
petition for certiorari is for. 2f the petitioner read the decision carefu!- in between
the above58uoted statements of the decision is the case of +eople v. ,ans, -.). No.
./0.01, 2ecember 3, .440, 563 7C)A 03- where the 'upreme Court e:picit!
e:pained that *review of the sufficienc! of the evidence and of the propriet! of
the ac8uitta of the accused [as a resut of the "rant of the demurrer to evidence]
ies outside the function of certiorari.+ True- a petition for certiorari ae"es an
error of the tria court but nowhere in our decision did it mention that the tria court
in this case committed an error. Fe mere! made an assumption- without sa!in"
that there was an error committed b! the tria court- to ma(e a point. Fe meant
that if the tria court did commit an error in ruin" that there was insufficient
evidence resutin" in the ac8uitta of the accused- such error can no on"er be
reviewed since it woud be one of Dud"ment- which is not within the ambit of a
certiorari. :::

The petitioner a"ain as(s us7 *Fho has the dut! of re8uirin" the accused to
si"n the pre5tria order- the prosecution or the tria court itsefH+ 2t answers that it
is the tria court because it *has the soe and e:cusive dut! of seein" to it that a
re8uirements in such proceedin"s be du! compied with : : : and that dut!
incudes the act of re8uirin" or compein" the accused to si"n the pre5tria order-
[hence] it is pain! fundamenta! erroneous to suppose that such dut! can be
dee"ated b! the tria court to the prosecution.+ The petitioner further ar"ues that
*the respondent Court was ri"ht off ousted of Durisdiction when it deiberate! and
without e"a basis refused to consider the stipuation of facts made b! the parties
in the eventua pre5tria order : : : despite the absence of si"nature of the accused
in the said pre5tria order.+

The ar"uments of the petitioner are baseess. Nowhere in #ue 111 on &re5
Tria on the #evised #ues of #ues of Crimina &rocedure does it re8uire the
prosecution or the accused to si"n the pre5tria order. A that is re8uired for the
tria court to do is to hod a pre5tria conference and issue an order recitin" the
actions ta(en- the facts stipuated upon b! the parties- and evidence mar(ed. And if
there were an! a"reements or admissions made or entered into b! the parties durin"
the pre5tria conference- these shoud be reduced in writin" and si"ned b! the
accused and his or her counse. ?therwise- such a"reements or admissions ma! not
be used a"ainst the accused. :::

Gence- it is not incumbent upon the tria court to re8uire the parties to
si"n the pre5tria order to ma(e the a"reements and admissions as evidence a"ainst
the accused. 2f the parties made such admission as to the identities of the accused
in this case- it is the oo(5out of the counses- particuar! the prosecutor- to re8uire
the accused to si"n. Fh! shoud the tria court remind the counses what to doH 2f
the private prosecutor wanted such admission as an evidence a"ainst the accused-
then she shoud have re8uired the admission in writin" [sic] and si"ned b! the
accused and their counse as re8uired b! the rues. %ut- as the records show- a
that was si"ned was the minutes of the pre5tria conference. As aread! discussed
in our decision- the tria court committed no error on this point.
[11]



Gence- this petition.


The Issues

&etitioner ae"es that the Court of Appeas erred in7

2. G?;D2N. TGAT 'E&&?'AD;J 2T 2' N?T TGA DETJ ?B TGA T#2A;
C?E#T T? #AKE2#A TGA ACCE'AD T? '2.N TGA &#A5T#2A;
?#DA#@

22 BA2;2N. T? C?N'2DA# TGA /ATTA#' 'TATAD 2N TGA 11 $ENA
133= &#A5T#2A; ?#DA# A' 'T2&E;AT2?N' /ADA %J TGA
&A#T2A' AND 'G?E;D TGE' %A %2ND2N. ?N TGA/@

222. #ABE'2N. T? #AC?.N2>A TGA BACT TGAT TGA ACCE'AD FA#A
'EBB2C2ANT;J 2DANT2B2AD DE#2N. TGA T#2A; %J TGA
F2TNA'' ?B TGA &#?'ACET2?N@ [AND]

2C. G?;D2N. TGAT D?E%;A $A?&A#DJ GAD A;;A.AD;J ATTACGAD
2N TGA CA'A.
[12]
2n his /emorandum- the 'oicitor .enera Doins causes with petitioner. The 'oicitor .enera contends
that the tria court<s dismissa of Crimina Case No. 345164130 was tainted with "rave abuse of discretion
thus- doube Deopard! does not app! in this case.
[10]


The Ruling of the Court


The petition has no merit.


On Whether Double Jeopardy is
Applicable Here


&ara"raph 1- 'ection =- #ue 11= )*'ection =+, of the 1316 #ues on Crimina &rocedure
[14]
on doube
Deopard! provides7

8ormer conviction or ac*uittal9 double eopardy. L Fhen an accused has
been convicted or ac8uitted- or the case a"ainst him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his e:press consent b! a court of competent Durisdiction- upon a
vaid compaint or information or other forma char"e sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had peaded to the char"e-
the conviction or ac8uitta of the accused or the dismissa of the case sha be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense char"ed- or for an! attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof- or for an! offense which necessari! incudes or is
necessari! incuded in the offense char"ed in the former compaint or
information.


Bor doube Deopard! to app!- 'ection = re8uires the foowin" eements in the first crimina
case7

)a, The compaint or information or other forma char"e was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction@
)b, The court had Durisdiction@
)c, The accused had been arrai"ned and had peaded@ and
)d, Ge was convicted or ac8uitted or the case was dismissed without his e:press
consent.
[16]


?n the ast eement- the rue is that a dismissa with the e:press consent or upon motion of the accused does
not resut in doube Deopard!. Gowever- this rue is subDect to two e:ceptions- name!- if the dismissa is
based on insufficienc! of evidence or on the denia of the ri"ht to speed! tria.
[14]
A dismissa upon demurrer
to evidence fas under the first e:ception.
[1=]
'ince such dismissa is based on the merits- it amounts to an
ac8uitta.
[11]

As the Court of Appeas correct! hed- the eements re8uired in 'ection = were a present in Crimina
Case No. 345164130. Thus- the 2nformation for estafa throu"h fasification of a pubic document a"ainst
respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The tria court had
Durisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses. #espondent spouses were arrai"ned durin"
which the! entered *not "uit!+ peas. Bina!- Crimina Case No. 345164130 was dismissed for
insufficienc! of evidence. Conse8uent!- the ri"ht not to be paced twice in Deopard! of punishment for the
same offense became vested on respondent spouses.


The !tent o" the Ri#ht A#ainst
Double Jeopardy

The ri"ht a"ainst doube Deopard! can be invo(ed if )a, the accused is char"ed with the same offense
in two separate pendin" cases- or )b, the accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had been
convicted or ac8uitted of such offense- or (c) the prosecution appeals from a jugment in the same case.
[13]
The ast is based on 'ection 2- #ue 122 of the #ues of Court
[20]
which provides that *[a]n! part! ma!
appea from a fina Dud"ment or order- e!cept if the accuse "oul #e place there#$ in ou#le
jeopar$.+

Gere- petitioner see(s a review of the 21 Apri 1331 ?rder dismissin" Crimina Case No. 345164130
for insufficienc! of evidence. 2t is in effect appeain" from a Dud"ment of ac8uitta. %! mandate of the
Constitution
[21]
and 'ection =- the courts are barred from entertainin" such appea as it see(s an in8uir! into
the merits of the dismissa. Thus- we hed in an earier case7

2n terms of substantive aw- the Court wi not pass upon the propriet! of the
order "rantin" the Demurrer to Avidence on the "round of insufficienc! of
evidence and the conse8uent ac8uitta of the accused- as it wi pace the atter in
doube Deopard!. .enera!- the dismissa of a crimina case resutin" in ac8uitta
made with the e:press consent of the accused or upon his own motion wi not
pace the accused in doube Deopard!. Gowever- this rue admits of two e:ceptions-
name!7 insufficienc! of evidence and denia of the ri"ht to a speed! tria ::: 2n
the case before us- the resoution of the Demurrer to Avidence was based on the
"round of insufficienc! of evidence ::: Gence- it cear! fas under one of the
admitted e:ceptions to the rue. Doube Deopard! therefore- appies to this case and
this Court is constitutiona! barred from reviewin" the order ac8uittin" the
accused.
[22]
)Amphasis suppied,


The strict rue a"ainst appeate review of Dud"ments of ac8uitta is not without an! basis. As the Court
e:pained in People $. %elasco
[20]
L

The fundamenta phiosoph! hi"hi"htin" the finait! of an ac8uitta b! the
tria court cuts deep into *the humanit! of the aws and in a Deaous watchfuness
over the ri"hts of the citi9en- when brou"ht in une8ua contest with the 'tate : : :
:+ Thus- -reen [v. :nited 7tates] e:pressed the concern that *)t,he under!in"
idea- one that is deep! in"rained in at east the An"o5American s!stem of
Durisprudence- is that the 'tate with a its resources and power shoud not be
aowed to ma(e repeated attempts to convict an individua for an ae"ed offense-
thereb! subDectin" him to embarrassment- e:pense and ordea and compein" him
to ive in a continuin" state of an:iet! and insecurit!- as we as enhancin" the
possibiit! that even thou"h innocent- he ma! be found "uit!.+

2t is a:iomatic that on the basis of humanit!- fairness and Dustice- an
ac8uitted defendant is entited to the ri"ht of repose as a direct conse8uence of the
finait! of his ac8uitta. The phiosoph! under!in" this rue estabishin" the
absoute nature of ac8uittas is *part of the paramount importance crimina Dustice
s!stem attaches to the protection of the innocent a"ainst wron"fu conviction.+
The interest in the finait!5of5ac8uitta rue- confined e:cusive! to verdicts of not
"uit!- is eas! to understand7 it is a need for *repose-+ a desire to (now the e:act
e:tent of one<s iabiit!. Fith this ri"ht of repose- the crimina Dustice s!stem has
buit in a protection to insure that the innocent- even those whose innocence rests
upon a Dur!<s enienc!- wi not be found "uit! in a subse8uent proceedin".

#eated to his ri"ht of repose is the defendant<s interest in his ri"ht to have
his tria competed b! a particuar tribuna. ::: [']ociet!<s awareness of the heav!
persona strain which the crimina tria represents for the individua defendant is
manifested in the wiin"ness to imit .overnment to a sin"e crimina proceedin"
to vindicate its ver! vita interest in enforcement of crimina aws. The utimate
"oa is prevention of "overnment oppression@ the "oa finds its voice in the finait!
of the initia proceedin". As observed in ;oc'hart v. Nelson- *)t,he fundamenta
tenet animatin" the Doube $eopard! Cause is that the 'tate shoud not be abe to
oppress individuas throu"h the abuse of the crimina process.+ %ecause the
innocence of the accused has been confirmed b! a fina Dud"ment- the Constitution
concusive! presumes that a second tria woud be unfair.



On Petitioner&s Clai' that the Trial Court&s
Dis'issal o" Cri'inal Case (o. )*+,-.,)/ 0as %oid

&etitioner- to"ether with the 'oicitor .enera- contends that the Court can in8uire into the merits of
the ac8uitta of respondent spouses because the dismissa of Crimina Case No. 345164130 was void. The!
contend that the tria court acted with "rave abuse of discretion amountin" to ac( or e:cess of Durisdiction
when it disre"arded evidence ae"ed! provin" respondent spouses< identit!.
[24]

The contention has no merit. To be sure- the rue barrin" appeas from Dud"ments of ac8uitta
admits of an e:ception. 'uch- however- is narrow! drawn and is imited to the case where the tria court
*act[ed] with "rave abuse of discretion amountin" to ac( or e:cess of Durisdiction ue to a %iolation of ue
process i.e. the prosecution was denied the opportunit! to present its case ::: or that the trial "as a
sham :::.+
[26]

None of these circumstances e:ists here. There is no dispute that the prosecution- throu"h petitioner<s
counse as private prosecutor- was afforded its da! in court. Neither is there an! 8uestion that the
proceedin"s in the tria court were "enuine. Fhat petitioner points to as basis for the tria court<s ae"ed
"rave abuse of discretion rea! concerns its appreciation of the evidence. Gowever- as the Court of Appeas
correct! hed- an! error committed b! the tria court on this point can on! be an error of Dud"ment and not
of Durisdiction. Fhat this Court hed in Central 1an2 $. Court o" Appeals
[24]
appies with e8ua force here L

'ection 2 of #ue 122 of the #ues of Court provides that *the &eope of the
&hiippines cannot appea if the defendant woud be paced thereb! in doube
Deopard!.+ The ar"ument that the Dud"ment is tainted with "rave abuse of discretion
and therefore- nu and void- is fawed because whatever error ma! have been
committed b! the ower court was mere! an error of Dud"ment and not of
Durisdiction. 2t did not affect the intrinsic vaidit! of the decision. This is the (ind of
error that can no on"er be rectified on appea b! the prosecution no matter how
obvious the error ma! be :::. )Amphasis suppied,

On the Other rrors Assi#ned by Petitioner

The Court wi no on"er rue on the other errors assi"ned b! petitioner L on who has the
responsibiit! to insure that the pre5tria a"reement is si"ned b! the accused- on the effect of the 11 $une
133= ?rder- and on whether respondent spouses were identified durin" the tria. A these entai an in8uir!
into the merits of the 21 Apri 1331 ?rder- which- as earier stated- cannot be done without vioatin"
respondent spouses< ri"ht a"ainst doube Deopard!.

&'EREFORE- we DEN( the petition. Fe AFFIR) the Decision dated 14 November 2001 and the
#esoution dated 24 $anuar! 2002 of the Court of Appeas.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24447 (5ne 29, 1968
&.% %OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, plaintiff$appellant,
vs.
9ILL: O'S!NI!, defendant$appellee.
;ffi%e of t#e 0oli%itor <eneral for plaintiffGappellant.
Maxi"o ?. ,uesta' Fr. for defendantGappellee.
$!S&RO, J.:
)efore us for review, on appeal by the People of the Philippines, is an order, dated January *,
/-8+, of the Court of 6irst Instance of Pangasinan dismissing, upon motion of the defense, an
indictment for rape against 2illy <bsania.
<n Fovember 99, /-8,, barely a day after the occurence of the alleged crime, Crlinda (ollente,
the /,$year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco (ollente and Carmelita ;ureta, filed in the
municipal court of )alungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery,
/
alleging
"hat on or about the 9/st day of Fovember /-8,, at around 9E00 to 3E00 in the
afternoon, particularly in sitio Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan, municipality of )alungao,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the !urisdiction of the Aonorable Court,
the said accused 2illy <bsania, armed with a dagger, by means of violence and
intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have carnal
knowledge of the complainant Crlinda (ollente, against her will and on the roadside in
the ricefields at the above$mentioned place while she was alone on her way to barrio
an 4aymundo.
7fter the case was remanded to the Court of 6irst Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings,
the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the
allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed
Dwith lewd designsD.
"he accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for the
dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege Dlewd
designsD and that the subseBuent information filed by the fiscal which averred Dlewd designsD did
not cure the !urisdictional infirmity. "he court a quogranted the motion and ordered dismissal of the
action, ruling that Dthe failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts
committed by the accused were with #lewd designs# does not give this Court !urisdiction to try the
case.D 6rom this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.
"wo issues are tendered for resolution, namelyE first, are Dlewd designsD an indispensable element
which should be alleged in the complaintK, and, second, does the present appeal place the
accused in double !eopardyK
)oth must be answered in the negative.
"he accused, in his motion to dismiss, as well as the trial !udge, in his order of dismissal, rely
basically on the ruling in =eople vs. <ilo %;$/*909, 7pril 30, /-8,&. In the case which involved a
prosecution for acts of lasciviousness this Court, in passing, opined that Dlewd designD is
... an indispensable element of all crimes against chastity, such as abduction,
seduction and rape, including acts of lasciviousness ... an element that characteri@es
all crimes against chastity, apart from the felonious or criminal intent of the offender,
and such element must be always present in order that they may be considered in
contemplation of law.
Fothing in the foregoing statement can be reasonably interpreted as reBuiring an expli%it allegation
of Dlewd designD in a complaint for rape. 2e hold in no uncertain terms that in a complaint for rape
it is not necessary to allege Dlewd designD or Dunchaste motiveD, for to reBuire such averment is to
demand a patent superfluity. ;ascivious intent inheres in rape and the unchaste design is manifest
in the very act itself I the carnal knowledge of a woman through force or intimidation, or when the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years
of age.
9
It is clear that the complaint here satisfies the reBuirements of legal sufficiency of an indictment for
rape as it unmistakably alleges that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant by
means of violence and intimidation. 2e therefore hold that the trial !udge erred in dismissing the
case on the proffered grounds that the complaint was defective for failure to allege Dlewd designD
and, as a conseBuence of such infirmity, that the court a quo did not acBuire !urisdiction over the
case. "he error of the trial !udge was in confusing the concept of !urisdiction with that of
insufficiency in substance of an indictment.
2e come now to the more important issue of double !eopardy. "he accused maintains that
Dassuming, arguendo, that the argument is right that the court a quo has !urisdiction, the appeal of
the :overnment constitutes double !eopardy.D
7n appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if the defendant would thereby be
placed in double !eopardy.
3
Correlatively, section -, 4ule //5 of the 4evised 4ules of Court
providesE
2hen a defendant shall have been convicted or acBuitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a
court of competent !urisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acBuittal of the defendant or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
In order that the protection against double !eopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following
reBuisites must have obtained in the original prosecutionE %a& a valid complaint or information; %b& a
competent court; %c& the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and %d& the defendant was
acBuitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
"he complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the court a quo was a
competent tribunal with !urisdiction to hear the case; the record shows that the accused pleaded
not guilty upon arraignment. Aence, the only remaining and decisive Buestion is whether the
dismissal of the case was without the express consent of the accused.
"he accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered by the trial !udge upon his motion
to dismiss. Aowever, he vehemently contends that under the prevailing !urisprudence,
citing =eople vs. >an$alao' et al. %-, Phil. 3+,, 6ebruary /5, /-+,&, =eople vs. La2atete %;$/9-/5,
7pril 95, /-80&, =eople vs. ?illarin %;$/-5-+, July 3/, /-8,&, and =eople vs. ,lori2el %;$903/,,
7ugust 3/, /-8,&, an erroneous dismissal of a criminal action, even upon the instigation of the
accused in a motion to Buash or dismiss, does not bar him from pleading the defense of double
!eopardy in a subseBuent appeal by the :overnment or in a new prosecution for the same offense.
"he accused suggests that the above$enumerated cases have abandoned the previous ruling of
this Court to the effect that when a case is dismissed, other than on the merits, upon motion of the
accused personally or through counsel, such dismissal is to be regarded as with the express
consent of the accused and conseBuently he is deemed to have waived
,
his right to plead double
!eopardy andLor he is estopped
+
from claiming such defense on appeal by the :overnment or in
another indictment for the same offense.
"his particular aspect of double !eopardy I dismissal or termination of the original case without
the express consent of the defendant I has evoked varied and apparently conflicting rulings from
this Court. 2e must untangle this !urisprudential ma@e and fashion out in bold relief a ruling not
susceptible of eBuivocation. Aence, a searching extended review of the pertinent cases is
imperative.
"he doctrine of aiver of dou2le Keopardy was enunciated and formally labelled as such for the first
time in /-,- in=eople vs. 0ali%o' supra, with three !ustices dissenting. 8 In that case, the provincial
fiscal appealed from the order of the trial court dismissing, upon motion of the defendant made
immediately after the prosecution had rested its case, an indictment for homicide, on the ground
that the prosecution had failed to prove that the crime was committed within the territorial
!urisdiction of the trial court, or, more specifically, that the municipality of =ictorias in which the
crime was allegedly committed was compromised within the province of Fegros <ccidental.
4e!ecting the claim of the accused that the appeal placed him in double !eopardy, this Court held
that the dismissal was erroneous because the evidence on record showed that the crime was
committed in the town of =ictorias and the trial !udge should have taken !udicial notice that the said
municipality was included within the province of Fegros <ccidental and therefore the offense
charged was committed within the !urisdiction of the court of first instance of the said province. In
ruling that the appeal by the :overnment did not put the accused in peril of a second !eopardy, this
Court stressed that with Dthe dismissal of the case by the court below upon motion of the
defendant, the latter has not been in !eopardy,D and Dassuming, arguendo, that the defendant had
been already in !eopardy in the court below and would be placed in double !eopardy by the appeal,
the defendant has waived his constitutional right not to be put in danger of being convicted twice
for the same offense.D 'r. Justice 6elicisimo 6eria, speaking for the ma!ority, reasoned that
... when the case is dismissed it# t#e express %onsent of the defendant, the dismissal
will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in
having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege,
for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the
merits and rendering a !udgment of conviction against him.
"he 0ali%o doctrine was adhered to and affirmed in =eople vs. Marapao %*+ Phil. *39, 'arch 30,
/-+0&, <andi%ela vs. Lutero %** Phil. 9--, 'arch +, /-+/&, =eople vs. =inuela' et al. %-/ Phil. +3,
'arch 9*, /-+9&, ,o +e Bue vs. An%arna%ion %-, Phil. 9+*, January 98, /-+,&, and =eople vs.
1esalisa %;$/++/8, (ecember /5, /-88&.
In Marapao, the defendant was indicted for slight physical in!uries in the municipal court of
ibonga, Cebu. 7fter the prosecution had rested its case, a continuance was had, and when trial
was resumed, the court, upon motion of the defense, ordered the case dismissed for failure of the
prosecution to appear. Aowever, the court reconsidered this order upon representation of the fiscal
who appeared moments later, and ordered the defense to present its evidence. "he accused
moved to get aside the latter order on the ground that it placed him in double !eopardy. 7cceding to
this motion, the court dismissed the case. ubseBuently, the accused was charged in the Court of
6irst Instance of Cebu with the offense of assault upon a person in authority, based on the same
facts alleged in the former complaint for slight physical in!uries. 7gain, upon motion of the accused,
the trial court dismissed the new indictment on the ground of double !eopardy. 6rom this order, the
prosecution appealed. In upholding the appeal of the :overnment, this Court observed that
although the information for assault necessarily embraced the crime of slight physical in!uries for
which the accused was indicted in the !ustice of the peace court,
... it appears that the appellee was neither convicted nor acBuitted of the previous
charge against him for slight physical in!uries, for that case was dismissed upon his
own reBuest before trial could be finished. Aaving himself asked for such dismissal,
before a !udgment of conviction or acBuittal could have been rendered, the appellee is
not entitled to invoke the defense of double !eopardy...
In <andi%ela, this Court had occasion to reiterate the 0ali%o rulingE
)ut where a defendant expressly consents to, by moving for, the dismissal of the case
against him, as in the present case, even if the court or !udge states in the order that
the dismissal is definite or does not say that the dismissal is without pre!udice on the
part of the fiscal to file another information, the dismissal will not be a bar to a
subseBuent prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. %People vs. Jlagan, +*
Phil. *+/; People vs. alico, *, Phil. 599.&.
7nd in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused in that case, this Court heldE
7ccording to ection - of 4ule /3, if a criminal case is dismissed otherwise than upon
the merits at any stage before !udgment, without the express consent of the defendant,
by a court of competent !urisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the
defendant has pleaded to the charge, the dismissal of the case shall be definite or a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense; but if it is dismissed upon the petition
or with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will be without pre!udice or
not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, because, in the last case, the
defendant#s action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right not to be prosecuted again for the same offense.
In =inuela, as in 0ali%o, the prosecution had presented its evidence against the defendant, and the
trial court, upon motion of the accused, dismissed the criminal action for lack of evidence showing
that the crime charged was committed within its territorial !urisdiction. <n appeal by the
:overnment, this Court found that the evidence showed otherwise and, like in 0ali%o, the ma!ority
re!ected the plea of double !eopardy interposed by the accused on the ground that his virtual
instigation of the erroneous dismissal amounted to a waiver of his right against a second !eopardy.
In ,o +e Bue, it was the theory of the petitioner that the charge of estafa filed against him having
been dismissed, albeit provisionally, without his express consent, its revival constituted double
!eopardy which bars a subseBuent prosecution for the same offense. "his claim was traversed by
the olicitor :eneral who contended that considering what had transpired in the conference
between the parties, the provisional dismissal was no bar to the subseBuent prosecution for the
reason that the dismissal was made with the defendant#s express consent. "his Court sustained
the view of the olicitor :eneral, thusE
2e are inclined to uphold the view of the olicitor :eneral. 6rom the transcript of the
notes taken at the hearing in connection with the motion for dismissal, it appears that a
conference was held between petitioner and the offended party in the office of the
fiscal concerning the case and that as a result of that conference the offended party
filed the motion to dismiss. It also appears that as no action has been taken on said
motion, counsel for petitioner invited the attention of the court to the matter who acted
thereon only after certain explanation was given by said counsel. 7nd when the order
came the court made it plain that the dismissal was merely provisional in character. It
can be plainly seen that the dismissal was effected not only with the express consent
of the petitioner but even upon the urging of his counsel. "his attitude of petitioner, or
his counsel, takes this case out of the operation of the rule.
In essence, this Court held that where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the
express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel, there can be no double
!eopardy under section -, 4ule //3, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal. "his
decision subscribes substantially to the doctrine on waiver established in 0ali%o.
"he validity and currency of the alico doctrine were intimated in the recent case of =eople vs.
-aKardo %;$/*9+5, June 9-, /-88&, and six months later were reaffirmed in =eople vs. 1esalisa'
supra.
In -aKardo, this Court, through 'r. Justice ?uerube 'akalintal, observedE
"he record does not reveal that appellees expressly agreed to the dismissal of the
information as ordered by the trial Judge or that they performed any act which could be
considered as express consent within the meaning of the rule. 2hile they did file a
motion asking that the case be Buashed or that a reinvestigation thereof be ordered,
the court granted neither alternative. 2hat it did was to order the prosecution to amend
the complaint. "his order was in effect a denial of the motion to Buash, and it was only
after the prosecution failed to amend that the court dismissed the case on that ground.
ConseBuently, even under the theory enunciated in some decisions of this Court
%People vs. alico, etc.& that if a valid and sufficient information is erroneously
dismissed upon motion of the defendant he is deemed to have waived the plea of
double !eopardy in connection with an appeal from the order of dismissal, appellees
here are not precluded from making such plea.
"o paraphrase, had the dismissal been anchored on the motion to dismiss, the defendants would
not have been entitled to protection against double !eopardy.
"hen in 1esalisa, this Court, in a unani"ous decision penned by 'r. Justice Jesus >arrera, held
that
... "he ruling in the case of alico, that the act of the defendant in moving for the
dismissal of the case constitutes a waiver of the right to avail of the defense of double
!eopardy, insofar as it applies to dismissals which do not amount to acBuittal or
dismissal of the case on the merits, %annot 2e %onsidered to #ave 2een a2andoned 2y
t#e su2sequent de%isions on t#e "atter. %Cmphasis supplied&
x x x x x x x x x
... an appeal of the prosecution from the order of dismissal %of the criminal complaint&
by the trial court will not constitute double !eopardy if 517 t#e dis"issal is "ade upon
"otion' or it# t#e express %onsent' of t#e defendant' and 567 t#e dis"issal is not an
a%quittal or 2ased upon %onsideration of t#e eviden%e or of t#e "erits of t#e %ase; and
%3& the Buestion to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal; so that should
the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
%Cmphasis supplied&
"he doctrine of estoppel in relation to the plea of double !eopardy was first enunciated
in A%ierto which held that when the trial court dismisses a case on a disclaimer of !urisdiction, upon
the instigation of the accused, the latter is estopped on appeal from asserting the !urisdiction of the
lower court in support of his plea of second !eopardy. "he doctrine of estoppel is in Buintessence
the same as the doctrine of waiverE the thrust of both is that a dismissal, other than on the merits,
sought by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to be with his express consent and bars
him from subseBuently interposing the defense of double !eopardy on appeal or in a new
prosecution for the same offense.
In A%ierto, the defendant was charged before a Gnited tates court$martial with having defrauded
the :overnment of the Gnited tates, through falsification of documents, within a military base of
the Gnited tates in the Philippines. "he challenge by the accused against the !urisdiction of the
military tribunal was brushed aside, and he was convicted. <n review, the verdict was reversed by
the Commanding :eneral who sustained 7cierto#s position on the ground of lack of !urisdiction.
ubseBuently, he was convicted of estafa and falsification based on the same facts by the Court of
first Instance of 4i@al. <n appeal to this Court, he claimed former !eopardy in the court$martial
proceedings, asserting that the military court actually had !urisdiction. In a unanimous
5
decision,
this Court, through 'r. Justice Pedro "uason, ruledE
"his is the exact reverse of the position defendant took at the military trial. 7s stated,
he there attacked the court$martial#s !urisdiction with the same vigor that he now says
the court$martial did have !urisdiction; and thanks to his ob!ections, so we incline to
believe, the Commanding :eneral, upon consultation with, and the recommendation
of, the Judge 7dvocate :eneral in 2ashington, disapproved the court$martial
proceedings.
x x x x x x x x x
Irrespective of the correctness of the views of the 'ilitary authorities, t#e defendant
as estopped fro" de"urrin$ to t#e =#ilippine %ourtCs Kurisdi%tion and pleadin$ dou2le
Keopardy on t#e stren$t# of #is trial 2y t#e %ourtG"artial' A party ill not 2e alloed to
"aLe a "o%Lery of Kusti%e 2y taLin$ in%onsistent positions #i%# if alloed ould result
in 2razen de%eption. .t is triflin$ it# t#e %ourts' %ontrary to t#e ele"entary prin%iples of
ri$#t dealin$ and $ood fait#' for an a%%used to tell one %ourt t#at it la%Ls aut#ority to try
#i" and' after #e #as su%%eeded in #is effort' to tell t#e %ourt to #i%# #e #as 2een
turned over t#at t#e first #as %o""itted error in yieldin$ to #is plea. %Cmphasis
supplied&
"he 7cierto ruling was reiterated in =eople vs. A"ada Reyes' et al. %-8 Phil. *95, 7pril 30,
/-++&; =eople vs. Reyes' et al. %-* Phil. 8,8, 'arch 93, /-+8&; =eople vs. ,asiano %;$/+30-,
6ebruary /8, /-8/&, and =eople vs. Ar%#illa %;$/+839, 6ebruary 9*, /-8/&.
"he defendants in =eople vs. A"ada Reyes' et al., were charged as accessories to the crime of
theft committed by their brother, 7nselmo, the principal accused. "he latter pleaded guilty to simple
theft and was sentenced accordingly. "he former pleaded not guilty and subseBuently filed a
motion to Buash on the ground that being brothers and sisters of the principal accused, they were
exempt from criminal responsibility for the acts charged against them in the information.
"hereupon, the prosecution moved to amend the information so as to allege that the defendants
profited from the effects of the crime. In view of this development, counsel for the defendants
moved to withdraw their motion to Buash, and ob!ected to the proposed amendment which sought
to change materially the information after plea without the consent of the accused. 2ithout acting
on the petition to withdraw the motion to Buash, the trial court denied the motion of the prosecution
on the ground that the proposed amendment would substantially affect the fundamental rights of
the accused who were exempt from liability under the information because of their relation to the
principal culprit. "hen the prosecution moved for the dismissal of the case against the alleged
accessories with reservation to file a new information. "he court ordered the dismissal without
ruling on the reservation. ubseBuently, a new information was filed virtually reproducing the
previous one except that now there was an added allegation of intent to gain. "he lower court
Buashed the new information upon motion of the accused on the ground of double !eopardy. <n
appeal by the prosecution, this Court, thru 'r. Justice J. ). ;. 4eyes, held that the plea of double
!eopardy was erroneously sustained because
In the first place, the accused$appellees herein filed a motion to Buash on the ground
that they incurred no criminal liability under the facts alleged in the information in the
preceding case, Fo. ?$-59, and the trial court instead of allowing the withdrawal of the
motion to Buash, virtually sustained the same when it denied the fiscal#s motion to
amend, thereby forcing the latter to dismiss the case; hence, it can not be held that the
former case was terminated without the express consent of the accused. econdly, the
defendants themselves showed that the information in the previous case was
insufficient to charge them with any criminal offense, in view of their relationship with
the principal accused; and it is well established doctrine that for !eopardy to attach,
there must be an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction.
;astly, the herein accused having successfully contended that the information in the
former case was insufficient to sustain a conviction, they cannot turn around now and
claim that such information was after all, sufficient and did place them in danger of
!eopardy of being convicted thereunder. If, as they formerly contended, no conviction
could be had in the previous case, they are in estoppel to contend now that the
information in the second case places them in !eopardy for the second time. "heir case
comes within the spirit of the rule laid down in People vs. 7cierto.
7gain, in =eople vs. Reyes' et al.' supra, this Court, speaking thru 'r. Chief Justice Paras,
reiterated the A%iertoruling thusE
2here the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient, but the case is
dismissed upon the petition of the accused on the ground that the complaint or
information is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will not bar another prosecution
for the same offense and the defendant is estopped from alleging in the second
information that the former dismissal was wrong because the complaint or information
was valid.
In this particular case, upon motion of the defendants, the trial court dismissed the information
because it did not allege the use of violence, notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged was
coercion under article 9*5 of the 4evised Penal Code. <n appeal, however, this Court ruled that
the dismissal was erroneous because Dalthough the offense named in the information is coercion,
it does not necessarily follow that the applicable provision is the first paragraph, since the second
paragraph also speaks of #coercions#. Inasmuch as the recitals in the information do not include
violence, the inevitable conclusion is that the coercion contemplated is that described and
penali@ed in the second paragraph.D
2e come now to the case of =eople vs. ,asiano. In this case the accused was charged with
estafa in a complaint filed with the !ustice of the peace court of 4osales, Pangasinan. "he accused
waived her right to preliminary investigation and the record was accordingly forwarded to the Court
of 6irst Instance of Pangasinan where the provincial fiscal filed an information for Dillegal
possession and use of false treasury or bank notes.D Gpon arraignment the defendant pleaded not
guilty. ubseBuently, the defense filed a motion to dismiss on the thesis that there had been no
preliminary investigation of the charge of illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank
notes, and that the absence of such preliminary investigation affected the !urisdiction of the trial
court. "he motion was granted on the ground that the waiver made by the defendant in the !ustice
of the peace court did not deprive her of the right to a preliminary investigation of an entirely
different crime. <n appeal to this Court, it was held that the dismissal was erroneous because the
allegations of the information filed in the Court of 6irst Instance were included in those of the
complaint filed in the !ustice of the peace court where the defendant had already waived her right
to a preliminary investigation. <n the Buestion of whether the appeal placed the defendant in
double !eopardy, this Court, thru 'r. Chief Justice %then 7ssociate Justice& Concepcion, observed
that the situation of Casiano was identical to that of the accused in A%ierto
... were she to plead double !eopardy in this case, for such plea would reBuire the
assertion of !urisdiction of the court of first instance to try her and that the same erred
in yielding to her plea therein for lack of authority therefor. In the language of our
decision in the 7cierto case, it is immaterial whether or not the court a quo had said
authority. It, likewise, makes no difference whether or not the issue raised by defendant
in the lower court affected its !urisdiction. "he fact is that she contested its !urisdiction
and that, although such pretense was erroneous, she led the court to believe that it
was correct and to act in accordance with such belief. "he elementary principles of fair
dealing and good faith demand, accordingly, that she be estopped now from taking the
opposite stand in order to pave the way for a plea of double !eopardy, unless the rule of
estoppel laid down in the 7cierto case is revoked. 7s a matter of fact, said rule applies
with greater force to the case at bar than to the 7cierto case, because the same
involved two %9&separate pro%eedin$s before courts deriving their authority
from different soverei$nties, whereas the appeal in the case at bar is a %ontinuation of
the proceedings in the lower court, which like this upreme Court, is a creature of
the sa"e soverei$nty. In short the inconsistency and impropriety would be more patent
and glaring in this case than in that of 7cierto, if appellant herein pleaded double
!eopardy in this instance.
"his Court then forthnightly stated that Dthe rule of estoppel applied in the 7cierto case should be
maintained, becauseE
/. It is basically and fundamentally sound and !ust.
9. It is in conformity with the principles of legal ethics, which demand good faith of the
higher order in the practice of law.
3. It is well settled that parties to a !udicial proceeding may not, on appeal, adopt a
theory inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower court.
x x x x x x x x x
,. +#e operation of t#e prin%iple of estoppel on t#e question of Kurisdi%tion see"in$ly
depends #et#er t#e loer %ourt a%tually #ad Kurisdi%tion or not . If it had no !urisdiction,
but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it #ad !urisdiction, the parties
are not barred on appeal, from assailing such !urisdiction, for the same Dmust exist as a
"atter of la' and "ay not 2e %onferred 2y %onsent of t#e parties or 2y estoppel D %+
C.J.. *8/$*83&. Aowever, if the lower court had !urisdiction, and the case was heard
and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
!urisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on
appeal, to assume an inconsistent position I that the lower court #ad!urisdiction. Aere,
the principle of estoppel applies. "he rule that !urisdiction is conferred by law, and does
not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.
"welve days after ,asiano, this Court, in =eople vs. Ar%#illa' supra, invoked anew the doctrine of
estoppel. In this case 7lfreda 4oberts, together with Jose 7rchilla, was charged with bigamy. 7fter
pleading not guilty, 4oberts, through his counsel, filed a motion praying that the complaint be
Buashed with regard to her on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute the
offense charged for failure to aver that Dinsofar as 7lfreda 4oberts is concerned, her marriage to
Jose ;uis 7rchilla was her second marriage ...D <n appeal, the prosecution contended that the trial
court erred in granting the motion to Buash, because the complaint was sufficient and at least
charged the accused as an accomplice. "he defendant maintained that even if that were true, the
Buashing of the information amounted to her acBuittal which prevented the prosecution from taking
the said appeal as it would place her in double !eopardy. 'r. Justice 6elix )autista 7ngelo, writing
for the ma!ority, ruled that the trial court erred, and proceeded to emphasi@e that the accused
... cannot now be allowed to invoke the plea of double !eopardy after inducing the trial
court to commit an error which otherwise it would not have committed. In other words,
appellee can not adopt a posture of double dealing without running afoul with the
doctrine of estoppel. It is well$settled that the parties to a !usticiable proceeding may
not, on appeal, adopt a theory inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower
court %2illiams v. 'c'icking, /5 Phil. ,0*; 'olina v. omes, etc.&. ConseBuently,
appellee is now estopped from invoking the plea of double !eopardy upon the theory
that she would still be convicted under an information which she branded to be
insufficient in the lower court.
"he accused in this case now before us nevertheless insists that the 0ali%o doctrine and
Dnecessarily analogous doctrinesD were abandoned by this Court in >an$alao, La2atete'
?illarin and ,lori2el.
In >an$alao, the complaint filed by the victim#s mother alleged that the rape was committed Dby
means of force and intimidationD while the information filed by the fiscal alleged that the offended
party was a Dminor and demented girlD and that the defendants Dsuccessively had sexual
intercourse with her by means of force and against the will of 4osita Palban.D 7fter the accused
had pleaded not guilty, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that
the trial court lacked !urisdiction to try the offense of rape charged by the fiscal since it was distinct
from the one alleged in the complaint which did not aver that the victim was a demented girlD. "he
lower court sustained the motion and dismissed the case for lack of !urisdiction. <n appeal by the
prosecution, this Court held that the trial !udge erred in dismissing the case for lack of !urisdiction,
but ruled, however, that the appeal could not prosper because it placed the accused in double
!eopardy.
7s the court below had !urisdiction to try the case upon the filing of the complaint by the
mother of the offended party, the defendants$appellees would be placed in double
!eopardy if the appeal is allowed.
7fter mature analysis, we cannot agree that this Court in >an$alao impliedly abandoned the alico
doctrine on waiver. >an$alao was decided solely on the Buestion of !urisdiction. "his Court,
however, after holding that the lower tribunal had !urisdiction, decided outright to repress the
appeal by the :overnment on the ground of double !eopardy without considering whether the
appealed order of dismissal was issued with or without the express consent of the accused %this
aspect of double !eopardy not being in issue&. Aence, the ruling in 0ali%o I that the dismissal was
with the express consent of the accused because it was granted upon his instigation thru a motion
to dismiss I was not passed upon in >an$alao.
7 case of striking factual resemblance with 0ali%o is =eople vs. -errer %/00 Phil. /9,, <ctober 93,
/-+8&. In this case, after the prosecution had rested, the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the territorial !urisdiction of the trial court had not been published. 7cting on this
motion, the lower court dismissed the case. "he prosecution appealed. "his Court found that the
evidence on record, contrary to the finding of the trial court, amply proved the !urisdiction of the
lower tribunal. Aowever, without the defendant interposing the plea of double !eopardy, this Court
held that Dthe :overnment however meritorious its case cannot appeal the order of dismissal
without violating the right of the defendant not to be placed in double !eopardy.D 7gain, like
in >an$alao, this Court did not consider the nature of dismissal I whether it was with or without
the express consent of the defendant.
"he accused in the case at bar avers that the alico doctrine
was for"ally and expressly abandoned in =eople vs. La2atete' supra. In the latter case, the trial
court, upon motion of the defendant, dismissed the original information for estafa on the ground
that it did not allege facts constituting the offense charged. "he information recited that the
accused had contracted a loan from the complainant, giving as security the improvements and
products of his property %a piece of land&, without averring that the said property, which was
allegedly mortgaged by the accused to the 4ehabilitation 6inance Corporation, formed part of the
security. ConseBuently, the fiscal filed an amended complaint alleging that the accused also gave
as security the land in Buestion, which he later mortgaged to the damage and pre!udice of the
complaining creditor. "his amended information was also dismissed upon motion of the defendant
on the ground of double !eopardy. "his Court, in sustaining the appealed order of dismissal, heldE
If the amended information were to be admitted, the accused will be deprived of his
defense of double !eopardy because by the amended information he is sought to be
made responsible for the same act of borrowing on a mortgage for which he had
already begun to be tried and acBuitted by the dismissal of the original information.
x x x x x x x x x
... the trial court found that the accused could not be found guilty of any offense under
the information. +#e Kud$"ent entered as not one of dis"issal 2ut of a%quittal , and
whether the !udgment is correct or incorrect, the same constitutes a bar to the
presentation of the amended information sought to be introduced by the fiscal.
%Cmphasis supplied&
In not applying the 0ali%o doctrine, this Court, through 'r. Justice 7le!o ;abrador, expoundedE
... "he !udgment of the trial court %in People vs. alico& was in fact an a%quittal because
of the failure on the part of the fiscal to prove that the crime was committed within the
!urisdiction of the court. "he !udgment was in fact a final !udgment of acBuittal. "he
mere fact that the accused asked for his acBuittal after trial on the merits %after the
prosecution had rested its case& is no reason for saying that the case was DdismissedD
with his express consent and he may again be sub!ected to another prosecution.
6rom the above named statement, it is clear that what in 0ali%o was repudiated in La2atete was
the pre"ise that the dismissal therein was not on the merits and not the %on%lusion that a
dismissal, other than on the merits, sought by the accused, is deemed to be with his express
consent and therefore constitutes a waiver of his right to plead double !eopardy in the event of an
appeal by the prosecution or a second indictment for the same offense. "his Court, in La2atete,
merely pointed out that the controverted dismissal in alico was in fact an acBuittal.D 4easoning a
%ontrario, had the dismissal not amounted to acBuittal, then the doctrine of waiver would have
applied and prevailed. 7s a matter of fact we believe with the ma!ority in alico that the dismissal
therein was not on the merits and therefore did not amount to an acBuittalE
If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial
!urisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acBuittal,
inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted for the same
offense before a court of competent !urisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case
the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of
competent !urisdiction.
:ranting, however, that the 0ali%o doctrine was abandoned in La2atete, it was resurrected
in 1esalisa. 'oreover,La2atete never mentioned the doctrine of estoppel enunciated
in A%ierto which had been repeatedly reaffirmed.
"o bolster his contention that the alico doctrine has been dropped from the corpus of our
!urisprudence, the accused cites =eople vs. ?illarin' supra. Aere the accused appealed to the
Court of 6irst instance his conviction in the inferior court for acts of lasciviousness with consent.
7fter conducting the preliminary investigation, the fiscal charged the accused with corruption of
minors. =illarin pleaded not guilty, and before the case could be heard, his counsel filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the information did not allege facts constituting the crime charged.
7cting on this motion, the trial court dismissed the case. <n appeal by the prosecution, this Court
thru 'r. Justice 6elix 7ngelo )autista, held that the dismissal was erroneous, but that this error
... cannot now be remedied by setting aside the order dismissal of the court a quo and
by remanding the case to it for further proceedings as now suggested by the
prosecution considering that the %ase as dis"issed it#out t#e express %onsent of
t#e a%%used even if it as upon t#e "otion of #is %ounsel , for to do so would place the
accused in double !eopardy. "he only exception to the rule on the matter is when the
dismissal is with the consent of the accused, and here this consent has not been
obtained. %Cmphasis supplied&
?illarin gives the impression, as gleaned from the above statement, that this Court therein
sustained the plea of double !eopardy on the ground that dismissal was without the express
consent of the defendant as it was ordered Dupon the motion of his counselD and not upon motion
of the defendant himself. "his conclusion is rather unfortunate and must be rectified, for the settled
rule is that the acts of counsel in a criminal prosecution bind his client. "hus, in =eople vs.
Ro"ero %*- Phil. 859, July 3/, /-+/&, this Court held categorically that
+#e fa%t t#at t#e %ounsel for t#e defendant' and not t#e defendant #i"self personally
"oved for t#e dis"issal of t#e %ase a$ainst #i"' #ad t#e sa"e effe%t as if t#e
defendant #ad personally "oved for su%# dis"issal' inas"u%# as t#e a%t of t#e
%ounsel in t#e prose%ution of t#e defendantCs %ases as t#e a%t of t#e defendant
#i"self , for the only case in which the defendant cannot be represented by his counsel
is in pleading guilty according to ection 3, 4ule //,, of the 4ules of Court. %Cmphasis
supplied&
<n this consideration alone, we cannot agree with the accused in the case at bar that this Court in
=illarin intended to abandon the alico ruling. Aad the motion to dismiss filed by =illarin#s counsel
been considered as one made by the defendant himself, as should have been done, the =illarin
case should have been resolved consistent with the doctrine of waiver in 0ali%o andLor that of
estoppel in A%ierto.
7s a final citation in support of his theory, the accused in the case at bar invokes =eople vs.
,loli2el' supra, where this Court, in sustaining the plea of double !eopardy interposed by the
defendants, stated inter aliaE
In asserting that Criminal Case Fo. ,+5/5 may still be reinstated, the petitioner adopts
the ruling once followed by the Court to the effect that a dismissal upon the defendant#s
own motion is a dismissal consented to by him and, conseBuently, will not be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense, because, his action in having the case
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that
he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a
!udgment of conviction against him. %People v. alico, *, Phil. 559& >ut' t#is aut#ority
#as lon$ 2een a2andoned and t#e rulin$ t#erein expressly repudiated.
"hus, in the case of People v. 4obles, :.4. Fo. ;$/958/, June 9-, /-+-, citing People
v. )angalao, ;$+8/0, 6ebruary /5, /-+,; People v. (ia@, ;$8+/*, 'arch 30, /-+,;
People v. 7bano, ;$5*89, 'ay /5, /-++; and People v. 6errer, ;$-059, <ctober 93,
/-+8, 2e saidE
... In reaching the above conclusion, this Court has not overlooked the
ruling in People vs. alico, ,5 <.:. ,58+, to the effect that a dismissal upon
defendant#s motion will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense as said dismissal was not without the express consent of the
defendant, which ruling the prosecution now invokes in support of its
appeal; 2ut said rulin$ is not no %ontrollin$' #avin$ 2een "odified or
a2andoned in su2sequent %ases #erein t#is ,ourt sustained t#e t#eory of
dou2le Keopardy despite t#e fa%t t#at dis"issal as se%ured upon "otion of
t#e a%%used. %Cmphasis supplied&
7lso, the rule that a dismissal upon defendant#s motion will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal is not without the express consent
of the defendant, #as no appli%ation to a %ase #ere t#e dis"issal' as #ere' is
predi%ated on t#e ri$#t of a defendant to a speedy trial. %People vs. "acneng, et al.,
:.4. Fo. ;$/90*9, 7pril 30, /-+-&. %emphasis supplied&
"he above statements must be taken in the proper context and perspective. 7s previously
explained, >an$alao' -errer, and even La2atete, did not actually abandon the doctrine of waiver
in 0ali%o %and not one of the said cases even implied the slightest departure from the doctrine of
estoppel established in A%ierto&. In 1iaz' A2a@o,+a%nen$ and Ro2les which are cited above, like
in ,lori2el, the dismissals therein, all sought by the defendants, were considered acBuittals
because they were all predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial and on the failure of
the :overnment to prosecute. "herefore, even if such dismissals were induced by the accused,
the doctrines of waiver and estoppel were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a
dismissal not amounting to an acBuittal.
"his Court, through 'r. Justice 'arceliano 'ontemayor, held in =eople vs. 1iaz %-, Phil. 5/,,
'arch 30, /-+,&E
Aere the prosecution was not even present on the day of trial so as to be in a position
to proceed with the presentation of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. "he
case was set for hearing twice and the prosecution without asking for postponement or
giving any explanation, !ust failed to appear. 0o t#e dis"issal of t#e %ase' t#ou$# at
t#e instan%e of defendant 1iaz "ay' a%%ordin$ to #at e said in t#e <andi%ela %ase'
2e re$arded as an a%quittal. %emphasis supplied&
7 similar result was reached by this Court thru 'r. Justice abino Padilla, in =eople vs. A2ano %-5
Phil. 9*, 'ay 95, /-++&, in this wiseE
7fter a perusal of the documents attached to the petition for a writ of certiorari, we fail
to find an abuse of discretion committed by the respondent !udge. Ae took pains to
inBuire about the nature of the ailment from which the complaining witness claimed she
was suffering. Ae continued the trial three times, to witE on 95 'ay, / and /9 June. +#e
defendant as entitled to a speedy trial . 2hen on /+ June, the last day set for the
resumption of the trial, the prosecution failed to secure the continuance thereof and
could not produce further evidence because of the absence of the complaining witness,
the respondent !udge was !ustified in dismissing the case upon motion of the
defense ... "he defendant was placed in !eopardy for the offense charged in the
information and the annulment or setting aside of the order of dismissal would place
him twice in !eopardy of punishment for the same offense. %emphasis supplied&
"hen in =eople vs. +a%nen$ %;$/90*9, 7pril 30, /-+-&, 'r. Justice Pastor Cndencia, speaking for a
unanimous Court, stressed that
... when criminal case Fo. /5-3 was called for hearing for the third time and the fiscal
was not ready to enter into trial due to the absence of his witnesses, the herein
appellees had the right to ob!ect to any further postponement and to ask for the
dismissal of the case by reason of their constitutional right to a speedy trial; and if
pursuant to that ob!ection and petition for dismissal the case was dismissed, such
dismissal ammounted to an acBuittal of the herein appellees which can be invoked, as
they did, in a second prosecution for the same offense. %emphasis supplied&
7nd this Court proceeded to distinguish the case from =eople vs. 0ali%o, thusE
2e are fully aware that pursuant to our ruling in the case of Peo. v. alico, ,+ <.:. Fo.
,, /58+$/558, and later reiterated in Peo vs. 4omero, ;$,+/5$90, July 3/, /-+/, a
dismissal upon defendant#s motion will not be a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense as said dismissal was not without the express consent of the
defendant. +#is rulin$' #oever' #as no appli%ation to t#e instant %ase' sin%e t#e
dis"issal in t#ose %ases as not predi%ated' as in t#e %ase at 2ar' on t#e ri$#t of a
defendant to a speedy trial' 2ut on different $rounds. In the alico case, the dismissal
was based on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution did not show that the
crime was committed within the territorial !urisdiction of the court which, on appeal, we
found that it was, so the case was remanded for further proceedings; and in the
4omero case the dismissal was due to the non$production of other important witnesses
by the prosecution on a date fixed by the court and under the understanding that no
further postponement at the instance of the government would be entertained. In both
cases, the right of a defendant to a speedy trial was never put in issue. %emphasis
supplied&
"he gravamen of the foregoing decisions was reiterated in =eople vs. Ro2les %;$/958/, June 9-,
/-+-& where the trial court, upon motion of the defendant, dismissed the case on the ground that
the failure of the prosecution to present its evidence despite several postponements granted at its
instance, denied the accused a speedy trial. In re!ecting the appeal of the :overnment, this Court
heldE
In the circumstances, we find no alternative than to hold that the dismissal of Criminal
Case Fo. //08+ is not provisional in character but one which is tantamount to acBuittal
that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.
In ,lori2el, the case dragged for three years and eleven months, that is, from eptember 95, /-+*
when the information was filed to 7ugust /+, /-89 when it was called for trial, after numerous
postponements, mostly at the instance of the prosecution. <n the latter date, the prosecution failed
to appear for trial, and upon motion of defendants, the case was dismissed. "his Court held Dt#at
t#e dis"issal #ere %o"plained of as not truly a Cdis"issalC 2ut an a%quittal. -or it as entered
upon t#e defendantsC insisten%e on t#eir %onstitutional ri$#t to speedy trial and 2y reason of t#e
prose%utionCs failure to appear on t#e date of trial.D %Cmphasis supplied.&
Considering the factual setting in the case at bar, it is clear that there is no parallelism between
Cloribel and the cases cited therein, on the one hand, and the instant case, on the other. Aere the
controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that the
complaint was defective and such infirmity affected the !urisdiction of the court a quo, and not on
the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the :overnment to prosecute. "he
appealed order of dismissal in this case now under consideration did not terminate the action on
the merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other related cases the dismissal amounted to an
acBuittal because the failure to prosecute presupposed that the :overnment did not have a case
against the accused, who, in the first place, is presumed innocent.
"he application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel reBuires two sine Bua non conditionsE
first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel;
and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an
acBuittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls sBuarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which
have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our !urisprudence.
7CC<4(IF:;J, the order appealed from is set aside. "his case is hereby remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law. Fo costs.
G.R. No. 103323 (an5a,y 21, 1993
R!MON S. !"LIN, !NG%L! -. !"LIN an) (OS% '!$.O, petitioners,
vs.
.ON. $%LSO M. GIM%N%8 =In 1i0 ca/acity a0 ,e0i)in6 (5)6e o2 R&$, $e+5 $ity, ',anc1 5>,
.ON. M!M%R&O :. $OLI-LOR%S =In 1i0 ca/acity a0 (5)6e o2 t1e M&$ o2 &a3i0ay, ',anc1
I4, $e+5>? $!S&RO '%LM%, an) &1e %OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, respondents.
Mari ?. Andres and Ro"arie <. ?illon%o for petitioners.
<ar%ia' <ar%ia' ;n$' ?ano E Asso%iates for respondent ,astro >el"e Ma2uyo.

M%LO, J.:
"he petition before us arose from a Fovember /0, /-*- incident when the !eep ridden by private
respondent and )arangay Captain Castro )elme 'abuyo was overtaken by the Fissan Patrol
ridden by herein petitioners, the spouses (r. 4amon and 7ngela Paulin, smothering the former
with dust.
Irked by this incident, 'abuyo followed the Fissan Patrol until it entered the back gate of 4attan
<riginals in "anke, "alisay Cebu. InBuiring from a nearby security guard as to who owns the
Fissan Patrol, he was informed that it belonged to and was driven by petitioner (r. 4amon Paulin.
;ater, while 'abuyo was investigating some problems of his constituents in Oilawan at "anke,
Cebu, (r. 4amon Paulin and his wife, 7ngie, allegedly pointed their guns at 'abuyo while Jose
)acho, a companion of the spouses, acted as back$up. 'abuyo instructed one of the barangay
tanods to call the police in "alisay and the rest to block the exit of the spouses and their lone
companion.
ensing that they were outnumbered, the spouses put their guns down and upon the arrival of the
police officers, they were brought to the police station. <n the same date, tation Commander
PL;t. 7riel Palcuto filed a complaint for Dgrave threats,D against the spouses Paulin and )acho,
herein petitioners, which was later docketed as Criminal Case Fo. +90,. <n Fovember 90, /-*-,
the station commander filed a complaint for, Dgrave threats and oral defamation,D against private
respondent 'abuyo, docketed as Criminal Case Fo. +9/3.
"he cases were !ointly tried and, on June /3, /--0, the 'unicipal "rial Court of "alisay, Cebu
%)ranch IH&, acting on a motion of the spouses Paulin and Jose )acho, dismissed Criminal Case
Fo. +90,. <n July 9, /--0, 'abuyo filed a, D'otion for 4econsideration,D of the said dismissal
order which the court granted in a resolution dated July 3, /--0.
7t the hearing of Criminal Case Fo. +9/3 on July +, /--0, petitioners vigorously sought the setting
aside of the July 3, /--0 resolution in Criminal Case Fo. +90,, but the same was denied in
another resolution.
Fot satisfied with the resolution of respondent Judge 'amerto J. Coliflores, petitioners filed on
July 3/, /--0 a petition for D%ertiorari' prohibition, damages, with relief for preliminary in!unction
and the issuance of a temporary restraining orderD with the 4egional "rial Court of the eventh
Judicial 4egion, which was thereafter docketed as pecial Civil 7ction Fo. CC)$-905 and later re$
raffled to )ranch + stationed in Cebu City presided over by respondent Judge Celso '. :imene@,
who dismissed the petition in a decision dated (ecember /-, /--/. "he decretal portion of the
decision statesE
7ll the foregoing considered, for lack of merit and for being a prohibited
pleading under the 4ule on ummary Procedure, as revised, the instant
petition is hereby dismissed. Public respondent is hereby ordered to
proceed with the trial of Crim. Case Fos. +90, and +9/3 and to decide both
cases on their merits within the period provided under the 4evised 4ule on
ummary Procedure. "he preliminary in!unction heretofore issued dated
'ay -, /--/, is hereby lifted and set aside. %p. //*, Rollo.&
till not contented, petitioners have now resorted to the instant petition, arguing that %a& the
decision of the municipal trial court dated June /3, /--0 dismissing the case against them was a
!udgment of acBuittal, and may no longer be set aside without violating petitioners# right against
double !eopardy; and %b& the regional trial court, in dismissing the petition in CC)$-905 abused its
discretion as it ignored petitioners# right against double !eopardy.
"he main issue to be resolved is whether or not the municipal trial court#s dismissal of Criminal
Case Fo. +90, against petitioners precludes a subseBuent reconsideration or reversal of such
dismissal as the same would violate petitioners# right against double !eopardy. "he secondary
issue dwells on the applicability of the 4ule on ummary Procedure prohibiting motions to dismiss
and petitions for %ertiorari.
6or double !eopardy to be validly invoked by petitioners, the following reBuisites must have been
obtained in the original prosecution;
a& a valid complaint or information;
b& a competent court;
c& the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
d& the defendant was acBuitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent %People v. <bsania, 93 C47 /9,- ./-8*1E Caes v. I7C,
/5- C47 +, ./-*-1&.
Jurisprudence on double !eopardy as well as the exceptions thereto which finds application to the
case at bar has been laid down by this Court as followsE
. . . Aowever, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal %of
the criminal case& by the trial court shall not constitute double !eopardy if %/&
the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the
defendant; %9& the dismissal is not an acBuittal or based upon consideration
of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and %3& the Buestion to be
passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the
dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of
the defendant. %People v. =illalon, /-9 C47 +9/ ./--01, at p. +9-.&
6or double !eopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of
the accused %People v. :ines, /-5 C47 ,*/ ./--/1&. 2here the dismissal was ordered upon
motion or with the express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his protection
against double !eopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners.
(ouble !eopardy thus did not attach. "his doctrine of waiver of double !eopardy was examined and
formally introduced in =eople v. 0ali%o %*, Phil. 599 ./-,-1&, where Justice 6elicisimo 6eria statedE
. . . when the case is dismissed, with the express consent of the defendant,
the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense;
because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the
court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a !udgment of
conviction against him. %ee also People v. 'arapao %*+ Phil. *39
./-+01&; <andi%ela v. Lutero %** Phil. 9-- ./-+/1&, =eople v. 1esalisa %/9+
Phil. 95 ./-881&; and, more recently, =eople v. Aquino %/-- C47 8/0
./--/1&.
Petitioners insist that the June /3, /--0 decision of the 'unicipal "rial Court %'"C& is an acBuittal
since it was issued after it had allegedly considered the merits of the prosecution#s evidence.
In =eople v. 0ali%o %supra&, distinctions between acBuittal and dismissal were made, to witE
. . . 7cBuittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is
acBuitted because the evidence does not show that defendant#s guilt is
beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the
merits or that the defendant is not guilty. (ismissals terminate the
proceedings, either because the court is not a court of competent
!urisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed
within the territorial !urisdiction of the court, or the complaint
or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. . . . %at
pp. 539$533.&
"he '"C decision dismissing the case is not an acBuittal from the charge considering that no
finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.
Gnder ection /,, 4ule //0 of the /-*+ 4ules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, it is statedE
ec. /,. 7mendments. I . . .
If it appears at any time before !udgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint
or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with 4ule //-, ec. // . . .
In ection // of the same 4ule, it is providedE
2hen it becomes manifest at any time before !udgment, that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be
convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily
included therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if there appears to
be good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the
accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information. %.d., ec. //, 4ule //-.&
In the case at bar, the original case was dismissed without the proper information having been
filed, it appearing that the proper charge should have been, Ddisturbance of public performance,D
punishable under 7rticle /+3 of the 4evised Penal Code instead of Dgrave threats,D under 7rticle
9*9 of the same penal code.
Jurisprudence recogni@es exceptional instances when the dismissal may be held to be final,
disposing of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused
himself, to witE
/. 2here the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a
!udgment on the merits and operates as an acBuittal.
9. 2here the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of
the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to
prosecute. %Caes v. I7C, /5- C47 +, ./-*-1 at pp. 80$8/.&
Petitioners# motion to dismiss premised on procedural grounds cannot be considered a demurrer to
evidence nor was the dismissal sought by them predicated on the denial of their right to speedy
trial. Aence, the exceptions mentioned find no application in the instant case, especially so
because when the municipal trial court dismissed the case upon petitioners# motion, the
prosecution still had to present several witnesses.
2here the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated %People v.
)alisacan, :.4. Fo. ;$98358, 7ug. 3/, /-88, /5 C47 ///-; Gy v. :enato,
:.4. Fo. ;$353--, 'ay 9-, /-5,, +5 C47 /93&. 2here there is a violation
of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of !urisdiction. Aence, the
violation of the tate#s right to due process raises a serious !urisdictional
error %:umabon v. (irector of the )ureau of Prisons, :.4. Fo. ;$30098,
Jan. 30, /-5/, 35 C47 ,90& as the decision rendered in disregard of the
right is void for lack of !urisdiction. %7ducayen v. 6lores, +/ C47 5*
./-531, at p. 5*.&
2here the order of dismissal was issued at a time when the case was not ready for trial and
ad!udication, the order is null and void %People v. Pamittan, 30 C47 -* ./-8-1&.
In =eople v. >o%ar %/3* C47 /88 ./-*+1&, this Court found that the prosecution was denied due
process as it never had the chance to offer its evidence formally in accordance with the 4ules of
Court in view of the trial court#s order of dismissal. "he trial court was thereby ousted from its
!urisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to
complete the presentation of its evidence and, therefore, the first !eopardy had not been
terminated. Aence, the remand of the case for further hearing or trial is merely a continuation of
the first !eopardy and does not expose the accused to a second !eopardy.
In the subseBuent case of =eople v. Al2ano %/83 C47 +// ./-**1&, this Court reiterated its
previous ruling in the>o%ar case, holding that the trial court exceeded it#s !urisdiction and acted
with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of !urisdiction, when it pre$emptively dismissed
the case and as a conseBuence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and
prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to due process. 2ith such violation, its orders
are, therefore, null and void and cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double !eopardy.
In the more recent case of 0aldana v. ,ourt of Appeals %/-0 C47 3-8 ./--01&, the issue raised
was as followsE D2here the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution#s
evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence, may the case be
remanded for further proceedingKD "his Court, applying the >o%ar case, ruled that the order of the
Court of 7ppeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by the trial court does not violate
the rule on double !eopardy inasmuch as the trial court was ousted from its !urisdiction when it
violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
"he municipal trial court thus did not violate the rule on double !eopardy when it set aside the order
of dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its
error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the
right to complete the presentation of its evidence. It follows then that the decision of respondent
regional trial court sustaining that of the court of origin cannot be said to be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
"he 4ule on ummary Procedure was correctly applied by the public respondents in this case.
Petitioners argue that public respondents gravely abused their discretion in applying the provision
prohibiting the filing of motions to dismiss and petitions for %ertiorari provided under the 4ule on
ummary Procedure. "hey claim that the prohibition under ection /+ of the 4ule on ummary
Procedure refers to motions to dismiss or to Buash filed before the accused enters his plea. In any
event, petitioners insist that they filed a demurrer to evidence which is not a prohibited pleading
under the 4ule on ummary Procedure.
(emurrer to evidence due to its insufficiency pre$supposes that the prosecution had already rested
its case %ec. /+, 4ule //-, /-*+, 4ules on Criminal Procedure&. Aence, the motion is premature if
interposed at a time when the prosecution is still in the process of presenting its evidence %7Buino
v. ison, /5- C47 8,* ./-*-1&, as what happened in this case.
Petitioners, of course, maintain that all the prosecution#s evidence was already on record since the
affidavits of complainant and his witnesses, in law, constituted their direct testimonies and that,
therefore, no other evidence could have been introduced by the prosecution.
ubmission of the affidavits to the court does not warrant the interference that the prosecution had
already finished presenting its evidence because the affiants are still reBuired to testify and affirm
the contents thereof; otherwise, these affidavits cannot serve as competent evidence for the
prosecution. "he 4ule on ummary Procedure statesE
ec. /,. =ro%edure of +rial. I Gpon a plea of not guilty being entered, the
trial shall immediately proceed. "he affidavits submitted by the parties shall
constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same.
2itnesses who testified may be sub!ected to cross$examination. hould the
affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as competent
evidence for the party presenting the affidavit, but the adverse party may
utili@e the same for any admissible purpose.
Fo witness shall be allowed to testify unless he had previously submitted
an affidavit to the court in accordance with ections - and /0 hereof.
2AC4C6<4C, the petition is (I'IC( and the decision of the 4egional "rial Court dated
(ecember /-, /--/ 766I4'C(.
< <4(C4C(.
G.R. No. 95642 May 28, 1992
!"R%LIO G. I$!SI!NO, (R., petitioner,
vs.
.ON. S!NDIG!N'!:!N =-i,0t Di7i0ion> an) %OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, respondents.
F.,. >aldoz E Asso%iates for petitioner.

!DILL!, J.:
4omana 'agbago filed an administrative complaint dated /5 6ebruary /-*5 with the upreme
court against then acting 'unicipal "rial Court Judge of Faic, Cavite, herein petitioner 7urelio :.
Icasiano, Jr. for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and incompetence.
1
"he administrative complaint arose from two %9& orders of detention dated /* and 95 Fovember
/-*8 issued by the said acting !udge against complainant %'agbago& for contempt of court
because of her continued refusal to comply with a fift# alias writ of execution.
7fter evaluating the allegations of the complaint, respondent#s comment thereon and the Court
7dministrator#s recommendation, the upreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint for
lack of merit in an en 2an%resolution dated 9 6ebruary /-**.
2
'eanwhile, on /5 'arch /-*5, complainant 'agbago also filed with the <ffice of the <mbudsman
the same letter$complaint earlier filed with the upreme Court; this time, she claimed violation by
Judge Icasiano, Jr. of the 7nti$:raft and Corrupt Practices 7ct %4.7. 30/-, sec. 3 par. .e1&. "he
complaint with the <mbudsman was docketed as ")P$*5$00-9,.
7fter considering respondent Judge Icasiano#s answer, in a resolution dated 5 7pril /-** pecial
Prosecutor Cvelyn 7lmogela$)aliton recommended dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. "he
recommendation was approved by then pecial ProsecutorL"anodbayan 4aul '. :on@ales. It
appears from the records of the "anodbayan, which were forwarded to the upreme Court, upon
order of the Court in connection with this case, that the resolution dismissing the complaint was
released on /, 7pril /-**.
"he olicitor :eneral#s memorandum in the present case %p. 3, par. 9& states that the office of the
"anodbayan received another complaint from the same 4omana 'agbago %complainant in ")P$
*5$00-9,& which was docketed this time as ")P$*5$0/+,8. "he exact date of filing of the second
complaint is not stated but the records of the case were allegedly among those transmitted to the
then newly created office of the <mbudsman; unfortunately, the transmitted records did not contain
the earlier resolution of dismissal in ")P$*5$00-9,.
pecial Prosecutor Ficanor Cru@, Jr. who was assigned to investigate the case %")P$*5$0/+,8&
appeared completely unaware of the earlier case, ")P$*5$00-9,, because the following transpired
in ")$*5$0/+,8E
/. Preliminary investigation.
9. Petitioner %Icasiano, Jr.& appeared on 5 Fovember /-*- and asked for +
days to file counter affidavit; however no such counter$affidavit was filed.
3. "he Clerk of Court of the 'unicipal "rial Court of Faic, Cavite was
summoned to testify on the contempt proceedings held before said court.
,. 7 resolution of the investigator dated 30 January /--0 was issued
recommending the filing of the information.
+. 7 memorandum dated + 'arch /--0 of pecial Prosecution <fficer III
Jane 7urora ;. ;antion adopted the recommendation of the investigator.
"he corresponding information against herein petitioner was thereafter filed with the
andiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case Fo. /,+83.
7fter said information was filed on 9/ 'arch /--0, petitioner %as accused& filed a motion for
reinvestigation which resulted in the issuance of two %9& separate resolutions from the respondent
andiganbayan, namely, resolution dated - 'ay /--0, readingE
Considering that the D'<"I<F 6<4 4CIF=C"I:7"I<FD filed by accused
Judge 7urelio Icasiano, Jr., which, among other things indicates that he has
been exonerated by the upreme Court in 7dministrative 'atter Fo. '"J$
*5$*/ filed by the complaining party herein against the accused, the
Prosecution is given fifteen %/+& days from receipt hereof to indicate if the
!udicial act or acts complained of have been taken to a superior court for
review %and the resolution thereof, if any& as well as whether or not the
upreme Court 4esolution dated 6ebruary 9, /-** in the above mentioned
administrative matter had already resolved the issue at bar, considering
that the Buestion of evidence reBuired therein cannot be greater than in
criminal cases such as that initiated by the instant information.
and <rder dated 9/ 'ay /--0, readingE
It appearing that the prosecution is still to submit its comment on this
Court#s 4esolution reBuiring a review and affirmation of the alleged
exoneration of the accused herein by the upreme Court which
exoneration, if true, would put at very serious doubt the prosecution of this
case against him, by agreement of the parties, the arraignment of the
accused is hereby reset for July -, /--0, at *E00 o#clock in the morning.
pecial Prosecution <fficer III Crdulfo ?. ?uerubin responded to the resolution of - 'ay /--0 with
a ComplianceL'anifestation dated 9* 'ay /--0 statingE
xxx xxx xxx
/. "hat the records in the hands of the prosecution do not show any
indication that the !udicial acts complained of have been taken to a superior
court for review;
9. "hat prosecution#s records do not contain any document or paper
relative to 7.'. Fo. '"J$*5$*/, Ro"ana Ma$2a$o vs. Fud$e Aurelio <.
.%asiano' Fr.' 'unicipal "rial Court, "an@a, Cavite, except a xerox copy of
the upreme Court#s 4esolution, dated 6ebruary 9, /-**, which was
attached to copy %si%& of the 'otion 6or 4einvestigation and (eferment of
7rraignment, dated 'ay *, /--0, furnished to the <ffice of the (eputy
pecial Prosecutor on some date, and prosecution#s information on the
matter is limited to the text of said resolution.
3
"he petitioner#s motion for reinvestigation was denied in the 9- June /--0 resolution, of
respondent court, which stated thusE
)oth the accused and 7tty. Jaime C. )aldos having received this Court#s
4esolution dated 'ay 9-, /--0 2efore June 5, /--0 %when the registry
notices were received by this Court& or more than twenty$one %9/& days
ago, despite which the accused had failed to present relevant papers and
documents to demonstrate action by the upreme Court as %in&
7dministrative 'atter '"J *5$*/ which would support his claims that the
sub!ect matter of this case has been resolved by the upreme Court in his
favor, his motion for reinvestigation is (CFIC(.
Petitioner then moved to Buash the information on the following groundsE
/. that the accused shall be placed in double !eopardy in so far as the
resolution of the Aon. upreme Court in 7dministrative Case Fo. 4"J$*5$
*/;
9. that there exists no valid cause of action as may be filed against the
accused;
3. that the Aon. andiganbayan cannot acBuire valid !urisdiction over the
person of the accused and sub!ect matter of this instant case.
4
(enying the motion to Buash, the andiganbayan heldE
Judge 7urelio Icasiano, Jr.#s 'otion to ?uash dated July /8, /--0 is
denied.
"he upreme Court#s resolution in 7dministrative 'atter Fo. '"J$*5$*/
lodged by the same complaining person, 4omana 'agbago, whether of
exoneration or conviction, even if evidence beyond reasonable doubt is
reBuired for conviction in said proceedings, cannot serve as basis for the
defense of double !eopardy because '"J$*5$*/ remains an administrative
case and the instant proceeding is criminal. <ne is not a bar to the other.
In an administrative matter against a deputy clerk of court of a Court of 6irst
Instance and a clerk thereat for shortages in the collection of court fees, the
upreme Court said, D. . . It is clear that both respondents 7rmando
oriano and 'ila "i!am are still administratively and %ri"inally liable
%despite restitution& for which they may still be prosecuted for
malversation.D %<ffice of the Court 7dministrator vs. oriano, /38 C47
,8/, ,8+, emphasis and words in parenthesis supplied&.
Fecessarily, the andiganbayan would have !urisdiction over the criminal
action arising from the sub!ect matter of the administrative case against the
accused since it is only the andiganbayan which may hear prosecutions
for the violation of 4.7. Fo. 30/-.
7 motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence the present petition relying on the sole
ground that the respondent court acted without or in excess of its !urisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion in denying his motion to Buash the information, and that there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adeBuate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Initially, a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court ordering the andiganbayan to
cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case.
5
7fter a closer look at the records
of the case, the Court is of the view that the distinction between administrative and criminal
proceedings must be upheld, and that a prosecution in one is not a bar to the other.
It is, therefore, correct for the andiganbayan to hold that double !eopardy does not apply in the
present controversy because the upreme Court case %against the herein petitioner& was
administrative in character while the andiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in
nature.
2hen the upreme Court acts on complaints against !udges or any of the personnel under its
supervision and control, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court
!udging !usticiable controversies. 7dministrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical
rules. ubstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the
andiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the same acts sub!ect of the
administrative case, reBuire proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
"o avail of the protection against double !eopardy, it is fundamental that the following reBuisites
must have obtained in the original prosecutionE %a& a valid complaint or information; %b& a
competent court; %c& a valid arraignment; %d& the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and %e& the
defendant was acBuitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
6
7ll these elements do not apply visGaGvis the
administrative case, which should take care of petitioner#s contention that said administrative case
against him before the upreme Court, which was, as aforestated, dismissed, entitles him to raise
the defense of double !eopardy in the criminal case in the andiganbayan.
7
"he charge against petitioner Judge Icasiano before the andiganbayan is for grave abuse of
authority, manifest partiality and incompetence in having issued two %9& orders of detention against
complaining witness 'agbago. <rdinarily, complainant#s available remedy was to appeal said
orders of detention in accordance with the 4ules. It is only when in appellate court reverses the
lower court issuing the Buestioned orders can abuse, partiality or incompetence be imputed to the
!udge. 8 Aere no appeal from the Buestioned orders of the issuing !udge %petitioner Icasiano& was
takenE instead, administrative and criminal cases were filed against the !udge for issuing the
orders.
It is precisely for this reason, among others, that the administrative case against petitioner was
dismissed by the upreme Court for lack of merit; and yet, it cannot be assumed at this point that
petitioner is not criminally liable under 4.7 30/-, par. 3%e& for issuing the Buestioned orders of
detention. In fact, the <mbudsman has found apri"a fa%ie case which led to the filing of the
information.
2e now recur to the fact that the "anodbayan had earlier dismissed the complaint against
petitioner Judge Icasiano for violation of ec. 3%e& of 4.7. 30/-. "his was in ")P$*5$00-9,. "he
case was dismissed for lack of merit on /, 7pril /-**. )ecause no motion to re$open or revive the
case could be found in the pleadings, a resolution of this Court dated 30 7pril /--/ reBuired the
<ffice of the <mbudsman to submit the pertinent office memorandum !ustifying the re$opening of a
case which had already been dismissed and to elevate the records to this Court.
"he <mbudsman#s compliance claims that it is not true that ")P$*5$0/+,8 was Dreopened.D D")P$
*5$0/+,8 was another case involving the same parties and the same facts docketed separately
from ")P$*5$00-9,.D
9
Ae further explainedE
")P$*5$0/+,8 was among the several cases transmitted to the then newly
created <ffice of the <mbudsman in line with the intention to relieve the
former <ffice of the "anodbayan of some of its long$pending cases. "he
record of ")P$*5$0/+,8 did not contain the resolution previously issued in
")P$*5$00-9, which was approved by former "anodbayan 4aul '.
:on@ales.
Gpon the record of ")P$*5$0/+,8 being received in the <ffice of the
<mbudsman, it was assigned to Investigator Ficanor J. Cru@, Jr. for
appropriate action. Gpon his recommendation, a preliminary investigation
was conducted with the respondent therein %herein petitioner Judge
Icasiano, Jr.& having been served with subpoena for the preliminary
investigation scheduled on Fovember 5, /-*-. Judge Icasiano affixed his
signature to the said subpoena and appeared at the hearing to ask for an
extension of five %+& days within which to file his counter$affidavit. (espite
the extension granted him, Judge Icasiano failed to file any counter$affidavit
nor to call attention to the fact that a similar case had earlier been
dismissed by the former <ffice of the "anodbayan.
Fo memorandum !ustifying reopening of a case previously dismissed by the "anodbayan was
submitted to this Court by the <ffice of the <mbudsman. 2hat was submitted is a memorandum
dated + 'arch /--0 signed by Jane 7urora C. ;antion, pecial Prosecution <fficer III, which
!ustifies the filing of the information for violation of sec. 3%e&, 4.7. 30/- as amended, thusE
xxx xxx xxx
2hile there is no showing that a charge in writing or Petition for Contempt
has been filed against defendant 'agbago before respondent#s sala,
records bear out that petitions to declare defendant for Contempt have
been previously filed in Civil Case Fo. ,0, on /0 6ebruary /-*,, /3 June
/-*, and /9 eptember /-*,. "here is no showing that these petitions
have been acted upon by the !udges before whom the same were filed.
"his, plus the fact that the writs of execution could not be enforced against
defendant 'agbago, could have been the reasons for respondent#s action
herein complained of. "hough the ends may be !ustifiable, the means
employed which contravene the reBuirements of due process cannot put
the imprimatur of legality to respondent#s !udicial actuation sub!ect of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx
In any case, the dismissal by the "anodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the present
prosecution, since double !eopardy does not apply. 7s held in ,irilo ,in%o' et
al. vs. 0andi$an2ayan and t#e =eople of t#e =#ilippines,
10
a preliminary investigation %assuming
one had been conducted in ")P$*5$ 00-9,& is not a trial to which double !eopardy attaches.
In <aspar vs. 0andi$an2ayan,
11
this Court also heldE
'oreover, there is no rule or law reBuiring the "anodbayan to conduct
another Preliminary investigation of a case under review by it %him&. <n the
contrary, under Presidential (ecree Fo. -//, in relation to 4ule /9,
7dministrative <rder Fo. =II, the "anodbayan may, upon review, reverse
the findings of the investigator, and thereafter Dwhere he finds a pri"a
fa%ie case, to cause the filing of an information in court against the
respondent, based on the same sworn statements or evidence submitted,
without the necessity of conducting another preliminary investigation.
In the present controversy, it will be noted that a preliminary investigation was conducted by the
<ffice of the <mbudsman in ")P$*5$0/+,8 to accord the herein petitioner due process even if it
could be argued that in ")P$*5$0/+,8, the <mbudsman was merely reviewing the "anodbayan#s
original dismissal of the complaint in ")P$00-9, %involving the same parties and the same facts&,
and he could have filed the information even without a new preliminary investigation.
2AC4C6<4C, the petition is (CFIC(. "he temporary restraining order issued earlier is ;I6"C(;
the andiganbayan is ordered to proceed with Criminal Case Fo. /,+83.
< <4(C4C(.
G.R. No. 176389 Dece*+e, 14, 2010
!N&ONIO L%(!NO, Petitioner,
vs.
%OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, 4espondent.
x $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $x
G.R. No. 176864
%OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, 7ppellee,
vs.
."'%R& (%--R%: . 9%'', !N&ONIO L%(!NO, MI$.!%L !. G!&$.!LI!N, .OSI$IO
-%RN!ND%8, MIG"%L RODRIG"%8, %&%R %S&R!D! an) G%R!RDO 'IONG, 7ppellants.
( C C I I < F
!'!D, J.:
',ie2 'ac@6,o5n)
<n June 30, /--/ Cstrellita =i@conde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and
Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in ParaMaBue City. 6ollowing an intense
investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions.
)ut the trial court smelled a frame$up and eventually ordered them discharged. "hus, the identities
of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused
by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the =i@conde massacre.
6our years later in /--+, the Fational )ureau of Investigation or F)I announced that it had solved
the crime. It presented star$witness Jessica '. 7lfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she
witnessed the crime. he pointed to accused Aubert Jeffrey P. 2ebb, 7ntonio D"ony )oyD ;e!ano,
7rtemio D(ongD =entura, 'ichael 7. :atchalian, Aospicio DPykeD 6ernande@, Peter Cstrada, 'iguel
D:ingD 4odrigue@, and Joey 6ilart as the culprits. he also tagged accused police officer, :erardo
)iong, as an accessory after the fact. 4elying primarily on 7lfaro#s testimony, on 7ugust /0, /--+
the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against 2ebb, et al.
/
"he 4egional "rial Court of ParaMaBue City, )ranch 95,, presided over by Judge 7melita :.
"olentino, tried only seven of the accused since 7rtemio =entura and Joey 6ilart remained at
large.
9
"he prosecution presented 7lfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her
testimony. "hese included the medico$legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the
security guards of Pitong (aan ubdivision, the former laundrywoman of the 2ebbPs household,
police officer )iongPs former girlfriend, and ;auro :. =i@conde, CstrellitaPs husband.
6or their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were
elsewhere when it took place. 2ebbPs alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was
then across the ocean in the Gnited tates of 7merica. Ae presented the testimonies of witnesses
as well as documentary and ob!ect evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented
witnesses to show 7lfaro#s bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.
)ut impressed by 7lfaroPs detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial
court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and
frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross$examinations. "he trial court remained unfa@ed by
significant discrepancies between 7lfaroPs 7pril 9* and 'ay 99, /--+ affidavits, accepting her
explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Cstrada, and a
relative, accused :atchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators
who helped her prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and
security she needed once she disclosed all about the =i@conde killings.
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that 2ebb, ;e!ano, 4odrigue@, and
:atchalian set up for their defense. "hey paled, according to the court, compared to 7lfaroPs
testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. "hus, on January ,, 9000,
after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered !udgment, finding all the accused
guilty as charged and imposing on 2ebb, ;e!ano, :atchalian, 6ernande@, Cstrada, and 4odrigue@
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on )iong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four
months, and one day to twelve years. "he trial court also awarded damages to ;auro =i@conde.
3
<n appeal, the Court of 7ppeals affirmed the trial courtPs decision, modifying the penalty imposed
on )iong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages
to ;auro =i@conde.
,
"he appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or
that the trial !udge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered 4odrigue@,
:atchalian, 6ernande@, and Cstrada eBually guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing
Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.
<n motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of 7ppeals# pecial (ivision of five
members voted three against two to deny the motion,
+
hence, the present appeal.
<n 7pril 90, 90/0, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a 4esolution
granting the reBuest of 2ebb to submit for (F7 analysis the semen specimen taken from
CarmelaPs cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the F)I. "he
Court granted the reBuest pursuant to section , of the 4ule on (F7 Cvidence
8
to give the accused
and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of,
leading to a correct decision in the case.
Gnfortunately, on 7pril 95, 90/0 the F)I informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. "he trial record shows, however,
that the specimen was not among the ob!ect evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in
the case.
"his outcome prompted accused 2ebb to file an urgent motion to acBuit on the ground that the
governmentPs failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due
process.
Issues Presented
7ccused 2ebbPs motion to acBuit presents a threshold issueE whether or not the Court should
acBuit him outright, given the governmentPs failure to produce the semen specimen that the F)I
found on CarmelaPs cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.
In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not 2ebb, acting in conspiracy
with ;e!ano, :atchalian, 6ernande@, Cstrada, 4odrigue@, =entura, and 6ilart, raped and killed
Carmela and put to death her mother and sister. )ut, ultimately, the controlling issues areE
/. 2hether or not 7lfaroPs testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and
identifying 2ebb, ;e!ano, :atchalian, 6ernande@, Cstrada, 4odrigue@, and two others
as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and
9. 2hether or not 2ebb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut
7lfaroPs testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
"he issue respecting accused )iong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its
commission.
&1e Ri61t to !cA5itta3
D5e to Lo00 o2 DN! %7i)ence
2ebb claims, citing )rady v. 'aryland,
5
that he is entitled to outright acBuittal on the ground of
violation of his right to due process given the tatePs failure to produce on order of the Court either
by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
"he medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen
specimen was found in her. It is true that 7lfaro identified 2ebb in her testimony as CarmelaPs
rapist and killer but serious Buestions had been raised about her credibility. 7t the very least, there
exists a possibility that 7lfaro had lied. <n the other hand, the semen specimen taken from
Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial
support. Fo two persons have the same (F7 fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.
*
If,
on examination, the (F7 of the sub!ect specimen does not belong to 2ebb, then he did not rape
Carmela. It is that simple. "hus, the Court would have been able to determine that 7lfaro
committed per!ury in saying that he did.
till, 2ebb is not entitled to acBuittal for the failure of the tate to produce the semen specimen at
this late stage. 6or one thing, the ruling in )rady v. 'aryland
-
that he cites has long be overtaken
by the decision in 7ri@ona v. Joungblood,
/0
where the G.. upreme Court held that due process
does not reBuire the tate to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the
accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police.
Aere, the tate presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and
2ebb in fact sought to have the same sub!ected to (F7 test.
6or, another, when 2ebb raised the (F7 issue, the rule governing (F7 evidence did not yet exist,
the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent
had as yet recogni@ed its admissibility as evidence. ConseBuently, the idea of keeping the
specimen secure even after the trial court re!ected the motion for (F7 testing did not come up.
Indeed, neither 2ebb nor his co$accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the
meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied 2ebbPs application for (F7 testing, he allowed the
proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of 7ppeals or
the upreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other
accused.
//
"hey raised the (F7 issue before the Court of 7ppeals but merely as an error
committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. Fone of the accused filed a
motion with the appeals court to have the (F7 test done pending ad!udication of their appeal.
"his, even when the upreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test.
Considering the accusedPs lack of interest in having such test done, the tate cannot be deemed
put on reasonable notice that it would be reBuired to produce the semen specimen at some future
time.
Fow, to the merit of the case.
7lfaroPs tory
)ased on the prosecutionPs version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
7ppeals, on June 9-, /--/ at around *E30 in the evening, Jessica 7lfaro drove her 'itsubishi
;ancer, with boyfriend Peter Cstrada as passenger, to the 7yala 7labang Commercial Center
parking lot to buy shabu from 7rtemio D(ongD =entura. "here, =entura introduced her to his
friendsE Aubert Jeffrey P. 2ebb, 7ntonio D"ony )oyD ;e!ano, 'iguel D:ingD 4odrigue@, Aospicio
DPykeD 6ernande@, 'ichael :atchalian, and Joey 6ilart. 7lfaro recalled freBuently seeing them at a
shabu house in ParaMaBue in January /--/, except =entura whom she had known earlier in
(ecember /--0.
7s 7lfaro smoked her shabu, 2ebb approached and reBuested her to relay a message for him to a
girl, whom she later identified as Carmela =i@conde. 7lfaro agreed. 7fter using up their shabu, the
group drove to CarmelaPs house at *0 =in@ons treet, Pitong (aan ubdivision, )6 Aomes,
ParaMaBue City. 4iding in her car, 7lfaro and Cstrada trailed 6ilart and 4odrigue@ who rode a
'a@da pick$up and 2ebb, ;e!ano, =entura, 6ernande@, and :atchalian who were on a Fissan
Patrol car.
<n reaching their destination, 7lfaro parked her car on =in@ons treet, alighted, and approached
CarmelaPs house. 7lfaro pressed the bu@@er and a woman came out. 7lfaro Bueried her about
Carmela. 7lfaro had met Carmela twice before in January /--/. 2hen Carmela came out, 7lfaro
gave her 2ebbPs message that he was !ust around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not
go out yet since she had !ust arrived home. he told 7lfaro to return after twenty minutes. 7lfaro
relayed this to 2ebb who then told the group to drive back to the 7yala 7labang Commercial
Center.
"he group had another shabu session at the parking lot. 7fter sometime, they drove back but only
7lfaro proceeded to =in@ons treet where Carmela lived. "he Fissan Patrol and the 'a@da pick$
up, with their passengers, parked somewhere along 7guirre 7venue. Carmela was at their garden.
he approached 7lfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she %Carmela& had to leave the house
for a while. Carmela reBuested 7lfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian
gate, the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told 7lfaro
to blink her carPs headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would
know that she had arrived.
7lfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. 7lfaro
trailed Carmela up to 7guirre 7venue where she dropped off a man whom 7lfaro believed was
CarmelaPs boyfriend. 7lfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed CarmelaPs instructions
to 2ebb. "hey then all went back to the 7yala 7labang Commercial Center. 7t the parking lot,
7lfaro told the group about her talk with Carmela. 2hen she told 2ebb of CarmelaPs male
companion, 2ebbPs mood changed for the rest of the evening %Dbad tripD&.
2ebb gave out free cocaine. "hey all used it and some shabu, too. 7fter about ,0 to ,+ minutes,
2ebb decided that it was time for them to leave. Ae said, DPipilahan natin siya .Carmela1 at ako
ang mauuna.D ;e!ano said, D7ko ang susunodD and the others responded D<kay, okay.D "hey all
left the parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong (aan ubdivision for the
third time. "hey arrived at CarmelaPs house shortly before midnight.
7lfaro parked her car between =i@condePs house and the next. 2hile waiting for the others to alight
from their cars, 6ernande@ approached 7lfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer
near the =i@condePs residence to cause a brownout %DPasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na
itoD&. )ut 7lfaro shrugged off the idea, telling 6ernande@, D'alakas lang ang tama mo.D 2hen
2ebb, ;e!ano, and =entura were already before the house, 2ebb told the others again that they
would line up for Carmela but he would be the first. "he others replied, D< sige, dito lang kami,
magbabantay lang kami.D
7lfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. 2ebb, ;e!ano, and
=entura followed her. <n entering the garage, =entura using a chair mounted the hood of the
=i@condesP Fissan entra and loosened the electric bulb over it %Dpara daw walang ilawD&. "he
small group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the
aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. he and 2ebb looked each other in the eyes for a
moment and, together, headed for the dining area.
7s she lost sight of Carmela and 2ebb, 7lfaro decided to go out. ;e!ano asked her where she was
going and she replied that she was going out to smoke. 7s she eased her way out through the
kitchen door, she saw =entura pulling out a kitchen drawer. 7lfaro smoked a cigarette at the
garden. 7fter about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a womanPs voice ask, Dino yanKD
7lfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her car. he found her other companions milling
around it. Cstrada who sat in the car asked her, D<kay baKD
7fter sitting in the car for about ten minutes, 7lfaro returned to the =i@conde house, using the same
route. "he interior of the house was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen,
7lfaro saw =entura searching a ladyPs bag that lay on the dining table. 2hen she asked him what
he was looking for, he saidE DIkaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi.D he asked him what key he
wanted and he repliedE D)asta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse.D
2hen she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the
lock. he also did not find the car key.
Gnable to open the main door, 7lfaro returned to the kitchen. 2hile she was at a spot leading to
the dining area, she heard a static noise %like a television that remained on after the station had
signed off&. <ut of curiosity, she approached the masterPs bedroom from where the noise came,
opened the door a little, and peeked inside. "he unusual sound grew even louder. 7s she walked
in, she saw 2ebb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. "wo bloodied bodies
lay on the bed. ;e!ano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his !acket. Carmela was gagged,
moaning, and in tears while 2ebb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
2ebb gave 7lfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. he met =entura at the
dining area. Ae told her, DPrepare an escape. 7alis na tayo.D hocked with what she saw, 7lfaro
rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk.
he entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. 2ebb, ;e!ano,
and =entura came out of the house !ust then. 2ebb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the
main door, breaking its glass frame.
7s the three men approached the pedestrian gate, 2ebb told =entura that he forgot his !acket in
the house. )ut =entura told him that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already
locked. "hey all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached 7guirre 7venue. 7s they got
near an old hotel at the "ropical Palace area, 7lfaro noticed the Fissan Patrol slow down.
omeone threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.
"he convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long
driveway at )6 Cxecutive =illage. "hey entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the
Dblaming sessionD took place. It was here that 7lfaro and those who remained outside the
=i@conde house learned of what happened. "he first to be killed was CarmelaPs mother, then
Jennifer, and finally, Carmella. =entura blamed 2ebb, telling him, D)akit naman pati yung bataKD
2ebb replied that the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she !umped on him, bit
his shoulders, and pulled his hair. 2ebb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and
repeatedly stabbed her. ;e!ano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the house.
'eanwhile, 2ebb called up someone on his cellular phone.
7t around 9E00 in the morning, accused :erardo )iong arrived. 2ebb ordered him to go and clean
up the =i@conde house and said to him, DPera lang ang katapat nyan.D )iong answered, D<kay
lang.D 2ebb spoke to his companions and told them, D2e donPt know each other. 2e havenPt seen
each otherRbaka maulit yan.D 7lfaro and Cstrada left and they drove to her fatherPs house.
/9
/. "he Buality of the witness
2as 7lfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the F)I after four years, bothered by her
conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and do what was rightK Fo. he
was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the F)I as an Dasset,D a stool pigeon, one who
earned her living by fraterni@ing with criminals so she could sBueal on them to her F)I handlers.
he had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.
7ccording to 7tty. 7rtemio acaguing, former head of the F)I 7nti$Oidnapping, Ai!acking, and
7rmed 4obbery "ask 6orce %7OA74& ection, 7lfaro had been hanging around at the F)I since
Fovember or (ecember /--, as an Dasset.D he supplied her handlers with information against
drug pushers and other criminal elements. ome of this information led to the capture of notorious
drug pushers like Christopher Cru@ antos and <rlando )acBuir. 7lfaroPs tip led to the arrest of the
leader of the D'artilyo gangD that killed a police officer. )ecause of her talent, the task force gave
her Dvery special treatmentD and she became its Ddarling,D allowed the privilege of spending nights
in one of the rooms at the F)I offices.
2hen 7lfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was
piBued. <ne day, she unexpectedly told acaguing that she knew someone who had the real story
behind the =i@conde massacre. acaguing showed interest. 7lfaro promised to bring that someone
to the F)I to tell his story. 2hen this did not happen and acaguing continued to press her, she
told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant. acaguing testified thusE
7""J. <F:OIO<E
?. 7tty. acaguing, how did Jessica 7lfaro become a witness in the =i@conde murder
caseK 2ill you tell the Aonorable CourtK
x x x x
7. he told me. Jour Aonor, that she knew somebody who related to her the
circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the =i@conde family. "hatPs what
she told me, Jour Aonor.
7""J. <F:OIO<E
?. 7nd what did you sayK
x x x x
7. I was Buite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and
she promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and together with her, we
will try to convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.
x x x x
?. 7tty. acaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witnessK
2I"FC 7C7:GIF:E
7. Fo, sir.
7""J. <F:OIO<E
?. 2hy notK
2I"FC 7C7:GIF:E
7. )ecause Jessica 7lfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man
to me. he told me later that she could not and the man does not like to testify.
7""J. <F:OIO<E
?. 7ll right, and what happened after thatK
2I"FC 7C7:GIF:E
7. he told me, Deasy lang kayo, ir,D if I may Buote, Deasy lang ir, huwag kayongRD
C<G4"E
Aow was thatK
2I"FC 7C7:GIF:E
7. DCasy lang, ir. ir, relax lang, ir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang Syan.D
x x x x
7""J. <F:OIO<E
?. 7ll right, and what was your reaction when 's. 7lfaro stated that Dpapapelan ko na
lang yanKD
2I"FC 7C7:GIF:E
7. I said, Dhindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness.D
7""J. <F:OIO<E
?. 7nd what was the reply of 's. 7lfaroK
2I"FC 7C7:GIF:E
7. Aindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
%"F, 'ay 9*, /--8, pp. ,-$+0, +*, 55$5-&
?uite significantly, 7lfaro never refuted acaguingPs above testimony.
9. "he suspicious details
)ut was it possible for 7lfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with the
physical evidence at the scene of the crimeK Fo doubt, yes.
6irstly, the =i@conde massacre had been reported in the media with di@@ying details. Cverybody
was talking about what the police found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations
about them.
econdly, the police had arrested some Dakyat$bahayD group in ParaMaBue and charged them with
the crime. "he police prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up
with details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. 7lfaroPs F)I handlers who were doing
their own investigation knew of these details as well. ince 7lfaro hanged out at the F)I offices
and practically lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and
gain access to the documents.
Fot surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the )arroso Dakyat bahayD gang,
condemned by the 'akati 4"C as fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them, shows how
crime investigators could make a confession ring true by matching some of its details with the
physical evidence at the crime scene. Consider the followingE
a. "he )arroso gang members said that they got into CarmelaPs house by breaking the glass panel
of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. 7lfaro could not use this line
since the core of her story was that 2ebb was CarmelaPs boyfriend. 2ebb had no reason to
smash her front door to get to see her.
ConseBuently, to explain the smashed door, 7lfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out of
the house, 2ebb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass$paneled front
door of the =i@conde residence. Ais action really made no sense. 6rom 7lfaroPs narration, 2ebb
appeared rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to
get away Buickly to avoid detection. Aurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous
noise was bi@arre, like inviting the neighbors to come.
b. "he crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. "he re!ected confessions of the
)arroso Dakyat$bahayD gang members said that they tried to rob the house. "o explain this physical
evidence, 7lfaro claimed that at one point =entura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another
point, going through a handbag on the dining table. Ae said he was looking for the front$door key
and the car key.
7gain, this portion of 7lfaroPs story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of the
ransacked house. he never mentioned =entura having taken some valuables with him when they
left CarmelaPs house. 7nd why would =entura rummage a bag on the table for the front$door key,
spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with
the crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason 2ebb and his companions
entered that house.
c. It is the same thing with the garage light. "he police investigators found that the bulb had been
loosened to turn off the light. "he confessions of the )arroso gang claimed that one of them
climbed the parked carPs hood to reach up and darken that light. "his made sense since they were
going to rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. ome
passersby might look in and see what they were doing.
7lfaro had to ad!ust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. o she claimed
that =entura climbed the carPs hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. )ut, unlike the )arroso
Dakyat$bahayD gang, 2ebb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. "hey
supposedly knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not
make sense for =entura to risk standing on the carPs hood and be seen in such an awkward
position instead of going straight into the house.
7nd, thirdly, 7lfaro was the F)IPs star witness, their badge of excellent investigative
work.lavvp#il 7fter claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade, the F)I people had a
stake in making her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed
for the !ob of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. he was their DdarlingD of an asset. 7nd
this is not pure speculation. 7s pointed out above, acaguing of the F)I, a lawyer and a ranking
official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. 2hy the trial court and the Court of 7ppeals failed to see
this is mystifying.
7t any rate, did 7lfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given
the circumstancesK Fot likely. he named 'iguel D:ingD 4odrigue@ as one of the culprits in the
=i@conde killings. )ut when the F)I found a certain 'ichael 4odrigue@, a drug dependent from the
)icutan 4ehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be 7lfaroPs 'iguel 4odrigue@ and showed him
to 7lfaro at the F)I office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking 'ichael, exclaimingE DAow can I
forget your face. 2e !ust saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you
will kill me.D 7s it turned out, he was not 'iguel 4odrigue@, the accused in this case.
/3
"wo possibilities existE 'ichael was really the one 7lfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score
with him but it was too late to change the name she already gave or she had myopic vision,
tagging the wrong people for what they did not do.
3. "he Buality of the testimony
"here is another thing about a lying witnessE her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies. 7n understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people will
help expose a lie. 7nd it has an abundant presence in this case.
<ne. In her desire to implicate :atchalian, 6ernande@, Cstrada, 4odrigue@, and 6ilart, who were
supposed to be 2ebbPs co$principals in the crime, 7lfaro made it a point to testify that 2ebb
proposed twice to his friends the gang$rape of Carmela who had hurt him. 7nd twice, they
%including, if one believes 7lfaro, her own boyfriend Cstrada& agreed in a chorus to his proposal.
)ut when they got to CarmelaPs house, only 2ebb, ;e!ano, =entura, and 7lfaro entered the house.
:atchalian, 6ernande@, Cstrada, and 4odrigue@ supposedly stayed around 7lfaroPs car, which was
parked on the street between CarmelaPs house and the next. ome of these men sat on top of the
carPs lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to
watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby house.
<bviously, the behavior of 2ebbPs companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gang$
rape of Carmela.
"wo. =entura, 7lfaroPs dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to 2ebb and his
friends in a parking lot by a mall. o why would she agree to act as 2ebbPs messenger, using her
gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. 'ore inexplicably, what motivated 7lfaro to
stick it out the whole night with 2ebb and his friendsK
"hey were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Cstrada. 2hen it came to a point that
2ebb decided with his friends to gang$rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for 7lfaro. Jet,
she stuck it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report,
only she was not yet an DassetD then. If, on the other hand, 7lfaro had been too soaked in drugs to
think clearly and !ust followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much
details that only a drug$free mind canK
"hree. 2hen 7lfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that
she still had to go out and that 2ebb and his friends should come back around midnight. 7lfaro
returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. 7nd she trailed her up to
7guirre 7venue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was CarmelaPs
boyfriend. 7lfaroPs trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to 2ebb did not make sense since
she was on limited errand. )ut, as a critical witness, 7lfaro had to provide a reason for 2ebb to
freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.
6our. 7ccording to 7lfaro, when they returned to CarmelaPs house the third time around midnight,
she led 2ebb, ;e!ano, and =entura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Fow,
this is weird. 2ebb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to do. Ae decided and
his friends agreed with him to go to CarmelaPs house and gang$rape her. 2hy would 7lfaro, a
woman, a stranger to 2ebb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang$rape of
Carmela, lead him and the others into her houseK It made no sense. It would only make sense if
7lfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.
6ive. 7lfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. 7fter about twenty minutes, a woman
exclaimed, Dino yanKD <n hearing this, 7lfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to
her car. 7pparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. omeone other than
Carmela became conscious of the presence of 2ebb and others in the house. 7lfaro walked away
because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. "his was
supposedly her frame of mindE fear of getting involved in what was not her business.
)ut if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in
the houseK 7lfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. o
that is what she next claimed. he went back into the house to watch as 2ebb raped Carmela on
the floor of the masterPs bedroom. Ae had apparently stabbed to death CarmelaPs mom and her
young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Fow, 7lfaro testified that she got
scared %another shift to fear& for she hurriedly got out of the house after 2ebb supposedly gave
her a meaningful look.
7lfaro Buickly went to her car, not minding :atchalian, 6ernande@, Cstrada, 4odrigue@, and 6ilart
who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. he did not speak to them, even to Cstrada, her
boyfriend. he entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know
where to go. "his woman who a few minutes back led 2ebb, ;e!ano, and =entura into the house,
knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know
where to goN "his emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own
lies.
4. &1e 05//o0e) co,,o+o,ation0
Intending to provide corroboration to 7lfaroPs testimony, the prosecution presented six additional
witnessesE
D,. ,o0/e,o !. $a+anayan, the F)I 'edico$;egal <fficer who autopsied the bodies of the
victims, testified on the stab wounds they sustained
/,
and the presence of semen in CarmelaPs
genitalia,
/+
indicating that she had been raped.
No,*a3 %. 91ite, (,., was the security guard on duty at Pitong (aan ubdivision from 5 p.m. of
June 9- to 5 a.m. of June 30, /--/. Ae got a report on the morning of June 30 that something
untoward happened at the =i@conde residence. Ae went there and saw the dead bodies in the
masterPs bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a
television set.
/8
2hite claimed that he noticed :atchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go
in and out of Pitong (aan ubdivision. Ae also saw them along =in@ons treet. ;ater, they entered
Pitong (aan ubdivision in a three$car convoy. 2hite could not, however, describe the kind of
vehicles they used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. 7nd he did not
notice anything suspicious about their coming and going.
)ut 2hitePs testimony cannot be relied on. Ais initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. Ae actually
saw :atchalian and his group enter the Pitong (aan ubdivision only once. "hey were not going
in and out. 6urthermore, 7lfaro testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in
the direction of CarmelaPs house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse
without stopping. Jet, 2hite who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.
urprisingly, 2hite failed to note )iong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the
early morning of June 30 when he supposedly Dcleaned upD =i@conde residence on 2ebbPs orders.
2hat is more, 2hite did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before 7lfaroPs first visit that night.
Carmela supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around /0E30 p.m. but 2hite did not
notice it. Ae also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. 2hite actually discredited 7lfaroPs
testimony about the movements of the persons involved.
6urther, while 7lfaro testified that it was the 'a@da pick$up driven by 6ilart that led the three$
vehicle convoy,
/5
2hite claimed it was the Fissan Patrol with :atchalian on it that led the convoy
since he would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that :atchalian, a resident, was in it.
ecurity guard 2hite did not, therefore, provide corroboration to 7lfaroPs testimony.1avvp#i1
(50to $a+anacan, the security supervisor at Pitong (aan ubdivision testified that he saw 2ebb
around the last week of 'ay or the first week of June /--/ to prove his presence in the Philippines
when he claimed to be in the Gnited tates. Ae was manning the guard house at the entrance of
the subdivision of Pitong (aan when he flagged down a car driven by 2ebb. 2ebb said that he
would see ;ilet y. Cabanacan asked him for an I( but he pointed to his Gnited )6 Aomes sticker
and said that he resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong (aan had a local sticker.
Cabanacan testified that, at this point, 2ebb introduced himself as the son of Congressman 2ebb.
till, the supervisor insisted on seeing his I(. 2ebb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture
and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed 2ebb to pass without being
logged in as their tandard <perating Procedure reBuired.
/*
)ut Cabanacan#s testimony could not be relied on. 7lthough it was not common for a security
guard to challenge a CongressmanPs son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the
incident on the guardhouse book. For did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitorPs
entry into the subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing
2ebbPs I( but not in recording the visit.
Mi3a Ga7io3a used to work as laundry woman for the 2ebbs at their house at )6 Aomes Cxecutive
=illage. he testified that she saw 2ebb at his parentsP house on the morning of June 30, /--/
when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied at about ,.a.m.
he saw him again pacing the floor at - a.m. 7t about / p.m., 2ebb left the house in t$shirt and
shorts, passing through a secret door near the maidPs Buarters on the way out. 6inally, she saw
2ebb at , p.m. of the same day.
/-
<n cross$examination, however, :aviola could not say what distinguished June 30, /--/ from the
other days she was on service at the 2ebb household as to enable her to distinctly remember,
four years later, what one of the 2ebb boys did and at what time. he could not remember any of
the details that happened in the household on the other days. he proved to have a selective
photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.
:aviola tried to corroborate 7lfaroP#s testimony by claiming that on June 30, /--/ she noticed
bloodstains on 2ebb#s t$shirt.
90
he did not call the attention of anybody in the household about it
when it would have been a point of concern that 2ebb may have been hurt, hence the blood.
)esides, =ictoria =entoso, the 2ebbs# housemaid from 'arch /-*- to 'ay /--9, and gt. 'iguel
'uMo@, the 2ebbs# security aide in /--/, testified that :aviola worked for the 2ebbs only from
January /--/ to 7pril /--/. =entoso further testified that it was not :aviola#s duty to collect the
clothes from the 9nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning
the rooms.
2hat is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to
collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up children at
four in the morning while they were asleep.
7nd it did not make sense, if 7lfaroPs testimony were to be believed that 2ebb, who was so careful
and clever that he called )iong to go to the =i@conde residence at 9 a.m. to clean up the evidence
against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for
laundrywoman :aviola to collect and wash at , a.m. as was her supposed habit.
Lo3ita De 'i,,e, was accused )iongPs girlfriend around the time the =i@conde massacre took
place. )irrer testified that she was with )iong playing mah!ong from the evening of June 9-, /--/
to the early morning of June 30, when )iong got a call at around 9 a.m. "his prompted him,
according to (e )irrer, to leave and go to )6. omeone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him
up. 2hen )iong returned at 5 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails.
7nd he threw away a foul$smelling handkerchief. he also saw )iong take out a knife with
aluminum cover from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.
9/
"he security guard at Pitong (aan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get
into the village although )iong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. Ais
departure before 5 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. )esides, if he had
cleaned up the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the
following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators
and on$lookersK In fact, why would he steal valuable items from the =i@conde residence on his
return there hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlierK
7t most, )irrerPs testimony only established )iongPs theft of certain items from the =i@conde
residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving
around and altering the effects of the crime. )irrerPs testimony failed to connect )iong#s acts to
2ebb and the other accused.
La5,o #iBcon)e testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two
daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a re!ected suitor she called D)agyo,D because he was a
ParaMaBue politicianPs son. Gnfortunately, ;auro did not appear curious enough to insist on finding
out who the re!ected fellow was. )esides, his testimony contradicts that of 7lfaro who testified that
Carmela and 2ebb had an on$going relation. Indeed, if 7lfaro were to be believed, Carmela
wanted 2ebb to come to her house around midnight. he even left the kitchen door open so he
could enter the house.
+. "he missing corroboration
"here is something truly remarkable about this caseE the prosecutionPs core theory that Carmela
and 2ebb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this
reason that 2ebb brought his friends to her house to gang$rape her is totally uncorroboratedN
6or instance, normally, if 2ebb, a CongressmanPs son, courted the young Carmela, that would be
news among her circle of friends if not around town. )ut, here, none of her friends or even those
who knew either of them came forward to affirm this. 7nd if 2ebb hanged around with her, trying
to win her favors, he would surely be seen with her. 7nd this would all the more be so if they had
become sweethearts, a relation that 7lfaro tried to pro!ect with her testimony.
)ut, except for 7lfaro, the F)I asset, no one among CarmelaPs friends or her friendsP friends would
testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts in
ParaMaBue or 'akati. 7lfaroPs claim of a five$hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and
unconnectedly inserted into 2ebb and CarmelaPs life stories or like a piece of !igsaw pu@@le
trimmed to fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it clashes with the
surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their
personal histories. It is Buite unreal.
2hat is more, 7lfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger,
'r. H, whom 7lfaro thought the way it looked was also CarmelaPs lover. "his was the all$important
reason 2ebb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. 7gain, none of CarmelaPs relatives, friends,
or people who knew her ever testified about the existence of 'r.H in her life. Fobody has come
forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. 7nd despite the gruesome news about her
death and how 'r. H had played a role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a
special friend normally would. <bviously, 'r. H did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of
7lfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.
9e++C0 ".S. !3i+i
7mong the accused, 2ebb presented the strongest alibi.
a. "he travel preparations
2ebb claims that in /--/ his parents, enator 6reddie 2ebb and his wife, Cli@abeth, sent their
son to the Gnited tates %G..& to learn the value of independence, hard work, and money.
99
:loria
2ebb, his aunt, accompanied him. 4a!ah "ours booked their flight to an 6rancisco via Gnited
7irlines. Josefina Folasco of 4a!ah "ours confirmed that 2ebb and his aunt used their plane
tickets.
2ebb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy,
Joselito <rendain Cscobar, of his travel plans. Ae even invited them to his despedida party on
'arch *, /--/ at 6aces (isco along 'akati 7ve.
93
<n 'arch *,/--/, the eve of his departure, he
took girlfriend 'ilagros Castillo to a dinner at )unchums at the 'akati Cinema Buare. Ais
basketball buddy 4afael Jose with "ina Calma, a blind date arranged by 2ebb, !oined them. "hey
afterwards went to 6aces (isco for 2ebb#s despedida party. 7mong those present were his friends
Paulo antos and Jay <rtega.
9,
b. "he two immigration checks
"he following day, 'arch -, /--/, 2ebb left for an 6rancisco, California, with his 7unt :loria on
board Gnited 7irlines 6light *0*.
9+
)efore boarding his plane, 2ebb passed through the Philippine
Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration <fficer,
6erdinand ampol checked 2ebbPs visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass
through.
98
Ae was listed on the Gnited 7irlines 6lightPs Passenger 'anifest.
95
<n arrival at an 6rancisco, 2ebb went through the G.. Immigration where his entry into that
country was recorded. "hus, the G.. Immigration Faturali@ation ervice, checking with its Fon$
immigrant Information ystem, confirmed 2ebb#s entry into the G.. on 'arch -, /--/. 2ebb
presented at the trial the IF Certification issued by the G.. Immigration and Faturali@ation
ervice,
9*
the computer$generated print$out of the G$IF indicating 2ebb#s entry on 'arch -,
/--/,
9-
and the G$IF Certification dated 7ugust 3/, /--+, authenticated by the Philippine
(epartment of 6oreign 7ffairs, correcting an earlier 7ugust /0, /--+ Certification.
30
c. (etails of G.. so!ourn
In an 6rancisco, 2ebb and his aunt :loria were met by the latterPs daughter, 'aria "eresa
Oeame, who brought them to :loriaPs house in (aly City, California. (uring his stay with his aunt,
2ebb met Christopher Paul ;egaspi Csguerra, :loriaPs grandson. In 7pril /--/, 2ebb,
Christopher, and a certain (aphne (omingo watched the concert of (eelite )and in an
6rancisco.
3/
In the same month, (orothy 2heelock and her family invited 2ebb to ;ake "ahoe to
return the 2ebbsP hospitality when she was in the Philippines.
39
In 'ay /--/, on invitation of another aunt, usan )rottman, 2ebb moved to 7naheim Aills,
California.
33
(uring his stay there, he occupied himself with playing basketball once or twice a
week with teven Oeeler
3,
and working at his cousin$in$lawPs pest control company.
3+
2ebb
presented the companyPs logbook showing the tasks he performed,
38
his paycheck,
35
his I(, and
other employment papers. <n June /,, /--/ he applied for a driver#s license
3*
and wrote three
letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.
3-
<n June 9*, /--/, 2ebbPs parents visited him at 7naheim and stayed with the )rottmans. <n the
same day, his father introduced Aonesto 7ragon to his son when he came to visit.
,0
<n the
following day, June 9-, 2ebb, in the company of his father and 7ragon went to 4iverside,
California, to look for a car. "hey bought an '49 "oyota car.
,/
;ater that day, a visitor at the
)rottmanPs, ;ouis 2hittacker, saw 2ebb looking at the plates of his new car.
,9
"o prove the
purchase, 2ebb presented the Public 4ecords of California (epartment of 'otor =ehicle
,3
and a
car plate D;C2 2C)).D
,,
In using the car in the G.., 2ebb even received traffic citations.
,+
<n June 30, /--/ 2ebb, again accompanied by his father and 7ragon,
,8
bought a bicycle at
<range Cycle Center.
,5
"he Center issued 2ebb a receipt dated June 30, /--/.
,*
<n July ,, /--/,
Independence (ay, the 2ebbs, the )rottmans, and the =aca family had a lakeside picnic.
,-
2ebb stayed with the )rottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. <n
7ugust ,, /--/ he left for ;ongwood, 6lorida, to stay with the spouses Jack and on!a
4odrigue@.
+0
"here, he met 7rmando 4odrigue@ with whom he spent time, playing basketball on
weekends, watching movies, and playing billiards.
+/
In Fovember /--/, 2ebb met performing
artist :ary =alenciano, a friend of Jack 4odrigue@, who was invited for a dinner at the 4odrigue@Ps
house.
+9
Ae left the 4odrigue@Ps home in 7ugust /--9, returned to 7naheim and stayed with his
aunt Imelda Pagaspas. Ae stayed there until he left for the Philippines on <ctober 98, /--9.
d. "he second immigration checks
7s with his trip going to the G.., 2ebb also went through both the G.. and Philippine
immigrations on his return trip. "hus, his departure from the G.. was confirmed by the same
certifications that confirmed his entry.
+3
6urthermore, a (iplomatic Fote of the G.. (epartment of
tate with enclosed letter from 7cting (irector (ebora 7. 6armer of the 4ecords <perations, <ffice
of 4ecords of the G$IF stated that the Certification dated 7ugust 3/, /--+ is a true and accurate
statement. 7nd when he boarded his plane, the Passenger 'anifest of Philippine 7irlines 6light
Fo. /03,
+,
certified by 7gnes "abuena
++
confirmed his return trip.
2hen he arrived in 'anila, 2ebb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival
stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to 'anila on <ctober 95, /--9. "his was
authenticated by Carmelita 7lipio, the immigration officer who processed 2ebbPs reentry.
+8
Gpon
his return, in <ctober /--9, Paolo antos, Joselito Crondain Cscobar, and 4afael Jose once again
saw 2ebb playing basketball at the )6#s Phase III basketball court.
e. 7libi versus positive identification
"he trial court and the Court of 7ppeals are one in re!ecting as weak 2ebbPs alibi. "heir reason is
uniformE 2ebbPs alibi cannot stand against 7lfaroPs positive identification of him as the rapist and
killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. )ecause of
this, to the lower courts, 2ebbPs denial and alibi were fabricated.
)ut not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly
innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. o how can such accused penetrate a
mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a
hangmanPs noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, DI saw him do it.DK 'ost !udges
believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. "his Buick
stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. 6or how else can the truth that the accused is really
innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone$cast tenetK
"here is only one way. 7 !udge must keep an open mind. Ae must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion, often arising from a desire to Buickly finish the !ob of deciding a case. 7 positive
declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically
cancel out the accusedPs claim that he did not do it. 7 lying witness can make as positive an
identification as a truthful witness can. "he lying witness can also say as forthrightly and
uneBuivocally, DAe did itND without blinking an eye.
4ather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteriaE
6irst, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. he is credible
who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Aer word has, to
one who knows her, its weight in gold.
7nd second, the witnessP story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. 7 witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and
makes bewildering claims.
Aere, as already fully discussed above, 7lfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.
he did not show up at the F)I as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. he had
been hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with
criminals and sBuealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. he was the
prosecutionPs worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she
volunteered to play the role of a witness in the =i@conde killings when she could not produce a
man she promised to the F)I.
7nd, although her testimony included details, 7lfaro had prior access to the details that the
investigators knew of the case. he took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in
her testimony the clearly incompatible act of 2ebb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames
even when they were trying to slip away BuietlyI!ust so she can accommodate this crime scene
feature. he also had =entura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that
nobody needed !ust to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. 7nd
she had =entura climbing the carPs hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when
they did not need to darken the garage to force open the front doorI!ust so to explain the
darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.
6urther, her testimony was inherently incredible. Aer story that :atchalian, 6ernande@, Cstrada,
4odrigue@, and 6ilart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their
indifference, exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to
neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it
was their turn to rape Carmela. 7lfaroPs story that she agreed to serve as 2ebbPs messenger to
Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till the bi@arre end when they were practically
strangers, also taxes incredulity.
"o provide basis for 2ebbPs outrage, 7lfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to
watch her let off a lover on 7guirre 7venue. 7nd, inexplicably, although 7lfaro had only played the
role of messenger, she claimed leading 2ebb, ;e!ano, and =entura into the house to gang$rape
Carmella, as if 7lfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Aer
swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of
absolute courage when she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is
also Buite inexplicable.
Gltimately, 7lfaroPs Buality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable,
testimony cannot be the positive identification that !urisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to
!ettison a denial and an alibi.
2. ! )oc5*ente) a3i+i
"o establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence
+5
that %a& he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and %b& that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
+*
"he courts below held that, despite his evidence, 2ebb was actually in ParaMaBue when the
=i@conde killings took place; he was not in the G.. from 'arch -, /--/ to <ctober 95, /--9; and if
he did leave on 'arch -, /--/, he actually returned before June 9-, /--/, committed the crime,
erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the G.. and Philippine
Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the G.., and returned the normal
way on <ctober 95, /--9. )ut this ruling practically makes the death of 2ebb and his passage into
the next life the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this un!ust and
inhuman paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that 2ebb, with his fatherPs
connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a 'arch -, /--/ departure stamp on his
passport and an <ctober 95, /--9 arrival stamp on the same. )ut this is pure speculation since
there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. )esides, how could 2ebb fix a
foreign airlinesP passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the G..
that had his name on themK Aow could 2ebb fix with the G.. ImmigrationPs record system those
two dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret
from the G.. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return thereK Fo one has come up
with a logical and plausible answer to these Buestions.
"he Court of 7ppeals re!ected the evidence of 2ebbPs passport since he did not leave the original
to be attached to the record. )ut, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means
that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the !udge to see. 7s
Court of 7ppeals Justice "agle said in his dissent,
+-
the practice when a party does not want to
leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and
stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. tipulations in the course of
trial are binding on the parties and on the court.
"he G.. Immigration certification and the computer print$out of 2ebbPs arrival in and departure
from that country were authenticated by no less than the <ffice of the G.. 7ttorney :eneral and
the tate (epartment. till the Court of 7ppeals refused to accept these documents for the reason
that 2ebb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. )ut this was
unnecessary. 2ebbPs passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under
international practice, is the official record of travels of the citi@en to whom it is issued. "he entries
in that passport are presumed true.
80
"he G.. Immigration certification and computer print$out, the official certifications of which have
been authenticated by the Philippine (epartment of 6oreign 7ffairs, merely validated the arrival
and departure stamps of the G.. Immigration office on 2ebbPs passport. "hey have the same
evidentiary value. "he officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to
testify on them. "heir trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty
attached to a breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the
publicity of the record.
8/
"he Court of 7ppeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the G..
Immigration office said that it had no record of 2ebb entering the G.. )ut that erroneous first
certification was amply explained by the G.. :overnment and Court of 7ppeals Justice "agle
stated it in his dissenting opinion, thusE
2hile it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the G.. IF on 7ugust /8, /--+ finding
Dno evidence of lawful admission of 2ebb,D this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no
less than the G IF <fficials. 7s explained by witness ;eo Aerrera$;im, Consul and econd
ecretary of the Philippine Cmbassy in 2ashington (.C., said Certification did not pass through
proper diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard
procedure governing such reBuest.
"he initial reBuest was merely initiated by )I( Commissioner =erceles who directly communicated
with the Philippine Consulate in an 6rancisco, G7, bypassing the ecretary of 6oreign 7ffairs
which is the proper protocol procedure. 'r. teven )ucher, the acting Chief of the 4ecords
ervices )oard of G$IF 2ashington (.C. in his letter addressed to Philip 7ntweiler, Philippine
(esk <fficer, tate (epartment, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it
was Dnot exhaustive and did not reflect all available information.D 7lso, 4ichard ;. Auff, Co$(irector
of the <ffice of Information and privacy, G (epartment of Justice, in response to the appeal
raised by Consul :eneral "eresita =. 'ar@an, explained that Dthe IF normally does not maintain
records on individuals who are entering the country as visitors rather than as immigrantsE and that
a notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the Fonimmigrant Information system.
ince appellant 2ebb entered the G.. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could
not have produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked into contained
entries of the names of I''I:47F" and not that of F<F$I''I:47F" visitors of the G...
89
"he trial court and the Court of 7ppeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel
documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals
from airports. "hey claim that it would not have been impossible for 2ebb to secretly return to the
Philippines after he supposedly left it on 'arch -, /--/, commit the crime, go back to the G.., and
openly return to the Philippines again on <ctober 98, /--9. "ravel between the G.. and the
Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of
evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for
impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what
they state, are immune to attack. "hey are not. "hat presumption can be overcome by evidence.
Aere, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in
2ebbPs passport and the certifications of the Philippine and G..P immigration services regarding
his travel to the G.. and back. "he prosecutionPs rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that
it planted in the lower courtPs minds.
5. Cffect of 2ebbPs alibi to others
2ebbPs documented alibi altogether impeaches 7lfaro#s testimony, not only with respect to him,
but also with respect to ;e!ano, Cstrada, 6ernande@, :atchalian, 4odrigue@, and )iong. 6or, if the
Court accepts the proposition that 2ebb was in the G.. when the crime took place, 7lfaroPs
testimony will not hold together. 2ebbPs participation is the anchor of 7lfaroPs story. 2ithout it, the
evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
C<FC;GI<F
In our criminal !ustice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about
the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether
it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. 6or, it would be a serious mistake to send
an innocent man to !ail where such kind of doubt hangs on to onePs inner being, like a piece of
meat lodged immovable between teeth.
2ill the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an F)I
asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the =i@conde massacre
that she could not produceK
2AC4C6<4C, the Court 4C=C4C and C" 7I(C the (ecision dated (ecember /+, 900+
and 4esolution dated January 98, 9005 of the Court of 7ppeals in C7$:.4. C4$A.C. 00338 and
7C?GI" accused$appellants Aubert Jeffrey P. 2ebb, 7ntonio ;e!ano, 'ichael 7. :atchalian,
Aospicio 6ernande@, 'iguel 4odrigue@, Peter Cstrada and :erardo )iong of the crimes of which
they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. "hey
are ordered immediately 4C;C7C( from detention unless they are confined for another lawful
cause.
;et a copy of this (ecision be furnished the (irector, )ureau of Corrections, 'untinlupa City for
immediate implementation. "he (irector of the )ureau of Corrections is (I4CC"C( to report the
action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this (ecision.
< <4(C4C(.
G.R. No. L-26376 !5650t 31, 1966
&.% %OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, plaintiff and appellant,
vs.
!"R%LIO '!LIS!$!N, defendant and appellee.
;ffi%e of t#e 0oli%itor <eneral Arturo A. Alafriz' Assistant 0oli%itor <eneral .. ,. >orro"eo and +.
M. 1ili$ for plaintiff and appellant.
Rolando de la ,uesta for defendant and appellee.
'%NG8ON, (.., J.:
"his is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of acBuittal.
<n 6ebruary /, /-8+, 7urelio )alisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of 6irst Instance of
Ilocos Forte. "he information allegedE
"hat on or about (ecember 3, /-8,, in the 'unicipality of Fueva Cra, province of
Ilocos Forte, Philippines, and within the !urisdiction of this Aonorable Court, the herein
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one, ;eonicio )ulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that
immediately caused his death.
C<F"474J "< ;72.
"o this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was
assisted by counsel. 7t his de ofi%io counsel#s petition, however, he was allowed to present
evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. "hereupon the accused testified to the effect that he
stabbed the deceased in self$defense because the latter was strangling him. 7nd he further stated
that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities.
ubseBuently, on 'arch 8, /-8+, on the basis of the above$mentioned testimony of the accused,
the court a quorendered a decision acBuitting the accused. 7s stated, the prosecution appealed
therefrom.
"his appeal was first taken to the Court of 7ppeals. 7ppellant filed its brief on eptember -, /-8+.
Fo appellee#s brief was filed. 7fter being submitted for decision without appellee#s brief, the appeal
was certified to Gs by the Court of 7ppeals on July /,, /-88, as involving Buestions purely of law
%ec. /5, 4epublic 7ct 9-8&. 7nd on 7ugust +, /-88, 2e ordered it docketed herein.1p#I1.@Jt
"he sole assignment of error isE
"AC "4I7; C<G4" C44C( IF 7C?GI""IF: "AC 7CCGC( <6 "AC <66CFC
CA74:C( (CPI"C "AC ;7""C4# P;C7 <6 :GI;"J 2ACF 7447I:FC(.
7ppellant#s contention is meritorious. 7 plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with
respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and
leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the
circumstances. %People v. Fg Pek, */ Phil. +83&. In this case, the defendant was only allowed to
testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty. aid
testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
In view of the assertion of self$defense in the testimony of the accused, the proper course should
have been for the court a quo to take defendant#s plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the
case, in t#e order set fort# in ection 3 of 4ule //- of the 4ules of CourtE
CC. 3. ;rder of trial. I "he plea of not guilty having been entered, the trial must proceed in the
following orderE
%a& "he fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must offer evidence in support
of the charges.
%b& "he defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense.
%c& "he parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of !ustice, permit them to offer new additional evidence bearing upon the
main issue in Buestion.
%d& 2hen the introduction of evidence shall have been concluded, unless the case is
submitted to the court without argument, the fiscal must open the argument, the
attorney for the defense must follow, and the fiscal may conclude the same. "he
argument by either attorney may be oral or written, or partly written, but only the written
arguments, or such portions of the same as may be in writing, shall be preserved in the
record of the case.
In deciding the case upon the merits without the reBuisite trial, the court a quo not only erred in
procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard.
"his Court now turns to ection 9, 4ule /99 of the 4ules of Court, which provides thatE D"he
People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
!eopardy.D "he present state of !urisprudence in this regard is that the above provision applies
even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the Buestion of double !eopardy %People v. 6errer,
;$-059, <ctober 93, /-+8; People v. )ao, ;$/9/09, eptember 9-, /-+-; People v. (e :ole@, ;$
/,/80, June 30, /-80&.
"he next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the accused in double !eopardy. It is
settled that the existence of a plea is an essential reBuisite to double !eopardy %People v. Jlagan,
+* Phil. *+/; People v. ?uimsing, ;$/-*80, (ecember 93, /-8,&. In the present case, it is true, the
accused had first entered a plea of guilty. ubseBuently, however, he testified, in the course of
being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self$defense. aid
testimony, therefore I as the court a quo recogni@ed in its decision I had the effect of vacating
his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have reBuired him to plead a new on the charge, or at
least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. "his was not done. It follows that in
effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its !udgment of
acBuittal, there can be no double !eopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
/
6urthermore, as afore$stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the
prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the
defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. 7nd for lack of this fundamental
prereBuisite, its action is perforce null and void. "he acBuittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of
due process, is no acBuittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former
!eopardy %People v. Cabero, 8/ Phil. /9/; 9/ 7m. Jur. 9d. 93+; 'cCleary v. Audspeth /9, 6ed. 9d.
,,+&.
It should be noted that in rendering the !udgment of acBuittal, the trial !udge below already gave
credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the prosecution, without in any way
doubting the integrity of said trial !udge, 2e deem it proper to remand this case to the court a
quo for further proceedings under another !udge of the same court, in one of the two other
branches of the Court of 6irst Instance of Ilocos Forte sitting at ;aoag.
2herefore, the !udgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the
court a quo for further proceedings under another !udge of said court, that is, for plea by the
defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and !udgment
thereafter, Fo costs. o ordered.
G.R. No. L-43790 Dece*+e, 9, 1976
%OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, petitioner,
vs.
&.% $I&: $O"R& O- SIL!:, %RN%S&O D% L! !8, !$I-I$O S%N%$IO, (R. y S%'"S!,
ROM%O MILL!N y D%L%(%RO an) 9IL-R%DO (O$.I$O y M!G!LON!, respondents.
A%tin$ 0oli%itor <eneral Bu$o A. <utierrez' Fr.' Assistant 0oli%itor <eneral ;%tavio R. Ra"irez and
0oli%itor Anrique M. Reyes for petitioner.
Bilado' Ba$ad E Bilado as private prose%utors.
>enKa"in :. Telo' 0r. for private respondent Ro"eo Millan.
,i%eron 0everino and A"eterio Molato for ot#er private respondents.

M"DO8 !LM!, J.:
"his is a Petition for 4eview !ointly filed by the City 6iscal of ilay City, 'arcelino '. Paviera, and
the ;aw <ffices of Ailado, Aagad T Ailado, the latter as private prosecutors, praying that an order
of the City Court of ilay dated (ecember /-, /-5+, issued by Judge 4eynaldo '. 7lon,
dismissing Criminal Case Fo. 5/9,$C entitled D=eople vs. Arnesto de la =az' et al.D be set aside
and that respondent court be directed to continue with the trial of the aforementioned case. E
In compliance with <ur 4esolution of July 9/, J-58, the <ffice of the olicitor :eneral filed its
comment on <ctober /3, /-5,, !oining the Petitioner#s prayer that the order of respondent court of
(ecember /-, /-5+, be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
"he record shows that private respondent herein, Crnesto de la Pa@, Pacifico enecio, Jr. y
ebusa 4omeo 'illan y (ele!ero and 2ilfredo Jochico y 'agalona, were charged with
Dfalsification by private individuals and use of falsified documentD under Par. 9, 7rticle /59 of the
4evised Penal Code, alleged to have been committed as follows.
"hat sometime on January ,, /-5,, at Aawaiian$Philippine Company, ilay
City, Philippines, and within the !urisdiction of this Aonorable Court, the
accused Crnesto de la Pa@, overseer of Ada. 'alisbog belonging to
(eogracias de la Pa@, and the other three accused, scalers of Aawaiian$
Philippine Company, with intent of gain and to cause damage by conniving,
cooperating and mutually helping one another did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously alter or falsify the sugar cane weight report card
or Dtar!etaD, a private document showing the weight of sugarcane belonging
to (eogracias de la Pa@, particularly those loaded in cane cars Fos. /8*8,
/5,3 and /099 by increasing the total actual weight of 99.00+ tons to
95./80 tons for said three cane cars, thereby causing damage to the
central and other cane planters of about *.8* piculs of sugar valued in the
total amount of P8/*./-, to the damage and pre!udice of Aawaiian Central
and other sugarcane planters adhered thereto in the aforestated amount of
P8/*./-.
IF =I<;7"I<F <6 P747:47PA 9, 74". /59, 4.P.C. %p. /,, rollo&
Cvidence was presented by the prosecution showing thatE
<n January ,, /-5,, accused Pacifico enecio, Jr. 4omeo 'illan and
2ilfredo Jochico who were then scalers on duty that day at the Aawaiian$
Philippine Company, weighed cane cars Fos. /5,3,/8*8 and /099 loaded
with sugar canes belonging to (eogracias de la Pa@. "he weight of the
sugar canes were reflected on the weight report cards %A.P. Co. ;ab. 6orm
Fo. /& or Dtar!etasD showing that for car Fo. /5,3 I *.-90 tons %Cxhibit D)$
/D&, for Car Fo. /8*8 I *.-50 tons %Cxhibit DC$/D& for car Fo. /099 I *.*5+
tons or a total weight of 98.58+ tons. Aowever, they did not submit said
Dtar!etasD to the laboratory section, instead, they substituted Dtar!etasD
showing a heavier weight for car Fo. /5,3 I /0.+/+ tons %Cxhibit D)D&, car
Fo. /8*8 I /0.+9+ tons %Cxhibit DCD& and car Fo. /099 I /0.**0 tons
%Cxhibit D(D& with a total of 95./80 tons or an additional of +./++ tons.
"hese were the Dtar!etasD submitted to the laboratory section. Cxhibits D)$
/D, DC$/D and D($/D were taken later by the prosecution witness PC gt.
4ogelio evilla from the wife of Pacifico enecio, Jr. %pp. /+$/8, rollo, <rder
of (ecember /-, /-5+&.
7fter the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved
to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 7cting on this motion, respondent court issued its
order of (ecember /-, /-5+, dismissing the case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that
the acts committed by the accused as narrated above do not constitute the crime of falsification as
charged. 4easoning out his order, Judge 7lon saidE
"o be convicted under paragraph 9, 7rticle /59, an accused should have
committed one of the eight acts of falsification enumerated under 7rticle
/5/, 4.P.C. Is the act of substituting the Dtar!etasD with higher cane weight
for the ones with lower cane weight fall under one of the acts enumerated.
7fter going over the acts of falsification one by one and trying to correlate
the act of the accused with each of them, the Court finds that the said act
could not possibly be placed under any of them. .n%lusio unius est ex%lusio
alterius, the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other. 6ollowing this
maxim, we cannot !ust include the act of substitution as among those acts
enumerated under 7rticle /5/. 7nd, under the rule of statutory construction,
penal laws should be liberally construed in favor of the accused. "his Court,
therefore, is of the opinion that the accused have not committed the act of
falsification with which they are charmed. <bviously, it follows that there
could be no use of falsified document since there is no falsified document.
"he imputed acts of the accused in making the substitution, if true, is
repugnant to the human sense of right and wrong. )ut, however
reprehensible the act may be, it is not punishable unless there is a showing
that there is a law which defines and penalizes it as a %ri"e. Gnless there
be a particular provision in the Penal Code or pecial ;aw that punishes
the act, even if it be socially or morally wrong, no criminal liability is incurred
by its commission. %G.. vs. "aylor, 9* Phil. +--&
xxx xxx xxx
2herefore, the motion is hereby granted and the case dismissed with
costs de ofi%io ... %pp. /5$/*, rollo&
In their comment on this Petition, private respondents claim that there was no error committed by
respondent court in dismissing the case against them for insufficiency of evidence and that for this
Court to grant the present petition would place said respondents in double !eopardy.
<n the other hand, the People asserts that the plea of double !eopardy is not tenable inasmuch as
the case was dismissed upon motion of the accused, and the dismissal having been made with
their consent, they waived their defense of double !eopardy, citing various cases in support thereof.
%pp. +*$+-, rollo, Comment of the olicitor :eneral&
2e disagree with the position taken by the 7cting olicitor :eneral Augo C. :utierre@, Jr. that the
plea of double !eopardy is not available in the instant situation.
It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused; however,
this was a "otion filed after t#e prose%ution #ad rested its %ase, calling for an appreciation of the
evidence adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in
a dis"issal of t#e %ase on t#e "erits, tantamount to an acBuittal of the accused.
"hus, in =eople vs. A%osta, ;$938+5, <ctober 9-, /-8*, this Court dismissed an appeal taken by
the =eopleagainst an order of the Court of 6irst Instance of Ilocos Forte dis"issin$ a %ri"inal %ase
upon "otion of t#e a%%used after t#e presentation of eviden%e 2y t#e prose%ution as such appeal if
allowed would place the accused in double !eopardy. "here the accused was charged
with estafa by obtaining from Pedro 'iguel a ring valued at P/8,+00.00 and issuing a check for
U+,000.00 in Payment thereof which turned out later to be counterfeit to the damage and pre!udice
of said Pedro 'iguel in the aforementioned amount of P/8,+00.00. 7fter the presentation of the
evidence of the prosecution, the accused moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
evidence showed that the ring belonged to somebody else, )anang Jaramillo, and not to Pedro
'iguel as alleged in the information and that the element of damage was absent. "his motion was
opposed by the 7ssistant Provincial 6iscal but notwithstanding said opposition, the trial court
dismissed the case on the ground that Pedro 'iguel was a mere agent of the true owner of the
ring and therefore not the real offended party. "he 7ssistant Provincial 6iscal appealed to this
Court, 2ut t#e 0oli%itor <eneral "oved for t#e dis"issal of t#e appeal on t#e $round t#at it ould
pla%e t#e a%%used in dou2le Keopardy, and the Court agreed with the olicitor :eneral, stating that
it cannot be seriously Buestioned that the trial court had grievously erred in his conclusion and
application of the law, and in dismissing outright the case; however, the error cannot now be
remedied by an appeal because it would place the accused in double !eopardy. %per Cugenio
7ngeles, J., 9+ C47 *93,*98&
In the earlier case of ,atilo vs. Bon. A2aya, 'ay /,, /-+,, petitioner Catilo was charged with
murder before the Court of 6irst Instance of )atangas presided by respondent Judge. Petitioner
was arraigned and after the prosecution had rested its case petitioner moved for the dismissal of
the charge for insufficiency of evidence. "his motion was granted by the Judge and his order was
promulgated in open court to the accused. ;ater in the day, Judge 7baya set aside his order of
dismissal "otu proprio and scheduled the case for continuation of the trial on specific dates. 7
motion for reconsideration was filed by the defense counsel but because respondent Judge failed
to take action, the accused filed an original action for certiorari with this Court. In granting relief to
petitioner Catilo, the Court, through Justice 'arcelino 4. 'ontemayor, heldE
6rom whatever angle we may view the order of dismissal 7nnex D7D, the
only conclusion possible is that it amounted to an acBuittal. 2hether said
acBuittal was due to some Dmisrepresentation of factsD as stated in the
order of reconsideration, which alleged misrepresentation is vigorously
denied by the defendant$petitioner, or to a misapprehension of the law or of
the evidence presented by the prosecution, the fact is that it was a valid
order or !udgment of acBuittal, and thereafter the respondent Judge himself
advised the accused in open court that he was a free man and could not
again be prosecuted for the same offense.
"he inherent powers of a court to modify its order or decision, under section
+, 4ule /9, of the 4ules of Court claimed for the respondent to set aside
his order of dismissal, does not extend to an order of dismissal which
amounts to a !udgment of acBuittal in a criminal case; and the power of a
court to modify a !udgment or set it aside before it has become final or an
appeal has been perfected, under section 5, 4ule //8 of the 4ules of
Court, refers to a !udgment of conviction and does not and cannot include a
!udgment of acBuittal.
In conclusion, we hold that to continue the criminal case against the
petitioner after he had already been acBuitted would be putting him twice in
!eopardy of punishment for the same offense. ... %-, Phil. /0/5&
"he cases cited by the 7cting olicitor :eneral are not applicable to the situation now before Gs
because the facts are different. In ,o +e Bue vs. Fud$e An%arna%ion , -, Phil. 9+*, the case was
dismissed provisionally with the express consent of the accused. "he same occurred in =eople vs.
+o$le' /0+ Phil. /98 there was a provisional dismissal upon express reBuest of the counsel for the
accused, In <andi%ela vs. Lutero' ** Phil. 9--, it was the accused who asked for the dismissal of
the case because the private prosecutor was not in court to present the prosecution#s evidence
and the 'unicipal Court of the City of Iloilo dismissed the case without pre!udice to the refiling of
the charge against the accused.
1
In =eople vs. Ro"ero, *- Phil. 859, the dismissal was made at
the instance of the accused because the prosecution was also not ready with its evidence. "he
case of =eople vs. >elosillo, - C47 *38, is not applicable either, because the order of dismissal
of the Information was made 2efore arrai$n"ent, hence, the accused was not yet placed in
!eopardy of punishment for the offense charged.
In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against them as one
on t#e "erits of t#e %ase which is to be distinguished from other dismissals at the instance of the
accused. 7ll the elements of double !eopardy are here present, to witE %/& a valid information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, %9& a court of
competent !urisdiction, and %3& an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution
had rested its case, amounting to the acBuittal of the accused. "he dismissal being one on the
merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double !eopardy cannot be invoked.
It is clear to Gs that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private respondents was
erroneous.
7s correctly stated in the Comment of the 7cting olicitor :eneral, the accused were not charged
with substitution of genuine Dtar!etasD with false ones. "he basis for the accusation was that the
accused entered false statements as to the weight of the sugar cane loaded in certain cane cars in
Dtar!etasD which were submitted to the laboratory section of the company. "he act of making a false
entry in the Dtar!etasD is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document, the accused
having made untruthful statements in a narration of facts which they were under obligation to
accomplish as part of their duties$ Crnesto de la Pa@, as overseer of Ada. 'alisbog, and the other
accused as scalers of the offended party, the Aawaiian$Philippine Company, thereby causing
damage to the latter.
Aowever erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of !ustice
resulted from said order, to paraphrase Justice 7lex 4eyes in =eople vs. 3ieto, /03 Phil, //33,
such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double !eopardy.
In 3ieto, the background of the case is as followsE <n eptember 9/, /-+8, an Information for
homicide was filed with the Court of 6irst Instance of Fueva Cci!a against :loria Fieto who, upon
arraignment pleaded guilty to the charge but $notwithstanding that plea, the trial !udge acBuitted
her on the Page 9+, ground that although the accused was a minor Dover - and under /+ years
oldD the Information failed to allege that she acted with discernment. "hereafter the prosecution
filed another Information for the same offense stating therein that the accused :loria Fieto was Da
child between - and /+ yearsD and alleging in express terms that she acted with discernment. "he
defense filed a motion to Buash this second Information on grounds of double !eopardy, and the
trial court already presided by another Judge, Aon. 6elix =. 'akasiar, now Justice of this Court,
granted the motion. "he prosecution appealed to this Court from said order. In its (ecision, the
Court dismissed the appeal and sustained the order of then Judge 'akasiar, deploring that as a
result of a mistaken view taken by the trial !udge who acBuitted the accused :loria Fieto despite
her plea of guilty there was a miscarriage of !ustice which cannot be righted and which leaves the
Court no choice bat to affirm the dismissal of the second Information for reasons of double
!eopardy.
2
2e cannot but express <ur strong disapproval of the precipitate action taken by Judge 7lon in
dismissing the criminal case against the private respondents at that stage of the trial. 7 thorough
and searching study of the law, the allegations in the Information, and the evidence adduced plus a
more circumspect and reflective exercise of !udgment, would have prevented a failure of !ustice in
the instant case. 2e exhort Judge 7lon to take into serious consideration what 2e have stated so
as to avoid another miscarriage of !ustice.
IF =IC2 <6 "AC 6<4C:<IF:, 2e are constrained to (I'I this Petition of the People.
2ithout pronouncement as to costs. ;et copy of this (ecision be entered in the personal file of
Judge 4eynaldo 7lon.
o <rdered.
G.R. No. L-54110 -e+,5a,y 20, 1981
G%N%ROSO %SM%D! an) !L'%R&O !L'!, petitioners,
vs.
("DG% ("LI!N '. OGO:, $ity $o5,t o2 $e+5 $ity, ',anc1 III, %OL% O- &.%
.ILIIN%S an) RI$!RDO '. &!'!N!O, a0 S/ecia3 $o5n0e3, O22ice o2 t1e $ity -i0ca3,
$e+5 $ity, respondents.

!;"INO, J.:
"his case poses the issue of whether the revival of a grave coercion case, which was provisionally
dismissed %after the accused had been arraigned& because of complainant#s failure to appear at
the trial, would place the accused in double !eopardy, considering their constitutional right to have
a speedy trial.
Petitioners :eneroso CsmeMa and 7lberto 7lba and their co$accused, :enaro 7lipio, =icente
Cncabo and )ernardo =illamira were charged with grave coercion in the city court of Cebu City for
having allegedly forced 4everend 6ather "omas "ibudan of the Jaro Cathedral, Iloilo City to
withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from the bank and to give that amount to the accused
because the priest lost it in a game of cards.
"he case was calendared on <ctober ,, /-5* presumably for arraignment and trial. Gpon the
telegraphic reBuest of 6ather "ibudan the case was reset on (ecember /3, /-5*. )ecause
CsmeMa and 7lba were not duly notified of that hearing, they were not able to appear.
"he two pleaded not guilty at their arraignment on January 93, /-5-. Fo trial was held after the
arraignment because complainant 6ather "ibudan reBuested the transfer of the hearing to another
date.
In the meantime, the fiscal lost his record of the case. o, the hearing scheduled on June /*, /-5-
was cancelled at his instance. <n that date, respondent !udge issued an order setting the trial Dfor
t#e last ti"e on Au$ust 1&' 1()(, at *E30 o#clock in the morningD %p. 9/, 4ollo&.
2hen the case was called on that date, the fiscal informed the court that the private prosecutor
received from complainant 6ather "ibudan a telegram stating that he was sick. "he counsel for
petitioners CsmeMa and 7lba opposed the cancellation of the hearing. "hey invoked the right of the
accused to have a speedy trial.
"heir counsel told the courtE D ... we are now invoking the constitutional right of the accused to a
speedy trial of the case. ... 2e are insisting on our stand that the case be heard today; otherwise, it
will %should& be dismissed on the ground of invoking %sic& the constitutional right of the accused
particularly accused 7lberto 7lba and :eneroso CsmeMa %pp. +0 and +9, 4ollo&.
4espondent !udge provisionally dismissed the case as to the four accused who were present
because it Dhas been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearingD but the fiscal
was not ready with his witness. "he court noted that there was no medical certificate indicating that
the complainant was really sick. "he case was continued as to the fifth accused who did not
appear at the hearing. Ais arrest was ordered %p. 93, 4ollo&.
"wenty$seven days later, or on eptember /9, /-5-, the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the
case. Ae attached to his motion a medical certificate under oath attesting to the fact that 6ather
"ibudan was sick of influen@a on 7ugust /8, /-5-.
"he fiscal cited the ruling that a provisional dismissal with the conformity of the accused lacks the
impress of finality and, therefore, the case could be revived without the filing of a new information
%;auchengco vs. 7le!andro, ;$,-03,, January 3/, /-5-, ** C47 /5+&.
"he accused did not oppose the motion. 4espondent !udge granted it in his order of <ctober *,
/-5- %p. 98, 4ollo&.
<n <ctober 9,, /-5-, CsmeMa and 7lba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double
!eopardy. "hey pointed out that they did not consent to the provisional dismissal of the case.
Aence, the provisional dismissal amounted to an acBuittal which placed them in !eopardy. Its
revival would place them in double !eopardy.
"he fiscal opposed the motion. Ae called the court#s attention to the fact that 6ather "ibudan had
appeared in court several times but the hearing was not held. "he court denied the motion to
dismiss.
"hat order denying the motion to dismiss is assailed in this special civil action of certiorari. "he
olicitor :eneral agrees with the petitioners that the revival of the case would place the accused in
double !eopardy since the provisional dismissal of the case without their consent was in effect an
acBuittal.
"he rule on double !eopardy %non 2is in .de" or not twice for the same& is found in section 99,
7rticle I= )ill of 4ights& of the Constitution which provides that Dno person shall be twice put in
!eopardy of punishment for the same offense.D "his is complemented by 4ule //5 of the 4ules of
Court which provides as followsE
CC. -. -or"er %onvi%tion or a%quittal or for"er Keopardy. I2hen a
defendant shall have been convicted or acBuitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
defendant, by a court of competent !urisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acBuittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be
a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
In order that legal !eopardy may exist, there should be %a& a valid complaint or information %b&
before a court of competent !urisdiction and %c& the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded
to the complaint or information.
2hen these three conditions are present, the acBuittal or conviction of the accused or the
dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res Kudi%ata and is a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included therein %, 'oran#s
Comments on the 4ules of Court, /-*0 Cd., p. 9,0&.
Previous acBuittal %autrefois a%quit&, previous conviction %autrefois %onvi%t& or the dismissal or
termination of the case it#out #is %onsent precludes his subseBuent indictment for the same
offense as defined in section -.
In the instant case, we hold that the petitioners were placed in !eopardy by the provisional
dismissal of the grave coercion case. "hat provisional dismissal would not have place the
petitioners in !eopardy if respondent !udge had taken the precaution of making sure that the
dismissal was with their consent. In this case, it is not very clear that the petitioners consented to
the dismissal of the case.
It is the practice of some !udges before issuing an order of provisional dismissal in a case wherein
the accused had already been arraigned to reBuire the accused and his counsel to sign the
minutes of the session or any available part of the record to show the conformity of the accused or
his lack of ob!ection to the provisional dismissal.
"he !udge specifies in the order of provisional dismissal that the accused and his counsel signified
their assent thereto. "hat procedure leaves no room for doubt as to the consent of the accused
and precludes !eopardy from attaching to the dismissal.
"he petitioners were insisting on a trial. "hey relied on their constitutional right to have a speedy
trial. "he fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in court. 4espondent !udge on his own
volition provisionally dismissed the case. "he petitioners did not expressly manifest their
conformity to the provisional dismissal. Aence, the dismissal placed them in !eopardy.
Cven if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the
case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in !eopardy. "he use of
the word DprovisionalD would not change the legal effect of the dismissal %Csguerra vs. (e la Costa,
88 Phil. /3,; :andicela vs. ;utero, ** Phil. 9--&.
If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for
the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. 7fter the prosecution#s motion for postponement of the
trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and,
conseBuently, fails to prove the defendant#s guilt, the court upon defendant#s motion shall dismiss
the case, such dismissal amounting to an acBuittal of the defendantD %, 'oran#s Comments on the
4ules of Court, /-*0 Cd., p. 909, citing :andicela vs. ;utero, ** Phil. 9--, 305 and People vs.
(ia@, -, Phil. 5/,$5/5&.
"he dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not
prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal
eBuivalent to an acBuittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense
%alcedo vs. 'endo@a, ;$,-35+, 6ebruary 9*, /-5-, ** C47 *//; ;agunilia vs. Aon. 4eyes, etc.
and 'otas, /// Phil. /090 citing People vs. "acneng, /0+ Phil. /9-* and People vs. 4obles, /0+
Phil. /0/8. ee "aladua vs. <chotorena, ;$9++-+, 6ebruary /+, /-5,, ++ C47 +9*; 7cebedo vs.
armiento, ;$9*09+, (ecember /8, /-50, 38 C47 9,5; )aesa vs. Provincial 6iscal of Camarines
ur, ;$30383, January 30, /-5/, 35 C47 ,35; People vs. Cloribel, /90 Phil. 55+; People vs.
7baMo -5 Phil. 9*; People vs. ;abatete, /05 Phil. 8-5&.
2AC4C6<4C, the order of respondent !udge dated <ctober *, /-5-, reviving the criminal case
against the petitioners, and his order of (ecember /,, /-5-, denying petitioners# motion to
dismiss, are reversed and set aside. Fo costs.
< <4(C4C(.

G.R. No. 44205 -e+,5a,y 16, 1993
%OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, petitioner,
vs.
.ON. GR%GORIO G. IN%D!, ',anc1 44I, $o5,t o2 -i,0t In0tance o2 RiBa3, an)
$ONSOL!$ION N!#!L,respondents.
+#e 0oli%itor <eneral for petitioner.
0alon$a. ;rdo@ez' Tap E Asso%iates for private respondent.

M%LO, J.:
2hen Consolacion Faval, the herein private respondent, was separately accused of having
committed the crime of estafa in Criminal Case Fo. /+5-+ before )ranch /-, and of falsification in
Criminal Case Fo. /+5-8 before )ranch 9/, both of the then Court of 6irst Instance of 4i@al of the
eventh Judicial (istrict stationed at Pasig, 4i@al, she sought the Buashal of the latter charge on
the supposition that she is in danger of being convicted for the same felony %p. /8, 4ecord&. Aer
first attempt in this respect did not spell success
%p. 3,, 4ecord& but the Aonorable :regorio :. Pineda, Presiding Judge of )ranch 9/ was
persuaded to the contrary thereafter on the belief that the alleged falsification was a necessary
means of committing estafa %p. /,-, 4ecord&. It is this perception, along with the denial of the
motion for re$evaluation therefrom %p. 88, 4ecord& which the People impugns via the special civil
action for %ertiorari now before Gs.
"he indictment for estafa against Consolacion Faval and her co$accused 7nacleto antos, readsE
"hat on or about 'arch 93, /-53 and soon thereafter, in the municipality of
Pasig, province of 4i@al, Philippines and within the !urisdiction of this
Aonorable Court, the above$named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, by means of deceit
and with intent to defraud, knowing that their parcel of land among others,
situated in 'alaking )undok, )arrio (olores, "aytay, 4i@al, and more
particularly described as follows, to witE
<J7 Fo. +*+/
Isang lagay na lupa %bulubundukin& na nasa lugar
ng 'alaking )undok, )o. (olores, "aytay, 4i@al, na
may lawak na /,,8/+.+ metrong parisukat na may
tasang P+*0.00 at may hanggahang gaya ng
sumusunodE Ailagaan$Aermogenes Faval %now part
of 4ev. "ax (ec. -9*,; ilanganan$Ficolas del
4osario %now Jaime del 4osario&; "imugan$
Cduvigis, Consolacion, 7polinaria, Faval; Oanluran$
Creek %sapang bato&
was already sold and encumbered to one Cdilberto =. Ilano as can be
gleaned from a document entitled DOasulatan ng )ilihan Fg ;upa Fa 'ay
Pasubali < CondicionD sometime on 7ugust /9, /-8-; and the latter having
paid the partial amount of P/30,*+0.00 to the herein accused and without
informing said Cdilberto =. Ilano, the herein accused Consolacion Faval
executed and filed an 7pplication for 4egistration over the same parcel of
land among others, which document is designated as ;4C Case Fo. F$
5,*+, DConsolacion, Cduvigis and 7polinaria, all surnamed FavalD of the
Court of 6irst Instance of 4i@al, Pasig, 4i@al, as a result of which the
Presiding Judge of )ranch HIII to which said case was assigned issued
<riginal Certificate of "itle Fo. -339 in her name, which area was reduced
to /0,05+ sB. meters as appearing in item Fo. 9 in said <C" and
subseBuently referred to in "C" Fo. 350*50 in favor of said accused Faval
through 4odolfo 'endo@a, sold more than one$half %/L9& of said parcel of
land in her name in favor of 'aria, 7nacleto, Carmelo, 'ariano, Cecilia and
"eodorica, all surnamed antos and Iluminada "ambalo, Pacita 7lvare@
and Pedro =alesteros which sales were registered and annotated with the
4egister of (eeds of 4i@al at Pasig, 4i@al; and likewise a portion of which
was partitioned to herein accused 7nacleto antos; that despite repeated
demands the accused refused and still refuse to return said amount andLor
fulfill their obligations under said DOasulatan Fg )ilihan Fg ;upa Fa 'ay
Pasubali < CondicionD, to the damage and pre!udice of said Cdilberto =.
Ilano in the aforementioned amount of P/30,*+0.00. %pp. ,,$,+, Rollo&
while the charge for falsification narratesE
"hat on or about the /5th day 7ugust, /-5/, in the municipality of Pasig,
province of 4i@al, Philippines and within the !urisdiction of this Aonorable
Court, the above$named accused, being then private individual did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, committed as followsE
the said accused on 7ugust /5, /-5/, executed a document entitled
D7pplication 6or 4egistrationD for parcels of land located at "aytay, 4i@al, to
the effect that Dhe is the exclusive owner in fee simple of a parcel of land
situated in 'alaking )undok, )arrio (olores, "aytay, 4i@al with Psu$
9,*908 and that she Ddoes not know any mortgage or encumbrance of any
kind whatsoever affecting said land or that any person has estate or
interest therein, legal or eBuitable, in possession remainder, reversion or
expectancyD, as a result of which the Court in its (ecision of 'arch 99,
/-59 declared the herein accused the true and absolute owner of said
parcel of land free from all liens and encumbrances of any nature, when in
truth and in fact the herein accused has already sold and encumbered to
one Cdilberto =. Ilano said parcel of land referred to above as can be
gleaned from a document entitled DOasulatan Fg )ilihan Fg ;upa Fa 'ay
Pasubali < CondicionD dated 7ugust /9, /-8- and said Cdilberto =. Ilano
has already paid partial amount of P/30,*+0.00 to the herein accused.
Contrary to law. %p. 9, Rollo&
"he confluence of the foregoing assertions disclose that Consolacion Faval sold the sub!ect realty
on 7ugust /9, /-8- to Cdilberto Ilano who made a partial payment of P/30,*+0.00. 7bout two
years later, or on 7ugust /5, /-5/, an application for registration under the ;and 4egistration 7ct
was submitted by Consolacion wherein she stated that she owned the same lot and that it was
unencumbered. 6or those reasons, the corresponding title was issued in her name but she
allegedly disposed of the half portion of the property to nine other persons.
"hese antecedents spawned the simultaneous institution of the charges on eptember /5, /-5+.
<n <ctober 9*, /-5+, private respondent Consolacion Faval moved to Buash the information for
falsification, premised, among other things, on the apprehension that she is in danger of being
condemned for an identical offense. "he following day, Faval pleaded not guilty to the charge
levelled against her for falsification %p. 99, 4ecord& and on (ecember 99, /-5+, the court a
quo denied her motion to Buash %p. 3,, 4ecord&.
7s earlier intimated, the magistrate below thereafter reconsidered his order of denial which gave
rise to the corresponding unsuccessful bid by the People for reinstatement of the information for
falsification.
Aence the instant petition, which practically reiterates the same disBualification put forward in the
proceedings below %p. 5, Petition; p. ,5, Rollo&.
"he issue of whether the court below correctly Buashed the information for falsification must be
answered in the negative for the following reasonsE
/. 7ssuming in $ratia ar$u"enti that falsification was indeed necessary to commit estafa, which
ordinarily constitutes a complex crime under 7rticle ,* of the 4evised Penal Code and thus
susceptible to challenge via a motion to Buash under ection 9 %e&, 4ule //5 visGaGvis ection /9,
4ule //0 %Moran' 4ules of Court, =ol. ,, /-*0 Cd., p. ,9; 930&, still, it was serious error on the part
of the magistrate below to have appreciated this discourse in favor of private respondent since this
matter was not specifically raised in the motion to Buash filed on <ctober 9*, /-5+ %p. /8, 4ecord&.
It was only in the motion for reconsideration where private respondent pleaded this additional
ground after her motion to Buash was denied %p. 3-, 4ecord&. "he legal proscription against
entertaining another saving clause to abate the charge for falsification is very explicit under ection
3, 4ule //5 of the 4evised 4ules of CourtE
ec. 3. 'otion to Buash I 6orm and contents I 6ailure to state ob!ection
I Cntry of record I 6ailure to record. I "he motion to Buash shall be in
writing signed by the defendant or his attorney. It shall specify distinctly the
ground of ob!ection relied on and t#e %ourt s#all #ear no o2Ke%tion ot#er
t#an t#at stated in t#e "otion. It shall be entered of record but a failure to
so enter it shall not affect the validity of any proceeding in the case.
It must be observed that the denial of the motion to Buash was re$examined not in the light of D res
Kudi%ata dressed in prison greyD but on the aspect of whether falsification was supposedly
perpetrated to commit estafa. "he course of action pursued by the trial court in this context may
not even be !ustified under ection /0 of 4ule //5 which says thatE
ec. /0. 6ailure to move to Buash I Cffect of I Cxceptions. I If the
defendant does not move to Buash the complaint or information before he
pleads thereto he shall be taken to have waived all ob!ections which are
grounds for a motion to Buash except when the complaint or information
does not charge an offense, or the court is without !urisdiction of the
same. .f' #oever, t#e defendant learns after #e #as pleaded or #as "oved
to $uas# on so"e ot#er $round t#at t#e offense for #i%# #e is no
%#ar$ed is an offense for #i%# #e #as 2een pardoned, or of #i%# #e #as
2een %onvi%ted or a%quitted or 2een in Keopardy, t#e %ourt "ay in its
dis%retion entertain at any ti"e 2efore Kud$"ent a "otion to quas# on t#e
$round of su%# pardon, %onvi%tion, a%quittal or Keopardy.
for the simple reason that the theory of a single crime advanced by private respondent in her
belated, nay, DsecondD motion to Buash couched as motion for reconsideration is not synonymous
with Dpardon, conviction, acBuittal or !eopardyD. In effect, therefore, respondent !udge
accommodated another basis for the Buashal of the information albeit the same was not so stated
in the motion therefor. "his should not have been tolerated because it is anathema to the
foregoing proviso %Moran' supra, at p. 9*3, citing uy ui vs. People, ,- <.:. -85&. "his%aveat is
now amplified in ection * of 4ule //5 as amended, thusE
ec. *. -ailure to "ove to quas# or to alle$e any $round t#erefor. I "he
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to Buash before he
pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to Buash or failed to allege the same in said motion shall be deemed
a waiver of the grounds of a motion to Buash, except the grounds of no
offense charged, lack of !urisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of
the offense or penalty and !eopardy, as provided for in paragraphs %a&, %b&,
%f& and %h& of ection 3 of this 4ule.
7t any rate, it is virtually unacceptable to suppose that private respondent concocted the sinister
scheme of falsification in /-5/ precisely to facilitate the commission of estafa in /-53 such that
both crimes emanated from a single criminal impulse. <therwise, an unfounded verisimilitude of
this nature will run afoul with what this Court already observed in =eople vs. =enas %8* Phil. +33
./-3-1; / Aquino' 4evised Penal Code, /-58 Cd., p. +5,& to the effect that the eleven estafas
through falsification which the same accused therein committed between Fovember 9,, /-38 and
January 3, /-35 including the falsification which he committed on January *, /-35 were
considered distinct offenses, not one complex crime, because they were committed on different
dates, not to mention the discrepancy in places where they were accomplished.
In the same breath, it necessarily follows that the suspended hiatus, between /-5/ and /-53 in the
case at bar will not afford the occasion to buttress the unwarranted submission that the first is an
integral part of or intimately interwoven with the second felony. 7 simple perusal of the two
informations will disclose, and this cannot be gainsaid, that the recitals thereof radically differ with
each other. "he indictment for falsification allegedly perpetrated in /-5/ was levelled against
private respondent because of the pretense in the application for registration of her exclusive
dominion over a parcel of land notwithstanding the previous sale of the same lot in /-8- to
Cdilberto =. Ilano. )y contrast, the inculpatory aspersions against private respondent in /-53 for
estafa have their roots in the overt act of disposing the same piece of lot in favor of other persons
subseBuent to the conveyance in favor of Cdilberto =. Ilano in /-8-. Indeed, the intent to
prevaricate on a piece of document for the purpose of securing a favorable action for registration
within the context of 7rticle /5/ %,& in con!unction with 7rticle /59 of the 4evised Penal Code is
definitely distinct from the perceived double sale contemplated by the first paragraph under 7rticle
3/8 of the same code.
9. It was similarly fallacious for the lower court to have shared the notion that private respondent is
in danger of being convicted twice for the same criminal act, a circumstance recogni@ed under
ection 9%h& 4ule //5 of the <ld 4ules as suggested in the motion to Buash, because this plea is
understood to presuppose that the other case against private respondent has been dismissed or
otherwise terminated without her express consent, by a court of competent !urisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge %People of the
Philippines versus Aon. 'aximiano C. 7suncion, et al., :.4. Fos. *3*35$,9, 7pril 99,
/--9; 0e%tion )' Rule 11)' /-*+ 4ules on Criminal Procedure, as amended&. In
the Asun%ion case, Justice Focon said thatE
. . . according to a long line of cases, in order that a defendant may
successfully allege former !eopardy, it is necessary that he had previously
been %/& convicted or %9& acBuitted, or %3& in !eopardy of being convicted of
the offense charged, that is, that the former case against him for the same
offense has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent, by a court of competent !urisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge.
2ithal, the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an appropriate basis
for the invocation of double !eopardy since the first !eopardy has not yet set in by a previous
conviction, acBuittal or termination of the case without the consent of the accused %People vs.
'iraflores, //+ C47 +*8 ./-*91; Fierras vs. (acuycuy,/*/ C47 * ./--01&.
In =eople vs. Miraflores %supra&, the accused therein, after he had pleaded to the charge of
multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Fo. **/53 and subseBuent to his arraignment on a
separate charge of 'urder in Criminal Case Fo. **/5,, invoked the plea of double !eopardy but
Justice )arredo who spoke for the Court was far from convincedE
)ut the more untenable aspect of the position of appellant is that when he
invoked the defense of double !eopardy, what could have been the first
!eopardy had not yet been completed or even began. It is settled
!urisprudence in this Court that the mere filing of two informations or
complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused in
those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in !eopardy
twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of
the defense of double !eopardy is that the accused has already been
convicted or acBuitted in the first case or that the same has been
terminated without his consent. %)ulaong vs. People, ;$/-3,,, July 95,
/-88, /5 C47 5,8; ilvestre vs. 'ilitary Commission Fo. 9/, Fo. ;$
,8388, 'arch *, /-5*, )uscayno vs. 'ilitary Commissions Fos. /, 9, 8 and
9+, Fo. ;$+*9*,, Fov. /-, /-*/, /0- C47 953&.
'oreover, it appears that private respondent herein had not yet been arraigned in the previous
case for estafa. "hus, there is that other missing link, so to speak, in the case at bar which was
precisely the same reason utili@ed by Justice (avide, Jr. in La"era vs. ,ourt of Appeals %/-*
C47 /*8 ./--/1& when he brushed aside the claim of double !eopardy of the accused therein who
was arraigned in the previous case only after the !udgment of conviction was promulgated in the
other case. "he ponente cited a plethora of cases in support of the proposition that arraignment of
the accused in the previous case is a condition sine qua non for double !eopardy to attach %at page
/3E People vs. Jlagan, +* Phil. *+/; People vs. Consulta, 50 C47 955; 7ndres v. Cacdac, //3
C47 9/8; People vs. )ocar, et al., /39 C47 /88; :aspar vs. andiganbayan, /,, C47 ,/+&
and echoed the reBuisites of legal !eopardy as announced in =eople vs. >o%ar thusE
;egal !eopardy attaches only %a& upon a valid indictment, %b& before a
competent court, %c& after arraignment, %d& a valid plea having been
entered, and %e& the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused. %at p. /-3.&
"o be sure, Chief Justice 'oran said in his treatise on the sub!ect under consideration thatE
2here there is no former conviction, acBuittal, dismissal or termination of a
former case for the same offense, no !eopardy attaches. %Comments on the
4ules of Court, by Moran, =ol. ,, /-*0 Cd., p. 9*/&
<f course, 2e are not unmindful of the erudite remarks of 'r. Justice 6loren@ (. 4egalado, in his
4emedial ;aw Compendium thatE
It would now appear that prior conviction or acBuittal in the first case, as
long as the accused had entered his plea therein is no longer reBuired in
order that the accused may move to Buash a second prosecution for the
same offense on the ground of double !eopardy. %=olume 9, /-** Cdition,
page 393; 33-&
xxx xxx xxx
Jeopardy attaches from the entry of his plea at the arraignment %People vs.
City Court of 'anila, et al., ;$38,9, 7pril 95, /-*3&. %?ide page 395&.
"he sentiments expressed in this regard by <ur distinguished colleague which rest on the ruling of
this Court in=eople vs. ,ity ,ourt of Manila' >ran%# U. %/9/ C47 835 ./-*31, cited by Re$alado'
?ide' at p. 33- to the effect that !eopardy would already attach when the accused enters his plea
due to the o2iter di%tu" of the ponente in that case, based on the following factual backdropE
"he Buestion presented in this case is whether a person who has been
prosecuted for serious physical in!uries thru reckless imprudence and
convicted thereof may be prosecuted subseBuently for homicide thru
reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same
in!uries he had suffered.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the incident occurred on <ctober /5, /-5/. "he following
day, <ctober /*, an information for serious physical in!uries thru reckless
imprudence was filed against private respondent driver of the truck. <n the
same day, the victim (iolito de la Cru@ died.
<n <ctober 90, /-59, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of
serious physical in!uries thru reckless imprudence. Ae pleaded guilty, was
sentenced to one %/& month and one %/& day ofarresto "ayor' and
commenced serving sentence.
<n <ctober 9,, /-59, an information for homicide thru reckless imprudence
was filed against private respondent.
<n Fovember /5, /-59, the City Court of 'anila, upon motion of private
respondent, issued an order dismissing the homicide thru reckless
imprudence case on the ground of double !eopardy.
where it was opined, thusE
2ell$settled is the rule that one who has been %#ar$ed .implying that there
is no need to show previous conviction, acBuittal, or dismissal of a similar
or identical charge1 with an offense cannot be charged again with the same
or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former.
%Cmphasis supplied.&
6rom the conclusion thus reached, it would appear that one simply DchargedD may claim possible
!eopardy in another case. Aowever, a closer study of the case adverted to reveals that
the ponente may have overlooked the fact that the accused therein was not only charged, but he
actually admitted his guilt to the charge of serious physical in!uries through reckless imprudence
and more importantly, he was %onvi%ted of such crime and commenced serving sentence. =erily,
there was no occasion in said case to speak of !eopardy being properly invoked by a person
simply %#ar$ed with an offense if he is again charged for the same or identical offense. It may be
observed that in ,ity ,ourt of Manila the accused therein pleaded on the first offense of which he
was charged and subseBuently convicted, unlike in the scenario at bar where private respondent
entered her plea to the second offense. )ut the variance on this point is of no substantial worth
because private respondent#s plea to the second offense is, as aforesaid, legally incomplete to
sustain her assertion of !eopardy for probable conviction of the same felony, absent as there is the
previous conviction, acBuittal, or termination without her express consent of the previous case for
estafa, and it being plain and obvious that the charges did not arise from the same acts. In short, in
order for the first !eopardy to attach, the plea of the accused to the charge must be coupled with
either conviction, acBuittal, or termination of the previous case without his express consent
thereafter. %"olentino vs. (e la Costa, 88 Phil. -5 ./-3*1&. Justice <scar Aerrera, in his book
D4emedial ;awD enumerates the elements constitutive of first !eopardy, to itE
/. Court of competent !urisdiction;
9. =alid complaint or information;
3. 7rraignment and a
,. =alid plea %People vs. Jlagan, +* Phil. *+/; *+3&
+. "he defendant was acBuitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused %People
vs. (eclaro, :.4. Fo. 8,389, 6ebruary -, /-*-, /50 C47 /,9; ee also
People vs. antiago, /5, C47 /,3; People vs. :ines, :.4. Fo. *3,83,
'ay 95, /--/, /-5 C47 ,*/; ?ue vs. Cosico, /55 C47 ,/0 ./-*-1;
Caes vs. Intermediate 7ppellate Court, /5- C47 +,; ;amera vs. Court of
7ppeals, /-* C47 /*8 ./--/1&. %Berrera'4emedial ;aw, /--9 Cd.,
=olume ,, p. ,/5&.
Citing cases, both old and of recent vintage, Justice Aerrera continues to submit the idea thatE
"he first !eopardy is said to have validly terminated upon conviction,
acBuittal or dismissal of the case or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of defendant %People vs. :arcia, 30 C47 /+0; People
vs. ;edesma, 53 C47 55; People vs. Pilpa, 5- C47 */; )uscayno vs.
'ilitary Commission, /0- C47 953; People vs. Cuevo, /0, C47 3/-;
:alman, et al. vs. andiganbayan, :.4. Fo. 59850, eptember /9, /-*5.&
%?ide, at page ,93&.
In =eople vs. Ledes"a %53 C47 55 ./-581&, Justice 'artin declared in no uncertain termsE
. . . In the case before Gs, accused$appellee was charged with estafa in
Criminal Case Fo. ,3- before a competent court under a valid information
and was duly convicted as charged. Ae was therefore placed in legal
!eopardy for the crime of estafa in Criminal Case Fo. ,3- for having failed
to turn over the proceeds of the sale of an 7vegon radio in the amount of
P930.00 to the offended party. . . . %at p. */&
"he same observation was made by then Justice, later Chief Justice 7Buino in =eople
vs. =ilpa %5- C47 */ ./-551&E
In synthesis, there is former !eopardy when in the first case there was a
valid complaint or information filed in a court of competent !urisdiction, and
after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, he was acBuitted or
convicted or the case against him was terminated without his express
consent %People vs. Consulta, ;$,/9+/, 'arch 3/, /-58, 50 C47 955;
People vs. Jlagan, +* Phil. *+/, *+3&. %*8&
7t any rate, and inasmuch as this Court has spoken Buite recently in =eople vs. Asun%ion' %:.4.
Fos. *3*35$,9, 7pril 99, /--9&, the ambiguity stirred by the imprecise observation in =eople
vs. ,ity ,ourt of Manila' a /-*3 case, can now be considered modified in that a prior conviction, or
acBuittal, or termination of the case without the express acBuiescence of the accused is still
reBuired before the first !eopardy can be pleaded to abate a second prosecution.
2hile 2e are at a loss as to the status of the progress of the estafa case on account of private
respondent#s apathy towards <ur order for the parties herein to D'<=C IF "AC P4C'ICD %p.
/9+, Rollo& which information could substantially affect the results of this case, from all indications
it appears that the estafa case has not yet been terminated.
2AC4C6<4C, the petition is :47F"C( and the <rders of respondent !udge dated January 93,
/-58 Buashing the information for falsification, and 'arch 93, /-58 denying the People#s motion
for reconsideration therefrom are hereby 4C=C4C( and C" 7I(C. ;et the information for
falsification be reinstated and this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings and
trial. Fo special pronouncement is made as to costs.
< <4(C4C(.
G.R. No. 102485 May 22, 1995
%OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, petitioner,
vs.
L"IS &!M!L, DOMINGO !D"MON, !RS%NIO !D"MON, S!M"%L !D"MON, an) .ON.
9IL-R%DO $. O$.O&OR%N! in 1i0 ca/acity a0 ,e0i)in6 (5)6e o2 ',anc1 4I, Re6iona3
&,ia3 $o5,t, Sin)an6an, 8a*+oan6a )e3 No,te, respondents.
!'LI&O S"$O, D!RIO S"$O, an) G!#INO $!DLING, %7t ;arge&.

"NO, J.:
7s significant as the right of an accused to speedy trial is the right of the tate to prosecute people
who violate its penal laws and who constitute a threat to the tranBuility of the community. 2e hold
that when the postponements of the trial of an accused have not reached the point of oppression,
the tate#s right to prosecute should not be curtailed.
In an Information,
1
dated 7ugust /5 /--0, ;GI "7'P7;, (<'IF:< P7(G'<F, 74CFI<
P7(G'<F, 7'GC; P7(G'<F, P7);I"< GC<, (74I< GC< and :7;=IF< C7(;IF:
were charged before the 4egional "rial Court of :a"2oan$a del 3orte %)ranch HI& with the crime
of DRo22ery it# Bo"i%ide and Multiple =#ysi%al 0erious .nKuries.D "he case was docketed as
Criminal case Fo. $/-09 and raffled to respondent 2ilfredo <chotorena as presiding !udge.
<nly private respondents ;uis "ampal, amuel Padumon, 7rsenio Padumon and (omingo
Padumon, were arrested.
2
"he others remained at large.
Gpon arraignment on 'ay /5, /--/, the private respondents pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.
3
"he case was set for hearing on July 98, /--/. <n said date, however, 7ssistant
Provincial Prosecutor 2ilfredo :uantero mover for postponement on the ground that he failed to
contact his material witnesses. "he case was reset to eptember 90, /--/ without any ob!ection
from the defense counsel.
4
"he case was called on eptember 90, /--/ but the prosecutor was not present. "he respondent
!udge considered the absence of the prosecutor as un!ustified, and dismissed the criminal case
for failure to prose%ute.
5
"he prosecution moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal claiming, inter alia, that the
Provincial Prosecutor#s <ffice was closed on said date. It was alleged that eptember 90 is a legal
holiday for 'uslims, the same being the birthday of Prophet 'ohammad 72. (espite the
explanation, the motion for reconsideration was denied by the respondent !udge in an <rder dated
<ctober ,, /--/.
6
"he <rder readsE
<n eptember 90, /--/, %this& Court issued an order of % si%& the following
tenorE
I" appears on the record that this case has been
filed on 7ugust 9,, /--0; the arraignment was done
on 'ay /5, /--/; trial was held an July 98, /--/.
2ACF this case was called for today#s trial,
prosecuting %si%& prosecutor failed to appear despite
of %si%& due notice. 7s such, for its failure to
prosecute, this case is hereby (I'IC(.
;C" them be released immediately from custody
unless held on other legal cause.
C<" de ofi%io.
< <4(C4C(.
2A7" was the effect of the said orderK (id it amount to an acBuittal as
would bar a reinstatement of the instant case by reason of dou2le
KeopardyK "he answer would be in the 766I4'7"I=C.
"o start with, the authority of the Court to dismiss a case for failure of
prosecution to appear cannot be denied. "he authority and extent of the
Court#s power in that regard is clearly recited in ection 3, 4ule /5 of the
Few 4ules of Court. "he rule readsE
ec. 3. 6ailure to prosecute. I 2hen plaintiff fails
to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his
action for an unreasona2le length of time, or to
comply with these rules or any order of the Court,
the action may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the Court#s own motion. "he
dismissal shall have the effect of an ad!udication
upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the
Court.
I" should be observed that under the aforeBuoted rule, the authority of the
court is broad and definite. It grants to the Court the power to dismiss even
upon its own motion. %'anila Aerald Publishing Co., Inc., vs. 4amos, **
Phil -,&. 'oreover, it reposes in the trial Court the discretion to so dismiss
or not. %People vs. Cloribel, // C47 *0-&.
2AC4C6<4C, premises considered, %the& motion %for reconsideration& at
bar is hereby (CFIC( for lack of merit.
< <4(C4C(.
In the present petition for %ertiorari, the olicitor :eneral contends that respondent !udge acted
without or in excess of his !urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed the
criminal case for failure to prosecute despite the fact that the public prosecutor#s absence was for a
valid cause. Ae also claims that since the dismissal of the case is void, the case may be reinstated
without placing the private respondents in double !eopardy.
In his comment, respondent !udge !ustifies the dismissal of Criminal Case Fo. $/-09 on the rights
of the accused to speedy trial
7
and against double !eopardy.
8
"he petition is impressed with merit.
In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should
carefully weigh the circumstances attending each case. "hey should balance the right of the
accused and the right of the tate to punish people who violate its penal laws. )oth the tate and
the accused are entitled to due process.
9
In the petition at bench, the records show that on 'arch //, /--/, the <ffice on 'uslim 7ffairs,
4egion IH, >amboanga City, thru 4egional (irector Aad!i alih I. Aayre, issued a 'emorandum
Circular in connection with CC 4esolution Fo. */$/955, dated Fovember /*, /-*/. %reE 4eBuest
for 4ecognition of 'uslim Aolidays in areas outside the 7utonomous 4egions&,
10
thusE
Pursuant to ections 9 and + of Presidential (ecree Fo. 9-/ dated
eptember /9, /-53, as amended by Presidential (ecree Fo. 399 dated
<ctober 98, /-53, the reBuest for authority to excuse from office 'uslim$
6ilipinos who are working with local or the national government in areas
throughout the Philippines outside of the autonomous regions, is hereby
approved in the manner herein providedE
/. (uring theE 6or CJ /--/
xxx xxx xxx
3& 'auluddin Fabi %)irthday
of Prophet 'ohammad 72& ept. 90
'uslims are free from office work the whole day of
these holidays without being marked absent.
xxx xxx xxx
,. In Re$ions ( and 16, as
authori@ed by the President,
offices andLor agencies of
the Fational and ;ocal
governments are closed
during the above$mentioned
'uslim ;egal Aolidays,
therefore' Musli"s and nonG
Musli"s are all ex%used
fro" orL.
It is apparent that the public prosecutor#s failure to attend the eptember 90, /--/ hearing was
due to his good faith and belief that said date was a 'uslin ;egal Aoliday. "o be sure, the
prosecutor could not be faulted for not working on that day since the Provincial Prosecutor#s <ffice
was closed pursuant to the aforeBuoted memorandum circular.
In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. 2hat offends
the right of the accused to speedy trial are unKustified postponements which prolong trial for an
unreasonable length of time. 2e reiterate our ruling in <onzales vs. 0andi$an2ayanE
11
. . . "he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,
is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious'
%apri%ious or oppressive delays; or when un!ustified postponements of trial
are asked for and secured; or when without cause or !ustifiable motive, a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried. CBually applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense are weighed, and such factors as length of
delay, the defendant#s assertion or non$assertion of his right and pre!udice
to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.
Criminal Case Fo. $/-09 was only postponed twice and for a period of less than two months. "he
first postponement was without any ob!ection from the private respondents. "he second
postponement was due to a valid cause.
"he facts in field in no way indicate that the prosecution of private respondents in Criminal Case
Fo. $/-09 had been unKustly delayed by the prosecution, hence, the respondent !udge should
have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case ."he settled rule is that the right
to speedy trial allows reasona2le continuance so as not to deprive the prosecution of its day in
court.
12
"hus, we held in =eople vs. 3avarro'
13
E
7 trial court may not ar2itrarily deny a timely and well$founded motion of the
prosecution for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acBuittal and that
such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set aside to give the tate
its day in court and an opportunity to prove the offense charged against the
accused and to prevent miscarriage of !ustice, espe%ially #en no
su2stantial ri$#t of t#e a%%used ould 2e preKudi%ed t#ere2y. %emphasis
supplied&
Private respondents cannot also invoke their right against double !eopardy. "he three %3& reBuisites
of double !eopardy areE %/& a first !eopardy must have attached prior to the second, %9& the first
!eopardy must have been validly terminated, and %3& a second !eopardy, must be for the same
offense as that in the first.
14
;egal !eopardy attaches onlyE %a& upon a valid indictment, %9& before a
competent court, %3& after arraignment %,& when a valid plea has been entered, and %+& when the
defendant was acBuitted or convicted , or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.
15
It is true that in an, unbroken line of cases,
16
we have held that dismissal of cases on the ground
of failure to prosecute is eBuivalent to an acBuittal that would bar further prosecution of the
accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated
on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. "hese cases are not applicable to the petition at
bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by
the tate. 6or this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double !eopardy.
17
IF =IC2 2AC4C<6, the instant petition for %ertiorari is :47F"C(. "he respondent !udge#s
eptember 90, /--/ <rder of dismissal and the <ctober ,, /--/ <rder denying the motion for
reconsideration of the prosecution, are 7FFG;;C( 7F( C" 7I(C. "he case is remanded to
the court or origin for further proceedings. Fo costs.
< <4(C4C(.
G.R. No. L-3580 Ma,c1 22, 1950
$ONR!DO $!RM%LO, petitioner$appellant,
vs.
&.% %OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S an) &.% $O"R& O- -IRS& INS&!N$% O-
RI8!L, respondent$appellees.
Fose A. -oKas for petitioner.
-irst Assistant 0oli%itor <eneral Ro2erto A. <ianzon and 0oli%itor Martiniano =. ?ivo for
respondents.
MOR!N, C.J.<
Petitioner Conrado 'elo was charged in the Court of 6irst Instance of 4i@al, on (ecember 95,
/-,-, with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon )en!amin <billo, with a kitchen
knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, reBuiring medical
attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual
labor for the same period of time. <n (ecember 9-, /-,-, at eight o#clock in the morning, the
accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at /0E/+ in the evening of the same day
)en!amin <billo died from his wounds. Cvidence of death was available to the prosecution only on
January 3, /-+0, and on the following day, January ,, /-+0, an amended information was filed
charging the accused with consummated homicide. "he accused filed a motion to Buash the
amended information alleging double !eopardy, motion that was denied by the respondent court;
hence, the instant petition for prohibition to en!oin the respondent court from further entertaining
the amended information.
)rushing aside technicalities of procedure and going into the substance of the issues raised, it may
readily be stated that amended information was rightly allowed to stand. 4ule /08, section /3, 9d
paragraph, is as followsE
If it appears at may time before the !udgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information
and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant
would not be placed thereby in double !eopardy, and may also reBuire the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Gnder this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the first information and order the filing
of a new one for the treason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter
did not place the accused in a second !eopardy for the same or identical offense.
DFo person shall be twice put in !eopardy of punishment for the same offense,D according to article
III, section / %90& of our constitution. "he rule of double !eopardy had a settled meaning in this
!urisdiction at the time our Constitution was promulgated. It meant that when a person is charged
with an offense and the case is terminated either by acBuittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical
offense. "his principle is founded upon the law of reason, !ustice and conscience. It is embodied in
the maxim of the civil law non 2is in ide", in the common law of Cngland, and undoubtedly in
every system of !urisprudence, and instead of having specific origin it simply always existed. It
found expression in the panish ;aw and in the Constitution of the Gnited tates and is now
embodied in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citi@en.
It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second !eopardy for
the sa"e offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that Dif an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acBuittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.D "he phrase sa"e offense, under the general rule, has
always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the
one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. "here is identity
between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. "his so called Dsame$evidence testD which was
found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the 4ules of Court in a clearer and more accurate
form. Gnder said 4ules there is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is
exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or
a frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information. %4ule //3, sec. -; G.. vs. ;im uco, // Phil., ,*,; G. . vs.
;edesma, 9- Phil., vs. 'artine@, ++ Phil., 8.& In this connection, an offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the
information constitute the latter. 7nd vice$versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included
in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the
latter %4ule //8, sec. +.& In other words, on who has been charged with an offense cannot be again
charged with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former.
D7s the :overnment cannot be with the highest, and then go down step to step, bringing the man
into !eopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither can it begin with the lowest and ascend
to the highest with precisely the same result.D %People vs. Cox, /05 'ich., ,3+, Buoted with
approval in G. . vs. ;im uco, // Phil., ,*,; see also G. . vs. ;edesma, 9- Phil., ,3/ and People
vs. 'artine@, ++ Phil., 8, /0.&
"his rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not in existence at the
time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. "hus,
where the accused was charged with physical in!uries and after conviction the in!ured person dies,
the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in !eopardy. "his is the
ruling laid down by the upreme Court of the Gnited tates in the Philippines case of (ia@ vs. G.
., 993 G. . ,,9, followed by this Court in =eople vs. Aspino, :. 4. Fo. ,8/93, 8- Phil., ,5/, and
these two cases are similar to the instant case. tating it in another form, the rule is that Dwhere
after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which
changes the character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a
new and distinct offenseD %/+ 7m. Jur., 88&, the accused cannot be said to be in second !eopardy if
indicated for the new offense.
"his is the meaning of Ddouble !eopardyD as intended by our constitution for was the one prevailing
in !urisdiction at the time the Constitution was promulgated, and no other meaning could have been
intended by our 4ules of Court.
7ccordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another
offense, for the purpose of determining the existence of double !eopardy, when both offenses were
in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was
then inexistence, no !eopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and conseBuently a
subseBuent charge for the same cannot constitute second !eopardy. )y the very nature of things
there can be no double !eopardy under such circumstance, and our 4ules of Court cannot be
construed to recogni@e the existence of a condition where such condition in reality does not exist.
:eneral terms of a statute or regulation should be so limited in their application as not to lead to
in!ustice, oppression, or an absurd conseBuence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that
exceptions have been intended to their language which would avoid results of this character. % .n
re 7llen, 9 Phil., 8,/.&
2hen the 4ules of Court were drafted, there was absolutely no intention of abandoning the ruling
laid down in the (ia@ case, and the proof of this is that although the said 4ules were approved on
(ecember /-3-, yet on January 30, /-,0, this Court decided the Cspino case reiterating therein
the (ia@ doctrine. Aad that doctrine been abandoned deliberately by the 4ules of Court as being
unwise, un!ust or obnoxious, logically it would have likewise been repudiated in the Cspino case by
reason if consistency and as a matter of !ustice to the accused, who should in conseBuence have
been acBuitted instead of being sentenced to a heavy penalty upon the basis of a doctrine that had
already been found to be wrong. "here was absolutely no reason to preclude this Court from
repealing the doctrine in the Cspino case, for as a mere doctrine it could be repealed at any time in
the decision of any case where it is invoked, is a clear proof that the mind of the Court, even after
the approval of the 4ules, was not against but in favor of said doctrine.
6or these reasons we expressly repeal the ruling laid down in =eople vs. +aroL, 53 Phil., 980, as
followed in =eople vs. ?illasis, ,8 <ff. :a@. %upp. to Fo. /&, p. 98*. uch ruling is not only
contrary to the real meaning of Ddouble !eopardyD as intended by the Constitution and by the 4ules
of Court but is also obnoxious to the administration of !ustice. If, in obedience to the mandate of the
law, the prosecuting officer files an information within six hours after the accused is arrested, and
the accused claiming his constitutional right to a speedy trial is immediately arraigned, and later on
new fact supervenes which, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a more serious
offense, under the "arok ruling, no way is open by which the accused may be penali@ed in
proportion to the enormity of his guilt. 6urthermore, such a ruling may open the way to suspicions
or charges of conclusion between the prosecuting officers and the accused, to the grave detriment
of public interest and confidence in the administration of !ustice, which cannot happen under the
(ia@ ruling.
)efore closing, it is well to observe that when a person who has already suffered his penalty for an
offense, is charged with a new and greater offense under the (ia@ doctrine herein reiterated, said
penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense.
6or all the foregoing, the petition is denied, and the respondent court may proceed to the trial of
the criminal case under the amended information. 2ithout costs.
G.R. No. L-41863 !/,i3 22, 1977
%OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, an) !SS&. RO#FL -IS$!L -. #ISI&!$ION, (R., petitioners,
vs.
.ONOR!'L% MID!N&!O L. !DIL, ,e0i)in6 (5)6e, $o5,t o2 -i,0t In0tance o2 I3oi3o,
',anc1 II, an) M!RG!RI&O -!M!, (R., respondents.
A%tin$ 0oli%itor <eneral Bu$o A. <utierrez' Fr.' Assistant 0oli%itor <eneral Ali%ia ?. 0e"pioG1iy
and 0oli%itor A"ado 1. Aquino for petitioners.
-a"a E Fi"enea for private respondent.

'!RR%DO, J:
Petition for %ertiorari; to set aside the orders of respondent !udge dated eptember 99, /-5+ and
<ctober /,, /-5+ dismissing Criminal Case Fo. +9,/ of the Court of 6irst Instance of Iloilo against
private respondent 'argarito 6ama, Jr., said dismissal being predicated on the ground of double
!eopardy, in view of the dismissal of a previous charge of slight physical in!uries against the same
respondent for the same incident by the 'unicipal Court of Janiuay, Iloilo in Criminal Case Fo.
333+, notwithstanding that in the information in the first$mentioned case, it was alleged that the
in!uries sustained by the offended party, aside from possibly reBuiring medical attendance from 8
to - days barring complicationsD, as was alleged in the information in Criminal Case Fo. 333+, had
left Da permanent sear and deform%ed& I the right face of %said offended party& 'iguel =ia!ar.D
"he first criminal complaint filed against respondent 6ama Jr. on 7pril /+, /-5+ %Case Fo. 333+&
was as followsE
"hat at about +E30 o#clock in the afternoon of 7pril /9, /-5+, at 7Buino
Foble@a t., 'unicipality of January, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the !urisdiction of this Aonorable Court the above$named accused,
while armed with a piece of stone, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, assault, attack and use personal violence upon one 'iguel
=ia!ar by then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting said 'iguel =ia!ar on
the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical in!uries which would have
reBuired and will reBuire medical attendance for a period from + to - days
barring complication as per medical certificate of the physician hereto
attached.
C<F"474J "< ;72. %Pp. -3$-,, 4ecord&
7rraigned on July 5, /-5+, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
'eanwhile, on June *, /-5+, complainant =ia!ar filed a letter$complaint with the Provincial 6iscal of
Iloilo charging 7tty. 7lfredo 6ama, 4aul 6ama and herein respondent 'argarito 6ama, Jr. with
serious physical in!uries arising from the same incident alleged in above Criminal Case Fo. 333+.
7fter conducting a preliminary investigation, under date of July 9*, /-5+, the 6iscal filed in the
Court of 6irst Instance of Iloilo an information, but only against respondent 6ama Jr., %Case Fo.
+9,/& for serious physical in!uries as followsE
"hat on or about 7pril /9, /-5+, in the 'unicipality of January, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the !urisdiction of this Court, the said accused,
with deliberate intent, and without any !ustifiable motive, armed with pieces
of stone did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and throw pieces of stone at 'iguel =ia!ar, hitting him on the lower
right eye which would heal from five %+& to nine %-& days barring
complications but leaving a permanent scar and deforming on the right face
of said 'iguel =ia!ar.
C<F"474J "< ;72. %Pp. -,$-+, 4ecord&
<n 7ugust /, /-5+, 6ama Jr. filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in Criminal Case Fo.
+9,/, claiming that since he was already charged and pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case Fo.
333+, he would be in double !eopardy, if Case Fo. +9,/ were to be prosecuted. "his motion was
opposed by the 6iscal and the Court reBuired both parties to file their respective memorandum on
the issue of double !eopardy.
In the meantime, the 6iscal after filing Case Fo. +9,/, sought the dismissal of Case Fo. 333+, but
the 'unicipal Court did not act on said motion. Instead, the case was set for hearing, and in view
of the postponements asked by the 6iscal in order to await the resolution of the issue of double
!eopardy in Case Fo. +9,/, on eptember //, /-5+, the following order was enteredE
Gnder our democratic and constituted system of government litigants
before our courts of !ustice, plaintiffs and defendants, complainants and
accused are entitled to the eBual protection of our laws. 'ore is an
accused, the trial of his case has been repeatedly postponed for several
times by this Court in the exercise of its sound discretion at the instance of
the prosecution. o, when this case was called for hearing on the afternoon
of eptember /, /-5+ the accused through counsel vigorously ob!ected to
another postponement and moved for the dismissal of the case against
him. "o grant another postponement as sought by the 6iscal against the
vehement, strong and vigorous ob!ection of the accused is to the mind of
the Court, no longer an exercise of sound discretion consistent with !ustice
and fairness but a clear and palpable abuse of discretion amounting to a
serious denial to, and a grave violation of, the right of the accused to a
speedy trial to which he is rightfully entitled to under ection /8 of 7rticle
I=, %)ill of 4ights& of the Philippine Constitution.
IF =IC2 <6 "AC 6<4C:<IF:, the above$entitled case is hereby ordered
dismissed. "he Cash )ond posted by the accused is hereby ordered
cancelled and released %Pp. -8$-5, 4ecord.&
2hereupon, on even date, 6ama Jr. filed an addendum to his memorandum in Case Fo. +9,/
inviting attention to the above dismissal order and reiterating his theory of double !eopardy. <n
eptember 99, /-5+, respondent court issued the impugned order sustaining the contention of
double !eopardy and dismissing Case Fo. +9,/. "he prosecution#s motion for reconsideration was
denied in the other assailed order of <ctober /,, /-5+, respondent !udge relying on the ruling laid
down in =eo. vs. 0ilva, , C47 -+.
In brief, what happened here was that when Case Fo. 333+ was filed in the inferior court of
January, the charge against 6ama Jr. had to be for slight physical in!uries only, because according
to the certification of the attending physician, the in!uries suffered by the offended party =ia!ar,
would reBuire medical attendance from + to - days only Dbaring complications.D Indeed, when the
complaint was filed on 7pril /+, /-5+, only three days had passed since the incident in which the
in!uries were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver in!ury or
conseBuence to be suffered by said offended party. Cvidently, it was only later, after Case Fo.
333+ had already been filed and the wound on the face of =ia!ar had already healed, that the
alleged deformity became apparent.
Fow, expert evidence is not needed for anyone to understand that the scar or deformity that would
be left by a wound on the face of a person cannot be pre$determined. <n the other hand, whether
or not there is actually a deformity on the face of =ia!ar is a Buestion of fact that has to be
determined by the trial court. "he only issue 2e are to resolve here is whether or not the additional
allegation of deformity in the information in Case Fo. +9,/ constitutes a supervening element
which should take this case out of the ruling in =eople vs. 0ilva cited by respondent court.
In ilva, there was no Buestion that the extent of the damage to property and physical in!uries
suffered by the offended parties therein were already existing and known when the prior minor
case was prosecuted, 2hat is controlling then in the instant case is Melo vs. =eople, *+ Phil. 588,
in which it was heldE
"his rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was
not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason
that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent "hus,
where the accused was charged with physical in!uries and after conviction
the in!ured dies, the charge of homicide against the same accused does not
put him twice in !eopardy.
o also is =eople vs. Tora%, ,9 C47, 930, to the following effectE
tated differently, if after the first. prosecution #a new fact supervenes on
which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the
crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, #the accused cannot be
said to be in second !eopardy if indicted for the new offense.
In =eople vs. >ulin$, /05 Phil. //9, 2e explained how a deformity may be considered as a
supervening fact. 4eferring to the decision in =eople vs. Manolon$, *+ Phil. *9-, 2e heldE
Fo finding was made in the first examination that the in!uries had caused
deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. 7s nothing was
mentioned in the first medical certificate about the deformity and the loss of
the use of the right hand, we presumed that such fact was not apparent or
could have been discernible at the time the first examination was made.
"he course %not the length& of the healing of an in!ury may not be
determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after the period of
healing has ended. "hat is the reason why the court considered that there
was a supervening fact occuring since the filing of the original information.
In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double !eopardy of private
respondent 6ama Jr., cannot hold. It was, therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for
respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case Fo. +9,/.
7CC<4(IF:;J, the orders of eptember 99, /-5+ and <ctober /,, /-5+ herein complained of
are hereby set aside and respondent court is ordered to proceed with the trial and !udgment
thereof according to law. Costs against private respondent 6ama Jr.
G.R. No. L-45129 Ma,c1 6, 1987
%OL% O- &.% .ILIIN%S, petitioner,
vs.
&.% .ONOR!'L% '%N(!MIN R%LO#!, in 1i0 ca/acity a0 ,e0i)in6 (5)6e o2 t1e $o5,t o2
-i,0t In0tance o2 'atan6a0, Secon) ',anc1, an) M!N"%L O"L%N$I!, respondents.

-%LI$I!NO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines seek to set aside the
orders of the respondent Judge of the Court of 6irst Instance of )atangas in Criminal Case Fo.
988, dated /9 7ugust /-58 and * Fovember /-58, respectively, Buashing an information for theft
filed against private respondent 'anuel <pulencia on the ground of double !eopardy and denying
the petitioner#s motion for reconsideration.
<n / 6ebruary /-5+, members of the )atangas City Police together with personnel of the
)atangas Clectric ;ight ystem, eBuipped with a search warrant issued by a city !udge of )atangas
City, searched and examined the premises of the <pulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold torage
owned and operated by the private respondent 'anuel <pulencia. "he police discovered that
electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from
the city government, and Darchitecturally concealed inside the walls of the buildingD 1owned by the
private respondent. "hese electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner
Ddesigned purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the
electric meter of the said electric .ice and cold storage1 plant.D
2
(uring the subseBuent
investigation, 'anuel <pulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation
of the electrical devices Din order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter.
3
<n 9, Fovember /-5+, an 7ssistant City 6iscal of )atangas City filed before the City Court of
)atangas City an information against 'anuel <pulencia for violation of <rdinance Fo. /, eries of
/-5,, )atangas City. 7 violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine
Dranging from 6ive Pesos %P+.00& to 6ifty Pesos %P+0.00& or imprisonment, which shall not exceed
thirty %30& days, or both, at the discretion of the court.D
4
"his information reads as followsE
"he undersigned, 7ssistant City 6iscal, accuses 'anuel <pulencia y ;at of
violation of ec. 3 %b& in relation to ec. 8 %d& and ec. /0 7rticle II, "itle I=
of ordinance Fo. /, . /-5,, with damage to the City :overnment of
)atangas, and penali@ed by the said ordinance, committed as followsE
"hat from Fovember, /-5, to 6ebruary, /-5+ at )atangas City, Philippines
and within the !urisdiction of this Aonorable Court, the above$named
accused, with intent to defraud the City :overnment of )atangas, without
proper authori@ation from any lawful andLor permit from the proper
authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
unauthori@ed installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or
decrease the consumption of electric fluid at the <pulencia Ice Plant
situated at Oumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such unathori@ed
installations of electric wirings and devices made by the accused, the City
:overnment of )atangas was damaged and pre!udiced in the total amount
of 6<4"J <FC "A<G7F(, IH"J "2< PC< 7F( IH"CCF
CCF"7=< %P,/,089./8& Philippine currency, covering the period from
Fovember /-5, to 6ebruary, /-5+, to the damage and pre!udice of the City
:overnment of )atangas in the aforestated amount of P,/,089./8,
Philippine currency.
"he accused 'anuel <pulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. <n 9 6ebruary /-58,
he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had
already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the
!urisdiction of the )atangas City Court to award. In an order dated 8 7pril /-58, the )atangas City
Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense
charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it
appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery
of the offense charged in 6ebruary /-5+.
6ourteen %/,& days later, on 90 7pril /-58, the 7cting City 6iscal of )atangas City filed before the
Court of 6irst Instance of )atangas, )ranch //, another information against 'anuel <pulencia, this
time for theft of electric power under 7rticle 30* in relation to 7rticle 30-, paragraph %/&, of the
4evised Penal Code. "his information read as followsE
"he undersigned 7cting City 6iscal accuses 'anuel <pulencia y ;at of the
crime of theft, defined and penali@ed by 7rticle 30*, in relation to 7rticle
30-, paragraph %/& of the 4evised Penal Code, committed as followsE
"hat on, during, and between the month of Fovember, /-5,, and the 9/st
day of 6ebruary, /-5+, at Oumintang, lbaba, )atangas City, Philippines,
and within the !urisdiction of this Aonorable Court, the above$named
accused, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
)atangas Clectric ;ight ystem, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and appropriate electric current valued in the total
amount of 6<4"J <FC "A<G7F(, IH"J "2< PC< 7F( IH"CCF
CCF"7=< %P,/,089./8& Philippine Currency, to the damage and
pre!udice of the said )atangas Clectric ;ight ystem, owned and operated
by the City :overnment of )atangas, in the aforementioned sum of
P,/,089./8.
"he above information was docketed as Criminal Case Fo. 988 before the Court of 6irst Instance
of )atangas, )ranch II. )efore he could be arraigned thereon, 'anuel <pulencia filed a 'otion to
?uash, dated + 'ay /-58, alleging that he had been previously acBuitted of the offense charged in
the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against
double !eopardy. )y <rder dated /8 7ugust /-58, the respondent Judge granted the accused#s
'otion to ?uash and ordered the case dismissed. "he gist of this <rder is set forth in the following
paragraphsE
"he only Buestion here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be
properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to Buash.
In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges that the
prosecution Daccuses 'anuel <pulencia y ;at of violation of ec. 3%b& in
relation to ec. 8%d& and ec. /0 7rticle II, "itle I= of <rdinance Fo. /, s.
/-5,, it# da"a$e to t#e ,ity <overn"ent of >atan$as' et%. D %Cmphasis
supplied&. "he first case, as it appears, was not simply one of illegal
electrical connections. It also covered an amount of P,/,089./8 which the
accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to defraud, deprived the city
government of )atangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric
installations only, it could have alleged illegal connections which were done
at one instance on a particular date between Fovember, /-5,, to 6ebruary
9/, /-5+. )ut as the information states Dt#at fro" 3ove"2er' 1()* to
-e2ruary 1()Q at )atangas City, Philippines, and within the !urisdiction of
this Aonorable Court, thea2oveGna"ed a%%used it# intent to defraud t#e
,ity <overn"ent of >atan$as' it#out proper authori@ation from any lawful
andLor permit from the proper authorities, did t#en and t#ere ilfully'
unlafully and feloniously "aLe unaut#orized installations of ele%tri%
irin$s and devi%es' etc.D %Cmphasis supplied&, it was meant to include the
P ,/,089./8 which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the city
government. "he information could not have meant that from Fovember
/-5, to 9/ 6ebruary /-5+, he had daily committed unlawful installations.
2hen, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before the
City Court, he had already been exposed, or he felt he was exposed to
conseBuences of what allegedly happened between Fovember /-5, to
6ebruary 9/, /-5+ which had allegedly resulted in defrauding the City of
)atangas in the amount of P ,/,089./8. %Cmphases and parentheses in the
original&
7 'otion for 4econsideration of the above$Buoted <rder filed by the petitioner was denied by the
respondent Judge in an <rder dated /* Fovember /-58.
<n / (ecember /-58, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed in this Court by
the 7cting City 6iscal of )atangas City on behalf of the People.
"he basic premise of the petitioner#s position is that the constitutional protection against double
!eopardy is protection against a second or later !eopardy of conviction for the sa"e offense. "he
petitioner stresses that the first information filed before the City Court of )atangas City was one for
unlawful or unauthori@ed installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of
an ordinance of the City :overnment of )atangas. <nly two elements are needed to constitute an
offense under this City <rdinanceE %/& that there was such an installation; and %9& no authority
therefor had been obtained from the uperintendent of the )atangas City Clectrical ystem or the
(istrict Cngineer. "he petitioner urges that the relevant terms of the City <rdinance I which read
as followsE
ection 3.$Connection and Installation
%a& x x x
%b& "he work and installation in the houses and building and their
connection with the Clectrical ystem shall be done either by the employee
of the system duly authori@ed by its uperintendent or by persons adept in
the matter duly authori@ed by the (istrict Cngineer. 7pplicants for electrical
service permitting the works of installation or connection with the system to
be undertaken by the persons not duly authori@ed therefor shall be
considered guilty of violation of the ordinance.
would show thatE
"he principal purpose for %sic& such a provision is to ensure that electrical
installations on residences or buildings be done by persons duly authori@ed
or adept in the matter, to avoid fires and accidents due to faulty electrical
wirings. It is primarily a regulatory measure and not intended to punish or
curb theft of electric fluid which is already covered by the 4evised Penal
Code.
5
"he gist of the offense under the City <rdinance, the petitioner#s argument continues, is the
installing of electric wiring and devices without authority from the proper officials of the city
government. "o constitute an offense under the city ordinance, it is not essential to establish
any "ens rea on the part of the offender generally speaking, nor, more specifically, an intent to
appropriate and steal electric fluid.
In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under 7rticle 30* of the 4evised Penal Code
filed before the Court of 6irst Instance of )atangas in Criminal Case Fo. 988 has Buite different
essential elements. "hese elements areE
/. "hat personal property be taken;
9. "hat the personal property %taken& belongs to another;
3. "hat the taking be done with intent of gain;
,. "hat the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
+. "hat the taking be accomplished without violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things.
6
"he petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of electricity can be effected even
without illegal or unauthori@ed installations of any kind by, for instance, any of the following meansE
/. "urning back the dials of the electric meter;
9. 6ixing the electric meter in such a manner that it will not register the
actual electrical consumption;
3. Gnder$reading of electrical consumption; and
,. )y tightening the screw of the rotary blade to slow down the rotation of
the same.
7
"he petitioner concludes thatE
"he unauthori@ed installation punished by the ordinance .of )atangas City1
is not t#e sa"e as theft of electricity .under the 4evised Penal Code1; that
the se%ond offense is not an atte"pt to commit the first or afrustration
t#ereof and that the second offense is not ne%essarily in%luded in t#e
offense %#ar$ed in t#e first inforrnation
8
"he above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct. "his is clear both from the
express terms of the constitutional provision involved I which reads as followsE
Fo person shall be twice put in !eopardy of punishment for t#e sa"e
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acBuittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act. %Cmphasis supplied; 7rticle I= %99&, /-53 Constitution&
9
and from our case law on this point. 10 "he basic difficulty with the petitioner#s position is that it
must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of 7rticle I= %99& of the /-53
Constitution, but rather under t#e se%ond senten%e of t#e sa"e se%tion. "he first sentence of
7rticle I= %99& sets forth the general ruleE the constitutional protection against double !eopardy
is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense
charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based
upon the same act or set of acts. "he second sentence of 7rticle I= %99& embodies an exception to
the general propositionE the constitutional protection, against double !eopardy is available although
the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subseBuently
under a national statute such as the 4evised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from
the same act or set of acts. "his was made clear sometime ago in Tap vs. Lutero. 11
In Tap, petitioner 'anuel Jap was charged in Criminal Case Fo. /80+, of the 'unicipal Court of
Iloilo City, with violation of 7rticle /, of <rdinance Fo. 99, eries of /-+/, in relation to <rdinance
Fo. /+, eries of /-+,, of the City of Iloilo. "he information charged him with having Dwilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drive.n1 and operate.d1D an automobile I Drecklessly and without
reasonable caution thereby endangering other vehicles and pedestrians passing in said street.D
"hree months later, Jap was again charged in Criminal Case Fo. /8,,3 of the same 'unicipal
Court, this time with serious physical in!uries through reckless imprudence. "he information
charged him with violation of the 4evised 'otor =ehicle ;aw %7ct Fo. 3--9 as amended by
4epublic 7ct Fo. +*5& committed by driving and operating an automobile in a reckless and
negligent manner and as a result thereof inflicting in!uries upon an unfortunate pedestrian. Jap
moved to Buash the second information upon the ground that it placed him twice in !eopardy of
punishment for the same act. "his motion was denied by the respondent municipal !udge.
'eantime, another municipal !udge had acBuitted Jap in Criminal Case Fo. /80+,. Jap then
instituted a petition for certiorari in the Court of 6irst Instance of Iloilo to set aside the order of the
respondent municipal !udge. "he Court of 6irst Instance of Iloilo having reversed the respondent
municipal !udge and having directed him to desist from continuing with Criminal Case Fo. /8,,3,
the respondent Judge brought the case to the upreme Court for review on appeal. In affirming the
decision appealed from and holding that the constitutional protection against double !eopardy was
available to petitioner Jap, then 7ssociate Justice and later Chief Justice 4oberto Concepcion
wroteE
"o begin with, the crime of damage to property through reckless driving I
with which (ia@ stood charged in the court of first instance I is a violation
of the 4evised Penal Code %third paragraph of 7rticle 38+&, not the
7utomobile ;aw %7ct Fo. 3--9, as amended by 4epublic 7ct Fo. +*5&.
Aence, (ia@ was not twice accused of a violation of the sa"e la.
econdly, reckless driving and certain crimes committed through reckless
driving are punishable under different provisions of said 7utomobile ;aw.
Aence I from the view point of Criminal ;aw, as distinguished from
political or Constitutional ;aw I they constitute, strictly, different offenses,
although under certain conditions, one offense may include the other, and,
accordingly, once placed in !eopardy for one, the plea of double !eopardy
may be in order as regards the other, as in the (ia@ case. %Cmphases in
the original&
"hirdly, our )ill of 4ights deals with to %9& kinds of double !eopardy. "he
first sentence of clause 90, section /, 7rticle III of the Constitution, ordains
that Dno person shall be twice put in !eopardy of punishment for the
sameoffense.D %Cmphasis in the original& "he second sentence of said
clause provides that Dif an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acBuittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.D +#us' t#e first senten%e pro#i2its dou2le
Keopardy of punis#"ent for t#e sa"e offense' #ereas t#e se%ond
%onte"plates dou2le Keopardy of punis#"ent for t#e sa"e a%t. Mnder t#e
first senten%e' one "ay 2e ti%e put in Keopardy of punis#"ent of t#e sa"e
a%t provided t#at #e is %#ar$ed it# different offenses' or t#e offense
%#ar$ed in one %ase is not in%luded in or does not in%lude' t#e %ri"e
%#ar$ed in t#e ot#er %ase. +#e se%ond senten%e applies' even if t#e
offenses %#ar$ed are not t#e sa"e' oin$ to t#e fa%t t#at one %onstitutes a
violation of an ordinan%e and t#e ot#er a violation of a statute. .f t#e to
%#ar$es are 2ased on one and t#e sa"e a%t %onvi%tion or a%quittal under
eit#er t#e la or t#e ordinan%e s#all 2ar a prose%ution under t#e
ot#er. 12 Incidentally, such conviction or acBuittal is not indispensable to
sustain the plea of double !eopardy of punishment for the same offense. o
long as !eopardy has attached under one of the informations charging said
offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same
offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acBuittal in either
case.
"he issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the
information in case Fo. /8,,3, petitioner could I if he failed to plead
double !eopardy I be convicted of the same act charged in case Fo.
/80+,, in which he has already been acBuitted. "he information in case Fo.
/80+, alleges, substantially, that on the date and in the place therein
stated, petitioner herein had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven and
operated Drecklessly and without reasonable cautionD an automobile
described in said information. Gpon the other hand, the information in case
Fo. /8,,3, similarly states that, on the same date and in the same place,
petitioner drove and operated the aforementioned automobile in a Dreckless
and negligent manner at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the
4evised 'otor =ehicle ;aw %7ct Fo. 3--9&, as amended by 4epublic 7ct
Fo. +*5, and existing city ordinances.D "hus, if the theories mentioned in
the second information were not established by the evidence, petitioner
could be convicted in case Fo. /8,,3 of the very same violation of
municipal ordinance charged in case Fo. /80+,, unless he pleaded double
!eopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred eventually sustaining
the theory of petitioner herein.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penali@ed either by different sections of the
same statute or by different statutes, the important inBuiry relates to the identity of offenses
%#ar$e/ the constitutional protection against double !eopardy is available only where an Identity is
shown to exist between the earlier and the subseBuent offenses charged. In contrast, where one
offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penali@ed by a statute, the
critical inBuiry is to the identity of t#e a%ts which the accused is said to have committed and which
are alleged to have given rise to the two offensesE the constitutional protection against double
!eopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense
under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense
charged under a statute.
"he Buestion may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different
sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the
situation where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a
national statute. If the second sentence of the double !eopardy provision had not been written into
the Constitution, conviction or acBuittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. 7n offense penali@ed by
municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. "he two offenses
would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different rule$making
authorities I though one be subordinate to the other I and the plea of double !eopardy would
never lie. "he discussions during the /-3,$/-3+ Constitutional Convention show that the second
sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against
double !eopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence. 13
"he Buestion of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential
elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective
legislative definitions of the offenses involved. "he Buestion of Identity of the acts which are
claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must
be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. 2hen
the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and
space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those
acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or
negligence, such acts may be appropriately characteri@ed as an integral whole capable of giving
rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments %a municipal ordinance and a
national statute&.
In Tap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo City <rdinance and
serious physical in!uries through reckless imprudence under the 4evised 'otor =ehicle ;aw as
derived from the same act or sets of acts I that is, the operation of an automobile in a reckless
manner. "he additional technical element of serious physical in!uries related to the physical
conseBuences of the operation of the automobile by the accused, i.e., the impact of the automobile
upon the body of the offended party. Clearly, such conseBuence occurred in the same occasion
that the accused operated the automobile %recklessly&. "he moral element of negligence
permeated the acts of the accused throughout that occasion.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frameE from Fovember /-5,
to 6ebruary /-5+. (uring this period, the accused 'anuel <pulencia installed or permitted the
installation of electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or
authori@ation from the municipal authorities. "he accused conceded that he effected or permitted
such unauthori@ed installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power bill. "his corrupt
intent was thus present from the very moment that such unauthori@ed installation began. "he
immediate physical effect of the unauthori@ed installation was the inward flow of electric current
into <pulencia#s ice plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other
words, the DtakingD of electric current was integral with the unauthori@ed installation of electric
wiring and devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double
!eopardy to a subseBuent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute
literalness. "he Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute IdentityE the first and
second offenses may be regarded as the Dsame offenseD where the second offense necessarily
includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. 14 "hus, for the constitutional plea
of double !eopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need
be present in the technical definition of the second offense. "he law here seeks to prevent
harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different
from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of
technical elements. 7s 7ssociate Justice and later Chief Justice 4icardo Paras cautioned
in =eople vs. del ,ar"en et al.' ** Phil. +/ %/-+/&E
2hile the rule against double !eopardy prohibits prosecution for the same
offense, it seems elementary that an accused should be shielded against
being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single
act. ;t#erise' an unlaful a%t or o"ission "ay $ive use to several
prose%utions dependin$ upon t#e a2ility of t#e prose%utin$ offi%er to
i"a$ine or %on%o%t as "any offenses as %an 2e Kustified 2y said a%t or
o"ission' 2y si"ply addin$ or su2tra%tin$ essential ele"ents. Mnder t#e
t#eory of appellant' t#e %ri"e of rape "ay 2e %onverted into a %ri"e of
%oer%ion' 2y "erely alle$in$ t#at 2y for%e and inti"idation t#e a%%used
prevented t#e offended $irl fro" re"ainin$ a vir$in. %** Phil. at +3;
emphases supplied&
)y the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused
by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be
segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under
municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the )atangas City Court of the information for violation
of the )atangas City <rdinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed,
amounts to an acBuittal of the accused of that offense. Gnder 7rticle *- of the 4evised Penal
Code, Dprescription of the crimeD is one of the grounds for Dtotal extinction of criminal liability.D
Gnder the 4ules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to Buash based on prescription is a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense. 15
It is not without reluctance that we deny the people#s petition for certiorari and mandamus in this
case. It is difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his
profit by stealing from the community. 'anuel <pulencia is able to escape criminal punishment
because an 7ssistant City 6iscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an
offense which he should have known had already prescribed. 2e are, however, compelled by the
fundamental law to hold the protection of the right against double !eopardy available even to the
private respondent in this case.
"he civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. )ecause no reservation of the right to file
a separate civil action was made by the )atangas City electric light system, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal
action both before the City Court of )atangas City and the Court of 6irst Instance of )atangas. "he
extinction of criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double !eopardy does not
carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In the present case, as
we noted earlier, 16 accused 'anuel <pulencia freely admitted during the police investigation
having stolen electric current through the installation and use of unauthori@ed elibctrical
connections or devices. 2hile the accused pleaded not guilty before the City Court of )atangas
City, he did not deny having appropriated electric power. Aowever, there is no evidence in the
record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated by 'anuel <pulencia, the
criminal informations having been dismissed both by the City Court and by the Court of 6irst
Instance %from which dismissals the )atangas City electric light system could not have
appealed17& before trial could begin. 7ccordingly, the related civil action which has not been
waived expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of 6irst Instance of )atangas City
for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power appropriated and converted
by 'anuel <pulencia and rendition of !udgment conformably with such evidence.
2AC4C6<4C, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is (CFIC(. ;et the civil action for related
civil liability be remanded to the Court of 6irst Instance of )atangas City for further proceedings as
indicated above. Fo pronouncement as to costs.
< <4(C4C(.